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Islam and Modernity: Perspectives of

a Nineteenth Century Modern


Islamic Philosopher
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897)

Student: Willem van der Sluis


Student nr.: S2413450
University: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Course: BA Thesis History
Supervisor: Dr. Anjana Singh
Date: July 1st, 2015
Words: 16.605

Table of content

Chapter One: Introduction and Theoretical Framework....p.: 2-8


Chapter Two: Interaction One: Western Modern Sciences and Islamic Philosophy.....p.: 9-14
Chapter Three: Interaction Two: Western and Islamic Political Thought.p.: 15-24
Chapter Four: Interaction Three: Western and Islamic Theories of Civilization...p.: 25-31
Figure 1: The Body of Thought of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghanip.: 30
Chapter Five: Conclusion...p.: 32-34
Bibliography...p.: 35-37

Front page:
A photograph of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani taken in 1883, probably in France.
Source: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani (accessed: 24-6-2015)
1

Chapter One
Introduction and Theoretical Framework

Since the alarming rise of ISIS in the MENA-region and the attack, orchestrated by al-Qaida in the
Arabian peninsula, on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the spotlight turned again
towards the complicated relationship between Islam and the West.1 One of the debates that arose was
whether Islam is compatible with the basic ideas, values and freedoms of a modern democratic society.
Although a very current and necessary debate, this historical problem, the relationship between Islam
and the modern West, has been debated for over two-hundred years.
For a long time, the debate has been dominated by, on the one hand, Western populist
politicians and, on the other hand, Islamic fundamentalists. Although diametrically opposed, they
share the same literalist interpretation of Islam which has resulted in a strong emphasis on the
incompatibility of Islam in general with modern ideas, values and freedoms. Both discourses are
attractive because of the fact that they are over-simplified and do not recognize the complexity of
Islam. In this way, they are both responsible for the prevalent negative discourse maintained within the
dominant Islam vs. the West dichotomy and thus for severely tainting the image of Islam.
However, this thesis will show that there is an alternative, more positive and nuanced,
discourse, known as Islamic modernism. At the heart of this discourse lies the strong conviction that
reason and reform are an inherent part of the Islamic tradition and that Muslims worldwide will honor
this tradition by reforming (islah) the rational interpretation (itjihad) of the principles of the Islamic
sources, the Quran and the Hadtih2, in such a way that these principles are applicable to the challenges
of their own time. Today, this discourse is maintained by an influential group of public Muslim
intellectuals, which emerged two decades ago, most prominent among them the Swiss scholar, Tariq
Ramadan.3 However, this discourse can be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century, a
period in which Muslims worldwide encountered major challenges to their identity and autonomy due
the rise of Western imperialism.
Several interrelated developments contributed to the rise of Islamic modernism. First, due to
growth in military strength of the modern West during the late eighteenth century, a sense of relative
decline became prevalent among Muslims. More importantly, this was further enhanced in the
nineteenth century as a result of Western colonial rule, either directly, as in India after the Sepoy
rebellion of 1857 and in Egypt after the Urabi revolt of 1882, or indirectly, as in Iran and the Ottoman
Middle East, by controlling their economy and finances. These events, and especially the Sepoy

In the contemporary context, the West is not a geographical area(i.e. the western part of the globe), but the countries we
commonly consider to be the First World. In the nineteenth century context, the West is considered to be Europe, mainly
France and Britain, but also Russia.
2
The Hadith are the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.
3
Mehran Kamrava ed., The New Voices of Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 1.; Tariq
Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12-14.

Rebellion in India, which was in essence a failed attempt to restore the old order, had a major impact
on the development of Islamic modernism.4
Second, the subsequent intensification of interactions between the modern West and the
Islamic world initiated a process in which modern ideas diffused to the Islamic world. However, this
was not a homogeneous process but was either facilitated by the establishment of colonial rule, as in
India, or by the state itself in order to prevent Western domination, as in Egypt before 1882 and the
Ottoman empire in the form of the Tanzimat, meaning reorganization.5 Nevertheless, in each of these
regions it ignited a transformation in which the traditional order declined, a modern educational
system was established, the modern state in the form of a centralized bureaucracy developed, new
socio-political elites and movements were formed, and the economy was being incorporated into the
world capitalist structure. This transformation challenged the traditional Islamic-based socio-political
organization and thus provided the necessary social, political and cultural conditions in which new and
modern discourses could emerge.6
Third, during the second half of the nineteenth century several Muslim intellectuals became
aware that the adaptation of modernity did result in economic failure, secular authoritarian states and,
as we have seen, further Western domination. These disenchanted Muslim intellectuals became
convinced that in order to strengthen the Islamic world they needed to find an Islamic basis for
modernity. As a method, they revived the concept of itjihad, ones own rational interpretation of the
Islamic sources, which led to the reevaluation of several key issues: the relationship of rational,
empirical sciences with Islam; the relationship between politics and Islam; the ideal form of
government; the relationship of Muslims societies with the outside world; national identity; and the
status of women. Out of the interactions between Western modern and Islamic intellectual thought, a
new theology emerged which stressed the compatibility of Islam with modernity. This first ideological
response to the impact of modernity on the Islamic world became known as Islamic modernism.7
This thesis focuses on the body of thought of the Iranian intellectual and political activist,
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897)8, who, in my view, was the best embodiment of Islamic
4

Martin van Bruinessen, Armando Salvatore and Muhammad Khalid Masud, Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates.
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 240.; Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and
Fundamentalism: Episodes and Discourse. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 62. Pankaj Mishra, From the
Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and Remaking of Asia. (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 53.
5
In India, due to the decline of Mughal power and the subsequent outbreak of conflicts between local rulers, the British East
India Company was able to subdue all the major Indian states by the 1820s. In this way, it removed the institutional barriers
and thus facilitated the influx of modern ideas. In Egypt and the Ottoman empire, Muslim rulers became convinced that in
order to resist French, British and Russian encroachment, they had to initiated change by modernizing along the Western
model. Thus, in these cases the state itself facilitated the diffusion of modern ideas. In Iran, despite the growing domination
of its domestic market by the British and the Russians, the diffusion of modern ideas was slow due to the tight grip on society
by the Shii establishment. Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism, 30 and 60.; John Tolan, Gilles
Veinstein and Henry Laurens. Europe and the Islamic World: A History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 6.
6
Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism, 7-8.
7
Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism, 2-3 and 7.; Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens. Europe and
the Islamic World, 310-312.
8
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani claimed to be a Sunni Afghan, hence the name al-Afghani. However, historical research have
shown that he was in fact a Shii Muslim born in Iran. He made this claim when he arrived in Istanbul in 1869 and it was
spread by his disciples afterwards. He did this in accordance with the practice of taqiyya, or precautionary dissimulation of

modernism during the second half of the nineteenth century. Not only because he, by reevaluating the
key issues mentioned above, contributed to the formulation of this new theology, but also because he
was a transnational figure who witnessed the various important historical events that gave rise to
Islamic modernism: the Sepoy rebellion of 1857 in India; the height of the Tanzimat reforms during
the late 1860s in Istanbul; and the political tensions in Egypt that culminated in the Urabi revolt of
1882.9 In this thesis I will show that the body of thought of al-Afghani was a distinct way of
interpreting modernity and a coherent ideology, which results in the following research question:
How did the interactions between the Western dimensions of modernity and Islamic cultural heritage
result in a distinct and coherent way of interpreting modernity by the nineteenth century modern
Islamic philosopher, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897)?
In order to fully understand this research question it needs to be deconstructed. The body of
thought of al-Afghani arose out of three main interrelated interactions between Western modern and
Islamic intellectual thought, which simultaneously challenged three dominant positions within the
Islamic world and gave rise to three ambivalent positions. First, the modern sciences interacted with
Islamic philosophy. Although al-Afghani recognized that Muslims had to adopt modern science in
order to strengthen the Islamic world, he argued that the modern scientific method reflected the
rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy since both stress the use of reason and demonstrative
proof. In this way, he challenged the modern sciences as not distinctly Western. At the same time alAfghani was, due to his stay in British India, a fierce anti-imperialist, in particular anti-British and
subsequently involved himself in various political schemes against the British, which all failed. This
anti-British sentiment reached new heights when in the early 1880s al-Afghani began to call for
Muslim solidarity and unity in order to make a combined effort, under the banner of pan-Islam, against
British imperialism.10 Thus, al-Afghani held an ambivalent position towards the West.
Second, Western modern political ideas interacted with early and medieval Islamic political
thought. Again al-Afghani stressed the need to adopt these modern political ideas, however, he
promulgated that they were also rooted in Islamic political thought, thus providing an Islamic basis for
modern politics. In doing so, al-Afghani continued to dispute modernity as Western, but also
challenged the secular authority on which the newly formed authoritarian states were based, especially
the Egyptian and Iranian states. However, in contrast, al-Afghani supported the Ottoman
authoritarian state at a later stage in his life, giving rise to his second ambivalent position.11
Third, by exercising itjihad, in order to find an Islamic basis for modern science and politics,
ones true beliefs, which Shiism, as a persecuted minority, legitimized. Already during his lifetime there were a lot of
Iranians who claimed that he was an Iranian Shiite but it was of course for him, as a Sunni, much easier to travel through
Arab and Turkish lands and to engage within their intellectual circles. Therefore al-Afghani is put in inverted commas.
Nikkie R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din alAfghani. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 5-9.; Gerard Bowering, ed., The Princeton Encyclopedia of
Islamic Political Thought. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 18.; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the
Liberal Age: 1789-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 108. ; Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 53.
9
Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 54-56.
10
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 41-42.
11
Ibidem, 21-32.

al-Afghani challenged the dominant position of Islamic orthodoxy during his day. He was convinced
this dominant position was the cause of despotic governments, the prevalence of superstition over
reason and the ignorance of Muslim towards science and thus for the decline of the Islamic world after
its Golden Age (7th-12th centuries). In trying to find a way to revive the Islamic world, al-Afghani
developed, out of an interaction between Islamic philosophy and Western modern and Islamic theories
of civilization, a distinctly modern concept of civilizational progress. However, in his concept on
civilizational progress al-Afghani both condemned Islamic orthodoxy as an obstacle to progress and
defended Islamic orthodoxy as a vital necessity for progress. As we will see, this ambivalent position
towards Islam gave way to much academic debate among scholars who did not explore the concept of
civilizational progress of al-Afghani into great detail. It is therefore that Margaret Kohn argues that
this concept is the crucial element in explaining his ambivalent position towards Islamic orhodoxy. As
a logical outcome, she argues that the body of thought of al-Afghani was a coherent ideology.12
As stated, I will also show that the body of thought of al-Afghani was a coherent ideology.
However, in this thesis I argue that analyzing his body of thought in the light of the theory of multiple
modernities of late Israeli sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1923-2010), provides a theoretical, and
thus a new, explanation of how and why the attempt of al-Afghani to reconcile Islam and modernity
and was a distinct way of interpreting modernity and a coherent ideology. Eisenstadts theory is a
revision of the dominant traditional modernization theories of the so-called founders of sociology,
Karl Marx (1818-1883), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920), and the primarily
American theorists that followed in their footsteps during the 1950s. Together they were, and still are,
highly influential in the way scholars have approached the subject of modernity.13
The traditional modernization theories have defined the key dimensions of the transformative
processes societies go through during their transition from what is called a traditional, or premodern, society into a modern society. Three dimensions are distinguished which are analytically
separable, but historically interconnected. First, the structural, organizational dimension which
included the processes that constitute the development of a modern social structure: growing structural
differentiation, industrialization, urbanization and communication. Second, the institutional dimension
which include the processes that led to modern institutional formations: centralized and bureaucratic
nation-states, nationalistic collectivities and capitalistic economies. Third, the cultural dimension
which entails the processes of individualization including the emphasis on reflexivity and human
agency, rationalization, especially the development of science, and secularization meaning the shift of
religion into the private sphere.14

12

Margaret Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization. Political Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3 (June 2009), 409-416.
Matthew J. Lauzon, Modernity, in The Oxford Handbook of World History, ed. J.H. Benthly (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 77.
14
Lauzon, Modernity, 77.; Bowering, ed., The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 352.; S.N. Eisenstadt,
Fundamentalist Movements in the Framework of Multiple Modernities, in Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity
in a Transcultural Space, eds. Almut Hfert and Armando Salvatore (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A., 2000), 176.
13

However, these theories regarded these processes as distinctly European, particular WestEuropean, in origin and thus as an European prerogative.15 In their line of argument, non-European
societies were not able to modernize themselves but, due to the expansion of modernity across the
world, these societies would adopt European modernity and subsequently become modern. The
implicit assumption was that the transformative processes Europe experienced were the model along
which all other societies can be expected to modernize, thereby implying European superiority.
Especially the modernization theories of the 1950s strongly emphasized this singularity of modernity.
At the heart of their argument lay the process of convergence which basically meant that all societies
of the world eventually would develop into similar modern democratic and capitalistic nation-states.16
According to Eisenstadt, the European dimensions of modernity did reach most of the world to
various degrees, however, in reality the convergence of all societies into similar modern nation-states
did not happen. From the 1970s onwards, due to the actual developments in various non-European
societies, he began to question this Eurocentric perspective of modernity and subsequently started to
revise the singularity of European modernity. In his theory of multiple modernities, Eisenstadt
argued that modernity was never singular and homogeneous, not even in Europe or in the larger
Western world.17 In fact, it was due to the interactions between the European dimensions of modernity
and the indigenous cultural heritage, especially religion, and the historical experience of non-European
societies, that these societies modernized in various ways, each with its particular and authentic
character.18 Thus, in his view The best way to understand the contemporary world, indeed the history
of modernity, is for it to be seen as a story of continual formation, constitution, reconstitution and
development of multiple, changing and often contested and conflicting modernities.19
In laying out his theory, Eisenstadt distinguished three major themes of modernity, which
first developed in Europe and were later, due to the expansion of modernity, appropriated by nonEuropean societies, although in different ways. First of all, there was the continual confrontation
between the traditional elements of these societies and the new modern elements that took root within
these same societies. Secondly, but related to the first, was the inherent tension between the cultural
and institutional dimensions of modernity, for example the modern rational model of the
Enlightenment, and what was considered to be the authentic religious model, including both their
orthodox and heterodox formulations, of these non-European societies. These cultural and institutional
dimensions were often confronted by claims that they reflected the authentic religious models of the
non-European societies. According to Eisenstadt, efforts were subsequently made to appropriate and
15

Bowering, ed., The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 352.


Lauzon, Modernity, 77. Bowering, ed., The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 352.; Eisenstadt,
Fundamentalist Movements in the Framework of Multiple Modernities., 176.
17
The first alternative modernities developed within the Western civilizational framework in the Americas and later in Asia,
the Middle East and Africa. S.N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities. Daedalus (Winter 2000), 13. Also in regard to the
different development of modernity between Europe and the United States, scholars often refer to Werner Sombart, Why is
there no socialism in the United States? (London: Macmillan, 1976).
18
S.N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities: A Paradigma of Cultural and Social Evolution. (Frankfurt am Main: Preyer, 2007),
20-24.
19
Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, 21.
16

reinterpret these universalistic frames [religions], often connected with attempts to disassociate
modernity from Westernization.20
The third theme is the development of an enduring ambivalent position towards the
universalistic and hegemonic claims of the European dimensions of modernity in these non-European
societies. On the one hand, they were sincerely attracted to European modernity. On the other hand,
the indigenous socio-political organizations of these non-European societies were a result of centuries
of interaction between different cultures and thus were deeply rooted. As a result, the prevalent social
and political discourses maintained in these societies were used to challenge the universalistic and
hegemonic claims of European modernity.21 However, the extent to which these claims of European
modernity were challenged depended on their specific historical experience, the degree to which
modernity had impacted them and the level of their incorporation into the modern political, economic
and ideological international frameworks.22
According to Eisenstadt, it was the appropriation of these themes by the newly formed social
and political movements in the non-European societies, which had developed from the 1850s
onwards, that made them able to promulgate a new and distinct way of interpreting modernity. The
key players in these movements were mainly the elite, consisting of reformers, activists and
intellectuals, who were acquainted with both the several dimensions of European modernity and their
own cultural heritage. In one key paragraph Eisentadt stated:
For many groups within these civilizations, the attraction of these themes and of some of these
institutions lay in the fact that their appropriation permitted many groups in non-European nations,
especially elites and intellectuals, to participate actively in the new, modern (that is, initially Western)
universal tradition, while, at the same time, enabling them to selectively reject many of its aspects and
avoid Western control and hegemony. The appropriation of these themes made it possible for these
elites to incorporate some of the universal elements of modernity into a construction of their new
collective identities without necessary giving up either their negative attitude towards the West or
specific elements of their traditional identities, which were often also couched in universal, especially
religious terms and which differed from those that were predominant in the West.23
In my view, the theory of Eisenstadt applies in three ways to the body of thought of alAfghani. First, at the heart of his theory lies the interactions between the dimensions of European
modernity and the cultural heritage and historical experience of the non-European societies, in this
case the Islamic societies. As we have seen, the body of thought of al-Afghani arose out of three

20

Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, 47-48.; Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, 12-13.


Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, 48.; Eisenstadt, Fundamentalist Movements in the Framework of Multiple
Modernities., 183-184.
22
Eisenstadt, Fundamentalist Movements in the Framework of Multiple Modernities., 183.
23
Ibidem, 181.
21

main interrelated interaction between Western modern and Islamic intellectual thought and was
influenced by the historical experience of these Islamic societies.
Second, the three themes distinguished by Eisenstadt overlap with the key issues al-Afghani
reevaluated. In general, the first theme, the continual confrontation between the traditional elements of
society and the new modern elements, reflect the conflict between the expansion of modernity towards
the Islamic world and its traditional Islamic-based socio-political organizations. More specifically, the
second theme, the inherent tension between the cultural and institutional dimensions of modernity and
the authentic religious model, reflect the reevaluation of the relationship of rational, empirical sciences
with Islam, the relationship between politics and Islam, the ideal form of government, national identity
and the relationship of Muslims societies with the outside world. The third theme, the development of
an enduring ambivalent position towards the universalistic and hegemonic claims of the European
dimensions of modernity, reflect the ambivalent position towards the West of al-Afghani because he
was both attracted to and challenged these claims of European modernity.
Third, the quoted paragraph of Eisenstadt above contains three elements which can be found in
the body of thought of al-Afghani. 1) The appropriation of the themes permitted al-Afghani to
participate in this new and modern universal tradition. 2) In doing so, it enabled him to selectively
reject some aspects of it in an attempt to avoid Western domination. 3) By appropriating these themes,
al-Afghani incorporated some of the universal elements of modernity into a construction of his new,
however ideal, collective Muslim identity without giving up either his negative attitude towards the
West or specific elements of his traditional identity, which was also couched in universal, especially
religious terms and differed from those that were predominant in the West.
In each of the subsequent three chapters one of the main interactions in the body of thought of
al-Afghani is examined in-depth and applied the theory of S.N. Eistenstadt. Thus, the second chapter
examines the interaction between Western modern sciences and Islamic philosophy, the third chapter
the interaction between Western modern and Islamic political thought and the fourth chapter the
interaction between Islamic philosophy and Western and Islamic theories of civilizationial progress.
The sub-questions that are asked in each chapter are: how did each of these interactions came about?
And how do they apply to the theory of multiple modernities of Eisenstadt? As we have seen, these
interactions did not occur in isolation but were shaped by a variety of historical events during the
nineteenth century. Thus, in line with Eisenstadts theory, the specific historical experience of the
various Islamic regions is taken into account. Moreover, in this thesis the interactions are only
separated for an analytical purpose, while historically they are interrelated, which means that the
chapters at certain moments chronologically overlap. Finally, the last and fifth chapter provides the
conclusion in which a comprehensive answer is given to the research question and will end with a note
on the legacy of al-Afghani.

Chapter Two
Interaction One: Western Modern Sciences and Islamic Philosophy
As an Iranian, al-Afghani was brought up and educated in the Iranian Twelver Shii religious
tradition. First being schooled at home, and later in Qazvin and Tehran, he was further educated in
Shii holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in Ottoman Iraq by the religious leaders of his day. Because
Shii Islam was traditionally much more open and tolerant towards different Islamic heterodox
traditions, al-Afghani not only developed an in-depth understanding of the traditional Islamic
disciplines but also in particular of Islamic philosophy.24
Islamic philosophy is crucial for understanding the body of thought of al-Afghani because it
helps to understand his reconciliation of Islam with the modern sciences and politics, both his
condemnation and defense of Islam and the ambivalences that characterized his thought. The starting
point is the distinction Islamic philosophers made between the intellectual capacity of the elites and
the masses. They argued that the elite were capable of understanding a rational interpretation of Islam
and the masses were not. The masses therefore needed a literalist scriptural interpretation, or Islamic
orthodoxy, stressing the unity of God, a Day of Judgment and an Afterlife in order to ensure their
loyalty to the community and the morality in their actions. Out of this followed the practice of
adjusting ones argument to the intellect of the respective audience in question.25 This distinction and
the usage of different arguments were an inherent part of the writings and speeches of al-Afghani.
Most of the time, when writing for or speaking to an intellectual elite, al-Afghani stressed the
rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy. At the heart of this rational interpretation lay the general
belief in human reason and demonstrative rational proof as a way to explain humankind and the
universe, or what is considered to be science. Islamic philosophy was based on the ancient Greek
philosophy, however, the challenge for the Islamic philosophers was to reconcile reason and
demonstrative proof with a scriptural revelation. In order to do so, they argued that the Islamic
sources, especially the Quran, provided positive instructions for the use of reason and demonstrative
proof. They even went so far as to state that when the Quran contradicted this, it had to be
reinterpreted by exercising itjihad.26 Islamic philosophy thus established a different way of
interpreting Islam in addition to the orthodox literal way which was strictly based on revelation.
All sources show that al-Afghani, as a young eighteen-year-old teenager, travelled to India
around 1855-56 to continue his education. The consensus among scholars is that in India al-Afghani
encountered the modern sciences for the first time, which brings us to the first interaction.27 According
to Nikki R. Keddie, this encounter was for al-Afghani less traumatic and fundamental than it
24

Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 8.


Ibidem, 38.
26
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 48.
27
Ibidem, 11.; Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present. (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 302.; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 108. Mishra, From the Ruins of
Empire, 53.
25

would have been for a more orthodox schooled Muslim due to his philosophical background. Not that
Islamic philosophy drew the same conclusions as the modern sciences but someone who puts a
rational interpretation above a literalist interpretation was probably more open-mined to new and
different conclusions.28 Keddie also provides an account of Salim al-Anhuri, who knew al-Afghani
in Egypt in the 1870s, and who claimed to know how the modern sciences had impacted him. AlAnhuri states that al-Afghani became irreligious and held an evolutionary view of religion meaning
that the objects which humans worshipped corresponded with the stage of his intellectual progress.29
The highest state was the belief in natural laws which led to conviction that all the other beliefs had
no truth and no definition.30
Although the religiosity of al-Afghani is a debated subject, it is true that he in some of his
writings maintained a skeptical and negative view on Islam. But it is very unlikely that the modern
sciences gave him this insight because it clearly resembled the rational interpretation of Islamic
philosophy, which stressed that the less advanced masses needed to believe in a literalist interpretation
of Islam and the more advanced elite were able to understand a rational interpretation.31 Thus, instead
of invoking a whole new perspective, this encounter with the modern sciences in India probably
contributed to, and maybe strengthened, the already existing ideas of al-Afghani. This is further
examined in chapter four.
It is not clear for how long al-Afghani stayed in India, but there exists a consensus in the sources
that al-Afghani travelled next to Mecca. Keddie assumes that he subsequently travelled elsewhere in
the Ottoman empire, probably to Istanbul32, and from there went, via the Shii holy cities in Iraq, back
to Iran arriving in Tehran in December 1865. He stayed there until the late spring of 1866 after which
he proceeded towards Afghanistan. Here we find the first documented writing records of al-Afghani
with exact dates and activities, among them his first political scheme against the British.33
Al-Afghani left Afghanistan and, via Bombay and Cairo, he arrived in Istanbul in the autumn of
1869.34 He now found himself in the heart of the Ottoman reform movement known as the Tanzimat,
meaning literally reorganization. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards the Ottoman Sultans,
starting with Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), felt obliged to reform the empire military, political,
economic, diplomatic, educational and administrative as a consequence of their relative weakness in
28

Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography. (Los Angeles: Near Eastern Center
University of California, 1972), 29.
29
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 13.
30
Ibidem, 14.
31
Ibidem.
32
Keddie assumes this because when al-Afghani arrived in Afghanistan in 1866 he claimed to be from Istanbul. She
argued that he probably would not have claimed this, in his first use of taqiyya, if he had never seen the city and therefore
knew nothing about it. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 15.
33
It was in Afghanistan that al-Afghani plotted his first political scheme. He became a close relation to Azam Khan, the
military ruler of Qandahar and later the Amir of Kabul, and advised him to align himself with the Russians against the
British. This plot shows that he was already political active, not as a religious reformer, but promoting his anti-British
agenda. When Azam Khan was defeated in 1868 by his half-brother Shir Ali Khan, he fled to Iran. Al-Afghani did not
follow him but tried to get a position with Shir Ali Khan, the new Amir. Shir Ali Khan grew suspicious of him, expelled him
and escorted him out of the country. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 14-16.
34
Ibidem, 15-16.

10

comparison with the Western powers. The West served as the model for this large-scale reform
program and resulted in the diffusion of modern ideas by the Ottoman state. It was characterized by
the codification of civil law, restructuring of institutions, centralization of economic and
administrative power by an expanding Ottoman bureaucracy, and a new secular state ideology, known
as Ottomanism, which made no distinction between religion.35
Initially met with some resistance by the more conservative elements of Ottoman society, this
Westernization program found its apogee between 1839 and 1876. The key concept of the Tanzimat
was Alla Franca, meaning in the Western way.36 Its main goals were to secure the integrity of
Ottoman territory against the Western powers and to prevent rebellion within the empire by nationalist
movements. During these three and a half decades the Sublime Porte, normally the residence of the
Grand Vizier, was transformed into a central bureaucratic institution which oversaw the entire
administration of the Ottoman state. It was dominated by three men, Mustafa Resid Pasha, Mehmed
Emin Ali Pasha and Mehmed Fuad Pasha, who together reformed the empire along the Western
model in a top-down authoritarian manner until 1871. They did this with almost no interference from
the Ottoman Sultans during this period, Abdlmecid I (1839-1861) and Abdlaziz I (1861-1876), or
the conservative religious scholars, the ulema.37
The reforms were in general large-scale attempts to abolish the old system but they did not achieve
the results the reformers had hoped for. Out of disenchantment with the achievements of this
Westernizing program, a new Islamic reaction emerged from the 1860s onwards. In 1865 a new
opposition group of intellectuals and former bureaucrats was formed, known as the Young Ottomans.
They argued that due to the reforms the religious basis of Ottoman authority became very unstable and
thus the reforms were in need of an Islamic justification.38 A second Islamic reaction came from the
Ottoman Sultan, Abdlaziz I. The reforms had failed to prevent further encroachment by the European
powers and thus to secure the integrity of the empire.39 The Sultan tried to regain some of his powers
from the Sublime Porte but did not have the means to do so.40 He therefore started to systematically
emphasize his position as Caliph, the protector of all Muslims worldwide, in order to give his rule a
stronger Islamic dimension, which subsequently resulted in political instability.41 This Islamic reaction
is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
It thus seems that when al-Afghani set foot in the Ottoman capital in 1869 there existed an
atmosphere in which the Tanzimat reforms were being contested by the need for a stronger emphasis
on the Islamic heritage, both by reform-minded intellectuals and the Ottoman Sultan. During his stay

35

kr M. Hanolu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 42.;
Bowering, ed., The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought., 543.
36
Hanolu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 100.
37
Ibidem, 72-73.
38
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. (London: Hurst &Company, 1964), 202.
39
Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, 310.
40
Ibidem.
41
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 106.

11

in Istanbul al-Afghani became active in the Ottoman modern educational system in which the
modern sciences were thought, thereby continuing the first interaction. At the time of his arrival, alAfghani was not yet the well-known public figure he would become in Egypt. It was in Istanbul that
he claimed to be an Afghan and therefore it was very unlikely that many knew his past.42 However, he
possessed a fine sense of becoming acquainted with men of importance and in particular with men in
the field of modern education. Most of them had studied in Europe and believed progress was obtained
by science and education rather than by religious doctrine.43 Al-Afghani also was convinced that
modern sciences, especially military and other technologies, had to be learned in order to strengthen
the Islamic world and, in combination with his philosophical background, it is therefore not surprising
that he turned his attention towards modern education.44
Al-Afghani became involved in the new university of Istanbul, the Darlfnun-i Osmani,
which opened in 1870, as part of new educational reforms.45 He established contact with Tahsin
Efendi, the director of the new university, Manuf Efendi, president of the Council of Education, and to
a lesser degree with Safvet Pasha, the Minister of Education. In early 1870, al-Afghani, as a man of
excellence and perfection from Afghanistan46, was invited to give a speech at the opening of the new
university in which he praised Western-styled reforms and emphasized the need for Muslims to adopt
the modern science in order to strengthen themselves. This speech is a good example of how he
adjusted his content to the intellectual level of his audience because he expressed himself in the
Westernizing language of the Tanzimat.47 Shortly after al-Afghani was appointed to the Council of
Education, presided over by Manuf Efendi.48
However, in this atmosphere of a growing Islamic reaction to these Westernizing reforms,
these educational reformers faced growing criticism. Tahsin Efendi was constantly attacked for being
a scientist, materialist and freethinker and therefore an unbeliever.49 They felt the need to provide their
Western educational project with an Islamic basis and considered al-Afghani as an Islamic scholar,
or alim, who could help them.50 Obviously not being part of the official ulema of the Ottoman
empire, al-Afghani rather portrayed himself as an international alim. He already dressed himself in
a gown and a Turkish turban but was in this style also able to play the role of what Niyazi Berkes
called pseudo-ulema, which the educational reformers badly needed.51

42

Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 60.


Ibidem, 61.
44
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 62. ; Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 114.
45
Hanolu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 102.
46
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 180.
47
This speech is translated by Nikki R. Keddie and in it al-Afghani used the word civilized to distinguish Western from
Islamic nations which is a discourse used by Westernizers Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 16.
48
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 61.
49
Ibidem.
50
Ibidem, 65.
51
Ibidem, 61-62. In a footnote Keddie provides a excerpt of a private letter from Professor Niyazi Berkes in which he
elaborates on the role of al-Afghani as an alim.
43

12

Later in 1870 al-Afghani was to put his role as pseudo-ulema into practice when he
volunteered to give another lecture as part of a series of annual public lectures during the month of
Ramadan organized by the new university. The aim was to provide elementary knowledge of the
modern sciences and al-Afghani was scheduled to give a talk entitled The Progress of Sciences and
Arts.52 However, he chose to deviate and to revive the old philosophy versus prophecy controversy. In
his lecture al-Afghani equated philosophy and prophecy as sources of knowledge by calling them
the two highest crafts. By referring to prophecy as a craft and putting philosophy on the same level of
importance, he implied that the intellectual elite could obtain, by using reason and demonstrative
proof, scientific knowledge without prophecy.53 It was in this lecture that al-Afghani for the first
time publicly provided his Islamic basis for the modern sciences.
The lecture had unfortunate consequences both for al-Afghani himself as for the university.
Equating philosophy and prophecy was considered heretical in Sunni Islam and thus by the Ottoman
orthodox ulema. They were in general against educational reforms because it threatened their
traditional role in educating Ottoman society, but as long as these reformers refrained from openly
attacking established religious doctrine, they could have their way. Al-Afghani did just that by
calling the unique position of prophecy into question and his appearance as an alim provoked
probably even more hostility from the ulema. It is not exactly clear how much commotion alAfghani caused within the larger Ottoman society but his lecture was used as a pretext by the ulema
to make a move on the university. Al-Afghani was expelled. Tahsin Efendi was dismissed as the
director of the university. A year later the university was closed, although for other reasons.54
Probably due to his prior stay in the Eastern Islamic world, where there existed more toleration
for Islamic philosophy, and the large-scale Westernization of the Ottoman empire for at least forty
years, it is likely that al-Afghani did not anticipate this strong reaction from the conservative
religious establishment. It was nothing new in the Ottoman empire to express the need to learn for the
West and some of the educational reformers held even more extreme views then he did.55 But it was
al-Afghani who for the first time openly attempted to provide these modern sciences with an Islamic
basis by emphasizing Islamic philosophy. Extending the philosophical rational interpretation to
include the modern sciences was one of the new contributions put forward by al-Afghani.56
In his later writings, like his Lecture on Teaching and Learning and The Benefits of
Philosophy, al-Afghani expressed this in more detail. As stated, it is absolutely clear that he held the
modern sciences in high regards and that the Islamic world needed to learn them. But by emphasizing
the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy he insisted that the ways to acquire scientific
knowledge, human reason and demonstrative proof, were not unique to the West but were traditional
52

Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 182.


Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 70-72.
54
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 77-79.; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 185.; Hanolu, A
Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 102.
55
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 184.
56
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 79.
53

13

elements of Islamic culture. In fact, these practices were not even solely Islamic, but universal because
according to al-Afghani science has no connection with any nation, and is not distinguished by
anything than itself.57 He was convinced that the Western powers were not innately stronger than the
Islamic countries, but that every dominant political and military power owed it strength to its
application of scientific knowledge because there was, is, and will be no ruler in the world but
science.58 However, when it comes down to the relation with religion The Islamic religion is the
closest of religions to science and knowledge, and that there is no incompatibility between science and
knowledge and the foundations of the Islamic faith.59
But how does this first interaction apply to the three levels of Eisenstadts theory? First, we find
an interaction between the modern rational model of the Enlightenment and the authentic religious
model, in this case the heterodox formulation of Islamic philosophy. Also, it was the specific historical
experience, especially the Tanzimat-reforms and in particular the Islamic reaction against it, that
provided the momentum for Islamic modernism and which probably made al-Afghani believe that
he could promulgate his ideas publicly. Second, by appropriating the three themes, al-Afghani
reevaluated the relationship between rational, empirical science and Islam, one of the key issues which
Islamic modernism tried to tackle. Third, we examine the three elements of the quoted paragraph by
Eisenstadt. 1) In actively participating in public lectures at a modern educational system, the
Darlfnun-i Osmani in Istanbul, al-Afghani engaged in this new and modern universal tradition. 2)
However, in doing so, al-Afghani rejected the negative role given to religion in relation to the
modern sciences in this tradition by the Westernizers of the Tanzimat. Instead, he provided an Islamic
basis for the modern sciences by emphasizing Islamic philosophy, with the underlying intension to
strengthen the Islamic world and avoid Western domination. 3) As we have seen, al-Afghani argued
that the Western rational model and the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy maintained the
same starting point, reason and demonstrative proof, which were both couched in universal terms. In
doing so, he reinterpreted the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy and extended it to included
the modern sciences, thus incorporating some elements of Western modernity. However, this same
reinterpretation resulted in the dislocation of the modern sciences from the West, making a clear
distinction between modernization and Westernization and thus rejecting the hegemonic claims of
Western modernity. Thus, in doing so, al-Afghani did not have to give up his negative attitude
towards the West and specific elements of his traditional identity. In this way, he could be both in
favor of modern sciences and anti-Western, which provides the coherence in his ambivalent position
towards the West. Finally, it were all these elements, modern sciences, the rational interpretation of
Islamic philosophy and an ambivalent attitude towards the West, that were part of his new, however
ideal, collective Muslim identity.

57

Al-Afghani, Lecture on teaching and learning, 107.


Ibidem.
59
Ibidem.
58

14

Chapter Three
Interaction Two: Western Modern and Islamic Political Thought
Due to the political and military strength of the West and the relative weakness of the Islamic world in
the nineteenth century, al-Afghani held a deep appreciation for early and medieval Islam, the time
that the Islamic world was politically and military strong. Somewhere the Islamic world had deviated
from the first principles of Islam, which were prevalent in early and medieval Islamic political
thought. According to al-Afghani these first principles reflected Western modern political thought,
especially liberalism, and thus these principles provided an Islamic basis for modern political ideas.
For the starting point of this second interaction, we need to go back to the time of alAfghani in India during the 1850s. In addition to his encounter with the modern sciences, he also
witnessed for the first time a largely Islamic rebellion against a Western power, Great-Britain. During
the nineteenth century the British had gradually taking over the position of the ruling Muslim classes
in India and a general feeling among Muslims of marginalization developed which culminated in what
is called the Sepoy Rebellion, or the Indian Mutiny, of 1857, a year or so after the arrival of alAfghani. Some of the Muslim leaders of the rebellion were influenced by earlier reform movements
in India, who in their turn were influenced by Wahhabism60, which promoted religious purification, or
a return to the first principles of Islam. Although there is no evidence that al-Afghani had any
contact with these leaders, it is very likely that his later emphasis on a return to the first principles of
Islam, his subsequent advocacy to reform the interpretation (itjihad) of the Islamic sources and his
lifelong aversion against the British were influenced by them and this rebellion.61
However, al-Afghani did not immediately develop the first principles of Islam into an
Islamic basis for Western modern political ideas. It seems that he was influenced by several Ottoman
and Arab intellectuals, who either preceded or paralleled him in this development. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, from the 1860s an Islamic reaction emerged out of disenchantment with the
Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman empire and a new opposition group arose, known as the Young
Ottomans. This new group, consisting of former Ottoman bureaucrats, some of whom had studied in
Europe, turned towards journalism and used the new printed media, journals and newspapers, to
criticize the reforms. They characterized the reforms as a capitulation to Western secular laws which
had resulted in economic failure, an increased financial debt and an authoritarian state.62
The Young Ottomans argued, influenced by Western liberalism, that the main weakness of the
Tanzimat reforms was that they did not take the participation of the general population into
60

Wahhabism is an Islamic reform movement originated in is eighteenth century Arabia and based on the ideas of
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1783). It promotes the revival of the practice of the pious ancestors, the Prophet
Muhammad and his first companions , known as the Salaf. To accomplish this, it calls for the reform of the religious
practice whereby most innovations were rejected. Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism, 42-45.
61
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 11-12 and 48. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 301.; Mishra,
From the Ruins of Empire, 37 and 56-57.
62
Hanolu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 103-104.

15

consideration. Participation in, and even approval of, the reforms by the people was needed in order
for them to be successful, thus stressing the need for democracy. They were also convinced that blind
imitation of the West had caused a shock in the religious consciousness of the Muslim population, had
destabilized the religious authority of the Ottoman state and thus an Islamic basis for politics was
needed. As we have seen, this emphasis on Islam corresponded with the renewed claim of the Ottoman
Sultan, Abdlaziz I, as the Caliph. Nevertheless, the Young Ottomans had to go in exile but were
pardoned in the late 1860s and early 1870s and subsequently some of them returned to Istanbul.63
Due to the continuing failure of the reforms the Young Ottomans gained direct political influence and
as a result like-minded politicians deposed Abdlaziz I in 1876. After a short period of political
instability the new Sultan, Abdlhamid II (1876-1909), proclaimed the first Ottoman constitution.64
The return of some of the Young Ottomans to Istanbul coincided with the time when al-Afghani
lived there, which might have resulted in influence on him in two aspects. First, the Young Ottomans
argued that Western liberal ideas like individual freedom, constitutional government and
representative democracy were in accordance with the first principles of early Islam, or what they
called true and original Islam. By exercising itjihad the Quranic text So Pardon (your brothers)
and take counsel with them in affair(Q.3:153) and the Hadith difference of opinion within my
community is an act of divine mercy were reinterpret to mean constitutional government and
parliamentary democracy.65 In addition, Islamic concepts were reconciled with Western liberal ideas.
The concept of itjihad itself was equated with idea of freedom of thought, both umma, the Islamic
community, and milla, people, with nation, shura, mutual consultation, with parliamentary democracy,
ijma, consensus, with public opinion, ahl al-hall wa al-agd, prominent individuals in a society, with
elected representatives and so on.66 Thus, the Young Ottomans argued that whatever the West had to
offer in political morality already existed within early original Islam.67 According to Anthony Black it
were therefore the Young Ottomans, rather than al-Afghani, who broke the door of itjihad wide
open and became the first true Islamic modernists.68
Black is probably right because it was in Egypt that al-Afghani would promulgate this Islamic
basis for modern political ideas publicly. However, one remark must be made in relation to the use of
itjihad. The concept of itjihad was dominant in the early period of Islam when it was still in the
process of being crystallized. In Sunni Islam it was, with the establishment of the four Sunni Islamic
law schools in the eighth and ninth centuries, gradually overtaken by the concept of taqlid, which
roughly means following the interpretation of one of the law schools. This basically meant that from

63

Hanolu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire,, 103.


Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 201-203.; Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World,
311-312.
65
Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 293.
66
Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 34.; Black, The History of Islamic
Political Thought, 293.
67
Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 294.
68
Ibidem.
64

16

then on the door of itjihad was closed in the Sunni Islamic world.69 However, in Twelver Shii Islam,
in which al-Afghani was educated, the door of itjihad was never closed. Central to Twelver Shiism
is the belief in the return of the Hidden Imam, the twelfth successor of Imam Ali, who went in
occultation in 874 C.E. In the mean time, the will of the Hidden Imam was interpreted by the Shii
religious leaders, the Mujtahids, and therefore the use of itjihad was legitimized. So where exercising
itjihad was a clear break from the tradition of taqlid for the Sunni Young Ottomans, this was not the
case for al-Afghani. Thus, although the Young Ottomans broke this door wide open in the Sunni
Islamic world, it seems that the advocacy for exercising itjihad by al-Afghani was for the large part
influenced by his education in Shii religious tradition.70
Second, in addition to Islam as a basis for modern political ideas, the Young Ottomans also
considered Islam as the only basis for unity among Muslims against the growing encroachment of the
West, thereby stressing the need for solidarity and patriotism. As a result, they framed Islam in
nationalistic terms, especially Namik Kemal (1840-1888), the best known Young Ottoman. As we
have seen in the previous chapter, al-Afghani was during his stay in Istanbul mainly preoccupied
with modern science and education. However, in his first speech in 1870 at the Darlfnun-i Osmani,
praising modern sciences, he also referred to the Islamic people, or milla, in nationalistic terms. He
stated: Know that the Islamic people (milla) were once the strongest in rank, the most valuable in
worth71, and We must turn all our attention to elevating with honor our milla and the sons of our
race. We must go to the paths leading to the stages of wisdom.72 According to Keddie, the Islamic
milla is equated with individual Western nations. Thus, the appeal to the milla is nationalist in spirit,
although the focus of this form of nationalism was the whole Islamic world.73
The extent to which al-Afghani was influenced by the Young Ottomans is not totally clear
because, according to Keddie, there exist no evidence, although she believes it was possible.74 Berkes,
however, argues that the political ideas of the Young Ottomans, which were formulated before 1872,
appear to anticipate similar ideas, later expressed by many Muslims intellectuals, in the Islamic world
during the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century. In regards to al-Afghani this was true for
most of these ideas, but it seems that the framing of Islam in nationalistic terms paralleled with the
Young Ottomans. However it may be, Berkes added, and as we will see later, that perhaps the best
international representative of them [ ideas of the Young Ottomans] was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.75
The next arena in which al-Afghani acted as the best representative of these ideas was Egypt,
where he arrived in the spring of 1871 after his expulsion from Istanbul. Here he spent the next eight
years during which he was highly influential. Up to 1877 al-Afghani was mainly active as an
69

Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam: A Source Book. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9-14.
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 8-9.
71
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 63.
72
Ibidem.
73
Nikki R. Keddie, Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), 22.
74
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 60.
75
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 222.
70

17

informal teacher and gained a significant following of young Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals, among
them the later Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). They were attracted to him,
partly because of his personal charisma, but mainly because of his strong emphasis on Islamic
philosophy and political thought as a source for reform in order to strengthen Egypt.76
As many Islamic regions, Egypt was also gradually being dominated by the West, especially the
British, during the nineteenth century. As a reaction the Egyptian rulers, starting with Muhammad Ali
(1769-1849) in 1811, also tried to reform along the Western model but subsequently became even
more dependent on the West. In the 1870s Egypt experienced a crisis, due to its increasing financial
indebtedness to the West, and this also sparked large-scale disenchantment with these reforms among
young intellectuals. Like the Young Ottomans, these Egyptian intellectuals also became convinced
that it was time for an indigenous ideology, something that was not borrowed from the West, to reform
and strengthen Egypt. They found in al-Afghani the man who could school them and he became
their teacher emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with the modern sciences and political ideas.77
To express their ideas and discuss political issues, like the Egyptian financial crisis, proposals to
extend the power of the Egyptian parliament and the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, al-Afghani
encouraged his disciples to set up newspapers, a medium which, as we have seen with the Young
Ottomans, grew in popularity in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century. In Egypt, not being
under direct Ottoman rule, existed a larger degree of press freedom which contributed significantly to
the growth of political journalism and made Egypt the center of Arab journalism. 78 Al-Afghani
functioned more as an inspiration for these young intellectuals and as an organizer, helping to obtain
government licenses for newspapers, than as an active public figure.79 Not surprisingly, al-Afghani
taught his followers to use different arguments for different audiences. Appealing to the masses
traditional and religious sentiments, by emphasizing the British threat to Islam, was very useful to
arouse them against British domination, while they were discussing reform.80
As a platform to express ideas, discuss political issues and criticize the government and foreign
activities, these newspapers contributed to a growing public opinion and more political interest among
the Egyptians. In 1877, taking advantage of this development, al-Afghani decided to move from an
informal teacher and organizer to a more visible public figure publishing his own articles.81 In these
articles, either under his own name or a pseudonym, and in the speeches he gave we find that alAfghani, next to being a promoter of anti-British sentiment, started to be that international
representative of the Islamic basis for Western modern political ideas.82

76

Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 86.


Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 18.
78
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 96.
79
Ibidem.
80
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 19.
81
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 95.
82
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 101.
77

18

In finding this Islamic basis, al-Afghani was probably influenced by the Young Ottomans, but
also in the Arab speaking world there were already some earlier Muslim intellectuals who expressed
similar ideas, most prominent among them the Egyptian translator and teacher, Rifaa al-Tahtawi
(1801-1873), and the Tunisian-Ottoman politician and writer, Khayr al-Din al-Tunsi (1820-1890). As
an Imam in the Egyptian army, al-Tahtawi spent five years in Paris during which he absorbed the
political thought of the Enlightenment. He argued that some of these ideas, for example, the principle
of justice, reflected Islamic political thought, but also brought new ideas back to Egypt, like the idea of
the nation, thus given rise to Egyptian nationalism.83 Like al-Tahtawi, al-Tunsi also resided for a time
in Paris and later became the president of the Grand Council of Tunisia as part of the Constitution of
1861. However, in less than a year he resigned and left Tunisia between 1862 and 1869. During this
period al-Tunsi wrote his most important work, The Surest Path to Know the Conditions of the State,
in which he also considered the adaptation of Western modern political ideas compatible with Islam,
but emphasized particularly the need for Muslim to learn from others, especially the West, because
knowledge is common to all people.84 Both Arab intellectuals introduced the concepts of
republicanism and constitutionalism into the Arab speaking world which, as we will see, were also
discussed by al-Afghani. It is therefore very likely that he was acquainted with their ideas, however,
it is even more certain, based on his collection of books, that al-Afghani did keep up with Western
modern ideas himself, both scientific and political.85
The newspaper Misr, established in July 1877 and edited by the Syrian Christian disciples of alAfghani, Adib Ishaq, became the main outlet of his ideas. In an article entitled Despotic Government,
which appeared in Misr on February 15th, 1879, al-Afghani discussed various forms of despotism,
of which he considered the Enlightened Government the best, and also mentioned the Western forms
of republican and constitutional government.86 However, according to Keddie, al-Afghani
considered the actions of a government more important than its form. 87 Thus, to understand how he
found an Islamic basis for Western modern political thought, the actions of all three forms of
government need to be examined.
In emulation of the Islamic philosophers, especially al-Farabi (872-950) and Ibn Sina (980-1037),
al-Afghani argued that the wise leaders of the Enlightened Government were comparable to a
provident and discerning father who does everything to prepare the conditions which will ensure the
happiness of his children.88 What ensured this happiness was the perfection and mastery of
agriculture, industry and commerce. There were two conditions, which needed to be prepared by the
Enlightened Government, that could bring this about. The first was the establishment of well83

Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 69-74.


Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 95-99.
85
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 90 and 97.
86
The article Despotic Government of al-Afghani is translated in L.M. Kenny, Al-Afghani on Types of Despotic
Governments. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 86, No. 1(Jan.-Mar., 1966)
87
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 108.
88
Al-Afghani, Despotic Government, 25.
84

19

organized schools in which the true beneficial sciences and the useful arts can be educated by skilful
teachers. The second was to provide the necessary tools and machinery to engage in agriculture and
industry, and to facilitate the means for communication in commerce. More important, this
government realizes that the preservation of all this will only be attained through a just[system]of
law and achieved through a policy based on justice and equity, which needs to be safeguarded by
custodians, notaries, scholars, judges, rulers and their agents. Furthermore, the happiness of the people
and the independence of the country will only be maintained through political relations and
commercial ties with other countries, so the above mentioned men are to be schooled and experienced
in administration, discerning events before their occurrence, and familiar with commercial affairs.
They also have to know that to enhance the peoples wellbeing, to make the country prosper, to
prevent corruption, and to avert catastrophes, they have to levy equitable taxes, spend this on the
public good and establish a fighting force in order to repulse foreign enemies. To do this they need to
weigh all their deeds, actions and movements and constantly appraise their views and morals. 89 In
this article al-Afghani does not mention religion directly, except for religious law, but in a speech
given in Alexandria, published in Misr on May 24th, 1879, he referred to the founders of various
religions stating that we find in their precepts only the call for the recognition of the origin of truth,
and that is God, and the call to virtues and the practice of good, coupled with the avoidance of evil.90
Comparing this to the description of al-Afghani of the republican and constitutional forms of
government, we find similar characteristics. In the article, Despotic Government, he stated that when
Easterners will discuss republican government they will reveal its true nature, its merits, the
happiness of those who have achieved it, and the fact that those governed by it enjoy a higher state and
loftier position than other members of the human race. The same thing goes for constitutional
government, which would set forth its beneficial results and show how those governed by it have
been aroused by [their] original human nature and stimulated to emerge from the lowly estate of
animality, to ascend to the highest degree of perfection and to cast of the burdens which despotic
government lays upon them.91 In the Alexandria speech al-Afghani encouraged his listeners to
support the parliament in Egypt by saying I hope you will support the cause of the fatherland and will
strengthen its parliamentary rule, through which the cause of justice and equity may be established,
and you may no longer need any foreign protection.92
In both the Enlightened Government and the republican and constitutional government alAfghani found similar characteristics like the obligation to ensure the happiness of the people and a
higher state of welfare, to stimulate the people to achieve the highest degree of perfection, to maintain
the rule of law, or justice, to be based on a policy of equity and the ability to confront foreign enemies.
By comparing these characteristics we find that the appreciation of the Western modern political
89

Al-Afghani, Despotic Government, 25-27.


Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 109.
91
Al-Afghani, Despotic Government, 21.
92
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 110.
90

20

models by al-Afghani was likely due to their familiarity with the political thought of the Islamic
philosophers. However, he did not equated them. Although al-Afghan thought all three were far
superior to the current governments of the Islamic world, he considered republicanism and
constitutionalism the best, thus stressing the need for democracy.93 Nevertheless, according to Keddie,
al-Afghani inspired many young intellectuals by emphasizing the similarities with Islamic political
thought and thereby provided a bridge between their traditional political thought and Western modern
political ideas.94 Obviously, the argument that al-Afghani made, like the Young Ottomans, was that
the political morality of Western liberalism already existed in Islamic political thought.
In both the article and the speech al-Afghani did not refer specifically to Islamic political
concepts or the first principles of early Islam, although he referred to the founders of various religions
and thus to the Prophet Muhammad. However, in another text of al-Afghani, written in 1884, he
appealed more explicitly to a return to the first principles of early Islam. He mentioned how the
current Islamic rulers have given up applying the principles of canonical justice, have departed from
the solid principles on which the Islamic religion was built and have distanced themselves from the
paths taken by their early ancestors. Only when they return to the rule of their Law and model their
conduct on those of the early generations, God will provide them with broader authority and
power comparable to Caliphs of early Islam, give them the ability to be upright in [their] actions
and lead them on the path of righteousness.95 Again we find in these first principles of early Islam
the same characteristics, the rule of law and justice, morality and a path towards a better life, which
al-Afghani so admired in the Enlightened, republican and constitutional forms of government.
The best illustration of the attempt by al-Afghani to make Islamic political thought compatible
with Western modern political ideas is an account of one of his disciples, Muhammad Khalil, written
down by a British Arabophile, Wilfrid S. Blunt (1840-1922), in 1880. According to Khalil, alAfghani was the true originator of Liberal religious reform and sought to convert the religious
intellect of the countries where he preached to the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic
position, and, instead of clinging on to the past, of making an onwards intellectual movement in
harmony with modern knowledge. His intimate acquaintance with the Koran and the traditions enabled
him to show that, if rightly interpreted and checked by the one and the other, the law of the Koran was
capable of the most liberal developments and that hardly any beneficial change was in reality opposed
to it.96 Although this account is likely to be exaggerated, it reflect the approach of reforming the
interpretation of the principles of the Islamic sources (itjihad) in the light of his own time in order to
respond to the major challenges the Islamic world faced during the nineteenth century. This is what
lies at the heart of Islamic modernism.

93

Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 108. Kenny, Al-Afghani on Types of Despotic Government, 19.
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 125.
95
Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, 312-313.
96
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 126.
94

21

By expressing his political views, al-Afghani challenged the current Islamic rulers, who, were in
his view not ruling in accordance with the first principles of early Islam.97 As we have seen, he
encouraged his audience in Alexandria to support parliamentary rule in Egypt, however, not much
later al-Afghani supported, during the 1880s and 1890s, the Ottoman Sultan, Abdlhamid II, who
had suspended the Ottoman constitution and parliament in 1878 and turned gradually into an
authoritarian ruler.98 The explanation for the change in his position towards authoritarian states is
twofold. First, according to Pankaj Mishra and Keddie, due to his expulsion of Egypt in late august
1879 by the new Egyptian Khedive, Taufiq (1879-1892), on the basis of his anti-Western viewpoints
and his political schemes99, and the subsequent failure and defeat of liberal reforms in Egypt, alAfghani became convinced that it was time for a new strategy, pan-Islamism.100
Second, al-Afghani shift was influenced by an already growing tendency in the late 1870s and
early 1880s, due to further Western encroachment, among Muslim intellectuals towards the
unification of the Islamic world, or pan-Islamism. After his expulsion from Egypt, al-Afghani gave
priority to the unification of the Islamic world instead of reform. However, pan-Islamism was also a
distinctly modern phenomena because it was a reaction against Western imperialism and, more
importantly, because it interpreted nationalism, a element of Western modernity, in a distinct way by
emphasizing the shared religion of all Muslims, Islam, was the strongest basis for unification. As we
have seen, al-Afghani already equated Western individual nations with the entire Islamic people, or
milla, but now he elevated this form of nationalism to be his primary goal.101
For al-Afghani and other pan-Islamists, Abdlhamid II was an attractive ruler because his
emphasis on the Islamic tradition and his anti-Western attitude corresponded with their own ideas.
Also, as one of the last independent Islamic rulers and able to claim the loyalty of all Muslims as the
Caliph, Abdlhamid II was considered the obvious choice as the leader in the attempt to unite the
Islamic world against Western imperialism.102 In his turn, Abdlhamid II needed a stronger Islamic
justification for his rule and he was also convinced, as the Caliph, to have some leverage against the
Western powers.103 In his last days in Egypt, al-Afghani sent a letter to Abdlhamid II in which he
requested the Sultan to use his power as Caliph to enhance the pan-Islamic sentiment across the
Islamic world and offered to be his representative in India, Afghanistan and Central Asia.104
Abdlhamid II did not respond to his request immediately. In fact, it would take more than a decade,
97

In addition to his role as teacher and organizer, al-Afghani was involved in a Freemasonic lodge to plot political
schemes. In early 1878 he was elected as head of the already existing Eastern Star Logde, which he turned into a political
instrument in order to engineer political change. Al-Afghani was a supporter of the deposition, and even assignation, of the
Khedive of Egypt, Ismail, who in his eyes had sold out Egypt to the Western interests. He believed he had some influence
with Taufiq, the future Khedive, but this seems non-existing when Taufiq came to power in 1879 after the British and the
French brought about the fall of Khedive Ismail. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 19-21.
98
Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 299.
99
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism , 21.
100
Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 88-89. ; Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 40.
101
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism , 39.
102
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism , 21-22.; Keddie, Pan-Islam as proto-Nationalism., 26.
103
Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 90.
104
Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 88.

22

during which al-Afghani wrote his first and major defense of Islam, The Refutation of the
Materialists, in India, published a pan-Islamic newspaper, al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Strongest Link),
in France, and became involved in various political schemes in London, Russia and Iran, before he
was invited to Istanbul by Abdlhamid II in 1892.105
However, al-Afghani became not the top adviser for pan-Islamic and anti-British plans as he had
hoped for. In addition to their shared pan-Islamic ideal, Abdlhamid II was very suspicious of alAfghani due to his contacts with Arab intellectuals and leaders. Instead of giving him major
responsibilities, the Sultan used al-Afghani to write letters to the Shii religious leaders in Iran in
order to convince them to support his pan-Islamic claims. In the last years of his life, al-Afghani was
a virtual prisoner of the Sultan. Nevertheless, he was involved in the assassination of the Iranian Shah,
Nasser al-Din (1831-1896), in May 1896 by encouraging Mirza Riza, who had visited al-Afghani
earlier, to shoot the Shah at a shrine near Tehran. This was his last political, and maybe his only
successful, scheme before he died of cancer of the chin in 1897.106 In own of his last letters, alAfghani expressed his regrets on supporting Abdlhamid II as the leader of his ideal Caliphate
instead of pursuing his dreams of reform. He wrote: Would that I had sown all the seed of my ideas
[on reform] in the receptive ground of the peoples thoughts! Well would it have been had I not wasted
this fruitful and beneficent seed of mine in the salt and sterile soil of that effete Sovereignty! For what
I sowed in that soil never grew, and what I planted in that brackish earth perished away. During all this
time none of my well-intentioned counsels sank into the ears of the rulers of the East, whose
selfishness and ignorance prevented them from accepting my words.107
To conclude this chapter, this second interaction is applied to the three levels of theory of
Eisenstadt. First, we find an interaction between the institutional dimension of European modernity,
modern political thought of the Enlightenment, and the authentic religious model, early and medieval
Islamic political thought. Also the historical experience of the Islamic world, in particular the Sepoy
Rebellion in India and the growing Islamic reaction against Western domination, contributed to the
formation of the body of thought of al-Afghani. Second, in his attempt to find an Islamic basis for
Western modern political ideas, al-Afghani appropriated again the three themes and reevaluated
several key issues: the relationship between politics and Islam, the ideal form of government, the
relationship of Muslim societies with the outside world and national identity. Third, we examine again
the three elements of the quoted paragraph of Eisenstadt. 1) By discussing the three themes and key
issues in the various articles published in the different newspapers he helped to establish, al-Afghani
participated in the new and modern universal tradition. 2) In doing so, he rejected the Western political
thought that gave rise to authoritarian states, both in Europe, as in Germany and Austria, and in the
Islamic world, as in Egypt. According to al-Afghani this had failed to avoid Western domination

105

Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 21-30.


Ibidem, 30-32.
107
Ibidem, 40.
106

23

and instead he argued that republicanism and constitutionalism were needed to reverse Western
domination. However, due to the failure of these two forms of government to expand their political
power in the Islamic world, al-Afghani shifted to a new strategy, pan-Islamism, and supported the
authoritarian Ottoman Sultan, Abdlhamid II as its ideal leader. This explains the coherence in the
ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards authoritarian states. But pan-Islamism itself was also a
result out of an interaction between Western nationalism and the Islamic concept of the milla, the
entire Islamic people. Thus, by reinterpreting the Islamic concept of milla, al-Afghani extended it to
include Western characteristics of nationalism. In this way, the theory of Eisenstadt also explains the
origins of pan-Islamism, which was considered a new strategy to avoid further Western domination,
and thus helps to understand the ambivalent position of al-Afghani to authoritarian states. 3) By
appropriating these themes, al-Afghani incorporated some universal elements of modernity, like the
obligation of a government to ensure the happiness of its people and a higher state of their welfare, to
stimulate the people to achieve the highest degree of perfection, to maintain the rule of law, or justice
and to be based on a policy of equity, into an ideology which did not give up its increasing negative
attitude towards the West or the specific elements of traditional Islamic political thought. Like with the
modern sciences, al-Afghani dislocated modern politics form the West, and thus challenged the
universal and hegemonic claims of Western modernity. Thus, in this way, he was able to be in favor of
modern political ideas, which could establish democracy, and still maintain his anti-Western attitude.
Finally, in addition to the modern sciences based on the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy,
the key characteristics shared by the Enlightened Government, republicanism and constitutionalism,
and the unity of all Muslims under the banner of pan-Islam were part of his new, however ideal,
collective Muslim identity.

24

Chapter Four
Interaction Three: Western and Islamic Theories of Civilization
As a teacher in Egypt, al-Afghani had lectured on various books, among them The Muqaddima by
the fourteenth century Islamic historian, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), which had been published in Cairo
in 1857, and The History of Civilization in Europe by the French historian and politician, Franois
Guizot (1787-1874), of which an Arabic translation appeared in 1877. Both authors dealt in different
ways with the rise, decline and fall of civilizations but shared the assumption that religion, whether
Islam or Christianity, was a source of civilizational progress.108 The influence of Guizot and Ibn
Khaldun and of the tendency towards pan-Islamism among Muslim intellectuals around the late
1870s on the body of thought of al-Afghani are crucial for why he choose to defend and support
Islam and promoted pan-Islamism during the 1880s and 1890s.
After his expulsion from Egypt, al-Afghani returned to India, this time to the Southern state
of Hyderabad. As stated earlier, it was here where he wrote in 1881, directed at the Muslim masses,
what is considered to be his first and major defense of Islam, The Refutation of the Materialists.109
However, two year later in France al-Afghani, in his Reply to Renan, directed at an European
intellectual elite, condemned Islam as being hostile to the sciences and in constant struggle over
domination with philosophy.110 As stated in the introduction, this ambivalent position towards Islam
caused much academic debate. Although there exists a scholarly consensus that al-Afghani adapted
his message to the intellect of his audience, a debate about what he was trying to achieve by this
remains. Ellie Kedourie argues that al-Afghani was in fact irreligious and only used Islam to gain
more influence and advance his career.111 Hisham Sharabi concludes that this incoherence was an
inherent part of Islamic modernism because it lacked systematic expression in general.112 Keddie is
less negative and argues that al-Afghani in his condemnation of Islam meant the prevailing Islamic
orthodoxy of his day and, in contrast, in his defense portrayed his philosophical interpretation of
Islamic orthodoxy.113 Margaret Kohn finds Keddies argument plausible, however, it does not provide
a sufficient explanation. She argues that to understand this ambivalence in the body of thought of alAfghani, his concept of civilizational progress is crucial.114 As we will see, The Refutation of the
Materialists was much more than a mere defense of Islam in order to unite the Islamic world. In fact,
it was a result of an interaction between the Islamic philosophical ideas on the social and political
utility of Islamic orthodoxy and the theories of civilization of Ibn Khaldun and Franois Guizot.
108

Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 132.


Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 53.
110
Al-Afghani, Reply to Renan, in: Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 187.
111
Ellie Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam. (London:
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), 45.
112
Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914. (London: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1970), 24-52.
113
Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 38 and 89.
114
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 408-409.
109

25

Underlying the distinction made by the Islamic philosophers between the intellectual
capacities of the elite and the masses was the social and political utility of Islamic orthodoxy within
society. The Islamic philosophers, especially Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), argued that when the masses
were exposed to a rational interpretation of Islam, it would break down their belief and would
eventually lead to schisms and sects. Thus, a belief in a literalist interpretation of Islam, meaning
Islamic orthodoxy, produced some practical virtues that were needed to maintain social and political
stability.115 In The Refutation of the Materialists al-Afghani stressed the same social and political
utility of Islamic orthodxy by explaining that it produced three beliefs and three qualities (see figure)
which prevented humans from chasing their animalistic instincts and thus maintained social and
political stability.116 But where the Islamic philosophers, like Ibn Sina, regarded religious law as the
instrument to guide the masses, al-Afghani put the emphasis more on religion as a driving force for
civilizational progress. At the end of The Refutation of the Materialists he stated that Above all it
[Islam] will be the cause of material and moral progress. It will elevate the banner of civilization
among its followers.117 This shows that he had developed a much more civilizational perspective on
Islam than the Islamic philosophers and according to Kohn he therefore pushed the Islamic
philosophical utility of Islam in a novel and distinctly modern direction.118
Due to his shift towards pan-Islamism al-Afghani often emphasized in his writings and
speeches after the 1880s, the role of Islam could play in fostering unity and solidarity among Muslims
in order to become politically strong again. This emphasis on unity and solidarity mirrored the theory
of civilization of Ibn Khaldun. In his work, The Muqaddima, he approached the rise, decline and fall
of political dynasties in a dialectical and cyclist manner which was based on the opposition between
the dynasties of settled civilizations and the civilization of nomadic people. According to Khaldun
these nomadic people possessed, due to the harsh conditions on the steppe, a strong natural sense of
group solidarity, or what he called asabiyah. This key characteristic enabled them to acquire political
power and establish new dynasties, but once established they displayed the same weaknesses, luxury,
idleness and docility, as their predecessors. This made them vulnerable for decline and eventually for
defeat by the next nomadic people whom possessed asabiyah.119
However, in addition to this natural sense of solidarity among the nomadic people, Ibn
Khaldun also identified Islam as an alternative source for solidarity. In fact, divine revelation was an
even more effective source due to its universal appeal and thus a more stable basis for civilizational
progress. He recognized that Islam was a fundamental factor in unifying the Arabs in the seventh
century, which must have had an extra appeal to al-Afghani since he held early Islam in high
regard.120 Although it is obvious that al-Afghani was influenced by Ibn Khalduns emphasis on
115

Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 46.


Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 141-147.
117
Ibidem, 169.
118
Kohn. Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 403.
119
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 411.; Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought,172-174.
120
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 411. ; Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 172-174.
116

26

Islam as an source for asabiyah in order to enhance civilization, its dialectical and cyclist approach
did not fit into the framework of the nineteenth century Western theories of civilization. They were
based on the belief in a continuous progress of history instead of an cyclist belief in history. Also the
dialectical opposition between settled civilizations and nomadic people was not in accordance with the
nineteenth century opposition between industrial nation-states and feudal-agrarian empires.121
Of the various Western theories of civilization, the one of Franois Guizot appeal most to alAfghani. Guizots book, The History of Civilization in Europe, which was based on several lectures
given at the Sorbonne between 1828 and 1830, was translated into Arabic in 1877, three years after his
death. Still in Egypt by this time, al-Afghani did read the book and told Muhammad Abduh to write
a positive review.122 According to Kohn, various historians have hinted at the connection between
Guizots book and the writings of al-Afghani, especially Albert Hourani, but have not explored the
significance of it.123 Kohn finds it difficult to say whether Guizots ideas influenced al-Afghani
directly, or that they reinforced his already existing ideas.124 However it might be, the similarities are
striking and Hourani therefore states that it is through al-Afghani above all that it [the modern idea of
civilization] reaches the Islamic world.125
In contrast to Ibn Khalduns emphasis on solidarity, Guizot particularly stressed the
importance of religion in stimulating morality and intellectual development, which were according to
him the foundations of civlizational progress. He argued that Christian clergy in Europe maintained
the practice of science in the Dark Ages, the Christian theology encouraged people to behave morally
and the autonomy of the Catholic Church resulted in the separation of powers.126 Likewise, alAfghani, in his discussion on the three beliefs and the three qualities produced by religion, also
emphasized both morality and intellectual development as the foundations of civilizational progress.
In relation to morality, the third belief maintained that man has come into this world in order to
acquire accomplishments worthy of transferring him to a world more excellent, higher, vaster and
more perfect than this narrow and dark world that really deserves the name of the Abode of
Sorrows.127 Al-Afghani argued that this belief refrains people from dishonest and deceitful behavior
and thus instilled refined morals.128 The first quality, shame, prevented people from acting in ways
that would cause foulness and disgrace. He argued that shame was essential because it instilled in
humans the need to be faithful to their words and deeds, was the source of pride and zeal and

121

Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 411-412.


Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 114.
123
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 412.
124
Ibidem, 421.
125
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 114.
126
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 413.
127
Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 141.
128
Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 143.
122

27

encouraged humans to be virtuous.129 In the words of al-Afghani It thus becomes clear that this
quality has been and is the basis of all virtues and excellence, the motive force of all progress.130
The best incentive for intellectual development were the first and second belief. The first
belief was that there is a terrestrial angel (man), and that he is the noblest of creatures and the second
was the certainty that his community is the noblest one and that all outside his community are in error
and deviation. Al-Afghani argued that these beliefs led to rivalry and competition with other
communities in the arena of virtues, to the quest of being superior to and above all other
communities in all human virtues, whether intellectual, spiritual or material, and therefore encouraged
people to compete in civilization131 According to Kohn, al-Afghani took the Quranic ethics
underlying these two beliefs and reinterpreted them in the light of the nineteenth century context,
which was the common method of itjihad. She states that in the Quran the only criteria for superiority
is taqwa, or God-consciousness, which is reflected in the first belief. The idea that Gods community
is the noblest instilled in people a strong sense of group pride which encouraged them to compete
with, but also emulate, the achievements of other communities. Kohn argues that al-Afghani
obviously has in mind the scientific achievements of Europe and therefore these two beliefs also
contain an explanation of his ambivalent position towards the West.132
Another important similarity between Guizot and al-Afghani was that they both were
convinced that religion, if left unchecked, would eventually stifle civilizational progress. Guizot
argued that the institution of the Catholic Church was in general hostile to freedom of action and
thought, but was checked by the quest for freedom and the inherited Roman political institutions.
According to him, it were the tensions between these forces that created the conditions for progress.
However, Guizot was not that optimistic and maintained that if it was not for the Protestant
Reformation, or a return to the religious origins, the Catholic Church had stifled civilizational progress
even further and thus would have prevented the Enlightenment.133 In his Refutation of the Materialists
al-Afghani made the same argument about the Reformation and even cited Guizots work by
quoting that One of the greatest causes for European civilization was that a group appeared, saying:
Although our religion is the Christian religion, we are seeking the proofs of the fundamentals of our
beliefs.134 In addition al-Afghani argued that Luther, by rejecting the mere imitation (taqlid) of the
Catholic Priests, was following the example of the Muslims.135 He probably meant Muslims who
believed in his philosophical ideal of Islam in which religion redresses itself to reason; considers all

129

Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 144-145.


Ibidem, 145.
131
Ibidem, 143.
132
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 403.
133
Ibidem, 413.
134
Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 172.
135
Ibidem, 171.
130

28

happiness the result of wisdom and clear-sightedness; attributes perdition to stupidity and lack of
insight; and set up proofs for each fundamental belief in such a way that it is useful to all people.136
However, al-Afghani was convinced that the dominant Islamic orthodoxy in the nineteenth
century, like the Catholic Church in Europe earlier, was hostile to the sciences and in constant struggle
over domination with philosophy. In his Reply to Renan al-Afghani stated: It is clear that wherever
it became established, this religion [Islam] tried to stifle the sciences and it was marvelously served in
its design by despotism.137 And: Whenever religion will have the upper hand, it will eliminate
philosophy; and the contrary happens when it is philosophy that reigns as sovereign mistress.138 Thus,
in analogy of the Protestant Reformation, al-Afghani argued that a return to Islamic religious origins,
which he found in the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy and early and medieval Islamic
political thought, was needed in order to reset the Islamic world towards its path of civilizational
progress. And that it were in fact the tensions between Islamic orthodoxy, science and philosophy
which stimulated even further progress.139 Most scholars agree that al-Afghani, in his appeal to
return to the Islamic religious origins, was inspired by the Protestant Reformation, as put forward by
Guizot.140 If al-Afghani also considered himself to be the one to fulfill the role of an Islamic Martin
Luther or John Calvin is more questionable. According to Keddie, there is evidence for this claim141
and many other scholars have hinted at this.142 However, Kohn argues that this is only true in the most
general sense that he hoped to foment an Islamic Reformation.143 More importantly, Kohn has shown,
by explaining the significance of the concept of civilization in the body of thought of al-Afghani,
that his condemnation of the dominant position of Islamic orthodoxy and his defense of Islamic
orthodoxy as a vital element for civilizational progress were both part of his ideology to strengthen the
Islamic world. The only thing that had to be done was to evoke an Islamic Reformation. In this way,
Kohn has provided the coherence in the ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards Islam.
Coming back to the thee levels of the theory of Eisenstadt, we find, first, an interaction
between the cultural dimension of Western modernity, the Western theory of civilization of Guizot,
and the authentic religious model, in the form of Islamic philosophy and the Islamic theories of
civilization by Ibn Khaldun. As we have seen, with the first and second interactions, the specific
historical experience contributed to the direction in which the body of thought of al-Afghani
developed. But for this third interaction there is no specific historical event that contributed to his
emphasis on civilization progress. The only development that caused this was the general interest in
Western theories of civilization in the Islamic world, which found its way to this part of the
136

Al-Afghani, The Refutation of Materialists, 172.


Al-Afghani, Reply to Renan, 187.
138
Ibidem.
139
Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, 312.; Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 95.;
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,114-115.
140
Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, 312.; Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 95.;
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 114-115.
141
Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 95.
142
Tolan, Veinstein and Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, 312.
143
Kohn, Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization., 414.
137

29

Figure 1: the Body of Thought of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani

Islamic philosophy
Starting point: distinction between the intellectual
capability of the masses and the elite:
Masses: literalist scriptural interpretation
Elites: rational interpretation

One set of arguments

Other set of arguments

Rational interpretation (elites)

Literalist scriptural interpretation (masses)

Premise 1: humankind and the universe can be explained

Three beliefs:

by human reason and demonstrative rational proof (i.e.

God is the noblest creature;

science)

His community is the noblest and the others are in error

Premise 2: the Islamic sources provides positive

competition acquiring knowledge;

instructions for the use of reason and rational proof

Humans has come into this world to acquire

Conclusion: Islam and science are compatible

accomplishments worthy of transferring them to the afterlife

al-Afghani: same for modern Western science because

Three qualities:

science is universal and has no connection to any nation

Shame: will prevent humans of ding foolish and disgraceful

and is not distinguished by anything than itself.(i.e.

things and thus regulates social order;

modernization westernization). Islamic sources need to

Trustworthiness: the basis for human reciprocal relations

be reinterpreted (i.e. reformed) in a philosophical manner

and for government;

so that they are compatible with Western modern ideas.

Truthfulness and honesty: humans relies on the

Only in this way the Islamic world could strengthen itself

truthfulness and honesty of other humans in need for help

and oust the Western powers

Civilizational progress
Literalist scriptural interpretation: the three beliefs and qualities lead to solidarity and
unity(i.e. social order), political stability, acquisition of knowledge and thus to civilization
advance. Emphasis of al-Afghani on solidarity and unity pan-Islamism
Rational interpretation: human reason and demonstrative rational proof(i.e. science) leads
to civilizational progress. By reforming the interpretation of the Islamic sources Muslims can
return to the Islamic religious origins
Coherent ideology: both interpretations contributed to unite(pan-Islam) and
strengthen(reform) the Islamic world civilizational progress

30

world via translations. Second, the development of a concept of civilizational progress was part of the
reevaluation of all the key issues by al-Afghani since science, politics and Islam were all needed to
advance civilizational progress. Third, we examine the three elements of the quoted paragraph of
Eisenstadt again. 1) By publishing The Refutation of the Materialists, in which he laid out his concept
of civilizational progress, and by his journalistic correspondence with Ernest Renan, al-Afghani
participate in this new and modern universal tradition. 2) In arguing that religion was the driving force
for civlizational progress, he selectively rejected all the other Western theories on civilization in this
universal tradition in which religion did not maintain such a vital position. A return to the religious
origins was needed, as the West had done, to strengthen the Islamic world via civilizational progress
and thus to end Western domination. Also this shows that the shift of al-Afghani to pan-Islamism
was part of his ideology to enhance Islamic civilizational progress, but received priority because the
historical context obliged him to. 3) By developing a modern concept of civlizational progress, alAfghani incorporated the universal idea of civilization of modernity in his ideology, although a very
specific one, the theory of Guizot, without giving up his negative attitude towards the West, which
only exaggerate during the two decades of his life, or specific elements of his traditional identity,
Islamic philosophy and the theory of Ibn Khaldun. In fact, the concept of civilizational progress of alAfghani could not have developed without his negative attitude towards the West and these specific
elements of his traditional identity since his goal was to enhance the progress of the Islamic
civilization which was, according to him, prevented by Western imperialism. Thus, this new, however
ideal, collective Muslim identity al-Afghani tried to construct was an identity which was committed
to strengthen the Islamic world through civilizational progress by maintaining an interest in science,
philosophy and politics, but also a strongly negative attitude towards Western domination.

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Chapter Five
Conclusion
In this thesis I tried to show three things. First, I tried to show that, instead of the prevailing negative
discourse maintained today, there is an alternative, more positive and nuanced, discourse, known as
Islamic modernism, that deals with the historical problem of the complicated relationship between the
modern West and Islam. Second, in doing so, I tried to show that the best embodiment of this
discourse during the second half of the nineteenth century was the body of thought of the Iranian
intellectual and political activist Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. Third, I tried to show that applying the
body of thought of al-Afghani to the theory of multiple modernities of S.N. Eisenstadt, provides a
theoretical, and thus a new, explanation for the coherence in his body of thought.
The main insight that is drawn from this approach in relation to the first interaction is that by
emphasizing that both the modern rational model of the Enlightenment and the rational interpretation
of Islamic philosophy maintained the same starting point, reason and demonstrative proof, alAfghani disputed the modern scientific model as being distinctly Western in origin. This was a
distinct way of interpreting modernity because al-Afghani reinterpreted the rational interpretation of
Islamic philosophy and extended it to include the modern sciences. As a result, he dislocated a
universal element of modernity, the modern sciences, from the West and made therefore a clear
distinction between modernization and Westernization. In this way, al-Afghani was able to maintain
his negative attitude towards the West and did not have to give up a specific element of his traditional
identity, the rational interpretation of Islamic philosophy.
As stated, the interactions were interrelated and therefore the second interaction is complementary
to the first interaction because al-Afghani used the same method. He argued that the modern liberal
notion on what the necessary characteristics of the state should be, reflected in the republican and
constitutional forms of government, were also rooted in the Islamic philosophical Enlightened
Government and the first principles of early Islam. Although al-Afghani maintained that the
republican and constitutional forms of government needed to be aspired, he disputed the modern
political morality as being distinctly Western in origin. This was again a distinct way of interpreting
modernity because he reinterpreted, by exercising itjihad, Islamic political thought and extended it to
include individual freedom, constitutional government and representative democracy. As a result, alAfghani dislocated a second core element of modernity, modern politics, from the West and again
made a clear distinction between modernization and Westernization. In this way, he was again able to
maintain his negative attitude towards the West and did not have to give up a second component of his
traditional identity, his deep appreciation for early and medieval political thought. Thus, applying the
first and second interaction to the theory of Eisenstadt, provides a theoretical and new explanation for
the coherence of the ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards the West.

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The ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards the newly formed secular authoritarian states in
the Islamic world is only partly explained by the theory of Eisenstadt. As we have seen, he challenged
these states by calling for reforms which would result in a republican and a constitutional form of
government. However, due to the failure to implement these reform and the growing Islamic reaction
against the West, his negative attitude towards the West exaggerated to such an extent that alAfghani supported, in contrast to his previous position, the authoritarian Ottoman state of Sultan
Abdulhamid II. As we have seen, this ambivalent position is explained by his shift towards panIslamism. But, as I have argued, pan-Islamism was also a result of an interaction between Western
nationalism and the Islamic concept of milla, the Islamic people, and thus, in line the theory of
Eisenstadt, another distinct way of interpreting an element of modernity. In this way, it helps
explaining the ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards these authoritarian states.
The third interaction resulted in the formation of a modern concept of civilizational progress by
al-Afghani. This was again a distinct way of interpreting a element of modernity because alAfghani reinterpreted the philosophical social and political utility of Islamic orthodoxy and extended
it, by incorporating both the theories of civilization of Guizot and Ibn Khaldun, to include religion, in
his case Islam, as a driving force for civilizational progress. Thus, in this way, al-Afghani was able
to defended Islamic orthodoxy as a vital necessity for progress but, at the same time able to condemn
it, in emulation of Guizot, as to dominant and thus an obstacle to progress. As a result, al-Afghani
was convinced that a return to the Islamic religious origins was needed to strengthen the Islamic world
against Western domination, which he considered also as an obstacle to progress. Thus, with his
concept of civilizational progress, al-Afghani was able to maintain his negative attitude towards the
West and also did not have to give up a third specific element of his traditional identity, again Islamic
philosophy but also the theory of civilization of Ibn Khaldun. Thus, the theory of Eisenstadt also
provides a theoretical and new explanation for the ambivalent position of al-Afghani towards
Islamic orthodoxy. Considering all this, I conclude that every idea, view or standpoint on either the
West, the authoritarian states or Islamic orthodoxy contains a piece to the puzzle in order to find that
the body of thought of al-Afghani was in fact a coherent ideology.
To end this thesis, I would like to end with a note on how the body of thought of al-Afghani has
laid the foundations for future Islamic movements, particular in the MENA-region. However, due to
the wide scope of his body of thought, these foundations both inspired modernists as well as
fundamentalists. One of the most important Islamic movements is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded
in Egypt in 1928. Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder, was influenced by al-Afghani and
regarded him as the announcer. After the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal, or
Atatrk (1881-1938), the Muslim Brotherhood reaffirmed that the Caliphate was their ideal head of
the universal Islamic community and were also against British colonial rule, mirroring the pan-Islamic
ideal of al-Afghani. However, until that was achieved they held a modernist view of constitutional

33

democracy, although guided by Islamic principles, for the separate Islamic countries, reflecting the
approach of al-Afghani in which Islam and modernity are compatible.
However, although initially not a violent organization, around 1948 some members of the Muslim
brotherhood were convinced that speeches and social aid did not suffice and started to use violence
against the Egyptian government, culminating in the assignation of Egypts second President, Anwar
Sadat (1918-1981), in 1981. This split between moderates and radicals in the Muslim Brotherhood has
continued to this day. The radical faction gave birth to radical Islamic fundamentalism of whom the
most important ideologue was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). He argued that everybody who was against
the Islamization of the society, especially the secular state of Nasser, was regarded as a jahili, or an
apostate, and thus killing them is legitimate. Qutbs anti-modernists ideology, would later inspire the
founders of al-Qaida, Ayam al-Zawahiri (1951- ) and Osama bin Laden (1957-2011), which, due to
the devastating American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the current civil war in Syria , gave rise to the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This movement shares with al-Afghani the need for a return to
the Islamic religious origins, or the Salaf. However, in the body of thought of al-Afghani it were the
guiding principles of these origins that were reinterpreted in the nineteenth century modern context in
order to reconcile Islam and modernity. This stands in stark contrast to the literalists interpretation of
these religious origins by Islamic fundamentalists. Nevertheless, although that in their view Islam and
modernity are each others opposite, they are also a distinctly modern phenomena.
These radical Islamic fundamentalist have severely tainted the image of Islam, but it is just a small
minority in the Islamic world. The large majority of the Muslims in the MENA-region is building on
the foundations, laid by al-Afghani, of assimilating Western ideas, rethinking the Islamic traditions,
and a belief in the MENA-region that it can determine its own future. Among them are the new group
of public Muslim intellectuals, mentioned in the introduction. On the more broader scale, one might
conclude that the foundations laid by the body of thought of al-Afghani contributed to what would
culminate in the Arab Uprising of 2011, which ended at least some of the secular authoritarian states
in the MENA-region. In this way, these young protesters shared the one of the goals of al-Afghani.

34

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