Citizen Support For Trade Liberalization

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization
Author(s): Karl C. Kaltenthaler, Ronald D. Gelleny and Stephen J. Ceccoli

Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 829-851
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 829-851
Explaining Citizen Support for Trade

Liberalization
KARL C. KALTENTHALER
Rhodes College
RONALD D. GELLENY
Rhodes College
STEPHENJ. CECCOLI
Rhodes College
This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade
liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is
influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian
considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995-1997).
We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors-primarily education, but also gender and income-as the principal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization.
Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors

such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization,
we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than
the economic interest predictors.
Trade liberalization remains an important and controversial component of the

economic globalization process. The potential consequences of the liberalization of
international economic markets have generated a contentious political debate.
World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings continue to be met with large public
demonstrations and strikes, as protestors of trade liberalization have taken to the
streets in Seattle, Washington, DC, Prague, Quebec City, and Genoa.- Yet, many
governments seemingly remain convinced that trade liberalization--the increased
flow of international goods, services, and capital across countries-will yield pos-
Authors' note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association. The authors would like to thank Christopher J. Anderson, William Hixon, the editors of and
reviewers at ISQ, and the participants at the panel on which this was presented as a paper. The authors, of course,
are responsible for any errors.
1 Opposition to trade liberalization is also apparent in EU countries. For example, in the fall of 2002, French
workers conducted a series of strikes and protests against the continued opening of France's economic market to EU
competition.
? 2004 International Studies Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
830 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

itive and long-term economic growth. To this end, the World Bank has estimated
that "abolishing all trade barriers could increase global income by U.S.$2.8 trillion
and lift 320 million people out of poverty by 2015" (WTO, 2001:2).
Given this considerable debate, it is readily apparent that public opinion is a
critical factor in the trade liberalization process. It has been shown in the U.S. and
other advanced industrialized democracies that public opinion is, at the least, a
constraint, if not a determinant of foreign policy decisions (Page and Shapiro, 1983;
Brooks, 1990; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Sobel and Holsti, 2001). For instance, if international trade flows and other aspects of trade liberalization are perceived by the
public to impose significant economic and political costs, domestic governments will
be pressured to implement protectionist trade policies. However, while much has

been written about the effects of trade liberalization on economic growth (see Andrews, 1994; Garrett, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1995; World Bank, 1997; Dollar,
2001; WTO, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002) and the relationship between trade
liberalization and domestic government policies (see Crotty, Epstein, and Kelly,
1996; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996; Eichengreen, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Swank,
1998; Gelleny and McCoy, 2001; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko, 2001), relatively few
studies have directly examined the relationship between public opinion and aspects
of trade liberalization.2 This gap is particularly true in the case of cross-national
studies exploring public attitudes toward trade and other aspects of foreign policy
(see Holsti, 1996).
Early studies of public attitudes toward foreign policy issues argued that the
public did not have well-formed opinions on such matters. Specifically, the seminal
studies of Almond (1950) and Converse (1964) found that significant segments of
the American public failed to exhibit any coherent and structured preferences
regarding foreign policy matters. Other studies appeared to reinforce these find-
ings (see Erskine, 1963; Free and Cantril, 1968; Simon, 1974). However, more
recent research has revealed far more structured foreign policy attitudes than
allowed for by Almond and Converse (see Maggiotto and Wittkopf, 1981; Hurwitz
and Peffley, 1987; Shapiro and Page, 1988; Wittkopf, 1990; Eichengreen and Dalton, 1993; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1993; Chittick, Bingley, and Travis, 1995). Hurwitz
and Peffley (1987:1102), for example, find that citizens support specific policy
positions based on general foreign policy inclinations and that "foreign-policy
attitudes are more stable and organized" than previously assumed. Thus, foreign
policy preferences are coherent and not as easily manipulated as previously
thought (Page and Shapiro, 1983).

Trade liberalization has been identified as a leading element of increased economic integration throughout history (Cooper, 1968; Lindert and Williamson,
2001; Aninat, 2002). For example, between 1820 and 1913, often considered the
first global century, global trade jumped drastically owing to decreased transport
costs (Rodrik, 1997; Lindert and Williamson, 2001). Trade has continued to maintain a prominent role in the integration of the international economy (Gilpin,
2001). Furthermore, trade policy is extremely politically sensitive since it directly
affects job security and wages-issues that are dear to the hearts of all citizens.
Building on previous public opinion and political economy research, this paper
addresses the question "What factors influence public support regarding trade
liberalization?" To answer this question, we examine individual-level data from
respondents in six advanced industrialized countries--Australia, Germany, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. We think it is important to study
attitudes about trade liberalization in industrialized countries because the trade
liberalization process is much more advanced in these countries compared to oth

parts of the world. Moreover, public opinion is playing an increasingly prominen
2 Important exceptions include O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2002).
KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 831
role in trade policy circles. For example, it is commonly recognized that the Single
European Act and the Treaty on European Union have relaunched the European
Union's economic integration process through the opening of Europe's internal
trade and capital markets. These treaties required public ratification before their
implementation, thereby obliging European elites to convince their domestic constituents of the benefits of trade liberalization. In short, it is impossible to ignore the
fact that public opinion has become a primary constraint on the European integration process (Eichengreen and Dalton, 1993). By examining the role of public
support for trade liberalization, we are analyzing an essential, but poorly understood, component of the economic globalization process.
In this paper, we seek to fill several gaps in the literature. We argue that public
support for trade liberalization is influenced by both politically driven views as well
as individual economic utilitarian considerations. Thus, we seek to provide a fuller

picture of how public opinion is shaped regarding trade liberalization policies. We
begin our study by discussing the general outlines of the domestic politics of trade
liberalization. Next, we develop a model of public support for trade liberalization.
We analyze individual-level data derived from The World Values Surveys on six industrialized countries using a series of logistic regression models. We first estimate a
pooled model to provide baseline parameter estimates and then estimate the model
for each of the six countries. Lastly, we end the paper with a discussion of the results
and suggest further paths of research.
Differing Views of Trade Liberalization

Trade liberalization has become a popular phrase to describe many different aspects of the international economy. For the purposes of this paper, we define trade
liberalization as the increased flow or liberalization of goods, services, and capital
across countries (Tonelson, 1997; IMF, 2000; Dollar, 2001; Aninat, 2002). Proponents of trade liberalization argue that the integration of the world's economic
markets encourages economic growth and efficiency. Opening domestic markets to
trade and capital flows establishes powerful and direct ties between national economies and the international system (Andrews, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995). For
one, increased capital flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) provides host countries with additional jobs. Furthermore, portfolio investment and the expansion of other capital instruments provide
an infusion of capital which local firms can access (Hausler, 2002).4 More importantly, the liberalization of capital restrictions allows money to flow to the most
productive investments, thereby enhancing economic growth and efficiency (Eichengreen, 1997; IMF, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). To maintain levels of capital
investment (i.e., limit capital flight), governments must be willing to implement
policies conducive to capital investment. These policies often include limiting domestic budget expenditures and providing lower taxes for business firms.
Trade liberalization also enhances economic competitiveness. In order to maintain high income and employment levels, domestic firms must be capable of competing efficiently against international competitors. Hence, governments must be
willing to establish a business environment that helps the competitive position of
domestic firms. Such policies may again include lower corporate taxes and the
restructuring of employment regulations (Owens and Whitehouse, 1996; Owens,
1999).
3 Domestic competition from MNCs also encourages local firms to become more competitive to protect their
market share.
4 FDI consists of building plants or acquiring a controlling interest (more than 10% of outstanding stock) in an
overseas company. Portfolio investment is the purchase of stocks and bonds of less than 10% of the outstanding stock
in foreign firms (Walther, 1997).

The end result is that trade liberalization encourages governments to limit their
involvement in the economy. Markets, not politicians, government agencies, nor
government bureaucrats, drive economic decisions. Consequently, economic decisions are more efficient and optimal economic results are achieved. This logic is
reflected by Mexican President Vicente Fox, who stated that we "are convinced that
trade liberalization is good and it's good when you do your homework ... keep
your fundamentals in line on the economy, build up high levels of education,
respect the rule of law.... When you do your part, we are convinced that you get
the benefit" (Dollar and Kraay, 2002:130). Keeping economic fundamentals in line
generally implies maintaining low levels of government spending, decreasing corporate tax rates, loosening regulation standards that apply to businesses, and respecting the rule of law (see Crotty et al., 1996; Swank, 1998).
Opponents of trade liberalization fail to see the above process as a positive occurrence in the international system. Instead, opponents steadfastly contend that
the competitive environment created by trade liberalization encourages a "race to
the bottom" regarding domestic social policies (Crotty et al., 1996). The trade
liberalization process is seen as forcing governments to make economic concessions

that benefit the capitalist elites, including multinational corporations and international investment firms (Economist, 9/25/2000; Bhagwati, 2002). For instance, while
MNCs are increasingly excused from paying taxes, the ensuing tax burden is
shifted to the less wealthy. Moreover, the loss of tax revenue from capitalist elites
strains the ability of governments to maintain the social safety nets that many cit-
izens have grown accustomed to having (Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).

The issue of income inequality is also of considerable concern to many since there
is a perception that income inequality is highly correlated with increasing trade
liberalization. For example, although many new jobs were created in the United
States during the decade of the 1990s, many families saw the gap between themselves and the wealthy continue to rise (Bergsten, 1999; Cline, 1999; Galbraith,
2002). There has been significant concern in the U.S. that trade liberalization has
come at the expense of American jobs (Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2002). Unemployment
rates in many European countries have remained high. Studies have shown that
once European workers lose their jobs they have found it very difficult to find new
employment opportunities." Trade liberalization exposes already anxious workers

to greater economic competition from newly industrialized countries (NICs), thus
heightening worker fear regarding income stability (Iverson and Wren, 1998;
Bergsten, 1999; Mazur, 2000).
Thus, ultimately, trade liberalization is seen to exacerbate economic inequality
(both within and between countries), threaten the domestic welfare state, pose a risk
to the health of the world's environment, and enable unchecked capitalism to extend its reach throughout the world.
Below, we briefly describe the various factors that we expect to influence the
relationship between public opinion and trade liberalization. These individual-level
factors are grouped into two distinct categories: political attitudes and economic
utilitarian considerations.
Political Attitudes
Individual-level political attitudes are likely to be critical in the formation of public
support for trade liberalization. Considering the general Right and Left attitudes
toward economic liberalization, with the Right in more general support of neoliberal economic policies at the domestic level than those on the Left, some think that
5 Between the early 1970s and early 1990s, the EU member states were unable to produce a net increase in
private sector jobs (see OECD, 1994).
people who place themselves on the ideological Right would want more liberalized
international trade (Dalton, 2001).
We have strong suspicions that the traditional Left-Right ideological continuum,
by itself, is a relatively imprecise measure of an individual's ideological predisposition toward trade liberalization (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990). For instance, a person's declaration that s/he is on the political Left or
Right may be a statement about how s/he thinks about culture, religion, or the role
of the state in the economy. Alternatively, it is increasingly common to think about
the Right-Left spectrum as a two-dimensional space, with one dimension con-
cerned with materialist/economic issues and the other related to concerns about
individual freedom and self-expression (Kitschelt, 1995). Just asking a person if s/

he is on the Right or Left does not tell if s/he thinks of herself on the materialist
Right/Left or cultural Right/Left.
We agree that those who think of themselves as on the economic/materialist Right
would be more supportive of trade liberalization than those who place themselves
on the economic/materialist Left. The best way to determine where the individuals
are on the economic/materialist Left-Right dimension is to ascertain how they think
about the state's role in the distribution of income in the economy. There is a
general consensus among scholars of public attitudes toward the economy that
those who think of themselves on the materialist Left believe the government should
take responsibility for creating a relatively equal distribution of incomes, whereas

those on the materialist Right believe the market should be the primary determinant
of the distribution of incomes. Thus one's attitudes toward the state's role in income
distribution will identify where one sits on the materialist Right-Left spectrum. We
also argue that it will predict how one thinks about trade liberalization.
A common grievance attributed to trade liberalization is that the process intensifies the gap between the rich and the poor (Cline, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2002;
Galbraith, 2002; Jesuit and Smeeding, 2002). As mentioned above, MNCs and
international investment firms are seen by antitrade liberalization activist forces to
be at the center of a system designed to exploit people abroad and labor locally
(Bhagwati, 2002). MNCs, for example, are able to use the threat of exiting to a
more "business friendly" environment to negotiate and extract favorable tax, labor
and environmental standards from host governments. Furthermore, high profile
cases of executives receiving large sums of money (often paying little corporate
taxes) while their respective companies go bankrupt and workers discover that their
pensions are valueless reinforces the insecurity of citizens.6 Consequently, trade

liberalization can heighten the uneasiness of citizens regarding the equitable nature
of the process. Past political experience has shown that the issue of income equality
can fuel fierce political conflict within societies (Verba and Kelman, 1987).
This common view of trade liberalization means that those who are upset by
rising income inequality will have a less supportive attitude toward trade liberalization than those who are not very concerned about the issue of income inequality.
Therefore, we hypothesize that those who want governments to make incomes
more equal will be less supportive of trade liberalization than those who do not
want governments to engage in such actions.
Second, another dimension of political attitudes that may affect how people think
about trade liberalization is an individual's level of cognitive mobilization. Ingelhart

(1970) and Inglehart and Rabier (1978), writing in reference to public support for
European integration, have argued that the more people think of themselves as
citizens of the world as opposed to their nation or locality, the more likely one is to
accept the international integration process. Their cognitive mobilization hypothesis "argues that the rising educational levels of recent decades, coupled with the
6 Recent highly publicized cases include Enron and IBM's raiding of their labor forces pension funds.

growing availability of information about things happening in distant places, is
conducive to an increasingly cosmopolitan outlook on the part of Western publics"
(1978:86).
Inglehart and Rabier reason that one's level of cosmopolitanism is a function of
one's level of education and degree of political sophistication. The more educated
an individual is and the more informed that person is about politics, the more likely
that person is to view the world from a cosmopolitan (as opposed to parochial)
viewpoint. It is argued that those who are uneducated and parochial cannot grasp
the world beyond their locality because they do not know about it or understand it.
This process of becoming more cosmopolitan is a result of the "cognitive mobi-
lization" individuals go through as they are educated (Inglehart and Rabier,
1978:86). They posited that the greater the individual's exposure to the cognitive
mobilization process, the more supportive that person would be of the European
integration process. This cognitive mobilization argument views one's cosmopolitan
orientation as an intervening variable between the cognitive mobilization process
and one's position on European integration. In other words, as one becomes more
cognitively mobilized, one becomes more cosmopolitan oriented and thus more
supportive of the integration process.
The same conclusions could be drawn about individual attitudes toward inter-
national trade. Specifically, a cognitive mobilization hypothesis would posit that th

more educated and informed one is about politics, the more likely one is to accep
trade liberalization. Those who have a higher degree of cognitive mobilization wi
not feel threatened by trade but will view it as an opportunity to try new products
and interact with the broader world. As the parochial will not have an abiding
interest in goods from other countries, they will not see trade as bringing them
benefits. Increased trade could be viewed as threatening, in that it brings in good
that may challenge the local customs and norms.
Whereas Inglehart and Rabier view one's level of cognitive mobilization as a
predictor of support for integration, it is also possible to utilize a person's self
identified attachment to a geographic entity (such as a city, a province, or a country)
as an additional predictor of support for trade liberalization. Thus, we hypothesiz
that the more parochial a person is (i.e., the more local their sense of political
attachment) the less likely that person is to support trade liberalization.
In summary, we seek to test the effects of three factors related to responden
political attitudes -attitudes toward income distribution, cognitive mobilization
and geographic orientation. We argue that these factors should help explain individual attitudes regarding trade liberalization. In contrast to the political arguments, the following section outlines several economic interest arguments.
Economic Interest Factors
Aside from one's political ideology, a person's perceived economic interests may
determine how s/he evaluates the trade liberalization process. There are several
aspects of one's place in society that could condition the level of support one accords to the opening of the economy to imports. Many scholars have argued that
individuals make rational decisions about what they themselves expect to gain in
material terms from government decisions (Downs, 1957; Kiewiet, 1983; Page and
Shapiro, 1992). In terms of individual economic interests, we explore the role of
education, income, perceived social class, union membership, gender, and age as
factors that could potentially affect how individuals evaluate their support for trade
liberalization.
Scholars have argued that those individuals with higher levels of human capital
(i.e., skill levels) will be more supportive of economic liberalization than those with
lower levels. That is, the liberalization of the international economy provides opportunities for efficient enterprises to invest in the generation of new technologies
and skilled workers to exploit significant opportunities of research successes in a

vast world market (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Gilpin, 2001). Hence, economic
liberalization stands to benefit those with the skills to compete efficiently in the
international market place. Those with higher skill levels have an upper hand in
market competition and should welcome enhanced market forces and reduced
barriers to competition. As such, individuals with higher levels of human capital,
such as education, will be more supportive of economic integration than those with
lower levels of human capital because the liberalization of markets stands to benefit
those with the skills to outperform and thus profit from those with lower skill levels
(Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Scheve and
Slaughter, 200 la, b). Thus we hypothesize that the higher one's level of education,
the more one should support trade liberalization.
One's level of income could also affect how one thinks about trade liberalization.
This logic has been demonstrated in similar empirical contexts. For example, Gabel
(1998) has argued that the higher one's income is the more supportive one is of
European integration. His logic is that higher income individuals stand to gain
more from the liberalization of trade than those with lower incomes. Specifically,
those with higher incomes have the resources to buy imports made available by
liberalized trade, whereas those with relatively lower incomes do not. Also, higher
income individuals have the resources to invest in the trade process and expect to
make increasing gains, whereas those with lower incomes will not have such an
opportunity. The poor will not perceive that they will make profits from trade
liberalization nor will they relish the thought of having more access to imports.
We would agree with Gabel that those with higher incomes will be more supportive of trade liberalization than those with lower incomes, but we would base our
argument on a slightly different logic. We posit that lower income individuals do

not think about their inability to buy imports and thus support trade liberalization
less than those with higher incomes, but rather lower income individuals think
about their inability to prosper in an enhanced competitive environment. Lower
income individuals would likely think that they have not done well in the present
level of market competition, thus they stand to be made even worse off with more
competition. Those with higher incomes, on the other hand, would probably look
optimistically at trade liberalization as a way to maximize their wealth potential.
This means we would expect that the higher one's relative income, the more supportive one would be of trade liberalization.
An individual's perceived social class may be another economic utilitarian factor
affecting her attitude toward trade liberalization. The logic behind this assertion is
very similar to that of the income hypothesis. Those who think of themselves as in the
upper classes will think that more openness in trade will mean greater opportunity as
consumers and as investors. Those who think of themselves in lower social strata will
not perceive potential personal benefits from liberalized trade. In fact, they may very
well think that more market competition will make the rich, upper classes richer and
the working classes poorer. This leads to the hypothesis that the higher one's perceived social class status, the more supportive one will be of trade liberalization.
Fourth, the reaction of organized labor to the trade liberalization process should
also be a key factor regarding public support for trade liberalization. Survival in the
global economy requires firms to be cost efficient in the international market rather
than simply competitive in the domestic market (Gilpin, 2001). This may require
local firms to be given additional flexibility to hire or fire workers. Domestic laws
that lower worker safety standards in order to enhance the economic competitiveness of domestic firms may also be implemented. Furthermore, the lowering of
corporate taxes and the requirement of governments to maintain "good economic
fundamentals" may necessitate the dismantlement or restructuring of the welfare
system, thereby threatening the unspoken agreement between labor and capital
that forged the postwar economy (Eichengreen, 1997).

A growing backlash to trade liberalization by labor organizations has become
increasingly apparent. Unions and their allies have been largely successful in
deadlocking U.S. trade policy in recent years (Bergsten, 1999; Dollar, 2001). Trade
liberalization clearly has an impact on many issues that are of significant concern to
unions. Labor unions adversely affected by trade liberalization have the ability to
vigorously lobby politicians and the public to hold the line on issues such as job
losses, wages, labor standards, and welfare provisions (Moon, 1996; Cline, 1997;
Mazur, 2000). Additionally, unions in France and South Korea have struck over the
introduction of policies designed to undermine the welfare system and making it
easier to fire workers (Rodrik, 1997). Furthermore, labor organizations are starting
to better coordinate activities on an international scale and have established them-
selves in the forefront in challenging the expansion of trade liberalization (ILO,

1997; Mazur, 2000). As a consequence, we hypothesize that union members should
be less supportive of trade liberalization than non-union workers.
Gender is another individual-level attribute that may affect one's cost-benefit
calculus concerning trade liberalization. Public opinion studies have shown that
women think about the negative consequences of market operations differently
than do men. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) use longitudinal analysis to demonstrate
that women are more supportive than men of the government protecting those
who lose out from market competition. Women are particularly supportive of job
and income guarantees and wealth equalization.
It has also been argued that women are generally the losers of the economic
liberalization process (Finifter and Minkiewicz, 1992; Graham and Pettinato, 2000;
Tickner, 2001). In fact, Ramachandra Reddy, a State President in India, told the
Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee of the UN's General Assembly that
the "situation of the world's women is progressively deteriorating due to trade
liberalization" (Sandrasagra, 2000). Critics of trade liberalization argue that

women are let go more readily than men in times of economic downturn. In
particular, women are often disproportionately employed in low-skill and low-paying jobs in comparison to men who possess a greater percentage of professional
and management-level jobs (Ozler, 2000). In addition, those women displaced
from their jobs when domestic firms fail due to international economic compe-
tition are not guaranteed to find a replacement job quickly nor a job that
paid as much as the previous place of employment (Cardero, 2000). Consequently,
women bear the negative costs imposed by trade liberalization. Thus, women
would, generally, not be as welcoming of increased economic competition as
men and would want the state to protect them from the market. Therefore,
we would hypothesize that women would be less supportive of trade liberalization
than men.
The final individual-level characteristic that could affect support for trade liberalization we wish to examine is age. As with the gender variable, age is about one's
sense of vulnerability in the economy. Studies have shown that older individuals
tend to be less supportive of economic liberalization processes because they fear
that they will not be able to recover economically from being dismissed from their
employment (Lipset and Schneider, 1983; Duch, 1993). Indeed, older persons have
found themselves to be among those unemployed for more than one year (Kronauer, 1993; OECD, 1994). Thus, older individuals will think that they will have a
harder time getting rehired and that they will have less time to recoup economic
losses than younger persons. Because trade liberalization is exposing workers in
general to more competition, it would make the most vulnerable to dismissal very
wary. This logic would lead us to hypothesize that the older one is, the less supportive one will be of trade liberalization.
This section has outlined six economic interest factors that should influence how
citizens feel about trade liberalization. The following section describes the measures
used to test the hypotheses described above.
Research Design
To determine the factors that influence public support for trade liberalization, this
study uses a cross-sectional survey data set derived from World Values Surveys (19951997). Individual-level data are examined for respondents in six advanced industrialized countries: Australia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, and
Western Germany.7 These countries are the only advanced industrialized countries
with complete data for the 1995-1997 wave of the WVS (with respect to the variables included in this analysis).8 In addition to conducting an aggregate analysis of
the six countries, the availability of individual-level respondent data provides an
opportunity for a more in-depth analysis. As a result, we also seek to test our
explanations of support for trade liberalization within each of the six countries as
well.
Measuring Support for Trade Liberalization
To gauge public support for trade liberalization, we turned to a question in the

World Values Surveys (1995-1997) that asks individuals what they think about freeing
(or restricting) trade.9 Specifically, the question asked "Do you think it is better if:
(1) Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to
buy them; OR that: (2) There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here,
to protect the jobs of people in this country."10
Table 1 provides a first glance at individual respondent attitudes toward trade
liberalization both at the aggregate level (among the six nations) as well as within
each of the six countries. In the aggregate, slightly more than one-third (35.2%) of
individual respondents indicated a relatively supportive preference toward trade
liberalization. This response indicates a rather underwhelming sense of support for
trade liberalization, perhaps due to a number of factors including economic uncertainty brought about by the liberalization of product markets or even economic
nationalist sentiments in response to international trade outcomes.
Alternatively, there is considerable variation at the national level. Specifically,
support for trade liberalization was highest in Germany with 57.1% of respondents
in support of trade liberalization. Norway and Switzerland follow Germany in terms
of support levels with 47.9% and 42%, respectively. On the other hand, support for
trade liberalization was lowest among the six states in Australia (23.7%), the United
States (27%), and Spain (28.3%). This pattern of aggregate support seems to be
linked to the extent to which the economy is linked to trade. Germany, Norway and
Switzerland, the countries with the highest levels of support for trade liberalization,
have the highest relative proportion of their gross economic product devoted to
exports; 23%, 38%, and 36%, respectively."I The rest of the countries in the study
have, on the average, lower exposures to trade, such as Australia with 20%,
Spain with 24%, and the U.S. with 11% of its economy related to exporting, and
consequently lower relative levels of support for trade liberalization. This crossnational variation provides the impetus to study the determinants of support for
trade liberalization both at the aggregate level and national level across the six
countries.
7 We excluded eastern Germany because it was treated as a different country in the World Values Surv
would consider it a post-Communist transition economy, rather than a typical advanced industrialize
8 For example, the question we have operationalized as the dependent variable was not asked to res
the United Kingdom.
9 Appendix A provides a table of the questions we utilized from the World Values Surveys (1995-19
'oTo make interpretation of the results easier, we recoded the dependent variable as follows: "Do yo
better if: 1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy the
There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this cou
"The trade exposure data are for the year 1995 (World Bank, 1997).

TABLE 1. Support for Trade Liberalization in Six Industrialized Countries
Support (%) Oppose (%) n

Australia
23.7
76.3
1978
Norway
47.9
52.1
1103
W. Germany 57.1 42.9 967
Spain
28.3
71.7
1115
Switzerland
United
Total
42.0
States
27.0
35.2
58.0
73.0
64.8
1051
1464
7678
Support
=
refers
to
buy them."
Oppose = refers to response of "There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of
people in this country."
res
Factors Influencing Support for Trade Liberalization
We argued that public support (or lack of support) for trade liberalization can be
explained by both respondent political attitudes and economic interest considerations. To measure individual concern regarding economic inequality issues, respondents placed themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (complete agreement that
incomes should be made more equal) to 10 (complete agreement that we need
larger income differences as incentives for individual effort). Based on the arguments outlined in the previous section, we expect individuals that favor greater
income equalization efforts will be less supportive of the trade liberalization process.
In order to measure an individual's degree of cognitive mobilization, we considered interacting one's level of education with one's interest in politics (as per
Inglehart and Rabier). Since interest in politics is measured by the frequency of the
respondent's discussion of politics with friends, we hypothesize that those with

higher levels of education and higher interest in politics will be more supportive of
trade liberalization than all others. However, since the correlation between education and interest in politics is high (.73), we simply used the frequency of discussing politics as a proxy for cognitive mobilization and eschewed the interaction
of the two variables. That is, we feel that those who discuss politics frequently are
more likely to be supportive of trade liberalization than those who do not.
The alternative measure of cosmopolitanism that we employed was a self-identification of one's geographic attachment. Respondents were asked to identify the
geographic group s/he believed s/he belonged to first ranging from locality or town,
state or region, the country, the continent, or the world. We expect that the broader
the region the individual identifies with, the more supportive that person will be of
trade liberalization.
Alternatively, we contended that a number of economic utility factors influence

public support for trade liberalization. That is, individuals endowed with higher
levels of human capital, such as education, will reap the benefits provided by an
integrated international market and support the maintenance of such a system.
Individuals were asked to identify the highest educational level that they have
attained and we hypothesize that there should be a positive association between
education and support for trade liberalization. We also include the amount of individual income and perceived social class in our model. To tap the role of income,
respondents identified their income on a scale ranging from 1 (income falling into
the lowest wage bracket) to 10 (the highest wage bracket). We expect that high
levels of income should be positively related to support for trade liberalization.
Respondents were also asked to identify their economic class ranging from 1 (lower
class) to 5 (upper class). We argue that the lower the class individuals identify with,
the less support that they have for the trade liberalization process.
To measure the impact of union membership on support for trade liberalization,

respondents indicated whether they were active, inactive or non-union members.
Individuals that are active union members should be less willing to embrace
the trade liberalization movement. To measure the impact of gender (1 = male,

0 = female) and age we simply used questions asking respondents to identify their
gender and age. We hypothesized that females should be less supportive of trade
liberalization and age should be negatively associated with support of the liberalization. Finally, a series of individual country dummy variables are estimated to
capture any country-specific effects.
Model and Results
We use a series of logistic regression models to test the hypotheses develop

above. Specifically, we use maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate seven
arate logistic regression models using attitudes toward trade liberalization as
dependent variable. First, a single, pooled model encompassing the entire d
is estimated to give a general orientation of how the explanatory varia
affect support for trade liberalization across the six industrialized countries in
ed in this sample. Second, we then reestimate the same model (minus the cou
dummy variables) separately for each of the six countries. Although the cou
specific models are estimated to allow us to determine whether or not any countr
specific effects are present among individual attitudes concerning trade liber
tion, it is not our intention (and beyond the scope of this paper) to create deducti
country-specific hypotheses about the effects of the explanatory variables. T
presents the results of the pooled model. Appendix B presents the descript
statistics of the independent variables and Appendix C provides the correla
between the various independent variables.
Pooled Model Results
The results of the pooled model are generally consistent with our intuitions. First,
the goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the model performs fairly well, as 70% of
the cases were predicted correctly and the model represents an 8.5% improvement
over the modal prediction. The results showed that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are in the predicted direction and standard tests of statistical sig-
nificance are used to provide an initial interpretation of the results.1'2 Since
significance tests offer relatively little information about the substantive meaning of
the coefficients (Pampel, 2000), we also report first differences.13

We test three variables related to one's political attitudes: income distribution,
geographic orientation, and cognitive mobilization. First, the results of the pooled
model provide support for each of these three factors. The measure for income
distribution is positive and barely reaches a minimal level of statistical significance.
Second, the results support our arguments about geographic orientation in that
those who view themselves in more local and/or parochial terms have a lower
propensity to favor trade liberalization. Third, higher levels of cognitive mobili'2To determine if there was any systematic bias in the distribution of missing cases, we also ran the models with
median values in place of the missing cases. We found that the latter did not yield any significant differences in
results.
'3The logit model produces maximum likelihood coefficients. Since the beta coefficients in the logit analysis
cannot be interpreted directly, the first differences of the independent variables of theoretical interest and are
statistically different from zero are also estimated and reported. In each case, the first difference represents the
probability of change in the dependent variable (from 0 to 1) when the independent variable changes from one
standard deviation below the coefficient to one standard deviation above the coefficient while all other variables are
held at their means (King, 1990; Liao, 1994).

TABLE 2. Logistic Regression Estimates: Pooled, Baseline Model
Explanatory variables B SE First Difference

Dependent variable-support for trade liberalization
Constant - 3.865*** .241
Income Distribution .019* .011 .017
Geographic Orientation .139*** .024 .060

Cognitive Mobilization .138*** .049 .030
Education
Income
Class
Union
.091"
.046
.348***
.004**
Australia
.016
.013
.038
.120***
Gender
Age
.167***
.066***
.086
.028
.059
.002
.093
.127
.061
.020
.059
.021
Germany 1.541*** .110

Norway 1.256*** .103
Spain .773*** .117
Switzerland
1.059***
.105
- 2 (log likelihood) 6946.16

Probability > X2 .000
% correctly predicted 70.0
N
6004
Note:
Figures
are
The
United
States
pendent
variable
coefficient
to
one
variables:
them."
Suppor
Oppose
(0)
this
country."
In
incentives).
Geogr
where
5-upper).
(18-92).
frequ
Union
*p<.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
zation also influence support for trade liberalization. This suggests that those who
tend to discuss politics more frequently tend to favor trade liberalization.
The third column in Table 2 provides estimates of the impact of each variable
when the other explanatory variables are set to their means. Using the predicted
probabilities, our results demonstrate that among political attitudes cosmopolitanism and cognitive mobilization remain most important in predicting support for
trade liberalization. For example, the predicted probability of support for trade
liberalization increases by 6% as one's level of geographic orientation increases
along the range of possible values. Increased levels of cognitive mobilization raise
the predicted probability of support by 3%. Finally, the probability of support also
increases, though less so, as respondents tend to favor larger income differences as
incentives.
In terms of the economic utilitarian indicators, the sign and statistical significance
of each coefficient for the six variables in the pooled model support the theoretical
predictions made above. In relative terms, the effects of education are the greatest
as an increase in the range of education increases the probability of supporting
trade liberalization by nearly 13%. This seems to lend credence to the notion that
the more educated look forward to the economic opportunities afforded to them by
trade liberalization, while the less educated fear the increased economic competition occasioned by trade liberalization. Those who do not think they have the skills
to compete, regardless of their political predisposition on liberalized trade do not
welcome the specter of increased economic competition.
To a lesser extent, increases in income (6.1%) and being male (5.9%) also increase
the probability of support for trade liberalization. The higher one's income, we
find, the more supportive one is of the trade liberalization process. This seems to
indicate that those with higher incomes tend to view trade liberalization as an
opportunity to improve their lot-whether through consumption opportunities or
wealth maximization--while those with lower incomes do not foresee such opportunities afforded by trade liberalization. The results for gender indicate that women
are, in fact, less supportive of trade liberalization than men. This seems both intuitive and consistent with previous empirical studies of public attitudes toward
economic liberalization.
To a much lesser extent, though still significantly different from zero, increases in
social class (2.8%) increase the probability of support, while increases in age and
union membership decrease the probability of support by approximately 2%. The
social class variable supports our theoretical predictions that the higher one's per
ceived social class level, the more supportive one would be of trade liberalization.
Thus, it seems that the upper classes think of trade liberalization as an opportunit
to maximize their wealth and consumption and not as a threat. Being part of a
union clearly shapes how one thinks about the trade liberalization process. Union
members are clearly less supportive of trade liberalization than non-unionized
workers. This would seem to indicate that the antitrade liberalization message o
the union leadership is being internalized by the membership or that union mem
bers are concentrated in sectors of the economy that are not likely to do well in
more globalized economy. Additionally, since older respondents are more likely t
be concerned about one's ability to recover from a market-induced layoff than
younger respondents, this result supports our prediction that the older one is, th
less supportive one would be of trade liberalization.
Finally, using the United States as the reference category, four of the five country
dummy variables produced positive signs on the coefficient and were statistically
significant. The positive sign on the coefficients points to the general support fo
trade liberalization outside of the U.S. and also suggests that country-specific factors
are at work in terms of explaining respondent preferences for trade liberalization

Consequently, the next section discusses the results from each of the six country
specific logistic regression models.
The Country-Specific Models
The results of the country-specific models provide an interesting set of finding

First, the goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the model performs fairly well i
each of the six cases. At least 63% of the observations were predicted correctly i
each of the models and there were improvements over the model prediction. The
model performed best in Australia (77.3%) and the United States (73.6%). In each
of the six cases, we find general support for our theoretical predictions, althoug
there is a fair degree of variation in both the level of statistical significance and the
marginal effects of the explanatory variables across each of the six countries. Table 3
shows the logistic regression results and first differences from the six country spe-
cific models.
We now discuss the country-specific results in alphabetical order. The model

results for Australia were not entirely consistent with the findings in the pooled
model. In the case of Australia, none of the three measures of respondent political
attitudes were significant predictors. On the other hand, four of the six economic
interest variables-education, income, union membership, and gender--were important predictors in the Australian context. In relative terms, the marginal effect of
gender is by far the greatest, followed by education, then income and union membership. In Australia, the probability of support for trade liberalization increases
greatly for males (13%). Conversely, increases in education and income heighten

TABLE 3. Logistic Regression Estimates: Country-Specific Models
First
Explanatory
Dependent
First
First
Variables
variable-support
Constant - 4.080*** - 3.326*** - 3.842**

(.473) (.675) (.535)
Au
for
Income Distribution .009 .061"* .069 .038

(.025)
(.037)
(.033)
Geographic orientation .062 .153** .095 .054

(.052) (.068) (.070)
Cognitive Mobilization .123 .387** .108 .318** .093
(.102) (.152) (.127)
Education .161.** .096 .268*** .299 .226*** .246

Income
(.041) (.043) (.036)

.072*** .068 .053 .085*** .121
Class
Union
(.026)
(.040)
(.027)
(.081)
(.123)
(.087)
.123
.026
.196"**
.092
.193* .043 .049 .222** .082

(.091) (.146) (.101)
Gender .787*** .129 .608*** .146 .291** .072

(.128) (.174) (.142)
Age - .007 - .003 - .005
(.004) (.006) (.005)
- 2 (log likelihood) 1601.62 856.04 1169.86

N
1605
715
940
Probability > X2 .000 .000 .000
% correctly predicted 77.3 68.4 65.9

First
First
United
First
Explanatory Variables Spain Difference Switzerland Difference States Difference

Constant - 2.796*** - 2.180** - 3.285**
(.739)
Income
(.611)
Distribution
.004
(.511)
.017
.020
(.029)
(.025)
(.026)
(.066)
(.059)
(.050)
Geographic Orientation .211.** .104 .288*** .192 .096* .048

Cognitive Mobilization .126 - .032 .226** .053
(.126)
(.125)
(.114)
(.041)
(.049)
(.037)
Education .078* .082 .0814* .070 .224** .183
Income
Class
.044
-
Union
Gender
Age
.08***
(.031)
(.034)
(.110)
(.105)
(.087)
.239
.006
.018
(.051)
.068
.123
.137
(.191)
.037
.087
.024
(.137)
(.102)
(.165)
(.160)
(.140)
(.005)
(.005)
(.004)
.086
.002
.121
.283**
.013***
.052
.085
- 2 (log likelihood) 905.97 1009.52 1291.71

N
770
784
1190
Probability > X2 .000 .000 .000
% correctly predicted 70.5 62.8 73.6
Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are

Coding of variables: Income Distribution (1 -incomes should be ma
incentives). Geographic Orientation (I--local, 5-global). Cognitive
where 3 = frequent, 1 = never). Education (1-low, 10-high), In

per) Union (1-Active Member, 2-Inactive Member, 3-Don't Bel
*p < .1;**p <.05;***p < .01.
the probability of support by 9.6% and 6.8%, respectively, while an increase in the
union membership category decreases probability of support by 4.3%. The significance of these four economic interest variables, particularly gender and education,
suggests that economic utilitarian considerations play a pivotal role in explaining
support for trade liberalization in the Australian context, while the influence of
political attitudes in the Australian context are less important.
In the case of Germany, as was the case in the pooled model, all three measures of
respondent political attitudes--income distribution, geographic orientation, and

cognitive mobilization--were statistically significant. These three factors also have
considerable marginal effects. An increase in cognitive mobilization increases the
probability of supporting trade liberalization by 11% whereas increases in cosmopolitanism (geographic orientation) and income distribution increase the probability of support by 9.5% and 6.9%, respectively. In terms of the economic utilitarian
variables, both education and gender were positively related to support for trade
liberalization, consistent with our expectations. The results show a substantial relationship between education and support for trade liberalization in Germany as
increases in education lead to a much greater probability of supporting trade liberalization (30%). Gender also has a considerable impact, as being male increases
the probability of support for liberalization by over 14%.
The German model results support our predictions for the income distribution,
geographic orientation, cognitive mobilization, education, and gender variables
and thus fit the general pattern. Would we have reason to expect that Germany
would produce these specific results? To a degree it is not surprising that union
membership and age failed to achieve statistical significance in the analysis. German
unions are noted for their cooperative relationship with German corporate leadership. German corporatism has fostered a degree of harmony in industrial relations that has largely supplanted an "us versus them" mentality in labor relations.
Thus German workers would be less likely than workers in many other industri-
alized democracies to look at trade liberalization as a capitalist ploy to exploit

workers. Also, considering the very generous pensions that retired Germans receive, it is logical that they would not be as concerned about the increased exposure
to the market brought on by trade liberalization. The German state protects the
retired from the market.
In the case of the Norwegian data, of the variables measuring one's political
attitudes, only the cognitive mobilization variable was statistically significant. The
marginal effects of an increase in cognitive mobilization are relatively sizable,
though, as an increase in cognitive mobilization increases the probability of support
by nearly 10%. In terms of the economic utilitarian measures, education, income,
social class, union membership, and gender were all in the expected direction and
statistically significant. Of these five factors, education once again has the greatest
marginal effect (25%), followed by income (12%) and to a lesser extent, social class
(9.2%), union membership (8.2%), and gender (7.2%).
The results of the Spanish model yielded only two significant predictors of support for trade liberalization-geographic orientation and education. An increase in
the level of cosmopolitanism (geographic orientation) raises the probability of support for trade liberalization by just over 10%. This suggests that local and regional
influences remain predominant among Spanish respondents. Perhaps this result
stems from the long running debate in Spanish society over regional autonomy
versus national unity dating back to the Franco era. Increases in education among
Spanish respondents raise the probability of support by 8%. Also, unlike the other
three country-specific cases discussed thus far, the impact of gender was not a
significant predictor in the Spanish case.
The results of the model for Switzerland demonstrate that very little seems to
divide the Swiss over the issue of trade liberalization. The results from Swiss re-
spondents seem to most clearly parallel the Spanish case in that very few predictors

were statistically significant. Geographic orientation was once again an important
predictor and, as was the case in Spain, the impact of geographic orientation on
support for trade liberalization should probably not be surprising. The Swiss con-
federation dates back to the 13th century, and local and regional influences
throughout the 26 Swiss cantons continue to heavily influence the thinking of Swiss
respondents about trade liberalization. In addition to geographic orientation, education and income were also statistically significant predictors in the Swiss case. It
is also worth pointing out here, that as was the case with Spain, the impact of
gender is also not statistically significant among Swiss respondents. In both cases, it
seems as if geographic orientation provides much more of a predominant influence
(a 19.2% increase in the probability of support) than any other political factor and
far more than economic interest considerations (12% and 7% for increases in income and education, respectively).
Finally, the model for the United States produced results that support both the
political attitudes explanation as well as the economic interest explanation. In terms
of the variables measuring respondent political attitudes, the geographic orientation and cognitive mobilization variables are statistically significant predictors of
support for trade liberalization. However, the marginal effects of increases in geographic orientation (4.8%) and cognitive mobilization (5.3%) are relatively minor.
In terms of the economic interest explanation, three independent variables-education, gender, and age-were all in the predicted direction and statistically significant. We find that the less educated, females, and older Americans are less
supportive of trade liberalization than the higher educated, men, and younger
Americans. In relative terms, the marginal effects of education (18.3%) remain
considerably higher than gender and age. Overall, one might expect that those with
lower levels of human capital are unable to fully reap the rewards brought about by
trade liberalization. Because women often tend to be the losers of increasing market
forces in an economy, we were not surprised that women view trade liberalization in
a more negative light than do men.
The notable difference in the American model relative to the other countries,
however, is the emergence of the age variable as an important predictor. Only in the
United States does age seem to matter as something that divides people over the
issue of trade liberalization. One could surmise that this could have to do with the
relatively meager public pensions provided in the United States, which could engender some insecurity among older Americans.
If one looks at the general patterns across all of the country specific models what
emerges is that political attitudes about economic distribution provide little to no

explanatory power. The lack of consistent statistical significance in our income
distribution variable (with the exception of Germany) indicates a lack of any discernible pattern among the data for this explanation. Perhaps ones' political pre-
disposition is a much less important predictor of one's attitude toward trade
liberalization than other factors. Although we often are exposed to anecdotal evidence about political opposition to trade liberalization emanating from large and
regular protests in cities like Seattle or Genoa, it is clear that factors other than
political ideology are at work in shaping attitudes about international trade. For
instance, the measure for geographic orientation was statistically significant in four
of the six countries and the cognitive mobilization variable was significant in three
of the six cases.
Another noteworthy pattern is that in terms of economic interest variables, education is clearly the strongest predictor of support for trade liberalization across
the six countries examined in this study. Education is a significant factor in all six
countries and produces the greatest marginal effects, particularly in Germany,
Norway, and the United States. Gender and income are also particularly powerful
predictors. Together, as expected, those with higher levels of human capital tend to
be more supportive of trade liberalization. In particular, of those who may perceive
that they have much to lose from trade liberalization-particularly the lesser educated, those with lower incomes, and women-tend to be far less supportive of
trade liberalization.
Conclusion
This paper examines factors that condition individual-level attitudes toward tr

liberalization. A series of political and economic utilitarian hypotheses related
individual-level support for trade liberalization were developed and tested. Over
we find strong empirical support for several economic utilitarian consideration
consistent predictors of variations in support for trade liberalization. Educat
remains the strongest of such predictors in terms of its prevalence in the poo
model and the six country-specific models, as well as its considerable margin
effects. We also find gender and income to be strong predictors of support for trad
liberalization in both the pooled model and in several national contexts. On t

other hand, the political explanations were much weaker overall than the econo
interest variables. While some empirical support is found for the geographic o
entation and cognitive mobilization explanations, the income distribution exp
nation for variation in support for trade liberalization tested in this paper was muc
weaker than anticipated.

Perhaps most surprisingly, among the variables in the political explanation,
income distribution variable was generally not a useful predictor of attitudes towar
trade liberalization. Several potential explanations for this finding come to mi
We may be seeing that citizens recognize that while trade liberalization may increas
income inequality, it also raises the income of all groups. Instead, citizens may
holding their governments responsible for redistributing wealth. Alternativ
perhaps our results may be confirming the acceptance by most citizens of th
virtues of the neoliberal economic model. That is, individuals may generally em
brace the benefits of trade globalization. Consequently, governments advancing
virtues of free trade are not likely to face wide opposition based on inequality fears
Among the variables included in the political explanation, one's geographic or

entation and level of cognitive mobilization played significant roles in shaping
titudes toward trade liberalization in several national contexts. Thus, the less
parochial and the more politically sophisticated one is, the more supportive the
individual is of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization in many people's minds
seems to be about whether they want to embrace the broader world or keep
themselves isolated in their communities. We can well imagine that for many people, the outside world is a threatening place because it is unfamiliar and different.
Therefore, the prospect of trading with individuals from outside of one's limits of
community means accepting an interaction with those who are outside of one's
comfort zone. If so, this is a largely psychological, and intangible, calculation.
On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, we find in this study that
one's level of human or tangible capital is a very significant factor when people
decide whether to support or oppose trade liberalization. It seems evident that
citizens are rational actors who calculate their expected personal benefits from
trade liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization is not an issue that seems to elicit
irrational passions that preclude interest-based judgments of trade liberalization.
People seem to ask of the process: What's in it for me?
To this end, both education and gender were interest-based factors that produced not only the predicted results, but also considerably strong marginal effects.
Those with higher levels of education, across all of the models, were more sup-
portive of trade liberalization than those with lower levels. Thus, it is clear from our
results, that those with higher levels of education feel less threatened by trade
liberalization than less-educated individuals. Our interest-based explanation would
tell us that this is because the more educated have the skills to compete in a more

globalized economy characterized by free trade. It is also possible that the education
effect is picking up the difference between people who are educated and, therefore,
more outward looking and those who are less educated and perhaps less comfortable with different people and cultures. These human capital and open-mindedness
explanations are not mutually exclusive but could in fact have mutually reinforcing
influences on the same individuals. In other words, education can make one both
more secure in her/his ability to succeed in a global marketplace and also feel more
comfortable with people and products that are a part of such a market.
The education result also raises the very interesting possibility of a profound
divide in societies over trade liberalization. As a potential alternative explanation,
some may argue that the significant effects of education might actually reflect the
elite consensus in each country, which is overall pro-liberalization. This type of

explanation would be consistent with arguments suggesting that opinion elites play
a vital role in shaping public opinion toward important political issues (McClosky
and Zaller, 1984; Ginsberg, 1986). However, on an issue such as trade liberalization
which has direct and tangible effects on one's economic livelihood, we would agree
with Page and Shapiro (1992:170), who suggest that actual public opinion on such
policy matters is "highly resistant" to elite manipulation. When it comes to issues
that have a direct impact on people's lives, people are more likely to take the time to
form firm opinions and therefore will not be as easily persuaded by policy elites as
they would on issues that have little, direct personal impact.
In addition, women, who have been shown to be less supportive of other important aspects of economic liberalization, are also less supportive than men of
trade liberalization. This is consistent with other public opinion studies that have
shown that women tend to favor government protection of those who could suffer
from market competition. As economic liberalization and trade liberalization increase, could it be that this will heighten the saliency of a gender-based cleavage in
politics?
One of the most important points we can draw from this study is that society
divides in predictable ways over the issue of trade liberalization. For instance, our
findings suggest that the social nucleus of the antiglobalization protest will be
composed of segments of society that are generally the most vulnerable to the
challenges of trade liberalization, including union members, older workers, lower
wage earners, and the less educated. Consequently, protests against international
trade agreements are likely to become more polarized and difficult to attain since
the most vulnerable are likely to view such negotiations as zero-sum games. As the
trade liberalization process continues and deepens, these divisions over trade liberalization could become more salient and conflicting. Trade liberalization could
produce the next great cleavage in industrialized democracies.
Appendix A: Operationalization of Variables'14

Dependent Variable
Support for Trade Liberalization
Do you think it is better if: 1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and
sold here if people want to buy them; OR that: 0. There should be stricter limits on
selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country.
Independent Variables
Income Distribution: How would you place yourself on this scale? 1 means you
agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely
14All measures taken from the World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al., 2000).
with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you
can choose any number in between.
Incomes should be made more equal (1)
We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort (10)
Cognitive Mobilization: Measured in response to the following question: When
you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently
(3), occasionally (2), or never (1).
Geographic Orientation: To which of these geographical groups would you say
you belong to: 1. Locality or town, 2. state or region, 3. country as a whole, 4.
continent, 5. the world as a whole.
Education: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (1-9
scale)
No formal education (1), University-level education, with degree (9)
Union Membership: Could you tell me whether you are an active member (1), an
inactive member (2) or not a member of that type [labor union] of organization (3).
Level of Income: Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what
group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incom
that come in. Just give the letter of the group (1-10 scale) your household falls into
before taxes and other deductions.
Social Class: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working

class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as
belonging to the: 5. Upper class 4. Upper middle class 3. Lower middle class 2.
Working class 1. Lower class
Gender: Sex of respondent: Male (1), Female (0)
Age: You are *** years old.
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Income Geographic Cognitive
Nation Distribution Orientation Mobilization Education Income Class Union Gender Age
Australia 5.60 2.43 1.87 6.15 5.26 2.85 2.65 .49 44.64
2.56 1.23 .661 1.81 2.85 .87 .68 .50 17.38

2025 2027 2047 2016 1817 1952 2046 2048 1971
W. Germany 5.38 2.22 2.15 5.61 5.77 3.21 2.74 .46 41.64
2.34 1.28 .581 2.37 2.33 .81 .565 .49 16.16
1008 1001 1012 1011 827 920 1009 1017 1016
Norway 5.27 1.78 2.07 5.89 5.50 2.90 2.37 .49 43.26
2.26 1.04 .588 2.22 2.87 .94 .74 .50 16.18
1122 1121 1126 1121 1040 1017 1126 1127 1127

Switzerland 4.84 2.56 1.93 5.21 5.74 3.22 2.77 .50 45.04
3.07 1.36 .637 1.75 2.98 .86 .54 .50 17.25
1177 1188 1210 1208 967 1152 1196 1212 1204
Spain 5.56 1.97 1.66 4.19 3.91 2.46 2.85 .48 45.10
2.80 1.21 .685 2.58 1.85 .84 .44 .50 18.35
1183 1199 1196 1206 882 1165 1211 1211 1210
USA 5.44 2.59 1.89 6.27 6.50 2.96 2.67 .50 48.31
2.69 1.36 .646 2.24 2.49 .93 .65 .50 17.94
1495 1509 1515 1537 1379 1475 1525 1542 1518
Total 5.38 2.29 1.91 5.64 5.50 2.92 2.68 .49 44.89
2.65 1.29 .655 2.25 2.74 .91 .63 .50 17.41
8010 8045 8106 8099 6912 7681 8113 8157 8046
First row = mean.
Second row = std. deviation.
Third row = N.

Appendix C: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix*
Income Geographic Cognitive
Distribution Orientation Mobilization Education Income Class Union Gender Age
Income dist.
Geographic .004
orientation
Cognitive .056 .084

mobilization
Education .102 .128 .254

Income
Class
.136
.115
.083
.075
.209
.176
.376
.367
.424
Union .036 .025 - .128 - .102 - .169 .006

Gender .055 .061 .117 .054 .082 - .017 - .085
Age -.019 -.058 .008 -.255 -.192 -.042 .051 -.007
Trade .046 .084 .140 .188 .160 .152 .000 .092 - .108
liberalization
*Correlation matrices for independent variables across individual countries are available from author.
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Citizen Support For Trade Liberalization

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Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

Author(s): Karl C. Kaltenthaler, Ronald D. Gelleny and Stephen J. Ceccoli

International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 829-851

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade

Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors

Trade liberalization remains an important and controversial component of the

830 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

be pressured to implement protectionist trade policies. However, while much has

policy preferences are coherent and not as easily manipulated as previously

thought (Page and Shapiro, 1983).

liberalization process is much more advanced in these countries compared to oth

KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 831

as individual economic utilitarian considerations. Thus, we seek to provide a fuller

and suggest further paths of research.

Differing Views of Trade Liberalization

832 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

liberalization process is seen as forcing governments to make economic concessions

izens have grown accustomed to having (Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).

employment opportunities." Trade liberalization exposes already anxious workers

Individual-level political attitudes are likely to be critical in the formation of public

KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 833

the Right-Left spectrum as a two-dimensional space, with one dimension con-

individual freedom and self-expression (Kitschelt, 1995). Just asking a person if s/

take responsibility for creating a relatively equal distribution of incomes, whereas

international investment firms are seen by antitrade liberalization activist forces to

pensions are valueless reinforces the insecurity of citizens.6 Consequently, trade

about trade liberalization is an individual's level of cognitive mobilization. Ingelhart

834 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

This process of becoming more cosmopolitan is a result of the "cognitive mobi-

lization" individuals go through as they are educated (Inglehart and Rabier,

national trade. Specifically, a cognitive mobilization hypothesis would posit that th

KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 835

and skilled workers to exploit significant opportunities of research successes in a

argument on a slightly different logic. We posit that lower income individuals do

836 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

selves in the forefront in challenging the expansion of trade liberalization (ILO,

liberalization" (Sandrasagra, 2000). Critics of trade liberalization argue that

and management-level jobs (Ozler, 2000). In addition, those women displaced

paid as much as the previous place of employment (Cardero, 2000). Consequently,

we would hypothesize that women would be less supportive of trade liberalization

KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 837

Measuring Support for Trade Liberalization

To gauge public support for trade liberalization, we turned to a question in the

838 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

Support (%) Oppose (%) n

Factors Influencing Support for Trade Liberalization

incomes should be made more equal) to 10 (complete agreement that we need

respondent's discussion of politics with friends, we hypothesize that those with

Alternatively, we contended that a number of economic utility factors influence

KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 839

To measure the impact of union membership on support for trade liberalization,

the trade liberalization movement. To measure the impact of gender (1 = male,

Model and Results

We use a series of logistic regression models to test the hypotheses develop

is estimated to give a general orientation of how the explanatory varia

Pooled Model Results

nificance are used to provide an initial interpretation of the results.1'2 Since

the coefficients (Pampel, 2000), we also report first differences.13

held at their means (King, 1990; Liao, 1994).

840 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

Explanatory variables B SE First Difference

Geographic Orientation .139*** .024 .060

Germany 1.541*** .110

p<.1; p <.05; p <.01.

Constant - 4.080* - 3.326* - 3.842**

Education .161. .096 .268* .299 .226*** .246

Gender .787* .129 .608* .146 .291** .072

Geographic Orientation .211. .104 .288* .192 .096* .048