Olivier Lacans theory of discourse

Lacans theory of discourse

Bert Olivier
May 9, 2010 http://thoughtleader.co.za/bertolivier/2010/05/09/lacan%E2%80%99s-theory-ofdiscourse/
Thought Leader, Mail & Guardian
A commentator on one of my recent posts on discourse asked a question about the discourse
analysis of capitalism. Lacan had something interesting to say about that he remarked that the
discourse of the capitalist is the cleverest discourse ever devised by humans. One may wonder
why, but it is only when one has a reasonable grasp on his very sophisticated theory of discourse
that this remark about capitalism starts making sense.
Although I have had a number of papers on Lacan published, I do not profess to be an authority
on his (very difficult) work for that, one has to turn to the work of Slavoj Zizek, Joan Copjec,
Kaja Silverman, Bruce Fink, Jacques-Alain Miller, Jonathan Lee, and, in South Africa, Andrea
Hurst. As Derrida once remarked about the ancient philosophers, I can honestly say that, with
Lacan (and with Derrida, for that matter), I am always a beginner. But that does not mean that
one should not grapple with him/them on the contrary, all worthwhile philosophy entails a
certain difficulty in thinking.
Unlike Foucault, whose theory of discourse is pluralistic (like Wittgensteins, although he calls
discourses language games) in the sense that there are as many discourses as one can
distinguish rules governing meaning, interests, or points of cratological (power-related) gravity,
in anyones use of language. Lacan gives us a typology of discourse. In other words, while, for
Foucault, there is a discourse of fascism, of democracy, of patriarchy, of feminism, of socialism,
of ludic (play-) involvement, of bureaucracy, of revolution, and so on, Lacan groups all the many
discourses that we encounter under four headings, namely that of the master, of the
university (or of knowledge), of the hysteric and of the analyst. Later he adds another,
that of the capitalist, but this is a pseudo-discourse, insofar as it pretends to be what it is not, as
I shall try to explain.
This can get quite technical, so let me give the straightforward explanation first. The
masters discourse is a name given to any use of language in which some people are
constituted in the position of power, and others in the position of servants (those who serve the
ones in power) or slaves, metaphorically speaking.
The discourses that initially shape our subjectivity as children, are usually masters discourses of
some kind, such as that of the church (which is also an example of a patriarchal discourse), of
patriarchy (listen to me because I am your father!), of nationalism, of socialism, and so on.
Even the discourse of democracy is a masters discourse in practice, albeit a paradoxical one,
insofar as it elevates the people to the position of master, but those individuals who accede to
positions of power in political parties or governments usually act as agents of the partys or
governments masters discourse, in this way perverting the supposed power of the people.

By contrast, the discourse of the university (or of knowledge) is a use of language that gives
the subject who utters it a position of power through structuring life, or social relations, in terms
of knowledge, in the process making one aware of ones lack of knowledge or finitude. Or so it
seems. In truth, however, as Lacan points out, the university discourse is that of a slave to the
master, insofar as the university (and the sciences represented there) more often than not serve
the masters discourse of the day. In the middle ages it was the masters discourse of the church
in Europe, in the 19th century it was the political discourse of nationalism, and today it is the
masters discourse of neoliberal capitalism (with a twist to this tale, as I shall show later) which
is served by the university discourse as its slave. (Ask yourself which disciplines are prioritised
at university.)
Although Lacan initially seemed to associate the discourse of the university with that of science,
he changed his mind and later identified the hysterics discourse with that of true science.
Why? Because the discourse of the hysteric is one that questions the power wielded by the
master, just like the hysterics (in a clinical sense this time) in Freuds rooms showed their
rebellion against the patriarchal discourse of the Victorian era in the very symptoms on their
bodies, such as frigidity, for example. Hence, the discourse of the hysteric is any discourse that
questions the status quo, whether the latter is political, economic, social, cultural, genderoriented, scientific, or whatever.
The reason why Lacan later associated the discourse of the hysteric with that of authentic
science is because true science is not like the sciences taught at university predicated on
systematic completability, that is, on the implicit belief that such sciences can and will one day
be systematic, unified, epistemic wholes. As the history of science demonstrates, this is simply
not the case every time a scientist emerges who successfully questions the very foundations of
established science, an opening is created for breaking through to a paradigmatically new
science. (Heisenbergs indeterminacy principle is an exemplary case of the hysterics discourse,
insofar as it reveals the structural, as opposed to merely empirical, indeterminacy or
uncertainty at the heart of science.)
The discourse of the analyst is the most difficult to understand, because it is a mediating
discourse, according to which social relations are structured by revealing to subjects their true,
but usually hidden, desire, which they can only pursue (if I understand Lacan correctly here,
which is not necessarily the case) by producing a masters discourse of sorts, that is, one which
enables them temporary access to the means for pursuing this desire of theirs. I must stress the
word temporary here, because as soon as one allows this masters discourse to become allconsuming, one would cease being a healthy individual again, and require another bout of
hysterical questioning, followed by the analysts mediation.
The upshot of this is that truly fulfilled, healthy individuals know that any masters discourse
they may adopt, is a fiction, in a certain sense. [Is, as it were, a fiction.] It therefore has to be
questioned, from the position of the hysteric, to make way for the mediation of a new
(temporary) masters discourse through the analysts discourse which decodes ones words
and actions in such a way as to uncover the hidden desire that may lead one to another
(temporary) masters discourse.

The discourse of the capitalist is, as previously intimated, an instance of the masters discourse,
but it adopts the position of that of the hysteric, so as to create the impression that it is on the side
of those who are subordinated to the masters discourse, while, in fact, it surreptitiously promotes
the interests of the master. A good example of this is the way in which oil companies (which are
part and parcel of the discursive complex of the master) adopt a stance almost indistinguishable
from that of the hysteric (that is, the activists who protest against environmental damage caused
by the oil companies) when it comes to the protection of the natural environment, by assuring
activists that no one does more than they to protect ecosystems. This is why Lacan calls it a
clever discourse it masquerades as the hysterics discourse, but secretly advances the
interests of the capitalist master. (Matthias Pauwels has written an illuminating account of the
discourse of the capitalist, which may be accessible on the internet.)
A more difficult explanation might start with the fact that Lacan also provides a formula for each
of the kinds of discourse, as follows:
Masters discourse: University discourse: Analysts discourse: Hysterics discourse:
S1 > S2 S2 > a a > $ $ > S1
$ a S1 $ S2 S1 a S2
Capitalists discourse: Positions:
$ > S2 Agent address/command Other
S1 a Truth product
The meaning of the terms is as follows:
Terms: S1 Master signifier; S2 Knowledge (Knowing that ); $ The divided subject; a
object a and surplus pleasure.
This may seem very confusing, but it makes sense, if one considers that the way terms are
positioned, is simply an indication of the power relations involved. Look at the masters
discourse, for instance: The master signifier (S1) commands the knowledge (university-)
signifier (S2), in the sense that in this use of language (the masters discourse) knowledge is
subservient to, or at the disposal of the master. But underneath the master signifier one sees the
signifier for the divided subject ($,) which means, graphically, that the master represses the
truth, that is, the knowledge of his (it is usually a he) finitude and fallibility, which he cannot
afford to admit, lest he should lose power. (The divided subject is the subject, that is, all
humans, divided between consciousness and unconsciousness, or between seemingly stable
ego, and the subject of the unconscious, or the I, who speaks, but cannot be objectified).
Underneath the signifier of knowledge one sees the symbol for surplus pleasure or the object
a, which means that in the masters discourse what is produced is surplus pleasure, or
objects that can reveal what the masters true desire is, namely to command society in such a
way as to have all knowledge at his disposal, never doubting himself, and gaining his pleasure
from this position of domination.
Each of the other discursive positions may be explained in the same formal manner, of course.

I hope this shows just how useful Lacans theory of discourse is for decoding the true
intentions of the people around you by listening carefully to the way they use language. When a
husband tells his wife that he is a bit tired, and will listen to her complaints about the
children later, he is clearly adopting the position of the master, just as a manager does when he
or she tells workers that their grievances will be considered by management.
On the other hand, when a friend listens patiently to you pouring out your heart to him or her,
and afterwards observes that the very frequency with which you have referred to a certain
person, or profession, or city, or whatever, is an indication of where your heart is, such a friend
is adopting the discursive position of the analyst. Again, when a certain academic consistently
comes up with intellectual work that questions the status quo in her or his discipline, he or she is
in the discursive position of the hysteric, who is possibly pointing in a fruitful new scientific
direction. I must stress, however, that this is not always the case; sometimes one adopts a
hysterics position without good reason, but always as an important symptom that something is
wrong in the field of the discourse of the university/knowledge concerned (which also implicates
the masters discourse served by that of the university or knowledge).
Anyone interested in a fuller account of Lacans theory of discourse, can look at the following
two papers:
Bert Olivier: Lacan on the discourse of capitalism: Critical prospects. Phronimon: Journal of the
South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities, Vol. 10 (1), 2009, pp. 25-42.
Bert Olivier: Lacan en kapitalisme. Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe (Journal of Humanities),
Vol. 49 (2), June 2009, pp. 219-234.