HEADLINE: MiG Alley: How the IAF Dominated the Skies Over Kargil

On June 12, 1999 Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz hastily arrived in New
Delhi ostensibly to discuss ways to end the Kargil War. Aziz, who deeply resents
India, had landed with a single agenda he implored India to stop its air
strikes.
Here was a conservative hawk, who is known to attack India in the most vicious
manner, begging India to call off the Indian Air Forces round the clock barrage
on Pakistani positions. You dont get more desperate than that.
Azizs desperation was a result of the incredible amount of firepower that the IAF
in tandem with the Indian Armys 24/7 artillery barrage had brought to bear
on the Pakistanis. The Pakistan Air Force F-16s had been repeatedly buzzed by
Indias MiG-29s and the PAF pilots had simply refused to offer combat. This
allowed the Indian Army and the IAFs ground attack jets to blast away with
impunity.
Aziz hadnt come to buy peace he came to buy time and Pakistan Army lives. It
wasnt international read American pressure that made him dash to Delhi but
the desire to save the Pakistani military establishment from a humiliating 1971like defeat. Had Aziz known that India was hours away
(http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/exclusive-in-kargil-war-india-was-minutes-awayfrom-bombing-pak-bases-1433345) from bombing Pakistan, he would have
probably offered Balochistan in exchange.
IAF over Kargil
The IAF had deployed 16 jet fighters, mostly MiGs, for carrying out attacks deep
into enemy territory. Although the final clearance to cross the Line of Control
(LoC) in Kashmir was never given by the political leadership, the IAF was able to
inflict considerable damage on Pakistani forces while operating within the
confines of its own airspace.
The IAFs employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions at Himalayan
heights of 18,000 ft unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare achieved
three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani
military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.
Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war and later
during the 2002 border standoff the PAFs psyche took a big beating, says a
Strategy Page report.
(https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20050520.aspx)
While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover
provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles
that exposed the PAFs plight. Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when

the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the
Pakistan Army, angering the latter, says the report.
While PAF fighters did fly combat air patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they
stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the
deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the
latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver
numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.
The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and
Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: One Pakistani military expert observed that the
PAFs perceived inability to defend Pakistans airspace and even put up a token
fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders warnings that
any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would
be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAFs
psyche took a big beating.
Calibrated counter offensive
In the report Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War
(http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20/airpower-at-18-000-indian-air-forcein-kargil-war/dvc4) published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the
Pakistan Army and the PAF: Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF
reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate
combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air
fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting
on Indias side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to
enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained
a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they
occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground
engagements.
Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air
Command: I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (commands entire
area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I
was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a
glove, but it was not picked up.
Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the
Atal Bihari Vajpayee governments strict injunction that Indian forces not cross
the LoC, years later Chief of the Air Staff (COAS) Anil Tipnis recalled he had
personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft
back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy
fighters in aerial combat.
Operation Vijay
From the very beginning of the conflict, India had exposed the Pakistani militarys
limitations. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-

21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel
dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.
The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN
and MiG-27ML squadrons, while more squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s
deployed northward to Avantipur. While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the
other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.
An example of Indian jugaad or improvisation was the use of stopwatches and
handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated
onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in Mountain Warfare
and Tri-Service Operations, another novel technique developed by the IAF for
use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create
landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.
Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video
camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate
reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another
instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R which normally operates at 80,000 ft in a
medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the
aircrafts Russian designers may not have thought possible.
Laser strikes
However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s lacking modern weapons were
not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and
MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasnt
suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF
introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb
delivery pods.
On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided
bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantrys command
and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, For this pivotal attack, the IAF
waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically
ripe for such targeting.
The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy
casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed
severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as
an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N.
Ganesh in Indian Air Force in Action.
As stated in US air manuals, Air power produces physical and psychological
shock by dominating the fourth dimension of time. Shock results in confusion and
disorientation. At the same time, the Indian Army was pounding away at the
Pakistani positions with its heavy artillery. The continuous barrage of bombs
exploding around them day and night had a devastating effect on the Pakistani
intruders.

That was the tipping point that forced Aziz to rush to New Delhi.
Was the IAF late to the party?
The IAF offensive commenced on May 26, nearly three weeks after the Indian
Army launched operations against the Pakistanis. It is an indication of how little
intelligence was made available to the IAF that on May 10 the COAS left on an
official visit to Poland and the Czech Republic. In fact, the army seems to have
underplayed the seriousness of the intrusions.
Upon his return, the COAS asked the army chief to get political clearance for
deploying air power. Political clearance was necessary because as per a 1991
agreement between India and Pakistan, armed aircraft are prohibited from flying
10 km either side of the international border or the LoC. To be sure, such an
agreement becomes void during a conflict but nevertheless without New Delhi's
approval the IAF could not launch strikes.
Endgame
Former Pakistani federal minister and Lt-Gen (retd) Abdul Majeed Malik, who was
an insider during the then Nawaz Sharif government, says
(http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-142768-Kargil-war-was-a-totaldisaster-claims-Gen-Majeed-Malik-accessdate=30) Pakistan suffered more
casualties in the limited Kargil conflict than in the full-fledged 1971 War. Sharif
himself later admitted the misadventure led to the deaths of 2700 soldiers of the
Pakistan Armys Northern Light Infantry alone.
Malik says, India quickly mobilised its army and air force and inflicted heavy
damage to Pakistan. Had the war continued for another couple of months,
Pakistan would have faced more damage. In this tough situation when Pakistan
was in no position to fight India in that area, the Nawaz Sharif government
initiated the diplomatic process by involving the then US President Bill Clinton
and got Pakistan out of the difficult scenario.
The Pakistani generals who planned the Kargil intrusions were no different from
those responsible for the 1965 and 1971 fiascos. In Kargil, Pakistan initiated the
conflict, hoping that India would be restrained by outside powers. India pulled
back but only after badly bruising Islamabad.
(Again, on December 26, 2008 a month after the Mumbai attacks Pakistani
intelligence officials concluded that Indian warplanes were being positioned for
an air raid. The countrys national-security adviser at the time, Mahmud Durrani,
telephoned American officials in alarm.)
Pakistani diplomat Khalid Mahmood wrote in The News (September 29, 1999)
that to a limited extent, the Pakistan planners had formulated an innovative
military operation which faltered due to an anticipated and hard-hitting
response.

Pakistan was so acutely embarrassed by the failed invasion that it refused to

accept the dead bodies of its soldiers and officers. The Indian Army buried them
with honours befitting a soldier. This is the difference between us and them.
However, the most telling statement on the war was made by Indias Defence
Minister George Fernandes. In January 2000 he observed that in precipitating the
Kargil War, Pakistan had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation that
it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.