Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stathis Gourgouris
This essay belongs to a series of meditations on the secular imagination, by which I mean, very broadly, the capacity of humanity (occasional
though it is) to conceptualize its existence in the absence of external and
transcendental authority, and thus to exercise its radical potential for transforming the conditions of its existence in full cognizance of its historical
character. Obviously, such a meditation also involves an interrogation as to
what constitutes the historical subject, the subject of history, as well as, of
course, the subject in history, and would thus require equally an investigation of subjectivitys psychic dimensions. (Hence, the simultaneous interest
of the overall project in the politics of sublimation, though on this occasion
this will be broached only tangentially.) The central gure in this essay is
what Edward Said has called secular criticism, a notion I take to be indicative of an intransigent intellectual position that seeks to critique and transform existing conditionsand this holds true both in matters of aesthetic
form (literature, music) and social-political actionwithout submitting to the
allure of otherworldly or transcendent solutions. The motif of transformation against the grain of transcendence is the core element in Saids conboundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright 2004 by Duke University Press.
rence: namely, a mode of interrogation that begins with the question, How
can the secular be philosophically articulated apart from its traditional opposition to the religious? This is exactly the interrogation that Saids thought
performs with such subtlety and incisiveness.
On Wednesday, September 19, 2001, in the back pages of one of
the New York Times sections, a tiny unsigned article was introduced by the
astonishing headline Attacks Called Great Art. What followed was a hastily
and scantily reported news item that hardly justied the stunning claim. It
reported that Karlheinz Stockhausen, surely one of the leading gures in
contemporary music, described the attacks of September 11 as the greatest work of art ever, going on to reproduce a relatively long and awkward
quotation by the composer himself: What happened therethey all have
to rearrange their brains nowis the greatest work of art ever. That characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot dream of, that
people practice madly for ten years, completely, fanatically, for a concert and
then die. That is the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos. I could not
do that. Against that, we, composers, are nothing. Then the article concluded with a quizzical statement, which really belongs to the world of a
novel, not a news report: Mr. Stockhausen was reported to have left Hamburg in distress.
This last sentence, I suppose, refers to the immediate consequences
that the composers statements provoked, though this short article barely
touches on them. Apparently, the scandalous remarks were made during a
press conference that Stockhausen had given in Hamburg, on the occasion
of a performance of his recent work in the yearly festival, which this year
carried the title Welt-Raum, a theme whose multiple signications become
all the more pertinent at this juncture. The scandalous remarks prompted
a scandalous response, and the performance was summarily canceled by
the citys commissioner for culture. The signicance of this scandal in German (and more generally, European) circles, at both the state level and the
cultural community ranks, was obviously not newsworthy to this New York
Times correspondent. Neither was, apparently, the labyrinthine process of
correcting this apparent misquotation in the original German press report,
nor the laborious story of how the city of Hamburg dealt with the event. It
is likely that the whole lot was considered irrelevant because it pertained to
the complex relation between public funding and art production one nds
in Germany but, of course, would never nd in the United States in a million years.
I shall lay aside the sequence of these events and their signicance
for Germany, for the European framework of cultural production, and surely,
for Stockhausen himself, all of which is exceedingly fascinating as a nationalhistorical document. I shall also lay aside, however, for reasons that will
become apparent as we go, the problem emerging from the fact that the
remarks I just quoted are in effect a misquotationapparently, a deliberate act by a hostile reporter. Indeed, I would insist that the trouble with
word accuracy is merely symptomatic of the entire problem, because, even
though Stockhausen was certainly misquoted (as taped transcripts reveal),
the gist of his thinking was curiously preserved. It almost seems as if the
hostile reporter was so caught up in Stockhausens logic that he could not
but reveal its inner fold in misquoting him. So, any turning to Stockhausens
actual, accurate, comments would best be conducted not in the spirit of
correction but in the spirit of enhancement. Examining the composers response to the misquotation indeed enhances the overarching problematic
of both his thinking and the grim historical events he addresses.2
Arguably, the most likely reaction to hearing that Stockhausen called
the horric acts of September 11 the greatest work of art ever is to consider it yet another instance of the extreme aesthetization of violence that
decidedly characterizes the fascist tradition. Hence the anxious response of
the German authorities, who are as attuned to rened fascist overtones as
they are astutely committed to the continuation of German aesthetic expression. That Hitlerian fascism conceptualized war and violence in the purest
aesthetic terms is indisputable in retrospect, and German intellectual and
artistic minds, from Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno to Heiner Mller
and Hans-Jrgen Syberberg, have gone a long way, ultimately by negative
ritualization, to isolate and disintegrate the phenomenons many insidious
folds. That Stockhausens universe bears real afnity to this latter againstthe-grain tendency does not necessarily preclude it from falling into this
sort of problematic aesthetization; this is in itself indicative of the extremely
complex and contradictory conditions of German modernity since the late
eighteenth century, of which I have spoken extensively elsewhere.3 To put
2. The entire and rather baroque sequence of events, including numerous explications,
clarications, justications, retractions, and so forth, from all parties involved (including
Stockhausen and his entourage, the German senator Christina Weiss, the original reporter
from North German Radio who is credited with the mendacious reportage), can be found
in detail in Karlheinz Stockhausens ofcial Web site, www.stockhausen.com.
3. See Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution
of Modern Greece (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 12354; and The
Gesture of the Sirens, in Does Literature Think? Literature as Theory for an Antimythical
Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 16197.
Jnglinge (1955), in which real voices are combined with electronically produced vocal sounds so that all distinction between the natural and the
technological is blurred, producing a rather uncanny choral effect, to the
inimitable (and, from a certain conventional standpoint, insufferable) Helicopter String Quartet (1995), in which the string players perform each in his
own helicopter, with the sound of the rotor blades providing the consistent
rhythmic backdrop to a barrage of disembodied glissandi, Stockhausen has
sought not merely to enlist technologys aid in musical composition but much
more: to render possible, audible, by virtue of composition, the sound of
technology as such, in an intransigent gesture of making the Kantian object
speak its own uninstrumentalized language.
On the other hand, however, Stockhausens aesthetic and psychic
universe, which arguably culminates in the ultra-Wagnerian gesture of his
current opera-in-progress, Licht (ofcially begun as a composition in 1977
and, if ever actualized in performance, to last seven days, according to the
seven days of Creation in Genesis), suggests a rather traditional expression
of transcendence. Constructed entirely along biblical motifs, whereby the
archangels Michael and Lucifer are locked into the originary and denitive
battle between Good and Evil, this work is profoundly religious. And though
Lucifer here is drawn in Miltonian fashion through and throughas literally
the heroic bearer of light who seeks to destroy Lightthe mythological conceptualization of this work is hardly emancipatory. The opera merely serves
to conrm, beyond any of his previous works, Stockhausens aesthetic cosmos, which hinges on articulating the material power of technology as consubstantial with metaphysical excess, precisely the deadly combination of
the events of September 11.
From this standpoint, it hardly matters that Stockhausen attributed
the assessment of September 11 as the greatest work of art ever not in
fact to his person but to the Luciferian protagonist of his opera. This character gures, in the composers mind, as a veritable spiritual force. As he
put it in the corrective statement he issued to the press three days after the
notorious remark:
At the press conference in Hamburg, I was asked if Michael, Eve, and
Lucifer were historical gures of the past and I answered that they
exist now, for example Lucifer in New York. In my work, I have dened
Lucifer as the cosmic spirit of rebellion, of anarchy. He uses his high
degree of intelligence to destroy creation. He does not know love.
After further questions about the events in America, I said that such
Saids sense of contrapuntal reading has both a spatial and a temporal component. His keen geographical mind, sharpened by his perception
early on that Antonio Gramscis thought introduced in the Marxist dialectical tradition the primacy of the concept of territory, enables him to appreciate and gauge precisely the multiversality of a situation, a political event, a
text, an artwork. At the same time, his acknowledged allegiance to Georg
Lukcs and his groundbreaking understanding of the reication of consciousnessthe cornerstone of so-called Western Marxismremains at
the core of Saids constant reminder that the force of identity (as a concept, form, psychic state, mode of thinking) must be battled and resisted at
all costs. Resistance to identity means profound alertness to history, to the
temporal uidity and multiplicity we inhabit in our being in the world. The
temporal and the spatialor as Said prefers, the historical and the geographicalare thus distinguished by a shared multidimensional conguration, and the Saidian methodology, throughout its complex and multivalent
trajectory over the years, settles for nothing less. The musicological expression that Said lends to this methodology harkens back to his deep-seated
veneration for Adorno, whose remarkable intellectual edice, Said argues,
must be read primarily as the multifaceted work of a musical sensibility.
Indeed, in Adorno, Saids own personal investment in the gures of displacement (the intellectual as an exile) and nonidentity (the thinker as a performative subjectivity) nds precise and elaborated resonance. This triptych
of intellectual gures might well serve as a referential network for those primary signications animating the language of secular criticism. This does
not mean that the three thinkers form a nucleus of inuence, from which
Saids thought can then be derived. They belong to a group of twentiethcentury gures with whom Said remains consistently in dialogue (much like
Erich Auerbach, Frantz Fanon, C. L. R. James, Michel Foucault, or Glenn
Gould), but they are distinct insofar as they preside over the methodological
coordinates of the task of secular criticism, which Saids work conducts in
such uncompromising fashion.
Let us consider some of Saids own descriptionsso as not to say
denitionsof the task of secular criticism:
The secular intellectual works to show the absence of divine originality and, on the other side, the complex presence of historical actuality. The conversion of the absence of religion into the presence of
actuality is secular interpretation.6
6. Edward W. Said, Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, Community, in Reections
on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 131.
A secular attitude warns us to beware of transforming the complexities of many-stranded history into one large gure, or of elevating particular moments or monuments into universals. . . . Secular transgression chiey involves moving from one domain to another, the testing
and challenging of limits, the mixing and intermingling of heterogeneities, cutting across expectations, providing unforeseen pleasures,
discovering experiences.7
If secular criticism deals with local and worldly situations and is constitutively opposed to the production of massive, hermetic systems,
then it must follow that the essaya comparatively short, investigative, radically skeptical formis the principal way in which to write
criticism.8
Right off, one perceives two elemental gures that animate the conceptual
framework of these statements. First, an unequivocal sense of mobility characterizes Saids encounter with the realm of objective phenomena: not only
the worldly realm as suchthe order of thingsbut also the less tangible
but equally objective realm of concepts, ideas, desires, affects. This sense
of mobility, of restlessly moving from object to object, of denying the stability
of any presumable ground, produces an equivalent philosophical sense of
mobility regarding the subject-object relation as suchindeed, a condition
of mobility that is just as much a condition of mutability, particularly as it pertains to forms. This leads to the second elemental gure in this framework,
namely, the consistent characteristic of what Said calls in multiple contexts
elaboration, a working upon the plasticity (mutability) of form that denies the
frequent theoretical compulsion to engulf matters in impermeable and lasting structures. Converting thus the absence of religion into the presence
of actuality, which is admittedly an abstract statement, can be read as the
epitome of the critical secular attitude, not merely because it recognizes the
concealed void of religion (which arguably exists in order to ll the void of
existence) but because, more importantly, it describes a transformative process whereby the metaphysical void is elaborated as an actual condition in
the world with denitive consequences. This elaboration presupposes that
form is both material force and mutable ground, and that ones engagement
with it is the most tangible conrmation of ones signicance as historical
subject.
7. Edward W. Said, Musical Elaborations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 55.
8. Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 26.
transmutation into form (in essence, its transformation). This is one of the
central aspects of modernist thinking and applies distinctly to Saids own
attempts in relation to identity both to record his memoirs and to articulate
the signicance of his right to return to Palestine.
Before we take this up, however, I want to consider the way in which
Said broaches dialogically a kind of pedagogy of performativity in his discussions with Daniel Barenboim. A good part of their conversation is taken
up with an attempt to articulate the relation between performance and interpretation. Both Said and Barenboim focus on performance in the musical
domain, while Said returns repeatedly to interpretation as a gure that pertains to the act of reading, constituted primarily by the experience of reading
literature. In this respect, the meaning of performance (and, more broadly,
the implicit signicance of performativity as a particular quality) partakes
strongly of the language of music, which leads Barenboim in fact to certain astute remarks on the phenomenology of sound, the profound dialectical relation of music to silence, and musics deance of the physical laws
of nature. Surely, one can argue that interpretation in music (by an orchestra conductor or an instrumentalist) is inevitably subsumed to the discourse
of performance and that the most crucial questions pertain to the domain
that Barenboim rightly emphasizes: namely, using Saids language, the profound materiality of sound in its extreme relation to the occasion of its emergencespace, time, body.
Yet, insightful though it is, this side of the argument unwittingly casts
its shadow over a whole range of other instances, like the very act of reading
texts, where grasping the precise nature of interpretive performance itself
is at stake. Though reading belongs to a literary universe where orality is
no longer primary and is thus unavoidably individualized and silent, its constitutive performativity does not cease. It may become less tangible, it may
become implicated in the technological capacity for repetition, for returning
to a printed text whose words on the page do not change, but there is no
convincing epistemological ground on which to argue that each occasion of
reading, even the same text by the same person, loses hereby its occasionality, its singular, ephemeral, contingent relation to the act of reading. And
though the bodily dimension of reading a text is rather elusive compared
to the musical and theatrical arts (which confront directly the physical laws
of nature, as Barenboim formulates it), it does not mean that the corporeality of reading, the actual sensation of engagement and apprehension in
the occasion of reading, is not a presence to be reckoned with in assessing
the experience of interpretation. I would signify this experience as essen-
12. Daniel Barenboim and Edward W. Said, Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music
and Society, ed. Ara Guzelimian (New York: Pantheon, 2002), 12.
13. I discuss the poetics and politics of impersonation at length in Lucid Drunkenness
(Genets Poetics of Revolution), South Atlantic Quarterly 97, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 41356.
Saids afnity for Genet (and particularly for his ability to enter the world of the other without appropriating it) is well known. See Edward W. Said, On Jean Genets Late Works,
Grand Street 36 (1990): 2742.
All families invent their parents and children, give them a story, character, fate, and even a language. There was always something wrong
with how I was invented and meant to t in with the world of my parents and four sisters. Whether this was because I constantly misread
my part or because of some deep aw in my being I could not tell for
most of my early life. Sometimes I was intransigent, and proud of it. At
other times I seemed to myself to be nearly devoid of any character
at all, timid, uncertain, without will. Yet the overriding sensation I had
was of always being out of place. Thus, it took me about fty years
to become accustomed to, or, more exactly, to feel comfortable with,
Edward, a foolishly English name yoked forcibly to the unmistakably
Arabic family name Said. True my mother told me that I had been
named Edward after the Prince of Wales, who cut so ne a gure in
1935, the year of my birth, and Said was the name of various uncles
and cousins. But the rationale of my name broke down when I discovered no grandparents called Said and when I tried to connect my
fancy English name with its Arabic partner. For years, and depending
on the exact circumstances, I would rush past Edward and emphasize Said; at other times I would do the reverse, or connect these
two to each other so quickly that neither would be clear. The one
thing I could not tolerate, but very often would have to endure, was
the disbelieving, and hence, undermining, reaction: Edward? Said? 14
For any student of literature, the literariness of this passage is striking. There is a Proustian self-irony, the consciousness of how perilous it is
to apply oneself to the task of self-representation in writing, but there is also
a daring clarity about the theatricality of self-fashioningfamilial invention,
(mis)reading ones part in the drama of life, attempting to t into a character, a kind of Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt on the utterance of the name(s)
Edward Saidall of which dees any sort of propriety in the gesture of autobiographical self-reference. The literary effect consists in the double gesture
of simultaneously foregrounding the principle of ctionalization present in
any process of fashioning an identity with an unabashedly genuine staging
of the process of being named. Thus, the author Edward Said begins to
take on the genre of memoir by instantly dismantling whatever metaphysical
qualities traditionally authorize the proper name. His rst autobiographical
gesture is to cast the authorial personality in uncertain light, to problematize the otherwise assumed seamlessness of self-recognition across space
14. Edward W. Said, Out of Place: A Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 34.
erable condition, but this is precisely what enables it to articulate the necessity of achieving a home for the exiled and disenfranchised community. Said
has often been maligned for this dialectical position, which is the envy of
many who do not dare the risk of being committed to personal homelessness and yet, simultaneously, to political community. Regarding the memoir specically, the charges of elitism or narcissism from various quarters
of both American and Arab cultural-intellectual terrains dovetail perfectly
with slanderous attempts by Zionist propagandists to discredit Saids claim
to familial and territorial connection to his native Palestine. In all cases, of
course, a profound disdain, even contempt, is reserved for what remains
deantly personal in the worldly encounter with the other, even though in
fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is precisely this radically personal
imaginary that fuels ones unwavering commitment to communal affairs,
ones responsibility toward the polis.
Throughout his activist trajectory on behalf of the Palestinian cause,
Said has remained consistently vehement in his critique of both nativism
and separatism. He has always made a point of reiterating Fanons crucial
lesson that all nativism signals the victory of the colonial/imperial project
(or in a Saidian language, conrms the domination of Orientalism) by bearing out to its endpoint the fetishist logic of identity, singularity, and abolition of the other. In the same way, he rejects all separatist discourses as
epitomes of nationalism, as politics of exclusion, dispossession, deterritorialization. For this reason, Said has insisted that the grave task of resolving what he calls the sublime conict between Israel and Palestine cannot be conducted under a politics of partition. Partition, he reminds us, is
the legacy of British colonialism and has already left its mark on the Palestinian conictindeed, its inaugural markmuch as it has done on the
ongoing conicts between India and Pakistan and in Cyprus. In this respect,
from The Question of Palestine onward, Said has advocated, both politically
and theoretically, that the coexistence of the two peoples has become historically insurmountable. In an interview I conducted with him in 1990 for
a Greek journal, Said responded skeptically to a deliberately provocative
question about a future Palestinian national history inevitably embracing the
typical identitarian ideology of ancestry and ascendancy, claiming instead
that what made Palestinian history and society different was the impossibility of disengagement from its adversarial other.21 The force of identitarian
principles that fuels the writing of national history, he argued, is in this case
21. Stathis Gourgouris, Conversation with Edward Said (New York, 1990), Planodion
(Athens, Greece) 16 (June 1992): 392401.
disrupted by an antagonistic entwinement between two ongoing complicitous histories, which can neither be ignored nor dissolved. Some years later,
Said wrote a bold article in the New York Times Magazine that elaborated on
the one-state solution as the only historically possible outcome short of total
annihilation of both cultures; this drew support from certain Israelis but was
disparagingly rejected by many American Jewish commentators. Drawing
on the regions centuries-old (though now severely torn) tradition of multiethnic and multicultural coexistence, which he then grafted onto a theoretical privileging of civil society over religious-nationalist community, Said put
forth the thesis that there can be no reconciliation unless both peoples, two
communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and
that it has to be dealt with as such. 22
This activist theoretical and political trajectory, which is made possible by virtue of an intellectual mind that rejects totalizing and transcendentalist gures, has never been quite appreciated in these terms. On the
contrary, the secular vision is summarily discredited, arguably because its
historical power is tangible and perfectly real. When Zionist critics assail
Said for being the professor of terror, one gets the impression that they do
so because they desire to silence a Palestinian voice that articulates the profound historical reality of such coexistence. Though nowadays, in the context of such extreme adherence to nationalist/religious dogmatism on both
sides, this position seems utopian, the actual historical reality to which it
focuses our attention is ultimately more threatening to Ariel Sharons position than are scores of suicide bombers, precisely because it casts an insurmountable shadow over the Zionist dream-wish to do away with the Palestinian factor altogether, so as to clear out the territories for the unimpeded
establishment of Eretz Israel.
Said has trained his eye on this annihilating logic since the seminal essay Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims (1979), in which he
argues that, even at the simplest discursive level, the nationalist dream of
Zionism was predicated on the vision of a pristine, uninhabited land inherited
from time immemorial via the privilege of ancestry. It was thus inevitable
that the foundation of the Israeli state in the wake of the Holocaust and the
brutal militarization of the Zionist dream would spin forth a logic of unacknowledged but tacitly justied and altogether totalizing victimization of the
other. We are the victims of the victims, Said repeatedly declares. This
phrase is formidable in its utter simplicity because it exposes the unsayable
22. Edward W. Said, The One-State Solution, New York Times Magazine, January 10,
1999, 39.
Because it is conducted as a critical secular project, Saids uncompromising critique of Zionism has stayed explicitly clear from any of the
discursive traps that mirror the adversarys tactics. Hence his insistence
against any notion of de-Zionization, any sort of annihilating gesture in return. He has been too deeply involved in the experience of communal erasure, deterritorialization, and bona de bulldozing of history to learn of the
danger of monological principles. He continues, rather, to advocate the dialectical entwinement of societies and histories, and the continuous rediscovery of the making of history by real people in the real world. Instead of the
security of a religious-nationalist Palestinian vision, he prefers the secular
uncertainty of a state, a home, that is no ones singular property: I suppose part of my critique of Zionism is that it attaches too much importance to
home. Saying, we need a home. And well do anything to get a home, even if
it means making others homeless. . . . I want a rich fabric of some sort, which
no one can fully comprehend, and no one can fully own. 25 It is no surprise,
then, that in this, a recent interview for an Israeli journal, Said is recognized
by the interviewer to sound very Jewish. Saids response, the last words of
his recent collection of interviews, which I can imagine being spoken with a
great deal of humorous subversiveness, should be nonetheless taken seriously: Of course. Im the last Jewish intellectual. You dont know anyone
else. All your other Jewish intellectuals are now suburban squires. From
Amos Oz to all these people here in America. So Im the last one. The only
true follower of Adorno. Let me put it this way: Im a Jewish-Palestinian. 26
For those claiming to represent the allegedly real world of politics,
Saids critical secular vision is at best utopian, its sense of the future immaterial, literary. Yet I would argue, perhaps in a more philosophical vein, that,
on the contrary, the politics of comments such as the one above is drawn
from the mature cognizance of humanitys nite existence, of the corporeality and mortality of subjective experience, in addition to a deant lack of
interest in transcendent solutionsall of which, together, generate a sharpened and radical focus on the actual historical future. It is possible to consider that Said makes such comments in the spirit of lateness, or Sptstil
(late style), as Adorno theorized it, a notion forming the basis, during the
last decade, of Saids main literary and theoretical inquiry.27 According to
25. Edward W. Said, My Right of Return, interview by Ari Shavit (Tel Aviv, 2000), in Power,
Politics, and Culture, 457.
26. Said, My Right of Return, 458.
27. See Edward W. Said, Adorno as Lateness Itself, in Adorno: A Critical Reader, ed.
Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 193208.
Adorno, lateness exceeds what is acceptable and normal in the world, and
hence submits ones presumed unity with historical time and social environment to irreconcilable dissonance. Lateness reaches beyond its present
time in history, or, more precisely, it makes its mode of expression achieve a
suspended presentness that ssures time, disrupts the beguiling assurance
of controlled temporality, and thus enables a radical historical consciousness to emerge. Said diagnoses this kind of consciousness at work in a
variety of literary and artistic contexts; in addition to Adorno himself, he has
spoken specically of Beethoven, Strauss, Proust, Beckett, Genet, Cavafy.
But I nd particularly insightful, in this context, his discussion of late style in
Sigmund Freuds bold gesture of writing Moses and Monotheism as the last
response of a profoundly secular mind to a world of single-minded identities
and totalizing violence. Freuds own unresolved sense of identity (on many
registers, not merely the cultural, but also the scientic and professional)
produces a way of ssuring the imaginary core of monotheism by tying its
emergence to the constitutive presence of the stranger, the foreigner, the
other, within the instituted communal body. Said recognizes in what sense
this remarkable gesture attests as well to how an ethnic/national exclusionary institution is also irreparably entangled with the stranger, the foreigner, the other, at the origin. The strength of Freuds thought, Said argues,
can be articulated in and speak to other besieged identities as well, not
through dispensing palliatives such as tolerance and compassion, but rather
by attending to it as a troubling, disabling, destabilizing secular wound, the
essence of the cosmopolitan, from which there can be no recovery, no state
of resolved or stoic calm, and no utopian reconciliation even within itself. 28
Only a critical secular response that attends to this woundthat realizes
the limitations of history and yet recognizes the limitless capacity of the historical imaginationwould cast its eye upon the future without becoming
enchanted by its conjured irrelevance, apocalyptic abolition, utopian promise, or transcendence.
It is this transgressive, transformative desire to resist the will to transcendence that animates Saids conviction that all criticism is postulated
and performed on the assumption that it is to have a future. 29 The conviction of having a future against all odds is this paradoxical afrmation of
our historical being that emerges out of the acceptance of our existential
28. Edward W. Said, Freud and the Non-European (London: Verso, 2003), 54.
29. Edward W. Said, The Future of Criticism, in Reections on Exile and Other Essays,
171.
nitude. Disappointingly, this is becoming more and more rare in our historical present. The religious imaginary revealed in the events of September 11, whether intended this way or not, suggests the casualty of envisioning a futurea future in the world, of course, for the future of martyrdom is
no future, strictly speaking; it is submission to a heteronomous plenitude,
to the supreme authority of the Other, which knows no temporality. Sadly,
but perhaps not surprisingly, the response of the American state, institutionally a secular state, exhibits a similar monological (so as not to say outright monotheistic) attitude toward history, which might be said to cancel
historys capacity to remain unpredictable, uncertain, in ux. The scandalous White House document titled The National Security Strategy of the
United States of Americaa document of enormous signicance, if only
because of its unabashed declaration of the projected terms of global dominationenvisions a future so narrowly self-referential and wishfully guaranteed by sheer military power and ideological conviction in the transcendental
authority of the market and its brand of civilization that it leaves one wondering if thats any future at all. The faith that certain policies and courses of
action, whether directed by the will of God or by the pseudorational analysis
of national security specialists, will unilaterally transcend the contradictions
of the present and be fullled in a redemptive future means lack of thinking
critically, historically. It actually abdicates humanitys responsibility and selfconsciousness in the making of history, making of the future a mere game of
power in order to conrm the status quo of power in the present. The grave
problem laid before us is how to conduct a ght for the future that takes as
supreme values, rst, the untranscendable nitude of human existence; and
second, the absolutely teleological danger of the destruction of the whole
planet (that is, total nitude). To this extent, I argue, the tradition of transcendental thinking has never offered humanity anything better than the blissful pill of oblivion, while a transgressive, transformative thinking takes ones
individual nitude as the point of departure and draws from it the energy to
combat whatever forces might risk humanitys irreversible end.
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