Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO GLOBAL INSURGENCY
BRIAN L. GABRIEL
A Thesis
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
Submitted By:
BRIAN L. GABRIEL
Certificate of Approval:
___________________________________
James G. Breckenridge
Chair/Assistant Professor
Department of Intelligence Studies
___________________________________
Kristan J. Wheaton
Assistant Professor
Department of Intelligence Studies
___________________________________
Phillip J. Belfiore
Vice President
Office of Academic Affairs
May 2010
Copyright © 2010 by Brian L. Gabriel
All rights reserved.
iii
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my wife Debra for her tireless love, support,
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the faculty of Mercyhurst College’s Intelligence Studies department
for their assistance in the completion of this work. I would also like to thank my
v
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
By
Brian L. Gabriel
Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (FM 3-24). This examination questions whether the
new doctrine truly provides a framework to defeat insurgencies around the world
regardless of the nature of the insurgency or if the doctrine’s utility is more limited. In
order to answer this question, the paper uses a matrix to analyze the precepts of FM 3-24
successfully be implemented in Somalia. The paper concludes that the doctrine is not
limited by time or geography, but rather by the type of insurgency. Thus, although
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
COPYRIGHT PAGE................................................................................................ iii
DEDICATION.......................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 1
2 LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................... 5
Evolution of Counterinsurgency Doctrine............................... 5
Field Manual 3-24.................................................................... 18
Critiques of Field Manual 3-24................................................ 24
New Geopolitical Environment................................... 24
Liberation Insurgencies and Third-Party
Counterinsurgents........................................................ 25
Domestic Insurgency vs. Global Insurgency............... 27
Doctrine Derived from Wrong Case Studies............... 29
Different Motivations................................................... 30
Relationship with Host Government............................ 30
3 METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 33
Source Collection..................................................................... 33
Most Influential Sources.......................................................... 34
Construction of Transferability Matrix.................................... 34
Selection of Case Studies: Afghanistan and Somalia.............. 38
4 RESULTS............................................................................................... 41
Analysis: Transferability Matrix.............................................. 41
Horizontal Approach: Row 1....................................... 42
Vertical Approach: Column 2...................................... 46
Further Analysis of the Matrix..................................... 49
Conflict Arises: Population-centric Meets Global
Insurgency.................................................................... 50
Results: Transferability Matrix................................................ 52
Analysis: Case Studies of Afghanistan and Somalia............... 54
Afghanistan.................................................................. 55
Somalia......................................................................... 58
Results: Case Studies of Afghanistan and Somalia.................. 61
vii
5 CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 62
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 66
APPENDIX: RECOMMENDED COIN READING LIST...................................... 74
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1.1 Transferability Matrix 37
Table 2.1 Row 1, Transferability Matrix 42
Table 2.2 Column 2, Transferability Matrix 46
ix
1
INTRODUCTION
The United States military released its final version of the new Counterinsurgency
Field Manual, Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No.
(FM) 3-24, the manual defines the United States’ modern approach to fighting
insurgencies.1 When the manual was published in late 2006, twenty years had passed
since the Army had released a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency
operations. Twenty-five years had passed since the Marine Corps had published one.
Upon its release, FM 3-24 was widely reviewed by the press, military personnel, and
politicians. Several jihadi websites also reviewed the manual and copies have been found
in Taliban training camps in Pakistan. After its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and
Marine Corps websites, the manual was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the
The unprecedented interest in a military field manual reflects confusion about the
nation’s strategic purpose in the wake of September 11, 2001. Americans yearn
1
Throughout this paper, “FM 3-24” will be used to abbreviate the Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine
Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.
2
Given the popularity and the importance of this manual while the United States continues
to combat insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the goal of this paper will be to further
Petraeus, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant General James F. Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, the
recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges.
Petraeus and Amos (2007) argue, however, that “all insurgencies, even today’s highly
adaptable strains remain wars amongst the people. They use variations of standard
themes...” (p. xlv). The manual’s official Preface states that the doctrine presented is
“applicable worldwide” and that FM 3-24 is not focused on any one country or region
To further explore the new doctrine, this paper will examine and evaluate the true
“transferability” of FM 3-24. In other words, does the new doctrine truly provide a
framework to defeat insurgencies around the world regardless of the nature of the
insurgency, or is the doctrine more limited in its utility? This paper argues that the
doctrine is not limited by time or geography, but rather by the type of insurgency. This
means that although FM 3-24 is highly transferable among domestic insurgencies, the
global insurgency such as the war against Al Qaeda. To test the new doctrine and this
thesis, this paper will use a matrix to analyze the precepts of FM 3-24 against the
doctrine’s critiques relevant to transferability. Although the analysis of the matrix will be
the primary methodology, to provide real-world perspective, this paper will examine the
3
Immediately, readers of this paper are likely to ask why the new
counterinsurgency doctrine is being tested against the case study of Somalia. Like
Afghanistan, Somalia has been plagued by a violent insurgency and provides a haven for
Al Qaeda operatives. Located on the Horn of Africa, Somalia also has strategic
importance for the national security and foreign policy of the United States. In addition,
recent events indicate that Al-Shabaab, Somalia’s most notorious Islamic extremist
insurgent and terrorist organization, is expanding its operations outside of East Africa.
FBI Director Robert Mueller testified in October 2009 on Capitol Hill that Al-Shabaab,
continents; however, they also share a number of similarities. It will be this balance of
similarities and differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Somalia that
will allow for a fair examination of the modern counterinsurgency doctrine and its ability
converted in an intelligence question. In fact, the wording of this paper’s thesis is quite
similar to the language used in intelligence documents. This paper, however, is not an
All sources are open source and include publications from military personnel, official
2
This paper does not argue that the United States is likely to commit ground forces to defeat the Somali
insurgency. Rather, the paper will examine if the FM 3-24 doctrine could be successfully applied to
Somalia.
4
doctrine will be discussed in the second chapter. This literature review will outline the
Malaya, the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria, and conclude with the
American experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador. Lastly, the literature review will
addition to explaining why the case study of Somalia was paired with Afghanistan for
this analysis, the third chapter will organize the critiques from the literature review into a
matrix in order to evaluate the transferability of FM 3-24. The actual analysis of the
transferability of FM 3-24 using the matrix and within the case studies of Afghanistan
and Somalia will occur in the fourth chapter. In closing, the fifth chapter will summarize
Before progressing, it is important to define key terms that this paper will use.
Although there are a variety of definitions used to define insurgency, since the focus of
this paper is FM 3-24, this paper will utilize the manual’s definition. Expanding on the
LITERATURE REVIEW
to the transferability of the current doctrine. Understanding which historical case studies
counterinsurgency theorists drew upon is important. The case studies selected, as well as
the respective lessons learned, significantly influence the evolution of theory. The case
studies examined by the FM 3-24 authors, and the preceding theorists, foreshadow not
only how they approach counterinsurgency warfare, but also what kind of insurgent and
important to the analysis of FM 3-24 in the fourth chapter). This discussion on the
FM 3-24. Finally, this chapter will present a collection of doctrinal critiques that apply to
“almost entirely a product of the Cold War” (p. 21). At the time of the book’s
doctrine and offered several recommendations for improving current strategy based on
RAND’s five decades of studying the doctrine. According to Long, early in the Cold
War, there were two competing counterinsurgency theories: the “hearts and minds”
6
theory (coined by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency) and the
cost/benefit theory. Proponents of the “hearts and minds” theorized that in order to gain
the population’s support for the standing government, opposed to the insurgency,
counterinsurgents needed to restore the hope of the population by providing security from
the violence associated with the insurgency and increase the standard of living, political
rights, etc. The idea was that insurgencies were the product of insecurity due to the
changing economic climate and modernization, which affected other aspects of life
including the social and political realms. The competing theory, the cost/benefit theory,
was developed to evaluate the actions of the people rather than their attitudes. This
theory provided the populace with benefits, such as economic improvements, for their
cooperation with the government, and punishments, often the denial of food, for
The “hearts and minds” theory was first put into practice by the British during the
Malayan Emergency between 1948 and 1960.3 Malaya, a British colony, experienced a
Party, whose members where primarily ethnic Chinese. Few authors have dedicated
entire works to the British experience in Malaya; more often, authors have paired the
the Twentieth Century, followed this same pattern. His book examined the Malayan
Emergency, among other British case studies, as he attempted to determine what level of
violence a liberal, democratic state could use during a counterinsurgency operation. The
3
This is not to suggest, however, that the British doctrine exhibited the same civility that is outlined in FM
3-24; the British did utilize the denial of food.
7
implementation of a “hearts and mind” campaign was a learning experience for the
pace (p. 157). Fortunately, for the British, the insurgency’s failure to gain momentum
development, the “hearts and minds” strategy proved successful. In order to achieve this
success, the campaign also illustrated how to synthesize civil and military operations,
duties, and commands in order to effectively defeat the insurgents. Townshend called it a
“skilful [sic] balancing act which blurred the distinction between civil and military
spheres” (p. 158). The British recognized the need to combine military operations with
civil operations (economic development for example) in order to gain the support of the
For Wade Markel (2006), author of “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of
Population Control,” the success of the British campaign in Malaya was more than
Britain’s ability to adapt organizationally, integrate civil and military aspects of national
power, and exert the minimum amount of force necessary. Markel argued that the key to
British success was the effective “internment” of the Chinese “squatter” population (p.
35). By interning the “squatters” in fortified villages, the British were successfully able
to isolate the insurgents from a specific population in which the insurgents drew their
strength. Consequently, the insurgents were isolated from potential recruits, military
supplies, and food (p. 35-36). The British not only isolated the insurgents from the
population, the British “neutralized the desire to support the insurgents” (p. 38). The
British, and their Malayan allies, provided the squatter community with better
medical care and education (p. 38). As a result, the isolation of the insurgents from the
The role of local security forces, primarily the police, emerged from the Malayan
the importance of local security forces, given the subject of this paper, FM 3-24 likely
provides the most authoritative account in a vignette. According to the manual, the
British used the police, not the military, as the leading counterinsurgency force. To
combat initial problems within the police force, such as abuse of the civilian population
and corruption, the British overhauled their police strategy, removed incompetent and
corrupt officers, and provided advanced schooling in investigation and intelligence for
those remaining officers. In addition, in order to win the ethnic Chinese from the
insurgency, the British doubled the number of ethnic Chinese serving in the police force.
This created a better relationship between the population and the counterinsurgent forces,
which further resulted in the population increasing the amount of information it provided
to the police force (Headquarters, 2007b, p. 234-235). Police were thus able to gather
law enforcement and gather intelligence. His thesis categorized policing as consisting of
At the same time that Britain was drawing lessons from their successful
counterinsurgency the hard way in Indochina against the Viet-Minh from 1946-1954.
One of the leading works on the French Indochina War is Bernard Fall’s (1967) Street
Without Joy (first published in 1961). Although the book is not considered the definitive
account of the French Indochina War, it provided a “historical sketch” of the war’s key
developments and their impact on counterinsurgency doctrine (p. 15). Fall argued that
the French did not lose the war through any particular fatal error but through a
cumulative effect of numerous mistakes and other problems (p. 313). For instance, the
French attempted to defeat the Viet-Minh through conventional force and the use of
mechanized vehicles and weapons. As the result, the French were never able to match
the mobility of the Viet-Minh who effectively utilized guerrilla tactics and the jungle for
viewed the French as the “aliens,” leaving the French forces isolated from the population,
Indochina. He concluded that counterinsurgents could not effectively seal off an enemy-
even 20 to 1. The reason: the guerillas had the advantage of an intimate knowledge of the
terrain, defensive organization, and the sympathy of the population. This lesson was
largely derived from the failed operation to secure Road No. 1—known as the “Street
without Joy”—codenamed Operation Camargue. Fall argued that the major defect in this
operation, as well as all similar operations, was the inability to seal off the enemy from
10
the cover of the jungle, a sympathetic population, or sanctuary across the border (p. 171-
172). This meant that counterinsurgents must not only use an overwhelming number of
soldiers, but counterinsurgents must better utilize smaller, more agile units—including
more maneuverable rivercrafts over heavy, mechanized vehicles. Finally, Fall ended his
book by highlighting that at the time of its publication, much of what was being written
about insurgents and counterinsurgency focused solely on the military aspect of the
aspects in order to truly understand the political vastness of insurgencies (p. 369).
Algeria from 1954 to 1962 against growing Arab nationalism, led by the National
Liberation Front (FLN). Another one of the leading counterinsurgency theorists that
emerged from the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria is Roger Trinquier.
Reflecting on the defeat in Indochina and the impending defeat in Algeria, Trinquier
France’s strategy in Algeria to be, with few exceptions, identical to the one employed in
counterinsurgency moving beyond the military aspects alone. In fact, Trinquier offers a
author]” (Ibid). Within this conceptualization, Trinquier recognized that victory was
dependent upon the unconditional support of the host population, calling the protection of
4
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency was first published in France in 1961under the
title of La Guerre Moderne and later published in English in 1964.
11
the population against terrorism the first objective. As the result, he called for a change
in military thinking and for the study of terrorism, the principle weapon of modern
warfare. Likely building off the success of indigenous and police forces in Malaya,
Trinquier highlighted the role of these forces. To Trinquier, the mission of the police was
beyond seeking the few individuals who had carried out terrorist attacks, police should
eliminate the entire enemy organization. To do so, the police should operate undisturbed,
with the military providing an overlay to police forces already in place. Lastly, drawing
on the immense role of sanctuaries across national borders in Indochina and Algeria,
Trinquier introduced the idea of going on the offensive, attacking insurgents in their safe
Trinquier was right about the impending French defeat in Algeria. Alistair
Horne’s (2006) book, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, told the story of how
“…a handful of Algerian guerillas, primitively armed, but masterfully employing the
weapon of terror, outwitted and out-fought over eight years the best armies France could
provide…” (p. 13). Ironically, after Fall wrote about the need for counterinsurgents to
using overwhelming force. Throughout the war, the French often overreacted to Muslim
uprisings, further enraging the host population and increasing insurgent recruitment.
Examples of French overreaction can be seen even prior to the official start of the
Muslims, the French army came in and killed ten times the number of protestors
(p. 27-28). The French similarly overreacted to another revolt on All Saints’ Day in
12
1954 (p. 96). The French found themselves in a never-ending cycle of escalation in
acts of terrorism, provoking the French into another overreaction (p. 120-121).
Related to the dangers of using overwhelming force, the French use of torture also
had catastrophic consequences. The use of torture, not only increased support for the
FLN among the Algerian population, but also diminished support for the war back in
France. Horne wrote that the use of torture led to the French defeat “more than any other
single factor” (p. 18). As the result, counterinsurgency doctrine became a balancing act
amount of force.
Shortly after the end of the French Algerian War, David Galula (2006) published
one of the most influential books on counterinsurgency in 1964. His book, titled
well as in China, Indochina, and his service in World War II. At the time of the book’s
publication, Galula, a lieutenant colonel in the French army, argued that several writings
tung), however, little had been written outlining the strategy of counterinsurgents. In this
context, his goal was to create a “compass” for the counterinsurgent, defining
centrality of the host population, the expanded role of the military soldier, and the
13
although military and police operations are necessary, their role should be to create space
for political, economic, and social reforms that target the support of the host population
(p. 55). Securing the population and their support is the first “law” of counterinsurgent
warfare (p. 52). Bridging the gap between military and civil operations, he theorized that
soldiers must also be prepared to serve as propagandists, social workers, civil engineers,
school teachers, and other roles until civilians are ready to share responsibility for some
of these functions (p. 62). Additionally, every soldier and counterinsurgent on the ground
must operate as intelligence collectors. Intelligence must come from the population;
however, the population will not offer this information unless it feels safe and trusts the
to define victory for the counterinsurgents. He classified two types of victory: negative
and positive. Negative victory is the destruction of the insurgent and respective political
organization (however, both are likely to regenerate). Positive victory, on the other hand,
is negative victory plus the isolation of the insurgent from the host population in which
isolation is not imposed on the population, but maintained by the population (p. 54).
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, wrote that Galula died a few years
after publishing his book, “missing the chance to observe the American military ignore
most of his prescriptions on Vietnam” (Nagl, 2006, p. vii). The defeat of the French led
to the independence of Indochina and the division of Vietnam into a communist north and
14
Vietnam, the United States fought the Viet Minh from the north and Viet Cong insurgents
in South Vietnam from 1959-1975. Despite the experiences of the British and French,
the United States approached Vietnam largely from a conventional warfighting approach.
The United States thought in terms of large-scale maneuvers and employed a strategy of
GlobalSecurity.org wrote that the United States “…preceded from the premise that the
essence of the problem in Vietnam was military, with efforts to ‘win the hearts and
minds’ of the South Vietnamese people taking second place” (Vietnam, n.d.). Further,
increasing the body count of killed Viet Cong was the centerpiece of the American
strategy; however, it became increasingly clear that the strategy of attribution was not
effective due to the enemy’s capacity to replaces losses faster than the American’s ability
forces. In training these forces, however, the United States misunderstood the nature of
the war and trained them to fight in a conventional manner. According to a Marine Corps
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), responsible for the training of the South
Vietnamese army, “modeled the indigenous forces after the U.S. Army” to “conduct
that this approach was likely the result of the United States’ recent experience in Korea
(p. 142).
Despite this misunderstanding of the nature of the war, The United States’
counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam did have its successes. According to the RAND
article, “Money in the Bank,” the United States was able to achieve a level of unified
Support, the program enacted land reforms in order to build a political base outside
Saigon. CORDS achieved a high degree of pacification among insurgents. The article
stated that the program was so successful, “North Vietnam was forced to launch a
conventional invasion of South Vietnam in order to win the war” (Rabasa, 2007, p. 3).
one of the most authoritative books on the Vietnam War, titled Bright Shining Lie. The
lengthy book bonded history with the biography of Lt. Col. John Paul Vann. The book,
through the life of Vann, illustrated the failures of the American strategy and the
arrogance of the U.S. military. Vann was an outspoken critic of the attrition strategy,
which he considered brutal and ineffective. He argued for a strategy that placed a greater
emphasis on discriminate killings. Sheehan wrote, “The willy-nilly killing and maiming
enraged Vann, not only because it contradicted his ideal of profession, but also because it
struck him as the worst conceivable way to fight this war” (p. 107). Even though Vann
spent much of his time in Vietnam arguing against the U.S. strategy, his insatiable desire
to win the war changed his opinions and he began to accept, even promote, the use of
After September 11, 2001 and the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, John
Nagl (2005) published Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Malaya and Vietnam. Like Counterinsurgency Warfare, Nagl’s book was highly
counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam to the realities of the war, his central argument
organizational culture that is adaptive and flexible. Comparing the doctrine of the British
campaign in Malaya with the Vietnam War, Nagl argued that armies must have a culture
culture, among other factors, that allowed the British to succeed in Malaya whereas the
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself committed to
experience in Vietnam, the United States employed a far different strategy in El Salvador.
The United States limited its role to serving as advisors, particularly in the training of the
Salvadorian army. Through the use of reforms, the Salvadorian government was able to
calm the insurgency until it faded away as public support slowly diminished.
Major Robert Coates (1991), author of “The United States’ Approach to El Salvador,”
characterized the U.S. strategy as a “long and massive experiment by the United States to
defeat an insurgency through a policy of providing advisors and material support without
Salvadoran armed forces to combat the insurgents, and bolster democracy by reforming
In the same year that FM 3-24 was first released to the public, Robert Cassidy
(2006) published, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. His book combined
the maxims of counterinsurgency warfare from both the East and West, discussing the
approaches of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia. Cassidy brilliantly
summarized many of the lessons derived from the modern history of counterinsurgency
warfare. Many of these lessons are identical to the ones discussed in this chapter: employ
indigenous forces, integrate/unify military and civilian efforts, recognize the political
campaigns, FM 3-24 is also the product of several prior military manuals specifically
addressing “small wars” and insurgencies. Dating as far back as 1940, the Marine Corps
published its first manual on the subject, simply titled the Small Wars Manual. In 1951,
the U.S. Army published FM 31-20, Operations against Guerilla Forces, as the result of
the Chinese Revolution, the Greek communist insurgency, and other world events that
identified the need to formally publish a counterinsurgency doctrine. In 1957, the Army
1970, however, there were over 15 manuals between the Army and Marine Corps
Although the military published other field manuals during the 1970’s and 1980’s, these
manuals were largely ignored for various reasons. It was not until 1995 (post El
Salvador, Somalia, and other low intensity conflicts) that the military released Joint
Publication 3-07 but provided few changes to U.S. doctrine. The United States, as the
result, entered the post 9/11 era with a doctrine that had evolved little since the mid-
Motivated by the problems facing the United States as the insurgency in Iraq
developed, the Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) hurried to
Synthesizing the lessons from prior campaigns, along with other deliberations from
insurgencies.
to then Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant General James
addition to his doctorate in international relations from Princeton University, Petraeus has
proven his skill in counterinsurgency through his successful governing of Mosul, Iraq
after the U.S. invasion in 2003 (Ibid). The joint publication of FM 3-24 by the Army and
Marine Corps is both symbolic and practical. Likely based on the successes of the British
in Malaya and the CORDS program in Vietnam, the joint publication represents the
19
effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Noted in the previous section, the fact that
through the 1970’s and 1980’s the Army and Marine Corps had over a dozen manuals
relating to counterinsurgency, yet no clear strategy, was also likely a contributing factor.
operations, makes this subset unique. These stability operations are also commonly
p. xxiii). The proportion of effort in terms of the three-pronged approach changes over
time and can vary geographically (Headquarters, 2007b, p. 35). With the addition of a
third type of operation, the act of balancing offensive, defensive, and stability operations
is another core precept of FM 3-24. The inclusion of stability operations is likely the
result of one of the doctrine’s most renowned precepts: focus efforts on the population,
not the insurgents. This population-centric precept draws on the writings of Trinquier
and Galula as well as the fact that numerous twentieth century counterinsurgency
significant break from the previous American warfighting doctrine. Like Galula,
FM 3-24, argues that the host nation’s population commands the attention of the
campaign, not the insurgents. The counterinsurgents must convince the host population
to work with them to defeat the insurgency (Sewall, 2007, p. xxv). In order to gain the
host population’s support, counterinsurgents must begin with the safety and security of
the civilian population. The first requirement of success in FM 3-24 is the security of the
20
host population (Nagl, 2007, p. xix). The population must have a sense of safety and the
host nation’s government must have the security it needs to operate politically. Safety
and security, however, are not enough to persuade the host population from supporting
(even passively) the insurgency. Security, economic development, and good governance
(Ibid).
construction contractors, civilian intelligence personnel, and others fulfilling roles in the
NGO, for example, can have damaging repercussions throughout the entire campaign.
Like the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria, FM 3-24 places a heavy
patterns more closely to the British approach than the French use of torture. FM 3-24
recognizes that intelligence must isolate the insurgents from the general population. The
manual uses the following analogy: “Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are
like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents...With good intelligence,
counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital
counterinsurgent victory. Civilian casualties are not simply collateral damage, they
provide the insurgents with propaganda, increase insurgent recruitment, and undermine
21
the counterinsurgent’s ability to win the support of the population. The French
avoid collateral damage, this also means that counterinsurgents must carefully calculate
the type and amount of force applied (another failure of the French in Algeria). The
manual places a special interest on the use of Social Network Analysis due to the
cycle develops in which intelligence gathered from one operation, leads to another
operation, which gathers new intelligence and so forth. As a result, all missions must
have an intelligence component and collectors and analysts must be closely linked. (p. 41,
80, 118-119). Commanders and policy makers need this timely intelligence to
continually adapt their understanding not only of the insurgents, but of the perceptions,
values, beliefs, and interests of the general population and its culture (p. 80).5
This is primarily the result of the change in the role of intelligence. Since good
intelligence is based on the popular support of the host population (p. 52, 135), soldiers
are required to move out of their armored vehicles and outposts and interact with the
5
The January 2010 publication of “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in
Afghanistan,” popularly referred to as the Flynn Report, highlights the United States’ continued inability to
adapt the intelligence process to focus more on the host population, political environment, and social
structures to effectively combat the insurgency in Afghanistan. A copy of the Flynn Report can be
accessed at
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf
(accessed March 2010).
22
population. Constant interaction with the populace allows soldiers to increase the level of
training of host nation security forces (in insurgencies in which the United States in
intervening). The use of local, indigenous forces also allows the host government to
increase its legitimacy. The success of the British and El Salvadorian counterinsurgency
To summarize, unity of efforts, the balance of the three types of operations, focus
on the host population, intelligence-driven operations, and the training of host nation
security forces are some of the most important precepts of FM 3-24. In addition to these
precepts, FM 3-24 has already received considerable recognition for its “Paradoxes of
counterinsurgency warfare. The paradoxes are also popularly referred to as the “nine
paradoxes turn traditional military thinking on its head. They are as followed:
1. “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be” –
military forces that remain in their compounds lose touch with the population,
appear that they are scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive
2. “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is” – the more force,
the greater the probability of collateral damage, providing ammunition for the
insurgent’s propaganda.
23
3. “The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and
international law and the expectations of the host population lead to a reduction in
military actions.
are often used to entice counterinsurgents into overreacting in a way that the
5. “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot” – true victory
comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Money
6. “The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than [the United
States] doing it well” – who does the operation is just as important as how well it
7. “If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this
province, it might not work in the next” – insurgents are adaptive, they adjust to
insurgents can achieve their objective without ever scoring a military victory.
levels may make tactical decisions that have strategic consequences. (p. 47-51)
The manual states that these paradoxes represent the different mindset needed to execute
counterinsurgency doctrine (specifically the case studies used to derive lessons), it is now
best practices, a lessons learned from the previous modern counterinsurgency operations.
Does this derivative process translate into success? According to Colin Jackson (2010),
assistant professor at the Naval War College, when studying prior campaigns and
formulating new doctrines and policies, two critical questions must be answered. First,
are the assumptions about what worked valid? Second, are the lessons learned
transferable?
following is a list of critiques that challenge the notion that FM 3-24 is “applicable
literature are direct challenges to FM 3-24, others were published prior to the final release
of the manual in late 2006; however, this paper argues that FM 3-24 did not adequately
take into account the presented critiques. Although various authors have questioned
discussion is likely the first to compile the questions into one comprehensive critique
University, FM 3-24 “breaks little new ground.” (p. 351). He acknowledges that the
25
manual does provide more direction on intelligence and the design of counterinsurgency
counterinsurgency body of work from the 1960’s that emerged from the anti-colonial and
communist insurgencies of Malaya and Algeria (p. 351). His critique, however, that
FM 3-24 is a reformulation of old material raises questions about the new doctrine that
Austin Long (2006), whose impressive book that summarized RAND’s five
different than twentieth century insurgencies (Malaya and Algeria) due to the end of the
Cold War and the rise of militant Islam, among other factors (p. 29). In the end, Long
insurgencies of the last century, but he admitted that the geopolitical context of today is
quite different and “the full effects of this change on COIN is unclear at present” (p. 57).
Dr. Steven Metz, of the Strategic Studies Institute, has consistently argued that the
United States needs to adapt its counterinsurgency doctrine from the Maoist guerrilla
movements of the Cold War to the twenty-first century. As early as November 2004,
Metz and Lt. Col. Raymond Millen proposed that the operational concepts, organization,
and doctrine from twentieth century insurgencies should not be applied to the
Response,” contended that there are two major variants of insurgency: national and
26
liberation. National insurgencies, which primarily arose in the twentieth century, are
the two parties was often economic class, ideology or identity. Conversely, liberation
insurgencies are a struggle against a ruling power viewed by the insurgents as foreign;
thus, the insurgency “liberates” the population from the outsiders. Most of America’s
counterinsurgent doctrine and strategy, however, has been derived from national
insurgencies. Due to the evolution in insurgency today, the United States military must
reconceptualize its doctrine to confront insurgency’s new variants. Metz and Millen
conclude, “To simply extrapolate the ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts
from several decades ago and apply them to 21 st century insurgency is a recipe for
ineffectiveness” (p. 1). Further, they argued that FM 3-24 does not provide any
the twenty-first century? Metz and Millen suggested that historically the decision to
overwhelming insurgency. In the post September 2001 world, however, the United
States is likely to engage in stabilization and transformation operations for the duration of
the War on Terror such as Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As the result, the
United States is much more likely to face liberation-type insurgencies (p. 19).
Similarly, at the U.S. Naval War College’s Irregular Warfare Conference, Erin
Simpson (2009), an assistant professor at the U.S. Marines Corps Command and Staff
College, offered that today’s insurgencies may be “systematically” different than those of
the twentieth century. This systematic difference is driven by the increase of third-party
27
only likely to intervene into situations that are dire enough to require support. As a
have outright victories by the counterinsurgent forces. Simpson concluded that the
counterinsurgents are involved. Finally, she noted that within the category of third-party
information densities due to their relative familiarity with their colony’s people. This
This section reviews literature that differentiates the domestic twentieth century
insurgencies with the modern global insurgency of Al Qaeda and radical Islam. Lt. Col.
David Kilcullen’s (2004) “Countering Global Insurgency” argued that the Global War on
grouping of Islamists seeking to restore Islam’s role in the world order. Although the
global insurgents primarily use terrorism, it is not their only tactic. As a result,
counterinsurgency, rather than counterterrorism, may offer the best approach to defeating
this global jihad. Developed in the 1960’s, classical counterinsurgency, however, was
6
Sampson’s tabulation of 26 insurgencies that included the presence of third-party counterinsurgents since
1945 excludes insurgencies in which third-parties were limited to roles as advisors or peacekeepers.
28
disaggregation seeks to de-link or dismantle the links that allow the global jihad and
of regional and global actors to link and exploit local actors, disrupting flows
between and within jihad theatres, denying sanctuary areas, isolating Islamists
from local populations and disrupting inputs from the sources of Islamism in the
does not demand the immediate defeat of the Chechen insurgency; instead, it only
demands that Chechen jihad is denied its links to the global movement, followed by
support for Russia as the country addresses Chechen separatism (p. 37).
It is important to note that while Kilcullen was one of the first to conceptualize
the Global War on Terror as a global insurgency, other counterinsurgency theorists and
authors have endorsed this argument, including Robert Cassidy (2006, p 2, 11). In fact,
FM 3-24 also conceptualizes the war against Al Qaeda as a global insurgency. The
manual states, “Today’s operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency,
29
of a global insurgency led by Al Qaeda, nothing in the manual specifically addresses how
After the release of the final version of FM 3-24 in December of 2006, Metz
(2007-2008) authored another article titled, “New Challenges and Old Concepts:
Understanding 21st Century Insurgency.” Metz advised that despite the extensive effort
whole, and the authors of FM 3-24 more specifically, theorists may not have gotten the
lessons and principles right. Ironically, as the military worked to overcome the Vietnam
syndrome, a new syndrome emerged: Vietnam became the universal insurgency model
and the Viet Cong the archetypical foe. Metz specifically cited that as the military tried
to understand the insurgency in Iraq, the most recommended books were David Galula’s
Counterinsurgency Warfare and John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Both
books examined wars of imperialism and nationalism, not the complex conflicts of the
post Cold War era. In a sense, the United States derived new strategies from old
conflicts. Metz theorized that modern day insurgencies are more like the complex
internal conflicts of the 1990’s: Somalia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Colombia, and
Different Motivations
Continuing with Metz (2007-2008), he also argued in “New Challenges and Old
have changed. Metz believed that Americans, following Clausewitz, view insurgency as
recognized that an insurgency also fulfills economic and psychological needs of the
insurgent. Not only does participation in the insurgency often provide a source of income
proportionately higher than what insurgents could otherwise earn, but more importantly,
it provides a source of identity and empowerment. Metz wrote, “Without a gun, most
insurgent soldiers are simply poor, uneducated, disempowered people with no prospects
shared this sentiment. Again, although politics obviously play a role in motivating some
Islamic regimes, religion, rather that some form of nationalism, motivates many
insurgents. For these insurgents, just participating in jihad itself is enough (p. 73).
Stephen Biddle (2008), a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on
Foreign Relations, charged that FM 3-24 makes assumptions about the relationship
between the United States and the host government. In instances in which the United
States’ interests are aligned with the host government, the manual’s prescriptions
31
are sound. In other situations, the manual could easily lead to “serious strategic error”
(p. 348).
According to Biddle, the manual assumes that insurgencies contest for the loyalty
of a largely uncommitted host population that may side with the insurgents or the host
government through a hearts and minds campaign. In cases such as Vietnam and other
religion for survival. More importantly, many threatened governments will commit more
to their own subgroup’s interests than an abstract idea of national well-being. These
governments, which are already facing questions of illegitimacy, will view American-
sponsored reforms as a greater threat to their personal survival than the insurgency.
Biddle wrote, “One thus cannot assume that the U.S. interest and the host government’s
interests are aligned in COIN; what the United States wants is not necessarily in the self-
For example, Lt. Col. JJ Malevich (2010), a branch chief for the US Army/USMC
Counter Insurgency Center, blogged on the USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Center
Blog that the interests of the elders in Afghanistan may not be aligned with the interests
suggested that the United States mirror-images Western culture onto other cultures and
then develops policies that would work well in Western cultures, often resulting in
frustration when outcomes are different than expected. The underlying question, then, is
how well does population-centric doctrine account for differences in cultures with respect
32
to authority. He asked whether Coalition efforts towards the Afghan population have
been blocked by the elders which Coalition forces are forced to work through. Malevich
concluded that the United States assumed that it was dealing with a power structure that
has the community’s best interest at heart (typically the case in Western culture). Afghan
elders, in contrast, are likely looking out for their best interest, which includes
maintaining their authoritative role in Afghan culture and exploiting it for its benefits.
* * *
It is important to note that while this paper categorized the various critiques
relating to transferability into six categories, the arguments are highly interrelated and
could easily be grouped a number of ways. Regardless of how these critiques are
categorized, a common theme runs through all of them. Perhaps it was best summarized
briefly mentioned above. He acknowledged that the manual is a step forward and that we
however, Hoffman concluded, “...it still fails to answer the most critical question: How is
this relevant to the highly connected, religiously inspired, urban dwelling, global
METHODOLOGY
The following chapter will present in detail the methodology used to examine this
source collection, the most influential resources, the construction of a matrix to evaluate
Source Collection
given to the collection of sources. This paper draws on a variety of sources ranging from
official government and military publications from both the United States and abroad,
articles authored by veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, academic theses, video-
News articles in reference to current events also supplemented the case studies of
library catalog and proprietary academic database searches—as well as more modern,
sophisticated methods including “push” resources. For instance, Google Alerts yielded a
Afghanistan and Somalia. The use of two different methods of collection increased the
Somalia.
34
Given the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the recent publication
Almost everyone interested in military affairs, international relations, and politics has
their own opinion on how effective counterinsurgency operations are and how they
should be successfully executed. These views are published daily online as well as on the
editorial and opinion pages of popular newspapers and magazines. In order to clarify the
quality of sources drawn upon for this paper, this section provides a short list of the most
resources include the United States Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, the
Small Wars Journal blog, the USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Blog (part of the
Combined Arms Center Blog), and the journals Parameters and Military Review. These
resources were highly influential and valuable due to the frequency in which they
blogs and the Strategic Studies Institute are frequently referenced in the ongoing
level of structure, this paper has constructed a matrix to assist in the examination of
FM 3-24’s transferability. In order to construct the matrix, however, significant time and
thought was dedicated to the question of exactly what data should compose the matrix.
35
Two sets of data were needed for the matrix to be effective: one set relating to FM 3-24,
and a second set by which transferability could be derived from. The literature review
provided a solution for the latter. The subheadings from the second section of the
literature review dedicated to the critiques of FM 3-24 provided six entries in which
The more challenging question, relating to the other set of data, became exactly
which characteristics of FM 3-24 would be used to compare against the six categories of
critiques. There is no one official (de facto or de jure) list that summarizes FM 3-24.
Moreover, since this question of transferability is exploratory, there is no agreed upon list
transferability of the new doctrine. As the result, the author needed to determine what list
(or set of data) the analysis should use to effectively summarize FM 3-24 for the purpose
nine paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations as the other set of data. Although the
nine paradoxes are quite popular in counterinsurgency literature due to their controversial
break from conventional warfighting, it was determined that the paradoxes did not
provide the best set of data. The paradoxes do provide a rough summary of FM 3-24, but
the true goal of the paradoxes is not to summarize the modern doctrine, rather they
The author also considered using the twelve principles listed in the section
p. 36-44). As its title suggests, however, the section summarizes the key principles from
As the result, the author brainstormed a list of eight FM 3-24 precepts that
summarized the doctrine’s key characteristics. In order to ensure the validity of the
brainstormed precepts, the following lists the eight precepts and the respective paragraph
driven operations (1-126), Unity of effort (1-121), Calculate carefully the type and
amount of force applied (1-141), Train host nation security forces (5-40), and Continually
learn and adapt (1-144).7 The author was also careful to characterize this list as
principles.
7
The Field Manual paragraph numbers only provide one example (often the most succinct) of the precept’s
discussion, however, many of the precepts, such as Unity of effort and Intelligence-driven operations, have
whole other sections and chapters dedicated to their discussion. The only exception is the Population-
centric precept. FM 3-24 never uses the wording “population-centric” but the term is used to denote the
doctrine’s focus; everything from security, to intelligence, and legitimacy is all based on the host
population. The paragraph number associated with this precept in the text refers to a paragraph in the
manual outlining all the aspects of the population counterinsurgents must know.
37
Across the top of the matrix, or the distinction between columns, are the critiques
of the literature review in the previous chapter. Along the left side, or the distinction
between rows, are the eight brainstormed precepts of FM 3-24. Since the chart is
identify each box within the matrix in order to avoid confusion in the analysis of the
matrix. For instance, a discussion on box Precepts 1, Critiques 1 (P1C1) will analyze the
validity of the precept “Balance offensive, defensive, and stability operations” against the
The objective of the matrix is to determine whether the critiques significantly call
do so, this paper will compare each critique with each of the precepts of FM 3-24 and
ask, “Does the critique presented in the second chapter invalidate the precept in today’s
insurgencies?”
paper will also explore FM 3-24’s implementation in Afghanistan and estimate its
effectiveness if employed against the insurgency in Somalia. As the result, this paper
will be able to examine the question of transferability not only in the abstract through the
use of the matrix, but also from the perspective of two real-world case studies. These
real-world case studies should validate the analysis of the matrix and/or offer additional
in December 2009, the recent major offensive in Marjah, and the preparation for another
offensive in Kandahar, popular attention in the United States has shifted from Iraq to
The selection of Somalia, on the other hand, may be more surprising to some
readers. The conditions in Somalia, however, not only provide another effective litmus
test for current counterinsurgency doctrine, but the situation in Somalia is important for
the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Located off the
Horn of Africa are vital sea lanes for international trade, and Somalia has emerged as a
39
safe haven for terrorists including known Al Qaeda operatives. The following paragraphs
will briefly discuss the country’s relationship with the United States, background on the
insurgency in Somalia, and further justification for Somalia’s inclusion in this study of
FM 3-24.
Somalia first appeared in the American mainstream in the early 1990’s under then
President George H.W. Bush. At the time, Somalia found itself amid a period of famine
and political turmoil. Somalia’s dictator, Siad Barre, was overthrown and fled the
country in January 1991, propelling the country into civil war as factions competed to
assume control of the government, most notably between Mohammad Farah Aidid and
Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Along with a devastating drought, the warring factions often
used food as a weapon, which resulted in widespread famine across the country. To
contain the growing humanitarian crisis, President Bush launched Operation Provide
In October 1993, a failed mission by Delta Force and Army Rangers to capture
Aidid resulted in a tragic firefight in the streets of Mogadishu that claimed the lives of
eighteen American soldiers and thousands of Somalis. The high number of casualties
peacekeeping mission. President Clinton (2004) called the tragic October day, “one of
the darkest days of my presidency” (p. 549). Shortly thereafter, American forces
In the nearly two decades since, Somalia has remained a failed state. In 2006, the
Islamic Courts Union, an Islamic fundamentalist party who largely controlled the
country, was expelled from power by the mostly Christian Ethiopian forces. To fill the
40
political vacuum, a Transitional Federal Government was established with the support of
the West and the United Nations. Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, popularly known as
Al-Shabaab, the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union, has waged an insurgency
against the Transitional Federal Government ever since. Al-Shabaab, which originated as
a guerrilla organization, has evolved into a political organization that has continued to
terrorize the Somali population and combat Transitional Federal Government forces.
Today, the United States officially categorizes Al-Shabaab, who has known links
beginning to expand its influence and the Islamic extremists may be plotting attacks
outside of Somalia. For instance, Reuters reported in January 2010 that the Somali man
who attacked Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist of depicted Prophet Muhammad as
Previously, in August 2009, Australian police foiled an attack against a military base that
At the time of the writing of this thesis, the Somali Transitional Federal
Government is gearing up for a major offensive against Al-Shabaab. The United States
has pledged support on the behalf of the Transitional Federal Government. Statements by
the United States government and the Somali government, along with news reports,
however, conflict about the level of involvement by the United States within the
offensive.
41
RESULTS
As expressed in the Introduction, the goal of this paper is to further define and
explore the United States’ modern counterinsurgency doctrine outlined in FM 3-24. The
further defining the United States’ modern doctrine. This chapter will move beyond
defining FM 3-24 by exploring the exact transferability of the new doctrine. In doing so,
this chapter will analyze the Transferability Matrix and test the findings against the case
examination. Using the matrix, counterinsurgency theorists can analyze the level of
transferability within the doctrine presented in FM 3-24 in two ways. Either theorists can
proceed horizontally by row comparing one FM 3-24 precept with each of the critiques or
theorists can analyze the matrix vertically by column in which each critique is compared
to the eight precepts. In order to ensure the validity and thoroughness of this analysis, a
This section will analyze the first row of the Transferability Matrix. This analysis
will consist of testing the precept “Balance offensive, defensive, and stability operations”
against the six critiques. In box P1C1, the precept is tested against the critique that the
new geopolitical environment that exists today in the post September 11, 2001 world is
quite different from the environment during the Cold War. No longer are colonial
powers battling Maoist insurgencies seeking independence. The Cold War has ended and
insurgents today are religious extremists rather than nationalists. Although the
proponents of this critique are correct, and it is likely that characteristics of insurgency
have evolved since the Cold War, it is unlikely that this critique invalidates the precept.
target the root causes of the insurgency. Returning to Austin Long’s (2006) quote from
the second chapter, “the full effects of this change [in the geopolitical environment] on
COIN is unclear at present” (p. 57), can also be flipped around in defense of FM 3-24.
While it is true that the full effects are unknown, which may invalidate some of
43
FM 3-24’s precepts, until the full effects are known, nothing about the current
Box P1C2 compares the same precept against the critique that insurgencies waged
counterinsurgents, are systematically different from the largely national wars studied by
the authors of FM 3-24. Again, the critics are likely correct that third-party
counterinsurgents and other authority bodies viewed as foreign are likely to have to
pursue slightly different strategies than indigenous ruling authorities. Does the
overarching doctrine have to change, however? The need for offensive and defensive
operations paired with nation-building remains the same. Potentially the third-party
counterinsurgents and indigenous forces apply slightly different strategies, but it all
occurs within the same doctrinal approach. Even if the third-party counterinsurgents
focus on the offensive and defensive operations while indigenous forces nation-build, and
if the two parties are unified, then together, the counterinsurgency campaign balances the
counterinsurgents seeking the perfect balance between offensive, defensive, and stability
offensive aspect, but the British in Malaya does provide one example, among others, in
which considerable resources were spent on stability operations. Box P1C3, however,
transnational or global insurgency. The result of this comparison is different from the
results of boxes P1C1 and P1C2. While in those comparisons it was clear that the critic
44
had a legitimate concern, although it did not necessarily negate the importance of the
precept, in this comparison, it is quite definitive that the rise of a global insurgency does
not invalidate the need to balance the three types of operations. In fact, due to the very
defensive, and stability operations becomes all the more critical. In fact, FM 3-24 states
that the proportion of offensive, defensive, and stability operations are likely to vary by
state borders is likely to require a varying mix of operations throughout the duration of
The result of the comparison of box P1C4, consisting of the critique that the
authors of FM 3-24 studied the wrong case studies in their formulation of the new
doctrine, is similar to the previous box, P1C3. Although a deeper examination of the
1990’s “complex internal conflicts” (p. 22), as Metz (2007-2008) referred to them, may
have yielded additional insights to the authors of FM 3-24, an examination of them here
demonstrates that the “balance” precept holds true. For example, Operation Restore
Hope in Somalia did contain a balance of offensive and stability operations. American
forces conducted a number of offensive raids, including the one on October 3, 1993, as
Moving on to box P1C5, this box addresses the critique regarding the idea that
insurgents today are called to action by different motivations. Rather than the largely
nationalistic motivations of the past, insurgents today are often religiously inspired or
45
seeking the gratification of some other psychological need. Again, this also re-
emphasizes the need for counterinsurgents to include stability operations into their
Finally, box P1C6 compares the “balance” precept with the critique that FM 3-24
makes too many assumptions about the relationship between the United States and the
host government; often assuming that the goals of the United States and the host
government are aligned. Even if there are divisions between the United States and the
host government, this does not invalidate the need to balance offensive, defensive, and
the two governments is likely to lead to disagreements over how the operations should be
conducted and negatively affect their effectiveness, but again, this does not invalidate the
precept.
46
This next section continues to analyze the matrix by comparing one critique to the
precepts of FM 3-24. The conclusions in this section, however, are identical to the ones
from the previous section. The argument at the heart of the critique does not invalidate
the precepts. For example, box P2C2 compares the population-centric precept against the
throughout the Cold War time period clearly illustrated the inherent failure of solely
targeting the insurgents. As the result, the introduction of new players (third-party
counterinsurgents) into the equation does not reduce the need for a population-centric
approach that targets the recruitment and support base of the insurgency.
P3C2) remains a key precept of counterinsurgency doctrine despite the critique. Again, it
that environment, and the lines between the uncommitted population and the insurgents.
In fact, this is a another reason why the population-centric precept is still crucial today,
the intelligence necessary to drive operations must come from the population, who will
Box P4C2 provides another example in which the critique not only fails to
invalidate the precept, but the critique actually further demonstrates the precept’s
insurgencies, unity of effort becomes all the more critical to the success of the
efforts with the host government, but efforts must be synchronized with nongovernmental
organizations (NGO’s), intelligence services, domestic and foreign media outlets, private
contractors, etc. As mentioned in the second chapter, military successes can be undone
forces. For this reason, as the number of players within the operational environment
48
exponentially.
In box P5C2, there is a bit of disconnect between the critique and the precept of
“assuming a greater level of risk” by the counterinsurgents. When the two are compared,
likely increases the overall number of counterinsurgent forces which may decrease the
amount of risk taken by the forces as a whole. The heart of the precept, however, is the
idea that counterinsurgents must leave their fortified bases and move amongst the people,
building trust and gathering intelligence. Again, although the number forces may
increase, the counterinsurgent forces must still freely move amongst the host population
Like box P4C2, box P6C2 presents another instance in which the critique actually
supports the precept. Even with the presence of third-party counterinsurgents, the
coalition of forces must carefully calculate the kind and amount of force used in
operations. Again, the presence of additional forces only increases the likelihood that
excessive force may be used. Excessive force in a counterinsurgency operation not only
is wasteful, but it can have negative consequences for the larger campaign. Collateral
counterinsurgency operations comes only when the host government can govern and
protect its population on its own. As the result, the training of host nation security forces
(box P7C2) remains critical to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign. In fact, as
forces can only think about withdrawing from the environment once adequate security
Finally, in box P8C2, the critique unequivocally fails to invalidate the precept that
learn and adapt. As mentioned in the second chapter, this precept is quite generic. In any
type of warfare, the ability to learn and adapt greatly increases the effectiveness of the
campaign. The importance of this precept, however, is all the more important in
analyze just a few more boxes from the Transferability Matrix to ensure that the previous
analyses were not cherry-picked. Yet again, there is a level of disconnect that exists
between the “different motivations” critique and the “unity of effort” precept (box P4C5),
which by default, means that the critique does not invalidate the precept. Similarly, the
argument that the authors of FM 3-24 studied the wrong case studies and did not
thoroughly draw on the operations throughout the 1990’s, does not invalidate the precept
relationship between the host government and the United States, again, has little effect on
two trends have emerged. Either the critiques fail to invalidate FM 3-24’s precepts
(including some instances in which the critiques seems to further support the precepts) or
50
there is a level of disconnect between the two, with the precept emerging unscathed by
default. The importance and implications of this disconnect will be discussed in the final
chapter.
significantly calls into question a precept. Box P2C3 compares the population-centric
precept with the critique that the emergence of global insurgencies is a break from the
campaigns, in addition to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlight the immense
instance, in terms of personnel, Fall (1967) recommended that the ratio of defenders to
a ratio of security forces (including host nation forces) to population density. FM 3-24
suggests that this ratio should be 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents in an area
across the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia? The question, then, is given the limits
operatives and cells (with varying degrees of autonomy) in 100 countries (Bajoria and
8
Interestingly, the change of focus to a ratio of counterinsurgents to residents in terms of population
density from a ratio of defenders to attackers further illustrates the shift from an enemy-centric approach to
a population-centric one in current counterinsurgency doctrine.
51
Bruno, 2009). Obviously, the number of operatives ranges from country to country.
Some countries may only have a single cell while other countries, such as Somalia, are
may even argue that the global insurgency is broader than Al Qaeda, involving radical
Even using modest numbers, however, provides insight into the challenges of
Qaeda was limited to Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan, the number of counterinsurgents
needed, according to the ratio based on population density provided by FM 3-24, would
range from 4.2 million to 5.2 million. 9 To put these numbers in perspective, including
reserve forces, the armed forces of the United States only total 1.4 million (DoD, n.d.).
insurgent in every environment; rather, disaggregation targets the links that allow
9
This numbers were calculated by adding the populations of Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan (using the CIA
World Factbook’s statistics as of May 2010). In order to account for the proper ratio of counterinsurgents
to population density, the quotient of the population of the three countries divided by 1,000 was multiplied
by 20 and 25.
10
Global insurgencies, however, do have a geographic component (the insurgents and their actions must be
located somewhere) meaning counterinsurgents battling a global insurgency must address host country
support to a certain degree.
52
population-centric approach is more than the protection of the host population, but the
effective against a global insurgency, however, remains unclear. Only time will tell.
Important to remember, though, is that FM 3-24 does recognize the war against Al Qaeda
the transferability of the doctrine must be questioned when it is moved from a domestic
to the results of each of the analyses comparing the critiques to precepts. Green boxes
indicate comparisons in which the critique failed to invalidate the precept. Orange boxes
highlight the comparisons in which a level of disconnect existed between the critique and
precept. The red box stresses the conflict between the population-centric precept and the
11
Interestingly, the view that the war against Al Qaeda is a global insurgency is similar to the way some
viewed the spread of communism as a global phenomenon. In fact, Kilcullen acknowledged that his theory
of disaggregation is similar to the theory of Containment in the Cold War.
53
Analysis of the Transferability Matrix yields a clear result. Despite the critiques
other characteristics that differentiate insurgencies today from the twentieth century.
This means that the doctrine’s precepts—the balance of offensive, defensive, and stability
nation security forces, etc—remain valid in a post-anti-colonial era. This result, however,
only applies to domestic insurgencies. Serious questions emerge about the doctrine when
54
FM 3-24 is not limited by time or geography, but by the type of insurgency it combats.
estimating the doctrine’s potential effectiveness in Somalia, this section will provide real-
world perspective to the transferability of FM 3-24 and the results presented in the
previous section.
Somalia is the new Afghanistan, or at least East Africa’s Afghanistan. The first article
exploring this question the author found was published by Arab News (Shank, 2006).
Shortly thereafter, the question reached more mainstream news outlets. BBC News
published an article titled, “Somalia – East Africa’s new Afghanistan?” (Watson, 2008)
followed by the Times Online and the article “Is Somalia the new Afghanistan?” (Swain,
2009). Authors continue to discuss the question in other news outlets, blogs, and
—such as geography, the years the insurgencies began, the key players, etc—there are a
number of similarities between the two countries. For instance, Afghanistan and Somalia
Islamic extremists seeking the expulsion of foreign forces and the implementation of
Sharia law nationally wage the insurgencies in both countries. Additionally, the Taliban
and Al-Shabaab receive a portion of their funding from international illegal activities.
Although it is not the sole source of revenue, the opium trade is a well-documented
55
moneymaker for the Taliban (Whitlock, 2009). While it remains a misconception that the
Somali pirates and Al-Shabaab are directly tied, it does not mean that the two entities
operate completely separate from each other. According to ABC News, the pirates pay
ships and kidnapping ship-personnel (Hughes, 2010). Finally, both insurgencies have,
Afghanistan
The following section will examine the implementation of the United States’
FM 3-24, the case study provides real-world context, or a comparison to the case study of
Somalia.
Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan has been tumultuous to say the least. The
United States achieved early success in “liberating” the country, overthrowing the
Taliban, and holding democratic elections. Although the period certainly had it setbacks,
From roughly 2005-2008, the Taliban resurged and stole the imitative from the United
States and Coalition forces (Barno, 2007, p. 97). Today, in May 2010, the United States
has shifted its focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. In an attempt to regain the initiative in
Afghanistan, better protect the Afghan population, and increase the training of Afghan
security forces, the United States is in the process of increasing its troop levels from
In the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States largely
employed an enemy-centric approach to the war in Afghanistan and the fight against the
Taliban. Again, early in the war, the United States achieved relative success, however
much of the Pashtun Taliban either assimilated into the local Pashtun tribes or fled to
United States also lacked any significant unity of effort (Barno, 2007, p. 87).
Under General McChrystal, the United States has shifted its approach in
security forces such as the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army
(ANA), and executing operations that are intelligence-driven. The United States has
primarily focused its reconstruction efforts on large population centers and around Kabul,
despite only twenty-three percent of the population living in urban areas. Over fifty
percent of construction spending has been spent in Kabul (Savage, 2009). The strategy is
to secure, hold, and build population centers and project Afghan government power
outward. The flipside, then, withdraws soldiers from rural areas in which commanders
2010). The insurgency, however, has focused more on the mountainous, rural areas
(Savage, 2009). The recent offensive in Marjah, and the upcoming offensive in
Kandahar, are examples, though, of Coalition forces concentrating efforts away from the
capital city.
57
America’s counterinsurgency doctrine and the inherent challenges of its execution. In the
video, American forces try to gather intelligence from an Afghan village elder in a town
from which the Taliban has launched rockets against Coalition forces. Unfortunately,
although the village elder says that he does not support the Taliban, the fear of retribution
from the Taliban forces the elder to withhold any intelligence. The series, and
warriors?” which is another video in the series, illustrates the difficulties for Coalition
forces who are required to balance the roles of aggressive, fearless warriors and
compassionate nation-builders.
Although the new approach and counterinsurgency doctrine as a whole has been
largely accepted within military circles and by the American mainstream, it remains
unclear just how effective the “surge” in American forces and the strategic adjustment
has been. A recent article by the Washington Post, published in May 2010, asked Erin
12
For another video journalism series that provides a fuller understanding of the mission in Afghanistan, its
implementation, strengths, and weaknesses from a variety of perspectives, see the “30 Days through
Afghanistan” video blog at http://30days.isaf.nato.int/.
58
Unsurprisingly, each of the six respondents answered differently. Responses ranged from
a ringing endorsement of the strategy to outright denunciation, and even an “it’s still too
Somalia
amidst the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a solution more specifically for those
insurgencies? This section will examine the current situation in Somalia and estimate the
In all fairness to this examination, it must first be noted that Somalia provides a
case study of a situation that no solution may effectively resolve. As noted in previous
sections, Somalia has spent the past several decades as a failed state with no legitimate
national government. The level of poverty, disillusionment, and famine dwarfs just about
offensive, defensive, and stability operations, unifying the efforts of all counterinsurgent
13
This report does not mean to oversimplify the situation in Somalia by attributing the insurgency solely to
Al-Shabaab; other insurgent groups do exist. Al-Shabaab, however, receives much of the international
attention due to the organization’s suspected ties to Al Qaeda. In addition, recent reports indicate that
another major insurgency organization, Hizbul-Islam, has disintegrated, with forces either assimilating into
Al-Shabaab, remaining independent, or joining smaller organizations.
59
real challenges to the counterinsurgent forces. Although Somali insurgents could not rely
on dense jungles or a complex system of caves to provide cover, they could likely use
urban areas such as the capital Mogadishu and other port cities to blend into the general
distinctions about who constitutes as the enemy. For instance, are the notorious Somali
pirates insurgents or simply outlaws? The pirates often use force to hijack ships and are
opposed to any group that attempts to rein them in. The pirates, however, are not seeking
to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Rather, they are in some ways
similar to the opium farmers in Afghanistan who have simply turned to illegal activities
violence on TFG and African Union forces, the insurgent organization terrorizes the
population through harsh disciplinary action for the violation of Sharia laws. Dozens of
news articles report Al-Shabaab militants whipping (Sheikh, 2009), stoning, and killing
(Hughes, 2008) Somalis who break laws upheld by the terrorist organization.
eliminate many of the Al-Shabaab true believers in offensive operations. Through the
use of stability operations, however, many of the insurgents could likely be pacified by
improving the economic conditions in Somalia. The economic conditions are so poor in
Somalia, reports indicate that TFG forces are deserting to Al-Shabaab as a result of
insufficient pay (Smith, 2010). Stability operations would also be critical in improving
easing the famine and improving healthcare. In fact, NGO’s have been active in Somalia
for decades. During Operation Restore Hope, before the American mission began to blur,
the primary objective of American forces was to secure the delivery routes for food
delivered by the United Nations and NGO’s (United, 2003, p. 5). As a result of likely
large number of NGO’s and coalition forces necessary for the security of the country,
local security forces would also be necessary for the long-term security of Somalia. In
fact, the United States already has experience training Somali forces. According to
FM 3-24, Marines in Somalia, from 1992 to 1993, used extrapolated lessons from the
Marines were paired with host-nation security forces (Headquarters, 2007b, p. 187).
More recently, the United States has funded the training of Somali security forces. In
March 2010, the United States announced that it is considering joining an effort with the
European Union to actually provide the training for Somali forces in Uganda starting in
The case studies of Afghanistan and Somalia confirm the conclusions drawn from
the Transferability Matrix. FM 3-24 is not limited by time or geography. Although the
different continent from Afghanistan, it is likely that the precepts of FM 3-24 would
transfer well to the counterinsurgents. Like the FM 3-24 critiques, there is nothing about
the insurgency in Somalia that would invalidate FM 3-24’s precepts, when categorized
examination of the case studies provides little insight into the appropriate doctrine
CONCLUSION
exact transferability of the new doctrine. According to the author’s research, no other
FM 3-24. As part of this exploration, this paper examined a total of seven insurgencies,
from Malaya to Somalia, and the approaches of counterinsurgent forces from three
countries—Great Britain, France, and the United States. In addition, the transferability of
FM 3-24 was evaluated through the use of two methodologies, one theoretical and
another providing real-world perspective. This chapter will summarize the results and
subsequent conclusions of this comprehensive study and suggest three areas in which
As the result of this comprehensive approach and two methodologies, this paper
concludes that FM 3-24 is highly transferable among domestic insurgencies; however, the
that likely limits the doctrine’s transferability to global insurgencies. Quite simply, the
resources (time, money, personnel, etc) demanded by the doctrine cannot be matched on
a global scale. This means that the transferability of FM 3-24 is not limited by time or
understanding what type of insurgency they are facing. The manual, however, defines
the “type” of insurgency differently than the conclusion here (domestic vs. global
63
insurgency). In determining the type of insurgency, the manual stresses that commanders
should understand the root causes of the insurgency, the extent to which the insurgency
enjoys external support, the motivations and level of commitment of the insurgents, and
the likely insurgent weapons. The manual then goes on to discuss the different
9). The manual, however, does not go on to describe the ways in which the
counterinsurgents need to adapt their doctrine or strategies based on the type of insurgent
they are countering. This leaves the reader to conclude that FM 3-24 is broad enough
that its precepts can effectively counter the various “types” of insurgencies as defined by
the manual. For the sake of the scope of this paper, the author concedes that this is likely
the case. Conversely, the manual fails to take into account the type of insurgency as it
Due to the results of this study, as well as the absence any discussion relating to
the potential doctrinal adjustments necessary for the countering of a global insurgency,
this paper suggests that counterinsurgency theorists explore how to effectively defeat a
global insurgency and how this new type of insurgency affects modern counterinsurgency
however, it remains unclear whether Kilcullen is correct, whether this paper is correct,
and whether there are any alternative approaches. A related component unexplored by
any of the literature is how to counter insurgencies (global ones included) with the new
phenomenon of cyber-insurgencies.
64
The final two areas of further study suggested by this paper come from the
Transferability Matrix. Although many of the critiques voiced against FM 3-24 failed to
invalidate the doctrine’s precepts, this does not mean that the critiques should not be
studied and pursued further. In fact, this paper recognizes that several of the critiques
may have a more significant impact if they are developed further. For instance, the
“global insurgency” critique was easy to compare against FM 3-24’s precepts because
disaggregation). Today, many of the critiques are just that, critiques. If these critiques
FM 3-24. For instance, theorists should continue to question what lessons can be derived
from the complex internal conflicts of the 1990’s. By further examining these operations,
Finally, the Transferability Matrix highlighted the need for one more area of
further study related to the one directly above. This paper already highlighted six
theorists also need an effective, structured way to reconcile the critiques with the United
States’ doctrine. This suggestion is largely attributed to the discussion under the “Further
Analysis of the Matrix” subheading in the fourth chapter. When the Transferability
Matrix compared several of the critiques to the precepts, there was a level of disconnect.
This disconnect provides a real challenge to theorists’ ability to continually learn and
critiques raised against the doctrine do not match up with the doctrine’s precepts? This
paper used a simple methodology in which it directly compared the precepts and the
critiques. Is there a better alternative? Is there a way to structure the critiques in a way in
which it is easier to contrast them against the standing doctrine? Failure to do so will
severely handicap the ability to further study and improve counterinsurgency doctrine.
At the 2009 Irregular Warfare Conference hosted by the U.S. Naval War College,
Jeremy Pugh-Moran (2009) commented that doctrine is evolutionary, but the insurgency
against all types of insurgencies, critique it, and find a structured, efficient methodology
14
The term “revolutionary” here has a dual meaning. First, insurgencies are political struggles,
revolutionary, in a sense, against an established government. Second, “revolutionary” also refers to the
strategy and tactics employed by insurgents, which are often revolutionary. For instance, consider the ways
in which indiscriminate terrorism (which includes the targeting of the host population) revolutionized
insurgency from the situations in which terrorism was only employed against counterinsurgents and
government institutions.
66
REFERENCES
Bajoria, J. & Bruno, G. (2009, December 30). Al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida).
http:///www.cfr.org/publication/9126/.
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA471170.
Biddle, S. (2008, June). In J.C. Isaac (Ed.), The new U.S. Army/Marine Corps
http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/POPJune08.pdf.
Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the global war on terror: Military culture
Coates, R.J. (1991). The United States’ approach to El Salvador. Retrieved March 29,
DoD 101: An introductory overview of the Department of Defense (n.d.). United States
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/dod101/index.html.
Fall, B.B. (1967). Street Without Joy (4th ed.). Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company.
67
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2007a). Preface. In The
U.S.
No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (pp. xlvii-xlviii).
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2007b). The U.S.
No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Herridge, C. (2009, October 02). FBI director: Al Qaeda-linked Somali group could
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/02/fbi-director-al-qaeda-linked-somali-
group-attack/.
documents/neocoin.pdf.
Horne, A. (2006). A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (4th ed.). New York: New
Hughes, D. (2008, December 4). Brutal terror group seeks power in Somalia. ABC News.
6386869&page=1.
68
Hughes, D. (2010, April 28). Somalia’s pirates and Islamists clash and cooperate. ABC
somalia-pirates-islamic-fighters-works-times/story?id=10500912.
International security and assistance force key facts and figures (2010, April 16).
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/Apr-16-2010-placemat.pdf.
Is President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy working? (2010, May 9). Washington Post.
dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050704506.html.
Jackson, C. (2010, March 5). Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan - forum. John Hopkins
Kalyvas, S.N. (2008, June). In J.C. Isaac (Ed.), The new U.S. Army/Marine Corps
http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/POPJune08.pdf.
Lekic, S. (2010, March 4). US looking into helping train Somali forces. ABC News.
id=10008504.
69
Malevich, J.J. (2010, April 14). Population centric COIN: Are we doing it?. USA and
http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/04/14/population-centric-
coin-are-we-doing-it.aspx.
Markel, W. (2006, Spring). Draining the swamp: The British strategy of population
McDaniel, L. (2006, June 7). A tentative manual for countering irregular threats: An
usmc/manual.pdf.
McHugh, J.D. (2009). John D McHugh in Afghanistan. Retrieved May 9, 2010 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/john-d-mchugh-afghanistan.
Metz, S., & Millen, R. A. (2004, November), Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the
21st century: Reconceptualizing threat and response. Retrieved May 12, 2010 from
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=586.
Metz, S. (2007-2008, Winter). New challenges and old concepts: Understanding 21st
century insurgency. Parameters, XXXVII(4), 30-32. Retrieved May 12, 2010 from
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07winter/metz.pdf.
Mount, M. & Shaughnessy, L. (2009, December 3). Frequently asked questions about the
70
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/30/afghanistan.faqs/index.html.
Nagl, J.A. (2005). Learning to eat soup with a knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from
Nagl, J.A. (2007). Foreword to the University of Chicago University press edition: The
Manual: U.S. army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine corps Warfighting
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475521&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
Petraeus, D.H. & Amos, J.F. (2007). Foreword. In The U.S. Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine
Chicago Press.
Conference.aspx.
Q+A-what is the global reach of Somalia’s rebels? (2010, January 6). Reuters. Retrieved
71
L120100106?sp=true.
Rabasa, A., Warner, L.A., Chalk, P., Khilko, I. & Shukla, P. (2007). Money in the bank:
papers/2007/RAND_OP-185.pdf.
Rosenberg, M. (2010, April 15). U.S. forces leave Afghan ‘valley of death’. Wall Street
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230415930457518338365483724
8.html.
Savage, S. (2009, September). COIN lessons learned: Human terrain system (HTS)
COIN training [Adobe Presenter]. U.S. Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
repository/OPDs/hts_coin/hts_coin_training_index.htm.
frustrations of reform and the illusions of nation building. Retrieved March 29,
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field
Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (pp. xxi-
Shank, M. & Ali, K. (2006, August 13). Somalia: Revisiting Afghanistan’s failed policy?.
72
page=7§ion=0&article=77820&d=13&m=8&y=2006.
Sheehan, N. (1988). A bright shining lie: John Paul Vann and American in Vietnam. New
Sheikh, A. (2009, October 16). Somali islamists whip women for wearing bras. Reuters:
http://af.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/idAFTRE59F1K420091016.
part 1. U.S. Naval War College Irregular Warfare Conference 2009. Recording
Smith, D. (2010, April 28). US-trained Somali soldiers defect to al-Qaida. The Guardian.
apr/28/somalia-soldiers-defect-alqaida.
Swain, J. & Gillard, M. (2009, August 9). Is Somalia the new Afghanistan?. Times
tol/news/world/africa/article6788623.ece.
United States forces, Somalia: After action report and historical overview: The United
73
History.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam.htm.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR
2009092602707.html?hpid=topnews.
74
APPENDIX
the author. Only works not previously cited or referenced in the paper are included
READER_II.pdf.
Flynn, M.T., Pottinger, M. & Batchelor, P.D. (2010, January). Fixing intel: A blueprint
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.
Galula, D. (2006). Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958 (2nd ed.). Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation.
Hammes, T.X. (2006). The sling and the stone: On war in the 21st century. St. Paul, MN:
Zenith Press.
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24-2.pdf.
75
COIN/repository/28_Articles_of_COIN-Kilcullen(Mar06).pdf.
85(3), 8-12.
16-28.
Ucko, D.H. (2009). The new counterinsurgency era: Transforming the U.S. military for
Watson, R. (2008, May 2). Somalia-East Africa’s new Afghanistan?. BBC News.