Expropriation; damages for taking of property without payment of just

compensation. We stress, however, that the City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for
taking private respondents property without payment of just compensation. In Manila International
Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,the Court held that a government agencys prolonged occupation of
private property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner
to damages. City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treas, City Mayor vs. Hon. Loilita-Bersana,
et al., G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010.

Expropriation; no recovery of possession. We commiserate with the private respondent. The

school was constructed and has been in operation since 1985. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo
City have long reaped the benefits of the property. However, non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot. Concededly,
Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a
deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to withdraw or even
verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private respondent not only accepted the valuation made
by the petitioner, but also was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end.
As such, private respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to
just compensation. It is high time that private respondent be paid what was due him after almost 30
years. City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treas, City Mayor vs. Hon. Loilita-Bersana, et
al., G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010.

.R. No. 165273

March 10, 2010

LEAH PALMA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO, Respondents.

In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf,
without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed
two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had
already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of
time to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.24 When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to

secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise. 25

HongKong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, 483 Phil. 525 (2004); Orosa v.
Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 67 (1996).
24

G.R. No. L-21521

October 29, 1965

LU LUAN CO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, ET AL., respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
In the early part of 1960, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna an application for
naturalization (Case No. B-2), at the hearing of which the Office of the Solicitor General authorized
the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna to represent the government. After the hearing, the court,
presided by the Hon. Francisco Arca, on April 25, 1961, rendered judgment admitting petitioner to
Philippine citizenship but providing that it "shall not become executory until after two years from its
promulgation and after the Court on proper hearing with the attendance of the Solicitor General or
his representative, is satisfied, and so finds that during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of any government promulgated rules (4) or committed any act
prejudicial to the interests of the nation or contrary to any government-announced policy."
Notice of judgment was served on petitioner on April 27, l961, while the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Fiscal of Laguna received the corresponding notice on May 8, and 4, 1961, respectively.
No appeal was taken by the State.
On May 3, 1963, after Judge Arca had gone on leave, petitioner filed a motion to be allowed to take
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen. Copy thereof was furnished the Provincial Fiscal of
Laguna but not the Solicitor General. On May 8, 1963, the Clerk of Court notified the Provincial
Fiscal of Laguna and petitioner's counsel that the hearing on petitioner's motions would be held in
Branch IV at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, on May 11, 1963. Again, this notice was not served upon the
Solicitor General. After the hearing on petitioner's motion, Judge Arsenio Naawa, presiding as
vacation judge of the Bian Branch of the Court of First Instance, entered the following order:
From the evidence submitted by the petitioner this morning, it appears, inter alia, that since
the promulgation of the decision in this case sometime on April 27, 1961, he has not left the
Philippines; he dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession, that is, being, an employee

of the La Confianza and the Liberty Sawmill, earning P1,050.00 a month; he has not been
convicted of any offense or violated any government promulgated rules; he has not
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government
announced policies.
Wherefore, the petitioner Lu Luan Co is hereby allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen.
On the same date (May 11, 1963) Lu Luan Co took his oath of allegiance and on May 17 of the
same year, the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization was issued to him.
In a communication dated May 20, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna advised the Office of the
Solicitor General of the allowance of the petition for oath-taking and recommended that no appeal be
taken therefrom.
On June 3, 1963, the respondent Judge, then presiding over the Bian Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, entered an order on June 3, 1963, setting aside the abovementioned order of Judge Naawa, upon the following grounds: (1) that the Solicitor General
was not furnished a copy of the motion to take oath; (2) that the Solicitor General was not
notified of its scheduled hearing; (3) that petitioner and his counsel were too much in a hurry
to obtain petitioner's citizenship papers; and (4) that as far as the Solicitor General was
concerned, the two-year period had not yet expired when the motion for hearing and oathtaking was filed on May 3, 1963 said office having received copy of the decision on May 8,
1961. The respondent judge set the rehearing of the petition to take the oath for July 10, 1963.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned order having been denied, he filed
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside the order of
the court of June 3, 1963, and prohibit it from rehearing the petition for oath-taking.
The pertinent portions of the order complained of read as follows:
The foregoing chronology of events leaves an impression in the mind of the Court that the
petitioner and his counsel were too much in a hurry to obtain the petitioner's citizenship
papers even at the risk of circumventing the intent and purpose of the law which requires a
careful scrutiny of petitioner's actuations and behavior during the two-year period after the
decision was rendered. There is also the impression in the mind of the Court that the
petitioner and his counsel were reluctant to have the proprietary Judge of the Court to inquire
into his conduct and behavior during the past two years. Furthermore, the petitioner did not
like that the Office of the Solicitor General will appear at the hearing because his counsel did
not even furnish the Solicitor General's Office with a copy of his motion to set the case for
hearing. He furnished a copy of said motion to the Provincial Fiscal.
The notice of hearing was issued by the Clerk of Court only on May 8, 1963 and the hearing
was set for May 11, 1963, which was only three (3) days thereafter. What time has the
Government to inquire and verify whether the petitioner has really behaved properly during
the past two years in the manner required by law? The Assistant Provincial Fiscal who

attended the hearing on May 11, 1963 was not the one who attended the case when the
petition was originally heard. It is therefore, safe to infer that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
was not very familiar with the case and could not conduct his examination of the petitioner
with the same efficiency as one who had ample time to prepare the case and make the
necessary investigation of the conduct of the petitioner from competent official sources.
It should also be pointed out that the copy of the decision of this Court was sent by
registered mail to the Solicitor General on May 8, 1961. Therefore, as far as the Solicitor
General is concerned the two-year period has not yet expired when the petitioner filed his
motion for hearing and oath taking on May 3, 1963.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court is of the considered opinion that these
proceedings should be reopened and that the Solicitor General be given full and ample
opportunity to investigate and inquire into the Conduct and behavior of the petitioner during
the past two years after the decision in this case has been rendered.
The order of this Court authorizing the petitioner to take his oath as a Filipino citizen was
issued on May 11, 1963. The said order is not yet final and this Court has the inherent power
to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice (Sec. 5 [g], Rule 124, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders and sets aside the order dated May 11, 1963 allowing
petitioner Lu Luan Co to take his oath of allegiance as Filipino citizen. The Court sets aside
and cancels the 'Oath of Allegiance' of said petitioner on May 11, 1963 and the "Certificate of
Naturalization" issued by the Clerk of Court dated May 17, 1963.
The Court orders that the motion of the petitioner for hearing and oath taking dated May 3,
1963 be set for hearing on July 10, 1963, at 8:30 in the morning. The Solicitor General or his
duly authorized representative is ordered to cause the necessary verification and inquiry as
to whether or not petitioner has complied with the requirements of the law during the past
two years in a manner as will entitle said petitioner to take his oath of allegiance as prayed
for in his motion and inform the, Court of his findings on or before the date of the hearing.
The present being an action for certiorari and prohibition, the question to be determined is whether,
upon the undisputed facts of the case, the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order mentioned above.
That the subject matter thereof is one within the jurisdiction of His Honor's court is obvious. The only
remaining question, therefore, is whether or not His Honor committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order under consideration.
The authority mentioned heretofore given by the office of the Solicitor General to the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Laguna to represent the Government authorized the latter only to represent the
State at the hearing held on April 25, 1961. That it is so and was so construed by the lower court
itself is shown by the circumstance that notice of the judgment rendered was served not only on the
Provincial Fiscal of Laguna but also upon the office of the Solicitor General. Therefore, when

petitioner filed on May 3, 1963 his motion to be allowed to take, his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen, he should have served copy thereof to the office of the Solicitor General which he did not.
Similarly, when the Clerk of Court sent out the notice of hearing to be held on May 11, 1963 in
connection with said motion, he should have served said notice upon the office of the Solicitor
General which he did not.
Moreover, as the notice of judgment was received by the office of the Solicitor General on May 8,
1961, it is obvious that, as far as the Solicitor General was concerned. the two-year period had not
yet expired when petitioner filed his motion of May 3, 1963.
In view of the foregoing, it seems beyond question that the respondent judge did not commit any
abuse of discretion in issuing the order complained of.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby denied, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, JJ., are on leave.

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE

INC. and MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN,
Complainants,
vs.
JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO
Undersecretary for Communi- Promulgated:
cations, Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC), May 3, 2006
Respondents. G.R. No. 142362
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated 21 February 2000 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP
49422. The assailed Decision authorized the dismissal of a civil complaint against
respondent Josefina Trinidad-Lichauco (Lichauco), former Undersecretary for

Communications of the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC), on the premise that the complaint constituted a suit against the State.
A brief rundown of the relevant facts is in order.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized
corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael
C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers[2] which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space.
Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private
sector, and the satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium
(subsequently organized as PASI).[3] The consortium was to grant the Philippine
government one (1) transponder free of charge for the governments exclusive use
for non-commercial purpose, as well as the right of first refusal to another one (1)
transponder in the Philippine satellite, if available. [4] The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International
Telecommunication Union the required orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s)
for the Philippine satellite.

PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The government,

together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication
Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as 161 East Longitude and 153 East
Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC
Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government
confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots
to PASI for its satellites, which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites.
[5]
Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming the

Philippine Governments assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to

[PASI] for its [Agila] satellites.[6]
PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine
government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its
capital, negotiation with business partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5
Million to the French satellite manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then
DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly embarked on a crusade to
malign the name of [Michael de Guzman] and sabotage the business of
PASI. Lichaucos purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude

for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite the prior
assignment to PASI of the said slot. [7] It was later claimed by PASI
that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity
whose indentity was unknown to PASI.[8]
Aggrieved by Lichaucos actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted on 23 January
1998 a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the
DOTC, and the Unknown Awardee who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153
East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action, was for
injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages. The first cause of action,
for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude
should be enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot
to PASI. The second cause of action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred
that the award to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it was rendered
by Lichauco beyond her authority.[9]
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as
part of her alleged crusade to malign the name of plaintiff [D]e Guzman and
sabotage the business of [PASI]:

12. xxx
(a)
On 4 December 1996, in a meeting with the members of the
Board of Directors of plaintiff corporation, defendant Lichauco then uttered
disparaging and defamatory comments against plaintiff de Guzman. These
defamatory remarks triggered efforts from within the plaintiff corporation
aimed at ousting plaintiff de Guzman from his position.

(b)
Defendant Lichauco, then an undersecretary of DOTC, wrote
Mr. Jesli Lapuz on 5 December 1996 (barely two days after plaintiff de
Guzman wrote him) to deny that the DOTC has assigned the two (2)
Philippine orbital slots to plaintiff corporation. Defendant Lichauco falsely
asserted that only orbital slot 161 E was assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot
153 E was not.
In the same letter, defendant Lichauco branded as FALSE plaintiff de
Guzmans claim that Agila is a registered corporate name of plaintiff
corporation.
A copy of the letter is attached as Annex E.
(c)
Not contented, defendant Lichauco, again for reasons known only
to her, and with malice aforethought, made defamatory remarks against
plaintiffs
during
a
telecommunications
forum
held
in Makati City sometime in October 1997 in the presence of public officials
and business executives.
(d)
Defendant Lichauco did not spare plaintiff corporation from her
unprovoked defamation. Defendant Lichauco arrogantly said that she had
asked President Fidel V. Ramos to sue plaintiff Michael de Guzman. With
the same degree of arrogance she threatened plaintiff corporation not to use
the name Agila, otherwise she would fight plaintiff corporation and would
make sure that the name of Agila would never be given back to plaintiff
corporation.
(e)
To top it all, defendant Lichauco without basis and with evident
bad faith, said that plaintiff corporation will never pay its contractors.

(f)
In December 1997, defendant Lichauco delivered the coup de
grace. Again, acting unilaterally, without prior notice to plaintiff
corporation and in gross violation of DOTCsearlier assignment to plaintiff
corporation of orbital slot 153 E, defendant Lichauco offered said slot to
interested applicants. A copy of the notice of offer is attached as Annex F.
13.
Plaintiffs learned of defendant Lichaucos acts after orbital slot
153 E was offered for bidding. To plaintiff coprorations knowledge, the
orbital slot was eventually awarded to defendant Unknown Awardee.
x x x x[10]

The complaint alleged that since Lichaucos act of offering and awarding orbital
slot 153 East Longitude was patently illegal and violative of DOTCs prior
commitment to PASI,Lichauco should be enjoined from performing any acts and
entering into or executing any agreement or arrangement of whatever nature in
connection with the said orbital slot. The complaint also averred that the purported
award of the orbital slot to the Unknown Awardee was illegal, and thus should be
declared null and void. Finally, the complaint alleged a cause of action for damages
against Lichauco, cast in the following manner:
xxxx
21.

Defendant Lichauco attacked the good name and reputation of plaintiffs.

22.

She willfully caused damage to plaintiffs by orchestrating the abovedescribed acts which are contrary to law; morals and basic norms of good
faith.

23.

She interefered with and violated plaintiff corporations contract with

DOTC by offering and awarding orbital slot 153 E to defendant
Unknown Awardee.

24.

Because of defendant Lichaucos reprehensible acts, plaintiffs suffered

actual damages of at least P10 million each, for all of which
defendant Lichauco should be held liable to pay.

25.

By reason of defendant Lichaucos illegal and malicious acts, plaintiff

corporations business name and goodwill was tarnished, for which plaintiff
corporation should be indemnified by way of moral damages in the amount
of at least P10 million.

26.

For the same reasons, plaintiff de Guzman suffered and continue to suffer
extreme mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock
and besmirched reputation, for all of which plaintiff de Guzman should be
indemnified in the amount of at least P10 million.

27.

Defendant Lichauco should also be sanctioned, as a deterrent for public

good, to pay each plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of at least P5
million.

28.

In order to protect and enforce their rights, plaintiffs were compelled to

institute this suit, engage the services of counsel and incur litigation
expenses, for all of which plaintiffs should be indemnified in the amount of
at least P500 Thousand each.[11]
xxxx

In sum, petitioners sought the following reliefs for the three (3) causes of action:

xxxx
3.

After trial of the issues, render judgment as follows:

[a] On the first cause of action, making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction;
[b] On the second cause of action, declaring the offer and award of
orbital slot 153 E to defendant Unknown Awardee null and void.
[c] On the third cause of action, directing defendant Lichauco to
pay the following sums:

i. P10 million each to plaintiffs as actual damages;

ii. P10 million to plaintiff corporation as moral damages;

iii.
iv.
v.

P10 million to plaintiff de Guzman as moral damages;

P5 million each to plaintiffs as exemplary damages;
P500 Thousand each to plaintiffs as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
x x x x[12]

The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Mandaluyong City, and subsequently raffled to Branch 214. On 2 February
1998, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order against Lichauco, who
received the summons together with the complaint on 28 January
1998. Lichauco failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, but eight
(8) days after the lapse thereof, she filed a Manifestation and Motion asking for a
new five (5)-day period, or until 25 February 1998, to file a responsive pleading to
the complaint. However, she filed instead a Motion to Admit with attached Motion
to Dismiss on 27 February 1998. She rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the
complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a suit against the State which
may not be sued without its consent; that the complaint stated no cause of action;
and that the petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to
seek recourse with the Office of the President.
In an order[13] dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It
characterized the defense of state immunity as at very least a contentious issue

which can not be resolved by mere allegations in the pleadings but which can be
best threshed out in a litig[i]ous forum where parties are accorded enormous (sic)
opportunity to argue for the ascertainment of whether the act complained of are
indeed within the parameters and prerogatives of the authority exercising the same.
[14]
The RTC also noted that the allegations in the complaint regarding the ultimate
facts sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco, and that she was being
sued in her personal capacity. As to the argument pertaining to the non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that the principle is not an inflexible
rule, and may be dispensed with when its application would cause great and
irreparable damage or when it would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.[15]
Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently nullified the RTC order in the
Decision now assailed before us. The Court of Appeals sustained the contention
that the complaint is a suit against the State with the following ratiocination:

The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the state.
The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad
faith was done in the exercise of and in pursuance of an official duty. Her duties
are as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers and
Undersecretary shall:

Duties

of

the

Undersecretary. The

(1)
Advise and assist the Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of department objectives and policies;
(2)
Oversee all the operational activities of the department for
which he shall be responsible to the Secretary;
(3)
Coordinate the programs and projects of the department and
be responsible for its economical, efficient and effective
administration:
xxxxxxxxx

It is apparent from the above enumeration that the petitioner is directly under and
answerable to the DOTC Secretary. We can therefore conclude that her official
acts such as the said notice of offer was with the blessing and prior approval of
the DOTC Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the presumption that the same was
performed in good faith and in the regular performance of official duty.
Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. As a
rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive,
is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an
act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the
line of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within the
scope of official authority, it is not necessary that they be
prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or
requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done
by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to his control
or supervision, or that they have more or less connection with such
matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of the
department under whose authority the officer is acting. Under this
principle, state building commissioners who, in obedience to a
stature, discharge one who has been employed to construct a state
building, take possession of the work, and place it in the hands of
another contractor, are not liable to the former contractor in
damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of
their duty. An officer is not personally responsible for the
necessary and unavoidable destruction of goods stored in
buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by him in the
lawful performance of a public duty imposed on him by a valid and
constitutional statute.
xxxxxxxxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. Where an officer is
invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his
judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a
quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given
immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the
result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however, erroneous
judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done within
the scope of the officers authority, and without willfulness, malice,
or corruption. (43 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86).
In Sanders vs. Veridiano[[16]], the Supreme Court held:

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have

to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United Statesgovernment. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority,
it is that government and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and
it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners
in their personal capacities but by the United States government as
their principal. This will require that government, viz.: the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government
without its consent.

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot

prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer
but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state
immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to
foreign States sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not
been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not
shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith. This too is well-settled.[17]

Preliminarily, we discuss the procedural grounds cited by petitioners which they

assert are sufficient to have caused the dismissal of Lichaucos petition before the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners claim that contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Lichauco failed to attach all pleadings and documents
relevant to her petition, and that those that were attached were merely duplicate
original copies. Lichauco counters that for the viability of her petition for
certiorari, all that she needed to attach were her motion to dismiss, the RTC orders
acting on such motion, her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion

to dismiss, and petitioners opposition to said motion for reconsideration. She

claims that only these motions and submission were relevant to the resolution of
her petition.[18]
In her comment, Lichaucho claims that she did not have to attach the complaint to
the copy of the petition she sent to the petitioners herein, since the latter obviously
retained the original copy of the complaint they filed. [19] However, her petition
before the appellate court does not indicate that the same complaint was included
as an attachment, and indeed, there is a curious absence of any averment
on Lichuacos part that she indeed attached the said complaint to her petition.
[20]
Certainly, in a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of a motion to dismiss a
complaint, the very complaint itself is a document relevant and pertinent to the
special civil action. It should be remembered that unlike in an ordinary appeal that
is given due course,[21] the case record is not automatically elevated to the court
exercising jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari; hence there is an
even more impelling need to attach all pleadings and documents to the special civil
action, as mandated under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
After all, how could the court a quo properly ascertain whether or not the motion
to dismiss itself should have been granted if it did not have a copy of the complaint
sought to be dismissed itself.

Nonetheless, the requirement to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1,

Rule 65 is read in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, which states that the failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the documentary requirements, such as the
attachment of such relevant pleadings, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition. The procedural rule accords sufficient discretion to the court
hearing the special civil action whether or not to dismiss the petition outright for
failure to comply with said requirement. If the court does dismiss the petition on
that ground, the dismissal would be justifiable under Section 3, Rule 46, and
generally such action of the court cannot be assailed as constituting either grave

abuse of discretion or reversible error of law. If the court, on the other hand, takes
cognizance of the petition despite such lapses, the phrasing of Section 3, Rule 46
sufficiently justifies such adjudicative recourse. Indeed, the ultimate logic behind
rules of procedure being the promotion of the objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding,[22] the higher interests
of justice may at times sufficiently warrant the allowance of the petition for
certiorari despite such lapses, especially if they are nonetheless correctible through
subsequent submissions.
In any event, the Court is willing to overlook Lichaucos failure to attach the
complaint in her petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, an oversight
sadly ignored by the appellate court. There are weighty issues at hand relating to
the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the requisites of a motion to dismiss.
There is a connective issue between these two aspects in that if the State is
sued without its consent, the corresponding suit must be dismissed. At times, it
would be teasingly obvious, even from the moment of the filing of the complaint,
that the suit is one against the State. A cursory examination of the caption of the
complaint can sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as when the suit is directly
initiated against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or an
unincorporated government agency as the named respondents. In such cases,
obviously there is need for immediate caution, although if it is somehow
established that those respondents had given their consent to be sued, the suit may
nonetheless prosper.
The
present
action
was
denominated
against Lichauco and
the
unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the complaint as acting Secretary of
the [DOTC].[23] The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not

been formally impleaded.[24] However, government immunity from suit will not
shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to
protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because
it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her acts committed in
excess of her authority, ultra vires in nature, and tortious in character. The Court of
Appeals responded that such acts fell within Lichaucos official duties as DOTC
Undersecretary, thus enjoying the presumption that they were performed in good
faith and in the regular performance of official duty. This rationale is pure
sophistry and must be rejected outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of good faith or regular
performance of official duty, yet these presumptions are disputable [25] and may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[26] Many civil actions are oriented
towards overcoming any number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can
certainly be geared towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow a
party to present evidence overcome the disputable presumptions involved.
Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived
indisputability of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be relegated to a
mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing more.
Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save
perhaps for the provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a
jurisprudential rule, no public officer could ever be sued for acts executed beyond
their official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct or behavior, since such
acts would enjoy the presumption of good faith and in the regular performance of
official duty. Indeed, few civil actions of any nature would ever reach the trial
stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere determination from the complaint or
answer as to which legal presumptions are applicable. For example, the

presumption that a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable presumption on

the same level as that of the regular performance of official duty.[27] A civil
complaint for damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a
wrongful act or omission that would serve as basis for the award of damages. With
the rationale of the Court of Appeals, such complaint can be dismissed upon a
motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the presumption is that a person is
innocent of a wrong.
So obviously, the Decision of the Court of Appeals cannot receive
the imprimatur of this Court. Still, the question of whether Lichauco may validly
invoke state immunity from suit to secure the outright dismissal of petitioners
complaint warrants closer examination.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3) causes of action
against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to
orbital slot 153 East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to
nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude; and one for damages
against Lichauco herself. Evidently, the first two causes of action stem
from Lichaucos act of offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding, through
the Notice of Offer which was attached to the complaint.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she is being sued for issuing
the aforementioned Notice of Offer, which fell within her official functions as
DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She claims that it was
Secretary Lagdameo who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East Longitude
for bidding, and she thus acted well within the scope of her authority to advise and
assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department
objectives and policies.
The Notice of Offer cites Department Circular 97-01, signed by then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile, as authority for it. The Court has examined the

aforementioned Department Circular, issued on 17 October 1997, which

establishes the Guidelines on the Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency
Registration of Philippine Satellites. Therein, the DOTC is mandated to conduct a
bidding process in case there are competing applications for any one of the
assigned or applied-for-orbital slots[28]. Further, the Department Circular states that
the DOTC shall publish in three newspapers of general circulation a notice of offer
for the government assigned, initiated and applied for orbital slots.[29]
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned, Lichauco may
have a point when she asserts that they were based on acts which she performed in
her capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. But does this necessarily mean that these
two causes of action may thus be dismissed on the basis of state immunity of suit?
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official
functions by an officer of the government will result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit
against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where
the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and
jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution
itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.
On this point, our ruling in J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration[30] is material. Petitioners therein had filed a special civil action for
prohibition to nullifyRepublic Act No. 2616, or law that directed the expropriation
of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. Impleaded as respondents were the officials
and government agency tasked to undertake such expropriation. The respondents
alleged that the petition for prohibition was actually a suit against the State without
its consent. The Court, through then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique

Fernando, debunked the argument, ruling instead that the petition was within the
ambit of judicial review:
[T]he power of judicial review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear
implication from the relevant provisions of the Constitution. This power may be
exercised when the party adversely affected by either a legislative or executive
act, or a municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to test its
validity. The special civil action of prohibition has been relied upon precisely to
restrain the enforcement of what is alleged to be an unconstitutional statute. As it
is a fundamental postulate that the Constitution as the supreme law is binding on
all governmental agencies, failure to observe the limitations found therein
furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of nullity of the government
measure challenged. The argument then that the government is the adverse party
and that, therefore, must consent to its being sued certainly is far from persuasive.
x x x x[31]

The Court further noted that it was well-settled for the purpose of obtaining
a judicial declaration of nullity, it is enough if the respondents or defendants named
be the government officials who would give operation and effect to official action
allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality.[32]
Unlike in J.M. Tuason, the case at bar does not seek to nullify an
unconstitutional law or measure. However, the first two causes of action do
sufficiently impute grave abuse of discretion against Lichauco in her official
capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily
follows in such instances that it is the official concerned who should
be impleaded as defendant or respondent in the appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against Lichauco alone, and in her
personal capacity, yet it sought, as it now does, the nullification of the Notice of
Offer or the awards thereon, such remedy could not avail even if
granted. Lichauco, in her personal capacity, cannot be directed to set aside the
Notice of Offer, the award of the bid, or to issue a new award herself. It is only

because Lichauco was sued in her official capacity as the DOTC Undersecretary
that she, or her successors in office, could be judicially compelled to act in such
fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of
state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation.
These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against
the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these
two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner
additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would
have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitionerimpleaded the
DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the
suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance
obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Lichauco herself was already the acting head of the DOTC, owing to
the sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few days before. At that stage, any suit
seeking to nullify the Notice of Bid and the alleged award to the Unknown Bidder
should have properly denominated Lichauco as the respondent, and not the DOTC.

Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action, there was a viable ground to
dismiss the complaint: the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Indeed, such
ground was alleged by Lichauco in her Motion to Dismiss. Yet the principle of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies admits to several exceptions. In its
Order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, the RTC adequately dispensed
with the objection, applying the established exceptions to the rule of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. To wit:

Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies, it is fundamental that this principle is not an inflexible rule. It
yields to many accepted exceptions.(Rocamora vs. RTC Cebu, G.R. No.
65307). As in this case, this principle can be dispensed with when its application
would cause great and irreparable damage and when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.
When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out to other applicants, the
damage and injury plaintiffs stand to suffer was clear, present, and substantiated
that this Court was impelled to provide urgent needed measure such as the
issuance of writ of injunction against the public defendant. Indeed, under the
circumstances then obtaining it was impractical for the plaintiffs to first proceed
to the administrative official concerned before taking court action.[33]

A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action, anchored as

it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character or otherwise beyond the scope
of Lichaucosofficial duties. The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several
disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions
against them in her letter to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial to be
determined on the basis of the evidence. However, if proven, they would establish
liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded by the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals :[34]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without
its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed
to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted,
however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in
his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the

State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of

government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under
an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.[35]

The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it is established that
the public official concerned had committed illegal or tortious acts against the
plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to a motion to dismiss on the ground of state
immunity from suit, necessarily lodged before trial on the merits?
Our ruling in United States of America v. Reyes[36] warrants due
consideration. The Court therein, through then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled that a motion to dismiss averring immunity
from suit of a State and its functionaries was actually grounded on the specific
ground for dismissal of the lack of cause of action, for even assuming that the
defendants had committed the injurious acts complained of, no action may be
maintained thereon, because of the principle of state immunity.[37] Pertinently, the
Court noted that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by
the States immunity from suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be deemed a

concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts against
the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for damages.

Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of state immunity from suit
in regard to the third cause of action with the assertion that the acts complained of
constituting said cause of action fell within her official functions and were not
tortuous in character. Still, to establish such assertions of fact, a full-blown trial on
the merits would be necessary, as would the case be if Lichauco raised the defense
that she did not commit these acts complained of. Certainly, these defenses cannot
be accorded merit before trial, factual as they are in character.
All told, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying Lichaucos Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 21 February 2000 is SET ASIDE and the Order dated 14 August
1998 of theRegional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the merits with
deliberate dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39507 September 28, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FRANCISCO SIM TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES, FRANCISCO SIM, petitioner-appellee
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan by
the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the oppositor-appellant in this case, against petitioner-

appellee Francisco Sim. The dispositive portion of the assailed order, dated February 19, 1973, reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that it grants partly the Omnibus Motion and the
Motion for Reconsideration by declaring that the original motion to allow the petitioner to
take his oath of allegiance dated July 16, 1959, the notice of hearing and the hearing of
the same, the order approving the same and allowing the petitioner to take his oath, the
oath taken pursuant thereto and the Certificate of Naturalization issued on July 16, 1959
are all null and void. However, the Motion to take oath dated August 10, 1972, the notice
of hearing and notices of postponements thereof, the hearing had therein, and the order
dated November 16, 1972, granting the same, remain but with the added injunction that
the petitioner may take his Oath of Allegiance only after the lapse of the thirty (30) days
from the time that a copy of the Order is received by the Office of Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED. 1
The case before us emanated from the following facts:
Francisco Sim's application for naturalization was granted by the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, in Dagupan, onJanuary 30, 1957. On July 6, 1959, his motion to take the oath of allegiance
was granted and on July 16, 1959, he took his oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen. Consequently, the
corresponding Certificate Of Naturalization was issued to him.
On July 27, 1972, Francisco Sim prayed in an ex-parte motion before the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan to be allowed to take his oath anew. Francisco Sim wanted to abide with the decision of the
Supreme Court in a case of similar nature to his, and with a circular of the Solicitor General implementing
the said decision, holding that successful petitioners in naturalization cases should take the oath of
allegiance thirty (30) days after the order of the court allowing the taking of the oath of allegiance. Since
petitioner Francisco Sim had taken his oath on July 16, 1959, less than thirty (30) days after his motion to
take his oath was granted on July 6,1959, he petitioned that he be allowed to take his oath again.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in an omnibus motion dated August 22, 1972, opposed the
motion of Mr. Sim, averring that it was not furnished with a copy of the first motion to take the
oath, dated July 6, 1959, nor with a copy of the notice of hearing of the same, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 530, as amended. Moreover, it claimed that it was not served with a copy of the
order of the Court of First Instance permitting Mr. Sim to take his oath of allegiance. Thus the
Solicitor General's office prayed before the lower court:
a) to declare null and void all proceedings already taken, consonant to Republic
Act No. 530, as amended;
b) to issue an order dismissing the instant naturalization case; and
c) to deny the ex-parte petition of July 27, 1972.
The Court of First Instance, finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, set the same
for hearing on November 15, 1972. The petitioner, accompanied by counsel, appeared and testified at the
hearing. The City Fiscal also attended, appearing for the Government. 2

On November 27, 1972, the lower court granted the petitioner's motion, allowing him to take anew his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, in effect denying the Solicitor General's prayer to
declare null and void all proceedings with reference to Francisco Sim's application for naturalization.
Barely two weeks later, on December 8,1972, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order allowing the petitioner to take his oath anew. After considering the
arguments raised in the motion for reconsideration, the trial court modified its decision and promulgated a
new order, dated February 19, 1973, adverted to at the outset, which compelled the Office of the Solicitor
General to come to us.
The Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellant, assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE
PROCEEDINGS HELD ON NOVEMBER 15,1972, INCLUDING THE ORDER OF
NOVEMBER 27,1972.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING ALL PROCEEDINGS AS NULLITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PETITIONER TO TAKE OATH ANEW. 3
In sum, the Solicitor General's office pleads that all the proceedings with regard to the naturalization of
petitioner-appellee Francisco Sim since January 30, 1957 when he first submitted his application for
naturalization to the court, be declared null and void.
The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that it must be provided with notice and the
opportunity to determine if the applicant for naturalization has complied with the requisites, as provided for
in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, 4 as amended, is indeed meritorious.
The pertinent section states:
Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine
citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the
application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become
executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper
hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representatives, is satisfied,
and so finds, that during the intervening time the applicant (1) has not left the Philippines,
(2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.

The lower court is correct in ruling "that the original motion to allow the petitioner to take his oath of
allegiance dated July 16,1959, the notice of hearing and the hearing of the same, the order approving the
same and allowing the petitioner to take his oath, the oath taken pursuant thereto and the Certificate of
Naturalization issued on July 16,1959 are all null and void," 5 in view of the fact that the Office of the Solicitor
General had not been duly notified of the petition and the proceedings thereafter.

In its brief, the Office of the Solicitor General invokes the case of Lu Luan Co. vs. Hon. Hilario
Jarencio. 6 In that case, we declared null and void the applicant's petition to take the oath of allegiance, as well as
the oath taken and the Certificate of Naturalization, on the following grounds: (1) the petition of the petitioner to take
his oath of allegiance had been filed less than two years from receipt of the copy of the decision approving his
naturalization; (2) the Solicitor General's office had not been served with either a copy of the applicant's petition to
take his oath or a copy of the court's order setting the petition for hearing; (3) and that upon the approval of said
petition on the very day it was filed, the applicant was allowed to take his oath.

We affirm the decision of the court a quo, dated February 19, 1973, as challenged in this appeal. We find
that the Solicitor General's office had been duly notified of all proceedings leading to the issuance by the
trial court of this crucial order.
As can be seen from the records of the case, the Office of the Solicitor General was indeed served with a
copy of the July 27, 1972 petition to take another oath of allegiance. As stated by the lower court:
As page 3 of the records of this case shows that the office of the Solicitor General was in
fact served with a copy of the present petition on August 10, 1972, at 11:33 o'clock in the
morning and was likewise served with copies of the notice of hearing together with the
postponement which give the said office ample time to study and oppose the same, and
that said office in fact filed a timely opposition and the court heard the present petition
only on November 15, 1972-well over 3 months after it was filed, the Court thinks that the
office of the Solicitor General cannot say that the present petition and the proceedings
taken by this Court were not in accordance with law. 7
Thus, we find the allegations of the Office of the Solicitor General that "the ex parte petition, the apparent
rush to hear the same on November 15, 1972 and the short hearing so held, failed to afford the
government time to make confidential investigations of the petitioner" 8 are not supported by the records of
this case. The period from August 10, 1972 up to November 15, 1972 is sufficient to conduct inquiries into the life and
activities in the interim of petitioner.

The oppositor-appellant also argues that the proceedings held on November 15, 1972 (as shown by the
transcript of stenographic notes later furnished the Solicitor General) failed to indicate that the petitioner
had proved his case consonant to Rep. Act 530, as amended, with supporting documents, as devolved
upon him, such as proofs that:
a) he had not been convicted of any crime;
b) he had not violated any government rules;
c) he had not left the Philippines;
d) he had devoted himself to a lawful calling.

On the contrary, the records show that when the hearing came up on November 15,1972, the petitioner,
accompanied by his counsel, and in the presence of the City Fiscal of Dagupan who appeared for the
Government, testified:
... that on January 30, 1957, this Court allowed the petitioner to be naturalized Filipino
citizen (Exh. "A"-of the petition); that the Court likewise allowed said petitioner to take his
Oath of Allegiance as a Naturalized Filipino citizen (Exh. "A-1"-of the petition); that he
took his Oath before the Presiding Judge, Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, on July 16, 1959
(Exh. "A-2" of the petition); that he does not have any outstanding internal revenue
obligation due the government (Exhs. "B" and "B-1", of the petition); that he has been
religiously paying the Municipal License due the Government (Exh. "C" of the petition);
that he has never been charged nor convicted of any crime whatsoever nor is there any
pending case against him (Exhs. "D", "E", "F"-of the petition); that he has been exercising
all rights and privileges of a citizen of the Philippines since he took his oath of allegiance
on July 16, 1959; and finally, he stated that he never left the Philippines since he took his
said Oath of Allegiance in 1959. He also declared that he is not suffering from any of the
disqualifications mentioned in the law; and that since his last Oath, he has comported
himself as any good citizen is expected to do. 10
The aforecited portion of the records of the case clearly shows that petitioner-appellee strived to prove
that he has complied with the requirements of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, as amended. Thus, the
burden of proving otherwise shifted to the oppositor-appellant if he was dissatisfied with the evidence
adduced by the petitioner. Given sufficient time to make a confidential investigation of the applicant, it
should have then and there made its timely objections to the petitioner's application or dispute the
petitioner's evidence that he had complied with all the legal requirements for taking the required oath of
allegiance.
The lower court, finding that there was no defect in Francisco Sim's Motion to Take Oath anew, and
satisfied that he had complied with the requirements, granted the same.
We agree with the lower court's ruling that ample time was given to the oppositor-appellant to investigate
and that the Solicitor General had the opportunity on November 15, 1972 to contest the evidence
presented by herein petitioner-appellee.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the lower court, we AFFIRM the appealed
decision in toto.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES GERMAN
ANUNCIACION and ANA
FERMA ANUNCIACION and
GAVINO G. CONEJOS,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 152496

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and.
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA
and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
July 30, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision, [1] dated November 19,
2001, and the Resolution,[2] dated March 31, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65516. The CA decision affirmed the Orders dated February 19, 2001[3] and May 16,
2001[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 00-98813
which dismissed the complaint[5] for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452 of
petitioner spouses German Anunciacion and Ana Ferma Anunciacion and their co-petitioner,
Gavino G. Conejos.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 29, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452, docketed as Civil Case No. 0098813. The complaint averred that defendants (respondents) may be served with summons and
legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr., with office address at 2830 Juan Luna St.,
Tondo, Manila.[6] The summons, together with the copies of the complaint, were then served on
Atty. Pizarro. The record shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty. Pizarro wrote a
demand letter[7] on behalf of respondents and addressed to petitioner German Anunciacion,

among others, demanding that they vacate the land owned by his clients (respondents), who
needed the same for their own use. The said demand letter reads:
2830 Juan Luna St.
Tondo, Manila
August 19, 2000
Mr. German Anunciacion, Mesdames
Liwayway Nava, Evangeline Pineda,
and Ana Ferma
2982 Rizal Ave. Ext.
Sta. Cruz, Manila
Dear Sir and Mesdames:
I write in behalf of my clients, MS. PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and MR.
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, the registered owners of the parcel of land known as Lot
1-B (LRC) PSD-230517 located at 2982 Rizal Ave. Ext., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and duly
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 122452, which you are presently occupying.
I would like to inform you that your occupation and possession of the said land is
based on mere tolerance of the owners, and without any payment on your part of any
rental. Now, the owners need the subject property for their own use.
In view thereof, I hereby demand that you vacate the said land within a period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter. Otherwise, much to our regret, I shall be
constrained to institute the proper criminal and/or civil action against you.
Trusting that you will give this matter your most serious and preferential
attention.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, JR.

On October 27, 2000, respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Norby C. Caparas, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
action. Petitioners filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss[9] on November 6, 2000.
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to
Dismiss[10] dated November 13, 2000 was filed by respondents, alleging an additional ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. The petitioners filed, on November 27, 2000,

their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment to the Reply to the
Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.[11]
Thereafter, respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and
Manifestation dated November 27, 2000,[12] citing the following grounds:
1.)
2.)
3.)

That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.
That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

Petitioners then filed their Additional Comment on the Motion to Dismiss, Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Comment on the Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.[13]
In its order of February 19, 2001, the trial court sustained the respondents and dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as defendants. The trial
court ruled as follows:
However, the Court finds for the defendants on the Second Supplemental Motion.
In point is Section 3, Rule 3 of the same Rules, which reads
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. x x x x
In the case at bar Atty. Pizarro, Jr., has not been shown to be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, or any of the above for the action to be allowed to be defended
by a representative.
The fact that Atty. Pizarro, Jr., was the lawyer of the defendants in the demand
letters do not per se make him their representative for purposes of the present action. To
this effect, service on lawyer of defendant is an invalid service of summons. (Cordova v.
Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, 89 SCRA 59)
Going to the other raised issue, Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides
The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

The presentation of all objections then available as was done by the movants
subserves the omnibus motion rule and the concomitant policy against multiplicity of
suits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the
nullification of the RTC Orders dated February 19, 2001 and May 16, 2001, on the ground that
the said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On November 19, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition upon finding that there was no
waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the form of voluntary
appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA held that
although the grounds alleged in the two (2) earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss were lack of cause of action and failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing of the
said motions did not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on their persons as
defendants. The CA then concluded that there was no voluntary appearance on the part of
respondents/defendants despite the filing of the aforesaid motions. The CA also rejected
petitioners contention that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro, Jr. was deemed service
upon respondents/defendants, thus:
First of all, Atty. Rogelio Pizarro cannot be considered as counsel of record
wherein We could apply the jurisprudential rule that notice to counsel is notice to
client. Atty. Pizarro cannot be deemed counsel on record since Defendants were not the
ones (sic) who instituted the action, like plaintiffs who did the same thru counsel and
therefore, obviously the one who signed the pleadings is the counsel on record. Sadly, the
Motion to Dismiss filed by Private Respondents were signed not by Atty. Pizarro but by
someone else. How then could Petitioners claim that Atty. Pizarro represents Private
Respondents?
Secondly, the fact that Atty. Pizarro was the one who wrote and signed the
August 19, 2000 letter, on behalf of Private Respondents, demanding that Petitioners
vacate the premises of the formers land does not fall under the substituted service rule. To
be sure, Section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules, provide thus:
Sec. 7. Substituted Services If, for justifiable causes the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the

preceding section; service maybe reflected (a) by leaving copies of the

summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant (sic) office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
In the case at bench, service upon Atty. Pizarro did not fall under the aforequoted
rule and therefore cannot qualify as substituted service. Since the service made by
Petitioners was defective, the Public Respondent court never did acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of defendants and therefore correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
[14]

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision but it, too, was denied by the CA
in its Resolution of March 31, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition which raises the following assignment of errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE
FILING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO
DISMISS BY RESPONDENTS AMOUNTS TO VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE CONFERS
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ON THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENTS.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT
THE SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION ALLEGING THAT THE HONORABLE
TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OF THE PERSONS OF THE
DEFENDANTS IS ALREADY LATE FOR THE FIRST MOTIONS, NAMELY, THE
MOTION TO DISMISS AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REPLY TO THE COMMENT TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS, WHICH HAD BEEN
OPPOSSED, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, BY PETITIONERS, HAD ALREADY
CONFERRED JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ON THE
PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS.
3. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONSIDERED THAT THESE 3 MOTIONS OF
RESPONDENTS ARE BEING TREATED AS OMNIBUS MOTION AND ARE
COVERED BY SECTION 20 RULE 14 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
4. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DID NOT CONSIDER ATTY. ROGELIO PIZARRO, JR., AS THE AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE OF RESPONDENT TO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS AND

COMPLAINT.

In the Resolution dated July 14, 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In compliance, the respondents filed
their Memorandum on September 8, 2003,[15] while the petitioners filed their Memorandum on
September 24, 2003.[16]
We find merit in the petition.
While it is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the CA are binding and not to be
disturbed, they are subject to certain exceptions for very compelling reasons, such as when: (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court; (6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and (7) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[17] The Court finds here cogent
reason to take exception from the general rule.
Respondents, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss dated October 25, 2000, [18] with
only one ground, i.e., that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. Under this
ground, respondents raised the issues quoted hereunder:
I.

Defendants[19] anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of

Registration;

II.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has recognized the

authenticity of TCT No. 122452; and

III. Plaintiffs do NOT have the legal personality to quiet the title of the subject
property.

Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) states:

Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance The defendants voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Underscoring ours)

The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of
the respondents under the aforequoted provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be drawn
from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion
to Dismiss dated November 13, 2000 which alleged, as an additional ground for the dismissal of
petitioners complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to
raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the respondents.
It was only in respondents Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated November 27,
2000 that respondents for the first time raised the courts lack of jurisdiction over their person as
defendants on the ground that summons were allegedly not properly served upon them. The
filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the court of its
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the
trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. The
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC.
Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15,
Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules.
Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules provides:
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections

then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (emphasis
ours)

Rule 9, Section 1, in turn, states:

Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the claim. (emphasis ours)

Applying the foregoing rules, respondents failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction
over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause.They are already
deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court
plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could
take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental motions to
dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers
and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the
prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.
Although the CA correctly observed that Atty. Pizarro, as the lawyer of the respondents in
the demand letters, does not per se make him their representative for purposes of the present
action, a scrutiny of the record shows that the address of Atty. Pizarro and Atty. Norby Caparas,
Jr., (the counsel who eventually entered his appearance for respondents) is the same. This
circumstance leads us to believe that respondents belated reliance on the purported improper
service of summons is a mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid answering the
complaint.

At this point, we find it appropriate to cite Philippine American Life & General
Insurance Company v. Breva,[20] where this Court held that:
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to lack of jurisdiction over its person.
In denying the motion to dismiss, the CA correctly relied on the ruling in Lingner
& Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully
served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally
appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case
filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said
defendant

In the recent case of Teh vs. Court of Appeals, the petitioner therein also
filed a motion to dismiss before filing his answer as defendant in the trial court on
the ground of failure to serve the summons on him. In that case, the Court agreed
with the appellate court's ruling that there was no abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss the
complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias summons.
To be sure, a trial court should be cautious before dismissing complaints on the sole
ground of improper service of summons considering that it is well within its discretion to order
the issuance and service of alias summons on the correct person in the interest of substantial
justice.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition and affirming
the challenged orders of the RTC which dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who were the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CAs Decision dated November
19, 2001 and the Resolution dated March 31, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516affirming the
Orders dated February 19, 2001 and May 16, 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-98813
are reversed and set aside. Consequently, Civil Case No. 00-98813 is hereby ordered
REINSTATED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

[20]

G.R. No. 147937, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 217, 223.