S. Hrg.

1111104

NINE YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 22, 2010

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs

(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON

63832 PDF

2011

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 5121800; DC area (202) 5121800
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri
JON TESTER, Montana
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director
CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member
SEAMUS A. HUGHES, Professional Staff Member
BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs
LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel
TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk
PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk

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CONTENTS
Opening statements:
Senator Lieberman ...........................................................................................
Senator Collins .................................................................................................
Senator McCain ................................................................................................
Senator Brown ..................................................................................................
Senator Levin ....................................................................................................
Senator Akaka ..................................................................................................
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman ...........................................................................................
Senator Collins .................................................................................................

Page

1
3
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21
25
27
39
41

WITNESSES
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .
Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice .........................................................................................
Hon. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence ..............................................................
ALPHABETICAL ORDER

OF

5
8
10

WITNESSES

Leiter, Hon. Michael E.:

Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................

10
73
8
66
5
44

APPENDIX
Document for the Record submitted by Secretary Napolitano in response
to Senator McCains request ...............................................................................
Responses for the Record from:
Secretary Napolitano ........................................................................................
Mr. Mueller .......................................................................................................
Mr. Leiter ..........................................................................................................

59
83
114
131

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NINE YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room
SD342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Burris,
Kaufman, Collins, McCain, Ensign, and Brown.
COMMITTEE

ON

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good

morning. And in particular, thanks to Secretary Janet Napolitano,
Director Robert Mueller, and Director Leiter for being here.
This is an important hearing in the year of this Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. It is our third annual
hearing at which we invite the three leaders of the three most involved and important agencies of our Federal Government in protecting to discuss where we are in the terrorist threat to our homeland, how has it evolved, and how have our defenses evolved
against it. And it gives us an annual report, a snapshot picture, of
where we are and what the facts of the past year say to us about
what we can do together to continue to improve the security of the
American people post-September 11, 2001.
Last week, we marked the ninth anniversary of the September
11, 2001, attacks, and we paid homage to the 3,000 people who
were murdered that day by Islamist extremist terrorists.
I was struck yesterday by reading a Gallup poll in one of the
newspapers that showed a significant decrease in concern about
terrorism among the American people. Now, this is understandable, particularly because of the stress that the current economic
conditions have put so many American families under.
But as the three witnesses know very well, the threat is still all
too real. Our Committee knows that as well. It is our job and yours
to be focused on protecting our homeland and our people from violent extremists and terrorists no matter what the state of public
opinion is about it at the moment, and that is why, of course, we
are so happy and grateful that you are here today.
The tragedy of September 11, 2001, is a daily reality for the
three of you and the tens of thousands of men and women who
work with you every single day to ensure that such an attack never
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2
happens again. In some sense, the three of you oversee a mighty
force of literally hundreds of thousands of people that have been reorganized or augmented in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,
when the Islamist extremist terrorists declared war on us and we
responded, taking us into two active fields of combat, of course,
first in Afghanistan and the Iraq, but involving us on unconventional battlefields all across the world, and quite significantly,
which is the focus of our attention today, our homeland and the extent to which this enemy, unlike any we have ever faced, threatens
our security, our way of life, our freedom, and is prepared to do in
extraordinarily inhumane ways right here at home.
Let me just share three observations about what I see over the
last year, and I know that you will respond to this and other things
in your opening statements.
Since our last threat assessment hearing a year ago, it is clear
that there has been a marked increase in Islamist terrorist attacks
against us here at home. Most incidents, thank God and thanks to
you and all the work with you, have been thwarted, some really
with extraordinary, almost miraculous work, taking a shred of evidence, building on it, developing it, and finding the people who
were planning the attack, and stopping them, capturing them before they did.
But the fact that I know you know very well is that three of the
attempted attacks in the last year by terrorists managed to break
through our defenses, very different kinds of attacks; first, the Fort
Hood shooting last November, the Christmas Day attack, and the
Times Square bombing attempt. And, of course, in the Fort Hood
case, 13 people died at the hands of Nidal Hasan. Fortunately, in
the Christmas Day attempt and in Times Square, the explosives
failed in both cases and no one was hurt.
These attacks and others show the full range of threats we now
face from lone wolves, if you will, freely-operating terrorists like
Hasan, who, nonetheless, was motivated by terrorist agitators from
abroad to form homegrown terror cells, such as the so-called Raleigh 7 or the Fort Dix plotters, or to become inexperienced but potentially deadly operatives, including American citizens directly
trained by al-Qaeda or its affiliates around the world, as Faisal
Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, and Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber.
So the first fact that comes out at me is that there is an increased pace of attacks against our homeland in this war in which
we are involved, most thwarted, but three broke through. Second,
since 2009, at least 63 American citizens have been charged or convicted for terrorism or related crimes. Now, to me, just stepping
back and accumulating that number, that is an astoundingly high
number of American citizens who have attacked or planned to attack their own country, our country.
In addition to this number, an increasing number of Americans
are now actually in leadership positions in international terrorist
groups. Most notable is Anwar al-Awlaki, who, through his
writings and audiotapes, has inspired several plots against the
West over the last 5 years; and in the case of the Christmas Day
attack, apparently played a direct operational role.

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3
Like Adam Gadahn, who continues to serve as a chief propagandist for al-Qaeda, these are all Americans with citizenship status. Omar Hammami from Alabama, convert to Islam, featured
prominently in al-Shabaab recruiting videos and was identified as
an operational commander. Adnan el Shukrijumah, who grew up in
the United States and has legal permanent resident status, is now
a senior al-Qaeda operative and apparently responsible for the
planned attack last yearor involved in itby Najibullah Zazi on
the New York subway system.
So this is quite significant to me that we have this number of
Americans playing an active role. I know it is an infinitesimal in
proportion of the American public, but it is still a growing number
of Americans and something to be concerned about in terms of
homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization.
The third fact is the growing role of the Internet in selfradicalization and homegrown terrorism, which raises the question
of what we can do to combat the use of the Internet for these purposes. Many of those arrested in the last year have been radicalized online, influenced by al-Qaedas core narrative, that the
United States is at war against Islam, which has been tailored to
a Western, English-speaking audience by al-Awlaki and other online violent extremists. The fact is that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have adapted their online media strategies to
mainstream Web sites and social networking tools, and that has
made it easier for people to access extremist material and has significantly raised the challenge to our counterterrorism agencies
who we count on to discover and disrupt these terrorist plots.
So, those are three changing, evolving factors that jump out at
me, and I look forward to your response to them. The bottom-line
fact is that the fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism sure
looks like it is going to go on for a long time to come. It is the great
security challenge of our time. We must confront it with, in Lincolns words, energy and sleepless vigilance until it is defeated.
And again, I thank the three of you, and all who work with you,
for the extraordinary work that you are doing, really 24/7, 365 days
a year, to make sure that we do succeed in this fight. Thank you
very much.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Nine years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, our government is challenged today by the evolving nature of the terrorist
threat. We know that terrorists revise their tactics to adapt to
these security measures that we put in place. As we have made it
more difficult for terrorists to come in from abroad, we are seeing
the escalation of a significant new threat that takes advantage of
radicalized violent Islamist extremists within our borders. Foreign
terrorist organizations are aggressively targeting these homegrown
terrorists to carry out attacks. These home-based terrorists could
decide to act independently as lone wolves, motivated by terrorist
propaganda but acting on their own. Others appear to be acting
under the direction of foreign terrorist groups.

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4
To be sure, overall, the United States is far better prepared to
confront the terrorist threat than we were 9 years ago. Since September 11, 2001, we have created new security and intelligence
systems to detect, deter, and defend against terrorism, most notably through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
that Senator Lieberman and I coauthored. We have expanded our
intelligence gathering and information sharing systems. We have
erased bureaucratic barriers and dismantled silos. We have learned
to fight an enemy that wears no official uniform, that has no borders, and that represents no State in the traditional sense of the
word.
The results have been significant. Terrorists plots both at home
and abroad have been thwarted, but the threat has not been neutralized. Indeed, it is evolving and ever changing, and in some
ways more dangerous than ever. It is a chameleon by design. AlQaeda has extended its tentacles into regional terrorist organizations causing threats to emanate from new locations, like Yemen,
through the activities of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP).
AQAP and the radicalized American who has ties to that terrorist organization were behind the attempt to detonate a bomb on
a flight last Christmas Day and apparently were the inspiration for
U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Hasans murderous attack at Fort
Hood.
This Committee has been sounding the alarm regarding homegrown terrorism since 2006 when we held our first hearing on the
threat of violent radicalization within our prison system. In all,
Senator Lieberman and I have held 11 hearings on this issue. Our
investigation has predicted a potential wave of future terrorist activity in this country. We warned that individuals within the
United States could be inspired by al-Qaedas violent ideology to
plan and execute attacks even if they do not receive direct orders
from al-Qaeda.
Unfortunately, our warnings have proven to be prescient. In the
past 2 years, our Nation has seen an escalation in the number of
terrorist attacks with roots based in our own country. In fact, the
Congressional Research Service found that since just May of last
year, arrests have been made in 19 plots by U.S. citizens and residents compared to 21 plots during the 712 years from September
11, 2001, to last May. That is an alarming, significant increase.
On the eve of our Nations September 11, 2001, commemorations,
the National Security Preparedness Group, led by Lee Hamilton
and Tom Kean, issued a timely report entitled, Assessing the Terrorist Threat. The report said that America continues to face serious threats from al-Qaeda affiliates around the world and from
home-based terrorists. It warned of an increasingly wide range of
U.S.-based jihadist militants who do not fit any particular ethnic,
economic, educational, or social profile. It also sounded this grave
warning. The American melting pot has not provided a firewall
against the radicalization and recruitment of American citizens and
residents, though it has arguably lulled us into a sense of complacency that homegrown terrorism could not happen in the United
States. Initially, I remember we thought this was a problem that

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5
Western Europe would have but that we would not have because
of the differences in our culture.
The Kean-Hamilton report called 2009 a watershed year in terrorist plots in the United States. As the Chairman has been pointing out, the statistics are a call for alarm. In 2009 alone, at least
43 American citizens or residents, aligned with violent Islamist extremists, were charged or convicted of terrorism crimes in the
United States or elsewhere. And this year to date, 20 have been
similarly charged or convicted.
We also are seeing the terrorist threat morph into another stage
of development. While we must still remain focused on the catastrophic or spectacular attack on the scale of September 11, 2001,
I am convinced that terrorists are beginning to focus their efforts
on smaller scale attacks with small arms and explosives, such as
we saw at Fort Hood, in Arkansas, and in India.
We must see the disparate attacks and the changing tactics for
what they are, separate parts of a more dangerous pattern. The
past 2 years have taught us, through harsh lessons, that we simply
must increase our efforts. As the Kean-Hamilton report observed,
it is fundamentally troubling that there remains no Federal Government agency or department specifically charged with identifying
radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or
residents for terrorism.
We must redouble our efforts to better anticipate, analyze and
prepare. We must address what is quickly becoming a daunting
and highly challenging crisis. This dangerous reality must be met
with better security measures, innovative community outreach, and
enhanced information sharing. Most of all, we cannot risk another
failure of imagination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that excellent statement.
Secretary Napolitano, welcome, and let us begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF JANET A. NAPOLITANO,1 SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Collins, and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be
here today to testify on the terrorist threat to the United States
and what the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing to
combat it. I am very pleased to be here as well with my colleagues,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). We do
a lot of this work together.
As was alluded to in your opening comments, the threat of terrorism is constantly evolving, and over the past years, it has become more and more diverse. It is diversifying in terms of sources.
It is diversifying in terms of tactics. It is diversifying in terms of
the targets being considered.
Now, in terms of sources, the threat of terrorism is now emerging
from more places than it was on September 11, 2001. While alQaeda itself continues to threaten the United States, al-Qaeda also
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6
inspires an array of affiliated terrorist groups. Some of these, like
al-Shabaab in Somalia, have not tried to attack the United States.
They have carried out attacks elsewhere, but they have leaders
that espouse violent anti-American ideology. Others, like Tehrik-iTaliban (TTP) and AQAP, have attempted to attack the United
States in the Times Square and Christmas Day bombing attempts,
respectively.
In addition, a new and changing facet of the terrorist threat
comes from homegrown terrorists, and by which I mean U.S. persons who are radicalized here, and received terrorist training either
here or elsewhere, and bring knowledge of the United States and
the West to terrorist organizations. A clear trend in recent attacks
has been the role of English language and online propaganda from
operatives like al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen based in Yemen.
We are also seeing more diversity in terms of tactics. Recent
events and intelligence show a trend toward, as you mentioned,
Senator Collins, smaller, faster-developing plots rather than larger,
longer-term plots like September 11, 2001. These plots may include
the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or teams who use
small arms and explosives, both forms of attack have been used
abroad. The results of these changing tactics are that there are
fewer opportunities to detect and disrupt plots.
Now, we are also seeing greater diversity of targets. While some
targets, like commercial aviation, remain constant, others, like
mass transit systems and chemical facilities, are among critical infrastructure that terrorists could seek to strike.
These elements which make the terrorist threat more diffuse also
make it more difficult for law enforcement and the intelligence
community to detect and disrupt.
Accordingly, we are moving forward in a variety of ways to counteract these evolving threats. The steps we are taking are not a
panacea. However, they are substantially strengthening our defenses against terrorism here at home. One step we are taking is
getting information where it should be, when it should be there,
and in its most useful format. In this threat environment, it could
very well be a local police officer who detects or disrupts a threat
rather than an intelligence analyst here in Washington, DC. That
is why one of the top priorities for the department is to get information, tools, and resources out of Washington and into the hands
of the men and women on the frontlines.
Our fusion centers, which connect Federal, State, and local enforcement to first responders on the ground, play a major role in
identifying, preventing, and disrupting threats. We support these
centers through DHS personnel who work side-by-side with State
and local law enforcement.
We are also working with the Justice Department on the nationwide suspicious activity report (SAR) system, which standardizes
ways for police to identify and report suspicious activities and report it back to Federal intelligence so that they can be analyzed
against current threat information to identify broader trends.
We are supporting State and local law enforcement through
Homeland Security grants, eliminating red tape so these grants
can be used to sustain current programs rather than being forced
to buy new equipment or technology each year, and also making it

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7
easier to use these funds to rehire and retain experienced first responder personnel.
We are also working to raise public awareness through a campaign with the slogan If you see something, say something, which
was originally used by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
in New York with Homeland Security grant funds. As we all remember, it was a New York City street vendor who tipped off the
police about the bombing attempt in Times Square and the passengers themselves who thwarted the attack on Flight 253.
We are working with police in communities to counter violent extremism in cities and towns across our country. Homeland Security, in fact, begins with hometown security, and we are working
on a variety of recommendations made by a working group of our
Homeland Security advisory council to aid local law enforcement in
this effort. Specifically, DHS is using proven community-oriented
policing techniques to develop training and hold regional summits
for law enforcement to give them the tools they need to work with
communities to combat sources of violence and detect threats when
they arise.
We are also working to strengthen security in several specific
sectors. For exampleand this is not an exhaustive list, it is just
examples. In terms of aviation security, next week, we expect the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is part of
the United Nations, to issue a historic international agreement on
aviation security, strengthening security measures and standards
around the globe. And, we continue to move forward to enhance
surface transportation security, working closely with Amtrak and
mass transit agencies around the country to integrate our information-sharing efforts.
These initiatives are only a small part of the ongoing work at the
Department of Homeland Security. With the FBI and the NCTC,
we are conducting initiatives every day to help secure the country.
We are and will continue to do everything in our power to prevent
attacks, but I want to emphasize that it is impossible to guarantee
that there will never be another attack. We cannot simply put the
country under a glass dome. What we can do is take every possible
step to provide those on the frontlines with the information, the
tools and resources they need to better secure our country. This is
the homeland security architecture that we are building, and this
is what the hardworking men and women of the Department of
Homeland Security are devoted to every day.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I look forward
to answering the Committees questions.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Napolitano. That was a really good statement to begin our discussion
with.
Director Mueller, thanks for being here once again, and thanks
for all the good work that you and everybody that works with you
do every day.

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8
TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,1 DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and

Members of the Committee.
As you know, the FBIs highest priority continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the homeland, and since September 11, 2001, the threat from terrorism has evolved, as you
pointed out, in ways that present new challenges for us and for our
partners.
This morning let me focus on the most serious of these threats
and give you some idea of how we are moving to counter them. Despite the significant counterterrorism pressure abroad, al-Qaeda
continues to be committed to high profile attacks directed at the
West, including plans against Europe as well as the homeland.
Recent investigations have revealed some shift in their strategy
for these attacks. In the immediate aftermath of September 11,
2001, al-Qaeda plots and plans focused on using individuals from
the Middle East or South Asia for their attacks. Since 2006, alQaeda has looked to recruit Americans or Westerners who are able
to remain undetected by heightened security measures. For example, last year for the first time since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda
successfully trained and deployed an operative to the United States
to carry out such an attack. That operative was Najibullah Zazi, a
lawful U.S. permanent resident who was plotting to attack the New
York subway system.
The threat from al-Qaeda affiliates has also evolved as other terror groups have developed greater intent and capability to strike
at the homeland. We are increasingly concerned about the threats
from these groups operating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia, and Iraq. Their threats focus more on homeland attacks
now, as we saw with the Christmas Day and Times Square attempted bombings.
Of course, these groups are also seeking to recruit extremists
from the West. Cooperation between al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups has changed in the past year suggesting that this threat
may increase. Sharing financial resources, training and recruits,
these groups have been able to withstand significant counterterrorism pressure from the United States, coalition, and local government forces.
As both of you have pointed out, threats from homegrown violent
extremists also pose a significant concern to the United States.
These individuals may be inspired by the global jihadist movement
or use the Internet to connect with other extremists even if they
do not receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group.
Often, they have diverse backgrounds and life experiences, as well
as differing motivations. Based on cases from the past year, homegrown extremists are more sophisticated, harder to detect, and better able to connect with other extremists. In certain cases, they are
more operationally capable than what we have previously seen.
Moreover, the Internet has expanded as a platform for spreading
extremist propaganda, a tool for online recruiting and a medium
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9
for social networking with like-minded extremists, and this has
contributed to the threat from homegrown radicalization in the
United States.
We also face a continuing threat from U.S. persons traveling
overseas to conflict zones, seeking terrorist training, or combat experience. While the motivations and backgrounds of these individuals vary, once Americans travel overseas and make connections
with extremists on the ground, they become targets for use in plots
to attack the homeland, as we saw with the attempted Times
Square bombing. And in particular, Somalia has drawn the attention of American extremists, as more than two dozen Americans
have made it there to train or to fight in the past few years. Recent
disruptions inside the United States show that some Americans
still desire to travel to Somalia for extremist purposes.
To counter these threats, the FBI has joined with our Federal
partners and with State and local law enforcement in more than
100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These task forces operate nationwide to prevent and dismantle terrorist plots. Our partnerships are critical to our understanding of the threat environment and to protecting our Nation and its citizens. And the FBI,
along with the Department of Homeland Security, and NCTC, is
also committed to a nationwide approach for participating in State
and local fusion centers.
The FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, and DHS have
also joined together on initiatives to enhance our understanding of
homegrown violent extremism. And we also continue to work with
DHS to issue joint intelligence products on radicalization for our
Federal, State, and our local partners.
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the FBI has developed an
extensive outreach program to the Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh
communities in order to develop trust, address concerns, and dispel
myths about the FBI and our government. In 2009, we established
specialized community outreach teams composed of special agents,
analysts, and community outreach specialists to assist our field offices, establish new contacts with key communities, and work with
DHS to address these concerns.
Let me conclude by thanking this Committee for its service and
its support. And on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, I look
forward to working with you to continue to improve the FBI and
to help keep America safe. I, of course, will be happy to answer any
questions you might have, sir.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Mueller. At the beginning of your statement, you said something that is significant,
which is that the FBIs No. 1 priority continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. And I know that
is the truth, and your statement reminds us of how much our government has reorganized, refocused, and expanded in response to
September 11, 2001, to prevent terrorist attacks against our homeland.
We have two agencies here who did not exist on September 11,
2001, DHS and NCTC. And in the case of the FBI, we have an
agency that obviously was somewhat involved in counterterrorism
but has greatly increased its role, involved with not only law enforcement but prevention. So I hope that is something that is no-

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10
ticed not only by the American people but by those who would
think of attacking us.
Michael Leiter is the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, which was one of the most significant results of the 9/11
Commission report and the Intelligence Reform Act that began in
this Committee and passed Congress, signed by President Bush.
Thanks for being here, Mr. Leiter.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER,1 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. LEITER. It is my pleasure. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman,

Senator Collins, and distinguished Members. It is always good to
be here, especially with Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano.
I can tell you that there is virtually no terrorist event or issue that
comes up when the three of us do not work in a very close partnership.
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, as you have already
noted, the past year has noted the most significant developments
in terrorism since September 11, 2001. The three attempted homeland attacks during the past year from overseas-based groups and
the two lone-wolf attacks here in the United States, by Carlos
Bledsoe in Arkansas and Nidal Hasan, surpass the number and
pace of attacks during any year since September 11, 2001. The
range of al-Qaeda core-affiliated and allies plotting against the
homeland during the past year suggests the threat has, in fact,
grown far more complex and underscores the challenges of identifying and countering a more diverse array of threats to the homeland.
Al-Qaedas affiliates and allies increasing ability to provide
training, guidance and support for attacks against the United
States makes it very difficult to anticipate the precise nature of the
next attack and from where it might come. The regional affiliates
and allies that have grown have been able to compensate, to some
extent, for the decreased willingness of al-Qaeda and Pakistan to
accept and train new recruits. And additional attempts by al-Qaeda
affiliates and allies to attack the United States, particularly attempts in the homeland, could attract the attention of even more
Western recruits, thereby increasing those groups threat to the
homeland.
Even failed attacks, such as AQAPs and TTPs attempts this
part year, do, to some extent, further al-Qaedas goal of fomenting
terrorist attacks against the West and demonstrate that some affiliates, allies, and homegrown terrorists are embracing their vision.
Now, today al-Qaeda in Pakistan is at one of its weakest points
organizationally, but I would stress a significant however, that the
group has time and time again proven its resilience and remains
a very capable and determined enemy.
The threat to the homeland is, as you have noted, compounded
significantly by operationally distinct plotting against the United
States by its allies, affiliates, and sympathizers. Now, with respect
1 The

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to regional affiliates, I think it is worth highlighting four of particular concern. First and most notably is AQAP in Yemen and we
assess that it continues to pose significant threats to U.S. interests
in Yemen and that it continues to plot against the homeland.
Of additional note, as both Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins noted, dual Yemeni-American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who
played a significant role in the attempted airliner attack over Detroit, continues to be a key concern given his familiarity with the
West and his participation in AQAP external operations.
In addition, East Africa remains a key locale for al-Qaeda associates, and Somalia-based terrorists associated with the insurgent
group, al-Shabaab. Some al-Shabaab leaders share al-Qaedas ideology and publicly have praised Osama bin Laden and asked for
further guidance from the group. And as Director Mueller noted,
more than two dozen Americans, most ethnic Somali but not all,
have traveled to fight in Somalia since 2006. Now, of course, the
potential for those trainees to return to the United States or elsewhere in the West remains a very significant concern. And I think
it is also worth noting that al-Shabaab has vividly illustrated its
commitment to attacking outside Somalia, most tragically in the
waning days of Africas first-ever World Cup with a deadly attack,
a series of coordinated deadly attacks in Kampala, Uganda.
In North Africa, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb remains a
persistent threat to the U.S. and Western interests primarily in the
form of kidnapping and ransoms, but we are, of course, concerned
with their potential to reach beyond North Africa.
Finally, in Iraq, although the counter terrorism successes have
greatly diminished al-Qaeda in Iraqs effectiveness, we continue to
see them as a key al-Qaeda affiliate and having continued interest
in attacking beyond Iraq.
Now, as this Committee has very effectively noted, the spike in
homegrown violent extremism is indicative of a common cause that
has undoubtedly rallied some individuals within the United States
to al-Qaedas banner. In plots disrupted in New York, North Carolina, Arkansas, Alaska, and Texas, all of these were operationally
distinct but are indicative again of a collective subculture and common cause that has rallied these independent extremists. And undoubtedly, the Internet, as you noted, has been a significant factor
in many of these attacks or plots.
Now, although we are focusing on al-Qaeda today, I do believe
it is important to note, we continue to try to keep our eye on
groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hamas, and Hezbollah that threaten
U.S. interests abroad and potentially within the United States.
Now, given this very diverse landscape, and especially the failed
attack over Detroit on Christmas Day, at your instruction and at
the Presidents direction, we have implemented several changes to
try to address the diversity of this threat. As you know, NCTC led
the Director of National Intelligence Master Action Plan to make
sure that analytic resources were appropriately aligned with this
new threat and to appropriately allocate additional resources that
the Congress generously gave the counterterrorism community.
Second, we created pursuit groups which focus at a very granular
level on those issues which might not immediately appear to be
threats to the homeland but can, as in cases like Christmas Day,

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manifest themselves in tragic ways. In addition, we have worked
with the entire interagency, especially DHS and FBI, to review
watchlisting protocols and improve our watchlisting effort.
Finally, we have spent significant time, effort, and leadership on
developing an improved information technology infrastructure to
better meet the demands of increased information sharing with this
diverse threat.
Now, finally, as this Committee knows, NCTC has both an intelligence and a policy responsibility for coordinating across the U.S.
Government. And on that front, although I do not want to speak
about all of those areas, I would like to briefly speak to our efforts
to coordinate combating violent extremism, especially here in the
homeland.
Senator Collins, you noted the quote from the Kean and Hamilton group that we were somehow lulled into a sense of complacency about homegrown extremism. I will take the liberty of speaking for everyone at this table and tell you that none of us, nor anyone in our organizations, were lulled into any sense of complacency.
And to the extent there was complacency, I think it occurred outside, not inside the counterterrorism community.
But I would note, there is some truth to the idea that no one single organization is responsible for countering radicalization. But
from my perspective, that is actually a good thing. In fact, there
is centralized policy oversight of combating violent extremism at
the National Security Council; there is, in fact, centralized coordination of those efforts at NCTC; and there is also centralized assessment of the effectiveness of those programs at NCTC, providing
that to the White House.
What there is, though, is decentralized execution of programs related to countering violent extremism in the homeland. And from
my perspective, I think that is particularly important because the
issue is so complex that no one organization, FBI, Department of
Justice, or DHS, is in a position to address all of the factors of violent extremism. So I think it can be somewhat misleading to suggest that no one is in charge. I think, in fact, there is centralized
coordination and decentralized execution of the programs, which
have to be very varied to combat a varied threat. And, of course,
I am very happy to discuss this more in your questions.
In conclusion, I, again, want to thank this Committee. This Committee was instrumental in the creation of NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security. This Committee has helped us keep
our eye on the ball for violent extremism, both domestically and
abroad, and I look forward to continuing to work with this Committee as the challenges do change and we hope we get on top of
this threat.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Director Leiter.
We will do 7-minute rounds of questioning.
Let me begin with a current situation and ask you to respond to
the extent that you can. And I am going from public sources here.
There have been public statements over the last month by Homeland Security officials in Europe, particularly France, England, and
Germany, about heightened threat levels. And I wonder if you
would care to comment at all, particularly whether the statements

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and actions taken in Europe suggest the same forthat is to say
a heightened threat level for the U.S. homeland as well.
Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. There have
been a number of activities in Europe. We are in constant contact
with our colleagues abroad. Indeed, I will be at a meeting next
week on this topic. I think in an open setting, suffice it to say that
we are all seeing increased activity by a more diverse set of groups
and a more diverse set of threats, and that activity, much of which
is Islamist in nature, is directed at the West generally.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter, do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I would largely echo what the Secretary said. One thing I would note is that these levels, although
they are only apparent to the public sometimes, are constantly up
and down for us. We track a lot of things that never become public
and we do not want them to become public because that would undermine our ability to disrupt those threats.
September 11, 2001, and the period around that is always a time
of elevated threat, and I think we have worked quite closely with
our European counterparts on some specific issues because we do
not see any particularly focused on the homeland, but we have to
assume that any threat against the West can also implicate the
homeland.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that response and the fact
that the three of you are on top of it.
Let me go to one of the conclusions that we have all drawn,
which is that the pace of Islamist terrorist attacks, or attempted
attacks against the United States in the last year, has gone up.
The number is greater. And I hear at least two causes that I think
explain that from your testimony. One is the increase in attempted
attacks by foreign terrorist organizations, other than al-Qaeda, who
were created for more local foreign purposes, al-Shabaab in Somalia, other groups related to problems in Kashmir or Pakistan. So
that is one. The second is the increase in homegrown
radicalization.
Are those the two that explain this increase that we are seeing
in attacks against the U.S. homeland or is there something more?
Has there been a judgment made at the top of the al-Qaeda, for
instance, that it is time to sort of build back in attacking the U.S.
homeland?
Maybe, Director Mueller, you should start first on that one.
Mr. MUELLER. Let me start, if I could then, and say that the
third factor quite probably is the examples of Mumbai and Hasan
in Fort Hood and the ability to undertake terrorist attacks with
very few people, but launched pursuant to the ideology and the desire to expand jihadist extremism, and understanding that launching a larger, perhaps more devastating attack, is not worth the additional effort when you can get substantial coverage and impact
with smaller attacks.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. So that a large sophisticated
September 11, 2001, is always possible, but that for now, the direction of the enemy is on a smaller scale, more individual attacks,
as they have seen nonetheless, even when they fail, as they did on

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Christmas Day and the Times Square, it unsettles our country and
receives a lot of attention.
So what about the question of why there are more Americans involved? Is this just the obvious, that the process of homegrown
radicalization and the use of the Internet is growing greater, or is
there something else happening here?
Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, I think that we do not yet
have a complete understanding of what would cause a person to become radicalized to the extent of violence, to the extent of traveling
to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to train, and then returning to the United States. But as Director Leiter said, we are
looking at what is the continuum of activity, where the best place
that we could possibly intervene is.
What we are doing at the Department of Homeland Security is
really working with the community policing strategy, and that is
to say really educating local police departments, arming them with
intelligence, products that we jointly develop so they can watch for
tactics and trends to prevent one of those persons from being actually able to carry out an attack. So, we have really focused on acknowledging the phenomenon exists, and figure out what do we do
from a law enforcement perspective to minimize the risk an attack
can be successful.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter, you responded in your
opening statement to Senator Collins reference to the Kean-Hamilton report. They said in their report, There remains no Federal
Government agency or department specifically charged with identifying radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or residents for terrorism.
But I heard you to say in your opening statement that the National Counterterrorism Center is that agency. Am I right?
Mr. LEITER. We are the organization responsible, in conjunction
with the National Security Council, for helping to coordinate what
different departments and agencies are doing. I think in terms of
identifying people who are radicalized and the factors that go into
that radicalization, our closest partners in that are the FBI and
DHS. Director Mueller can address what they do, but the basic
idea is the FBI is the investigative piece, DHS is working with
State, local, tribal officials, private sector and awareness, and
working with the communities. NCTC is trying to piece together
the foreign perspective and the domestic perspective into one cohesive picture of where we see that radicalization.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. We have heard from leaders in the Muslim-American community that different Federal Government agencies have their own outreach efforts to the community, which at
times do not appear to be closely coordinated. And obviously, this
communityI will state for the record, we all know itis overwhelming made up of patriotic, law-abiding Americans, but the
problem is coming from a small group of people in that community
who can cause our country terrible damage. And so in some sense,
they are within the community the first line of defense in noticing
potential trouble.

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Are we adequately coordinating our outreach to the MuslimAmerican community and their cooperation with us in this counterterrorism effort?
Mr. MUELLER. Let me start, if I could, by saying that since September 11, 2001, we have 56 field offices, 400 resident agencies in
the FBI. Since September 11, 2001, every one of those entities in
the United States has been engaged in an outreach effort with the
Muslim community, from the bottom all the way to the top. My
message to the Muslim community is the worst thing that could
happen to the Muslim community is another attack. We need your
help.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. MUELLER. Law enforcement cannot do it itself. And through
a variety of mechanisms, whether it be citizen academies or other
mechanisms, we have to bring the community in so that they understand the FBI. We have been doing this since September 11,
2001.
There are additional areas of activity that have grown over a period of time, and I do believe that the coordination is successful
with NCTC. Inevitably, there will be particular areas where the coordination does not go as well as you would like, but I think generally it is good.
The other thing to remember is that we also have the responsibility for investigating civil rights offenses, and we want to make
certain that the Muslim community understands that whenever
there is an offense that falls within that purview, that we are out
there investigating that and making certain the persons responsible are brought to justice.
So I do believe we have substantial outreach, have had it for a
number of years, does not mean that it cannot be improved, but
that it is moving in the rightI hate to say moving in the right
direction, but it is contributing substantially and in coordination
with the other partners.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think I should leave it at that because
I am over my time.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I was just going to add, Mr. Chairman,
that if the comment is there is too much outreach, not too little,
it seems to me we cannot do enough outreach in this setting.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I agree. I mean, the comment was
that it is not coordinated.
Maybe I will come back to you, Director Leiter, on that on the
next round. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask each of you a basic question. We have seen a dramatic spike in the number of attempted and successful attacks during the past year and a half. Do you believe this is an aberration
or is this likely to continue?
Madam Secretary, we will start with you.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that caution would dictate that
we assume it is not an aberration, that we are going to see increased diversification of groups, tactics, and targets, and that
means we have to continue to work on keeping State and locals
prepared and informed. It means information sharing is at a pre-

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16
mium. It means we need to involve the entire U.S. citizenry. This
is why we have campaigns like See something, say something.
And, we must be very resilient should an attack actually succeed.
Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller.
Mr. MUELLER. As the Secretary says, we have to assume it is not
an aberration. I do think it is, in part, contingent on what happens
overseas, whether it be in Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan, and that
the seriousness, the effectiveness of the threat will grow or be reduced in some part with our success overseas.
Most of the individuals who have been radicalized in the United
States have been radicalized by influences outside the United
States as opposed to being radicalized by influence in the United
States. And to the extent that we can address those radicalizing influences, whether it be in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
or elsewhere, I also think it is important to reduce the level of the
threat.
Senator COLLINS. Director Leiter.
Mr. LEITER. I would agree with Director Mueller that the outside
influences are very important here. Right now, we do not see any
great likelihood of those diminishing any time in the future, nor do
we see any indicators within the United States of a significant
drop-off in radicalization.
What I would say is the silver lining, I hope, that through greater awareness and engagement with these communities of the risks
to their children traveling overseas to Somalia or Yemen, that the
community engagement will over time reduce the likelihood of
radicalization.
Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, several years ago, I held
hearings on terrorism financing, and I recognize that the Department of Treasury, as well as the FBI, play the critical lead role in
trying to block money from flowing from this country to terrorist
groups overseas. A means of funneling that money is often the
hawalas, and indeed, there was a recent indictment which indicated that there was a money transfer to the Times Square attempted attacker.
How big a problem do you believe it is with funds from groups,
such as Somalian immigrants in this country, going to terrorist
groups like al-Shabaab?
Mr. MUELLER. I would say it is a significant problem, and it is
a difficult problem to know fully how extensive it is, principally, because while we can often track funds from the United States, many
of those funds are going overseas for legitimate purposes to support
families and the home countries of the individuals sending the
funds, and the inability of our investigations to identify the funding
stream all the way to the pocket of the terrorists.
It is a substantial problem, difficult to address. We have a number of ways of doing that, whether it be through looking at it
through technology, the money transfers, or most particularly, the
use of sources but there is a substantial problem with challenges
to being successful in turning it off.
Senator COLLINS. Should there be greater regulation of hawalas?
Mr. MUELLER. I would have to look at exactly what that regulation might be, but, yes, additional recordkeeping that gives us in-

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sight into the purpose of the transfers is always beneficial to our
abilities to stop that stream of funding.
Senator COLLINS. Mr. Leiter, in the wake of the Christmas Day
attempted bombing, we held hearings at which your deputy, Mr.
Travers, talked about the problems with linking databases, and he
testified that had information been linked with the cable from the
embassy in Nigeria with information in other databases, it would
have supported a watchlisting nomination that would have stopped
Abdulmutallab from flying into the United States. He went on to
say that the government needs to improve its ability to piece together this partial information that is in various databases.
What was disturbing to me, however, is Mr. Travers went on to
say that there were policy limitations and legal limitations that
must be addressed to enable effective information sharing. We have
asked, over and over and over again, what are those policy and
legal limitations because we want to address them. We want this
information sharing, which is so vital, to be improved, so that the
vital information can be linked while protecting, obviously, the privacy and civil liberty rights. And we have heard from technology
experts that a federated search capability across multiple agencies
and platforms is possible, that this is not a technical problem.
So what is the problem? What are the legal and policy constraints?
Mr. LEITER. Well, Senator Collins, I am happy to come up and
spend time with the Committee and walk through them in great
detail. I will tell you that, given the multitude of databases that
exist, hundreds of databases that might be relevant to some of
these challenges, there are a multitude of challenges. I will give
you some specific examples.
There are some issues that I have written a letter to the Senate
Intelligence Committee about regarding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and ways in which FOIA, as currently structured,
reduce the incentive for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
provide NCTC certain data. As Secretary Napolitano well knows,
there are significant policy issues with the European Union and
their provision of passenger name record information to the U.S.
Government and retention periods, which can inhibit effective use
of this data in counterterrorism operations investigations. Similarly, as I know you are well aware, the complexities of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the various amendments
to FISA have significant limitations on howand I need to stress,
some very appropriate limitationsU.S. persons information can
be handled.
Each of these are examples as to how, although we can have a
federated search, it is sometimes difficult to fully integrate databases in a way that the computers connect information prior to an
individual having to dive into a specific database and find that information.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an
issue that we do need to work further on. We have talked about
it for months, but we have never received the specifics from the Administration.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. I absolutely agree with you, Senator Collins, and we will do that.

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I just want to pick up on one comment, the response to Senator
Collins questions about the threat to our homeland. And you said
that the extent of the threat really depends a lot on what is happening in places far away, like Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan. And
it reminds us of what I suppose is obvious to all of you, which is
that this war with Islamist extremism is really a world war, so
that what happens far away really affects our security here at
home. And therefore, the ongoing U.S. and allied efforts in countries like Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan against extremists groups
is critically important to the work that you are doing here at home.
In order of appearance among the Senators present, Senator
McCain is next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Leiter, if the United States captures a terrorist tomorrow
outside the U.S., Iraq, or Afghanistan, where would we detain that
person for purposes of interrogation?
Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think it would obviously depend, in part,
on the circumstances of the capture, but I believe that he can be
detained by U.S. military forces or potentially detained by the
country in which he was captured.
Senator MCCAIN. He would be detained where?
Mr. LEITER. Or potentially he could be turned over to the country
in which he was captured or his home country.
Senator MCCAIN. A terrorist that is apprehended in attempting
to inflict a act against the United States of America would be
turned over to the host country?
Mr. LEITER. Senator, as I said, it depends on many factors. He
could be detainedI am not an expert on law of war and Department of Defense (DOD) authorities, but obviously, if he were captured by the U.S. military, there is an ability to detain there, or,
in some circumstances, in host nations or the individuals host
country if they were a willing partner with the United States.
Senator MCCAIN. Well, maybe you can look into it and give us
a better answer. That is not a good answer.
Mr. Leiter, recently, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton said that
the situation and violence in Mexico is now comparable to that of
Colombia in the 1980s.
Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would actually have to defer to both Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano, who are much closer to
the Mexico issue.
Senator MCCAIN. Let me ask then both of them. Mr. Mueller.
Mr. MUELLER. Senator, I am in no position to equate what happened in Colombia 5 or 6 years ago to what is happening in Mexico
now.
Senator MCCAIN. You have no ability to do that?
Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am somewhat familiar with what happened in Colombia and what has changed in Colombia since then,
but the structure of the feuding factions in Colombia is different
than the types of feuding factions that you have in Mexico today.
You had the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) that

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was involved in narcotics trafficking with an infrastructure that I
would say is far different from the colliding cartels today.
So I am not certain how you would compare what happened 5,
6, or 7 years ago in Colombia with what is happening in Mexico
today, although I do believe that some of the mechanisms that contributed to the successes in Colombia should be adopted by Mexico.
Senator MCCAIN. You do agree that there has been a dramatic
increase in violence in Mexico in all areas, ranging from assassination and kidnapping of journalists, and murder of 72 immigrants
from other countries, including 14 women.
Would you agree that the violence in Mexico has dramatically escalated in, say, the last 3 or 4 years?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes.
Senator MCCAIN. And would you say that increases the threat of
national security on the other side of our border?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes.
Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that is right, and particularly in
some of the states of northern Mexico, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas,
for example, homicide rates are up dramatically as are attacks on
government. And, of course, we saw the paper in Juarez just a few
days ago on a front page editorial saying what do we need to do.
Senator MCCAIN. So wouldnt that lead one to the concern that
with still hundreds of thousands of people crossing our border illegally, that a terrorist act could be committed on the United States
of America since there have been threats by the cartels alone to do
so?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. That goes to all of the efforts that are
going on with Mexico in Mexico and along the Southwest Border.
But to the extent, yes, we see groups in Mexico, the large drug cartels.
Now, the plain fact of the matter is that illegal immigration,
while still too high, is down significantly. It is the plain fact that
drug seizures, cash seizures, and gun seizures are up significantly.
It is the plain fact that there is more manpower and more technology at the border than ever before and more is going to the border. But it is also true that the situation in Mexico is very serious
and we have seen it escalate in the past several years.
Senator MCCAIN. And does that mean that the situation in Mexico has worsened over the last couple of years or improved?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think in terms of the violent crime in
Mexico, it has worsened.
Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Napolitano, there is an old saying
about, in your duties, on a policy, it is not where you stand, it is
where you sit. In 2008, you sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff saying, arguing for more help on the border. You said then, Human
and drug smuggling rings continue to thrive in Arizona, crossing
our border and using our elite cities as major hubs to transport
crossers throughout the country. We wait for real progress on the
virtual fence, and we know there has not been progress on the virtual fence. Border communities in Arizona will continue to be
strained by the millions of dollars in costs they must absorb to the
state of border security.

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Then, of course, just last week you said, He is a governor. He
always has the ability, in a way, to bring up National Guard if he
is willing to pay for them. That is always an option available to a
governor. At the same time, suing the State of Arizona for trying
to get its border secure by enacting legislation to try to address the
issue of illegal immigrants in our State, which is a Federal responsibility, all that in the backdrop of, apparently, that there will be
new policy by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) according to a Fox News report, ICE proposes new policy that would let
illegal immigrants go free.
According to a news report and other news reports, proposed ICE
changes in ICE policy state, Immigration officers should not issue
detainers against an alien charged only with a traffic-related misdemeanor unless or until the alien is convicted. The ICE proposal
would prevent law enforcement officers from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a traffic-related stop or arrest
to Federal authorities unless they are a convicted felon, they are
wanted for a felony, they are part of an existing investigation, they
were involved in an accident involving drugs or alcohol, or they fled
the scene. Apparently, the draft proposal was posted on ICEs Web
site last month.
Could you testify as to what in the world is going on here?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, sure can.
Senator MCCAIN. Good.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. And I would be happy to. First of all,
where I sit has not changed my position.
Senator MCCAIN. Clearly, you have.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. No, I disagree, Senator.
But what we have done in the past 2 years is put more resources
at the Southwest Border than ever before, both in terms of Federal
and providing resources to the States. I am not going to get into
the tit for tat with Governor Rick Perry of Texas. I think that is
not worthy of this Committee.
ICE has put out guidance that we are going to focus on criminal
aliens, and, in fact, we have removed, and will be removing, more
criminal aliens from this country than ever before. And I think that
is the right policy, criminal aliens, felony fugitives, those in our
country illegally also endangering public safety. However, ICE has
not said in any formal policy that others will not be detained.
So I would be happy to respond in writing. I think the ICE comments that you have just made are misconstrued, misinterpreted,
and just wrong. I would also be happy to put in the hearing record,
the entire record of DHS on the border.1
Senator MCCAIN. So it is not true that the ICE has proposed that
it would enact a policy that would prevent law enforcement officers
from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a
traffic-related stop or arrest to Federal authorities unless they are
a convicted felon, wanted for a felony, etc.? That is not true?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. ICE has issued guidance to prioritize
those who are convicted felons, those who have committed violent
crimes, those who are felony fugitives, and those who are gang
1 The Document for the Record from Secretary Napolitano to Senator McCains request appears in the Appendix on page 59.

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members. And our removals of those individuals are at record numbers.
Senator MCCAIN. Would that prevent law enforcement officers
from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a
traffic-related stop?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. No.
Senator MCCAIN. It would not?
Sectary Napolitano. No.
Senator MCCAIN. That proposal, as posted on the Web site of
ICE, is not true?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is not the policy of ICE.
Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. I know that you are very busy, but
from my visits to the southern part of our State, they do not see
this dramatic improvement, Madam Secretary. In fact, they are
more worried than they have ever been. They see continued home
invasions. They see continued requirement for our government to
put up signs that say warning to our citizens that they are in a
drug smuggling area and human smuggling area. They do not
have the same security that people do in other parts of our country.
Our wildlife refuges continue to be trashed. The treatment and horrible abuses that are committed by these coyotes and human and
drug smugglers, who are basically the same nowat least in the
view of the citizens I representthey have not actually seen any
improvement. They have seen conditions worsen, and they live
there.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, again, I would be happy to come
and brief you personally, because we are in constant contact with
those very citizens, at least in law enforcement. And all I can do
is say, look, I measure what we are doing by the results and by
the numbers, and what should be going up is going up, what
should be going down is going down. However, the situation in
Mexico is very serious, and it does demand our utmost attention.
You are correct about that.
Senator MCCAIN. Could I just finally respond then? Well, let us
get Sheriff Larry Dever and the sheriffs that Secretary Napolitano
says she is in contact with, and they will tell you, they are the law
enforcement people. They are down there on the front line, and
they will tell you, they have not seen improvement.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, we will add Sheriff Tony Estrada,
Sheriff Ralph Ogden, and some of the other sheriffs, as well.
Senator MCCAIN. Would be more than happy to. They are on the
front lines and they are the citizens that
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let us get them all up here.
Senator MCCAIN. Things are not improving at all, Secretary
Napolitano.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you both.
Let us go to Senator Brown, who can bring some sheriffs from
Massachusetts. [Laughter.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just as a follow-up to Senator McCain, do you consider people
who cross our border without proper authority or paperwork to be
here illegally?

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Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes.
Senator BROWN. And if that is the case, especially in Arizona and
surrounding areas, what is your policy and the Administrations
policy with regard to when you, in fact, stop somebody, whether it
is through a traffic stop or some other means? What actually happens to those individuals? What is your policy and recommendation
and the Administrations?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it depends on the circumstances of
the stop and it depends on the
Senator BROWN. Well, assuming the stop is illegal and they are
stopped properly
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Correct.
Senator BROWN [continuing]. And all that legal stuff which we all
know. But what happens? What is the position? Are they then subjected to being deported or does it depend on whether they are a
violent offender?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. They will be recorded. They will be
put into the immigration system. They may or may not be detained, which is
Senator BROWN. Well, that is where I am a little confusedmay
or may not. They are either here illegally or they are not. If they
are here illegally, are they supposed to be detained or are they not?
I mean, what are the factors?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it depends on, quite frankly, the seriousness of the offender and the availability of bed space. And this
is a real problem along the border. We do not have enough beds,
as senators who are from the border recognize, and we have testified before. There are not enough beds to detain everybody who
crosses the border, and so what happens is some of them who are
here illegallyand that is their offense; they have crossed illegally,
but they have committed no other crimethey will be put into an
administrative procedure. If, however, if somebody has crossed illegally and they have a felony record, or they are a gang member,
they are somebody who is a fugitive, then we will be able to seek
detention and removal.
Senator BROWN. And is there a plan to ultimately secure the border, as Senator McCain, Senator Kyl, and others have tried? I remember when I was down there visiting, I was surprised. One section of the country that has a double fence and is secure, and another part of the State is somewhat porous.
Is there a plan? Do you have a plan? I know when you were the
governor you had the very same concerns.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Those concerns have been the concerns
that I have been acting on as the Secretary, and we have built a
fence. I think the Congress has appropriated enough money for 700
miles of fence, roughly, and we have built all but a few miles. But
you cannot just rely on a fence. You must have technology. You
must have manpower. And as I told Senator McCain, there is more
of that at the border than ever before and more is on the way.
Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you.
Further, let me start out by just saying, I appreciate all the efforts of all of you and all of our law enforcement and other officials
trying to battle daily to try to keep our country safe, and aside
from our economic problems that we are having, our national secu-

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23
rity and international security is the No. 1 threat that faces us.
And, quite frankly, if we do not get our economy squared away, we
are going to have some difficulty, I feel, dealing with a lot of the
national security obligations that we have not only locally but
throughout the world in helping our international friends.
Director Leiter, 8 months ago, after the Christmas Day bombing,
you announced the creation of pursuit teams who were charged
with chasing leads and connecting the dots by freeing up some of
your analysts.
Have you seen any benefits? Are these teams in place? Are there
any benefits, in fact, because of that, that you have seen, and have
we caught any intelligence links that we might otherwise have
missed?
Mr. LEITER. Senator, they are in place. There are more than 50
analysts working on them. I would also note that something we
added since that last testimony, some of them are merged components with FBI investigative groups to further increase the information sharing. We have seen benefit. We have FBI cases that
have been opened because of pursuit group leads that otherwise
would not have been uncovered. We have enhanced numerous
watchlisting records that otherwise would not have been enhanced.
So I think we have done a better job since Christmas Day of
identifying new cases, domestically and overseas, and enhancing
our understanding of individuals who may pose a threat to the
United States.
Senator BROWN. Would you suggest that DHS and FBI would
benefit from adopting that model as well or are they?
Mr. LEITER. I think for the FBI, again, the jointness of the
groups, from my perspective, that is the FBI doing it with us, and
I think that is the optimal way to do it. We are also co-locating
members from DHS operational intelligence components to enhance
the transfer of information as we uncover something immediately
into Secretary Napolitanos area of responsibility, setting screening
standards and the like.
Senator BROWN. And could you give me an assessment of what
you feel Hezbollahs terrorist capabilities are as to how they affect
the United States?
Mr. LEITER. Hezbollah remains a highly effective terrorist and
political organization, with quite incredible capability, both within
the Levant, but also elsewhere. They have a global network of individuals, and within the Levant, they have highly sophisticated
weaponry that they, in the past, used against Israel.
The big question mark for us has always been not their capability but their intent. Currently, we do not assess there to be a
clear intent to attack the United States, but should that intent
change, they undoubtedly have the capability to launch attacks
against the United States and the West on a relatively global scale.
Senator BROWN. Now, I know Iran is obviously the chief sponsor
of their money and weaponry.
Mr. LEITER. Yes.
Senator BROWN. That is still the case?
Mr. LEITER. That is still the case.

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Senator BROWN. Do you think if there is an escalation between
Iran and Israel, that we will see more of a threat here in the
United States?
Mr. LEITER. Yes.
Senator BROWN. And then to shift gears a little bit, how have you
noticed that the coordination between the State and local intelligence shops, how closely does the NCTC work with, for example,
the Boston Police Department, the New York Police Department,
and those local authorities, because I know the Secretary said it
needs to be a local effort, almost like a neighborhood watch on a
statewide basis.
What have your experiences been?
Mr. LEITER. First and foremost, everything we do with State and
locals is really done in conjunction or through DHS and the FBI.
We think that is critical because, honestly, what we have heard
from State and local is that they do not want more places to connect in the U.S. Government. They want to understand who is
doing what and having another organization deal with them directly is not what they seek.
What we try to do is take that national-level intelligence and
work with DHS and the FBI to get it down to a level where it is
actually useful to State and local officials either through JTTFs or
through the fusion centers. I would simply note, though, Boston
and New York are two organizations that we have always had a
very close relationship with. I have a New York City detective who
is an analyst in our organization, and I also have a Boston Police
Department lieutenant who leads an organization that is led by
DHS but is within NCTC to provide information back to State and
local organizations. And, in fact, in conjunction with the FBI and
DHS several months back, we ran an exercise on information sharing and terrorist threats with the City of Boston.
Senator BROWN. And if I could just, Mr. Chairman, follow up
with the remaining two folks that are testifying with that same
question. How are you noticing the relationship between the State
and local governments? And also, I would just like to convey, when
we do know of an issue that is happening in our State, it is important, I think, to let us knowthe senators or congressman that are
dealing with itso we can work with you in concert, with the public relations to get the word out in a respectful, responsible manner.
So if you two could comment on that same question, which is, between the State and local intelligence shops, how do they work
with you?
Then I would be done, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. MUELLER. We have a very successful Joint Terrorism Task
Force in Massachusetts. We also have branches in States to the
north in which the Boston Police Department, State police, other
police departments and organizations contribute. The persons who
work on the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are given top secret clearances. They have access to everything we have. And whenever
there is a threat, the information running the threat is distributed
to those who will be responsible for that threat. And if it is at the
secret or top secret level, we get it out so that it could be more
widely disseminated.

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But I ask you to go and sit down and talk with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and perhaps be briefed by not only what the
composition of the task force is but what they are currently looking
at in that area.
Senator BROWN. I have, and I will again. Thank you.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Likewise, Senator, fusion centers are
somewhat different than JTTFs. They have a different function.
They complement each other, and we would be happy to get you
briefed up on what is happening in Massachusetts.
Senator BROWN. That would be wonderful. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Brown. Senator
Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding these hearings as you have so consistently.
During a similar hearing last year, I asked the question whether
or not someone who is on local law enforcement who arrests somebody for suspicion of commission of a crime could call a single place
or find out from a single location whether or not there is any information that this person may be engaged in terrorist activities.
Secretary Napolitano, I think at that time you testified that the
ability to fuse that information and get it available to the officer
on the street was a work in progress. And I am wondering whether
or not progress has been made on that in the last year.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I think significant progress has been
made, and if there were arrests on that basis and the person were
to run a name and any other identifiers through either the JTTF
or the fusion center, there would be the ability to cross-check
against a number of databases.
Senator LEVIN. And how many databases are not included in
that information and how many are? Is it the majority of sources
of information, two-thirds, three-quarters, and are we improving
that number?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. We are definitely improving that number.
There are a lot of databases, and I think the search engines have
been improved as well. I know at DHS, for example, there are at
least 47 different databases against which such information could
be run. It is easier to say how many as opposed to what is out
there in other agencies that we do not yet have.
Senator LEVIN. Well, how many are you seeking that you have
not yet gotten?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let me provide you with that information
after this hearing, Senator.
Senator LEVIN. Would you do that for the record?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely.
Senator LEVIN. The 50 states now form nearly two million corporations and limited liability companies each year without knowing who actually owns them. The failure to collect ownership information invites wrongdoers to misuse U.S. companies for terrorism,
money laundering, tax evasion, or other crimes. It is a subject
which this Committee has been examining for a number of years
now.

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Just one example, of how corporations are being misused by terrorists. A man named Victor Bout is a Russian arms dealer who
has been indicted in the United States for the following: Conspiracy
to kill U.S. nationals, to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and
to provide material support to terrorist organizations. He carried
out his activities in part by using shell companies, including a
number of them, about 10, right here in the United States. We are
trying to extradite Mr. Bout right now from Thailand.
In a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 4 years ago,
the FBI was quoted as saying that U.S. shell companies with hidden owners had been used to launder as much as $36 billion from
the former Soviet Union and were involved in most of over 100
stock market manipulation cases, and many other reports have followed since them.
Corporations have been misused for drug trafficking, financial
crime and more. Yet we continue to have a corporation formation
regime in this country that does not require people forming corporations to provide information about the real owners. You have
to provide more information to a State in order to get a drivers license in this country than to form a new corporation. We properly
criticize tax havens who create these shell corporations as mechanisms which frustrate law enforcement. And yet, we ourselves have
not taken the action that is so important to law enforcement, as
law enforcement has testified here consistently.
Secretary Napolitano, your predecessor, Michael Chertoff, testified to this Committee about law enforcement problems caused by
U.S. companies with hidden owners. Here is what he said. In
countless investigations where the criminal targets utilize shell corporations, the lack of law enforcements ability to gain access to
true beneficial ownership information slows, confuses or impedes
the efforts of investigators to follow criminal proceeds. This is the
case in financial fraud, terrorist financing, and money laundering
investigations. And he went on, It is imperative that states maintain beneficial ownership information while the company is active
and to have a set time frame for preserving those records. By maintaining records not only of the initial beneficial owner but of the
subsequent beneficial owners, the states will provide law enforcement, the tools necessary, to clearly identify the individuals who
utilize the company at any given period of time during the companys history.
So let me start with you, Director Mueller. Do you agree with
Mr. Chertoffs assessment that it is imperative that states obtain
beneficial ownership information?
Mr. MUELLER. I certainly agree with Mr. Chertoffs assessment
of the problem.
Senator LEVIN. And you believe that the lack of beneficial ownership information for corporations creates a problem for law enforcement?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Secretary Napolitano, would you give your answer to those same two questions?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would concur on both, yes.
Senator LEVIN. Now, we have a bill, as I think both of you know,
S. 569 that I introduced with Senators Grassley, McCaskill, and I

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believe others. It is a bipartisan bill to give law enforcement access
to beneficial ownership information and to require states to obtain
and maintain that information. We have been working with the
Administration and with law enforcement to improve and strengthen that bill.
Let me ask you both, do your agencies support enacting legislation to require states to obtain beneficial ownership information for
U.S. corporations? Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Levin, I think we may have actually seen some draft language on that bill, but, yes, we support
that concept.
Mr. MUELLER. And I would have to defer to the Department of
Justice and whatever views that are being put together on that
particular legislation.
Senator LEVIN. Do you know what views they have expressed on
it?
Mr. MUELLER. I do not.
Senator LEVIN. Could you check it out?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. I think it is important. Well, I know that they
have expressed support, and frankly, I am surprised you do not
know that they have expressed support. But in any event, you are
the FBI and you are the law enforcement agency that would be
helped by this information, and I would hope you would weigh in
with the Department of Justice. They have indicated support, but
to translate that support into real action so that we can get this
done is something else. And your help would be very much valued,
and I hope you would take a look at that.
Mr. MUELLER. I understand, Senator.
Senator LEVIN. Will you do that?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. I think my time is up.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Levin. Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
In the 9 years since September 11, 2001, the United States has
become better prepared to confront a wide variety of terrorist
threats. However, the Times Square bomb plot and also the plot to
bring down an airliner traveling to Detroit remind us that we must
stay vigilant. In particular, the United States must confront the
threat of homegrown terrorist attacks.
An ongoing concern of mine, that Id like to address to the panel,
has been about how well the United States communicates its core
values, national identity, and policies to people around the world.
How are your agencies working with the Department of State and
other agencies to ensure that our public diplomacy offers a compelling narrative and an array of programs that challenge the messages offered by al-Qaeda and its affiliates?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. We work very closely, Senator, across the
interagency and internationally. I think one of the things that has
surprised me most, as the Secretary of Homeland Security, is how

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much international reach there needs to be to give full effectiveness
to the job. And so we work, as I mentioned earlier, with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on international aviation standards. We work with the G6. We work with the European Union on the exchange of information. We work very closely
with Canada and Mexico, our two neighbors.
So there is a huge amount of interaction at the international
level but all designed to minimize the risk that a terrorist could either enter the United States or be plotting somewhere else to injure U.S. interests.
Senator AKAKA. Director Mueller.
Mr. MUELLER. Senator, we have realized for any number of
years, certainly before my time, that our success is in large part
dependent on working with our counterparts overseas. We have
over 60 legal attache offices now in the embassies around the
world, which we use as a liaison bridge to our counterparts. We
have had since the 1970s the national academy in which we bring
in State and local law enforcement for a 10-week period for training. We have for many years included our foreign counterparts,
whether they be from Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, as part of
those classes in an effort to educate persons as to what the FBI
does but also how the FBI does it and what we do not do. And in
those relatively small ways, but I think important ways, we have
developed persons that provide the relationships that are necessary
to operate in a global environment.
Senator AKAKA. Director Leiter.
Mr. LEITER. Senator, one of our closest partners is the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy at the State Department, Judith
McHale. We work quite closely with her and also, of course, the
White House to ensure that U.S. messaging and outreach that occurs overseas is consistent with the same message we are also trying to convey to our Muslim-American communities.
We really do not think all that much of a foreign audience and
domestic audience. In many cases, these audiences are one. In the
age of the Internet, that information is moving across boundaries
far faster than we can sometimes keep up. So we have worked
closely with the White House. We are working with them on followup from the Presidents speech in Cairo and also Istanbul to make
sure that the programs follow up from those pledges that the President made. And again, we work quite closely with the State Department to ensure that our diaspora communities are well connected with their communities in their home countries to convey
American values and the experience of American Muslims, which
are often skewed by al-Qaedas propaganda.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you.
At this Committees hearing on the failed plot to bring down an
airliner traveling to Detroit, a former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, testified that the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board would provide a valuable service. To date, it is not
in place. As you know, this Board was created by the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act to protect Americans privacy and civil liberties.
What is the status of this Board being formed and how do government-wide counterterrorism efforts currently incorporate privacy and civil liberty protections?

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Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary Napolitano. Senator Akaka, I think the membership of
that board is currently being looked at by the White House, but I
would share with you that we have within the Department of
Homeland Security, an Office of Privacy. It is fully staffed, and
they are fully incorporated in our policy decisionmaking, not as an
afterthought, but at the outset to make sure that we are taking
those values into account.
Senator AKAKA. Director Mueller.
Mr. MUELLER. We have both internally but also through the Department of Justice individuals that look at our undertakings from
the perspective of assuring the sanctity of privacy and civil liberties.
Senator AKAKA. Director Leiter.
Mr. LEITER. Senator, we have a similar structure. We have a
civil liberties protection officer who is involved not after the fact
but during the construction of policies and operations. In addition,
we have an inspector general within the Director of National Intelligence. And finally, the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board
also does reviews of our work often relating to civil liberties.
Senator AKAKA. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just ask this final question.
I have always been interested in language skills. How are your
agencies coordinating to ensure that our language skills for homeland security and intelligence meet the needs of our counterterrorism mission?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we are constantly looking to hire
individuals with a variety of language skills. It is a high demand
area, and I would hope that over time our universities will produce
even more. But we do that primarily in the hiring processidentify
those areas where we need more language expertise, particularly
for intelligence and analysis, and we go and recruit.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Director Mueller.
Mr. MUELLER. To a certain extent, we recruit from the same
cadre of individuals. There are too few with the particular languages that we need. I know in the wake of the 1950s and during
the Cold War, there were governmental efforts to encourage development of language capabilities. I have seen, I think, in the last
2 or 3 years emphasis in universities and around the country on
languages as important, whether it be Arabic or Chinese, just to
name two off the top of my head. And so I think that the pool is
growing but not growing as fast as we need it to.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Director Leiter.
Mr. LEITER. I would echo my colleagues points and simply add
that it remains a challenge, especially in hard-to-find languages. I
think we have done a better job over the past several years of being
more flexible in providing resources from one government entity to
another during times of crises to cover critical areas. That being
said, we absolutely need them not just for the language but for the
cultural literacy, which is often associated with understanding a
foreign language.
Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

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We will do another round and move as quickly as we can.
Director Leiter and others have responded in testifying on what
lessons we learned from the Christmas Day bombing attempt and
what we are doing to implement those lessons. I want to focus the
three of you on the Times Square bombing and ask you to do a
similar sort of post-event analysis of how did Shahzad break
through and what lessons did we learn. What have we changed, to
the extent you can say in open session, since that attempt?
Madam Secretary, you want to begin?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. And we had a beltand-suspenders approach really to finding Shahzad. It involved
both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP ultimately was able to
pull him off the plane. To prevent him from getting on the plane,
however, we have now made sure that we have converted all the
watchlist vetting from the airlines themselves. We have accelerated
the cut-over so that TSA actually does that vetting.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. How about before? In other words, I
mean, obviously, you can build on that, but is there anything that
we think we should have done or could have done to have stopped
him from actually gettingput that car in Times Square with the
bombs in it?
Mr. MUELLER. I think there are areas that we subsequently
learned about in the debriefing of Shahzad and others that have
enabled us to look at certain investigative techniques and tools and
the like, but they are better discussed in closed session.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter.
Mr. LEITER. Senator, at a very broad level for the same reasons
as Director Mueller noted, I will just give you two areas of successes and challenges. On the success front, as Senator Brown
asked before, pursuit worked. Pursuit in conjunction with DHS and
the FBI, I believe, helped accelerate the investigation, so that sort
of activity. And not just that investigation but making sure we did
not have other things going on, so pursuit worked in that context.
Second, and we cannot talk about these in open session, but
much of what DHS and FBI does on a preventative side, I think
increased the likelihood that his bomb-making skills would lead to
failure. There were things in place that made it less likely that the
IED would be effective.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very interesting and encouraging
to hear.
Mr. LEITER. On the challenges of even when we know someone
is there and traveling back and forth to Pakistan, how far can investigations go on so many individuals who have similar profiles.
That is an ongoing challenge.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. The profile of just going back and forth
from the United States to Pakistan?
Mr. LEITER. Exactly.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Obviously, we have a lot of PakistaniAmericans who are going back to see their families.
Mr. LEITER. And respecting individuals civil liberties, what kind
of investigative steps you want to take in that scenario? And I
think that continues to be a challenge for us and one that, obviously, you are well aware of.

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Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go back to the coordination of
what I would call the counter-homegrown radicalization effort. I
just want to be clear about this because this is really important
now, based on the statistics we see, with more and more Americans
being radicalized over the Internet and through other influences,
still personal influences on them.
Do you feel that you have enough authority and resources at
NCTC to effectively coordinate across the Federal Government the
counter-radicalization effort, Mr. Leiter?
Mr. LEITER. I think as a government bureaucrat, my answer to
those are always supposed to be no. But I do not want to go down
that easy path.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. But it is clear to you that your authority
is recognized that as across the government. I know everybody always would like more resources. I want to just be clear that in the
Federal Government, when people ask who is in charge of trying
to run a counteroffensive to homegrown radicalization that they
say it is the director of the NCTC.
Mr. LEITER. I think saying in charge would probably be too
strong a term. Who is responsible for coordinating across multiple
departments in conjunction with the National Security Council or
the NCTC?
I do think your prior question to Secretary Napolitano and Director Mueller about are there ways to improve outreach coordination
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. LEITER [continuing]. I think there undoubtedly are, and it is
one of the reasons that we have had discussions at the Deputies
Committee at the White House, to institute some sort of improved
coordination function that would still be interagency led. That sort
of coordination can be done better, but the important thing is
Washington having a light hand of coordination and then enabling
a coordinated face among the Federal, State, and local officials in
the field so they can adjust their strategies for outreach and engagement at a local level because local circumstances differ very
significantly.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So now let me focus in, in the
counter-homegrown radicalization effort on the reality that the war
against terrorism, Islamist terrorism, is a war of ideas and values,
because underneath all these brutal acts, there is an ideology, an
extreme theology that is totally inconsistent with our values. And
as we have said here before, we assumed at the outset of this
thatand I like to think, for most Muslim-Americans it is still true
that they are much more accepted, integrated, free, and successful
here than in other countries of their diaspora. And yet, there clearly is a group, particularly younger people, younger males, but not
exclusively males, who are vulnerable to the jihadist approach
about ideas that they get, particularly on the Internet, but also
from individuals they run into.
So how do we coordinateI know what we are doing with public
diplomacy abroad. This is very different in its way. How do we figure out how to target and get that message out to what is a relatively small group of Americans who can nonetheless cause very
large damage, pain, and death in our country?

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Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I think you have clearly identified
the challenge, and I would say it is a different challenge than what
we have seen overseas, because unlike the population of the United
Kingdom, it is not easily isolated to a single demographic group.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. LEITER. It is quite varied here. But I think the key point I
would make is the Federal Government will be able to do some of
this. State and local governments will be able to do a lot of this.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Who does it? Is it the Department of Education? I mean, I was surprised, as I have said before at these
hearings, that when we have asked leaders in the Muslim-American community who do you have most contact with in the Federal
Governmentthis was 2 or 3 years agoand they said the FBI.
Mr. LEITER. Well, my last point there, and then I am going to
come to your question, specifically Muslim-American communities
are key in this. And I think we have seen, since September 11,
2001, Muslim-American mainstream communities condemn terrorism and al-Qaeda. I think over the past year, with the growth
of radicalization, we have seen a corresponding growth in mainstream Muslim communities condemning this. We have to as the
Federal Government help enable that and amplify that.
Now, your point about who in the Federal Government should be
the face of this, my answer is lots of people, including ones who are
not sitting at this table. We helped coordinate, about a month ago
now, a roundtable effort in Minneapolis through the Department of
Education
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good.
Mr. LEITER [continuing]. With various educators from communities that have significant Somali-American populations to talk to
them about the radicalization issues and get their input. Health
and Human Services, Citizenship and Immigration Services, all of
these are critical partners, because Director Muellers folks do a
great job, but every once in a while, people react, in a way you do
not want them to, when the FBI shows up.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, sure. That was what was surprising
about the answer. I mean, it was a positive answer, that they had
the most constructive interaction with the FBI.
Do either of you want to add to that, about the counter-homegrown radicalization effort?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, first of all, I think there is no one
way of counter-messaging. Second, I think that we are learning a
lot about counter-messaging. Third, as I mentioned earlier, Mr.
Chairman, our focus has been on sharing information and empowering local first responders, whether they are police, or other first
preventers, and to empower them on kind of a community policing
theory to be working with specific communities, building those
strong relationships, recognizing that they will be more effective locally than anything we can do from Washington.
That being said, both our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties group
and others, have been actively out around the country having town
halls and sessions similar to what Director Leiter mentioned. Some
of them are co-scheduled, by the way. I mean they are done together. In addition, Citizenship and Immigration Services is part
of the Department of Homeland Security, and they have a lot of

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outreach into communities. So there is a lot of that that goes on,
but I think our key strategy here is to really work through the local
first responders.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. You want to say anything, Director, in defense of the FBI?
Mr. MUELLER. No, not in defense. I would say, however, that a
success, whether it be law enforcement or intelligence, is generally
dependent upon relationships.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Mr. MUELLER. And the agencies have probably better coverage
around the United States. We have the 400 resident agencies in
many of the communities and our 56 field offices. And it is the development of relationships, and from those relationships comes the
trust and understanding and the ability to see things together. And
what we strive to do is build up those relationships in a variety of
ways. And we are a piece of it, but there are other aspects of it,
the war of ideas versus identifying radicalization, and moving to
prevent persons from being radicalized to the point that they are
willing to undertake extremist events. But it is very important for
us and I think we play a strong role in it.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I agree, of course. It is very important to be proactive and, to the extent that you can, to coordinate
those efforts. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, when I hear the witnesses describe the outreach efforts, I cannot help but think that we have
a lot of good people, a lot of good agencies, a lot of activity, but
there still does not seem to be an overall strategy, nor accountability built in, nor a means of assessing the success. And I think
that is what the Kean-Hamilton report was trying to say. It is not
that there are not great efforts going on in various cities by all of
your people, but how are we assessing the success and who is accountable for determining if this approach works versus that approach, whether there are best practices that should be shared?
Director Mueller, you and I had an interesting conversation
about the British approach, the Prevent Strategy, which has been
criticized in some ways and may not work well in our country for
constitutional and cultural reasons. But I am concerned that this
is too diffuse, that it is too nebulous. And I do not know to whom
to direct this.
Mr. Leiter, since you responded to me in your opening statement,
if you would like to start and maybe I will ask all three of you to
comment.
Mr. LEITER. Well, Senator, I would offer you six prongs of activity that I think do encompass the overall approach to this strategy
and the effort here. And I want to stress that, again, NCTC is not
in charge of this. NCTC has a coordinating function in this.
Senator COLLINS. That is my point. Who is in charge?
Mr. LEITER. I understand, Senator, and what I tried to stress at
the opening was I think there is a coordinated policy which comes
from the White House. There is a coordination of efforts in conjunction with the White House through NCTC, and then there is an assessment role that NCTC has to provide those assessments back to
the White House. And that final prong is that the White House is

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requiring monthly updates, not just on domestic countering violent
extremism but global countering violent extremism to measure the
effectiveness of programs.
Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, do you have anything to add
to that?
Mr. MUELLER. The problem itself is multifaceted with radicalization occurring from persons overseasthere are a number of
areas in the Federal Government where I would like to say, put
somebody in charge. Often, it takes a representative of the White
House, who has a coordinating activity, whether it be in foreign
policy or sometimes in military policy and the like, and which a
number of entities and institutions play a particular role. I am not
certain that this is not one of those areas in which National Security Council, through NCTC, is able to coordinate and direct and
identify whatever gaps there may be, as opposed to identifying one
person in that hierarchy and saying, OK, you are in charge. I
throw that out as sort of a reflection on the challenge and the issue
that we have in something like this that is so complex.
Senator COLLINS. Mr. Leiter, let me go back to you for a moment.
Do you think it would be helpful to have a strategy?
Mr. LEITER. I think it is helpful to ensure that the entire interagency is on the page of what needs to get done. I think that could
be done through a written strategy. I think there are additional
disadvantages of a strategy, though. Sometimes people can get
wrapped around the axle trying to write that strategy rather than
to do the work that we know has to be done.
Senator COLLINS. Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think I would concur with both Directors Leiter and Mueller. I believe that we know and have had a
number of meetings and discussions on countering violent extremism (CVE). We know that each of our departments and others are
all doing important work. We know there is communication that is
occurring between those departments. We know that NCTC has
some coordinating role that is a very important one. And perhaps
the only thing that is missing out of that is an overarching written
strategy, and it may be that at some point we want to invest in
that. But I do not think the lack of a single document on CVE
should be mistaken for a lack of activity in that area. There has
been a tremendous amount.
Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, I want to go back to an answer that you gave to the Chairman because I felt it was incomplete. And it had to do with the actions that we had taken to catch
the Times Square would-be bomber on the airplane. You said that
TSA now vets the list, but, in fact, isnt TSA doing that vetting
only for U.S. carriers?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, actually, they have moved and
cut over a large number of international carriers as well, and have
prioritized flag carriers from countries of particular interest. And
I would be happy to give you that list.
Senator COLLINS. So are they doinglet me pin you down on
this. Is TSA doing the vetting for all carriers whether domestic or
foreign?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. They will complete the cut over for international carriers, I believe, by the end of the calendar year. I will

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get you that list, but they have completed it for all domestic and
international carriers that carry the great majority of passengers,
but there are a few airlines left that have not yet cut over.
Senator COLLINS. Let me switch to another issue. Our country
has welcomed many people from Somalia. Somalia has been a
failed state. We have had many people come into our country and
seek status as refugees. Given that we very generously welcome
people from failed states like Somalia, how do we ensure that a Somali who presents himself at our borders is not a member of alShabaab seeking entrance into our country through our refugee
system?
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we run names and identities of
those seeking refugee status across a number of databases when
applications are made. We are working on a system to be able to
apply after acquired derogatory information; if someone, for example, has lied on their refugee application, we would be able to go
backwards as well as looking at what we have at the time of application. That is a project that is underway. It is not complete.
Senator COLLINS. I think it is a real problem and something that
we need to take a closer look at.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator
Levin.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Mueller, there is a loophole in Federal law that prevents
the Federal Government from stopping the sale of firearms or explosives to a person who is on the terrorist watchlist, unless that
individual falls into some other category, like having a criminal
record. But being on the terrorist watchlist in and of itself is not
sufficient to prevent the sale.
According to a May 2010 GAO report, individuals on the terrorist
watchlist were able to purchase firearms and explosives from licensed dealers about 1,120 times between 2004 and 2010. To close
that loophole, Senator Lautenberg has introduced legislation, which
I have cosponsored, that would give the attorney general the authority to deny the transfer of a firearm when an FBI background
check reveals that the prospective purchaser is a known or suspected terrorist and the attorney general has a reasonable belief
that the purchaser may use the firearm in connection with terrorism.
Do you believe that the Department of Justice should have the
authority to block guns and explosives sales to suspected terrorists,
and do you believe they should be able to block the sale of guns
to persons who are on the terrorist watchlist?
Mr. MUELLER. I would defer to the department in responding on
the policy questions inherent in what you are asking, sir, with regard to that legislation. I can say, needless to say, we share a common interest in keeping guns out of the hands of terrorists. In the
meantime, what we do is when a persons name shows up on the
Terrorist Screening Center watchlist, we take what time is necessary to do an immediate investigation as to why that person was
on the watchlist and what the impact of selling a gun would be to

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that individual, and we will take what steps are necessary to protect the American public in the meantime.
Senator LEVIN. And you have certain number of hours, I believe,
72 hours, is that right, to react?
Mr. MUELLER. I believe it is. I would have to check on that.
Senator LEVIN. And have you been asked by the Department of
Justice for your opinion as to whether or not persons on the terrorist watchlist should be able to buy guns and explosives?
Mr. MUELLER. This would be a particular issue, and versions of
the legislation have been around for a couple of years. I may have
been, but I would have to go back and check and get back to you,
sir.
Senator LEVIN. Well, do you have an opinion? I know that the
Department of Justice makes the policy decisions, but do you have
an opinion on the subject?
Mr. MUELLER. As I have said before, I think all of us would want
to keep weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
Senator LEVIN. And/or persons on the terrorist watchlist?
Mr. MUELLER. And/or persons on the terrorist watchlist, yes.
Senator LEVIN. And what about maintaining the records? Now,
the FBI is required to destroy the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, generated and approved firearm transfer
records after 90 days, for those persons who are on the terrorist
watchlist.
Would you like to be able to keep those records for longer than
90 days for persons on the terrorist watchlist?
Mr. MUELLER. I am generally in favor of records retention whether it comes to communication carriers records or records relating
to the purchase and sales of guns because the retention of records
gives us an ability to go back when we identify some person to determine whether or not there is additional information we would
have in those records that would enable us to conduct a more efficient investigation.
Senator LEVIN. And does your general view in that matter apply
specifically to transfers to persons who are on the terrorist
watchlist?
Mr. MUELLER. It applies generally to records retention across the
board.
Senator LEVIN. Does that include those persons?
Mr. MUELLER. I would generally be in favor of records retention,
yes.
Senator LEVIN. Have you determined how many firearm transactions by suspected terrorists, or persons on the terrorist
watchlist, between 2004 and 2010 involved purchasers who were
subsequently charged with a crime?
Mr. MUELLER. I do not know that. I do not dispute the GAO figures that you listed, but I do not know the breakdown of those figures and I would have to get back to you as to how many of those
were subsequently convicted of a crime.
Senator LEVIN. Would you see if you can determine? That is a
very specific number of cases and could you tell us how many were
subsequently prosecuted, charged with crimes?

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Mr. MUELLER. It is probably much easier to find out how many
were arrested, but to follow it through the court system would
be
Senator LEVIN. That is OK. Arrest would be fine.
Mr. MUELLER. OK.
Senator LEVIN. And finally, there was a question which we asked
for the record. We had a hearing in this Committee on May 5 entitled, Terrorists and Guns: The Nature of the Threat and Proposed
Reforms that looked at the issue you and I have just been discussing. Mr. Roberts, the assistant director of the FBI Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, testified at that hearing. I
submitted questions for the record.
Following the hearing, answers to those questions were supposed
to be received a long time ago. They would have helped a great
deal, frankly, in preparing for this hearing. Can you check out the
reasons why those answers have not been forthcoming?
Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I believe we completed those some time ago.
I will see where they are in the process.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you so much. Thank you all.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Levin.
Thanks very much to the three of you. This has been a very informative, constructive and, of course, as always, unsettling hearing. But I appreciate very much your testimony and what you are
doing. The obvious fact is that the war that began on September
11, 2001although it was actually being conducted by Islamist extremists against us before, but it certainly began in our response
to it after September 11, 2001goes on across the world on many
battlefields. And increasingly, we can see, from your testimony
today and what we know, that our enemies in the war with
Islamist extremism are bringing the fight to the homeland in the
United States with greater frequency. And while this started, clearly, as a war of foreign nationals against us, and it is still primarily
that, they are working increasingly to build alliances or essentially
recruit soldiers for their army against us from within the United
States.
So the threat is evolving and in some sense increasing to the
homeland, but so is our defense evolving and increasing. And it certainly gives me, and I hope will give the American people, some
sense of confidence in the midst of this unconventional conflict that
has come home within the continental United States in an unprecedented way.
I was thinking as I was listening in the most simplistic terms,
we are in a fight that we did not start. But now that we are in
it, we are damn sure not going to lose it. And I am confident, based
on everything you and all the people working with you are doing,
that we will be successful in that regard. It is not going to happen
tomorrow. It is going to go on for a period of years. But in the end,
we are going to triumph.
Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to echo your thanks to our witnesses and also to the
thousands of Federal employees who work for them and with them
each and every day to try to detect, deter, and defend our country
against terrorist attacks. The focus tends always to be on the fail-

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ures, and we all know from our classified briefings that there are
so many successes that the public never hears about. And I just
want to acknowledge that publicly here today.
I am going to, for the record, follow up on some issues that we
did not get into today. For example, in the Washington Post today,
there is a story about Bob Woodwards new book that says that a
classified exercise in May showed that the government was woefully unprepared to deal with a nuclear terrorist attack in the
United States.
I chose not to go into this today because I have a feeling this is
something we would need to deal with in a classified setting in any
event. But obviously, that is very troubling. We have had on this
Committee repeated hearings on our ability to deal with a nuclear
attack, whether it is a full-scaled weapon or a dirty bomb, as well
as looking at chemical and biological attacks. We know the warning
from the Graham-Talent Commission of an attack somewhere in
the world by the year 2013 using a nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapon, still rings in my ears. And so, I do believe this is an issue
that we need to pursue as well.
Finally, in my private meeting with Director Mueller, I asked
him, What do you need from us? And I would invite all of you,
for the record, to tell us what changes in laws, what different allocation and resources, what you need from Congress in order to
more effectively carry out the counterterrorism mission with which
you have been charged and which is so critical to our Nations security.
But again, I thank you very much for your hard work, dedication
and commitment.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins, very well done.
Do any of you want to say a final word? Madam Secretary.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. No, except I really appreciate thanking
the men and women who work in our departments. To go back to
a comment you made in your opening, Mr. Chairman, a lot of them
work very hardand do not get a lot of sleep sometimes. So I really want to express my appreciation to them, and I will try to get
some additional information to Senator McCain.
Senator LEVIN. And I am sure you would want to add, as we all
feel, that they do this at great risk, frequently, to their own wellbeing and to their families well-being, and that is true in all of
your cases.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.
Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed.
Senator LEVIN. And we are doubly grateful for that risk that
they take.
Mr. MUELLER. Nothing to add. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
So that phrase was from Abraham Lincoln, who is always a great
source of wisdom, said, obviously, at a different time of conflict in
our country, at home, too, of course, but that we would fight with
energy and sleepless vigilance. And I thank all of you for doing
exactly that.
The record will stay open for 15 days for the submission of additional statements or questions. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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