Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399

January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendantappellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:

American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way,

the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the
sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to
the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what
happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified
that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an
American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The
last witness stated that the American was walking as well as his
captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito
Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba
together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole
overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz.,

The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7

4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)

counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to

counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4,

The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond

5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count

reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and

4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have

physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned

sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty

above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and

on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to

physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes

death and to pay the fine of P20,000.Two witnesses gave evidence

distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The

on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single

Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical

detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March,

designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by

1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese

the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."

soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being
a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of
Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands
behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham
Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese
companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely
tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and
back and from there he was sent back to the Japanese
detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting
as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the
herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend
Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that
said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said
Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs,
giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of the
body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the
following day while his brother was detained and thereafter
nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;

3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the

Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused
acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese
soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects,
and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects
Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied
with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the
7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken
about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers,
said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the
killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these
counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the
other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and
often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal

Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing

opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively,
so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate
crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case,
it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would
not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical
injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the
culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as
an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are
charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries
were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead
of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into
account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this
case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties
unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded
not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated
while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed

that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is
made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36
Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to
aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the
designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not
sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to
overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the
court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his
duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the
present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did
his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not
discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not
conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did
his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney
admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence
in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the
appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty
of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an
aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this
respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the

judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of
the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that
he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor
of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court,
including the presumption that the accused was not denied the

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque
buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of
twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all
touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case
of rapine and near murder.

Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by

sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all
of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two
of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, TawiTawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court
of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a
public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had,

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch

and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and

possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats

sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to

was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven

return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in

men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a

another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of

number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the

copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount

second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the

of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by
the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however,
certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the
lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state,
"for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
(U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of

another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with
the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified
in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two
of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses
against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of
this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any
persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all

for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the

others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood

Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article

as including any part of the national territory.

153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code,
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the

every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy,

subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished

has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the

occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1.

United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from

See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

another State to the United States are well-known. The political law
of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code

in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the

dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands.

United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the

Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the

government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws

Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the

subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order

provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to

and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal

Filipinos.

character, continue until by direct action of the new government

they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs.
McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in

These principles of the public law were given specific application to

tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the

the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,

public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal

1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the

Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas,

Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress

and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition

shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies

of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,

committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of

such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide

nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting

for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force,

on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided

so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until

that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as

they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;

defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or

and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to

found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim.

remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,

Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)

substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened

The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were

practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present

content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception

under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime

the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the

of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the

corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

Philippines.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal

United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code,

Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the

like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that

circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing

wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the

either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was

words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,

accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the

the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the

abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving

United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat

themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as

similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs.

to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be

Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as

imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one

found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the

comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public

same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction

officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced

the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal

circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime

Code would read as follows:

was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United

States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished
with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor.

necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior

strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to
the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration
in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here
present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance
of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime
committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant

and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but
is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez,
registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act
No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is

G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accusedappellant.

reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found

guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung
until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of
first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended
parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half
part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y
ELAUSA, accused- appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y
Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were
charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named
accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy)
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew members of the
M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms,
to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1)
Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully
and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against
the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other

persona) properties belonging to the crew members and

and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution

passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money

which could have produced the death of said persons, but

amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand

nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of

Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of

the will of said accused, that is, by the timely and able medical

passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand

assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death.

Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts and

instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of

the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the

treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of

total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN

superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)

THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine

Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy
and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed accused to take,
steal and carry away the properties abovementioned, the herein
accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot
and, taking advantage of superior strength, use personal violence
upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan

Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico

Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were
convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not
guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of
guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.

Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk

Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael
Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo
Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji
Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul
Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam,
Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani

After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer
the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of
the four defendants because "there was a separate civil action for
breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court in
Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the
four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)

Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby

inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the

The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on

automatic review.

persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad

Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the

evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the
name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de TawiTawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following
day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the
evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the
vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or three hours
after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after
awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch
to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw appellant
Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico
Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's
companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to
handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another
passenger, while Que and the other crew members were ordered to
throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter
Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from
the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down
among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime
Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as
they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were
hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he
realized that he was also hit on the right side of his stomach.
Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion
from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it
could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a
gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra
until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he

was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in
the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming
from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his
Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something
worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to
direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies
overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel
reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure
pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats
nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and
Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and
Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken,
softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and
some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V
Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2,
1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the seajacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang
Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul
Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario
Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death
penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de
Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece
Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight
to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay,
Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as
evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that
accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of
piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money
to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.

10

There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants,

namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and
Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on
August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy,
or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of
saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the
crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is
mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error
in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a
mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In all
cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be
devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits

"C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement

(Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of
Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in
evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the
defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross
examination, admitted the truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and
Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have
signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)

Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069),

which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that
his participation in the commission of the offense was positively
testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a
passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde
Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr.
who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon
indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton

11

disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one
pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with
the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a
statement to the authorities stating therein his participation as well
as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the
Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of
Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where
they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and
Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00,
respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch
which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to the Acting InCharge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and
answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are
under investigation here in connection with the robbery committed
on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant
Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer
any of our questions here. You have the right to be represented by
counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be
represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a
lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give a sworn statement,
the same shall be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or
promise of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here
maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now
do you understand an these rights of yours?

3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify

that you so understand all your rights as above stated and that you
do not need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)

Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his

constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits
"E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each
other as each admits his participation and those of the other coaccused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among
them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is
a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is
responsible for the crime committed.WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

ANSWER: Yes, sir

2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.

12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

the death penalty.

Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time

from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said
pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money,
wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00,
Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the
crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said
victims were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the
water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which
caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de
Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused
have performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to
swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which
prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)

In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,

An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only

OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were

Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing

accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated

murder said to have been committed according to the information
as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality
of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named
accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with
firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring
and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the
other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation
against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the
pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court
finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple
Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized under the
provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences
each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty
of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a
regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life
imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)

13

In their appeal, Siyo and Kiram make only one assignment of error:

had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas
Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH
HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with

Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).

Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at

to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again

the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn).

accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at

On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo

another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00

Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods

(pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the

from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch

afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night

sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp.

Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day

4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement that they

when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he

would be sold by the above-named persons and thereafter they

slept at the house of Siyoh.

would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the
profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value

On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went

of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn).

to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell

On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that

goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas

his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his

Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).

companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were
brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18,
29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused
the death of his companions.

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to BalukBaluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They
used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time
armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with

Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters

his friends who were also travelling merchants like him, were on

away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-

their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they

53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two

received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them

persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp.

14

53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group,

to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp.

together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island.

66-68, tsn).

They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the

front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,

On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his

Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green

companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He

about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly

pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they

after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter

could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took

two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards

from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the

them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other

Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).

pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized

them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them,
Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja
Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of
their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter
Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram
put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill
all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while
Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into
the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two
companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn).
But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall.
When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio
de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up
by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at
Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano

Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot
wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution).
(pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of
Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and
E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de
Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the
victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record
does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants
are not convincing:

15

1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their

whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately

victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they

after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused,

were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at

the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting

Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately

the report of the accused or believing in the version of the report

suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods

made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently

would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while

with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for

at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and

investigation." (Expediente,pp. 127-128.)

provided safety from prying eyes.

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC.

Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the

The record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution

deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman

stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness

informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were

presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the

killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the

accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the

appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw

dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this

Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is

fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to

baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused

present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been

for as Judge Rasul has stated:

brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an

army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is

why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the

sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear to

report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also

have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14,

makes this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the

1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed

version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de

that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were

Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified

talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island;

against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can

B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-

be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented

witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same

showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or

two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk-

fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy

Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused,

with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes

without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold

us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to

goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and

16

companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with

undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not

both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following

molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy

modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed

and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro,

shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay

16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the

in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the

will of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime

amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.SO

amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them

ORDERED.

(People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed
together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his
remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14,
1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of
victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the
injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or
gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, respondents.

gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the
testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and
Jamahali were armed with armalites.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE.

17

DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO
DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, respondents.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G.

Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of
issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set
at liberty without further delay.

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:

DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO
REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for
petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

PER CURIAM:

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in
their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.

18

constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending

these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz.,
in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just
been committed and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant,
was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched

for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would
be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpushave been filed, had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the
eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information
about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the
day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car
identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and

19

thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an

information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal,
Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil,Rolando Dural,
and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of
the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on
15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The
petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of
an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection

therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier
case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that
they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in
law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the
herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder
acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation
that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing
their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3

20

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed

against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder,
etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or
on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial
court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest,
the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the
custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form
and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The
trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced
by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities
in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for
damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire.
It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and
after a trial free from error.

surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about

the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and
the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of
his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located
in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United
Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed
under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

II
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque,
upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan
City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation
grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one
Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

21

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit
or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to
give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking
member of the International Department of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August
1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member
of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to
"Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of
the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is
known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co.
from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC
(Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from
"Vic", dated August 11, 1988.

Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing

a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister
of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City.
Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia
Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day

(13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and
after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted,
the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the
occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one
Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the
NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit
books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as
well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live
ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16
Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and
the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation.
Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous
documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the
house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other
occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan
City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At
the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested
his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon

22

City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is
now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains
for resolution.

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and

Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed
by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without
warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-avis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in
possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered
with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same
caliber.

III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest
of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the
house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by
military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their
waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded
guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or
license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could
not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted",

and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who
had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at
Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal
Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging
that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested
without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are
null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and
preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return
of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were
unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of
arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.

a) Voluminous subversive documents

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed
against them are null and void for want of a preliminary

23

investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary

investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the
Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When
a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper
officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within
five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced
evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against
them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in
accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted
because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of the
provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that
based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to

believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners
cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this
case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at
Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In
the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by
Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of
ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky
Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to
the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other
hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this
Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and
denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested
in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified.
No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was

24

arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions

of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.

organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody

has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when
raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.

V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but
were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to
support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or
ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely,
has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do
not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as
counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest
that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of
P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an
in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than
former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and
seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was
not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military.
It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the
leads provided by former members of the underground subversive

The military agents working on the information provided by

Constantino that other members of his group were coming to his
place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True
enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's arrest,
petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military
authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of
Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's information was true, in that
Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the
circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and
search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such
as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court
yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they
went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the
day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military
authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it
was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot
be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the
former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of
jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper

25

taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and

Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.

sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men
did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they

acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the
events in question, especially considering that at the time of
petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their
possession.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District

at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained.
Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought
before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said
respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter
brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division
of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his
liberty. 7

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks

nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time,
place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude
tat they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas
corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by
virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General
Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators
Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of
public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual
aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire
his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him
and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner

is justified in view of the Information filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested
had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press
Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all
drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower
the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate
release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard
Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo
Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers
Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in
order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was
next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of

26

drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and

Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol
na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng
gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare
parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka
Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November
1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police
headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules
of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released
on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail
as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find
no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally
arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows
that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988,
one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner
of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was
arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning,
Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the
killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police
officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the

evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989,

an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but
the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10
January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his
co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing
that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents
by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the
evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bian, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently,
we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was
effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule
113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his coaccused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held
in People vs. Ancheta: 12

27

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by

reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for
the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the
detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or
person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any
court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule
102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of reexamine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan
vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after
an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of
arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said

information has been filed. 14The petitioners claim that the said
ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime
to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the
present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic,
fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners
point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against
them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas
corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the
criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind
the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert,
stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and
permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said
doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, reexamination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of thehabeas corpus to a
mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the
detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the
process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but
rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the
petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future
cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.

28

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in

G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur
convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General Order
No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential
Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this
case was not used in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph I
thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate sentence law,
accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum,

29

as minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty,

pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as
aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in
this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the
subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are
ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of

the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information
obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos,
Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally
and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00
o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters,
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as
member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against
his life, if he refused.

illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an

Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one

information which reads as follows:

(1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).

That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at

Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess and
without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession,
control and custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make
Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was
issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New
People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through lawless and violent means, of which the
accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the
accused in the performance of his subversive tasks such as the
recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection of
contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PCINP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain
Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben
Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived at
Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of
Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate
accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, HearingOctober 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team
and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm
but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan

30

with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below

To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former

their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8,

NPA convert was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in

Hearing-October 14, 1982)

his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused

Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos,

Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and

Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at about 5:00

dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38

o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told

revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.

Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him,

After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the

team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile

as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now

a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).

of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house.

Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their

Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and

group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He was also

likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored

warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities.

maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a

Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined

pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and

the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar

back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista

scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused

ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang

pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok

Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C",

really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused,

and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang

which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as

Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages,

Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74,

marked as Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.

Hearing-January 4, 1983).

Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its

On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied

recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor

by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to

Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team

the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present in

leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the

the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar

liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological

Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.

movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN,

The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very

pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).

distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure

31

the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow

Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his

the government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar

confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not

were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the

represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog,

authorities, they will be killed.

whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in

the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.

Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and

documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious.

Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from

Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as

English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question

Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75,

No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog

76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)

and signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the

allegations of his extra-judicial statement.

Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar

Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA.

Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to

It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos,

him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and

will be responsible for the collection of the contribution from the

right to answer any question propounded or not.

members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)

With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to

presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of

Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine

military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent

Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.

outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused.
(TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that

on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-

Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the

judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E "

subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and

for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.

explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos,

Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists of
firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of
accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the
lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1745.

32

After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case

pungent water poured in his body and over his private parts,

and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence,

making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly

despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was

irritating with pungent pain.

accordingly overruled.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case

of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in

against him is stated in the decision as follows:

similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only

whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of

From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot

his senses,

recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur,

and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about

Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and

8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers,

physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly

whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a civilian

refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be

attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.

The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was

detained with respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator,

After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped,

wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of

but accused was made to sign his affidavit marked as

his refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right

Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)

side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused in an

pages, including the certification of the administering

atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional

officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

attachment, described in detail how he was tortured and the

ordeals he was subjected.

In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him,

accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details, and

He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again

going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged

confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and

extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions

when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was

involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of

subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.

his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain

Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with

he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot

pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold,

33

Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the subject firearm,

subversive activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of

by force and violence exerted over his person.

his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to his good

character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio,

To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive

being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-

activities, and also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged

May 18, 1983)

extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42,

43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those questions,

He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of

involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata

arrests made by the authorities in his barrio involving subversive

Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-

activities but they were released and were not formally charged in

questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the

Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the

extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA

government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136,

personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because

Hearing-May 18, 1983)

on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons

mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet

Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife,

the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121,

Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified that the subject

Hearing-May 18, 1983)

firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol
on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun,

She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and

alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,

that she was personally charged with subversion in the Office of the

temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who

Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del

buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in their

Sur, but said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She

house at that time and that she did not inform him about said

likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise charged

firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear

for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del

of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)

Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-

On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok

examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a

mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6,

To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay

Hearing-November 22, 1983)

Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga

was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any

34

After the above-testimony, accused through counsel

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities

formally rested his case in support of accused's

went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him

through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to

upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused

evidence of the prosecution, or in the alternative for

allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they

violation merely of simple illegal possession of

did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them

firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as

(TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15,

amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the

1982).

manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages

113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

assignments of error, to wit:

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF

search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other

responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

TO BE LAWFUL.

and the persons or things to be seized.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9

unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to

IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7

his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva

Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his

vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:

house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right,

allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner?

but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a

Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of

constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not

proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US

293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to

35

choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has

refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of

reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has

who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants

committed it;

around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final

castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,

judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has

which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and

escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384

US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work
(Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a
'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no legs than to value human dignity, and
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.'
(Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without
any warrant as falling under one of the instances when arrests may
be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of
Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest,
even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section
6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence
on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the
firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an
incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12,
which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who
has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense

36

must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also

crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty

be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of

thereof.

Police, 80 Phil. 859).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever

enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person

knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its

to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact

entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The

or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually

location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to

suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual

commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of

possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he

reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

committing any act which could be described as subversive. He

was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of

Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure

that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for

of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and

evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery

fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the

of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a

requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any

frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without

exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a

warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing

warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided

that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The

by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests

fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases

specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with

liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving

which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to

of full protection.

see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a

warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still

that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing

be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of

that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the

reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar

verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the

Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a

whereabouts of the accused were unknown,

37

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the

invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the

verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe

supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).

his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to

state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable

(TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go

presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights

through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of

and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of

arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he

fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).

was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search
and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent
was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed
to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said

That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his

constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is evident from the
records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed
with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.

person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.

de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed
to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a

Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?

A No Sir.

permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.

770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia V. Locsin (supra)

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went
there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any

Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?

A Yes Sir.

affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or

Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?

waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a

A Yes Sir.

peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an

38

Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?

A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that
firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his
wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a
cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under
the constitution considering that he was purposely under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.

officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership

of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried.
The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily
pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was
never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.
So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun
and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after
questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art.
IV of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in
violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by
the appellant cannot be used against him.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?

A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive

documents were obtained in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two arresting

The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the

accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the
appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported
by reliable evidence but the failure to present the investigator who
conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have
been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to
be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower
court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his
statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no

39

palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time

of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was
being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge
of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the
testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos
beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court found

The first consideration is that said testimony stands

uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the
time. He knew his fate depended upon how much he
cooperated with the authorities, who were then
engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in
the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony We
discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura
cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally
unbiased source. . . .

Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are

not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court
attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs..
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question
of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to
observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses
during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute
for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon
appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the
record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were
not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to
that found in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and
the issue hinges on how much credence can be accorded to him.

In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally

uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the
military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated
with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with
subversion. The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil
Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may
be considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his
testimony is free from the opportunity and temptation to be
exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his
freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the
alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father
,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January
4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony
that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive
activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution
never presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

40

As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):

It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed
on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after
stressing that accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was
made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should
the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant
could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but
that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55
SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs.
Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69;
People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76
SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v.
Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA
1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs.
Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in

Davao del Sur where there appears to be a well-organized plan to
overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it
with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open
defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in
unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all
over the country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all
freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their
legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must
also remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538,
569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the
communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the
lawless with an the means at its command, it should
always be remembered that whatever action is taken
must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A
cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and protections will
only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of containing
and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with
which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver,
caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the
alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.Cost de oficio.SO ORDERED.

41

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial

Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case
No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan
Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information
filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent. The issue is
whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was
filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat,
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:

accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some
other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and
one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts
of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without
legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando
Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat,
members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando
Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about
eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and
that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer
who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge
Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated
April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.

That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,

42

Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without

legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion
to quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge,
is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that
the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements
of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired
with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the
police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez
for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal
ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a
public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested
with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused
of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents
of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent
Tuvera as such public officer when the former made this finding in
the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained
more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the
same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force
of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who

ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him
because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio
Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private
respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly
sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the
authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a
mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a
policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had
nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez; 9 (5) That he is
not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the
Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972
were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it was only
upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio
Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who
are persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal
Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now
barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In
various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and
convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and
Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano
Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through
the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal
building. There, they told him that he was under arrest. The priest
had not committed any crime. The two public officials were
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the
help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto
Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the

43

justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and
until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered released by
the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime,
Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised
Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include
the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the
barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal
councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties
in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to
enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the
barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever
the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and
order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration,
Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the abovementioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of
public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably
people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a
threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance
and persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when
necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a
person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain
persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this

crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors

would show that they are similar to those of a barrio
captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace
and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or
order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural
police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner
Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like
private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary
Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to
quash was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record
show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only
sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and
that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's
personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the
Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in
the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of
defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion,
except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of
criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. 29 In the case
of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot
allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to
those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one
exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31lawphi1

44

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting

of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his
favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a
motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not
merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The
accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured
not only with his consent but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case
No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the
appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement
as to costs.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer
and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.

45

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or

6

fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,

(1) that the

of committing the offense," which is described in the applications

contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in

adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and

accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,

Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal

were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the

Code."

effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,

regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void,

and seizures.

as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court

because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary

documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not

injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated

mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants

June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as

were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners

the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the

in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and

corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction

seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,

46

was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things

found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
9

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of

papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did
it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or
any one were invaded, they were the rights of
the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants.
Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not
been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was
with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an
alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . .
. (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F.
2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the

rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an

residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of

unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be

June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously

availed of by third parties.

10

Consequently, petitioners herein may

issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein

not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the

Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against

documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises

petitioners herein.

of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to

the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)

corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be

important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the

invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in

search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made

their individual capacity.

11

Indeed, it has been held:

under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer
to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said

47

documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against

committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for

petitioners herein.1wph1.t

the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in

competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has

the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures

performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,

effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this

violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,

connection, the Constitution13 provides:

the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the

highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of
said laws or

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe

persons or things to be seized.

out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code."
In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense

our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the
evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult
to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court

14

by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of

Court

15

that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable

48

cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with

abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common

this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing

law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely

that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific

"because the constable has blundered,"

offense."

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and

16

upon the theory that the

seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for

evidence unlawfully obtained,

the contested search warrants was compounded by the description

damages against the searching officer, against the party who

therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,

correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), RespondentsProsecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under

17

such as the common-law action for

assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal

punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have
been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18

consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court

things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners

had already declared:

herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of

the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be

49

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held

and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.

20

After reviewing

the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as

without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the
time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was

previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.

applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the

Ohio (supra.):

cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held

that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional

the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its

documentation of the right of privacy free from

provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition.

unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on

The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against

our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door

the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of

remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness

the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had

in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons

always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and

as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful

Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive

conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and

protections of due process to all constitutionally

seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same

unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically

authority, inadmissible in a State.

and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine

an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been

upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly

declared enforceable against the States through the Due

recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the

Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against

new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of

them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against

its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the

50

exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,

forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold

but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against

otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its

unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for

privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself

a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable

recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is

cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against

to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty

whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the

in the only effectively available way by removing the

applicant should not comply with the requirements of the

incentive to disregard it" . . . .

fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such

competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State

that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the

tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional

issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not

restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having

justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of

once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the

the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is

Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and

indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy

by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who

no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.

secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable

Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like

searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional

effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process

guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations

Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the

thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power,

whim of any police officer who, in the name of law

for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly

enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our

abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under

decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the

which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in

individual no more than that which the Constitution

prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the

guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to

fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility

which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the

securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power

courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true

of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

21

of

administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that

51

Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,

Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No.
304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the
premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers
and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged
possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.

search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in

the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches
and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.It is so ordered.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of
the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary
to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the

52

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and
J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto
Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity
of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business

well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written

literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles,
and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP,
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants,
subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v.
Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required
to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later
reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final
resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned
articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,

respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the

ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the

53

validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a

motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But
this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the
search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7
and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of
this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent
power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it
is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require it...".

the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this
country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons
from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of

laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the
lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners

finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for
the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p.
3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had
been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If
they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of

persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter
would yield the desired results.

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to

our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them
for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that
they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not
follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or
invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to
nullify the search warrants in question.

54

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to

conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be considered moot and
academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing
on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the
two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This
assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as
instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and
he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely,
two search warrants were applied for and issued because the
purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued
two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the
addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical
error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address

appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously

this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he
issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the
affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity
in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the
fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal
properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties

55

that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property

must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession
it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under
the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties
were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on
a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was
invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the
land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent
judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence
Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by
the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned

documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding
of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in
accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for
a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or
its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing
the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree
885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to
have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause
is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.

56

Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and

collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used
and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,

Light-a-Fire Movement and Apr 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez
v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in
said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.Another
factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought
to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink,
photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM"
newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related
to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which
authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec.
54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant,
and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to
be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a
notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent

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both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical

episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent
danger to state security.

The President denied a request flied by government

prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM
newspaper and its printing presses, according to
Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents
went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and

printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural
or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it
was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

Cendaa said that because of the denial the

newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal
of the owners, subject to the discretion of the
court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down
the recommendation of our authorities to close the
paper's printing facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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