American Geographical Society

Early Modern Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic Space

Author(s): Elizabeth Mancke
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, Oceans Connect (Apr., 1999), pp. 225-236
Published by: American Geographical Society
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EARLYMODERN EXPANSION AND THE POLITICIZATION

OF OCEANIC SPACE*
ELIZABETH MANCKE
The definition of oceans as internationalpoliticizedspaceis an integralbut little
analyzedaspect of earlymodern Europeanexpansion,which took placebetween about 1450
and 1800.In this essayI explorethe implicationsof thinkingabout the developmentof European imperialism and global dominance in oceanic terms. I arguethat oceanic, ratherthan
terrestrial,dominance characterizedearly modern Europeanempires,particularlyin relation to Africaand Asia,whereindigenouspoliticaland economic controlprevailed.The long
apprenticeshipin masteringoceanic space contributedto the ability of Europeansto build
land-based empires in Asia and Africain the nineteenth century.As well, the international
relationshipsworkedout by Europeansin the nonstatebut militarizedarenaof the high seas
contributed to an emergentglobal order.Keywords:colonialism,Europeanexpansion,imperialism, internationalrelations.

ABSTRACT.

,Iccording to the UnitedNations,sixteencolonies remainin the world.GreatBritain has ten;the United States,three;and France,New Zealand,and Spain,one each.'
In addition, these countries,as well as the Netherlandsand Australia,have overseas
dependenciesthat arenot technically"colonies,"a termof contestedmeanings.2Not
incidentally,almost all of these dependenciesareislandsor islandlikeenclaves,such
as Gibraltar,Ceuta,and Melilla.Individuallyand in total,they representthe firstand
lastoutposts of modern Europeanimperialism,territorialmanifestationsof the politicizationof oceanicspace.Aswell,theysuggestthatcontrolof theworld'soceanswas
a fundamentalpart of Europeanempirebuildingand remainsa criticalcomponent
of continued Europeanand neo-Europeandominancein the postcolonialworld.
Drawing on the rich historicalliteraturethat describesaspectsof earlymodern
expansion, I explore three broad implications of the oceanic dimensions of European imperialism.First,it engenderedan expansivedynamic distinct from the dynamics of other seafaringpeoples, wherebyEuropeansconstructeda new kind of
empire that differedsignificantlyfrom land-based ones. Second, the centralityof
oceanic control and the tenuousness of territorialcontrol outside Europeforcesus
to reassessthe agencyof Asian,African,and Americanpeoples in the history of the
early modern world. Third, oceanic expansion reconfiguredinternational relations, obliging expansionistpowersto define the legal and diplomatic implications
of interstateconflict in the extraterritorialarenaof the high seas. This in turn elevated interstaterelations in Europefrom a regionalsystem to a global one, which
would come to define contemporaryinternationalrelations.
* This
essay benefited from the comments of the participantsat the Oceans Connect workshop at Duke University and from the assessments of two anonymous reviewers.The John CarterBrownLibrary,where I was a fellow,
provided a collegial environment for completing the revisions.

D$ DR.

MANCKE

is an associate professor of history at the University of Akron, Akron, Ohio,

44325-1902.
The Geographical Review 89 (2): 225-236, April 1999

Copyright 0 2000 by the American GeographicalSociety of New York

226

THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

THE NOVELTY OF OCEANIC EMPIRES

The politicization and militarizationof oceanic space,as much as its globalization,

distinguished Europeanoceanic expansion from that of other seafaringpeoples.
Austronesianshad settledislandsstretchingfromRapaNui (EasterIsland)to Madagascarbut did not maintainthe politicaltieswith theirhearthsocietiesnecessaryfor
empirebuilding (Finney1994).Muslimtradersused maritimeroutesto carrytrade
goods and Islamas fareast as the South ChinaSea,and emporiafrom Japanto East
Africaallowedmerchantsto establishdense tradingnetworksspanningthousands
of kilometers. Politically,though, the Indian Ocean Basin continued to comprise
dozens of autonomous polities, from largeempiresto smallprincipalitiesto tribalbased societies, and political control stopped,in most instances,at the water'sedge.
Fifteenth-centuryChina demonstratedthe ability,if not the intention, to establish
an empirethroughlong-distanceoceanicexpansion,until the governmentdismantled the navy and curtailedseabornetrade (Das Guptaand Pearson1987;Ptakand
Rothermund 1991;Pearson 1998). Thus when Europeans began their long-distance

maritime ventures, trade and colonization were old processes in the Indian and
PacificOceans. But Europeans'transoceanicpolitical claims and their attemptsto
control and regulateaccessto the high seaswere new phenomena.
The "extendedpolities"these maritimeventuresengendereddifferedfrom the
major land-based empires,whether ancient and medievalempiresor the contemporary Ottoman, Safavid,Mughal,Ming, and RussianEmpires(Greene1986;Pagden 1995). Land-basedempires grew by pressing into strategicallyimportant or
weak areason their frontiersor acrossnarrowbodies of water,annexing territory
and people. Ottomanencroachmentsinto southeasternEuropeprovidedpartof the
impetus for Iberian forays into the Atlantic Ocean. The fifteenth-centuryPortuguesecourtwas dividedoverwhetherto spendmoney to confrontMuslimsin North
Africaor to developthe Atlanticroute aroundAfricato avoidthem;the latterstrategy ultimately prevailed (Boxer 1969). Between about 1450 and 1700, oceanic expan-

sion did not inherently represent superior strength and at times represented
preciselythe opposite. Englandostensiblystayedout of the ThirtyYears'War(16191648)andprofitedby actingas a neutralshipper.Caribbeanwaters,however,had not
yet been incorporatedinto the Europeaninternationalorder,allowingEnglishpirates-despite England'sneutrality-to undermineSpain'swar effortby preyingon
ships carryingthe silverand gold necessaryto financeits armies(Andrews1991).The
land-poor Dutch shrewdlyrecognizedthe potentialfor power throughexpertisein
maritimetradeand shipping (Boxer1965).Thus oceanicexpansionopened up new
opportunitiesforweakerpolities to realignthe balanceof powerwithin Europeand
with its Muslimneighbors,achievedas much throughcontrolof the maritimeenvironment as with territorialacquisitionsin Africa,Asia,and the Americas(Symcox
1976; Chaudhuri 1985;Pearson 1987).

Spatiallythese new "seaborne"empires bore little resemblanceto land-based

empires,with their territoriallycontiguous provinces(Boxer1965).The colonies of
these new far-flungempireswere separatedfrom their metropoles,and often from

POLITICIZATION

OF OCEANIC SPACE

227

other colonies, by thousands of kilometersof water.Emergingin a volatile and increasinglyglobal environment,these overseasoutposts of Europewere vulnerable
to seaborne attacksby rival interests.The multiple nations vying for colonies, the
ambiguity of internationallaw for these new oceanic frontiers,and the difficulties
monarchs faced in controllingtheir distantsubjectsforcedEuropeansgraduallyto
define a new internationalorderthat could accommodatethese new empires (Pagden 1995).
LAND-POOR EMPIRES

Whenwe think aboutthe expansionof Europewe often conflatean oceanicpresence

-or abounded presenceon an islandorlittoral-with continentalterritorialcontrol.
We ignore,forget,or do not realizethatearlymodern Europeanscontrolledverylittle in the wayofland, trade,people,or governmentsin theAmericas,Africa,andAsia.
Most European-occupiedterritorywas littoral or within easy reach of a saltwater
port. Papalbulls and treatiesdividing up the non-Europeanworld could not eliminate the practicalrealitythat African,American,and Asianpeoples dominatedterrestrialspace, even in the Americas,where introduceddiseasesraced ahead of the
Europeanpresence and decimatedlocal populations.
The threeareasof the Americasin which Europeansdid makesignificantterritorialinroadsbeforethe eighteenthcenturyweredirectlyconnectedto the conquestof
large pre-Columbian political or economic systems. The Spanish capitalizedon
their conquest of the Aztecs and the Incasto settle CentralMexico and Peru,while
smaller groups of natives throughout Hispanic America resisted submission to
Spanish authorityand constrainedcolonization.The Frenchpenetratedthe Great
Lakesregion of North Americaafterthe mid-seventeenth-centurydisruptionof the
Huron-Algonquintradingsystem,althoughthey neverestablishedan inlandsettler
presence that seriously displacednatives in the way that Englishsettlersdid along
the AtlanticSeaboard(White1991;Hinderaker1997).Not until the discoveryof gold
in the Brazilianinteriorin the 169os did the Portugueseestablishsettlementsbeyond
easy reach of the Atlantic Ocean (Boxer1969).Overmore than 300 yearsand with
greateffortEuropeanssolidifiedthe territorialclaimsin the Americasthat ministers
and diplomats asserted at distant negotiating tables. So limited was European
knowledgeof the Americanlandscape-and so expansivetheirhubris-that at times
they failed to recognizehow cluelessthey were.The belief of MeriwetherLewisand
William Clarkthat their expedition (1804-1806) could portage the RockyMountains in a day or two is testimonyto just how slowlyEuropeansgarneredgeographical knowledge, not to mention political control, of the Americas (Jackson1978;
Marshall and Williams 1982).

Europeaninroads in Africaand Asia were even more limited than they were in
the Americas,consisting at firstalmost exclusivelyof a few cities and fortifiedtrading posts.Afterinitialmilitaryconfrontationsthe Portuguesesettledinto negotiated
tradingrelationswith WestAfricans,establishingfortson offshoreislandsandlittoralareasaccessibleby oceangoingvessels(Thornton1998).In EastAfricathey seized

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control of the port towns of Sofalaand Kilwaand attemptedto monopolize their

trade.The Portuguesefoundedinlandsettlementsin AngolaandMozambique;only
in the formerwerethey marginallysuccessful,and therethey only penetratedabout
300 kilometers into the interior (Birmingham 1965;Newitt 1995;Pearson 1998). The

late-nineteenth-centuryscrambleforAfricaandthe ensuingbloody warsto enforce

colonial submission only make sense if we recognizethat duringthe previous four
centuriesof internationalcommerceAfricanscontrolledthe production and marketingof goods (includingslaves),to which Europeansgainedaccessat a few important trading centers (Pakenham 1991).

In Asiathe Portuguese,followedby the Dutch,the English,and the French,controlled tradingports, some takenby force,many occupied at the sufferanceof local
authoritiesand a few, such as Calcutta,createdby Europeans(Murphey1977).Although important to Europeantrade and economies, the overall impact of these
emporia on Asian economies remainedlimited for most of 300 years.Not until the
conquest of Bengal by the British East India Company (EIC) in the

1750S

and 176os

did Europeansmake their first major territorialacquisitionin Asia, an event that

scholarsof earlymodernAsiaincreasinglyuse to datethe onset of Europeanimperialism there.Vascoda Gama's1498voyageto India is a more importantevent in the
history of Europe than it is in the history of Asia (Leur 1955;Chaudhuri 1985;Das
Gupta and Pearson 1987;Marshall 1993; Subrahmanyam 1993).

Only in the nineteenth centurydid Europeansmakethe territorialinroadsinto

the Middle East,CentralAsia,SoutheastAsia,and Africathat we associatewith the
height of imperialism (Bayly 1989;Pakenham 1991).The long ascent of Europeans to

world dominanceoverthe lasthalf-millenniumshould not be confusedwith the actual achievementof global ascendancyless than two centuriesago. Although they
derivedconsiderablewealth from transoceanictrade,they remaineddependenton
commercial,financial,andproductionnetworkscontrolledby Asians,Africans,and
nativeAmericansand vulnerableto indigenouspoliticalleaderswho could and did
deprivethem of access.
TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL POWER

At the time of BartolomeuDias's,ChristopherColumbus's,and Vasco da Gama's

voyagesthe open oceanswere not politicizedspace.The seas,which had been navigated for thousands of years,were another matter.By venturing into the Atlantic
Ocean,western Europeanscould avoidthe Islamicpowersthat controlledmuch of
the Mediterranean,the RedSea,the PersianGulf,andthe BlackSea.Whentheysailed
south andwest, the challengesthey met werenot the armedfleetsof rivalpowersbut
their own ignoranceand fear,which in the short run they suppressedwith hopes of
economic gain and in the long runtheymasteredwith islandfootholds,with a growingbody of knowledgeaboutwinds andcurrents,andwith the adoptionand adaptation of new technologies (Fonseca1995).To resolvethe question of sovereigntythat
had arisen with the success of these new maritime ventures,the Portugueseand
Spanish agreedto the 1494Treatyof Tordesillas,which divided the non-Christian

POLITICIZATION

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229

world between themselves along a north-south line 370 leagues west of the Cape
VerdeIslands(Davenport1967).Thistreaty,however,did not providea solution that
other Europeanswould accept.Indeed,it would takemost of threecenturiesto sort
out the radicallynew internationalorderthat oceanic expansion created.
When the Portugueserounded the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean,
they entered waters that had been known and traversedby sailors for centuries.
These waterswere largelyunmilitarizedzones. The land-basedempiresbordering
the IndianOcean or the neighboringseas-in particularthe Safavidand the Mughal
Empires-did not have navies.Thus,when the Portugueseused their armedvessels
to wrest control of islandsand ports from local rulers,they met with relativelylittle
resistance(Subrahmanyam1993).They claimedsovereigntyover the IndianOcean
and the South ChinaSeaand set as theirobjectivethe licensingof travelon the maritime trade routes, a politicization of oceanic space that had no equivalentin Asian
practice(Chaudhuri1985;Pearson1987).Insufficientresourcesto coercethousands
of mariners,as well as Asian resistance,bluntedthe impactof this Portugueseclaim
of sovereignty.Ratherthan pay protection costs that licensesprovided,many merchants simply relocatedto ports not controlledby the Portuguese.Asian rulersemployed various strategiesto curb these newcomers'aggrandizementof power.The
Ming prohibited them from trading on the Chinese shore in the 152os. The Ottomans expanded their naval fleet to keep open the Red Sea route to the Levantafter
the Portugueseblocked it and to limit Portugueseinfluencein the PersianGulf.The
Acehnesesultanate,founded in northernSumatrain the earlysixteenthcentury,organized a tradingnetworkbetweenthe Indonesianarchipelagoand SouthAsiathat
challengedPortuguesedominance in the intra-Asiantrades.In the long run,peaceful accommodationwas more profitablethan coercion,and the Portuguesebecame
just anotherplayerin the Asiantrades(Hess 1970;Lane1973;Chaudhuri1985;Pearson 1987;Souza 1987;Subrahmanyam1993).
This interim solution was short-lived, however.In the late sixteenth century,
Dutch and Englishmerchantspenetratedthe Asianmarkets,providinga European
challengeto Portugal'scaim to sovereigntyoverthe IndianOceanand reinvigorating the contest for oceanic control. Significantly,events in Europedirectlyaffected
the timing of this new merchantpresence,and it would be neitherthe firsttime nor
the last that Europeansquite literallycircumnavigatedproblemsat home through
oceanic expansion. In 1585Philip II of Spainhad dosed the Lisbonspice marketto
merchantsfrom the Netherlandsand England,largelyin reactionto the civil warhe
was waging against English-supportedDutch Protestants.Initially,English merchants who were interestedin the Asian trades tried to avoid the Portugueseand
Spanishaltogetherby searchingfor a northernoceanicrouteto Indiaand by trading
with Asians through the Russian Company and the LevantCompany (Andrews
1984;Lawson 1993).Finding neither solution viable, they took the South Atlantic
route to India, passing through Spanish-and Portuguese-dominatedwaters.Once
in the Indian Ocean, the EIC,charteredin 1600 with limited capitalization,tried to
avoid confrontingthe Portugueseand the Dutch directly,but within a decadecom-

THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

230

pany officialsin Asiahad informedthe Boardof Directorsin Londonnot to "expect

any quiet trade" (Furber 1976, 40). At Surat, Portuguese influence kept the Mughal
emperorfrom grantingthe EICtradingprivilegesin the city.In retaliation,the Eng-

lish attackedIndian ships and engagedthe Portuguesein a navalbattle near Surat's

harbor.In 1613the emperor grantedthe Englishtrading rights in Surat,partlyto
checkthe Portuguese,whom he subsequentlyexpelledfromthe city in 1632. In Persia
the EICprovided Shah Abbas the necessarynaval support to oust the Portuguese
from Hormuz in 1622 (Furber 1976; Chaudhuri 1985; Subrahmanyam 1993).
The Dutch EastIndiaCompany(voc), charteredin 1602 and more heavilycapitalized than the EIC,began to tradein the IndianOceanwith the clearintention of
militarilyand commerciallychallengingthe Portugueseand the newly arrivedEnglish (Boxer

1965;

Furber 1976). The Dutch capture of a Portuguese galleon in 1604

prompted the Iberiansto claim the IndianOcean as exclusivelyPortuguesewaters

under the terms of the Treatyof Tordesillas.The voc hired the legal theorist Hugo
Grotiusto preparethe legalbrief,and his treatise,MareLiberum,becameimportant
in articulatingthe internationallawon freedomof the seas.The Dutch subsequently
used Grotius'sargumentsagainstthe Englishattemptto exclude other Europeans
from fishing in the North Sea and whaling in the North Atlantic waters around
Spitzbergen (Butler 1992; Roelofsen 1992).

For most of the seventeenth century the Dutch were the ascendantEuropean
influence in Asian waters,with the Englishan increasinglystrong competitor and
the Portuguesein decline.Followingthe Portugueseprecedentof controllingheavily traveledsea-lanes,the Dutch set their sights on monopolizing the spice tradeof
the Indonesian archipelago.They establishedBatavia(now Jakarta)in 1619as the
heavily fortified commercial center of their Asian interests.Asian rulers enlisted
their assistancein rebuffingthe Portuguese.The Japanesedecision in 1634to expel
the PortuguesefromNagasakiand transfertheirtradingprivilegesto the Dutch had
severeeconomic repercussions,becauseJapanesesilverhad providedmuch of the
bullion the Portugueseused in Asian trade (Furber1976).
Meanwhile,within Asian societies,emergentpowersweakenedthe cohesion of
the Mughal,Safavid,and Ottoman Empires(Bayly1989).Emblematicof this shift
was the rise of Oman as an autonomous state organizedaround maritime commerce and naval strengthin the western Indian Ocean.CapturingMombasafrom
the Portuguesein 1698,the Omanis extended their political control over much of
EastAfrica.On the high seastheyprovideda potent challengeto Europeans'military
dominance.What neither the Omanis nor other Asiansdid was to enter the interoceanic tradesthat linkedthe IndianOceanand AtlanticOceanmarkets.As well, in
the eighteenth century Europeanstate navies, not just armed merchantships, appeared more frequentlyin Asian waters,and in the nineteenth centurythe British
state would challenge the Omanis through the EIC(Risso 1986).

The presenceof the BritishNavy in the IndianOceancreateda functionalseparation of militaryand commercialpower and markeda new stagein the politicization of Asian ocean space. Militaryexpenses no longer had to be deriveddirectly

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from and balanced with commercial revenues,a shift in costs that was probably
criticalfor the territorialexpansionof the BritishEmpirein Asia.In contrast,Dutch
global influencehad declinedoverthe eighteenthcentury,in partbecausethe States
General of the Netherlands expected the provinces of Zeeland and Holland, the
most directbeneficiariesof Asiancommerce,to fund the navyout of maritimecommercial revenues (Boxer1965).
Successfuland regularcrossingof the AtlanticOcean,unlike the centuries-old
navigation of the Indian Ocean,was a Europeanachievement.As a result,the dynamic here was primarily one of intra-Europeanconflict. Geographically,three
transatlanticcircuitswerechartedwithin a fewyearsof eachother.The first,andhistoricallythe most prominent,was the mid-Atlanticcircuitconnecting Europeand
the Caribbean.But the Portuguesepioneered a second, South Atlantic, route between West Africa and Brazil;and a third route, across the North Atlantic, soon
opened the Newfoundland fishery to Europeans(Meinig 1986). During the sixteenth century the three remained separatearenasof competition, with growing
commercial and military integrationover the next two centuries.
In developing their Atlanticcircuits,the Spanishand Portugueseinitiallyfaced
little competition, except in littoral waters. In West Africa,local powers ably defended themselvesagainstPortuguesedepredations(Thornton1998).Resistanceby
the Caribs and the Arawaksin the LesserAntilles kept the Spanish from settling
these islands (Boucher 1992). But, as knowledge of Atlantic navigation spread
throughout the ports of westernEurope,the Iberiansfound that their greatestadversarieswere not indigenous peoples but roving Frenchand Englishpirateswho
dogged their galleonsand foreignmerchantswho interlopedin Africanand American markets.Spainrespondedfirstby armingmerchantships and then by providing
navalescorts for the annual fleet that left the Gulf Coastladen with bullion. Nevertheless, aggressiverivalspersistedin their encroachmentson Iberianinterests.The
Dutch, to compensatefor the loss of salt suppliesfrom southernEuropeafterSpain
cut off trade during the revolt in the Netherlands,began to produce salt on Caribbean islands. English harassmentof Spanish and Portuguesefishermen in Newfoundland, especially after 1585,effectivelydrove the Iberians out of the fishery,
leavingthe Englishto compete with the Frenchfor supremacyin the North Atlantic
(Lounsbury1934;Andrews1984;Boucher1989).
By the end of the sixteenth century,decadesof Atlanticmaritime conflict and
Europeanwars had so weakened Spain'spower that, in treaty negotiations with
Franceand Englandin 1598and 1604,respectively,the Frenchand Englishasserted
their right to establishcolonies in areasnot occupied by the Spanish (Quinn 1974;
Appleby 1996). The Frenchand English,as well as the Dutch, establishedcolonies
under the auspices of charteredcompanies or proprietors,to whom their Crowns
gave the right to wage war againstEuropeanrivalsand indigenous peoples. Armed
conflict among Europeans,most of it seaborne,becameendemicin the seventeenthcentury Atlantic world. Virginia sent armed ships to attackAcadia.The English
Kirkefamilyattackedand took Canadafromthe French.Englishand Frenchpirates

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continued to preyon Spanishshipping.A settlementof Scotson CapeBretonlasted

only a few months beforeit was destroyedby the French.The Spanishdestroyedthe
Puritancolony on ProvidenceIslandin the Caribbean.The Dutch drovethe Portuguese out of the slavetrade,as well as their settlementsin Brazil(Boxer1965,1969;
Andrews 1984; Boucher 1989; Appleby 1996). These armed engagements, to name

but a few, dispersed struggling settlements, established competing claims, and

forced the interventionof Europeanstates.
In short, transoceanictrade and colonization createdsignificantnew international conflicts and constellationsof power outside existing arrangements.The insistence by the Netherlands, England,and Francethat Spain and Portugalcould
not claim sovereignty over the oceans necessitated state-to-state negotiations
about the terms of interaction in this nonstate arena.The internationalcommunity needed some consensus about where sovereign,territorialwaters ended and
the international zone began. Likewise,the control of subjects on the high seas,
particularlypirates, required new laws and agreements, and the need to police
trade and to suppresspiracy demanded state-supportednavies. Government expendituresin Englandaccordinglyrose duringthe seventeenthcentury,with naval
expendituresaccountingfor a largeportion of the increase(Braddick1996).Meanwhile, a new range of tradelaws,such as the NavigationActs passedby the English
Parliamentbeginning in the mid-seventeenth century,sought to guaranteethat
the profits of the new carryingtrades would accrue to the home country. By the
mid-eighteenth centurythe managementof nationaleconomies, with a particular
focus on overseastrade, had become a central function of governments (Pagden
1995).

Gradually,overthe courseof the seventeenthcentury,westernEuropeanpowers

provisionallyworkedout manyof theseissuesin treatynegotiations.Forexample,as
partof the 1670treatybetweenSpainand Englandconcedingthe latter'sconquestof
Jamaica,the Englishgovernmentagreedto restrainits pirates.The crackdownin the
Atlantic Ocean encouragedpirates to move into the Indian Ocean, where a large
group planted itself on Madagascarand preyed on European shipping. These
English-speakingpiratesevinced such little regardfor national ties that they captured Englishvessels, prompting the EIC to insist that the governmentcontrol its
own nationals (Thomson 1994).

The Nine Years'War (1689-1697)inauguratedanotherlong centuryof conflict

thatwould not end until the Congressof Viennain 1815.Overthe courseof that century the spread of Europeanwars into overseastheatersmade the world'soceans
highlycontestedspaces.FromHudsonBayto Madrasandthe Capeof Good Hope to
Nootka Sound, warring Europeansattackedtheir enemies' forts and settlements,
and diplomatsnegotiatedthe futuresof WestIndianislands,Newfoundlandfishing
stations, fur-trade outposts, Asian emporia, and African slave-tradingforts. Although the expenses of war drainedthe coffersof Europeanstates,the prospectof
acquiringlucrativeoverseascolonies to offsetthe militarycosts figuredin the calculations of how long to prosecutea war.

POLITICIZATION

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Throughoutthis erathe edificeof Europeanstatecraftrelied,in part,on the abilto

ity compete in the transoceanicarenas.In the mid-eighteenth centurythe British
and Frenchstatesfunded explorationin the PacificOcean,often through navalappropriations,ratherthan leaving it solely to privateinterests,as had happened for
most of the seventeenthcentury (Williams1998).Both statesclaimed the Falkland
Islands(IslasMalvinas)off the east coast of SouthAmerica(as did Spain),intended
as a last provisioning station beforeheadingwestwardinto the PacificOcean.Mauritiusin the IndianOcean,SaintHelenain the SouthAtlanticOcean,andthe Hawaiian Islands in the middle of the Pacific Ocean were similarly important island
holdings as Europeanstates positioned themselvesin increasinglypoliticized and
militarized oceanic space (Gough 1980). So criticalwere these islands in oceanic
strategiesand so vulnerablewere they to environmentaldegradationthat imperial
states supported scientific researchinto managingthem as sustainableecosystems
(Grove 1995).Overseaspossessions also became integratedinto state strategiesfor
solving domestic problems,fromthe creationof Australia,VanDiemen'sLand(Tasmania), and Norfolk Islandas Britishpenal colonies to the incarcerationof Napoleon on Saint Helena (Hughes 1986).
As these examples demonstrate,the control of oceanic space had become not
just a commercial question but part of the constructionof power in the European
state system.Russia'sattemptsto gain greateraccessto the world'soceansbeginning
during the reign of Peterthe Greatis evidenceof the shift takingplacebetweenempires defined by continental control-whether Russian,Hapsburg,Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal,or Ching-and the empiresdefinedby oceanic control-the British,
French,Spanish, Portuguese,and Dutch. After 1783the United States successfully
enteredthe competition for oceaniccontrol,though maintaininga continentallyfocused and isolationist foreign policy.
THE LEGACY OF OCEANIC EMPIRES

The ascendancyof oceaniccontrolasa definingcharacteristicof poweramongEuropean statesandthen throughoutthe worldwasmorethanthreecenturiesin developing. In the nineteenth century, continentally focused imperial powers found
themselvesbeing outflanked,if not conquered,by aggressiveEuropeanpowersthat
used oceanicaccessto forceterritorialsubmissionin AsiaandAfrica.In a broadoverview of history,however,Europeanterritorialcontrol in Africaand Asia was relativelybrief.In manyplacesit lasteda centuryor less,testimonyto our need to see the
political ascendancyof Europein the world as an oceanic phenomenon.
With the riseof new powersin the latenineteenthcentury,particularlyGermany
and Japan,access to oceanic trade,the creation of new empires,and an arms race
with naval capacityas a centerpiececontinued to define relationsamong the great
powers.As Germanyaggressivelyacquiredcolonies, GreatBritainreactedby creating new protectorates(such as the Cook Islandsin 1888)in order to curb German
imperialexpansion (Porter1996).In the earlytwentiethcentury,internationaltensions over control of the world'soceans figuredin the controversiesthat led to the

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two world wars. At the end of World War II reform of world trade helped diffuse
some of the tension.
The contest for control of oceanic space has not disappeared, nor has the European and neo-European dominance of the oceans ended. Many of the remaining island dependencies continue to serve the strategic interests of distant metropolitan
states. Guam and American Samoa provide the United States with military footholds in the Pacific Ocean. Saint-Pierre and Miquelon maintain France's territorial
claim to the western Atlantic fishery. Island territories without permanent populations are used for military or scientific purposes. The British lease their Indian
Ocean Territory to the United States for military facilities; the Antarctic territories of
Australia, Great Britain, France, and New Zealand all have permanent research stations. Thus, in the twilight of oceanic empires, the colonial map is essentially one of
far-flung island holdings. This fact should remind us that in the last five centuries
oceanic space has been a central arena of imperial struggle.
NOTES
1. The sixteen are Anguilla, Bermuda,BritishVirgin Islands,CaymanIslands,FalklandIslands
(Islas Malvinas),Gibraltar,Montserrat,PitcairnIsland,Saint Helena,Turksand Caicos Islands,U.S.
VirginIslands,Guam,AmericanSamoa,New Caledonia,Tokelau,andWesternSahara.Spainnotified
the United Nations on 26 February1976that it had ceasedits participationin the temporarygovernment of the Western Saharaand thus its internationalresponsibilityfor the territory (Aldrich and
Connell 1998).On 25 October1999the SecurityCouncil establishedthe United Nations Transitional
Administration for EastTimor,which until then had been categorizedas a colony of Portugal.
2. Francehas departementset territoiresd'outremer (FrenchGuiana,Guadeloupe,Martinique,
Reunion, French Polynesia,Wallis and Futuna Islands, Saint-Pierreand Miquelon, and Mayotte),
most of which have representationin the metropolitan French government. Puerto Rico and the
northern MarianaIslandsare commonwealthsof the United States.AustraliadesignatedChristmas
Island, the Cocos Islands,and Norfolk Island as territories.Arubaand the NetherlandsAntilles are
autonomous partsof the kingdom of the Netherlands.The Cook Islandsarefreeassociationsof New
Zealand,and Niue is a dependency.Spain retainsCeuta and Melillaon the coast of North Africaand
the CanaryIslandsoff the coast of Africa.The Azoresand the Madeirasarepart of Portugal.As well,
Australia,New Zealand,GreatBritain,France,and the United Statesclaim a numberof island groups
without permanent residents (Aldrichand Connell 1998).
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