Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CANGURO
THE SPANISH
MIGRATION SCHEME,
1958-1963
Ignacio Garca
Ignacio Garca
OPERACIN CANGURO
The Spanish Migration Scheme, 1958-1963
The Spanish Heritage Foundation
Sydney 2002
Copyright Ignacio Garca 2002
ISBN 0-9577990-1-2
CONTENTS
Foreword ................................................................................... II
List of abreviations ...................................................................... VI
Acknowledgements ................................................................... VII
Introduction ................................................................................... 1
1. THE AGREEMENT ........................................................................ 5
1.1. The migration agents ........................................................... 5
1.2. The role of the Australian Catholic Church .....................20
1.3. The role of the sugar cane industry..................................27
1.4. The migration agreement ...................................................36
2. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT ................................47
2.1. After Canguro ...................................................................48
2.2. The migration scheme at work .........................................54
2.3. The protests of the people ................................................61
2.4. The suspension and its consequences .............................72
2.4.1. The diplomatic issue ...............................................73
2.4.2. Arrangements after March 1963 .............................80
3. THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY ..........................................................91
3.1. Operacin Canguro ............................................................94
3.2. Plan Marta ...................................................................... 104
3.3. Family migration ............................................................... 114
3.4. Territorial and occupational distribution ........................122
4. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY. ......................................... 127
4.1. Social clubs. ...................................................................... 129
4.1.1. The Spanish Club of Sydney ................................ 129
4.1.2. Other clubs and associations ............................... 142
4.2. The Spanish press in Australia ........................................ 150
4.3. Religion and politics ......................................................... 153
4.4. Coping with Australia .......................................................161
NOTES ............ ................................................................................ 171
Appendix 1. Spanish Clubs Committees, 1962-66 ...................... 191
Appendix 2. Statistics .....................................................................196
Bibliography ................................................................................ 201
FOREWORD
Soon after I arrived to Sydney in the mid eighties, I could not
help but feeling captivated by the stories of those Spaniards who
had preceded me. They had been born around the time of the
civil war, had grown up enduring the famine years of the forties,
and come into adulthood in the still bleak fifties, ill prepared for
what was going to be the most important trip of their lives: the
month long journey (ship was then being supersided by plane
transportation, but most came still by sea) that brought them to
Australia in the early sixties. In those days of still assimilationist
policies, they managed to carve a space here overcoming tough
barriers, linguistic and cultural. In the broad history of migration
they were at the edges. The Spanish-Australian flow took place at
the time the big cicle of European transoceanic migration was
fading, while the much shorter cicle of intra-European migration
had not yet fully developed. Australia was still in his European
only intake mood, but soon to move to allow inmigration from
other continents. To some extent as a consequence of this, it was
to be short lived. Spanish migration to America and to Western
Europe had been massive. In contrast, what we will find in Australia is a small community -in the twenty thousand at its peaktransported to the antipodes with a paid one-way tickect and left
here to fend for itself. The resiliance shown was apparent from
my first conversations with some of these pioneeer migrants in
our still vibrant Spanish Club. When I considered engaging in
postgraduate research at The University of Sydney, I knew it had
to be on their history, that until then had been completely neglected.
III
I finished my The Spanish Migration Scheme, 1958-1963 thesis, and with it my Master of Arts degree (by research only) in the
bicentenial year of 1988, the year after the Spanish Club had celebrated, with not as much display as it deserved, its 25 Anniversary. Since then, the work laid dormant, not much interest aroused,
known only by a bounch of friends. It was not until a decade later
that the community itself, the institutions Spanish and Australian
that had shaped this migration flow, and some academic experts
started paying attention to this remnant of Spanish-Australian history. On the occasion of the Association of Iberian and latin American Studies of Australiasia (AILASA) Conference in Aukland in
1997, the then Counsellor of Embassy of Spain, Agustn Maraver,
introduced me to Carmen Castelo, Sergio Rodriguez and John Garcia
with whom we were to form in 1999 the Spanish Heritage Foundation that now is editing this book. What followed were months,
years, of frantic activity that saw an ambitious program of oral
history recorded by Carmen Castelo, and the successful Memories
of Migration Seminar celebrated on 4 and 5 September 1998 at the
University of Western Sydney. The book with a selection of its
Proceedings, coedited by Maraver and myself, was launched precisely at the following AILASA Conference, in Melbourne, in 1999.
This expansive wave of studies on the Spanish in Australia did not
stop there: in 2000, Castelos The Spanish Experience saw the light,
also edited by The Spanish Heritage Foundation. It is encouraging
to know that even in Spain interest in these topics is also being
shown: former embassador in Canberra Carlos Fernndez Shaw
published last year a book on 500 years of Spanish-Australian relations. This that now appears is another Spanish Australian contribution to the now just finished Centenary of a Nation, a Nation
that was built also out of Spanish stock.
IV
Over a decade has passed from the time the writing of this
book was finished in 1988 till the moment of its publication in
2002. When I was approached to prepare it for publication, I felt
myself in the disyuntive of being faithful to the original or to
update it on the light of the new evidence that could had since
been uncovered, published. I first tried the updating path, soon
to realise that it would not serve well the text. The language itself
was enmeshed in the late eighties: I do not write English like that
now -updating it would have needed a complete rewriting as
well. The story was also enmeshed in the late eighties, with voices
that were spoken then, some of them since silent: let us just
mention those of Pilar Otaegui, Jos Luis Goi, Fernando Largo,
just to name a few. I was discouraged as well by the limitations
of what was to be gained: whatever new aspects of the Spanish
imprint in Australia have been uncovered since, whatever new
approaches have been developed did but confirm what here was
written. Thus, I felt the reader was best served by the voice of the
original. The changes have been kept to a minimum.
I should note that emerging in this text from piles of archival
material are the voices of a generation that came to Australia in
the prime of their life, at the pick of their employability, a generation that is crossing now, forty years later, the line into retirement.
Having faced so many challenges in their past, these migrants are
now facing a new one: that of making their lives meaningful after
having completed their reproductive and working cycles; that of
avoiding the risks of social exclusion that, more so that to their
peers in Australia or in Spain, stalk them. Uprooted from Spain in
the early sixties, uprooted from the routine of their working lives
in the late nineties, torn between their large families and old
friends in the Peninsula, and the their sons and daughters and
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS
APC
ASPA
AWU
CCEM
CDE
CFC
CIME
CSR
DEAS
DGAC
FCIC
FCICC
FCIC Collection.
ICEM
ICMC
IEE
IRO
SSC
SSCC
WWF
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
That this book has reached some for of completion is due to the
cooperation, help and support of a number of persons and institutions. I am greatly indebted to a number of people who helped
me to find and gain entry to a wide range of sources. My thanks to
Salvador Barber, then in the eighties Consul General of Spain in
Sydney, to Monsignor Crennan, Head of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, to Harold Grant, from the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration office in Canberra, and to
Bob Goddard, from the Department of Immigration in the same
city. In Madrid, Jos Ramn Manjon, Jefe del Servicio de Estudios
y Planificacin, gave me access to the records available in the then
Instituto Espaol de Emigracin, and Beln Verastegui to those of
the Comit Intergubernamental para las Migraciones Europeas office. The 1986 committees of the Spanish Club in Sydney, and of
the Spanish Australian Club of Canberra, kindly allowed me to
read their documents. Cristina Ferraro and Sydney Stott shared
with me important records they had kept from the early sixties
period.
My gratitude must also be expressed to Jim Blackie, Chief of the
Australian Mission in Madrid during the period studied, and first
Consul General of Australia in that capital, and to Al Grassby, the
author of the only took that has dealt, if only partially, with the
subject of this book; in Madrid, to Juan Rico and Paquita Bretn,
both posted by the Comit Catlico Espaol de Emigracin to
attend to the religious needs of the migrants in Sydney. Their
comments on matters they knew well were very helpful. I appreciate the help given to me by the staff of the Fisher Mitchell and
VIII
New South Wales State Libraries, and the Centre for Migration Studies in Sydney, the National Library in Canberra, the State Library of
Victoria, and the Hemeroteca Nacional in Madrid.
I would like to thank specially the people I interviewed for this
book, who gave unstintingly of their time and their opinions, and
who, I hope feel the finished product reflects their thoughts and
feelings. I have interviewed the following migrants, who came assisted to Australia under the scheme studied in the book:1
Alonso, Bernardo; Arjonilla, Antonio; Bilbao; Calzada, Moncho;
Carrasco, Basi; Corral, Francisca; de las Heras, Honorina; Enguix,
Roberto; Esparza, Antonio; Estanillo, Anbal; Estanillo, Carmina; Farina, Pilar; Garmendia, Pascual; Gonzlez, Oscar; Goi, Jos Luis;
Guerra, Violeta; Ingelmo, Manuel. Jimnez, Adolfo; Judak, Valentna;
Leiva, Armando; Lpez: Elvira; Lpez, Fermn; Martn, Justo; Martnez,
Enrique; Medina, Ernesto; Medina, Mara Luisa; Moreno (Otaegui),
Pilar; Moyano, Ana Victoria; Orea, Alfonso; Emilia Orea; Otaegui,
Juan; Prez, Maximiliano; Recio, Elisa; Rincn, Alejandro; Rincn,
Maruja; Roch, Emilia; Rojo, Carmen; Rubio, Alfonso; Rubio, Pilar; Ruiz,
Alfredo; Snchez, Julio; Santos, Carmelo; Santos, Sara; Sueiro; Ugarte,
Mara Jos; Unzueta, Manuel; Uriguen, Jess; Villegas, Claudio;Vulcano;
Zabala, Flori; Zaruz, Victorino.
IX
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Workers
Dependents
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
Total
328
314
969
638
1.621
133
261
868
2.682
3,873
3,994 (1)
Males
Females
328
313
774
675
2.299
11
4,400
134
456
874
2.027
67
3,558 (2)
The starting point for this research was found in the following
quotations from The Commonwealth Year Book of the early sixties:
Negotiations were completed in 1958 with the Spanish Government
and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)
under which selected rural workers suitable for sugar-cane cutting
were offered assisted passages to Australia. Later, this arrangement
OPERACIN CANGURO
was extended to include other occupational groups. The Commonwealth contributes 44/12/9 pounds ($100) towards the passage costs
of each approved migrant, while the Spanish Government, the migrant and the ICEM contribute the balance.2
At the request of the Spanish authorities, these arrangements, so far
as workers are concerned, were temporarily suspended in March
1963 . . . negotiations are in course with a view to restoring the
previous arrangements.3
INTRODUCTION
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
1 THE AGREEMENT
OPERACIN CANGURO
cally and culturally, two worlds apart. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM ) helped to bridge the geographical distance. The International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC), through its filial organizations in both countries, did
the same at the cultural level. The assisted migration flow from
Spain to Australia was created and carried out along the guidelines established by these governmental, intergovernmental and
voluntary bodies. A closer look at them will help us to understand better the working of the migration machinery.
Post-war Australia made a gigantic effort in attracting migrants,
basically for economic development, though defense figured as
well. After the Japanese scare in the Second World War, there was
a strong feeling that the country, in its particular geographical
position, was very difficult to defend unless its population greatly
increased. Populate or Perish, become the slogan of the moment. The aim was to reach a population growth of two per cent
per annum, one per cent of it to be achieved through immigration. During the Prime Ministership of J. B. Chifley (Labour), Arthur
Calwell was charged with setting up the Department of Immigration. This was achieved in July 1945. H. E. Holt took over the
portfolio when R. G. Menzies (Liberal) took power in 1949. In
October 1956, Athol Townley was appointed Minister for Immigration, with Holt keeping the portfolio of the Department of
Labour and National Service until December 1958. The latter Department retained responsibility in some areas of policy making
in the immigration field.
Tasman Hayes, Head Secretary of the Department of Immigration, was in charge of the coordination of the immigration machine until November 5, 1961, when he was replaced by Peter
THE AGREEMENT
OPERACIN CANGURO
cials with persuasive arguments to encourage Australian population to accept assisted migration from the Eastern European countries. Through the Displaced Persons Scheme, 170,700 people
arrived in Australia. An important group of Hungarians came after
the 1956 uprising. When the flow of refugees decreased, the Immigration Department moved to the Southern European countries, making agreements to bring migrants from Italy (1951) and
Greece (1952)5 The Spanish Migration Scheme came at a moment
in which many of the countries that were previously sending
migrants were reversing their migration trends owing to their own
extraordinary economic development.
On the Spanish side, the fifties were key years in the development of the regime set up by General Franco on September 29,
1936. At the economic level, these years saw the transition from
the post-war autarchic system to another in which Spain entered
into the network of the Western World economy. At the politicoideological level, the national-syndicalist revolution gave way
to a more technocratic manner of looking at politics and society. These variations in the economic and ideological spheres,
allowed Francos regime to survive, by adapting itself to the changing circumstances, without making major political concessions.6
Francos regime, internationally outcast during the forties while
the issue at stake was democracy versus fascism, gained acceptance during the Cold War years when the enemy was no longer
fascism but communism. With the diplomatic boycott ended, the
Spanish Government began to join international organizations,
amongst them, and of special interest to us, the ICEM, in 1956.
More important than the survival of Francoism was the dramatic
shift in Spain from a rural, pre-industralized society to a urban,
THE AGREEMENT
industrialized one. The strong economic situation of Western Europe allowed Spain to avail herself of international credits and
foreign currency brought in by tourists, or remitted by migrants.
This accounted for much of the Spanish miracle during the sixties.7
In Spain as well as internationally, the fifties were the years in
which spontaneous migration gave way to assisted migration. To
10
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make this shift, some legal measures had to be taken, and new
institutions were to appear. The first post-war legislative initiative
in the field of migration was the bill passed on July 17, 1956,
through which the Instituto Espaol de Emigracin (IEE), was
created.8 This bill, for the first time in Spain, aimed not only at
regulating emigration, but at assisting it as well. Through a decree
of May 9, 1956, this Institute, which previously had been assigned
to Presidencia del Gobierno, was to be dependent upon the Ministry of Labour. Another decree of July 23, 1959 developed the
1956 bill, detailing its functions and structures. The Bill 93/1960
of December 22, and the decree 1000/1962 of May 3 which develops it, completed the legal framework on migration during the
period covered in this study. The IEE was governed by an
Interministerial Council presided over by the Minister for Labour.
A Director General was in charge of the operations of the Institute.
Prior to 1960, the IEE was involved in various migration schemes.
The first was the Family Reunion Programme with Latin America.
Then came the Operaciones Bisonte and Aloe with Canada and
the emigration scheme with Australia, which we will analyse here.
After these, a Family Reunion Programme and also some temporary migration schemes with France for the recollection of rice
and beet. The IEE also sent miners to Belgium, arranged employment before departure for workers headed for Brazil, and dispatched Basques to work as shepherds to the United States.9
From 1960 on, its task grew in importance as a consequence of
the big increase in the migration flow to Western Europe.
The IEE shared the implementation of the Spanish policies on
migration with the Direction General of Employment of the De-
THE AGREEMENT
11
12
OPERACIN CANGURO
The ICEM had its origins in the Brussels Conference of December 1951. This Conference was convened by the US after the one
held previously in Naples and organized by the International
Labour Office failed to reach conclusions.11 With the obstacles
superseded in Brussels, the Conference set up a provisional international Committee for the Migration Movement in Europe
(PICMME). In its second meeting, in Geneve, in February 1952,
the twenty countries12 that were members of the Committee decided to carry on with their work on a permanent basis, and the
PICMME became ICEM.
The ICEM was primarily concerned with the movement of national migrants from Europe (economic migration). In January
1951, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
was established, to perform some of the functions that were formerly carried out by the International Refugee Organization. In
conjunction with that body, which did not have executive functions, the ICEM assumed as well the responsibility for the resettlement of refugees (humanitarian migration). In addition to economic and humanitarian migration, the third function of the ICEM
was the de-development of activities and technical cooperation
such as language training, vocational and orientation training and,
in particular, measures to facilitate the acceptance of European
migrants by Latin American countries.
The basic function for the ICEM was to make arrangements for
the transport of migrants for whom existing facilities were inadequate, and who could not otherwise be moved. At the request
of and in agreement with the governments concerned, the ICEM
carried out the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants which other international organizations were
THE AGREEMENT
13
not in a position to provide. Each member government was required to contribute an agreed percentage of the Committees
administrative expenditure. The contributions to its operational
expenditure were voluntary, and governments could stipulate the
terms and conditions under which they were to be used. The
ICEM was governed by a Council that met twice a year and in
which all government members were represented, and by an
Executive Committee that also met twice a year, and in which sat
the representatives of nine governments.13 During the first ten
years of its existence, the ICEM moved over a million people, 30
to 40 per cent of them being refugees. The figures in Table 1
relate to the number of migrants transported by the ICEM since
its constitution to January 1959, out of a total of 850,000.
Table 1. Migrants transported by teh ICEM until January 1959
Countries of origen
Italy
Germany
Austria
Holland
Greece
Spain
Countries of destination
241,000
195,000
142,000
60,000
57,000
20,000
Australia
US
Canada
Argentina
Brazil
Israel
230,000
160,000
143,000
93,000
72,000
36,000
14
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
15
Family
Australia Reunion
10,374
159
10,994
571
10,044
996
8,727
822
9,657
Travel
Loans
112
133
647
1,282
1,646
MOP
Total
108
347
604
1,099
10,486
11,394
11,609
11,609
13,224
16
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THE AGREEMENT
17
Table 3.
Countries of origen
Italy
Germany
Austria
Spain
Countries of destination
19,043
8,153
2,820
2,623
Canada
Australia
Latin America
United States
25,657
3,985
3,680
2,224
Source: F. Bastos de Roa, Immigration in Latin America, Pan American Union, Secretariat General of the Organization of American States,
Washington D.C., 1964, p. 253.
18
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THE AGREEMENT
19
Its objectives were to provide spiritual care for all catholic migrants, to assist in their integration into parochial and community
life, and to act in liaison with the Government and other organizations in the interests of Catholic migration. Included in its activities were, apart from the recruitment of immigrants abroad,
the distribution of religious publications and leaflets of instruction in various languages, the appointment of ships chaplains,
and the disposition and support of priests of required nationalities to work with their fellow nationals in camps, hostels and
parishes. In the field of operations, the FCIC granted travel loans,
did counselling of migrants, carried out processing and documentation tasks, and assisted in the reunion of families and in the
placement and integration of migrants.24
20
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
21
Roman Catholic
20,90%
22.94%
24.93%
Church of England
30.01%
37.93%
34.91%
In 1955, and after commenting on the matter with some Department of Immigration officials including Hayes, Monsignor
Crennan decided to include Spain in his agenda. He visited different provinces in which, with the help of the Diocesan Emigration Committees he could observe, first hand, the desires of so
many Spaniards to emigrate anywhere, Australia included. Later,
through the CCEM, he made his move to the Minister.
The timing was right. Spain had joined the United Nations only
months before, and negotiations to become a member of the
ICEM were under way. The foreign policy mechanisms of the
Spanish state, still stiff after so many years of isolation, were gradually receiving the lubrication they needed to perform adequately
in international politics. Spanish Foreign Affairs welcomed
Crennans visit, if not for other reasons, because it allowed the
Department to rehearse some of its new functions.
As an immediate consequence of this meeting, the Spanish diplomatic machinery started to move. From the Minister of Foreign
22
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THE AGREEMENT
23
bility of action for the next financial year was delayed by the
Australian request for detailed information on eleven points.
Canberra officials wanted to know whether Madrid would agree
to all the customary conditions on assisted migration: to make a
free contribution toward the passage costs on equal basis to Australia; to provide documentation and carry out the preliminary
processing and inland transportation of migrants; to assist the
Australian selection team with police and other records, as well
as with office accommodation, interpreters and clerical workers.
The Department of Immigration was also interested in the number of migrants Spain was prepared to assist, and whether there
were any restrictions on the migration of skilled tradesman or
single girls. It also asked if migrants could make a contribution to
their passage costs and, if not, how the difference could be covered.
Consul Tabanera felt constrained to explain a number of clauses
to Madrid. Regarding clause (v) which stated that Spain would
agree to ... every migrant signing an undertaking to work in employment approved by the Australian Government for two years,28
he pointed out it should not be taken too seriously, as there was
so much demand of workers that it was not difficult for migrants
to change their jobs. However, care should be taken, according
to the Consul, to avoid Spanish migrants being sent to inhospitable areas, and being forced to remain there.29 Tabanera also
elaborated on the reasons behind the question in clause (vii),
relating to the Spanish Government disposition on the departure
of single girls, explaining that the Department of Immigration
was anxious to avoid a gross sexual imbalance amongst the new
arrivals.
24
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THE AGREEMENT
25
26
OPERACIN CANGURO
ment in May 1957, and its materialization when the first expedition of Spanish assisted migrants disembarked in Brisbane in August 1958. The initiative was taken by Senator John Ignatius
Armstrong, member of the Australian Labour Party, fervent Catholic
and, as the Consul put it, the best friend Spain has in Australia.
Through him, an agreement was reached in April 1956 to send
two people to Spain in December the same year, to study the
feasibility of bringing two hundred labourers to work in the North
Queensland cane industry for the 1957 season. The two representatives to be sent were R. Muir, secretary of the Queensland
Cane Growers Council and member of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee, and R. E. Armstrong, Australian High
Commissioner and head of the Australian Migration Office at
Australian House in London.34
In this way, the Queensland sugar cane industry was to join
forces with the FCIC in fighting, from within the Australian political system, for the opening of a migration flow from Spain. Why
the cane growers were so interested, and how they managed to
influence the course of events are the questions to be considered
in the following section.
THE AGREEMENT
27
515
658
926
28
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
29
30
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
31
Flaws, Regional Director of the Department of Labour and National Service in Townsville, the 80 per cent of the canecutters
employed were non-British migrants.44 The sugar industry tried
to overcome its labour shortages in the mid fifties by arranging
with the Department of Immigration to bring to the area Italian
migrants specially selected for cane-cutting tasks. As the problem
remained, in the late fifties employers in the industry tried a similar scheme, but bringing instead Spaniards from the Basque provinces.
A closer study of how the Italian scheme was enacted will
reveal two central matters. Firstly, why still more migrant workers
were needed in the second half of the decade, thus giving the
cane growers reasons to press the Department of Immigration for
migrant workers from Spain. Secondly, to appreciate how the
negotiations were conducted with the Department of Immigration for that purpose. In fact, we will argue, the Spanish scheme
for North Queensland was a small-scale version of the Italian.
The Italian migration Agreement of 1951 opened North
Queensland cane growers to a new source of migrant labour
after the Displaced Persons Scheme had terminated. Nevertheless the QCGC as well as the ASPA, still stressed in their annual
meetings, the chronic labour shortages in the area.45 It was suggested that a pool of migrant labour for cane cutting and field
work be established in North Queensland prior to the commencement of the harvesting season.46
The problem was not only to attract migrants, but to attract the
right kind of migrants. As far as labour was concerned, the 1954
season was considered the worst season that sugar producers
had endured, not excluding even the war years.47 At the begin-
32
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THE AGREEMENT
33
Some 400 of the men with their womenfolk and children disembarked, and the remainder landed in Townsville. A second expedition came on the Toscanelli, that arrived at Sydney on July 13,
completing the figure of 1,500 migrants the Queensland team had
helped in the selection; 350 of them were allotted to the North
NSW canefields.53 They came from the South of Italy and Sicily.
Peter Lalli, who accompanied the expedition, said on arrival: The
migrants proved to be an excellent type, willing to do hard work,
and accustomed to a rural environment.54
The success of this scheme led to arrangements for similar measures for the 1956 season. The Chief Migration Officer in Rome
was instructed to recruit 500 cane cutters plus up to 200 dependents to arrive on or after May 15, 1956. A further 300 cane cutters
to complete the industrys estimated total requirements of 800
were to arrive early in July. But the scarcity of suitable cane cutters was only part of the problem the sugar growers had to face:
Of very serious concern to all growers, apart from the shortage of
reliable cane cutters was their extortionate demands for over awarded
cutting and loading rates, the breaking of contracts, and the unpredictable drift of cutters from farm to farm and from district to district.55
34
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Association for a ten per cent general wage increase under the
Sugar Industry Award, and many other items affecting both the
growing and milling side of the industry. A general strike occurred between September 4 and 9. The spread of the trouble
was averted by a compulsory conference held at the instigation
of the President of the Industrial Court.57
By then, conversations were well under way between the QCGC
and the Department of Immigration to bring migrants from the
Spain. They were to constitute a labour surplus for the growers,
to weaken industrial action. Late in 1956, the Commonwealth
Immigration Advisory Committee met in Brisbane and recommended the Government to seek migrants in Spain for sugarcane cutting in Queensland. From then on, the issue arose regularly on the different forums where migration policies were discussed. QCGC Secretary R. A. Muir visited Spain in December at
that effect, and he was impressed with the hard working qualities of Spanish workers. On his return he said he thought Australians would get on well with Spanish and that Spanish would like
Australia and assimilate easily.58
The first group of Spanish migrants was expected to arrive for
the 1957 season. The growers press announced the plan on January
15, 1957:
The proposal to introduce Spanish labour into the cane fields was
discussed at the recent meeting of the Commonwealth Immigration
Advisory Council in Melbourne. If the Spaniards are recruited they
probably will come from the Basque provinces. Australia will investigate the possibility of arranging to transport the Spaniards in association with the ICEM, of which Spain is now a member. Under such an
arrangement ICEM would contribute substantially to the cost of transport..59
THE AGREEMENT
35
36
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
37
Beside Rev. McEvoy letter, this Molnar cartoon explained better than a
thousand words what the Australian atmosphere towards Spanish
migration was. The Sydney Morning Herald, January 18, 1958, p. 2.
38
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THE AGREEMENT
39
40
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Valcrcel sent this information to Tabanera, in case the Consulate could do something to change the minds of the Australian
officials. Four days later, he wrote to Amstrong in London, adding
a further consideration: the Spanish Government recognized the
legal right of its citizens to migrate and this right was not to be
restricted only to one particular region of Spain. He ended the
letter by pointing out that it was upon this issue that the further
collaboration of the IEE with the Australian Government would
depend.66 Armstrong insisted on June 26 that, according to Hayes,
it was essential for the migrants to be exclusively from the Basque
provinces, otherwise, the negotiations could be considered terminated. Valcrcel wrote to the Consul that since Armstrong answers with, stubbornness . . . our decision is to freeze the negotiations until we can establish direct diplomatic relations.67
Australian reasons for wanting exclusively Basques can be found
in the sugar industrys previous experience with them, and in its
obsession with getting the right kind of cane cutters. Sociological
ideas may have bolstered this preference as well. A distinction
was often made between north and south, the north considered
as more suitable for settling in Australia than the south (north
Europe vs. south Europe, north Italy vs. south Italy etc.).68 This
assumption was quite common amongst Australians high level
public officials. It often appeared, subtly, in the press, as in the
following instance:
Most seoritas come from the north of Spain which is proving an
excellent recruiting ground for migrants. So far this year we have
welcomed 401 assisted Spanish migrants, and they are proving excellent settlers.69
THE AGREEMENT
41
42
OPERACIN CANGURO
had not totally come to terms with the presence of Italian and
other South European people, and they were not ready yet for
the Spaniards.
This might have been the reason to explain why the Australia
Government proceeded with such secrecy on the first stages of
the negotiation with Spain. When the press reported the two month
European tour of Hayes, there was a mention of all the countries
he visited (Britain, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Italy and Switzerland), but not of Spain.76 The first time the Australian press
reported the plan, with the exception of the note in the Australian Sugar Journal mentioned earlier, was on July 1957, with the
occasion of the Holt visit to Spain: curiously enough, this visit, to
which large coverage was given in almost all Australian newspapers77 was presented by the Spanish authorities as top secret.78
There was some reaction in the press towards this news. Reeves,
President of the British Australian Society, complained about the
reduction of the percentage of British immigrants, who he estimated comprised only 32.2 per cent of the total79 At the time of
the next Australian Citizenship Convention, a letter by Rev. T. P.
McEvoy broached the matter of Spanish migration. He pointed
out three issues: first he asked whether migrants from a fascist
country were more eligible than migrants from a communist country; second, he signalled that fascists, apart from being politically
reactionaries, do not allow religious freedom, Protestants being
banned; and third, he inquired whether sending Spaniards to North
Queensland, already a little Europe in Australia, would justify
migration on the grounds of defence reasons. Prime Minister
Menzies, who attended for the second time a Citizenship Convention, remarked that migration can not be turned on and off,
THE AGREEMENT
43
like a tap. Dr. Evatt, the Leader of the Opposition, criticised not
the plan in itself, but the way in which it was handled: The fact
that Spaniards are coming to Australia as migrants should have
been explained and related to the other aspects of their coming,
but there was no explanation. Its just being done.80
It was not only a question of the racial preferences or public
opinion. The Australian economy was passing through a period
of crisis. Commenting further on the subject of the five hundred
Spaniards, Holt had to refer to the unemployment situation, despite his disregarding it as important:
I do not regard the current level of unemployment as in any way
serious by comparison with standards in other countries. One third of
one per cent of the work force is as close to full employment as you
can reasonably get, unless you move into the undesirable position of
having an excess demand for labour.81
44
OPERACIN CANGURO
THE AGREEMENT
45
was the first operation of its kind: the Australian selection team
will set the standards as high as possible. On economic matters,
Australia would contribute 100 American dollars for each migrant
(instead of the 85 agreed before). It will also be necessary for the
applicants to be clear from the security point of view. I suggest
that this matter be discussed later, on a personal basis, between
Spanish official and an Australian officer whom, it is proposed,
will visit Spain prior to the commencement of the selection activities. It added that a certificate from the Spanish police relating
to their civil conduct, would be necessary. The letter finished by
directing Valcrcel to the Rome office when dealing with questions of administrative nature.86
The IEE agreed. On January 16, 1957, Valcrcel met with CIME
officials and the Australian selection team headed by Waterman.
By March 23, 400 Spaniards had applied for migration from the
provinces of Santander, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, Navarra,
Huesca y Teruel. Of them, 249 had been preselected.87 In May it
was known that the 166 migrants finally selected were to proceed
from Irun to Trieste on June 26, and then board the Italian ship
Toscana. The 55 year old Father Tomas Ormazbal Ayarbide, who
spoke English, was appointed by Monsignor Ferris, head of the
CCEM, for the pastoral care of the migrants.88 Enrique Lpez
Rodrguez, Mdico Inspector de Emigracin, also escorted the
expedition. Following Vice Consul de Viana suggestion, Alberto
Urberuaga, a Spanish long term settler in Queensland, was appointed honorary Vice Consul in Brisbane.89 The Toscana finally
berthed Brisbane on August 9, 1958, with 159 migrants. They
formed, according to Waterman, one of the bests groups.90
Senator J. I. Amstrong visited Spain in June, on his way to
46
OPERACIN CANGURO
47
48
OPERACIN CANGURO
49
perspectives of this migration scheme. The selection of the migrants was carefully made, and the Australian authorities seemed
contented. The only reserve was the gross exaggerations of the
Spanish press on the economic conditions of the workers there:
Australian prosperity is evident, although some Spanish publications
have grossly exaggerated the wages that are being paid there for
manual work Of all the emigrants sent there by the IEE, not a
single one has been repatriated at our Governments expense, which
speaks for the extreme care with which the selection procedures
have been conducted... The Australian authorities are very satisfied,
despite the high moral, professional and health standards they require from immigrates.94
In July 1961, Manuel Solana, Secretary General of the IEE visited Canberra, and in August, Hayes visited Madrid. Valcrcel again
travelled to Australia in November 1961, also accompanied by
Lahiguera, and by Rev. Justo Prez de Urbel, Abbot of the Monastery of the Valley of the Fallen. Lahiguera announced in Canberra
that Spain was ready and willing to increase its quota of Australian migrants to at least 2,500 a year; the Spanish government
hoped to send more migrants to Australia to balance a fall in
migration to Latin American countries and large increases in the
Spanish population. He understood that the Australian Government had adopted a go-slow policy on Spanish migration to
allow migrants to become fully assimilated to the Australian way
of life. The Spanish Government was very pleased with the treatment and conditions of Spanish migrants in Australia. The Australian migration system was a magnificent one, Lahiguera said.95
The highlight of the diplomatic honeymoon between Australia
and Spain for 1962, was the June visit of Downer and Heyden, as
a part of their European tour. They held conversations with Min-
50
OPERACIN CANGURO
51
Consul Garays ambitions of becoming the first Spanish ambassador in Australia vanished. After the Consulate was moved back
to Sydney, he kept a low profile, with long periods of absence.
After the sudden death of Vice Consul Fernndez de Viana, who
had faithfully served the Consulate interests under the previous
two Consuls, and had followed all the intricacies of the migration
arrangements since its very beginning, Jos Luis Daz was appointed to fill the vacancy. He was in charge of the Consulate
52
OPERACIN CANGURO
affairs during the periods Garay was absent, and until the appointment of Consul de la Riva in March 1963.
However, the diplomatic contacts allowed the two countries to
develop further migration arrangements. During the 1959-60 financial year the migration officials of Spain and Australia agreed
to carry out two new initiatives. First, to select another group of
single migrants, not to go directly to the Queensland canefields
but to work first in the Murray river fruit area; this group was set
to arrive to Australia in the 1959-60 summer. The second initiative
was the launching of the Plan Marta. In this way, what was just
an informal Agreement signed by both Governments in 1956-57
for one single expedition, was to regulate the relations between
Spain and Australia, without necessitating any more formal Treaty.
From the automatic application of this Agreement, in 1961, the
migration of family units started, and the 1962-63 financial year
saw the figure of migrants coming from Spain soar to 4,326.
Negotiations to establish Family Reunion programmes started
late in 1959. From 1960, Spaniards who were within the eligible
categories101 started joining the groups of assisted migrants. Accommodation was provided for them by the nominators. The
nominees had to pay the full fare, with the help of credits arranged by the CCEM and the CIME. From July 1, 1961, an Assisted
Nominated Dependents Scheme was set up, and both Governments contributed towards passage money for those who came
under it. The eligible categories for sponsored unassisted migrants
broadened, including boyfriends, who are not eligible for an
assisted passage, and can only come if they pay for their fare and
put down a deposit of 200 pounds, to be returned to them once
the marriage takes place.102
53
54
OPERACIN CANGURO
55
56
OPERACIN CANGURO
tries and the language barrier. Certainly too, many skilled workers found their ways through the selection procedures and arrived in Australia as labourers, as will be explained later.
A more conflicting issue was, however, where to select the
migrants from. This was precisely the issue that interested the
Spanish Government most. Immersed in an almost chaotic wave
of internal migration from country to town and from rural to
industrial areas, affecting millions of people over which little planning was possible,110 the Spanish Government found that external migration was comparatively much easier to regulate. Spanish
officials risked the carrying out of the Operacin Canguro on
these grounds, and only an agreement on the Basque exclusive/
preferential dilemma saved it in the last minute. They included a
group of twenty six non Basques in this first expedition so as to
make it clear to Canberra that they were not prepared to give in
on this issue. The 1959 and 1960 groups were recruited from the
north of Spain, but including Asturias, Valladolid, Burgos and
Navarra as well.
By the time family migration started it seems that Madrid had
already acquired the power to decide where to select the migrants from. An exception to this rule, was, however, the Canary
Islands, a region which accounted for the second biggest number
of emigrants. Canberra needed only to look at the map to know
that Africa was not yet one of the Australian sources of migrant
intake. Only as an exception, some Canarian people went to
Australia during these years.111
Australian officials decided on the number of migrants, their
labour status and the geographical areas in which to place them,
according to the requirements the Department of Labour and
57
58
OPERACIN CANGURO
eral, Garca Trevijano, pointed out, there are sections of the Spanish population who do not like emigration.114 They place a lot
of obstacles in our way. Abroad, we are held responsible for
making emigration difficult, and at home they say we encourage
it .115
In the Ley de Ordenacin de la Emigracin of 1960, and with
the aim to channel migration rather than to encourage it, they
banned its advertising. A polemic on whether this ban should be
lifted was still going on inside the IEE after the Australian scheme
had been closed.116 The provincial migration authorities had no
obligation to fill all the migration positions allotted to their provinces. Not that there was any need for advertising, though, as by
word of mouth, all the vacancies available were rapidly filled.
The IEE transferred most of its functions to the CCEM in the
Marta Programme, and the CCEM helped also in the enactment
on the Family Reunion schemes arranged with Australia, before
as well as after the suspension of the Agreement. This was due, in
part, to the lack of adequate infrastructure for the part of the IEE.
It was the reason why the IEE tended to transfer to the CIME and
the Australian Mission some of its most delicate functions in the
selection process, which proved to be a source of conflict, as we
will see below.
The ICEM, jointly with its CIME office in Spain, was in charge
of arranging and supervising the sea or air transportation to Australia. On the sea voyages, an IEE officer, a doctor and a priest
also escorted the Spanish groups. It was also a function of the
CIME to translate into Spanish all the information given by Australian authorities that migrants were supposed to know before
arrival. CIME officials also assisted the CCEM in the training courses
59
developed in the Marta Plan, and the IEE in the training courses
it organized for migrants in general.
The CIME edited three booklets in Spanish for the use of Spanish migrants to Australia. The first one contained specific information on working conditions in the canefields, stating working
hours, duties, description of the work, salaries, accommodation
etc., and also general notions on history and geography, climate,
religion and language.117 There was another edited by the ICEM
and used for the Marta training courses, and also for the training
of some other single women to be sent to Canada during the
same period.118 CIME also edited a training course for the same
purpose; its sixteen lessons included topics such as personal hygiene, ways of doing the washing up or the cleaning of the house,
the use of household electrical appliances etc.119 A booklet published also by the CIME before 1962 was distributed to all assisted
migrants from mid 1960. In it, apart from the general information
about history, climate, religion etc. detailed information was given
on holding camps, hostels, Commonwealth Employment Offices,
accommodation, education and social security.120 These booklets
represented all the written information that migrants received prior
their departure.
After their arrival at the point of disembarkation, the Australian
Department of Immigration arranged for the reception of all assisted migrants. They were temporarily accommodated in holding camps, most of them at Bonegilla, as we will see later. Breadwinners were interviewed by the Commonwealth Employment
Officers in the camp and placed in employment. Then, they would
proceed either to employer found accommodation, or to a Commonwealth Hostel. These arrangements continued until each in-
60
OPERACIN CANGURO
61
62
OPERACIN CANGURO
63
prepared to create trouble.126 Twelve migrants were finally remanded to appear in Court on August 15. According to Labour
MP Dr. J. F. Cairns, the camp riot was a revolt in the Eureka
tradition, and not migrants but the Menzies Government should
be punished.127 The rioting charges against the five Italians and
six Germans and Austrians were finally withdrawn.128
Of the 4,700 migrants in the camp at the time these incidents
occurred, there were about 150 Spaniards, who had arrived on
the Roma on June 21, the first group of family units to reach
Australia. They did not take, as a group, an active part in the riot:
no a single Spanish name come up, on the contrary, they acted
as Red Cross.129 When the next group arrived on the Aurelia,
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OPERACIN CANGURO
with over five hundred migrants, only about twelve Spanish families remained in the camp. They told the new arrivals what had
happened and, as a consequence, some Spaniards went to the
employment office, warning they would create a disturbance if
there was not work for them.130 Vice Consul Jos Luis Daz was
then called by the Australian authorities, and held a meeting with
his countrymen in the cinema, in which he asked them to be
prudent.131
The consequences of the Bonegilla riots for the Spanish migration scheme went, however, much further than that, in no a small
part due to Dazs sensationalist approach to the problem, which
we shall discuss later. Moreover, Spanish diplomacy at the migration level seemed to follow the trends of its Italian counterpart,
and Italy, as a consequence of the revolt, was passing through a
delicate moment in its relations with Australia. Italian Deputy Minister for Migration, Ferdinando Storchi, visited Australia, and
Bonegilla in September 1961. Although he stated that the relations between the two countries are very cordial indeed,132 he
also expressed his concern with the system of recruiting and selecting migrants in Italy, the recognition of tradesmens qualifications, and their initial settling in Australia, all in the light of a
pending Agreement to be revised in Rome early next year, to
align it with the present situation in the two countries.133 Through
the Sydney Consulate, Spanish diplomats followed the difficulties,
in 1962, with the revision of the Italian Agreement.134 The reasons
for the Spanish discomfort with the migration scheme did not derive solely from these observations. By the end of the year, Madrid
officials had reasons of their own to be unhappy with the way the
Department of Immigration was handling Spanish migration.
65
In Western Australia, both Commonwealth and State Governments had carefully prepared a plan, starting from the end of
September 1962, to bring a thousand Spanish migrants to work
on the standard gauge railway project. Changes in the route of
the railway were made when it was too late to alter this plan, thus
eliminating many anticipated jobs. By November 10, three groups
had already arrived by plane, to the Holden Migrant Accommodation Centre at Northam. Five days later, the Aurelia disembarked another load in Fremantle. During the following months,
over a hundred breadwinners, more than four hundred people in
total, stayed in the camp, unable to find work. The only jobs
available, and these were scarce, were in the Avon Valley area,
and many did not want to go, as the conditions were harsh and
the migrants could not take their. families along. On November 3,
Rafael Arias, father of three children, summed up the general
feeling of Spaniards: Everyone at the centre has been wonderful
to us. We have been very well treated. We are not worried yet,
only impatient for work.135
From then on, tension began to build up in the camp. To add
to the problem of lack of employment, those who worked claimed
they were promised between 15 and 20 pounds, and they were
earning less than 13 a week. Some of this tension was released in
a demonstration, in which about a hundred men and women
marched on the township to dramatize their pleas for more work
and more pay.136
This event, a second Bonegilla on a smaller scale, was the
most serious disturbance led by Spanish migrants in the early
sixties. The Vice Consul wrote to Madrid in a long report about a
demonstration by Spaniards in Perth, in a new camp they are
66
OPERACIN CANGURO
being sent to, who claimed that they were not being paid the
wages they had been promised . . . I fear that things will not stop
here: migrants of other nationalities destroyed the camps last year,
during ten months of total stoppage. I have written to the Director
of the camp, asking him for further information.137
Echoes of this event filtered into the Spanish press in Australia138 , and in the correspondence between Madrid and the Consulate in August 1963, when Garca Trevijano, Director General of
the IEE, asked the Consul for detailed information on the matter: I
hope that this report will be followed up by others, particularly
from the western part of the country, which is the one that worries
us the most.139
In the report on Western Australia sent by Consul de la Riva in
February 1964, he summarized his views on the incident:
The Northam camp was established for the reception of immigrants, as
it was understood that they would easily find employment in Western
Australia, which is now in process of industrial development; but things
did not go as planned, and it became necessary to transfer the workers
to other regions. Some of our fellow countrymen were victims of this
misjudgment. At present, this camp is closed.140
67
Many have concealed their real professions, with the purpose of being included in any of the groups, and these are the ones who create
the biggest problems. Within this class, most are people who have
got some sort of baking from Spanish authorities in very high, high or
medium positions . . . We have had a lot of pressure, as may have
been the case with the IEE, to include them in the expeditions.141
68
OPERACIN CANGURO
heaviest and most dangerous jobs, and by doing as much overtime as they could, may have them been able to save good money.
They were not used to hard work, and they soon realized they
had made a mistake when coming. Then, they complained against
the CIME and the Australian Mission in Madrid, and if they were
game enough, against the IEE as well. Coming from the guild
recommended by very high authorities, as la Serna put it, their
voice surely was heard in the right places.
However, the group whose complaints were taken more seriously was that of skilled workers that had arrived since mid 1962.
It was a very small group, less than ninety, but their claims were
echoed by many other migrants that considered themselves skilled
and equally misled, although they did not arrived to Australia as
such.
Skilled migrants expected to find in Australia a house, work
in their speciality, and minimum monthly salary of 10,000 pesetas, over 70 pounds. They based their claims on a document
issued by CIME on January 30, 1962, which they referred to as el
contrato del CIME, containing a list of specialities in demand,
the prerequisites to apply for them, fares to pay and other details,
including those the migrants alleged were not forthcoming, signed
by Chief of Operations B. H. Hayes.145
As had happened with migrants from other nationalities, Spaniards who felt they were misled by the selection teams in Spain
voiced their anger wherever they could, and one of the most
effective ways for doing so was the Spanish press. In the tightly
controlled Francoist press, complaints had to pass through a severe political screening before publication, but once printed, their
echoes could easily reach the higher ranks of the regime.
69
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OPERACIN CANGURO
inquired in the CIME offices was told that Mr. Fernndez is perfectly all right, and what was published in the letter is a lie, and
he prepared a new letter of complaint. Following instructions
from Madrid, Daz arranged to repatriate him, as soon as the
Department of Immigration gave its authorization, as he had not
finished his two year period in Australia.
The placement problems at Bonegilla and Northam, the selection of unsuitable migrants to work as labourers in Australia, and
the lack of immediate validity of the working qualifications given
by the Australian Mission in Madrid to nearly a hundred Spanish
skilled tradesmen were not the only caused of the Spanish Government concern with its Australian emigration. To add up, two
small incidents were still to occur. Although of not much importance, their timing had some bearing on the final outcome of this
migration plan.
Fernando Beltran, the IEE officer who escorted the Spanish
group, noticed that the ANZ Bank office operating on the Aurelia
voyage that berthed in Melbourne on January 28, 1963 had altered the exchange rate from 165 pesetas to the pound to 140 pts.
as it should have been. The mistake was redressed in Bonegilla,
but echoes of it reached Madrid.
On Sunday March 3, 1963, the Australian press gave quite large
coverage to the news that five young Spanish women had been
working in the nude at a vineyard near Mildura:
Quite a few Spaniards came to this district this season, but they were
split into groups. All the Spanish women are accompanied by their
husbands. The five nudists are working together at one vineyard and
their husbands on a neighbouring farm. The couples live together in
one or other of the vineyards150 .
71
The naked women incident seen through the eyes of Molnar in The
Sydney Morning Herald, March 6, 1963, p. 2.
72
OPERACIN CANGURO
73
get a formal Agreement signed, like that for Italy, let alone to
have a consulate or embassy representing Australian interests in
Madrid. In normal reciprocity, Spain not only abstained from creating an embassy in Canberra, but it neglected its Consular representation. Once the most delicate diplomatic deal had been done,
Madrid thought it was just a matter of letting the bureaucratic
machine move at its own slow pace.
Table 1.
Spanish emigration
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
to Lat. America
33,242
34,370
32,295
23,024
to Australia
799
837
4,230
1,436
to Europe
19,610
59,243
65,336
83,728
74
OPERACIN CANGURO
75
76
OPERACIN CANGURO
rettes, toothpaste, soap etc. They have only 2 left to pay taxes. After
two years work, they do not have enough to pay the return fare if
they wanted to return. If they earn less, they can not live decently nor
save. . . They can be made redundant at eight days notice, and the
employment benefits, 3.5 pounds for a male single, does not cover
even for accommodation. The Consul lend them money, on humanity grounds, and so as not to allow them to insult Spain, and he
invites bosses for dinner out of his own pocket, asking them to employ Spaniards . . . Spanish refugees and renegades tell them that the
difficulties are only at the beginning, but migrants know better. Some
lead almost a monastic life, they would have been millionaires in
Spain . . . others become mad, and have to be repatriated . . . CIME,
Catholic Emigration and the Australian Mission say this is the earthly
paradise when it is exactly the opposite.155
77
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OPERACIN CANGURO
To give greater weight to his impressions he added the opinions, sometimes very influential, of the Spanish chaplains: The
Spanish chaplain of Melbourne, Father Eduardo Snchez, and
that of Sydney Father Benigno Martn have visited me, and they
have asked me to inform you of the deplorable situation in which
the Spanish immigrants in this country find themselves.161
At a meeting with Carmelo Matesanz, new Director of Asuntos
Sociales - Emigracin, on March 15, 1963, Gaspar Gmez de la
Serna, Deputy Chief of the CIME, knew that, finally, the Spanish
Government had made up its mind, and the 1956-57 migration
Agreement with Australia had been suspended. At this same time,
Ramn de la Riva Gamba was appointed Consul General in Sydney.
We have already focused on the causes that brought the Spanish migration scheme to this end: the difficulties in the placement
of migrants, particularly in Western Australia; the selection flaws,
bringing into the country office workers who were doomed to
fail, and skilled tradesmen who were not warned on selection of
the impossibility of working in their trades on arrival, because of
their lack of knowledge of English. Problems that were presented
to Madrid through the distorted lense of Vice Consul Jos Luis
Daz, who was able to pass on several occasions his personal
opinions in official letters directly to the Minister.
As already pointed out, for Daz to bear such power. was just a
by-product of the lack of interest on the part of Canberra in the
diplomatic side of the migration programme. It is this diplomatic
79
issue which should account to a large extent for the drastic and
unexpected end of the scheme. The Italian Assisted Migration
Programme, much larger in size, survived better. the daily wear
and bear. Problems of major importance compared with the Spanish case often arose, but they were more easily solved. A comparison between the Italian migration treaty, and the Spanish informal agreement, may explain why.
All the clauses written in the Spanish agreement were also written, often to the letter, in the Italian treaty; the latter. was, however, more complete, covering more possible situations. One clause
in the treaty had it been in the Spanish document, might have
saved both Governments some embarrassment later: No official
pamphlet explaining the Scheme shall be issued without the concurrence of the two Governments.162 A major difference was that
the Italian treaty was made for a period of five years, and could
be continued there after by mutual agreement, not only for one
single expedition. In the event that either Italy or Australia wanted
to terminate the Scheme beforehand, either party had to give the
other six months notice of its intentions.
Given the disposition of the Spanish officials to collaborate, no
further diplomatic arrangements were considered necessary for
the Australian side. Canberra limited itself to creating the Australian Mission in Madrid when the volume of immigrants from Spain
necessitated doing so. While the volume of migration was small,
the migration procedures ran smoothly. But in 1962, when the
Spanish Scheme really started to take off with thousands of migrants being transported, the problems grew. Not having the diplomatic cover, the Scheme lacked the flexibility it needed to cope
with them; this caused it to break suddenly, to the surprise of the
80
OPERACIN CANGURO
81
The FCIC guessed that the difficulties in the placement of migrants were the real cause of the suspension. It thought that the
measures taken to deal with the problem were too extreme, and
did not hide its disappointment:
In April 1963, following the decision of the Spanish authorities, the
migrant flow to Australia was cut. It has been explained that this
decision was based on domestic grounds; however, the employment
difficulties in Australia during the last months of 1962 had also been
mentioned. But these were restricted to Western Australia, affected
only a limited number of migrants and were of a temporary nature.
Certainly, these difficulties were not of such importance as to explain
the suspension of this migration. Otherwise, the placement of Spanish workers in Australia has proceeded without difficulties, and there
is a strong demand for Spanish workers on the part of the employers
. . . They have created a favourable impression amongst the Catholic
community in Australia. The single Spanish women, approximately
800, have gained an excellent reputation, and there is no fear they
will lose their moral standards.167
The Australian Government thought it was then time to upgrade its diplomatic channels with Spain, and established a Consulate in Madrid. This measure was announced by Downer in the
1963 Citizenship Convention held in June.168 In August, J. Blackie,
the Chief of the Australian Mission in Madrid, became the first
Consul General.169 The second Australian move was for saving
the family reunion programme. After some negotiations, at a
meeting of Secretary of the Department of Immigration Heyden
with Consul de la Riva, this was agreed.170 At the initiative of the
Australian Government, ministers for External Affairs Castiella and
Garfield Barwick met in New York in October and for once, some
understanding seemed to appear.171 The discussions were centered on five points, two of which had already been agreed: to
establish an Australian Consulate in Madrid and continuity in the
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OPERACIN CANGURO
It was necessary to wait until July 25, 1968 to see the next first
group of 168 Spanish migrants nominated by the Commonwealth
land at Sydney airport.175
Back in April, 1963, de la Riva was expected to clarify to Madrid
what was the real situation in Australia. Paradoxically, the migration authorities of the Spanish Department of Foreign Affairs, who
did not pay much attention to the migration scheme when it was
functioning, felt compelled to examine it in detail on the months
following its suspension. In his reports,176 de la Riva pointed out
the three major lessons to learn from the migration fiasco: firstly,
that Australia was a long-term, not a two-year migration consider-
83
84
OPERACIN CANGURO
In his reports, de la Riva often sent to Madrid elaborate statistics, with information in pesetas, on wages, family allowances,
expenses etc. In one of them (Table 2) he calculated the possible
average monthly savings of a family:
Table 2.
No. children
Salary
Accommodation
Fa.allowances
Savings
0 (wife works)
single
9500
8300
1275
2475
9500
6630
700
3570
15000
5150
9850
9500
2700
6800
85
There were still two matters to be dealt with after the suspension of the Agreement. Migration authorities of both countries
and the other agencies involved addressed them: one concerned
the family reunion programmes; the other, repatriations.
The Spanish Government had readily allowed by August 1963
first grade family reunion, for assisted as well as for non-assisted
migrants, and this agreement was applied with lax criteria. Appendix 2 Table 1 depicts the number of arrivals up to 1966. Another matter was that of sending for fiances: in this case, marriage had to precede migration. Blackie pointed out in Madrid
that Italians, as well as Australian Catholics including the Spanish
migration chaplains, preferred the marriage to be realized in Australia rather than by proxy. De Viana was of the same idea, having in mind the risks of marrying by proxi (maintaining a relationship through letters written by a friend of the fiance), and
that disappointed brides might easily blame the IEE for the failure.182
An interesting polemic took place amongst the Spanish authorities, centred on the ideas about the matter of Monsignor
Fernando Ferris, head of the CCEM. He was also against marriages by proxi, only exceptionally allowed by Canon Law, and
asked the Spanish Government to demand from the fiances only
the requirements the Church requires to celebrate a marriage as
listed in the Canon 1017. In this way the interests of the Church
are favoured, without contradicting the regulations on migration
of the state.183 But this would be, according to the IEE, facilitating no family reunion but family constitution. External Affairs did
not agree with this policy either:
Promises of marriage do not legally fulfil the immigration require-
86
OPERACIN CANGURO
ments until the wedding has taken place. If the wedding is the reason
for the trip, we must demand marriage by proxy . . . [if not, it may
happen] that they would change their mind, and we are left with a
helpless single woman on the wharf, with all the problems that such
a situation involves.184
Consul de la Riva stated his opinion considering two possibilities. In one, the bride claims the groom: not advisable, the groom
is bound to fail. In the second, the groom claims the bride: gives
a deposit of 350 pounds; if they marry, the deposit is refunded, if
not, the bride could fly back to Spain with it.185 Monsignor Ferris
did not agree with de la Riva: my dear friend and most exemplar
civil servant is logical but chrematistic in excess, he argued, asking himself what would happen if the bride is the one who does
not want to get married.186 Migrants, the churchman regretted,
engaged in civil or mixed religion marriages because of lack of
prospective partners, and the Australian Catholic hierarchy worry
because so many Catholic marriages are lost. He summed up his
views on the problem: We are dealing with human beings that
have a soul, and whose eternal life is at stake; sometimes we deal
with these issues with too earthly a criteria.187
While some migrants wanted people of their kin to join them
in Australia, others were eager to return to their families in Spain.
At the Consulate, many claimed they were told by the CIME that,
should they wish to return to Spain after the two year period, the
Spanish Government was to pay for the fare. Again, this was a lax
interpretation of point 20 in the booklet CIME distributed to migrants: Two years after arrival in Australia, the migrant who wishes
to return to Spain and lacks the necessary founds to pay for the
fare, may apply to the Spanish Consulate in Canberra for his repatriation, at the cost of the Spanish Government.188
87
88
OPERACIN CANGURO
89
90
OPERACIN CANGURO
money to pay for her trip to Australia. Through it, she finally was
able to see her son, Miguel, who was happily settled in
Melbourne.199
91
90%
91%
89.8%
78%
68.8%
65.4%
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OPERACIN CANGURO
58.6%
57.6%
42.2%
201
93
were given the opportunity and did not want to miss it. A sense
of adventure drove many single people to Australia on a sort of
two year working holiday. We have found no traces of clandestine migration, i. e. operators that brought migrants to Australia
outside the regular travel fares or the assisted passages of ICEM
and Governments.202
Later in the sixties, the Victorian migrant chaplain Father Eduardo
Snchez, of whom we shall hear more later, wrote:
The arrival of Spaniards in Australia began around 1958. Firstly, woodcutters came, mainly single, from Navarra, the Vascongadas, Santander
and Asturias. Then, as a part of Operacin Marta, 747 single girls
came into the country in several groups. At the same time and afterwards also, couples with children arrived here. About three years
ago, Spanish migration to Australia stopped, with the exception of
family reunion.203
94
OPERACIN CANGURO
SHIP
FROM
DATE
TO
DATE
MIGRANTS
Canguro
Toscana
Trieste
26.6
Brisbane
6.8.58
159
Eucaliptus
Montserrat
Bilbao
5.5
Freemantle 29.7.59
169
Emu
Monte Udela
Bilbao
Karry
Torres
19.12 Melbourne
21.1.60
402
372
425
95
A first group of 150 Spanish migrants will leave soon for Australia.
Most of them will be Basques, from the north of Spain. An Australian
immigration expert who recently visited Spain, expressed the view
that Australia could get on well with Spaniards, and that Spaniards
would like Australia and assimilate early. He was impressed by the
hard working quality of these migrants.204
96
OPERACIN CANGURO
97
When the cane season ended, some joined the tobacco season,
also in Queensland, while others went to pick fruit at Griffith
(NSW), or to work on the Snowy Mountains Scheme or the Port
Kembla steel industry. Often, they travelled with the same gang
they worked with in the canefields. When the next cane season
started, many would move northward again; others would remain in the industrial areas or were drained towards the big cities
of Sydney and Melbourne. They lived for some years a sort of
nomadic existence, moving in small batches northward and southward, its epicenter being the sugar area of North Queensland.
They kept this lifestyle, common to all workers that engaged in
rural seasonal jobs, until they settled in one area, forming a family, or until they returned to Spain.
The only official information migrants had on cane cutting, and
for that matter, on Australia, was what they could get from a
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OPERACIN CANGURO
booklet edited in Spanish by the CIME213 and handed to the migrants on selection. There might have been other information,
not necessary accurate, gathered from people with acquittances
already in Australia. The booklet gave general information about
the tasks involved in the work, salaries, working hours, unions,
baggage they should bring, and other useful ideas.
On the canefields the Spaniards worked at Ingham, Tully,
Innisfail, Cairns, Gordon Valley and Babinda, were most of the
cutters were Italians. Mr. Zamora, who owned a petrol station in
Tully, Mara Pedrola and few other long term Spanish settlers,
gave them the first explanations needed. The new arrivals soon
picked up enough Italian to get by. They divided into gangs,
according to friendship, family ties and village origins, and started
working. The season lasted from June to December, work was
from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., and included: burning, cutting and cleaning the cane, bundling and loading it, and laying the portable
rails on which it was transported. All in all, one of the toughest
rural jobs in the whole Australia - poisonous snakes including
four metre pythoms, and fevers traced later to parasites carried by
droves of rats inhabiting the fields...214
Salaries were of about 15 pounds, but, after a month, each
cutter got an average of 22 weekly. They had to deliver, by contract, a minimum daily quota, and it was on the surplus, where
the chances of earning more money increased. Another regulation was that the aggregate forthrightly earnings of a gang are
shared equally by the members of the gang. Consequently, slackers are not encouraged and each member of the gang endeavour
to do the right thing by his mates.215 While this system seemed
to work well for employers, the social relations within the gang
99
were often strained: The same mates would give you the sack if
you were not fast enough, or else you have to give them money
for allowing you to work with them, as it was in my case ... Fights
within the gang were common, unless you had good friendship
with all of them.216
Despite such difficulties, North Queensland attracted numerous Spanish migrants. Even when family migration started, some
men left wife and children behind and went northward to work
there, at least for one season. La Crnica echoed this attraction:
We loved Queensland from the first moment! They say the tropics attract people, that he who comes here once will always return... 217 Some admitted they could earn more elsewhere, but
100
OPERACIN CANGURO
101
the 1960 season. The farmers asked for 200 migrants, preferably
Italians suited for cane cutting, to arrive in June, and a further
400, preferably Italians and Spaniards from the Basque Provinces, to arrive in July and August.224 This means that, despite
their small number, Spanish cane-cutters had some positive impact amongst the farmers. However, immigrant labour, Spaniards
included, did not solve the long term problems of the industry as
management sow them. Growers sought machinery to overcome
restrictive practices: The cutters in lots of instances do not want
to take a cut on now unless you have got a loader, they do not
want to hand load cane.225
The industry was also competing for migrant workers with the
tobacco and fruit sectors. It was often thought that these competitors had the advantages:
The better class of cane cutters is lost to the industry . . . Absorbed
into other industries such as tobacco and fruit. Being a good type of
worker, he seeks to better himself and in doing so is lost to us, and
the less valuable men is left there for years, to become a burden on
us.226
We are to be faced with competition particularly from the tobacco
industry, towards the end of the season. You know the difficulties of
trying to inject new labour into the industry later in the season. Firstly,
the weather conditions are not propitious, and secondly, established
gangs are by no means anxious by that stage of the season to accept
new labour.227
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OPERACIN CANGURO
For the 1964 season, migrant labour was recruited from Malta
and directly flown in to Queensland; most of them deserted their
jobs after a week or two to go southward. They did not solve the
problems of the industry either.229
Apart from working in the canefields, this group of migrants
were employed also in the tobacco area in Queensland, and in
the Griffith and Mildura fruit picking areas. Working in the tunnels of the Snowy Mountains Scheme was the most important
non farming related activity this batch of migrants engaged in.
Social life in the tobacco area (Mareeba, Dimbulah), was very
much similar to life in the canefields: similar working hours, hardships, salaries; similar people. The season lasted from November
to March. If they had a car, some gangs could even go and work
in the fruit season at Griffith, where there was always, during the
early sixties, a steady group of Spanish workers. More likely,
though, they would take some time off to see what the conditions were in other parts of Australia, and to enliven for some
weeks the social and financial life of the Spanish clubs in Sydney
and Melbourne.
From 1960 through to the mid sixties, there was an important
presence of Spanish migrants in the Mildura grape picking area.
Mildura was the first point of destination of the expeditions that
arrived during the season. The first Spanish women to work there,
who came in small numbers in the Emu and Torres groups, did
so as cooks. Later, when family migration started and their number increased, they did picking as well.
Many migrants worked in the Snowy Mountains Irrigation
103
Scheme, usually for short periods of time. Often they did so for
companies that, having finished their jobs there, kept employing
them on other mines or dams in the Northern Territory, Queensland
and even Tasmania and New Zealand. Work was hard, but restricted to eight hours, and wages were, in general, better than
what they could earn in the cane. Despite their mobility, the Spaniards managed to create some social life there, helping each other
in finding work, and spending the weekends together making
paellas and drinking beer.
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OPERACIN CANGURO
Since the mid fifties, the Australian press had reported on the
interest of the Department of Immigration in bringing single women
to ease the imbalance of sexes amongst the migrant population.
Every effort is made to encourage male migrants to nominate
their single sisters of marriageable age, said a spokesman, so as
to avoid that situation of single migrants who even kill themselves because of loneliness and failure to obtain a woman230
Despite the special migration programmes to bring single women
from Greece and Italy, the problem had still not diminished by
the early sixties. The subject arose in the 1960 Citizenship Convention,231 and as usual in the press. The lack of marriageable
women was described as
one of the worst hardships of young male migrants from Europe . . .
A bride ship that brought 300 single girls [from Greece] was greeted
at the Woolloomooloo wharf by 4000 Greek bachelors last month. . .
They need a good girl, not a beautiful doll type looking for luxury.232
105
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OPERACIN CANGURO
The first group arrived in Melbourne on March 10, 1966. Senoritas will even sexes, was announced in the Sydney Morning
Herald the day before, informing that this group of 18 was the
first of a hundred single women to come to Australia by June 30.
On the same Qantas plane, seventy four Greek girls joined the
107
108
OPERACIN CANGURO
109
These women came with the Marta group which reached Melbourne
on February 16, 1963 to join their fiancees already in Australia.
During the course, each person would learn to which city she
was going to and to which household. Emphasis was put on the
commitment of working for two years as domestics:
You have undertaken to go to your new country to work as a domestic for two years. Fulfil this commitment seriously. You are helped
with transport and employment. This would cost you so much money
that you would not be able to emigrate on your own account. The
only way to pay for it is by being the best possible employee, and by
fulfilling your work commitment (Australia: two years; Canada: one
year).246
They were asked to sign a paper undertaking to work as domestics for two years. This document had no legal validity, as an
Immigration official commented on the arrival of the first group:
We bring them out here and place them in jobs as domestics. They
go their own social ways from there. No condition was placed on the
women to remain domestics. They were introduced into their own
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OPERACIN CANGURO
communities soon after arrival and from then on nature usually takes
its course.247
This caused tensions with some of the women, and from mid
1962 they were not asked to sign the paper. Their employers
were warned that, should they refuse to employ the person placed
for them, they would not have the opportunity to apply for another one.
In Sydney, two chaplains who spoke some Spanish, Fathers
Roch Romac OFM and Lenard Hsu OFM, were appointed to
help these migrants and were available to them by phone.248 In
Melbourne Father Hallis SJ fulfilled the same task. The Catholic
Migration Offices of both countries also agreed to send some
Catholic social workers to Australia. Monsignor Ferris contacted
Father Cornelio Urtaso, founder of the Secular Institute Vita et
Pax, who appointed three of its members for the task: Paquita
Bretn, nurse, and Mara Louisa Erro and Carmen Cervero, dressmakers. They landed in Australia with the Marta flight of June 14,
1961, and went to Sydney. As there were misunderstandings on
the financial arrangements in the agreement, Louisa and Carmen
had to put themselves to work so that Paquita could devote herself full time to her social task.
A small group in each expedition came to Australia to marry
their boyfriends or to join relatives that had already migrated
before. They normally would not engage in domestic work. So,
of the group that arrived in December 1960, five girls married
the following week after their arrival.249 Of the twenty four
mothers helps who went to Sydney in March 1961, eight were
married within a few hours of their arrival, four at Port Kembla
and four in Sydney suburbs.250 In some cases, marriage was ar-
111
ranged by letter, and they met for the first time at the airport.
These immigrants were from all walks of life: The fact that
they begin working as domestics does not mean that they worked
as domestics back in Spain. Many have university degrees and
some are schoolteachers and nurses.251 Father Tierneys words
reflect a reality that was often pointed out in the press. The vocational complexion of these women was discussed in the Australian Womens Weekly through interviews with six girls working
in Adelaide as waitresses and ladies companions. Of them, four
were schoolteachers in Spain, one a manicurist and the other:
she is rich, she does not do anything:
[They] explained in broken English: There is much propaganda in
Spain about Australia. Australia, they say, is better country in the
world, where people makes money, where live better, where people
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OPERACIN CANGURO
very happy. So we go to Australia. We get help from your Government, who help pay our air tickets if we agree to work in Australia for
two years. So we are here . . . It is hard to say what we think about
Australian men, because so far we have not met many Australian
men, only what you call New Australian men . . . People here seem to
work too hard, rush too much, we have time for other things in
Spain, for the siesta.252
Life for these women was not always as happy as the press
articles seemed to paint. Linguistic and cultural misunderstandings were common and, isolated in their working homes, it was
not always easy to cope. One of the girls, who came with the last
group, was sent to Brisbane, to work with a family with seven
children. She spent the days crying. Her matron tried to entertain
her, took her to English classes, to the doctor and, finally, back to
the Catholic Migration Office. She was offered other jobs but she
refused. She was allowed to stay in a residence for senior citizens, helping the nuns to pay for her keep. Eventually, she became a nurse, married and settled happily in Australia. Her depression was not uncommon, and the women often referred to it
as el mal de Australia.253
They were relieved to find that domestic work in Australia did
not have the pejorative connotations of criada back in Spain at
that time. Some girls found their work interesting and enjoyable,
and kept doing it until they married.254 Some others were soon
dismissed, as in one particular case, after all the electric appliances of the house were broken.255 Most of them did not finish
the two years there but either left to join the mainstream workforce,
or just worked in a different house where the same job was being
better paid. In fact, despite Father Tierney boasting that the old
subsistence and pocket money basis for domestic work had gone,
113
114
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After the first pilot tests with Spanish migrants in Australia had
apparently succeeded, Australian immigration officials began to
bring family units from Spain, from mid 1961. Amongst these
groups was a small percentage of single and also childless couples,
usually married on the day before their departure. All sea voyages (see Table 2) ended in Melbourne, although on occasion,
important groups of migrants disembarked in Fremantle.
Table 2.
Ship
Roma
Aurelia
Castel Felice
Aurelia
Fairsea
Aurelia
Fairsea
Aurelia
From
Vigo
Barcelona
Vigo
Barcelona
Cadiz
Barcelona
Vigo
Barcelona
Arrival date
21-6-61
9-8-61
3-2-62
16-11-62
14-12-62
28-1-63
6-2-63
10-4-63
115
under l
1-3
male
3-12
1
3
10
14
2
15
50
67
3
21
68
85
fem
male
fem
3-12 over l2 over l2
4
22
72
98
24
1
151
129
304
TOTAL
11
127
118
225
Table 4.
Disembarkation
Fremantle
Melbourne
Sydney
Date
ICEM
COGEDAR (1)
TOTAL
4-4-63
17
48
65
10-4-63
716
148
864
12-4-63
90
111
201
45
1
339
441
823
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OPERACIN CANGURO
117
two. Some Spanish migrants were employed by the camp as interpreters, cleaners and cooks;264 many new arrivals learnt from
these the first clues about life in Australia, and they were also
often misinformed by them about wages on the cane fields and
the utility of the Commonwealth Employment Service.265
Despite its remarkable success in holding and distributing hundred of thousands of migrants during its history, Bonegilla was
not enjoyed by most newcomers, and the Spanish group was no
an exception. Alejandro Rincn exemplifies what the usual first
reactions of the migrants were and how they tried to cope with
the new situation:
Our first impression was that it looked like a concentration camp: the
women started weeping. The food was good, but we could not bear
this horrible smell of suet; despite being forbidden, we soon got hold
of some portable gas rings, and we used to wash the food they gave
us with water and recook it Spanish style266
The sour reaction to Bonegilla had surely to do with the breaking of the rosy picture the migrants had elaborated in their minds
before arrival. As Consul de la Riva put it: The holding centres
had a bad reputation, not per se, but for the fact of being the
end of a fantasy of exaggerated propaganda and immigrants imagination, and the first shock of reality267 Lack of immediate work
was not the only cause of distress. The whole change of lifestyles
strained family relationships. When sent to rural jobs (grapes in
Mildura, tomatoes in Shepparton, tobacco in Myrtleford etc.), it
was common for men to go first to see if they liked the job, later
bringing their families along; in some cases, it took a month for
the husband to contact his family.268
Apart from the unfortunate Western Australian plan, to which
we have referred in chapter two, family migration from Spain,
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OPERACIN CANGURO
fulfilled its function in the four major areas where it was introduced: rural work in the tobacco area in Victoria, and industrial
work in the developing areas of Geelong (Victoria), Whyalla (South
Australia) and Wollongong/Port Kembla (NSW).
Many Spaniards went, from 1961 on, to the tobacco area of
Victoria (Myrtleford, Whitfield, Mount Beauty etc.) to do the seasonal jobs of picking and grading. Some stayed on for the rest of
the year, and formed, during the early and mid sixties, an important colony, with over a hundred families living there. Women
realized that they could help their husbands with the work, taking care of the family at the same time, and this was one of the
reasons for their settling down.269 Most of the settlers worked as
share-farmers, splitting half the profits with the owner, but having to pay from their share the wages for extra labour needed for
the picking season. From February to July work was hard, 16
hours a day seven days a week. Then, during the slack season,
work would consist of preparing the seeds, planting, watering,
spraying and weeding. At weekends, social life flourished: playing soccer against Italians, celebrating birthdays and christening
parties, going picnicking at a local dam, socializing around petrol
stations and milk bars serviced by Spaniards. From 1965 on, the
Spanish population in the area started to decrease; many returned
to Spain, and others to Melbourne, where the study opportunities
for children were better.
By the end of 1962, there were about a thousand Spaniards
residing in Geelong. Most worked on the railways, and in major
industries, Ford, International Harvester and Alcoa. Doing overtime and working on weekends they could earn around 33 pounds
weekly. However, one of their favourite pastimes was to com-
119
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OPERACIN CANGURO
decent rest rooms or places to take their meals. The work is monotonous, uncreative and unrewarding. The workshops are hot, noisy,
dirty and ugly and the air is sometimes saturated with smoke, dust or
toxic chemicals. . . Perhaps the group of employees who suffer the
greatest hardship in this respect are the newly-arrived immigrants,
many of whom speak no English. Silenced by the language barrier,
their suspicion of trade unionism, and their unfamiliarity with Australian employment standards and awards, they are found working in
the more hostile and forbidding jobs that steel and shipbuilding can
offer. They are usually prepared to work long hours at any work that
they can get, in order to absorb the inevitable costs of establishing
themselves and their families in a new country.271
121
you showed me when I went to the CIME offices, with those beautiful landscapes; of course they exist, but I have never seen them, and
I doubt whether I will ever see them . . . The first disappointment was
on the ship, because all the other migrants had their movies, their
music and their interpreter, whereas we only had a doctor who took
no notice of us, and it happened that he was threatened once, but
not by me, I did not have any problem during the voyage . . . I have
been fortunate enough to escape having to go to Bonegilla, as a
friend of mine here sponsored me, but you should hear the way they
talk, those who had to go there. Everybody tells me that I have been
very lucky . . . I have got a job in a big steel factory in Wollongong,
but I work with a pick and shovel, even though I am qualified as a
Mechanic Tradesman . . . I do three shifts. I will also tell you that I
suffer immensely from the heat when a blast furnace has to be repaired, because they put me in some galleries to clean out the cinders, and they are very hot . . . I earn 34 pounds a fortnight . . . I have
been here for four months and I have not got a cent, because I have
six mouths to feed . . . I am a trained mechanic, but as I am unlucky
enough not to be able to learn a word of English for love or money,
in spite of the fact that I go to the school . . ., but as you told me, one
has to be patient, and keep working at it . . . it is true that people eat
much better here than in Spain, and that here nobody minds other
peoples business, and everybody lives his own life, and that is precisely what I wanted, to live quietly and earn everyones respect, and
in this sense, things are very good here.273
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OPERACIN CANGURO
From the moment of leaving the holding camp and the hostels,
differences between assisted and non-assisted migrants practically blurred. Obviously, the former had still to wait for two years
before leaving the country, unless they reimbursed the money
paid towards their trip by the ICEM and the Spanish and Australian governments. Table 3 in Appendix 2 shows the numbers of
assisted and non-assisted migrants who came to Australia during
the period studied.
Amongst the non-assisted migrants, two small groups of Spaniards arrived in Australia from Latin America and the Philippines
respectively. In Latin America, the economic situation of the subcontinent had worsened since the late fifties. Its traditional role as
an immigration land was quickly reversed. Many migrants, and
some Spanish amongst them, particularly from the Ro de la Plata
area, opted for a second migration; they could not come assisted,
however, as ICEM by-laws did not allow a migrant to receive its
assistance twice. In the Philippines, political instability forced many
economically affluent Spaniards to leave the country, and some
came to Australia. A third small group of Spanish migrants came
to Australia in the mid sixties after having first migrated to Western Europe (France, Germany, Holland etc.)
Some assisted migrants kept coming after the suspension of the
Agreement in March 1963. In most cases, they came under Family
Reunion Programs sponsored by different voluntary organizations
as well as the ICEM. Both assisted and non-assisted Spanish mi-
123
124
OPERACIN CANGURO
125
Later, attracted by the capital cities, they moved there and worked
as labourers in the building and other industries, and in the services sector. As for the women, once they quit domestic work
they found different jobs, many of them as cleaners. Child rearing
permitting, dual income families were the norm.
Most migrants were categorized as unskilled on arrival. They
joined the work force in similar conditions to other thousands of
labourers of South European background that every year entered
Australia. They were ready to be recruited straight into the hardest type of work, and to take as much overtime as possible. The
financial attraction of hard and dangerous jobs made them risk
work fatigue and industrial injury. They could not find time to
learn English. Handicapped by language, and with limited knowledge of local opportunities, many migrants found themselves in
work which they would not have accepted in Spain.
A large percentage of them were concentrated on the unstable
motor and building trades, where they were vulnerable to unemployment. Unions were not of much help. Union officials were
mostly Australian or English, and felt that newly arrived migrants
would break down working conditions. Nor did they help in
establishing recognition of work qualifications that migrants may
have had. They shared with the rest of the Australian population
all the prejudices about migrants. Non-English speaking migrants
rarely involved themselves in union activities, barriers of language
and training, and their unfamiliarity with the arbitration system
being some of the causes.275 The Spaniards were no exception.
Only about ninety migrants arrived from Spain as semiskilled
or skilled workers to have their qualifications fully recognized by
Australia.276 Some of these also worked for some time at un-
126
OPERACIN CANGURO
127
4 THE MAKING
OF A COMMUNITY
128
OPERACIN CANGURO
129
130
OPERACIN CANGURO
131
132
OPERACIN CANGURO
133
134
OPERACIN CANGURO
they had children and/or lived in the outer suburbs, and did not
see the possibility of frequenting it much. On the other hand,
many Spaniards who were just passing through Sydney decided
that it was worthwhile joining the Club.289 An attempt was made
to augment the number with Portuguese but it failed. Underaged
people were enrolled and, because it was thought that the chances
of obtaining the license were better, some women appeared on
the lists with a Mr. title.290
On March 4th 1962, with the 220 members secured, a general
meeting was held. The Constitution was adopted, and the first
committee named, with Lasala as President.291 All the participants
in the July meeting, sat on this first committee, with the exception
of do Rozario. Some other members were co-opted along the
way, amongst them Fernndez, Ugarte and Moreno. There were
no formal elections, members being chosen on the basis of their
capacity and willingness to work, not an easy decision, though,
as there were more enthusiastic people than places available on
the committee. In April, vice-consul Jos Luis Daz, with Lasala,
Ugarte and Largo went to Court to register the Club and in June,
it obtained its liquor license. After the closing of the Taj Mahal,
a lease of the ground and first floors was arranged with Lasala.
The lease was for five years starting on May lst at 3,260 pounds
for the first year and 4,000 for the succeeding years. From March
to September, some alterations were made particularly on the
ground floor where a coolroom and a bar were constructed;
furniture was purchased from Lasala on favourable terms, and
some poker-machines were installed.
A major reshuffle in the committee was carried out on September
29, just before the opening of the Club. Jos Fernndez was
135
Withdrawals
9523
11837
12233
14991
Deposits
10822
11966
14659
19093
Balance
1299
129
2426
4104
136
OPERACIN CANGURO
137
had to deal with discipline problems, the most dramatic being the
expulsion of Oscar Gonzlez, a decision taken on its meeting of
February 8. He was the fist member expelled, he would argue,
for thought crimes.299
In the next annual general meeting held on February 23, 1964,
that chose a new committee with Rafael Contreras as its president,
the Constitution was amended to ensure that 50 members signatures would be necessary to call a general meeting. During the
year, a very large amount of time was spent at committee meetings
dealing with matters of discipline, citing members to appear for
fighting and various breaches of the Clubs by-laws. A claim was
138
OPERACIN CANGURO
made from the Boletn de Noticias: We appeal to all to demonstrate their courtesy, chivalry, brotherhood, good harmony and
common sense during the coming celebrations. The Spanish Club
belongs to everyone, and we all have the right to enjoy its amenities
without anybody upsetting anyone else.300
Problems of this sort were not restricted to 1964. From the
beginning and well into the seventies, the situation was quite
similar. Often, members would not understand Australian laws.
They, for example, insisted on bringing their children to the bar
of the club. This could be normal practice in Spain, but was
against the law in Australia and the club risked its liquor license if
it did not enforce it. Another typical case was that of members
who would not want to leave the club premises at closing time.
There were clashes between members and employees of the club
which occasionally required police attention. Most often, these
incidents were caused by excessive alcohol consumption, the
strains and tensions of hard work and language isolation adding
to cultural misunderstandings.301
There were more crises in 1965. On January 31 the annual
general meeting took place, and the elected committee chose
Herminio Gonzlez as president. On March 14, an extraordinary
general meeting was held following the receipt of a letter alleging
that there were irregularities in the elections held in January. Although a vote of censure was lost, a lot of unrest remained. In
April, the decision of the secretary-manager Bertrand to dismiss
his assistant-manager began a dramatic chain of events. At a crucial
committee meeting held on the 11, the president and four members
resigned and Bertrands resignation, effective on April 30 was
received. To carry on, new office bearers were then appointed,
139
140
OPERACIN CANGURO
Male
Female
Mar. 62
Nov. 63
Apr. 64
Dec. 64
Dec. 65
Dec. 66
Jun. 66
220
564
394
524
669
758
1080
318
242
312
366
400
490
Total
882
636
836
1035
1155
1570
Spanish
1060
Australian
245
Others
265
141
ease and both make and keep up contacts. On the weekends, the
restaurant and the dance floor were crowded. People came from
as far as Wollongong and Canberra to attend its functions.
As the number of members and the experience of the club
increased, so did the number of activities organized. From the
beginning, Spanish lessons for non-Spanish members were given,
at first on a voluntary basis. Pedro Matas was the first teacher,
later replaced by Luis Vivas. Free English classes were also conducted for Spanish members. Other activities held on the Club
premises at the time included: on Thursdays, movie screening or
other cultural activities; on Fridays, Cabaret Night with flamenco
shows or exotic dancers, jugglers, contortionists, puppets, singing
or dancing contests etc. On Saturdays and Sundays, ballroom
dancing.310 In August 1964, a first order for 175 Spanish books
was placed to form a library.
Playing cards was one of the favourite mens pastimes. The first
mus311 competition was organized in 1964 and won by Jos
Luis Herrera and Guillermo Redondo. They also liked to discuss
the governance of the club, or to form regional groups, competing
to see who outdid the others in singing and drinking. The Saln
de Seoras on the ground floor became, by January 1964, a cafeteria
decorated with murals by Jos Martn. This section of the Club
was to become extremely popular for the quality of its coffee.
While women were very active in the foundation of the Club,
their presence was less noticeable afterwards. From 1966 to the
mid seventies, no women were elected to the committees. Their
new roles as wives and mothers separated the Marta generation
from the politics of the club, although they were still active in
those subcommittees related to child rearing and education. A
142
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143
144
OPERACIN CANGURO
145
146
OPERACIN CANGURO
147
148
OPERACIN CANGURO
Fernndezs family with friends. When the photo was taken, in 1962,
J. Fernndez was vice-president of the Spanish Club. Fernando Largo,
front row, left, wrote on the back the following comments in 1965: 1.
J. L. Daz, vice-consul of Spain. 2. Mr and Mrs Fernndez. 3. Jorge
Jacobi, that goes back to Spain on February 18. 4. Valentn [Ugarte]
and girlfriend Barbara. 5. Two sisters from Madrid, one of them
married to a Czech philosophy professor. 6. J. L. Navarrete. 7. Anbal
[Estanillo]. 8. Francisco. Isabel will not let him alone. 9. Dulce, niece
of Fernndez. X. All Fernndezs family. Ester is the madrina of El
Espaol en Australia.
149
hostel. It was not until Christmas 1965 that, sparked by the tragic
death in a car accident of Andrs Morejn, the idea of a club was
seriously envisaged. Through the initiative of the Villegas brothers,
Eduardo Lamadrid, Jos Ortega, Sanjiau and many others, on
October 16, 1966, the Spanish-Australian Club of Canberra Inc
was founded. Political problems amongst its members, aggravated
by the setting up of a Spanish Embassy in 1967, diverted their
efforts, and it was not until 1971 that the land for building the
club was bought. Mximo Lpez, a Spanish refugee who came in
1952, through his construction company Lpez & Sons, helped to
erect the building. The club finally opened for business in August
1973.335
The other big, stable colony of Spaniards was in Wollongong,
NSW. Probably due to the gravitational attraction of the Spanish
Club in Sydney, it was not until November 1968 that the creation
of a local social club began in earnest.336
150
OPERACIN CANGURO
151
opted to censor them, arguing that when one can not make any
sense of what is written or read, it is best to discuss it at the
pub.338 Two issues were the main focus of the polemic: the
community soccer team, and whether the migrants were misled
before their departure. Having financial problems from the
beginning, it once warned that from the first of January we shall
stop mailing issues to subscribers who have not paid up, their
names and addresses will be published so that everyone knows
who they are. At the same time, we will send this list to our
solicitor to begin the process of debt collection.339 The year 1965
brought a paper with two pages less, but a new interesting feature,
Los ripios de la semana, in which Valera tackled the explosive
community issues, this time in verse.
The launching of El Espaol en Australia, a fortnightly
publication of the same kind in Sydney, in March 1965, was a
serious drawback for La Crnica. It certainly did not greet the
appearance of the Sydney paper with enthusiasm; on the contrary, a bitter polemic broke out early in September.340 Despite
claiming 568 subscribers in Sydney alone, La Crnica could not
compete with El Espaol, which benefited from a better technical
organization. In April 1966, it announced that, due to changing
the typographic workshops, the paper would not appear for the
next three weeks.341 In fact, this was its last publication.
In the first issue of El Espaol en Australia, an independent
Australian-Spanish newspaper, Jos Fernndez, its founder and
editor during the sixties, stated the aim of the publication as being
to keep our manners and customs for the time we stay in this
country, so that the next generations do not feel themselves to
be foreigners within their own families.342 John Jakobi, who
152
OPERACIN CANGURO
153
154
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155
156
OPERACIN CANGURO
Priests felt that to better fulfil their spiritual mission, they should
take care of these welfare tasks. For doing it properly, they needed
financial support, and they sought it from the IEE via the Consulate
in Sydney. The first letter asking for such help, came from the Spanish
Mission in Victoria, and was also signed by Father Benigno. They
asked for a Mission Centre in Sydney and another in Melbourne,
with a chaplain office, a welfare office, twenty-five beds, a childrens
school and a hall to hold parties.350 Without them, the priests argued,
migrants would feel no protection and would drift away from their
Christian morals and their Patria. Soon after his arrival,351 Rico
insisted on the idea, arguing that the social club could not fulfil its
purpose, and stating that the cost of such a Mission, in Sydney,
would be about 5,850,000 pesetas, or 45,000 pounds.
Consul de la Riva did not endorse the priests demands. He
believed that it would solve only a minimal part of the problem. He
proposed instead that the chaplains direct people to their respective parishes, and then travel to meet their spiritual needs, rather
than ask the migrants to come to the chaplains centre. Paradoxically
enough, as the Consul himself recalled, he seemed to focus on the
spiritual well-being of the community, while the priests main concern
was at the temporal level.352
The Consulate channelled the help of the Spanish Government,
via IEE, to the social clubs and other organizations of the Spaniards
in Australia and Consuls used this help as a weapon to gain some
control over the them. Whilst the clubs of Geelong and Whyalla
maintained cordial relations with the Consulate,353 those in the major
cities were always a source of problems.
Vice-Consul Daz, nicknamed Consuln within the Spanish
community in Sydney, who was in charge of consular affairs prior
157
158
OPERACIN CANGURO
The relationship between the Consulate and the clubs can not
be fully understood without considering another social force that
operated within the community: that of the militant anti-Francoist
Spaniards. Some of these were refugees, who came from Europe
through the IRO and the ICEM in the early fifties; others, assisted
migrants who filtered through the tight political screening done
by the Spanish Government and the Australian Mission in Spain.
Anarchists and Socialists predominated in the former group, communists in the latter. Whilst the political refugees tended to remain apart from mainstream assisted migrants, the others, on the
contrary, despite their lack of formal organizations, developed a
non-sectarian, intelligent approach which had a lot to do with the
apolitical character (that at the time meant anti-Francoist) of the
clubs in Sydney, Melbourne, and later in the sixties, in Canberra.
It is to their credit that the Spanish community in Australia was
and remained as a whole apolitical as well.359
Only a few politically active Franco supporters came to Australia.
The leftists had the advantage of being better prepared, if for no
other reason than for having had to defend their opinions against
the wave and with extreme care for so long. On the other hand,
the Francoists had an easier task, as they only had to refer to
patria, bandera, and anti-Communism, all those stimuli that
Spaniards had been so conditioned to, to attract peoples attention. They succeeded only in Melbourne, where Sanjiau and Adolfo
Jimnez managed to split the Centro Espaol and attract some
tens of members for their Club Hispano Australiano -los de la
bandera.360 When Father Snchez, another Francoist activist, made
his second coming to found the Hogar Espaol, and los de la
bandera joined him, the Centro Espaol was left a minority, and
referred to as el club de los comunistas.361
159
160
OPERACIN CANGURO
161
162
OPERACIN CANGURO
problems in a new light. This was the case with language, the
major barrier preventing them from fully joining mainstream
society. The language problem was shared in Australia with many
other migrant groups; however, it was a specific problem of the
Spanish emigration. Long distance emigration went traditionally
to Latin America, where the language barrier was not as important. As guest workers in Western Europe, Spaniards were
surrounded by thousands of compatriots, and they could always
spend holidays in their home towns. In the Australia of the early
sixties, for the Spaniards the language related problems went
together with a deep sense of isolation. 370
Learning the language was considered by most migrants to be
an insurmountable task. With thoughts of a return to Spain, they
found it more important to make money than to spend time in
such unproductive activity as attending classes. English classes
were conducted at the Spanish Club of Sydney from the beginning, but they did not prove popular: One always hears it said
that the biggest problem in Australia is the language. Nevertheless, because of the tiny number of students who attend the English
classes it seems that the greater part of our members speak write
and understand the English language perfectly.371
James Jupp wrote in 1966:
Until a migrant can cope with the English language, he can not hope
to be anything other than a labourer. He may be exploited by his
fellow countrymen either as employers, as traders, or as guardians of
his interests. He will be unable to apply for hospital benefits . . . or
for industrial injury redress. He will only be able to get a drivers
license illegally, through the various agents who operate in the
capital cities . . . the language barrier is the greatest single factor
keeping [migrants] in the lower-paid, heavier jobs.372
163
The Costa Brava was the most popular Spanish restaurant in Sydney
during the mid sixties.
164
OPERACIN CANGURO
165
team and entourage for the Davis Cup in 1965] have eaten garlic
prawns, we have sung jotas and we have talked about bullfighting. Amado has put tourist posters up on the walls, and bullfighting
sketches. He serves cider, escancindola376 into the glass from
very high up, with style.377
Closely related to the activities of the restaurants and the clubs
were those of the entertainers, who also played an important role
in further tightening the bonds that joined together the Spanish
community in the early sixties.378 Artists and sportsmen (Luisillo
and Solera de Jerez, boxer Hrcules and others) touring
Australia also made an impact in the community life. Particularly
important was the arrival of tennis player Manolo Santana in
December 1965, to play the finals of the Davis Cup in Brisbane.
His victory against Roy Emerson, Australias number one, gave
the Spaniards an awareness of their own bonds as a community
and a sense of pride in belonging to it, and gave the Australians
an occasion to know and appreciate them.379
However, relations between Australians and Spaniards, were
not always as cordial as depicted by the press at the end of 1965.
Spanish migrants were still seen as foreigners at the lower ranks
of the social ladder and speaking a language Australians could
not understand. Out of this, some cases of discrimination against
Spaniards arose. This was part of the general trend of discrimination against New Australians of Mediterranean background.
Spaniards felt this discrimination at work, in the neighbourhood
and on the streets. Non English speaking migration was not accepted by the Australian working class on equal terms. As G.
Collins explains:
Non-British immigration was from the outset pitchforked into manual
166
OPERACIN CANGURO
Many Spaniards can recall such attitudes: the use of the Spanish
language in public places was usually the source of conflict.
Cultural misunderstandings such as singing outside the clubs lead
on occasion to police harassment. There were some cases in which
this discrimination against Spaniards bore more dramatic
consequences. Manuel Valera wrote one of his famous Ripios de
la Semana382 as well as an editorial on the problem:
Last week, five Spanish young men driving back from visiting friends
at Geelong were attacked by a gang of long-haired youngsters. Some
months ago it was another Spaniard who died in mysterious
circumstances which have not yet been clarified.383 Not long ago,
another Spaniard hung between life and dead in a hospital, with
massive head injuries. We know of similar cases in Sydney.384
167
168
OPERACIN CANGURO
169
170
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
171
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1
2
3
THE AGREEMENT
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
172
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
173
174
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
175
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
176
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
177
178
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
179
and 7).
DEAS to Consul, October 21, 1963. SCC.
Informe..., October 25, 1963. SCC.
Consul to DEAS, April 19, 1963. SCC.
Informe..., October 25, 1963. SCC.
Ibid.., February 7, 1964.
Consul to DGACE, August 3, 1963. SCC.
CCEM to Director General IEE, December 6, 1963. SCC.
DEAS to Consul, February 23, 1963. SCC.
Consul to DEAS, March 26, 1964. SCC.
CCEM to DEAS, undated. SCC.
Ibid.
CIME, Australia, undated, p.18. APC.
Informe..., May 31, 1963. SCC.
Consul to DEAS, June 20, 1963. SCC. Other reason argued: he begs
... he wants to educate his children on the Christian ways he was
taught by his elders and, above all, God and the Motherland.
Interview with J. Rico, December 28, 1986. APC.
IEE, Memoria, 1963, P. 107, 1964, PP.81-84, 1965, p.142, 1966, p.
105, 1967, p. 109.
On the importance of a social group views of itself or others, and
on the ways these views change, see R. White, Invention Australia.
Images and Identity 1688-1980, George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
J. Serrano Carvajal, op. cit., p. 29.
Diario Regional, Valladolid, December 22, 1963, pp. 18-19.
From Alerta, Santander, quoted in Consul to DGACE, January 9,
1964. SCC.
Interviews with F. Largo (July 6, 1986) and J. Blackie (April 26,
1987). According to Blackie, they were asked to retell their account
of Australia to the newspapers that printed it prior to granting them
the immigration visa; they did not appear at the Consulate again.
Alerta, December 31, 1963, p. 5.
La Crnica, February 18, 1965, p. 1. Also, IEE, Memoria, 1965, p.
103.
180
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
181
182
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
183
184
OPERACIN CANGURO
in the Club.
300 Spanish Club, Boletn de Noticias, no. 4, November December, 1964.
SSCC.
301 See interview with J. L.Goi, August 30, 1987.
302 Jos Fernndez, El Espaol en Australia, March 2, 1966.
303 Jos Fernndez, Objective Spanish Club, in Ibid., May 11, 1966,
p. 6.
304 Ibid., September 9, 1966, p. 5.
305 SSC.
306 Spanish Chamber of Commerce to Spanish Club, August 18, 1967,
Spanish Club to Dean Forbes Advertising, January 23, 1967, Dean
Forbes Advertising to Spanish Club, January 3, 1966. SSCC.
307 J. Fernndez, Jornada de verdadera tension emocional, in El
Espaol en Australia, February 22, 1967, p.2.
308 Ibid., February 22, 1967, p.2.
309 See, for example, shoplifting cases in interview with Bertrand, July
3, 1986. APC.
310 Spanish Club, Programme of Future Events, 1964, and Floor
Shows, Spanish Club, Boletn de Noticias, no. 4, November-December 1964. SSCC. A splendid description of one of the Friday night
events is given in M. Varela, in La Crnica, June 25, 1964 p. 2.
311 A typical Spanish card game.
312 Spanish Club, Newsletter, December 12, 1963. On the role of women
in the Club, see interview with Pilar Otaegui (Moreno), in I. Garca,
op. cit., September 29, 1987, p. 3.
313 El Espaol en Australia, April 13, 1966, P.11, and April 27. 1966, p.2.
314 Sydney Hispanic Society formed, in Sydney Morning Herald,
October 28, 1960, p. 8.
315 La Crnica, October 31, 1964, p. 3.
316 Interview with B. Haneman in I. Garca, op. cit., no. 29,
317 Basque for Our corner.
318 See M. Varela interviews with Jos Casal, President of the Centro
Gallego in Melbourne, and Ceferino Snchez, President of the Casa
de Espaa in Whyalla, in La Crnica, April 29, 1965 p.3, and June
24, 1965, p. 3.
319 El Espaol en Australia, June 25, 1965.
320 Ibid., August 2, 1966.
321 Interview with Oscar Gonzlez, July 25, 1986. APC.
322 Interview with Amparo Gauter, April 17, 1987. APC. No written
NOTES
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
185
records of this period are kept, but La Crnica, November 19, 1964
p. 9, refers to celebrations of the fourth anniversary.
Sporting Globe, June 12, 1956.
Manuel Varela, El Club de los Espaoles, Ibid., July 11, 1964, p. 3.
The number of members of the Club in 1987 was of about 450.
M. Varela often complained about it in La Crnica, for example
December 8, 1965, p. 4.
Ibid., August 22, 1964, October 17, 1964, and June 10, 1965, p. 3.
Ibid., November 19, 1964, p.9.
Mentioned in La Crnica, September 5, 1964, p. 2.
Typical Gallician dishes and wine.
So that Gallicians could fight homesickness living away from their
homeland, in a dialectal form of Spanish spoken in Galicia. La
Crnica, April 29, 1965, p. 3.
Ibid., August 1, 1964, p.2. Adolfo Jimnez, who was on the first
committee, and then, for two years, president of the Club, says that,
on the inauguration day, the police raided its premises and found
alcohol. From then on, this was the major problem the club had to
face. Fortunately, the owner of the premises had influence in the
right places and helped the Spaniards through. Interview with
Adolfo Jimnez, April 17, 1987. APC.
El Pilar, Melbourne, June 15, 1965, pp.2-3.
Interview with Francisca Corral, April 25, 1967. APC. Kriegler, op.
cit., pp. 7-8, signals the BHP paternalistic, sometimes philanthropic,
role in its efforts to aid the establishment of clubs; on the other
hand, BHP did not pay rates or taxes on its vast industrial sites, to
the City Council.
La Crnica, June 24, 1965, p. 3.
Spanish Australian Club of Canberra, Boletn Mensual. Interviews
with M. Lpez, April 3, 1986, and C. Villegas, September 3, 1986.
APC.
The first written reference on the Spanish Club at Wollongong in El
Espa;ol en Australia, November 11, 1968.
No record of this publication has been kept. Interview with Frank
Gallego, August 29, 1987. APC.
La Crnica, December 3, 1964, p. 3.
Ibid., December 17, 1964.
Ibid., September 1, 1965, p. 1-3.
Ibid., April 13, 1966, p.l.
186
OPERACIN CANGURO
NOTES
187
358 Ibid.
359 A Francoist member of the Committee of the Spanish Club, exemplifies what apolitical meant for them when he wrote, to his later
embarrassment, in a letter to the editor of a rightist Spanish magazine: For unknown reasons, migrants arrive to Australia with a hate
against Spain that I can not understand . . . indifferents and conformists [the members] have made possible for a bunch of reds to
take over the destiny of the club. Because of them, our Consular
authorities do not want anything to do with the club, in Fuerza
Nueva, 1970.
360 There was a polemic, all over Australia, about whether to put in the
clubs the Francoist bicoloured flag or the Republican tricoloured
one. The division was usually averted by putting none.
361 Interviews with A. Leiva, April 16, 1987, and A. Jimnez, April 17,
1987. APC. The most serious act of political violence took place in
Melbourne in the early seventies when the new premises of the
Centro Espaol of Victoria were set alight, supposedly by a maverick
Francoist.
362 Articulo 1, Estatutos of the Centro Democratico Espaol, undated.
APC.
363 For example, The Spanish Socialism and the future of Spain, by
Diego Garca, undated, and July 16: Remembering the heroic fight
of the Spanish people for their freedom, with reading of poems by
Lorca and Machado, undated. APC.
364 Workers Committees, Spanish anti-Francoist union movement.
365 El Espaol en Australia, March 1, 1967, p. 1.
366 Ibid., from March 8 to April 12, 1967, Manuel Vivas, Juan Antonio
Garca, Antonio Jimnez, Jos Baquero and Francisco Villa engaged
in a heated polemic in the section Letters to the Editor in page 2.
Similar controversies occurred when other demonstrations were
organized, or with the polemics within the clubs in Melbourne.
367 Acting Consul to Director General America and Far East, February l6,
1968. SCC. More information in Sun Herald, February 16, 19613.
368 Daily Telegraph, December 31, 1970, P. 3.
369 Most migrants from Spain originally come to Australia with the idea
of making money and returning home, but get hooked. From The
Spanish speaking people, Bulletin, September 11, 1976, p. 179. A
throughout review of all the journal sources has revealed that
virtually no journal coverage on Spanish migration in this period has
188
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
OPERACIN CANGURO
been published. This article is one of the few exceptions. The fact
that they considered their coming to Australia only as a temporary
move may be one of the specific characteristics of the Spanish, in
comparison with the rest of Southern European migration. See L.
Benyei, op. cit., p. 11.
Of the migrant families of this vintage, none suffered more the
consequences of their inability to make themselves understood in
English, than that of Felipe Munoz. On April 12, 1963, his eight
months old daughter Maranela died in the hospital of Albury, after
incorrect treatment due to a language misunderstanding at Bonegilla.
Consul to DEAS, May 29, 1963. SCC.
Spanish Club, Boletn de Noticias, no. 3, October, 1964.
J. Jupp, Arrivals and Departures, Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1966, pp.
171-2.
Informe February 7, 1964. SCC.
La Crnica, April 4, 1965, p. 3.
Ibid., January 21, 1965.
Pouring it in Asturian style.
F. Mellizo, Hemos descubierto Australia, in El Espaol en Australia,
April 13, 1966, P. 8. Mellizo was a journalist from the daily Pueblo,
from Madrid, who escorted the Spanish tennis team in December
1965. He published a series of articles under that title in Pueblo,
which were later reproduced in El Espaol en Australia.
Only a few were professionals in Spain before emigrating, but a
bunch of them managed to live for some years from their art,
singing, dancing and playing guitar: Juan y Carmen Dos Maravillas;
Miguel de Triana, who with Veronica Vargas la Titi and others
formed the group Los Tarantos, and later Sol y Sombra; Manolo
Danza, Barbara Ramos and Andre Levis Trio Espaol; guitarists
ngel Garca el Brujo and Jos Luis Gonzlez, etc.
El Espaol en Australia, April 27, 1966, P. 8; Sydney Morning Herald, December 30, 1965, p. 1.
G. Collins, The political Economy of Post-War Migration, The
Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, vol. 1, Sydney, 1975, p.
110.
J. P. OGrady, Theyre a weird mob, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1957, p. 204.
La Crnica, May 20, 1965, p.4.
Miguel Barbero, 52, died when run over by a car; apparently his
house had been broken into earlier, and another attempt had also
NOTES
189
190
OPERACIN CANGURO
APPENDIX
191
APPENDIX 1
Spanish Club Committees 1962-1967
Surname
Name
Votes
(1) Foundation Day 4.3.62
R. de Lasala
Roberto
Fernndez
Jos
Ugarte
Valentn
Escribano
Marcos
Crilly
George
Largo
Fernando
Goi
Jos Luis
Santin
Jess
Moreno
Pilar
Redondo
Guillermo
Meetings
From
Until Notes
30.9.62
P
VP
S
T
23.9.62
23.9.62
23.9.62
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Alberti
de Lasala (Jnr)
Matas
Dez
Illarramendi
Iglesias
Comyn
Jos
Roberto
Pedro
Jos Luis
Eusebio
A.
F.J.
23.9.62
23.9.62
6.1.63
5.5.62
23.9.62
30.9.62
30.9.62
(VP)
6.1.63
(2)annualgeneralmeeting17.2.63
lvarez
de la Torre
Snchez
Pinedo
Rosten-Lee
de Lasala
Goi
Alberti
Escribano
Lobo
Moreno
Linares
Grato
Juan
T.
Jess
George
Roberto
Jos Luis
Jos
Marcos
Jos
Pilar
Jos
95
91
87
81
79
71
69
65
64
61
59
581
11.8.63
28.7.63
21.4.63
27.10.63
13.10.63
27.10.63
11.8.63
27.10.63
21.4.63
P
VP
T
?
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
192
OPERACIN CANGURO
Surname
Name
Votes
Meetings
Sanvicenti
Tefilo
Largo
Fernando
Rodrguez
Josefina
Lpez
Rafael
Levy
V.
Comyn
F.J.
Carilla
Arturo
(3) extraordinary general meeting 10.11.6
Stott
Smith
Lpez
Otaegui
Vivas
Iglesias
Goi
Oriuela
Contreras
Parra
Carilla
Navarro
Sydney
Lionel
Rafael
Pilar
Salvador
Delfin
Jos Luis
Julin
Rafael
G.
Arturo
Francisco
From
21.4.63
2.6.63
2.6.63
15.9.63
15.9.63
13.10.63
13.10.63
123
105
101
100
95
93
87
78
76
73
69
61
9
8
8 31.12.63
7
9
9
3
10
9
4
9
8
154
152
149
145
144
128
123
123
122
122
107
7
18
16
12
15
12
Until Notes
27.10.63
27.10.63
27.10.63
27.10.63
VPL
p
VP2
(4)annualgeneralmeeting23.2.64
Smith
Stott
Hickey
Vivas
Tricio
Orvezabala
Carilla
Contreras
Navarro
Oriuela
Mas
Salas
Lionel
Sydney
Lancelot
Salvador
Jacinto
Juan
Arturo
Rafael
Francisco
Julin
Jos
Manuel
T
VP2
VPL
28.6.64
17
P
26.7.64
13
15
16
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Majarrs
Smith
J.
Ellen
6
7
16.6.64
16.8.64
APPENDIX
Surname
Name
Votes
Meetings
From
4
20
15
4
17
4
10
19
16
4
4
8
193
Until Notes
11.4.65
T
VP1 (P)
11.4.65
11.4.65
25.7.65
VP2 (T)
11.4.65
11.4.65
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Herranz
De Costa
Casas
Garca
Lpez
Mnguez
J.
Luis
Delfin
Cndido
ngel
F.
10
11
8
7
5
4
9.5.65
9.5.65
13.6.65
5.9.65
5.9.65
5.9.65
(6)annualgeneralmeeting20.2.66
Vivas
Comyn
Lpez Monlen
Lpez
Salas
Arias
Garca
Lpez Gmez
Goi
Pinedo
Zaruz
Gonzlez
Manuel
J.
Jos Luis
ngel
Manuel
Jernimo
Cndido
Jos Luis
Jos Luis
Jess
Victorino
Santos
VP2 (P)
VPL
T2 (VP2)
16.5.66
P
Tl
?
27
24
27
8
24
16
25
14
7
19
26
19
?
?
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Snchez Molla
Asensi
Gonzlez
Garca
T.
J.A.
S.
J.A.
9
11
19
8
5.9.66
20.9.66
?
?
(T)
194
OPERACIN CANGURO
Surname
Name
Votes
Meetings
From
Until Notes
Rafael
Jos A.
Manuel
Antonio
Gregorio
Antonio
Helios
ngel
Jess
Tomas
Manuel
100
98
98
93
89
86
85
84
84
83
69
6
4
9
11
13
22
7
7
21
6
30.4.67
2.4.67
?
11.6.67
10.12.67
6.8.67
P
Tl
VPL
T2
(P)
6.8.67
7.5.67
30.4.67
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Baron
Madden
Arias
Alonso
Cancio
Rubio
Rodrguez
Massina
Lpez
Snchez
Diego
Allan
Jernimo
Manuel
Eliseo
Jess
Francisco
Miguel
Rafael
Manuel
20 17.4.67
21
2.4.67
16 28.5.67
12 25.6.67
12
9.7.67
8
3.9.67
9 17.9.67
3 17.9.67
5 26.11.67
9 25.6.67
(VP)
(T)
15.10.67
(8)annualgeneralmeeting16.2.68
Scott
Da Costa
Lpez
Madden
Massena
Iglesias
Lpez
Rodrguez
Lpez
Arias
Snchez
Seisdedos
Sydney
Luis
Rafael
Allan
Manuel
Delfin
J.A.
Francisco
ngel
Jernimo
ngel
Miguel
163
148
139
139
116
115
112
111
109
96
94
92
22
6
17
17
1
16
19
10
12
12
21
20
VP2
2.6.68
29.9.68
23.6.68
VP1
T
(T)((P))
1.9.68
10.9.68
1.9.68
12.1.69
P
(P)
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
APPENDIX
Surname
Name
Saez
Baron
Escribano
Rodrguez
Llorente
Fernndez
Pedro
Diego
Marcos
ngel
Flix
Evaristo
Votes
Meetings
From
10 15.9.68
13 7. 8. 68
3 15.9.68
10 29.968
7 15.9.68
9 13.10.68
195
Until Notes
19. 1. 69
19.1.69
((T))
19.1.69
Votes:
Meetings:
From/Until: Date they sat on the committee for the first/last times
Notes:
196
OPERACIN CANGURO
APPENDIX 2
Table 1
Population of Local Government Areas. By Nationality: Spanish.
Census 1961
Census 1966
1109
4034
Male
Female
Total
319
265
587
1078
1003
2081
270
91
361
805
693
1498
NSW
Sydney
Total
Southern Tableland
Male
Female
Total
26
16
42
74
43
117
Hunter/Manning
Male
Female
Total
21
2
23
70
17
87
Riverina
Male
Female
Total
4
1
5
52
34
86
VICTORIA
Total
790
2805
Melbourne
Male
Female
Total
213
193
406
862
778
1640
North Easter
Male
Female
Total
182
72
254
275
195
470
APPENDIX
197
Geelong/West Central
Male
Female
Total
Census 1961
32
14
46
Northern
Male
Female
Total
10
1
11
45
42
87
Total
72
848
Adelaide
Male
Female
Total
10
23
33
208
234
442
WHyalla/Western
Male
Female
Total
2
2
212
148
360
783
989
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND
Total
Census 1966
241
200
441
Brisbane
Male
Female
Total
26
44
70
59
66
125
Cairns
Male
Female
Total
432
64
496
355
139
494
Hinchinbrook
Male
Female
Total
218
39
257
182
67
249
Townsville
Male
Female
Total
106
40
146
140
71
211
Ayr
Male
Female
Total
28
15
43
109
65
174
198
OPERACIN CANGURO
Census 1961
Census 1966
Jonhstone
Male
Female
Total
104
14
120
68
27
95
Cardwell
Male
Female
Total
51
4
55
63
24
87
Total
49
486
Perth
Male
Female
Total
9
6
15
151
127
278
Pilbara
Male
Female
Total
4
1
5
88
88
ACT
Total
36
343
TASMANIA
Total
13
49
NTHRN TERRITORY
Total
18
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
APPENDIX
199
Table 2.
Nationality of Permanent and Long Term Arrivals. Spanish
Financial Year
Assisted
Other
Total
1956-57
132
136
1957-58
85
85
1958-59
328
100
428
1959-60
447
125
572
1960-61
1231
248
1479
1961-62
1549
282
1831
1962-63
4317
322
4639
1963-64
105
432
537
1964-65
269
690
986
1965-66
541
814
1355
200
OPERACIN CANGURO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
201
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Bastos de Roa, F., Immigration in Latin America, Pan American Union,
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Bayn Marina, F., Legislacin Espaola de Emigracin, Instituto
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El Club Espaol 1962-1968: Ao a Ao, El Espaol en Australia, no. 40, 1987, pp. 18-22.
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Jupp, J., Arrivals and Departures, Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1966.
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OPERACIN CANGURO
INTERVIEWS
INTERVIEWS
Alonso, Bernardo, July 10, 1986.
Alonso, Manuel, July 4, 1986.
Aranda, Luis, August 22, 1986.
Arjonilla, Antonio, April 26, 1987.
Bastida, Antonio, April 3, 1986.
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Bilbao, August 10, 1986.
Blackie, Jim, April 25, 1987.
Bretn, Paquita, December 26, 1986.
Carceller, Manolo, October 4, 1986.
Carrasco, Basi, April 17, 1987.
Crdoba, Paulino, April 17, 1987.
Crdoba, Conchita, April 17, 1987.
Corral, Francisca, April 25, 1987.
Crennan, G., July 14, 1986.
de las Heras, Honorina, August 27, 1986.
Enguix, Roberto, August 9, 1986.
Esparza, Antonio, August 10, 1986.
Estanillo, Anbal, September 3, 1986.
Estanillo, Carmina, September 3, 1986.
Farina, Pilar, June 15, 1987.
Fernndez, Concha, May 31, 1987.
Ferraro, Cristina, November 25, 1986.
Gallego, Frank, August 29, 1987.
Gamero, Roman, April 3, 1986.
Garmendia, Pascual, August 21, 1986.
Gauter, Amparo, April 17, 1987.
Gonzlez, Oscar, July 25, 1986.
Goi, Jos Luis, August 30, 1987.
Grant, Harold, April 25, 1987.
Grassby, Al, July 4, 1986.
Haneman, Ben, May 31, 1987.
207
208
OPERACIN CANGURO
INTERVIEWS
209