University of Bucharest

Faculty of Letters

The Pragmatics of Negative Structures in

Political Discourse.
A Relevance Theoretic Approach

PhD Candidate: Elena Nicoleta ALBU

Scientific Coordinator: Prof. Dr. Liliana IONESCU - RUXNDOIU

Bucharest 2012

Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Preliminaries
1.2. Brief Overview of Romanian Negation
1.3. The Aim of the Dissertation
1.4. Corpus of Data
1.5. Structure of the Thesis
2. RELEVANCE THEORY
2.1. Basic Concepts and Main Principles
2.2. Descriptive Use vs. Interpretive Use
2.2.1. The Interpretation of a Description
2.2.2. The Interpretation of an Interpretation
2.3. Metarepresentation
2.4. Conclusions
3. A RELEVANCE THEORETIC APPROACH TO NEGATION
3.1. Description of a Negative Content
3.2. Metarepresentational Negation
3.3. Formal Affirmative Correspondent and Semantic Affirmative Correspondent
3.4. Main Features of Metarepresentational Negation
3.5. Conclusions
4. DESCRIPTIVE NEGATION
4.1. Preliminary Aspects
4.2. Descriptive Negation: General Overview
4.3. Previous Accounts of Descriptive Negation
4.4. Contextual Analyses of Descriptive Negation
4.4.1. Prototypical Cases
4.4.2. Description vs. Rejection
4.5. Conclusions

5. SIMPLE REJECTION: [not (X)]

5.1. A Brief Overview
5.2. Previous Accounts
5.3. Contextual Analysis
5.3.1. Structure Determined by the Hearers Utterance
5.3.2. Structure Determined by the Speakers Utterance
5.4. Conclusions
6. METEREPRESENTATIONAL NEGATION: [not (X) but (X)]
6.1. Theoretical Overview
6.2. Previous Accounts of Metalinguistic Negation
6.3. Metarepresentational Negation [not (X) but (X)]
6.3.1. Preliminaries
6.3.2. Structure Generated by the Hearers Intervention
6.3.3. Structure Generated by the Speakers Intervention
6.4. Metarepresentational Negation [not (X) {but} (X)]
6.4.1. Preliminaries
6.4.2. Contextual Analysis
6.5. Metarepresentational Negation [(X) not (X)]
6.5.1. Preliminaries
6.5.2. Contextual Analysis
6.6. Conclusions
7. CUMULATIVE STRUCTURE WITH NEGATIVE FORM: [not only (X) but also (X)]
7.1. Brief Overview
7.2. Contextual Analysis
7.3. Conclusions
8. INCLUSION
8.1. Preliminary Aspects
8.2. Metarepresentational Negation [(X) not just (X)]
8.2.1. Brief Overview
8.2.2. Contextual Analysis
8.3. Non-standard Conditional [(X) if not (X)]
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8.4. Conclusions
9. DOUBLE NEGATION
9.1. General Overview
9.2. [NOT {can} [NOT (X)]]
9.3. [NOT {can say} [NOT (X)]]
9.4. [NOT {mean} [NOT (X)]]
9.5. Conclusions
10. MENTAL ACTS vs. SPEECH ACTS
10.1. Preliminary Aspects
10.2. Previous Accounts of Rejection and Correction
10.2.1. Denial vs. Rejection
10.2.2. Correction
10.3. Mental Acts
10.4. Speech Acts and Negative Structures
10.5. Conclusions
11. THE DISCURSIVE CONTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE STRUCTURES
11.1. Macro-level vs. Micro-level Argumentation
11.2. The Functions of the Negative Structures
11.5. Conclusions
12. THE CONFIGURATION OF SELF IMAGE
12.1. Preliminaries
12. 2. Self-Image A Discursive Construct
12.3. Parliamentary Debates vs. TV Political Debates
12.4. Metarepresentational Negation [Not (X) but (X)] A Dual Strategy
12.5. Contextual Analysis
12.6. Conclusions
13. FINAL REMARKS
13.1. Summary of the Results
13.2. Perspectives for Future Research
REFERENCES

List of Abbreviations

AR: actual representation

AS: actual speaker
CAE: contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption
CR: conceptual representation
DN: descriptive negation
DU: descriptive use
FAC: formal affirmative correspondent
FOI: first order interpretation
HOR: higher order representation
INI: inside reading interrogative
IU: interpretive use
LOR: lower order representation
LS: litotic structure
MA: mental acts
MetNeg: metarepresentational negation
MD: metarepresentational discourse
MN: metalinguistic negation
MS: metarepresentational structure
MU: metarepresentational use
ND: negative description
NS: negative structure
ONI: outside reading interrogative
OR: original representation
OS: original speaker
PD: positive description
RR: rejected representation
RT: Relevance theory
SA: speech acts
SAC: semantic affirmative correspondent
SOA: state of affairs
SOI: second order interpretation
SR: simple rejection

Summary
1. Introduction
In the present dissertation we suggest a relevance theoretic account of NSs. In
comparison to different perspectives on negation, particular attention is paid to the action of the
negative operator not and to its interaction with various elements. Based on an authentic corpus
of data, we intend to illustrate the manner in which the NSs are mentally configured, indicate
what elements are involved in the generation of such structures and describe how they can be
interpreted. In order to answer these questions we divide our study in two parts. The most
consistent part (chapters (3) to (9)) aims at describing how NSs function at a cognitive level,
with an emphasis on what inferences are triggered and what cognitive effects are generated. In
the second part (chapters (10) to (12)), we attempt to indicate the discursive contribution of the
NSs in political discourse.
The interest in this research topic came as a result of the practical observation that there
are a lot of negations used for different reasons. Although they share the negative operator not,
they generate totally different constructions, having particular patterns and an autonomous
character within discourse. Moreover, there are negative structures with positive meanings and
negative structures with negative meanings. The use of more negations poses an important
challenge to the manner in which they are derived and processed by speakers. The central
question we are interested in answering is: Why do politicians use negative structures?
Concretely, we want to discuss the reasons for which a certain negative structure is the
politicians linguistic choice of expressing his communicative intentions, when there are other
possibilities of expression or even a positive correspondent available. This question is very
challenging and intriguing, raising a number of problems, both of theoretical and practical
nature. We will be addressing this question from different points of view throughout the
dissertation.
The present thesis is based on the premise that negation is not a unitary phenomenon and,
therefore, it needs to be approached from various perspectives. We consider that a study focused
on the mental configuration of negation may cast new light on the interpretation of this
phenomenon.
The Pragmatics of Negative Structures in Political Discourse. A Relevance Theoretic
Approach is a linguistic contribution, situated in the field of cognitive pragmatics, offering a
theoretical description of how negation functions in regard to Romanian. It also makes a
contribution to discourse analysis, having applications in political discourse, as the examples
represent authentic Romanian data, used in the attempt to illustrate how NS are used by the
native speakers in real communicative situations.
Our dissertation has a number of methodological goals. Although it is Relevance Theory
(RT) (Sperber and Wilson 1995) the theoretical framework we principally draw on hitherto, we
deploy on different existing theories in order to further depict and elucidate various aspects that
interact with the negative operator. We try to integrate certain elements from theories
6

corresponding to various areas of interest, such as semantics, argumentation theory, speech acts,
and philosophy of language in order to provide a comprehensive study about negative structures.
Our study is qualitative in the attempt to define structures, develop useful instruments, and
establish hypotheses about the process of interpretation.
We introduce the notion of negative structure (NS) in the attempt to delimit between the
mental configuration and the discursive pattern of the structure generated by the negative
operator. The mental configuration regards the manner in which the NS functions from a
cognitive point of view, with an emphasis on what inferences are triggered and what cognitive
effects are generated. We have created correspondent glossing formulas for each NS in order to
point out the manner in which they are generated and the relationships among the existing
components. In contrast, the discursive pattern concerns the linguistic representation and the
discursive organization of each NS. While the mental configuration is fixed, highlighting the
inferences generated in the context created, the discursive pattern is discourse based, taking
different forms of expression.
The linguistic corpus available provides a wide variety of empirical elements. It is
represented mainly by the TV political debates broadcast on Romanian channels in 2010. In the
attempt to offer a comprehensive image of how speakers use negation, we also opted for the
analysis of some examples extracted from press conferences and Parliamentary debates. We
collected the TV political debates from the websites of the political parties, politicians personal
websites and the website of the Romanian Parliament1. The transcripts were made by the
national agency Monitoring media, which is responsible for the transcriptions of all the TV
programmes, press conferences and electoral campaigns. It is necessary to mention that we made
no changes to the original transcripts in the attempt not to alter the authenticity of the corpus of
data.
For our analysis, we selected all the occurrences of the negative operator not and tried to
identify the material found in its scope. Then, we identified the manner in which the NS is
generated, on the one hand, and its constitutive elements, on the other, in accordance with the
glossing formulas. We also tried to indicate the discursive effects and the lexical relationships
between the lexical units encoded in the (X) or (X) segment.
For the purposes of our argument, in what follows we shall briefly offer an outline of
each chapter of the thesis.
Chapter 2: Relevance Theory
RT is an inferential ostensive approach to communication based on the concept of
relevance and two principles: a cognitive and a communicative principle. The general claim is
that human communication is overtly intentional, i.e. the speaker always has an intentional
communicative behaviour which is inferred by the audience. As a result of a biologic evolution,
the human mind has developed towards increasing efficiency and people pay attention to
1

http://www.psd.ro/transcripte.php, http://www.crinantonescu.ro/Public/cat/14/Noutati.html,
http://www.parlament.ro/.

ostensive stimuli, which raise precise and predictable expectations of relevance that contribute
greatly to the process of interpretation. As opposed to the Gricean and Neo-Gricean accounts,
according to which the expectations that guide the comprehension process are derived from
principles and maxims, RT claims that the act of communication itself raises expectations of
relevance that guide the comprehension process. From this perspective, the speakers meaning is
doubly embedded, i.e. the speakers goal is to make the informative intention mutually manifest,
and the process of understanding implies the inference of a mental state of the speaker.
The comprehension process is considered a selective process guided by a cognitive
human ability to consider the most relevant stimuli, processing them withs least effort until the
intended combination of explicature, implicature and context is reached. In sum, RT is based on
the premise that pragmatics involves a dedicated inferential comprehension module, the
psychological mechanisms playing a central role.
We delimited between DU and IU in terms of the interpretation of a description and
the interpretation of an interpretation. Our approach is based on the assumption that the two
uses highlight the manner in which information is configured in verbal communication. We
suggested schemes of interpretation for each use in order to point out the components, the
relationships between them and the outcomes of their interaction. DU is always a FOI, built on a
relationship of truthfulness between the given SOA and the speakers thought. In contrast, IU is
more complex, always representing a SOI. In consequence, more discursive levels, more
discursive entities and more representations can be identified.
In the third part of the chapter, we turned our attention to the phenomenon of
metarepresentation, interpreted as a cognitive ability with which humans are endowed. In
accordance with previous studies in the literature, we referred to the IU as MU. We briefly tried
to illustrate how it is defined and interpreted with an emphasis on the various combinations
between the elements that are involved in the actualization of this phenomenon.
Chapter 3: A Relevance Theoretic Approach to Negation
Every natural language has a wide variety of linguistic expressions that can generate a
multitude of meanings. What make these expressions different are the cognitive effects the
hearer can derive. In other words, communicators use linguistic expressions to achieve effects on
interpretation quite distinct from the meanings encoded in those expressions. In order to
understand the complexity of negation, we consider that the manner in which speakers configure
and process negation at a cognitive level may cast new light on the various uses and the
multitude of NSs found in verbal interaction.
In this chapter we tried to outline a general line of interpretation, according to which the
analysis will be concentrated in the following chapters. Therefore, we paid attention to the
manner in which each NS is configured, what type of cognitive effect is generated, what the
relationship between the components involved in the generation of the structure is and how the
constitutive elements are represented. We also drew the attention on the distinction between
use and function. We presented DU and IU/MU as the fundamental cognitive ways in which
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people configure information in verbal communication. In contrast, function points out the
reasons for which a certain representation is used. Therefore, DN and MetNeg represent ways of
configuration that can fulfil different functions, according to the speakers different intentions.
From this viewpoint, the delimitation between DN and MetNeg regards the action of the negator
and the nature of the material found in its scope. DN represents the description of a negative
content. It is the actualization of DU, always an instance of FOI. MetNeg constitutes the
rejection of a representation. It is the actualization of MU, always an instance of SOI.
We could identify several types of MetNegs, as follows: SR [not (X)], MetNeg [not (X)
but (X)], MetNeg [(X) not just (X)], cumulative structure with negative form [not only (X) but
also (X)]. Apart from SR which consists in only one segment, the rest of the MetNegs are
complex structures, consisting in two segments found in the cognitive domain of the correlative
pairs. Depending on the action of the negative operator not or of the correlative pairs, more
subtypes of the CAE effect were revealed, namely exclusion inclusion, accumulation. Our
approach is based on the conviction that NSs have a fixed mental configuration, conveying the
same procedural information and triggering the same cognitive effect in all contexts. While the
fived glossing formulas reveal the mental configuration of negation, various discursive effects
are generated when these NSs are embedded in discursive sequences according to the speakers
communicative goals. Moreover, a NS can be expressed either negatively or affirmatively,
indicating the fact that the negator can scope over different types of content.
Following the line initiated by Carston (1999) regarding the phenomenon of
metarepresentation, we tried to suggest an account of the MetNeg. It is our belief that the
MetNeg is intrinsically metarepresentational, i.e. the rejected assumption is always attributed to a
different discursive entity, actual and potential. The particularity of each NS is pointed out by its
constitutive features, such as: the nature, type and source of the LOR. We depart from Carstons
view regarding the expression of the speakers attitude. We do not consider that the expression of
a dissociative attitude is an essential feature of MetNeg and therefore we suggest that a
delimitation between the attitude at the level of the utterance vs. the attitude at the level of the
NS should be drawn.
Chapter 4: Descriptive Negation
This chapter aimed at describing the cognitive and discursive individuality of DN.
Starting from the dichotomy between FOI and SOI, as a result of the actualization of the DU and
MU, respectively, we have delimited between DN and MetNeg. Based on our corpus of data, we
could identify a restricted class of NS, generated by an action of the negative operator different
from rejection.
Unlike other approaches on DN, we believe that it is an instance of FOI, as a result of the
actualization of the DU. We defined DN as the description of a negative content. The approach
was based on the premise that the negative operator takes action on a particular content which is
used descriptively.

We identified two categories of NSs that fall into this category, namely bipolar realities
and to be constructions. In both situations, we came to the conclusion that there is no FAC
activated in the generation of the structures. On the contrary, a SAC can be identified depending
on the discursive context and the nature of the lexical items found in the scope of the negative
operator. In the end, we emphasised the fact that the boundary between the description of a
negative content and MetNeg is lax, which makes the correct identification of the structures
difficult. Moreover, we were able to identify instances of metarepresented DNs, i.e. the DN was
part of the lower order interpretation. In other words, at the level of the OR, the negative operator
determined a negative content.
Chapter 5: Simple Rejection [Not (X)]
SR [not (X)] occupies a particular place among the MetNegs, being the only NS that
consists only in one segment found in the cognitive domain of the negative operator not.
Accordingly, it is an intrinsically metarepresentational NS, always involving a SOI. The
procedure encoded by the negator implies the total elimination of the assumption found in the
(X) segment from the hearer and the audiences cognitive environment. A correction may be
suggested and but it is left to the hearer to infer. The speaker does not seem to express any
interest in the corrective alternative. In this way, the speaker points out what he considers
inappropriate, incorrect, false etc. In consequence, we believe that SR [not (X)] triggers a CAE
by exclusion.
We tried to capture in the data analysis the complexity of the SR in natural language use,
providing evidence both for prototypical examples and complex instances. We grouped our data
in two major categories: structures generated by the hearers utterance and structures generated
by the speakers own intervention, respectively. While the first category corresponds to the
prototypical examples, the FAC being easily recovered from the hearers previous intervention,
the second category illustrates the complex cases of SR, the target of rejection being found in the
speakers actual statement. Based on the available data, we came to the conclusion that SRs can
be generated entirely by the speaker, without any contribution from the hearer, as a result of the
metarepresentational nature. Unlike the prototypical instances where the FAC is explicitly
expressed and attributed to the hearer, in this situation the components are left implicit, requiring
more processing effort during the interpretation. Furthermore, the rejection can be used
anticipatorily by the speaker in the attempt to prevent possible objections the audience may have.
The analysis also revealed that various aspects can represent the target of rejection, such as the
truth conditional content, implicated premises and implicated conclusions, presuppositions.
In sum, in our corpus, the implicit FAC seems to be prevalent, while the number of the
structures in which FAC is easily recovered and equivalent to the (X) segment is reduced. We
are inclined to believe the NS generated by the speaker and NS generated by the hearer represent
a solid criterion, having a direct consequence on the generation of the MetNeg.
The boundary between DN and SR [not (X)] is very lax. While DN is a FOI, indicating
the description of a negative content, SR [not (X)] is a SOI, built on the rejection of a
10

representation attributed to a different discursive entity and situated on a different discursive

level. When there are no overt markers used to indicate the action of the negator on the material
found in its scope, a pragmatic reanalysis is necessary. Moreover, the two NSs generate different
cognitive effects in accordance with the speakers communicative intention. In comparison with
DN, SR appears to be more complex to process, requiring more cognitive effort from the
audience.
Chapter 6: Metarepresentational Negation [not (X) but (X)]
This chapter aimed at describing the manner in which MetNeg is mentally configured on
the one hand, and how it is used in natural language by native speakers, on the other.
In the light of the account suggested in chapter (3) we tried to illustrate the main features
of this NS. The analysis revealed the fact that the MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] is a unitary
construction, with a fixed configuration and interpretation. MetNeg is a complex NS, consisting
in two segments: the rejection and the correction segment, found in the scope of the correlative
pair [notbut]. In comparison to previous accounts on MN, our analysis concentrated equally on
the two segments: (X) and (X). We consider that the particularity of this NS is determined by
the action of the correlative pair and not by the action of the negative operator alone. This
hypothesis is supported by the Romanian disjunctive marker, i.e. the corrective but, which
cannot appear alone or in other contexts. Based on the corpus of data, we identified three patterns
that always lead to the generation of the same inferences: [not (X) but (X)], [not (X) {but} (X)]
and [(X) not (X)].
Following the classifications previously established regarding the elements on which the
actions determined by the correlative pair take action, we could identify several situations. We
preserved the distinction we proposed in the previous chapter between NS determined by the
hearers utterance and NS determined by the speakers own utterance. As a consequence of the
discursive genre analysed, the number of the situations in which the target of rejection and
correction were explicitly expressed is reduced in comparison to the cases in which the target of
rejected, source, presence and type are left implicit.
Many MetNegs are generated based on the speakers background knowledge, i.e. the
speaker assumes that the hearer and the audience may form a certain thought at some point based
on some information they previously acquired. Furthermore, some of NSs are used anticipatorily,
the speaker creating different scenarios about the assumptions that are or can become part of the
hearers cognitive environment. The speakers usually formulate different NSs based on what
they assume the audience may think. For instance, the speaker rejects an assumption to make
sure the audience would never think of something like that. These findings may cast new light on
the status of the rejected assumption and the manner in which it is accessed by the hearer and
becomes mutually manifest. There are clear instances in the corpus of data indicating that the
rejected assumption was not part of the hearers cognitive environment. It is accessed for the first
time when it is rejected by the speaker.

11

Chapter 7: Cumulative Structure with Negative Form [not only (X) but also (X)]
In this section our attention was focused on the processes that lie behind the cumulative
structure with negative form: [not only (X) but also (X)]. We were interested in illustrating the
main features of this NS and in pointing out the similarities and differences in comparison to the
rest of the NSs.
Our analysis was based on the assumption that negative structures encode procedural
information having a strong influence in the process of interpretation. The cumulative structure
with negative form [not only (X) but also (X)] consists of two segments, (X) and (X), and the
correlative pair [not only but also]. The result of the cumulative [rejection + correction]
inference is represented by the generation of a cumulative cognitive effect. The structure is
metarepresentational, always the actualization of a SOI. The resulted conceptual representation is
the outcome of the joint interaction of the rejected assumption and the correction assumption.
The FAC can be attributed to the hearer, but the rejection is usually used anticipatorily, namely
in the attempt to anticipate possible objections or to allude to some aspects, the speaker rejects a
representation he/she assumes that it may be or become part of the hearers cognitive
environment at some point.
The status of the rejected assumption in the (X) segment has a particular configuration. It
is hypothetical, leading to the derivation of the following opposition: a desirable representation
substitutes an actual representation for different reasons. It usually becomes accessible during the
processing of the NS. In comparison to the separate uses of the negative operator not and the
discursive marker only, the cumulative emphatic structure with negative form [not only (X) but
also (X)] functions unitarily.
Chapter 8: Inclusion
This chapter presented in a comparative manner two NSs that seemed similar at first
sight: MetNeg [(X) not just (X)] and the non-standard conditional [(X) if not (X)]. The analysis
revealed that the manner in which they are configured is different. While the first NS is part of
the MetNeg, always a SOI, the non-standard conditional is an instance of FOI, used to indicate
the appropriateness of different concepts.
Both NSs imply a fixed configuration and a fixed interpretation. The MetNeg [(X) not
just (X)] consists in two segments: (X) and (X). Similarly to the third pattern of MetNeg [(X)
and not (X)], the correction segment is used first, pointing out the speakers intention of
expressing his viewpoint on the given content. The resulted conceptual representation is the
outcome of a CAE by inclusion.
In the case of non-standard conditional an action of rejection is implied but it is rather a
lexical rejection, pointing out a metalinguistic reading. The paraphrase (X) not to say (X)
supports this hypothesis. The speaker is not certain that the strength of the lexical unit encoded
by (X) segment is adequate and he/she suggests a different interpretation, which functions like a
suggestion. Therefore, the speaker lets the hearer choose the interpretation he considers more

12

appropriate. At the same time, by indicating the potential character of the expression, the speaker
does not commit to its truth.
In sum, the comparison between the two NSs may shed light on the actions performed by
the negative operator not. Although both MetNeg [(X) not just (X)] and non-standard
conditional [(X) if not (X)] share the negative operator, totally different structures with distinct
mental configurations are generated.
Chapter 9: Double Negation
This chapter aimed at presenting comparatively several instances where more negative
operators are used. The approach was based on the premise that the interaction of two negative
operators in the same utterance may shed new light on the way in which they are configured and
function. We discussed three patterns we identified in our corpus of data: [NOT {can} [NOT
(X)]], [NOT {can say} [NOT (X)]] and [NOT {mean} [NOT (X)]].
The analysis revealed that the negators can generate different actions in comparison to
the prototypical action of rejection on which MetNeg is built. The first pattern is highly
influenced by the modal can. Contrary to expectations, [NOT {can} [NOT (X)]] is a MetNeg but
it is not generated by the rejection of an existing assumption. In other words, the negative
operator determines a different action. The interaction between not and the modal can seems to
be a type of lexical rejection, which is found in the scope of the second negator. Therefore, the
action of the second not on the group I cannot triggers a positive interpretation of the double
negation.
The status of the second negator reveals interesting aspects in the case of the second and
third pattern of double negation. Concretely, in both situations, the second negative operator was
part of LOR and was situated in the scope of the first segment, represented by it does not mean
and I cannot say. Moreover, [NOT {can say} [NOT (X)]] and [NOT {mean} [NOT (X)]] appear
to function anticipatorily, i.e. the speaker assumes what people may think or what they may
object to and react accordingly. It can be noticed that they seem to have the same pattern: double
negation embedded implicitly or explicitly in a contrastive segment.
Chapter 10: Mental Acts vs. Speech Acts
This chapter aimed at differentiating between the mental acts involved in the
configuration of a NS and the contribution of the NSs to the discourse as a result of the
interaction between the discursive pattern, lexical units and pragmatic principles. In order to
distinguish between different interpretations assigned to negation, denial and rejection, we
considered it appropriate to delimit between the mental acts that determine the actualization of
negation at the mental level and the discursive functions they have at a contextual level.
We tried to defend the hypothesis according to which NSs have a fixed configuration, i.e.
each NS is paired with an inference type, as previously shown. In contrast, the contribution they
have at the discursive level is different in accordance with the speakers intention and the context
in which the NSs are processed. We suggested that the notions of rejection and correction
13

represent the mental acts found in the configuration of the NSs, namely [rejection] in the case of
SR and [rejection + correction] in the case of the MetNegs. In sum, SR generates a cognitive
effect, represented by the rejection of the assumption found in the scope of the negative operator,
MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] is built on [rejection + correction] by exclusion, the cumulative
structure with negative form represents the result of a cumulative [rejection + correction] and the
MetNeg [(X) not just (X)] brings forward a cognitive effect of inclusion.
Regarding the dichotomy between rejection and denial, we consider that denial highlights
the function of the negative utterance. Therefore, we included it in the taxonomy of contextual
functions and values together with refutation, rebuttal, clarification, explanation, elucidation etc.
We briefly looked at the configuration of the negative imperatives to see whether the
MAs can be still identified. The analysis indicated that there are some structural differences due
to their different configurations, such as: there is no correspondence between the FAC and the
(X) segment, the rejection targets different types of assumption and the status of the rejected
assumption is different in comparison to the declarative utterances.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the discursive contribution of the NSs. Based
on our corpus of data and the theoretical information provided by RT, we could identify more
categories. The first category is represented by the situation when the negative operator is also an
illocutionary marker, generating a SA. SR [not (X)] falls into this category. The second category
is represented by the situation when the NS coincides with a SA, but the illocution is highlighted
by a different marker, and the third when the NS is part of a SA, whose illocution is explicitly
marked, other than the negative operator not.
We looked at a set of examples in order to point out the status of the NSs. The data
analysis revealed that all NSs can be part of a larger discursive sequence and therefore part of a
SA. In contrast, SR [not (X)] and MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] can generate SAs but only SR [not
(X)] can have a rejective illocution.
Concerning the rest of the NSs, we believe that the MetNeg [(X) not just (X)] and the
cumulative structure with negative form [not only (X) but also (X)] are always part of a SA.
Due to their mental configuration, they do not have discursive autonomy. Instead, they are used
to further explain or to add information to the utterance of which they are part.
Chapter 11: The Discursive Contribution of the Negative Structures
In the previous chapter we have tried to show that the mental configuration of a NS is
different from the SA generated by NSs in a communicative context. In this chapter, we intended
to highlight the argumentative functions and roles of DN, MetNeg and SR. Starting from the
delimitation we drew between the three possible situations, i.e. when the negator is also the
illocutionary marker, when the NS coincides with a SA, but the illocutionary force is carried by a
different marker and when the NS is part of a SA, the analysis was based on the situation in
which the NS represents the content of a SA.
Although it is a very difficult task to make generalizations about the derivation of certain
SAs at the discursive level, due to their increased context sensitivity, certain comments can be
14

made. Regarding DN, it always determines a SA with an informative value. It is usually an

assertion, the speaker being committed to its truth. MetNeg is a complex class of NSs that can
have various argumentative uses. Due to the complexity of this structure, in this chapter we only
illustrated the instances of negative definitions and negative explanations. We believe that they
are situated in the second category, i.e. the NS represents the content of a SA determined by a
different marker. Similarly, in the case of SR, we concentrated on the situations in which the NS
represents the content of a SA. In our corpus of data the polemic SAs seemed to be prevalent.
They are used in order to express the speakers attitude towards the communicated content. At
the same time, as a result of the constant political confrontation, the speakers try to alter the
cognitive environment of the audience in order to gain their trust.
A negative utterance can have multiple functions in order to point out the speakers
complex communicative goal. The exact identification of an illocution in political discourse is
very challenging, as the speakers communicative goal is complex, always targeting more
perlocutionary effects.
Chapter 12: The Configuration of Self Image
In this chapter, we have tried to outline the contribution of the MetNeg [not (X) but (X)]
in shaping the politicians SI in parliamentary and TV political debates. We started from the
premise that SI is a discursive construal that allows the speaker to express his/her views as an
individual politician, dissociated from his party. Particular attention has been paid to the manner
in which the MP presents himself/herself by means of the mental configuration and discursive
organization of the MetNeg [not (X) but (X)]. We suggested that the NS is a dual strategy that
brings forward the manner how others see the politician and how he sees himself/herself or how
he/she thinks he/she should be seen by the audience.
Although there are not many instances of MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] configuring the
politicians SI in our corpus of data, we can draw relevant conclusions. The first concerns the
small number of examples in both parliamentary debates and TV political debates. The
discourses are concentrated on the opponents image and especially on destroying the
government and the presidents credibility. The politicians interventions do not represent a
constructive discourse, but rather a destructive one. All their replies and interventions include
sharp and virulent attacks and accusations against the political opponents. These aspects are
revealed by means of a relevance theoretic reanalysis, that puts emphasis on the speakers
communicative intention, the inferential path the hearer is undergoing and the effects generated
in context.
MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] is an efficient strategy in configuring the politicians SI, due to
its mental configuration and discursive organisation. The duality of the segments allows the
speaker to present himself/herself in opposition to his/her political adversaries. Our findings
pointed out that the (X) segment is used to either indicate how the opponents are described by
the speaker (and therefore the speaker rejects a representation of how he is not) or to reject a

15

representation of how the speaker believes others see him. In contrast, the (X) is used to
reinforce the speakers SI.
The politicians SI is permanently configured through a continuous antithetic reference to
the others, to their actions, characteristics and attitudes. Therefore, there is a dichotomized
consistency in terms of the image conveyed: the politician fosters an SI in terms of
distinctiveness, of being different, but differently good, of being the only solution for a
problematic political system. We consider the meaning of the utterance is generated online, as a
result of the interaction between linguistic information, semantic content and pragmatic
intention.
We have identified more types of SI which are in direct correspondence with the format
of the political debate. The SI situated in the paradigm of volition is prevalent in TV political
debates, where the speakers represent themselves as individual politicians, who act on behalf of
the citizens. The format of this type of political debate allows them to express their opinions
more freely. Sometimes they present themselves as being personally involved to create the
impression of being close to the audience. In contrast, in parliamentary debates, the MPs act and
react on behalf of their party. As a consequence, a personal SI situated in the paradigm of
volition is almost inexistent.
The second category is represented by SI situated in the paradigm of epistemic judgement
marked by the verb to think. We could identify this type of SI in both parliamentary and TV
political debates. It is used to reflect the speakers belief and to indicate his/her commitment to
the truth of the communicated assumption. In comparison to the use of the verb to think in
parliamentary debates, where it clearly dissociates the MP from the members of his party, in TV
political debates it is preponderant in the (X) segment, meant to reinforce the speakers position.
One aspect has particularly drawn our attention, namely the reiteration of the verb to think in the
(X) segment indicating the fact that the MP explicitly and purposely emphasizes his/her opinion.
Moreover, the paradigm of the epistemic judgement is contrasted with different paradigms used
in the (X) segment, in order to clearly delimit between different politicians, colleagues or
adversaries.
The third type of SI is represented by the instances in which the speakers explicitly
represent themselves as individual politicians. In this situation, there is no apparent connection
between the fostered SI and the format of the debate. In both parliamentary and TV political
debates, the speakers create a contrastive image of themselves, dissociating from the rest of the
political class.
13. Final Remarks
The contribution of this dissertation is threefold. Firstly, it makes a theoretical
contribution to the study of negation by indicating a general line of interpretation of various NSs
based on the mental processes involved in their actualization. Secondly, the thesis suggests an
approach to negation applied to Romanian language. The analysis concerns the characterization
of certain NSs as they are expressed by native speakers in authentic situations of communication.
16

Thirdly, it contributes to the study of political discourse, indicating the values and roles of
various NSs at the discursive level. If the theoretical part attempts to give a generally valid
explanation of the way in which negation functions at a cognitive level, the argumentative
interpretation is discourse based, pointing out the contextually sensitive nature of the generated
acts.
(a) In the attempt to indicate what the NSs represent and why they are used in
communication we considered it relevant to discuss the manner in which negation is configured
and processed at a cognitive level. Our approach was based on the premise that the NSs are
unitary structures with fixed configuration and fixed interpretation. The negative operator not
can determine a NS by itself, performing an action on the segment found in its scope but it can
also be part of a correlative pair. In the latter situation the NS is complex, consisting in more
segments. In the attempt to depart from the contribution the NSs make at the discursive level and
to dissociate from their linguistic organization, we created glossing formulas for each type of NS.
The glossing formulas are meant to indicate the material found in the scope of the negative
operator or of the correlative pairs; they are the equivalent of the procedural formulas used
during the processing of the NSs.
We consider that the mental configuration is part of the utterance meaning, together with
the semantic structure and the contextual factors, such as information on the speech situation, the
background knowledge the interlocutors share etc. In comparison to the semantic structure,
which is highly dependent on the mentioned contextualization (in accordance with the semantic
underdeterminacy thesis), we consider that the mental configuration is not contextually
influenced at all. On the contrary, all the NSs can be represented by the same glossing formula,
i.e. the same mental operations are used and the same cognitive effects are generated, regardless
of the discursive organization. Furthermore, if we compare the utterance meaning to a pyramid,
the mental configuration of a structure represents the first level, the basis of the pyramid,
followed by the semantic structure, further enriched at the implicit and explicit level in order to
indicate the speakers meaning.
The dichotomy between the descriptive and interpretive use is found at the basis of our
account. Starting from the particularities of the two uses, we identified two major classes of NSs:
DN and MetNeg. We interpreted DN as the actualization of the DU, always a FOI, and MetNeg
as the actualization of metarepresentation, always a SOI. While DN represents the description of
a negative content, MetNeg is built around the action of rejection. We have defined rejection as
the mental activity generated in accordance with the contradicting and eliminating an existing
assumption cognitive effect. Depending on the relationship between the constitutive elements
we identified different subtypes of the CAE: exclusion, accumulation and inclusion. We
suggested that these NSs are intrinsically metarepresentational, i.e. they are always the
actualization of metarepresentation.
We consider the delimitation between the metarepresentational structures and
metarepresentational discourse essential when talking about negation. As already mentioned, we
17

use the notion of metarepresentational structure to refer to the manner in which a certain NS is
configured. In contrast, MD represents a certain type of discursive sequence. From our
viewpoint, there is a relationship of inclusion between them, i.e. a MD may consist in more MSs.
If this distinction is abandoned there are some aspects that may be missed and the individuality
of the NSs may be shadowed.
Our account is based on the conviction that the negative operator influences directly the
generation of a NS. It has to be mentioned that we depart from the delimitation established
between negation with negative values and negation with other values than negation. Our
findings showed that, from a cognitive point of view, the negative operator encodes the same
procedure, which leads to the generation of the same cognitive effect, in all contexts. The fact
that the negative operator combined with a different marker and formed a correlative pair
contributes to the derivation of different subtypes of CAE. Whether the meaning is negative,
positive or indeterminate between a negative and a positive reading, it is not influenced by the
action of the negator, but it concerns the process of the speakers meaning derivation.
(b) In what follows we shall try to summarize the particularities of the NSs applied to
Romanian. We suggested an account of NSs with an emphasis on their main features, namely
different levels of representation, various discursive entities, the status of the communicated
assumptions, the target of the actions generated by the negator. It has to be mentioned that
although our approach is based on the mental configuration, the use of NSs at the discursive
level contributes greatly to their interpretation.
According to our findings, the negative operator determines two different mental
operations that lead to the derivation of different cognitive effects. Consequently, we are inclined
to believe that there are two NSs generated, with two distinct mental configurations, namely DN
and MetNeg.
We defined DN as the description of a negative content, determining the derivation of a
new contextual implication in terms of cognitive effects. Based on Ducrots (1972, 1984)
approach we defended the view according to which no action of rejection is generated. We
admitted the existence of an affirmative correspondent but based on our data we concluded that it
has no active role in the case of DN. In some cases, as a result of the semantic and morphologic
organization of the items a SAC is available.
Although it is less frequently used in comparison to MetNeg, DN presents a set of
features that contribute to its discursive autonomy and individuality. We identified two
categories of structures: bipolar realities and to be constructions. Both of them are built on
two opposing realities, i.e. a description based on a negative content and a description of a
positive content. The identification of the affirmative correspondent indicated that the NS and the
affirmative correspondent are situated on different levels, usually pointing out the dichotomy
between present and past.
The border between the two classes of NSs is lax, a pragmatic reconstruction being
necessary in order to correctly identify them. Regarding the relationship between the description
18

of a negative content and the action of rejection, it appears that the two actions are subordinated,
i.e. the latter being able to take action on the former. In this situation a MS is derived, but not by
the negative operator. In other words, not is part of the OR, indicating a metarepresentation of a
description. There are also situations where not is part of the OR but indicates an action of
rejection. This means that the OR was initially generated as a type of MetNeg.
In comparison to DN, in the class of MetNeg more NSs are included. Starting from the
pattern of interpretation suggested in chapter (3), we identified SR [not (X)], MetNeg [not (X)
but (X)], cumulative structure with negative form [not only (X) but also (X)] and MetNeg [(X)
not just (X)] as particulars types of NSs.
The analysis revealed that they are instances of SOI built on the action of rejection. We
could identify two different types of structures that put challenge on the manner in which
MetNegs are determined, i.e. structures determines by the hearers utterance and structures
determined by the speakers utterance. If in the first situation the OR is easily found in the
hearers previous utterance (designating various aspects) the latter situation indicates that the
rejection can be used anticipatorily.
This delimitation emphasizes the fact that NSs are not generated only in response to a
previous utterance. Due to the speakers ability to attribute intentions and to assume the
availability of different assumptions, distinct NSs are derived in accordance with the speakers
convictions and communicative goals. Another aspect that has drawn our attention and
contributes to the individuality of the MetNeg is that the rejected assumption can be attributed to
people in general. Moreover, the status of the rejected assumption reveals novel aspects as the
speaker can communicate it under various forms, ranging from possibility to certainty.
These findings are supported by the analysis in chapters (5), (6), (7) which also pointed
out that the target of rejection can be represented by a myriad of aspects found at the level of
different representations belonging to different discursive entities. More interestingly, the source,
type and presence of the LOR is usually left implicit. The interpretation of such NSs requires
more processing effort from the hearer and generates more cognitive effects.
Starting from the previous accounts on metalinguistic negation, we identified MetNeg
[not (X) but (X)] in the attempt to indicate that this type of NS has a fixed mental configuration,
being generated around the mental actions of rejection and correction. In our demonstration, we
started from the assumption that the mental action of rejection cannot be dissociated from the
mental action of correction, their joint interaction leading to the derivation of the cognitive effect
represented by [rejection and correction] by exclusion. The Romanian distribution of the
disjunctive markers came in support to our assumption. In the context created by the MetNeg
[not (X) but (X)] only the corrective but can take action. According to this observation, we
considered that [not (X) {but} (X)] represents a pattern of the MetNeg, as well. Although the
corrective but is not linguistically expressed, its action can be recovered in the reconstruction
phase. Based on the available corpus of data, we are inclined to believe that the omission of but
is a result of syntactic constraints. Usually, when but is omitted the speaker opts for the
reiteration of the group on whose scope the NS is found. The analysis focused on the
19

characterization of the (X) and (X) segments, on the one hand, and on the relationship between
them, on the other. The data revealed that there is always an effect of exclusion between the
constitutive elements as a result of the contradictory semantic relationship acquired contextually.
In the light of the pattern of interpretation established in chapter (3), we grouped MetNeg [not
(X) but (X)] in structures generated in response to the hearers utterance and structures
generated by the speakers own intervention. In each case we tried to point out the situations in
which the FAC is explicitly marked and the situations in which its recovery is made by means of
pragmatic reanalysis. The corpus analysis also revealed that the rejected assumption is not
necessary to be mutually manifest to the hearer. Rather it becomes accessible while being
processed.
We also identified a third pattern represented by: [(X) not (X)]. In this case, the order of
the rejection and correction segments is changed, aspect that contributes to a different type of
processing, i.e. garden path processing. According to it, a descriptive reading is first accessed,
and immediately abandoned in favour of a metarepresentational one. Although there is a change
at the level of the correlative pair, [notbut] being replaced with [(and) not], the same type of
cognitive effect is generated: [rejection + correction] by exclusion.
If we compare SR [not (X)] to MetNeg [not (X) but (X)], an interesting aspect is
revealed regarding the mental act of correction. As previously argued, in the case of the MetNeg
the speaker explicitly indicates the correction of the rejected assumption. On the contrary, in the
situation of SR no correction is explicitly mentioned, due to the simple configuration of this NS,
but it is suggested the opposite of the rejected assumption. In other words, it is implied that the
assumption found in the scope of the negator is not adequate and as a result the hearer is offered
the liberty of inferring a correction.
In chapters (7) and (8) we presented three NSs that seemed similar at first sight:
cumulative structure with negative form [not only (X) but also (X)], MetNeg [(X) not just (X)]
and non-standard conditional [(X) if not (X)]. The analysis revealed that the structures have
different mental configurations and generate distinct cognitive effects. The MetNeg [(X) not just
(X)] and the cumulative structure with negative form are instances of SOI, generating an
inclusion CAE and a cumulative CAE, respectively. In contrast, it resulted that in the case of the
non-standard conditional [(X) if not (X)] the processes that lie behind a speakers choice when
selecting it do not determine a MetNeg but rather a FOI.
Regarding the existence of more negative operators not we express a reserved position.
At this point we can neither confirm nor disconfirm it. What we can clearly state is that the not
involved in the generation of DN is different from the not involved in the generation of MetNeg
in terms of the procedures conveyed and the cognitive effects generated: description of a
negative content and rejection of an assumption, on the one hand, and derivation of new
contextual implications and contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption, on the other.
The non-standard conditional [(X) if not (X)] provides further evidence that there is no
correlation between the grammatical form and the mental configuration. This NS may shed new
light on the debate about the existence of more negative operators. It appears that apart from the
20

action of rejection and the description of a negative content, the negator is involved in other
structures, generating different actions and different effects. If we compare the not found in the
correlative pair [if not] to the not found in the other correlative pairs, in the case of the nonstandard conditional not is less powerful. Although we took a reserved stance regarding the
existence of more negative operators, we cannot ignore the following questions: Can this be a
situation in which not has lost its procedural meaning (and its discursive autonomy)? And
implicitly: Are there more negative operators not used as homonyms? These are open questions
that are worth addressing in further research.
(c) We opted for the analysis of an authentic corpus of data for several reasons. Firstly,
we considered it appropriate to analyse the NSs as they are used in real communicative contexts
by native speakers. This aspect has two main consequences. On the one hand, we tried to avoid
the artificial, made up examples that could have led to a limited account of negation. On the
other hand, the fact the NSs are embedded in larger discursive sequences and were not analysed
as single instances revealed many interesting aspects. For instance, there are situations when the
NS overlaps with the utterance, but there are also situations in which the NS is just part of an
utterance together with other structures. In the latter case, the NS triggers a certain type of
cognitive effect which interacts with other cognitive effects generated by different structures and
the outcome of this interaction contributes to the derivation of the speakers meaning.
Secondly, we chose to discuss the NSs used in TV political debates based on the
conviction that this discursive genre plays an important role in the derivation of the NSs. Among
the features of the NSs pointed out by political discourse are the following: the existence of more
discursive entities, represented not only by the invited politicians but also indicated by the
constant allusions to political adversaries and opponents, a rich background shared by the
politicians, the hearer and the audience and more importantly, a background the speaker assumes
to be shared.
The last chapters point out the argumentative consequences of the phenomenon of
metarepresentation in political discourse. It has to be mentioned that, although the second part of
the thesis represents the normal follow-up of the first part, it is only a sketch, where we tried to
initiate a research direction. Metarepresentation is considered to play an important role in
unveiling the presence of multiple discursive entities, actual or potential. The plurality of
representation levels and the multitude of discursive entities are seen as the main features of
political discourse. In this respect, Chilton (2004) talks about the role of metarepresentation in
political discourse and discusses it in relation to truth, credibility and legitimisation. We consider
that credibility and legitimation are the results, the consequences, the perlocutionary effects of
the metarepresentational nature of the NSs. Thus, metarepresentation may cast new light on the
argumentative uses of NSs in dialogical contexts in terms of the propositional attitude and the
status of the rejected assumption.
In our approach we started from the premise that the mental configuration of a structure
is different from the discursive pattern of the same structure. In order to mark the difference
21

between the use and function of the NSs in chapter (10) we talked about mental acts in
comparison to speech acts. In chapter (11) we tried to indicate more SAs used by the speakers in
order to persuade the audience and to make them adhere to their opinions and beliefs. In (12) we
tried to suggest the manner in which the speakers configure their image in parliamentary debates
and TV political debates. Special attention was paid to the contribution of MetNeg [not (X) but
(X)] in shaping how the individual sees himself, on the one hand, and how the individual
perceives others see him, on the other hand.
We tried to indicate the contextual functions and roles of the NSs. We could identify two
major situations: NS as part of a SA and NSs overlapping with the SA, i.e. the NS is built, takes
action on the level of SAs. From this point of view, the delimitation between NSs and negative
utterances should be drawn. While NSs indicate the mental configuration determined by the
action of the negative operator not or of the correlative pairs on the material found in their scope,
a negative utterance consists in a NS or more structures which have different functions. In other
words, a negative utterance may achieve relevance as a clarification, explanation, definition etc.
Although the contribution of the discursive level of the NSs is highly contextual, we
could draw the following conclusions. SR [not (X)] in comparison to the other NSs has more
discursive autonomy and in consequence it can determine the value of the utterance. At the same
time, SR [not (X)] as well as MetNeg [not (X) but (X)] may overlap with an utterance, fulfilling
different functions. In contrast, MetNeg [(X) not just (X)] and cumulative structure with
negative form [not only (X) but also (X)] are mainly part of an utterance indicating how the
content can be interpreted.
Another aspect that drew our attention is represented by the fact that more functions can
be identified at the level of one negative utterance, aspect revealed by the derivation of the
higher level explicatures. A negative utterance by means of the mental configuration and the
contextual function communicates the speakers attitude and position towards a given content.
In sum, the mental configuration of the NSs and their argumentative uses contribute to
the derivation and interpretation of the speakers meaning. Metarepresentation may offer novel
insights into the argumentative uses of NSs in dialogical contexts in terms of the propositional
attitude, the speakers epistemic attitude towards the communicated assumptions and the status
of the rejected assumption.

22

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