Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Submitted to:
Professor Shaphali Gupta
Marketing
MDI, Gurgaon
Presented by:
Group-3 Section-A NMP-29
Abhijeet Sharma
Anupam Kumar
Ashish Sharma
Bhupesh Chawla
Debraj Sinha Roy
Neerja Malik
Abstract
29NMP01
29NMP13
29NMP17
29NMP21
29NMP23
29NMP47
One of the key determinants of leverage is firm size. Larger firms are usually more
established in their markets, diversified and less likely to fail. Therefore, it has been
argued that size can be seen as an inverse measure of bankruptcy risk. The aim of
this project is to investigate the relationship between firm size and the capital
structure of Indian small and medium-sized enterprises. Most of previous studies
have shown a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. But, several
empirical studies found negative relationship between firm size and leverage.
Research indicates negative relationship between firm size and leverage. But, firm
size differently affect short-term and long-term leverage. The relationship between
firm size and short-term leverage is negative but not statistically significant in all
observed years. The relationship between firm size and long-term leverage is
positive in all observed years but is not statistically significant, except one year.
Trade-off theory predicts that larger firms tend to be more diversified, and hence
less risky and less prone to bankruptcy. Further, if maintaining control is important,
then it is likely that firms achieve larger size through debt rather than equity
financing. Thus, control considerations also support positive correlation between
size and debt. However, it can also be argued that size serves as proxy for
availability of information that outsiders have about the firm. From pecking order
point of view, less information asymmetry makes equity issuance more appealing to
the firm. Thus, a negative link between size and leverage is expected.
Introduction
Background
Classical Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) asserts irrelevance of debt-to-equity ratio for firm
value. However, complete markets, no taxes, absence of transaction and bankruptcy costs, the
theory about the debt irrelevance is hardly realistic. Later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) relaxed
a no-tax assumption and developed a theory about tax benefits of debt. That paper gave rise to a
serious academic discussion on the theory of capital structure.
There are two main benefits of debt for a company. The first one is the tax shield: interest payments
usually are not taxable, hence the debt can increase the value of the firm. Another benefit is that debt
disciplines. Managers use free cash flows of the company to invest in projects, to pay dividends, or to
hold on cash balance. But if the firm is not committed to some fixed payments such as interest
expenses, managers could have incentives to waste excess free cash flows. That is why, in order to
discipline managers, shareholders attract debt. Besides, it is a popular practice in debt agreements
between banks and borrowers to introduce some financial covenants for firms (minimal level of the
free cash flow, debt-to-EBITDA ratio, EBITDA-to-interest expenses ratio etc.). Companies cannot
break these covenants, and hence are bound to be more effective. In addition, the law usually
guarantees a right of partial information disclosure to the companys debt holders, which serves
as additional managers supervision tool. As a result, actions of managers become more
transparent, and they have more incentives to create higher value for the owners. This is the
essence of Free Cash Flow Theory of capital structure.
Extravagant investments is one of the ways in which managers may not behave in the owners
best interests. This is called hazard problem. A standard example is huge exploration spending
by oil industry managers in the late 1970s, when it was cheaper to buy oil on the Wall Street than
to drill for it or to pump it. Besides, managers of the oil industry companies invested a large part
of their excess cash into non-core activities (Jensen, 1988). Blanchard et al. (1994) showed that
managers of firms who received cash windfalls often spent them on acquisitions of unrelated
firms and other activities which did not create any value for shareholders. These and other facts
prove that conflict of interest between managers and owners exists.
The cost hypothesis predicts that higher level of debt is associated with better firm performance.
Agency costs are costs which arise in agency conflict. There are several mechanisms through
which high leverage may reduce agency costs and as a result increase firm value:
1. Monitoring activities of debt holders
2. Managers fear of firm bankruptcy and liquidation, following misuse of funds, which may
Undoubtedly, there are other ways for shareholders to discipline managers. For example, owners
may commit managers to pay dividends, leaving less free cash flow at managers disposal. As a
result, firms with clear separation of managers and owners should pay higher dividends
.However, in this study we concentrate only on debt as a disciplining mechanism.
Since the value of the firm is directly related to its performance (the better a firm performs, the
higher its value is), economists study the relationship between leverage and firm performance in
order to check theory . Empirical studies have not reached an agreement about the relationship
between leverage and firm performance yet. Coricelli et al (2011) in their EBRD study of Central and
Eastern European companies showed hump-shaped relationship between the level of debt and
productivity growth. At the same time, Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) found significantly negative
effect of level of debt on firm performance. results even in basic facts about capital structure.
Therefore, an empirical evidence of the relationship between leverage and firm performance is still
not conclusive.
Firms with lower expected cash flows find it more costly to attract new debt. So, when the firm
attracts new debt, it commits itself to future interest payments and signals about its stable
financial position and ability to make these payments in the future.
There could also be inverse causality between firm performance and leverage. According
to efficiency-risk hypothesis, higher efficiency of the firm reduces expected costs of bankruptcy, and
such firms may attract more debt. On the other hand, according to franchise value hypothesis,
more efficient firms would like to protect economic rent derived from their efficiency, and might
choose lower leverage.
Moreover, we may expect, that relations between leverage and firm performance will not be
instantaneous and time lags could be present. Pecking order theory confirms this expectation and
explicitly states that past rather than current firm performance could have an effect on capital
structure.
In particular, we will explore the following questions: Does higher leverage results in better firm
performance? Is debt a disciplinary mechanism of the decrease of agency costs and thus in the
improvement of firm performance.
Understanding the relationship between the company debt and value could provide useful insights for
investors for two reasons. Firstly, shareholders would be able to target optimal debt-to-equity ratios,
which may improve discipline of the managers, but does not overburden a firm with extraneous
interest payments. Secondly, debt holders would have a tool in hand to identify overleveraged and
underleveraged firms. This may help them allocate their funds more effectively.
Increase in leverage
Decrease in leverage
Value of
Increase (since K0 is decreased)
firm
Leverage means using borrowed funds. In above table since you are
borrowing funds so that must be cheaper. This is assumed.
6. Steps involved in calculating the weighted average cost of capital under Net
income approach:
a. MV of equity share =
b. MV of debt =
Net income
Ke
Interest
rate of interest
t
Total Value of
constan Since K0 is content
firm
t
Decrease in leverage, would have same consequences expect that K e will
decrease.
8. Steps for calculating the Ke:
a. Total value of firm =
NOI
K0
interest
interest rate
Net income
Value of equity
Net incomeinterest
Value of equity
Traditional Approach
9. Traditional approach:
a. Traditional approach is intermediate of NI and NOI approach. Since it
considers both the approaches.
b. The calculation and steps involved in this approach are same as NI
approach.
Modigilani and Millar approach
10.MM approach:
a. According to this approach, K0 is independent of its capital structure.
That means by changing the debt equity ratio, a firm cannot change its
value and cost of capital.
b. If two firms are identical in all aspects except for the degree of
leverage, firms will have different MV so the arbitrage will start.
c. Assumptions:
i. There is perfect capital market.
ii. Homogenous risk class.
iii. No taxes
iv. All investors have same expectations.
v. Company has 100% payout ratio.
d. Criticism:
i. There is no perfect market.
ii. Arbitrage may fail.
iii. Existence of corporate tax
Theory
Modigliani and Miller
(1963)
Relationship Causality
Positive
Trade-off
Positive
Pecking-Order
Negative
Free-cash-flow
Positive
Company Background:
TCS:
Type
Public
Industry
IT services, IT consulting
Founded
1968
Founder
J. T. Tata, F. C.bdjgkc
Headquarters
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Services
outsourcing services
Revenue
Operating
income
Profit
Total assets
Total equity
Number of
employees
Parent
CTS:
Type
Public
Industry
IT services, IT consulting
Predecessor
Founded
Founder
Headquarters
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Services
IT, business
consulting andoutsourcing services
Revenue
Operating income
Profit
Total assets
Total equity
Number of
employees
WIPRO:
Type
Industry
Public
Founded
IT services, IT consulting
29-12-1945,(Mumbai, Maharas
htra)
Founder
Headquarters
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Azim
Premji (Chairman),Abidali
Neemuchwala (CEO)
Services
Revenue
Operating income
Profit
Total assets
Total equity
Owner
Number of employees
3i Infotech
Type
Public company
Industry
Technology services, IT
services,Outsourcing
Founded
1993
Area served
World wide
Key people
Padmanabhan Iyer,
Executive Director & Chief
Executive Officer
Revenue
1,344.00
crore(US$200 million)
Net income
Number of employees
over 200
ROLTA:
Type
Public company
Industry
Technology services,Outsourcing
Founded
1989
Headquarters
Mumbai, India
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Revenue
Number of employees
~1700
36,794.57
million (US$550 million) (2015)
GEO:
Type
Public
Industry
Predecessor
Founded
Founder
George Zoley
Headquarters
Area served
USA,Australia,South Africa, UK
Key people
Revenue
Operating income
Net income
Total assets
Total equity
Number of
employees
Financial
Year
Cognizant
Technology
Solutions(CTS
)
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
865367.2
725759.8
503173.0
357316.9
292498.8
204886.3
155320.0
115581.7
72456.8
58687.9
-39.47
-27.61
-61.08
-98.99
-61.53
-62.11
-52.74
-38.80
-45.66
-60.38
GEO Is.
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
7944.0
7525.0
6595.5
5662.5
4924.5
3481.3
3148.1
3447.7
4009.4
3912.8
-31.01
-22.34
-33.53
-24.40
-23.63
-7.18
-7.34
31.95
9.66
26.62
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
13425.3
26553.0
38032.2
37749.8
40645.4
42517.2
38860.0
38576.5
23585.6
208.46
3i Infotech
Total
Assets
Net Debt To
Equity
431.34
228.90
162.80
142.58
200.17
186.24
133.89
2006
13491.6
115.89
Rolta
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
31595.0
22556.9
9797.6
8353.2
10134.1
9372.2
9090.3
11907.4
12227.2
5470.0
209.23
227.80
208.75
131.92
70.28
71.94
57.46
13.31
-10.81
-11.43
Tata
Consultancy
Services(TCS)
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
893843.8
736608.8
671307.8
521678.7
413304.9
332607.5
273942.2
226373.4
175653.1
131861.5
-41.34
-37.41
-30.55
-18.89
-21.34
-17.45
-37.57
-23.28
-26.85
-22.86
WIPRO
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
724921.0
600033.0
502304.0
439730.0
436001.0
371443.0
329928.0
278511.0
216340.0
141550.0
-22.80
-32.70
-35.71
-31.52
-21.20
-23.97
-1.20
-6.08
4.73
-50.24
Results:
A. Correlation Results of Capital Structure & Assets for Wipro:
Correlations
Wipro Total
Assets
To Equity
Pearson Correlation
-.189
Sig. (2-tailed)
.601
N
Wipro Net Debt To Equity
Pearson Correlation
10
10
-.189
Sig. (2-tailed)
.601
10
10
TCS Total
Assets
To Equity
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
TCS Net Debt To Equity
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-.569
.086
10
10
-.569
.086
10
10
Correlations
CTS Total
Assets
To Equity
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.454
N
CTS Net Debt To Equity
.268
10
10
Pearson Correlation
.268
Sig. (2-tailed)
.454
10
10
Correlations
Pearson Correlation
GEO Total
Assets
To Equity
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GEO Net Debt To Equity
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-.728*
.017
10
10
-.728
.017
10
10
Correlations
3i Net Debt To
Equity
3i Net Debt To Equity
3i Total Assets
Pearson Correlation
.283
Sig. (2-tailed)
.460
N
3i Total Assets
Pearson Correlation
.283
Sig. (2-tailed)
.460
10
Correlations
Pearson Correlation
Rolta Total
Assets
To Equity
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Rolta Net Debt To Equity
.628
.052
10
10
Pearson Correlation
.628
Sig. (2-tailed)
.052
10
10