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ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR
RAUL
S.
ROCO,
DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under
Section
2
of
Article
XVII
of
the
1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent [1] and the
main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as innovative. [3] Indeed it is, for both
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by
Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed
with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country;
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total
number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the
number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman,
issued an Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after
publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and
not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five
days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this
special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No
such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is
still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative,
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in
the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is
not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have
been obviously left to a separate law.
lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire
document.
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him
to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set
the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On
17
January
1997,
the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to
the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but
a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions,
such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
toamendments.
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms,
recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates
the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and
defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in
R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is
deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and
Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he
claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A.
No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making
power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in
fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and
the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is
the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and
the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided
for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy
of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are
Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to
promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and
decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly
in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position
that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the
performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the
enabling law that implements the peoples initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition,
(b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and
means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of
the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any
decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to
legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section
20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as
the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that
implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law
is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he coauthored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which
is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that
the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the
Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not
have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be
proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the
Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well
as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the
Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to
file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments
on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its
Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from
notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible
period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on
the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the
allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include
or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering
the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as
proposed in the draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would
constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c)
directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed
by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop
the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not
supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered
voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required
number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
II
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members;
or
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held,
directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition
of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out
Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in
terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties
in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor
agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has
primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that
therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent
power we have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically
cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are
drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in
the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this
provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable
situations.[33]
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire
Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments
this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment
in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1,
instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a selfexecuting provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.[35]
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act,
which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
xxx
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied).
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended
R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which
only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the
invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude
the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved
pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the
local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care
in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum
on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation,
the Act provides for the following:
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the
local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the
proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within
the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the
contents of the petition;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required
number of votes for its approval;
COMELEC
RESOLUTION
NO.
2300,
INSOFAR
AS
IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
III
prescribe the form of the petition; [63] (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in
each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters
affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign
to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given
flesh and blood, energy and strength.Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation
of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
x -----------------------------------------------------x
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
x -----------------------------------------------------x
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSEPH EJERCITO
PILIPINO, Intervenors.
ESTRADA
and
PWERSA
NG
MASANG
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
The Case
Antecedent Facts
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735
or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
FROM
THE
PRESENT
BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM,
AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE
OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31
August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group
claims thatSantiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not
be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an oppositionin-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined
causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA
6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the
system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino
Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative
petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26
September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact
of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of people's
initiative from the United States where various State constitutions
incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify
their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or
she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation
of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for
fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having
actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by,
for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This
danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who
obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the
requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by
initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The
4
Province:
City/Municipality:
No. of
Verified
Legislative District:
Barangay:
Signatures:
6
10
Precinct Name
Number
Last Name, First Name,
M.I.
Address
Birthdate
MM/DD/YY
_________________
Barangay
(Print Name and Sign)
Official
_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)
___________
Witness
(Print Name
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments
before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people
the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative
clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signaturegathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's
draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC.
When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition
filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied
that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier
in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico
B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC,
states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition
in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of
the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as
representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the
Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before
this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together
with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any
indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that
the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is
not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached
to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82
C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.]
Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets
circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought,
made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that
the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In
their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated
"the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that
what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August
2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that
"a signer who did not read the measureattached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the
people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment
must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the
people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The
Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under
their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated,
from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the
draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC.
The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated
claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering
period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six
months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked
other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could
not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters
printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of
100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these
100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October
2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino
initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition
for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show
the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached
one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature
sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains
space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people
who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full
text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or
as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission
is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is
not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be
lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected
indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until
its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members
of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their
own term of office; 27
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of
the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud
or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had
to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group
because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who
were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in
2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who
signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent
with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from
being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This
puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to
the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of
their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May
2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim
Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want
the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets
do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for
such further amendments or revisions.The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly,
such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people
do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's
amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member
of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the
regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart
provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if
their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that
of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House
will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the
Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of
the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to
the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by
the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital
an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of
the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a
general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
"[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to
this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
XVII
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this
matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1.The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would
the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1,
instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified
a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in
the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does
it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended,
and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions
to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United
States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California
ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to
the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the
adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the
Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the
Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of
the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure')
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner
in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those
who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the
use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself
recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here
in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally
understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document
appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution
drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized
by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963
Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the twothird's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section
2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the
measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a
measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If
a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section
2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention
called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative
can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation
from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No.
364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution
in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is
almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the
people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in
doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may
alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in
violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an
amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for
being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent
and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term
"amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry
out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions
to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a twopart test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change
in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging
the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a BicameralPresidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have
at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories,
merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not
even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA
6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of
the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost
respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize
the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of
the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution
in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political
group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the
Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the
new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes
in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of
the total votes cast53 approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite
held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval
included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the
Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered
by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific
modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change,
which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the
Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its
solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people
decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups
gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases
to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice."
However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP
maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino
Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to
the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or
"sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will,
is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution
is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners,
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating
the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. 3 This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length,
and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
1.
Preliminarily
1.
2.
2.
law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States
under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to
bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we
The Issues
and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners
themselves
undermine their
assertion
of locus standi as
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded
in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps
any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control
over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of
Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue
that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty
over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.26
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).
the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion
from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of
drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space
account
the
Treaty
of
Paris
miles)
save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines).
Internal
or
Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument
archipelagic
waters
166,858
171,435
274,136
32,106
Territorial Sea
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law.
On
the
contrary,
RA
9522,
by
optimizing
the
location
of
Economic
382,669
Zone
TOTAL
440,994
586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone
drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the
rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there
are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States,
there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG
is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal:
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over
which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty
and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
3.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded
UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to
optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative
as discussed by respondents:
and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine
States
responsible
observance
of
its pacta
sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was
necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer
limits of its maritime zones including the extended
continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by
R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical
deficiencies, to wit:
1.
water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category
of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.37
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize
the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section
2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:
of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
2.
xxxx
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus
of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States
under UNCLOS III.47
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic
zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this
50
51
delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option
comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law,
to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international
dispute
over
Philippine
maritime
space.
These
are
DECISION
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510
of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future
generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is
strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or
fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources
within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and
permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the
US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4 On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1wphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US
Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets
over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F.
del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navyled salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under
'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and
liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require
Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future
environmental damage in general, and environmental damage
under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more
fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State, 17is expressly provided in Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of
state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in
Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles
the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing
a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity,
the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity
from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, 23 one of the consolidated cases
therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force,
and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in
court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the
said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had
not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and
dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buybust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at
his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver
31
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.
Article
32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and
trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership
in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all
nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
197
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the
expiration of the 30-day period.
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the
continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the
court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary
conference for the following purposes:
xxxx
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guidedmissile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the
Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After
spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was
reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over
coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the
US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the
Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists."
The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine
government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts
from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the
violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment
rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of
suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of
which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund
for that purpose subject to the control of the court.1wphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the
matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic
channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another
State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled
that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments
of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the
petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity
provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VF
A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 42 The present
petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance
of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Baguio City
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo
Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho,
Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her
minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion
M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON.
CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA DirectorGeneral, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by
its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo
Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez,
and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO
A.
BUGARIN,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
G.R. No. 207111
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(2) Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and
Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing
the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to
the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion,
the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it
is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are
public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians,
hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory
sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is
not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide
on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same
breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their
child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation
of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product
is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels
of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the
oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013,
the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide
for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more
effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To
put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and
make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and
population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates
the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante
- the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained." 73 It
explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the
role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet
secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program
to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be
the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices
and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the
Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing
rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts
that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a
product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of
the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak,"
since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional
policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot
prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the
actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom
of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers.
To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within
its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born
of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts
of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on
applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude
or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a
co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive
and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect
those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of
review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with
their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations
of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which
expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present
any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not
yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely
a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it
was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised
as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled
that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on
the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is
a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming
the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by
the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced
and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that
one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the wellentrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the
public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact
that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already
caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.
claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law
emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or
modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time
when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated.
To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would
lead to irreparable consequences.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and
post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health
care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to
prevent pregnancy.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the
case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of
the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or
are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and
management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep.
Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction
of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
to
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "nonabortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the
petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to
be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products
and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services,
methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
Life
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and
health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The
assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an
abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has
life.
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right
to life.137
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural
law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or
the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of
R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and
the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's
rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta
of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of noncoercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.
This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are
waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On
the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to
the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the
recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a wellsettled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of
becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results
in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in
human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even
prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the
original]
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when
the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has
already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards
the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that
they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and
not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may
be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler
phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection
under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is
called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be
banned under this provision.
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose
of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according
to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to
define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six
months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is
now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception.
There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to
Congress, too.153
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination
of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence.155
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should
be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
There is no life.
xxx
Atty. Noche:
xxx
xxx
Justice Bersamin:
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am prolife, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but
also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclearfree world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to
ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to
certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in
time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Justice Bersamin:
Atty. Noche:
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we
say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of
these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is
even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was
conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation.
Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception
as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a
zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used
by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ
cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon)
with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei
(the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is
a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position.
They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus
the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a
"Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that
PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives
is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms
of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of
human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164
Conclusion:
Fertilization
The
Moment
of
Conception
is
Reckoned
from
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods,
facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and
well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and
personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.
The RH Law and Abortion
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that
even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of
the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws
ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the
Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that
embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of
the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples,
to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion,
any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or
amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an
abortifacient as:
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to
the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is
the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When
a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started
earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces
abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the
law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as
empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that
a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency
cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the
RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the
fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and
non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that
"any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient
(third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare
either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners
likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect
the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must
be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches
and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized
ovum prior to implantation.
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by
any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the
approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that
these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its
declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be
those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also
those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in
line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily"
in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold
the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"
embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter,
the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when
the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the
use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold
increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that
the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable
and satisfying sex lives.180
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person
for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is
not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle
and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are selfexecuting. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent
Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D.
dispensed
prescription
Contraceptives
and
cannot
used
be
without
of
Religion
Religious
Accommodation
and
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient
seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this
amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very
thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient
seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded
the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public
health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in
public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend
that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service
provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare
service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their
will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of
the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector
to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another
provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to
become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by
the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no
emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain
how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights,
sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and
to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs
and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not
being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring
any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a
strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits
the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of
any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also
assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of
utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct
by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6
Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and
449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs
and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle
that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the
freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is
absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious
belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of
the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others.
It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the
Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and
"grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside
from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and
far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right
to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty.
The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the
"aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state
interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of
the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do
otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved
conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of
modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For
the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion
and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one
can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting
religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right
to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation.
Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias,
to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for
the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other
government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods
of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with
the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e),
Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples
to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under
various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's
and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the
religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health
and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address
the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise
a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the
desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to
their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological
preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns
consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use
of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.
were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle
was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be
against their conscience or will.
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have
not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH
Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH
Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do
you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
Congressman Lagman:
Justice De Castro:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law
must prevail.230
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling
State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals.
This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the
free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And
this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or
is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported
that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set
forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be
forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in lifethreatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference,
considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of
violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of
the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never
justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life
of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily
the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no
direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the
loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore,
unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder.
The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable.238
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population
growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the
decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
ARTICLE
THE FAMILY
XV
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock
births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion
of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of
the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and
medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution,
the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of
parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development
of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that
the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents
in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes
mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in
nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the ageappropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and
other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social
and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t)
of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage
behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them,
Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those
who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health
care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since
Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive
health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if
these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health
information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting
and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define
"incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict
and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs
and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted
as follows:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged
in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who
has undergone training programs under any accredited government and
NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of
the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a
cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law
renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of
the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and
inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it
may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to
all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It
is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in
the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases
supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged,
sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law
only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the
that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and
desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for
sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an
office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office
of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require
all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the
FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law.
Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of
food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the
principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that
are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the
RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only
those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah
to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional
government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in
no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to
enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the
veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in
the
relationship
between
the
national
and
the
regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it
by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent
and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice
it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for
upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While
every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance
is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable
legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction,
rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right
has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most
peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking
away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the
Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a
given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into
the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative
branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust
situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the
legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the
Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by
the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence.
The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself
to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking
body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for
women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "noabortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect
to
the
following
provisions
which
are
declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents
or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added
the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives,
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as
extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
- versus
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO
GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN;
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his
capacity as the present and duly appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or
SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
THE
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT
OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by
HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as
Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in
his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,HON.
CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman,
1stCongressional District, HON. CESAR G.
JALOSJOS,
Congressman,
3rd Congressional
District, and Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P.
JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR.,
HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR
M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON.
CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON.FELIXBERTO C.
BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO,
HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S.
DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and
HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO
G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G.
JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan,
Petitioners-in-Intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI,
Petitioners-in-Intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC
(MUSLAF),
Respondent-in-Intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR
PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD),
Respondent-in-Intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when,
under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the
ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of
the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.[1]
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court
involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.
strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the
GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation
of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its
military actions.[5]
the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict,
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June
and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while
20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
[2]
Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda
on
the
following
aspects
of
the
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth
sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early
2000,
Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed that the same be discussed further by
the
MILF
attacked
number
of
municipalities
in Central
Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,
and Ancestral
[3]
Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and
carried out an all-out-war against the MILF.
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 57, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a
Agreement
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the
violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and,
eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.[4]
2001,
which
was
signed
on May
7,
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13,
the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of
2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace
the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the
[6]
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No.
Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
183752, also
of Zamboanga,
for
[12]
Mandamus
and
Prohibition[11] filed
by
the
City
Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious consensus ever
Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.
also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the
official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,[14] to which she complied.[15]
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and ViceGovernor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right
to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of
Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc.
Jalosjos,
and
the
members[18] of
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus
and
Prohibition,[19] docketed
as G.R.
No.
183951. They
pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without
operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-
AD.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008,
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino
stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD
Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, [20] docketed as G.R. No.
and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and
respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29,
2008 that tackled the following principal issues:
[23]
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)[25] and the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),[26] and several international law instruments the
aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though
not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for
Muslims.[28]
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of compact rights
It thus appears that the compact rights entrenchment emanating from the
entrenchment
regime
emanating
from
the
regime
of dar-ul-muahada (or
to
all
other
territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement)
Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement that partake of
the nature of a treaty device, treaty being broadly defined as any solemn
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see
the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode
for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles
of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those
lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands
where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or
The MOA-AD
states
that
the
Parties
HAVE
AGREED
ineffective.[27] This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex
AND
through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international
community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant
States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the
world into dar-ul-Islam anddar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New
terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim
territories. For
instance,
areas
ofcompact)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
[30]
(pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme
all indigenous peoplesof Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD
adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically
defined.
of
of
occupation.[32] Both
parties
to
the
MOA-AD
hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural First
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
[33]
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to selfgovernance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
B. TERRITORY
west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the
aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
[38]
resources.[43] Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly
described as joint.
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic
area of the ARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur,
The
the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor
core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for
[39]
MOA-AD
further
provides
for
on
and the enforcement of police and safety measures. [45] There is no similar
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus,
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
[41]
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over
all natural resources within its internal waters, defined as extending fifteen
(15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; [42] that the BJE shall also
have territorial waters, which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up
to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.
[46]
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses,
contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.[51]
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential
sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the
compact is to embody the details for the effective enforcement and the
jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE as the party having
control within its territorial jurisdiction. This right carries the proviso that, in
AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party
shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central
Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be
resources.[48]
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.
[49]
rights,
customary
land
tenures,
or
their
marginalization
shall
be
Affairs of RP and Dato Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring amendments to the
Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last
existing legal framework shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive
August 5, 2008.
Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to
the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
of this provision.
on TERRITORY.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its
A. RIPENESS
[53]
of
the
power
of
judicial
review
to
actual
cases
and
AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
[62]
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and
modalities for the actual implementation of
this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take
such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States, [69] decided in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York
challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take
effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had
to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.[70]
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,[71] Prohibition, and
to which such other is entitled. [73] Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are
respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O.
No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make
a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual
[75]
order requires that [t]he government's policy framework for peace, including
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the
the dispute.[77]
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[78]
No. 3.
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOAAD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. [80] When the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.[81]
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality
on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the
taxpayers suit.
[83]
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution
[84]
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not
abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of
procedure.[91]
but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does
not suffice to clothe it with standing.
[86]
petitioners-in-intervention Province
of
Sultan
Kudarat,
City
of
Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct
and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories,
[88]
such as a
BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the
ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners legal
parties.
the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo
Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and
taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or
privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a
the Sangguniang
taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the
taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct
that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the
that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
importance clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial
these petitions.
of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to
In
G.R.
No.
183962,
petitioners Ernesto
Maceda,
Panlungsod of
Buxani, as
B. MOOTNESS
respondents of the publics constitutional right to be informed of the MOAAD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with
the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent
standing as an intervenor.
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out
that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.
[93]
[95]
MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot
the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did
not push through due to the Courts issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.
[99]
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them
into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just
as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also
in Province of Batangas v. Romulo[100] and Manalo v. Calderon[101] where the
Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would
ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure
of the MOA-AD,[102] the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the
disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public
interest, involving a significant part of the countrys territory and the wide-
agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-
the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.[103] where the Court did not
28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that no matter what the
Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-
or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a
AD], mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement
whole.
2001.
Need to formulate
principlesguidelines
the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain
similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of
the controversy.
agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only
form.
guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the
government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain .
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have
become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008,
Respondents invite the Courts attention to the separate opinion of then Chief
provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the
MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have
that the doctrine of capable of repetition yet evading review can override
mootness, provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their
issuance. They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which
provisions, viz:
this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City
of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court
will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and
raises questions that need to be resolved.[105] At all events, the Court has
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
[108]
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation [112] so that they may be
statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a selfexecutory constitutional right.[109]
The MOA-AD is a
matter
of
public
concern
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,[110] the Court ruled that
access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy,
the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
of
the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity
party-list
nominees,[121] among
others,
are
matters
of
public
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the peoples
right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy.[126] These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at
all times accountable to the people.[127]
[128]
already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr.,
sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
as
one
community.[134] Included
as
component
of
the
to
effectuate
position
consultation.[136]
that
continuing consultations,
plebiscite
is
more
contrary to
than
sufficient
out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and craftedruns contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the
final
comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority
[139]
draft
of
the
MOA-AD.By
unconditionally
complying
with
the
superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service.
respective
[140]
jurisdictions[142] is
well-taken. The
LGC
chapter
on
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,[144] the Court held that the above-stated policy and
above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among
the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the
environment and human ecology including those that may call for
[145]
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject
are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA,
the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which
may affect their rights, lives and destinies.[147] The MOA-AD, an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the
clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,[148] which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the
ancestral domain is the raison detre of the MOA-AD, without which all other
stipulations or consensus points necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make
a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the
IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents
clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even
the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal
framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that
they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and
laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this
Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing
legal
framework
to
render
effective
at
least
some
of
its
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the
BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as
a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Government.
the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own
name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the
sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural
Lucia, St.
have
since
obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM
on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with
either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM,
the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if
they were part of U.S. territory.The U.S. government, moreover, has the
option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these
associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at
[152]
The
concept
of association is not
recognized under th
e present
Constitution
that of the ARMM. Indeed,BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws.
2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the
Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite,
overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-
any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD
must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do,
for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making
precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
which states: The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and
Secretary[155] instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole
representative with foreign nations.As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority
to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treatymaking, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
communities within
the
framework
of national
unity and
the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in
the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping
Besides
being
irreconcilable with the
Constitution,
the
MOA-AD
is
also inconsistent
with
prevailing
statutory law, among
which are R.A. No.
9054[156] or
the
Organic Act of the
ARMM, and the IPRA.
[157]
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-ADs manner of
delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear
departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, [t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well
as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial
domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-SuluPalawan geographic region.
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure,
as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. The identification and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a
specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the
consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for
Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the
members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral
domain boundaries including census of all community
members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the
Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by
the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in
coordination with the community concerned and shall at all
times include genuine involvement and participation by the
members of the communities concerned;
even
after
two
years. Similarly,
the
Court
inAgustin
v.
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the
LEGAL
[163]
ASPECTS
OF
THE
AALAND ISLANDS
QUESTION.
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not
refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule
elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however,
was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a
time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The
internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal
that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a
sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil
war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a
large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital
and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and
the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these
circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a
definitively constituted sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that
Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population
the option to separate itself a right which sovereign nations generally have
with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term
has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state
practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections
to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a
larger governing society. These groups are regarded as indigenous since
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing
their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social
and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political,
economic, social and cultural life of the State.
indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to internal selfdetermination.[166] The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN
Article 8
61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those
in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or selfgovernment, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Article 4
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant
now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security
to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the
force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide
protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession
unnecessary.
of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of
MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse
thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the
MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be
established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with
different rebel groups to be appointed by the President as her official
emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions
with rebel groups. These negotiating panels are to report to the President,
through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was
not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as
they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace
process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the Paths to Peace, is the
pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new
legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3,
which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,[167] states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. The components of
the comprehensive peace process comprise the
processes known as the Paths to Peace. These
component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to
pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions
which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
discussion of
the extent of the
Presidents power to
conduct
peace
negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she
has no such authority. InSanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[168] in issue was
the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion an authority
which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution.The Court held thus:
legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the suspensive clause, however, cannot stop
here, because it must be asked
whether
the
President
herself
may exercise the
power delegated to
the GRP Peace
Panel under E.O. No.
3, Sec. 4(a).
Constitution. This
is
so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members
of
the
Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos,
for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of
rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from
her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is
implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-inChief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to
promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more
is
by
linking
them
to new
constitutional
While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers
may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people through initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of
an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President
achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to
a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body
with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the
interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the Presidents act, holding
that the urges of absolute necessity compelled the President as the agent of
solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from
however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that
controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino
v. COMELEC:[177]
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution,
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the
but
simply
to
recommend
proposed
amendments
or
since
her
authority
to
legal framework. This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive
propose
condition defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event but of a term. It
prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the
plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the
appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the
President, which for all intents and purposes is a proposal for new legislation
Comprehensive Compact.
to
this
stipulation,
therefore,
it
is mandatory for
the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the
MOA-AD which changes would include constitutional amendments, as
discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws
the consensus points found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down
as unconstitutional.
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a
binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change
community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it
would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year
transitional
period
involving
the
putting
up
of
new administrative
structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and
Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace
and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the
new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A.
No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
is,
however,
crucial
difference
between
the
two
Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the
full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by
them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the
conflict began.
In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord
created
an internationally
binding obligation
not
to
prosecute
the
beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the
participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the
finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this
argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only
create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law,
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would
amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under
international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein,
with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly
regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view
is Australia v. France,[181] also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the
legality of Frances nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to
appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar
statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that
its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to
dismiss the case.[182] Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal
undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no
acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
would
intercourse. Plainly,
be
detrimental
unilateral
to
the
declarations
security
arise
of
only
international
in
peculiar
circumstances.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric
tests would be the last, the French Government
conveyed to the world at large, including the
Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate
these tests. It was bound to assume that other
States might take note of these statements and
rely on their being effective. The validity of
these statements and their legal consequences
must be considered within the general
framework of the security of international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which
are so essential in the relations among States.It is
from the actual substance of these statements,
and from the circumstances attending their
making, that the legal implications of the
unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of
these statements are clear and they were
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a
later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,[183] also known as
the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of
that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by
a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by
a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then
pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of
Malis President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified
that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances
to the international community.The Philippine panel did not draft the same
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there
were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in
the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated
merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the
Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict,
the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international
organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOAAD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the
Mali Presidents statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration
by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine
panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest
that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have
come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be
legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an
would
constitute
an
acceptance
of
that
commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted
[184]
community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French
Government
from
entering
into
formal
agreement
with
other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal
SUMMARY
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the
Arroyo.
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present
petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to
the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the
Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is
information
contemplates
steps
and
negotiations
leading
to
the
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been
rendered moot in view of the respondents action in providing the Court and
the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its
annexes.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under
Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented
therein. The
MOA-AD
is
one
peculiar
program
that
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
environment.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
free
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
and
prior
informed
consent
of
the
Indigenous
Cultural
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
compromise.
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD,
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
SO ORDERED.
No.
181527
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court, concerningService Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed
the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within
Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of
Negros
and
Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents
from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross
violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal
laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit
respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to
provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Taon
Strait Oil Exploration Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and
around the Taon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos)
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as
friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize
with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the
ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among others. 5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region
VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and
Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as representatives
of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan,
Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as
then Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then
Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional
Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Taon Strait Protected
Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a
Philippine branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the
alleged
Philippine
agent
of
JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public
respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in
their capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and then Regional
Director
of
the
DOE,
Region
VII,
respectively.6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies of the Taon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted
by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and
gas
sampling
in
Taon
Strait.7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into
SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers
offshore
the
Taon
Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around
the Taon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately
JAPEX
Philippines 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Ltd.
c/o Atty. Maria
146 Valero Street
Farah Z.G.
NicolasSalcedo Village, Makati City
Suchianco
Atty.
Maria
Suite 2404 Discovery Centre
Farah Z.G.
Nicolas25 ADB Avenue
Suchianco
Resident Agent
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
of JAPEX
Philippines Ltd.
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above
addresses on February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines,
Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Admit 23 its
Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as to
whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this
Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It
also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities in the
Taon Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion
for Extension of Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated that since it received
the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22,
2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked for an additional thirty
days, supposedly to give this Court some time to consider its Motion for
Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution 26 granting JAPEX PH's
Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX
PH's Motion for Clarification, held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated
March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines. Ltd. as a real
party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s allegation that it is a completely
distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company,
Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX
Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business
transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no
separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded
in
this
case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the
responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign
corporation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign
corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who must
be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal
processes may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against
such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall
be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers
of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation
shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said
corporation,
in
form
and
substance
as
follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in
consideration of its being granted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any
time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or
shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or
proceeding arising out of any business or transaction which occurred in the
Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process may be made
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall
have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers
of
the
corporation
at
its
home
office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, within ten
(10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal
process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall
complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such
service shall be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service
is
made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its
duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is
to receive summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have
been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX
Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving
the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return
Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion
for extension of time to file its memorandum, and was given until April 21,
2012, as prayed for, within which to comply with the submission. 27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion,
asking this Court for an additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be
counted from May 8, 2012. It justified its request by claiming that this Court's
April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued past its requested deadline for filing,
which
was
on
April
21,
2012. 28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for
additional time to file its Memorandum and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda,29 and public
respondents had earlier filed a Manifestation 30 that they were adopting their
Comment dated March 31, 2008 as their memorandum, this Court submitted
the case for decision.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities
in the Taon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch
was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the
seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos;
but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos
a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the
"payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial
reef."31Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the
incidences of "fish kill"32observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the
seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private
respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions
with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC,
were
not
held
prior
to
the
ECC's
issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of
MARINE
WATERS
OF
THE
TANON
STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV.
II.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
OFF-SHORE
OIL
EXPLORATION CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. 46 IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE
WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED EXPRESSLY
FOR THE PURPOSE;
III.
IV.
II.
III.
V.
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various
issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:
I.
II.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic principle'
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and academic
under
the
following
exceptions:
1)
There
is
grave
violation
of
the
Constitution;
The
case
is
capable
of
repetition
yet
evading
review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary
to resolve these consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing
exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is
violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents' contested
actions are capable of repetition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Procedural
Issues
have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they
also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and
municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In
this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international
instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept
of
stipulation pour
autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their
right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the
case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the
primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the
environment
pursuant
to
the
public
trust
doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this
Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary
jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals
have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires
parties
to
an
action
to
be
either
natural
or
juridical
persons, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the counterclaimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term
"defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out
that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them
were
still
unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their
claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals,
which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents
argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to
show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.46
Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim
that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of their
acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her
own.47
Rule
Parties to Civil Actions
is
incorrect.
our natural resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts
but of FTAAs or Financial Technical Assistance Agreements.66
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former
President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her
as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling
co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her
office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in
suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time,
also
demands
undivided
attention." 59
Ruling
of
the
On
the
legality
of
Service
Contract
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
Main
Legality
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and
limit
of
the
grant.
of
Service
Service
Contract
Section
2,
Article
1987 Constitution
Contract
No.
XII
No.
of
Issue:
46
46 vis-a-vis
the
No.
Court
46
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment
exclusively
to
Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law
that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion
of
terms
disadvantageous
to
the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature,
it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms
to
law
and
can
withstand
public
scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it
to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is
indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution.
1.
The
General
Law
on
Oil
Exploration
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay
are
hereby
repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding
the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752,
and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs
locally-funded
projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree
No.
972,
as
amended,
and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87
had not yet been expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we
held in Villarea v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not
lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one
another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the
Philippines
v.
Marcopper
Mining
Corporation,72 we
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of
petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by
the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the
said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither
shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution
of
such
contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle,"
their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply
in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept of the alter ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this
wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4,
Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities,
they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La
Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the
Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only
render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are
requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental
law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the
concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government
Service Insurance System,79 held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments
their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles
on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate
official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service
contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the
President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these
circumstances is evident in the case at bar.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the
President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken
lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President
had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually
the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her
disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into
these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in
the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount
interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put
in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed
and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or
approved
of
these
service
contracts
herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that
the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the
execution of any contract under said statute, as shown in the following
provision:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. - Every contract
herein authorized shall, subject to the approval of the President, be executed
by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public notice prequalification and public bidding or concluded through negotiations. In case
bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the bids submitted
are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to the
Government, the contract may be concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum
operations, any of the following alternative procedures may be resorted to by
the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President [.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize
the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section
14 of the NIPAS Act, the gathering of information must be in accordance with
a DENR-approved program, and the exploitation and utilization of energy
resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by Congress expressly
for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR-approved program nor a
general law passed by Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling
operations were all done illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46
infringes on its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters
as it is denied free access within the prohibited zone, in violation not only of
the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
subsistence fisherfolk and social justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes
that the provisions in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore
drilling even in municipal waters, should be deemed to have been rendered
inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No.
7160, which reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution.83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue
that Section 14 of the NIPAS Act is a more particular provision and cannot
be deemed to have been repealed by the more general prohibition in Section
27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14, under which SC-46
falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section 27.84
Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a
violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147, the public respondents
assert that what the section prohibits is the exploration of minerals, which as
defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy materials such
as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal
energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does
not
apply.85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does
not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the
rule on preferential use of municipal waters. Moreover, they allege that
JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary to the FIDEC's
claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the declining
fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded.
They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources'
fish catch data, the reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to
destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling
of
the
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Court
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for
being violative of the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the
legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the
Government when executing service contracts involving not only the Taon
Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is
in violation of several laws, including international ones, their arguments
focus primarily on the protected status of the Taon Strait, thus this Court will
concentrate on those laws that pertain particularly to the Taon Strait as a
protected
seascape.
The Taon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of
Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of
marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For this
reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Taon Strait as a
protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 - Declaring
the Taon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and
Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be
known as Taon Strait Protected Seascape. During former President Joseph
E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Taon Strait Commission via
Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the
resources in that area without threatening its marine life. He followed this
with Executive Order No. 177,87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros
Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Taon Strait Commission, to
represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was
subsequently abolished in 2002 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
via
Executive
Order
No.
72. 88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to
secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.
These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into
a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system
encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important
public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support
systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of
resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the
greatest extent possible.91 The following categories of protected areas were
established under the NIPAS Act:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a.
b.
Natural park;
c.
Natural monument;
d.
Wildlife sanctuary;
e.
f.
Resource reserve;
g.
h.
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land
and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological significance,
managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human
exploitation.
The Taon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and
declared a protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in
obtaining an ECC103and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14
of
the
NIPAS
Act,
due
to
the
following
reasons:
1) The Taon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible
energy
resources;
and
3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done
with
the
least
damage
to
surrounding
areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities
which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas
shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law
before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into
consideration
in
the
decision-making
process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such
activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry
them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves
and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of
gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried
out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of
such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the
President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization
of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through
a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without
exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the purpose of
surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the
NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained
why a statute should be construed as a whole:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so as
to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to
the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a
statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context,
some particular definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the
instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be
construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word
or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of the
subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed
the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed the statute or
constitution, x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption
from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead,
Section 14 provides for additionalrequisites before any exploration for
energy
resources
may
be
done
in
protected
areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated in Section 2
of the NIPAS Act, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of
man's activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the
effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial
advancement amd recognizing the critical importance of protecting and
maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment
notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and
development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy
of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas
within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features,
possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of
this area is possible only through cooperation among national government,
local government and concerned private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of
biological
diversity
and
sustainable
development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential
Decree
No.
1586.
SO
ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Leonen,
J.,
see
concurring
opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent
their
generation
as
well
as
generations
yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four
per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose
of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric
power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses
as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if
TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege
in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not
reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative
branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued,
a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of
a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against
the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions
of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but
the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta
and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to
provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to
healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs.
Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall
be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as
law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe
vs.
Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the
holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.