Putnam and Cavell on the Ethics of Democracy

Author(s): Richard Shusterman

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 193-214
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191945
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PUTNAMAND CAVELLON THE

ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY
RICHARDSHUSTERMAN
TempleUniversity

Two of America'smostprominent
philosophers,
HilaryPutnamand
on the questionof
StanleyCavell, have recentlyfocusedtheirattention
thearguments
foritsjustification
and reconciling
its
democracy,
studying
defensewiththeclaimsofindividual
BothPutnam
andCavell
self-perfection.
notintermsofitsconcrete
rulesandpoliticalinstitutions,
exploredemocracy
butrather
as an ethicalidealthatis centralto whattheyregardas theprimal
philosophicalquestion,"how to live?" ThusCavell advocates"thelifeof
forits"powertochangepeople"byteaching
themtolivebetter;
philosophy"
whilePutnamdeclaresthat"theroleofphilosophical
atitsbest"is
reflection
"tochangebothourlivesandthewaywe see ourlives,"since"we all have
ofthinking
forourselveswithrespecttothequestionofHow to
thepotential
Live."'
This,ofcourse,was theburning
questionofnineteenth
century
Harvardbredthinkers
likeEmersonandThoreau,whoavidlypursueditnotonlyin
theorybut through
adventurous
in living(such as Walden).
experiments
Faithful
tothistradition
ofconstruing
lifeas thecentral
philosophical
project,
CavellandPutnam
chideprofessional
forignoring
ittoconcenphilosophers
trateon metaphysical
issuesthathavevirtually
no impacton howonelives.
By affirming
philosophy's
practicalorientation
to theproblemsof life,
Putnamand Cavell are likewisetrueto thespiritof pragmatism.
Bothare
especiallyinspired
byDewey'sethicsofdemocracy
andself-realization.
But
its allegedlimitations,
by criticizing
each attempts
a bettertheoryof the
democraticphilosophicallife.To continuethisprojectof reconstructive
I hopeto showwheretheirowntheories,
pragmatist
meliorism,
as well as
Vol.25No.2,April1997193-214
POLITICALTHEORY,
? 1997SagePublications,
Inc.
193

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194 POLMCALTHEORY/April1997

I beginwithPutnam,who,
Dewey's, requirerevisionand amplification.
unlikeCavell,firmly
identifies
himself
withpragmatism.

II
is explicitly
builton twoDeweyanlines
Putnam'sdefenseofdemocracy
as social andepistemological.
The social
thathe characterizes
of argument
aboutdemocracy
lineofargument
that
helpscombatthekindofskepticism
one thatwouldjustify
derivesfroma demandfor"absolute"justification,
interms
of"theworldas itis independent
ofourexperience"
democracy
(RP,
itsinsistence
thatknowledgeis always
p. 81).2 Dewey'spragmatism-with
thevery
situatedandhas impacton theplastic,changinguniverse-rejects
idea ofsuchan absolutepointofview.
andno needtojustifydemocracy
intermsof
Thereis thusno possibility
something
beyondtheexperienceand values thatsituatedmembersof a
of democracyis always already
community
alreadyshare.Justification
andbasedon itsvalues.It aimsat "giving
social,addressedto a community
reasontopeoplealreadydisposedtohearit,tohelpincontinually
a
creating
heldtogether
It is, as Putnamsays,
community
by thatsamedisposition."
"addressedto us as opposedtobeingaddressedtoeach 'me' " (RP,p. 183).
social in a further
Moreover,thevaluesto whichit appealsare essentially
sense: beingvalues of intelligent
discourseand action,ratherthanmere
valuesofphysicalorpsychicfitness(metaphorically
describedbyBernard
Williamsas the"ethologicalstandardof thebrighteye and thegleaming
coat,"RP,p. 182).
this"socialjustification"
Complementing
is whatPutnamcalls Dewey's
"epistemological
justification
a lineof argument
ofdemocracy,"
thatsimilarlyissues frompragmatism's
insistence
thatknowledge(and indeedthe
verynotionof reality)dependson a community
of inquirers.3
Putnam
formulates
theclaimlikethis:"Democracyis notjustoneformofsociallife
amongotherworkableformsofsociallife;itis theprecondition
forthefull
of intelligence
to thesolutionof socialproblems"(RP, p. 180).
application
How is thisstrong
claimsupported?
The argument's
first
premise,
Putnammaintains,
is that"epistemology
is
hypothesis."
Experiencehas shownthatknowledgeoftheworld,including
theworldofvalue,is bestachievednotthrough
apriorism
or acceptanceof
butthrough
authority
"intelligently
conducted
inquiry,"
whichincludesthe
formation
of hypotheses
and theirtestingin experimentation
(RP, p. 186).
thatpromotes
thefullestcapacitiesofforming
Second,thesocialcondition

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Shusterman
/PUTNAMAND CAVELL

195

andtesting
is surelya freecollaborative
hypotheses
ofinquirers
community
theirdifferent
exchanging
pointsofviewandresults.
Hence"theneedforsuchfundamental
democratic
institutions
as freedom
of thought
and speechfollows,forDewey,fromrequirements
of scientific
procedure
ingeneral:theunimpeded
flowofinformation
andthefreedom
to
offerand to criticizehypotheses"
(RP, p. 188). For Dewey suchfreedom
meanspositivefreedom
orrealempowerment
to applyone's thought
to the
ofselfandsociety.
government
Democracymeansactiveparticipation
byall,
ratherthansimplyleavingquestionsof governanceto expertswho are
entrusted
withthejob ofensuring
thefreedoms
andbenefits
thatwe wishto
enjoyfromsociety.
Dewey can defendhis participationist
model of democracyover the
oneofexpert-governance
consumerist
hisepistemologibyagainemploying
cal justification.
Despitetheirspecialistknowledge,expertsdo notknow
relevant
tothedirection
everything
ofsociety,
andtherefore
goodgovernment
needstheparticipation
ofallmembers
ofsociety.
Allthesedifferent
members,
theirdiversesituations,
through
possessdifferently
situated
knowledgethat
needstobe heardso as toensurenotonlya widerrangeofhypotheses
about
howto directsocietybutalso a widerrangeofcriticisms
andexperiences
of
thosehypotheses
thatare actuallytested.As PutnamstatesDewey's argument,sincethematerials
usedto assessandimprove
democracy
"cannotbe
inadvance,. . thereis noonefieldofexperience
circumscribed
[oroneclass
of people]fromwhichall theconsiderations
relevantto theevaluationof
come"(RP,p. 189).
democracy
Deweywas particularly
suspiciousofthe"cognitive
distortion"
produced
bytheprivilege
ofexperts:"A classofexperts
is inevitably
so removedfrom
commoninterests
as to becomea class withprivateinterests
and private
knowledge,
whichin socialmatters
is notknowledge
at all,"sinceitfailsto
see theexperienceand interests
of othersectionsof society."All special
privilegenarrowstheoutlookofthosewhopossessit."4The argument
that
expertsrulebestgetsitspowerbyassumingthattheyknowbest,thatthey
possess morethanall othersall the necessaryknowledgeforgoverning
Butthisinturnassumesthatwe knowwhatthatnecessary
society.
knowledge
is, thatwe know,forexample,whatouressentialhumannature,
needs,and
capabilitiesare."In contrast,"
PutnamassertswithDewey,"we don'tknow
whatourinterests
andneedsareorwhatwe arecapableofuntilwe actually
engageinpolitics.A corollary
ofthisviewis thattherecanbe nofinalanswer
tothequestionofhowwe shouldlive,andtherefore
we shouldalwaysleave
itopento further
discussionandexperimentation.
Thatis precisely
whywe
needdemocracy"
(RP,p. 189,WL,p. 217).

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196 POLITICALTHEORY/April1997
III

ofdemocracy
as "overAlthough
endorsing
Dewey's"socialphilosophy"
whelmingly
right,"Putnamfindshis "moralphilosophy"inadequatefor
treating
"problemsof individualchoice"thatarecentralto thecoreethical
hasinmindarethose
Putnam
issueofhowtolive(RP,p. 190).Theproblems
"individualexistentialchoices" of the kindevoked by Sartre'sfamous
and Humanism),
whoconfronts
theagoPierre(in Existentialism
character
nizingchoice betweenjoiningtheResistance(and thusleavinghis aged
withhismother
the
aloneon thefarm)orremaining
mother
(andforsaking
Resistance).
ofindividual
choice"cannotjustbe handledlike"social
Such"problems
wherewe aim "to
problems"of collaborative
empiricalproblem-solving,
'maximize'thegood"bychoosingthebestsolutionin termsof "estimated
utilities."For it is nota questionhereof obtaininggeneralsocial conseofwhatis goodor"right"
fortheindividual
quencesthataregoodbutrather
methodbut
(RP, p. 19O).5Suchdecisionscannotbe determined
byscientific
act of freedom
or leap of faithbeyondany
insteadrequirean "existential"
availableevidence.As Putnamforcefully
putsit:
whoactsonlywhenthe"estimated
utilities"
arefavorable
doesnotlivea
Someone
ofwhoseethical
human
life.EvenifI choosetodo something
andsocial
meaningful
is absolutely
no doubt,
or
valuethere
say,todevotemylifetocomforting
thedying,
I stillhavetodecidenot
thementally
thesick,orrelieving
helping
ill,orcuring
poverty,
should
whether
itisgoodthat
someone
dothat
butwhether
itisgoodthat
thing,
I,Hilary
Theanswer
dothat
tothat
bea matter
Putnam,
thing.
question
cannot
ofwell-established
inhowever
scientific
generous
a senseof"scientific."
(RP,p. 194)
fact,

Putnamtherefore
turnstoWilliamJameswhofamously
arguedthatwith
crucial,pressing
personalquestions(e.g.,religiousfaith)onehastherightto
exercisethewilltobelieve"inadvanceoftheevidence"(RP,p. 192).Seeing
thisJamesian
voluntarist
idea reflected
in Sartre'sandKierkegaard's
views
of existentialistself-creation,of "becoming who [one] . . . is," Putnamen-

dorsesitas thebestmodelforaddressing
thepersonalethicsofhowto live
torecognizesuchindividual
(RP,p. 191).6 Dewey'sfailure
ethicsis explained
as resultingfroma "dualisticconceptionof humangoods" thatdivides
betweena social-ethical
dimension
expressedintermsofrationalcollaborationand,on theotherhand,an aestheticdimensionwheretheindividual
finallyfindsexpressionbut only throughher private"consummatory
experience."

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Shusterman
/PUTNAMANDCAVELL 197
ForDeweythere
arefundamentally
tohuman
dimensions
two,andonlytwo,dominant
which
forDeweymeant
thestruggle
life:thesocialdimension,
fora better
and
society,
thereleaseofhuman
andtheaesthetic
dimension.
To thecriticism
thathe
potential;
sawalloflifeas socialaction,
on
fundamentally
Deweycouldanddidalways
reply
that,
thecontrary,
inthelastanalysis
hesawall"consummatory
asaesthetic.
The
experience"
a bifurcation
ofgoodsintosocialgoodswhich
with
thisanswer
isthat
areattained
trouble
theuseofinstrumental
andconsummatory
whichare
through
rationality
experiences
is tooclosetothepositivist
ultimately
aesthetic
orempiricist
division
oflifeintothe
ofexperiences
prediction
andcontrol
andtheenjoyment
ofexperiences
tobeadequate.
(RP, p. 196)

ThatDewey's "conceptionof humangoods" involvesa rigiddualism

betweenthesocial and theaesthetic-theone concernedwithimproving
scientific
societythrough
whiletheotherconcerned
rationality
simplywith
privateconsummatory
experience-isa verytroubling
charge.It is particusinceDewey'sdeclaredpragmatist
larlytroubling
agendawas to overcome
suchdivisionsbetweenscienceandculture,
societyandtheself,instrumendualismcanberefuted
talityandart.Butanysocial/aesthetic
bylookingmore
at Dewey'saesthetics
andhighlighting
carefully
an important
for
argument
thatPutnamignores,
democracy
oneI shallcall theaesthetic
justification
for
democracy.Beforetakingthisup, we shouldappreciatethefullforceof
Putnam'sclaimthatneglecting
theindividualethicsof how to live is not
merelya minoromissionin a theoryof democracy,
buta centralgap that
wouldundermine
thewholedemocratic
projectofmodernity.

IV
Putnamdrawsa usefuldistinction
betweenthreebasic conceptionsof
Westernculture(all seen to be inspiredby "the
equalityin premodern
Jerusalem
basedreligions")
andthemodern
conception
established
byKant.
The former,
Putnamformulates
as follows:
(I) There
issomething
about
human
beings,
someaspect
which
isofincomparable
moral
withrespect
towhich
allhuman
significance,
beings
areequal,nomatter
howunequal
they
maybeintalents,
achievements,
socialcontribution,
etc.
(II) Eventhosewhoareleasttalented,
orwhoseachievements
aretheleast,orwhose
contribution
tosociety
is theleast,aredeserving
ofrespect.
(III) Everyone's
orsuffering
happiness
isofequalprima
faciemoral
importance.
(MFR,

p. 45)

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198

POLITICAL THEORY/ April1997

Putnamnotes,"thevalueof
In all threeofthesetraditional
conceptions,
equalitydoes nothave muchto do withindividual
freedom"and "can be
reconciledwithvarioussortsoftotalitarianism"
(MFR,pp.46, 51). One can
andinterpreting
theseequalities
easilyimaginea totalitarian
theocracy
urging
intermsof"divinehumannature"
andthenrepressively
freedom
so
limiting
thatthisdivinenatureanditspromiseofeternalhappinessandsalvationare
One can imagineseculartotalitariannotperverted
byungodlytemptations.
ismsmakingsimilarmovestoensure"equality."
Putnamargues,Kantgivesa radicallynew "content
In contrast,
to the
notionofequality... thatbuildsliberty
intoequality."
Humanautonomy,
for
Kant,meansmorethanfreewillandourcapacityforreason.It is also "the
freedom
idea thatwe havethefurther
thatwe haveno knowledge
ofa fixed
endofwhathumanhappinessis,"sinceabstract
reasoncannotdetermine
the
contentof "an inclusivehumanend thatwe shouldall seek (unlessit be
the contentof
moralityitself,and thisis not an end thatcan determine
not
morality"[MFR,pp. 46, 49]). Our choiceof how to live is therefore
predetermined
or constrained
by anyknowledgeof theessenceof human
orhappiness.
nature,
function,
as Foucaultalso noted,7Kant urgedthe enlightenment
Consequently,
maximAudesapere:dareto knowbydaringto thinkforyourself.
Andthis
needto thinkforourselvesis likewisewherewe finda particularly
modern
democratic
conceptionof equalitythatalso impliesfreedom.
Since we all
haveto thinkforourselveswithout
priorknowledge
ofwhathumanessence
andhappinessare,thisabilitytothinkbecomes"itselfthemostvaluablefact
aboutourlives. Thatis thecharacteristic
withrespectto whichwe are all
equals.We areall in thesamepredicament,
andwe all havethepotential
of
forourselveswithrespectto thequestionofHow to Live" (MFR,
thinking
p. 50). This "is notjusta virtuebut. . . themostsignificant
moralcapacity
thatwe have,"onewhosedenialinanindividual
wouldmeanthatthedenied
"hasfailedto livea fullyhumanlife"(MFR,pp. 61-62).
Ifequalityis defined
insuchtermsoffreethinking
abouthowtolive,then
constraints
on thatfreedom
wouldthreaten
claimtoequalityas
democracy's
wellas toliberty.
Andifethicsweresimplya questionofsocialplanning
in
whichcollaborative
inquiry
bythegroupprovidestheknowledge
thatdeterminesall decisionsabouthowtolive,thentherewouldnolongerbe freedom
fortheindividual
tochoosehowtobecomewhohe is. Suchan ethicswould
be inconsistent
withmoderndemocracy.
ThesearethedeepworriesthatspurPutnamtoattackDeweyforrefusing
ethicsthrough
a bifurcation
individual
ofthesocialandaesthetic.
Butwe can
dispellsuchfearsand allegationsbyrecognizing
whatI call Dewey's aestheticjustification
fordemocracy,
a justification
based on the strongly
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Shusterman
/PUTNAM AND CAVELL

199

thatdemocracyprovideswhen
personalyetsocial aestheticsatisfactions
pursuedas "a personalwayofindividual
life"(LW 14:226).
We shouldfirst
remember
thatDewey'saesthetics
deniesanydichotomy
and aestheticconsummatory
betweensocial instrumentality
experience.I
developthesepointsin Pragmatist
butletme notethembriefly
Aesthetics,
here.In contrast
to thedominant
Kantiantradition
thatdefinestheaesthetic
in oppositionto practicalinterest,
Deweycelebratestheembodiedinterest
and wide-ranging
"instrumental
function"
of aestheticexperiencewhose
and overflows
stimulating
intoother
energybothenrichespresentactivity
in contrast
tasks(AE, pp. 140, 144). Moreover,
to a privatistic
he
aesthetic,
insiststhatart'sexperience
is essentially
socialandcommunicative:
"since
it is constituted
... by thecommonqualitiesof thepublicworld,"artis a
communicative
oftheexperience
ofthecommunity
"remaking
in thedirecorderandunity"(AE,pp. 87,275).
tionofgreater
Finally,Deweyinsistson theethicaldimension
ofaesthetics,
that"artis
moremoralthanmoralities"
(AE, p. 350). Aesthetic
is always
imagination
idealshigherthanthoseofconventional
suggesting
newvisionsor
morality,
modelsoflifebeyondthosetheindividual
hasencountered
inreallifebutto
whichshecanaspireinaddressing
thequestionofhowtolive.As iftoanswer
Putnam'sworryabouttheneedto go "in advanceoftheevidence,"Dewey
declaresthatartfosters
our"senseofpurposesthatoutrun
evidenceand of
meaningsthattranscendinduratedhabit,"such purposesand meanings
theexperiencing
enriching
selfbothaesthetically
andethically
(AE, p. 350).
If aesthetics
is notin opposition
tothesocial,instrumental,
andethically
personal,Deweycandevelopan aesthetic
fordemocracy
justification
based
on theidea of enrichedexperienceand self-realization.
It involvesthree
relatedlinesofargument.
Thefirst
is this.Anyindividual
ofa community
is
a social individual,
whothushas needs,habits,anddesiresassociatedwith
and affected
by communallife.Therefore,
theindividual'sfreeand active
indemocratic
participation
life-in thesocialbusinessofdirecting
associated
life as well as in the protection
and government
of her own personal
freedom-willmakeherexperience
andselfmuchricherandmoreinterestingthanifshehadnoopportunity
toparticipate
inthegovernment
ofselfand
society.Sincedemocracy
providesbetter
opportunity
forthefreeandequal
ofmoreindividuals
participation
ingovernment,
itcanprovidethema richer
lifeand is thussuperior.
As Dewey putsit: "Onlyby participating
in the
commonintelligence
andsharing
inthecommonpurposeas itworksforthe
commongoodcanindividual
humanbeingsrealizetheir
trueindividualities,"
and the"selfwhichis formedthrough
actionwhichis faithful
to relations
withotherswillbe a fullerandbroaderselfthanone whichis cultivated
in
isolation"fromthem(LSA,p. 20,E, p. 302).
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200

POLITICALTHEORY/April1997

is closelyrelated.
If nothing
The secondaesthetic
is "as
justification
as is concerted
consensus
ofaction,"
thensince
andas rewarding
fulfilling
suchactionit shouldbe valuedand
participatory
democracy
promotes
fortheexperiential
satisfactions
suchaction
pursued
like
brings.
Democracy,
"is consummatory
as wellas instrumental,"
communication,
and"shared
ofhuman
is thegreatest
experience
goods"(EN,pp. 145,157).Thethird
ideaofpersonal,
argument
appealsagaintotheaesthetic
enrichexperiential
itthrough
fordifference
ment,
butdevelops
andtheright
democracy's
respect
tohaveanddevelopherdistinctive
ofeveryindividual
onlife.
perspective
ofthefreeandequal(though
notnecessarily
identiDemocracy's
advocacy
ofalldifferent
ofpeopleinthedirection
ofcommunity
cal)participation
types
enriches
theexperience
ofeach.Itnotonlyprovides
lifegreatly
thespiceof
andnovelty,
butgivestheindividual
a heightened
variety
senseofherown
andidentity.
"Tocooperate
differences
a chance
distinct
perspective
bygiving
becauseofthebelief
toshowthemselves
thattheexpression
ofdifference
is
notonlya right
oftheother
butis a meansofenriching
persons
one'sown
is inherent
in thedemocratic
life-experience,
personal
wayof life"(LW
14:228).
In defining
democracy
bytheaimthat"further
willgrowin
experience
ordered
andinrecognizing
that
richness,"
thispursuit
willbeguided
by"need
anddesire"
thatgo"beyond
knowledge,
beyond
science,"
Deweyembraces
notonlyan aesthetic
butalsoan aesthetic
justification
idealofdemocracy
thataffirms
theroleofpersonal
ethicsandlife-choices
in advanceofthe
evidence.
as a personal,
anindividual,
"a
"Democracy,
wayoflife"demands
inthepossibilities
faith
working
ofhuman
thesamesortofwillto
nature,"
believethatPutnam
appealstoinJames
(LW14:226,229).Italsorequires
faith
inone's(andothers')
aesthetic
senseofwhichexistential
choiceswill
makea richer
butstillunified
self.Thesechoicesoftheself,Deweyinsists,
cannot
belegislated
fortheindividual
onthebasisofscientific
bythegroup
aboutsocialutilities;
findings
theyarerather
a function
ofone'sparticular
needsanddesires.
Explicitly
linking
democratic
theory
toaesthetics,
Dewey
claimsthat
aesthetic
justas significant
wholesmustbe"constituted
byparts
thatarethemselves
so"nosignificant
significant,"
canexistsave
community
as itis composed
ofindividuals
whoaresignificant"
(AE,pp. 207-208).
Blindto thisaesthetic
ofdemocracy,
justification
Putnam
falsely
condemnsDeweyfora bifurcation
ofthesocialandtheaesthetic
thatleavesno
roomfora personal
ethics
ofself-creation.
hewrongly
LikeRorty,
identifies
withtheprocedural,
Dewey'sdemocratic
project
institutional
democratic
of JohnRawls.ButwhileRortyfindssucha public-democratic/
theory
dualismconvenient
private-aesthetic
foraestheticizing
theethicsofself,'
Putnam
thisaestheticism
resists
andinstead
lookstoJames
andexistentialism
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Shustennan
/PUTNAMANDCAVELL 201

tofinda placeforindividual
ethics
thatdefiestheallegedDeweyan
dichotomyof thesocialandaesthetic.
However,
just as theaesthetic/social,
andaesthetic/instrumental
are false,so is the
aesthetic/ethical,
dualisms
dualismofsocial/individual.
Theindividual,
as Deweyinsisted,
is always
alreadysocial.Evenone'smostprivate
andpersonal
dilemmas
thoughts
thevoicesofsociety
reflect
onehasinternalized,
which
doesnot,forallthat,
preclude
one'sfreedom.9
Putnammayhaveoverlooked
theindividual
dimension
of Deweyan
democratic
because
ethics,
thesocial-insisting
Deweydoestendtohighlight
notonlyonthesocialconstruction
oftheselfbutalsoontheessentially
social
nature
ofitsself-realization.
individual
Although
"self-realization
advocating
as themoralideal,"heargued
thattheindividual
selfis bestfulfilled
notby
to itsindividuality,
butbyinstead
consciously
attending
to the
attending
socialrelations
andshared
concerns
that
theselfinforming
shapeandenrich
itsinteracting
environment.
"Self-realization
maybe theend"butpreoccupationwithselfis notthewaytoachieveit.For"tomakeself-realization
a
conscious
aimmight
andprobably
wouldprevent
fullattention
tothosevery
which
relationships
about
thewider
bring
oftheself'(E, p.302).
development
HenceDewey'srecommendation
forindividual
fulfillment
indemocracy
is notto cultivate
one'sdistinctive
consciously
selfbutto enrichit by
onshared
concentrating
interests
and"objects
thatcontribute
totheenrichmentof thelivesof all" (E, pp. 302-3).Thisdoesnotdenyindividual
expression
in lifestyles,
sincedifferences
in ourtalents,
situations,
and
inclinations
willmakefordistinctive
contributions
tothesociety
andvalues
weshare.
Nordoesitmeanthatevery
lifemustbedevoted
topolitics,
since
therealmof sharedinterests
is muchwider.Butit doesmilitate
against
extreme
concentration
on theself'spersonal
distinction
andmoreprivate
gratifications.
Deweypracticed
theethichepreached,
translating
hispersonal
questfor
self-fulfillment
intothesocialstruggle
fora moredemocratic
society
and
systematically
sublimating
(perhaps
evenrepressing)
hismoreprivate
concernsanddesires.
Ifhislifeproved
thatdistinctive
self-realization
isconsistentwithselfless
socialaction,
itfailstoentailthatthisis thebestoronly
wayforself-perfection
today.Nordoes it reallyprovethatdemocratic
self-realization
mustalwayseschewthecultofselfhood.
Ifcontemporary

societyis morefragmented,
selfish,
andprivatistic
thaninDewey'sday,then
self-realization
maymorelikelysucceedbytakinga moreprivatist
turn.This
is Rorty'sconclusion,
reinforced
bythefearthatattempts
toforcea unityof
socialandpersonalgoodwilllead eithertorepressive
self-denial
oroppressiveimposition
ofone'spersonalauthority
on others.

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202

POLITICALTH-EORY!
April1997

ForsakingDewey's unionof democracyand theethicsof self,Rorty

roleofprotecting
ourfreedom
tothemerely
consignsdemocracy
external
to
pursueprivate,aestheticself-fulfillment.
SharingRorty'sconcernforindiinDewey'sdemocratic
vidualismandfailing
toseeitsatisfied
Putnam
theory,
anddemocracy.
insteadseeksa wayto connecttheprojectsofself-creation
as expressingthebasic equalitythat
He does so by seeingself-creation
mustguarantee:
freedom
ofthought
abouthowtolive.
moderndemocracy
However,giventhebasic tensionsbetweenfreedomand equalitythat
thisstrategy
seemsfartoothintounitethe
Putnam(likeDewey)recognizes,
The valueofthinkingfor
andself-fulfillment.
oneself
questsfordemocracy
aboutone's distinctive
does notentailthevalueof thinking
self.
primarily
withdistinctive
Dewey's worryremains:preoccupation
selfhoodnotonly
impoverishes
theselfbutalso deprivesothersofcareandweakensthesocial
To relievethisworry
bondsofdemocracy.
thereseemsnobetter
placetoturn
thanto StanleyCavell's ingeniousethicsof democracy,
whosearguments
shareDewey'sstrategies
butsurpassthem.

V
Cavell's 1988 Carus Lectureson "Emersonian
seek to
perfectionism"
reconciletheidealsofself-realization
anddemocracy
thattogether
constitute
thecoreoftheAmericandream.Emerson'sadvocacyofindependent,
nonconformist,
self-perfection
Nietzsche'selitistUbermensch)
(onethatinspired
musttherefore
be shownto be consistentwithdemocracy'segalitarian
concernforgood andjusticeforall. ButCavell (likeDewey andPutnam)
wantsmorethanmereconsistency
through
compartmentalization.
He wants
thedeep,essentialintegration
ofdemocracy
andself-realization.
Indefending
theconsciouscultivation
ofdistinctive
hisambitious
self-perfection,
goal"is
notsimplyto showthatitis tolerable
tothelifeofjusticein a constitutional
buttoshowhowitis essentialtothatlife"(CH, p. 56). How,then?
democracy
Putmostbriefly,
perfectionism
is "essential
tothecriticism
ofdemocracy
fromwithin"by providingthe sortof caring,demanding,
critical,selfimprovingindividualswho can best guaranteethatthe institutions
and
of democracy
practitioners
will notrestcontent
withthealwaysimperfect
justiceand improvablegood theyprovide.Cavell developshis argument
a critiqueofRawls'sseminalaccountofdemocracy
through
as essentially
a
matter
ofinstitutional
rulesandprocedures
foradministering
justice.Praising
Rawls'sformulation
ofthegeneralprinciples
bywhichconstitutional
democracycan bothadminister
justiceand criticizeits failuresto do so "from

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Shusterman
/PUTNAMANDCAVELL 203

thatperfectionCavellnonetheless
insists
itsprincipled
within"
framework,
ismis also "essential
tothecriticism
ofdemocracy
from
andhe
within,"
ofperfectionism
as "inherently
undemocratic
Rawls'srejection
or
contests
elitist"
(CH,p. 3).
inhisdistinctive
Cavell'sarguments
resist
Formulated
clear
writerly
style,
Yetthemainlinesseemtobethese.
is necessummary.
First,
perfectionism
andprinciples
areonlyas strong,
sarybecauseinstitutions
just,andeffective
whoanimate,
criticize
and
them.
as theindividuals
apply,
Onlyperfectionism
to keepthedemocratic
canbuildthe"character
hopealivein thefaceof
withit"(CH, p. 56). Thisis precisely
disappointment
Dewey'sargument
bepracticed
as a personal,
must
individual
aboutwhydemocracy
wayoflife:
areno guarantee
fortheexistence
"democratic
institutions
ofdemocratic
... [while]
individuals
whoaredemocratic
inthought
individuals
andaction
fortheexistence
andendurance
arethesole finalwarrant
ofdemocratic
institutions"
(LW14:92).
oninstitutional
Second,torelysimply
ofjusticeallowsus to
principles
becomecomplacent
abouttheinjustices,
andwasteofhuman
brutalities,
opportunities
that,
giventhecomplexities
andscarcities
oftheworld,
arenot
excluded
bymere
totheprinciples
compliance
Cavellthuscontests
ofjustice.
Rawls'sideathat
bycorrectly
these
wecouldlive"above
following
principles
reproach"
(CH,p. 18).1oTheperfectionist
willnever
besatisfied
with
himself
andthesystem
as longas anyinjustice
ormisery
exists.
himself
Reproaching
andthesystem
fornotdoingbetter,
he willconstantly
struggle
to better
himself
andothers.
ifitis torealizethebestjusticepossible,
Democracy,
needsthisvigilance
andsupererogation.
Finally,
Rawlsseesperfectionism
as a fixed
teleological
principle
"directtoarrange
ingsociety
andtodefine
institutions
theduties
andobligations
of
individuals
soastomaximize
theachievement
ofhuman
excellence"
insome
setofvalueddomains.'1
particular
ButEmersonian
perfectionism,
Cavell
is noinstitutional
argues,
principle
promoting
somefixedhierarchy
ofends;
anindividual
itis rather
ethical
injunction
tostrive
tobebetter
anddosoby
theclaimsofdifferent
beingalwaysopentoexploring
ends.
Thesecritiques
ofRawls'sinstitutionalism
againreflect
Dewey'sdemocratic
oftheself,whoseidealofcontinual
ethics
growth
andself-perfection
as intrinsically
spurns
complacency
immoral
andrefuses
theverynotion
of
a fixedsetoffinalendsthat
wouldseta limit
togrowth.
LikeDewey,
though
moreinspired
clearly
byEmerson,
Cavelladvocates
a dynamic
selfdirected
atself-improvement
and(through
this)attheimprovement
ofsociety.
Conin themaking,
theselfshouldalwaysbe striving
stantly
toward
a higher
self.""Torecognize
"4unattained
yetattainable
theunattained
self...isa step
inattaining
it,"buttheprocess
ofstriving
is nevercompleted:
notbecause
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204 POLITICALTHEORY/April1997

we neverreachthenextorhigherself,butbecauseinreaching
it,we should
alwayssee yetanother
next,stillhigherselftoreachfor(CH, p. 12).
as "a processof movingto,and from,nexts,"demands
Self-perfection,
real courage.Not onlymustit overcomehabitand fear's"resistanceto
factthatweneedradical
internal
change,"butitmustalso facetheunpleasant
improvement
(CH, pp. 12, 16). For Cavell,thisborderson self-loathing.
"Emersonian
Perfectionism
requiresthatwe becomeashamedina particular
ourselvestoournextselvesanda better
wayofourselves"so as toconsecrate
ofdisgustwithora disdainforthepresent
society.Itinvolves"anexpression
stateofthingsso completeas to requirenotmerelyreform,
buta call fora
ofthings,
andbeforeall a transformation
oftheself-a call
transformation
and obscureas to makemorality
thatseemsso self-absorbed
impossible."
ofsuchself-perfecting
Replyingto theapparent
immorality
self-absorption,
Cavell questions:"whatis themorallifeapartfromactingbeyondtheself
andmakingoneselfintelligible
tothosebeyondit?"(CH, pp. 16,46).
In linking
self-transcendence
withintelligibility
toothers,
Cavelldeploys
forcountering
theradicalopposition
a Deweyanstrategy
ofselfandsociety.
The selfmustbe seenas essentially
dialogicalandstructured
bythesociety
it shares.Informed
notonlyby society'ssharedlanguagebutalso by the
different
voices it has heardand internalized,
the self cannotfulfilland
understand
itselfwithout
tooneself
regardforothers."Becomingintelligible
may accordinglypresentitselfas discoveringwhichamongthe voices
to expressyournatureareonesforyouto ownhere,now"(CH,
contending
theselfcan defineitsowndistinctiveness
p. xxxvi).Moreover,
onlyby its
relations
ofcontrast
andconnection
withothers.
Henceperfectionism's
withself,itsdemandfor"absolute
preoccupation
of theselfto itself,"is notaimedat narcissistic
responsibility
isolation.It
insteadcalls for"responsibility
of the self to itself,by way of others,"
"through
endlessspecification
[oftheself],bywayofexemplification,
inthe
world(ofandwithothers)."Cavellcallsthis"theabsoluteresponsibility
of
theselftomakeitselfintelligible,
without
itself'(CH, p. xxvii).
falsifying
Such generalarguments
of selfand
fprtheconceptualinterdependence
societyhardlydissolveall conflict
betweenperfectionist
cultivation
ofindividualismand theclaimsof democratic
community.
Theycouldnotdispel
willonlybe stunted
Dewey'sfearthatdemocratic
self-realization
bytaking
thanone's environing
one's own self(rather
community)
as theconscious
end-in-view.
Yet by applyingDewey's own epistemological
and aesthetic
Cavell can make a strongcase thatdemocracyis excellently
arguments,
servedby self-absorbed
The idea, in a nutshell,
perfectionism.
is thatthe
to perfect
one's individuality
struggle
andexemplify
it in thesocial world
willprovideourdemocratic
withattractive
community
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/PUTNAMANDCAVELL 205
Shusterman

and
is worthhavingandhowitmaybe improved
mendbothwhydemocracy
enriched.
servesthedemocratic
searchforbetter
Epistemologically,
perfectionism
threerelatedresources:an inspiring
life and greaterjustice by offering
abouthowbestto live,
exampleof untiring
meliorism,
specifichypotheses
relentless
demandforselfPerfectionism's
andcritiqueofsuchhypotheses.
andspurtoimproving
thesociety
standard
improvement
givesanexemplary
to keepthe
in whichtheselfis found.Notonlydoes itbuildthe"character
butitoffers
a potent
democratic
hopealive"in thefaceofdisappointment,
of the
way of recognizingthe value of otherselves by its privileging
nextselfwhois,as yet,another.
Thus"recognizing
unattained,
mydifferences
frommyself'(CH,
ofrecognizing
fromothers[is] a function
mydifferences
and intelligibility
p. 53). Since self-growth
requireacknowledging
others,
shouldpromotesocial changetowarda moredemocratic
self-perfection
meansbeing
"human"order.Perfectionism
andin others;
whichmeans,holding
oneself
in
opento thefurther
self,in oneself
which
oftheneedforchange;
as a
knowledge
means,
beingonewholivesinpromise,
whichinturn
meansexpecting
oneself
tobe,making
sign,orrepresentative
human,
as aninhabitant
nowalsoofa further
realm..., callthistherealm
oneself,
intelligible
ofthehuman-and
toshowoneself
torecognize
others
asbelonging
there.
prepared
(CH,
p. 125)

of individualistic
Cultivation
self-realization
also servesdemocracy
by
witha wealthofdifferent
thecommunity
providing
life-hypotheses
ofhow
to live.Thedemocratic
is involvedina searchforbetter
community
waysto
live andto providegreater
justice.By refusing
to conform
to conventional
waysof living,butinsteadconsciously
cultivating
one's individual
distinctionand exemplifying
it in theworld,perfectionists
providetheirfellow
citizenswithnewmodelsorexperiments
ofgoodliving,whosevalueis tested
theirlives, thusadvancingdemocracy's"conversationofjusthrough
tice" (CH, pp. 24-5).12
Throughhis nonconformist,
heightened
sense of self,theperfectionist
makeshimself
ofa veryparticular
representative
wayoflife,developing
his
ownspecial"partiality,"
sincetherearealwaysdifferent
waysoflivingthat
forsome,be better,
might,
andourfinitude
meanswe can onlylivein some
theirdistinctive
partialway.By presenting
lifestyles,
perfectionists
offer
alternatives
to conventional
lifethatwe mightadaptand applyto ourown
conditions.Still better,theycould inspireus "to let theirfoundingsof
partiality
challengeus tofindourown."Othersthusstandforselveswe have
notyetrecognizedor achieved;theyrepresent
"ourbeyond"(CH, pp. 58,
126).
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206 POLITICALTHEORY/April1997

offers
thedemocratic
an immanent
Finally,
perfectionism
community
of itsvariousvisionsofthegoodlife.Eachpartial
critique
lifeof selfanimplicit
perfection
constitutes
notonlyofanyuniversal
claimof
critique
butespecially
other
ofthenecessity
perfectionist
andvalueof
partialities,
to theconventional.
Suchcritique
conformity
ofdifference
byexemplars
seemsespecially
democratic
sinceitworks
notbyappealtosomeabsolute
that
deniesourfreedom
tochoosethelifewethink
endorfixed
standard
more
theexemplar's
critical
force
perfect.
Instead
derives
from
itsaesthetic
appeal,
overother
Theaimis nottorefute
itsattraction
theother's
waysofliving.
"buttomanifest
fortheother
wayofliving,
another
way."
is similarly
Themanner
ofpersuasion
herediscursive
"moral
aesthetic;
cometoanendandsomething
justifications
is tobe shown"-the
superior
incontrast
appealofsucha life(especially
tothemisery
thatcomplacent
of"goodenough
principles
justice"stillallow).Here,ethical"constraint
intheplaceoftheKantian
names,
a form
ofattraction,
therelation
'ought,'
to thefriend
orfurther
[another
is backednotbya
self];andjudgement
standard
ofjustice)butfronted
(a morallaw,a principle
of
bythecharacter
thejudger"
whosepoweris theattraction
ofthelifeandselfhebothdisplays
andstrives
for(CH, pp.xxix-xxx,
31,124).
As aesthetics
figures
inourassessment
centrally
andadoption
ofthebest
waystolive,so italsoaffords
anargument
forencouraging
individualistic
self-cultivation
indemocracy.
Besidesa greater
rangeofuseful
hypotheses
forliving,
individualism
offers
selfandsociety
thepleasures
ofrichvariety
anddistinctive
difference:
ofposition
is to be allowedits
"separateness
satisfactions"
(CH, p. 25).
Although
employing
theseveryarguments
forindividual
self-realization,
Deweystillcautioned
against
itsconscious
cultivation,
advocating
instead
thatself-realization
shouldbe sought
inselflessly
attending
toother
things.
Emerson
madethesamecaseforindirection
inself-perfection.
"I likenotthe
manwhoisthinking
howtobegood,butthemanthinking
howtoaccomplish
hiswork.""3
YetCavellmayhavean argument
whythisstrategy
willnot
succeed.Ifthemotor
forself-perfection
is self-critique
thatresults
indeep
shameor self-loathing,
then,unlesswe examineourselvescloselyand con-

thisshame
willnotsurface
stantly,
andconstantly
produstoward
perfection.
Cavell'sargument
ofwhyself-improvement
requires
self-absorption
is
presented
as anabsolute
claim,
astrue
fortheancients
asforcontemporaries.
Butevenifhistoricized,
itcanstillbeeffective,
perhaps
evenmoreconvincing.'4ForDewey,whogrewupwiththeCongregationalist
idealofselfless
service
anda deeply
entrenched
religious
senseofguilt,
themeliorative
habit
andsenseofcommunity
mayhaveseemedsufficiently
strong
tomotivate
self-perfection
through
socialservice.
Forseculars
steeped
inpostmodern
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/PUTNAMAND CAVELL
Shusterman

207

fragmentation
andskepticism
aboutprogress,
Cavellmayberight
thatonly
a strong
on oneselfcan generate
concentration
intense
enoughdrivefor
continuous
improvement.
is not
thisdrivemustbe fueled
Butwhether
byshameandself-loathing
rundeepinthehistory
ofphilosophical
which
andheroism,
clear.Narcissism
evenifegalitarian
democrats
life,arealsostrong
motives,
maynotwantto
canbeseenas a form
ofdemocratic
Cavell'sperfectionism
facethis.Indeed,
us toevergreater
efforts
to
heroism
in whichself-cultivation
encourages
eveniftheselabors
ofothers,
respect
thedifference,
claims,andsuffering
selfwhois represented
inothers
ofourownfurther
ofpursuit
taketheform
as "ourbeyond."

VI

anddemocracy
is extremely
Cavell'sreconciliation
of self-cultivation
entails
concerned
forothers
ingenious:
self-absorbed
perfectionism
respect
intheself'sunattained
areimplied
butattainable
sincethey
further
self.But
willthisstrategy
work?Does perfectionist
self-cultivation
reallymakeus
or is it,as Rortythinks,
indifferent
to thequestion
moredemocratic
of
inneedofrelegation
andtherefore
totheprivate
democracy
Since
sphere?
neither
inference
norcontrolled
seemrealopconceptual
experimentation
tionshere,
howindeed
dowedetermine
thisissue?Oneis tempted
toassess
its
Cavell'stheory
own
aesthetic
standards
of
not
as an
by
attraction,simply
abstract
lineofargument,
but(as heputsit)byits"exemplification"
inthe
lifeheleads.Hashisowncultivation
philosophical
ofindividual
perfection
madehimmoredemocratic?
Is Cavellan "exemplar"
whoseattraction
constrains
andinspires
ustotakea similar
(though,
givenourownindividualsoa somewhat
courseofself-absorbed
ality,
different)
self-cultivation?
Thesequestions
callforadhominem
clearly
arguments,15
academic
which
as anyfreshman
philosophy,
hasfirmly
knows,
outruled
as invalid.
Butif
isviewed
philosophy
asrecommending
a waytolive,sucharguments
cannot
bedismissed;
a philosopher's
ofliving
cansurely
beassessed
theory
interms
of theactuallifeit inspires.
Butif validandimportant,
howshouldad
hominem
considerations
bepursued?
Howavailable
isa philosopher's
actual
life,and howfaris it reasonable
and moralto probeit?Do we need
andprivate
investigative
reporters
detectives
toassessa philosophy
oflife?
he neverdirectly
Although
raisessuchquestions,
Cavell'saccountof
philosophical
an answerto them.It is embodied
livingsuggests
in his
advocacyofa toolofdemocratic
self-perfection
thathe rightly
criticizes
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208

POLITICAL THEORY /April1997

thetransformative
activities
of writing
andreading.
Dewey forneglecting:
what
we
are
to
Compellingus go beyond
already byexpressing
something
butattainable
self.And,in so
new,writing
drivesus towardourunattained
ofthisotherself,ithelpsus to appreciate
thevalue
showingtheimportance
we had not
of others.Conversely,
readingcompelsus to considerthoughts
of theotherselves
thusinducingnotonlyrecognition
previously
attained,
selfwho,byembracing
whowrotethembutalsothatofourownfurther
them,
is enriched.Cavell thusmakes writingand readingthe essence of the
as forhis
philosophical
lifeofself-perfection.
Speakingas muchforhimself
heroesEmersonandThoreau,Cavell insiststhatthephilosopher's
"writing
is partofhisliving,an instance
ofthelifeofphilosophy";
"hiswriting
is this
life."Or,sincewriting
andreadingaresimply"variations"
ofeachother,
we
of writingand readingis whathe claims as his
can say "the interplay
philosophy"
(IQ, pp. 10, 18; CH, p. 42)."6
In highlighting
as a valuablemeansfordemophilosophical
textuality
Cavellmarksa realadvanceonDewey.Butevenifwe
craticself-perfection,
as moreovertdemocratic
regardtextualactivityas important
action,one
shouldnottakeitas an adequatesubstitute
forthelatter.
Cavell's
Otherwise,
textualist
advanceonDeweywouldbe a graveregression.
Itmay,inanycase,
reflect
retreat
frommorerobustpraxis.His emphasisontextual
philosophy's
activity
conveys(as itatonesfor)theadmissionthatphilosophy's
truetarget
is theideal"cityofwords"(CH, pp. 7-8) rather
thanthedirection
ofactual
life.Deweywas notreadytoconcedethis,buthisconfidence
community
in
is
now
much
philosophy's
publicleadership
hardertoshare,thoughperhaps
notquixoticin all domains."7
democratic
as anessentially
Construing
textualwayoflife
self-perfection
mighthelpanswerthead hominem
questionsraisedabove.It suggestsboth
a criterion
forassessingtheattraction
of a philosophical
lifeand a way of
limitingwhatin thatlife shouldbe relevantforsuch assessment.If the
philosopher's
lifeis expressedprimarily
inhiswriting,
thentheattraction
of
thatexemplified
life mustalso be exemplified
in thatwriting.
So if the
ofa philosophy
persuasiveness
oflifeis intheattraction
ofthelifelived,this
inturnis intheappealofthelifeas written.
No wonderCavellhasturned
to
exercises"as inA PitchofPhilosophy.
"autobiographical
Butthereis dangerofgraveconfusion
here,becausethenotionsofwriting
anditsattraction
havea verydistinctive
forCavell.Writing,
meaning
forhim,
is notmerely
theformulation
oftextsandideasbuta deeplypersonal,
ethical
workof self-critique
andself-transformation.
It is (in PierreHadot'ssense)
a spiritual
exerciseoraskesisonone'sactualself.'8Ifone'swritings
transcend
one's self,itis onlybecausetheytranscend
itbymovingtowarda higherself
towardwhichtheyalso bringtheactual,livingself;it is notbecausethey
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/PUTNAMAND CAVELL
Shusterman

209

a higher,
constitute
merelytextualpersonathatis onlycausallyconnected
withtheconcrete,
embodiedpersonwhowrites.
forCavell,theattraction
ofwriting
Similarly,
cannotmeantheeasycharm
of an appealingwriting
stylelike,say,thatof WilliamJames.Otherwise,
Cavell'sphilosophy
wouldstandcondemned
Incontrast,
byitsowncriterion.
theself-conscious
ofCavell'swriting
aimsnottoflatter
thereader's
difficulty
taste(or Cavell's own) butrather
to challengeit and thusengagebothself
andreadermoredeeplyso as toeffect
theaimofself-transformation.
If one challengedhis "aversive,"difficult
styleas an obstacleto democracy'segalitarian
aims,Cavellcouldcounter
thatanimposedaccessibility
or
easy stylewould be false to the struggleforself-knowledge
and selftranscendence
thatis equallycentral
todemocracy's
He might
further
project.
arguethatevenapparently
obscureand difficult
texts(likeWittgenstein's)
canreacha wideaudienceandbeeffective
onvariouslevelsofunderstanding.
Indeed,despiteitsuncompromising,
oftentortured
style,Cavell'sownwork
has enjoyeda widereception
outsideacademicphilosophy.
The idea of simplyperfecting
and presenting
oneselfas a beautifully
written
textwouldbe condemned
byCavellas a debasedperfectionism.
But
sucha visionofphilosophical
lifehasindeedbeenproposed,
moststrikingly
in AlexanderNehamas'sNietzsche:Life as Literature.
Here "Nietzsche
himself... is noneotherthanthecharacter
[his]verytextsconstitute."
His
lifehasnothing
philosophical
todo "withthemiserable
littlemanwhowrote
thembutwiththephilosopher
whoemergesthrough
them,themagnificent
character
thosetextsconstitute
andmanifest."19
Thewholelifeofphilosophy,
thephilosopher's
verysubstance,
becomesa merely
literary
affair-nodoubt
a seductively
flattering
andcozyconclusionforacademicphilosophers
after
thelinguistic
turn,
especiallyforthoseofus withliterary
pretensions.
ButNietzschehimself
canbe invokedagainstthis.Inattacking
themodern
neglectofphilosophical
living,hecomplains:"Theonlycritiqueofphilosophythatis possibleandthatprovesanything,
namelytrying
to see whether
one can livein accordancewithit,has neverbeentaughtat universities:
all
thathas everbeentaughtis a critiqueofwordsbymeansofotherwords."20
In scorningtheacademictextualism
of theuniversities,
Nietzschereverts
hereto an ancientHellenisticdistinction
betweenrealphilosophical
living
andmerephilosophical
words.The beautyofa lifeshouldbe in theformer
andnotmerelyinthelatter.
Although
Caveli'sethicsofdemocracy
is notreducibleto a meretextual
itleavesitselftoovulnerable
aestheticism,
to suchan interpretation
through
itsextreme
emphasison writing
andneglectofotherimportant
dimensions
ofdemocratic
philosophical
life.Forisn'ttheremoretoknowing
howtolive
thanknowinghowto writeandread,evenin thespecial,moredemanding,
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210

POLITICALTHEORY/April1997

Cavellgivesthesetextual
terms?
Ifthephilosophical
sensethat
perfectionist
richconcreteness
lifeisreally
taken
seriously-that
is,withthefull-blooded
a fictive
thatlifeentails,
weneedtogonotonlybeyond
textual
personabut
also beyondtheideal"cityof words"andidealistic
of selfdimensions
thatCavellemphasizes.
We wantto knownotonlyhow
transformation
a philosophy
oflifewaspursued
andformulated
inwordsbut
attractively
it was embodied
in concrete
also howattractively
deeds,in ethicaland
politicalpraxis.Socrates'appealderivesnotsimplyfromits linguistic
ismostly
itssenseofinner
for
expression
(forthat
Plato's)andfrom
struggle
butlargely
from
theheroic
ofhisexemplary
self-betterment,
publicactions
IfDewey'sphilosophical
lifeanddeath.
lifeattracts
us,thisis notduetohis
asexemplified
intherepetiexpansive
goodwillandmelioristic
engagement
dullandprolix
it
tivereformulations
ofhisoften
is
because
hisactual
prose;
lifeembodied
tireless
democratic
praxis.
An attractive
ethicsofdemocracy
mustbe concretely
livedas wellas
In distinguishing
between
written.
mereprofessors
ofphilosophy
andtrue
Thoreau
insists
onthispoint:
philosophers,
is notmerely
Tobe a philosopher
tohavesubtle
noreventofound
a school,
thoughts,
butsotolovewisdom
astoliveaccording
toitsdictates,
a lifeofsimplicity,
independence,
Itistosolvesomeoftheproblems
andtrust.
oflife,
magnanimity,
notonlytheoretically,
butpractically.21

No oneknowsthisbetter
thanCavell,whofirst
reclaimed
Thoreau
and
Emerson
tocriticize
precisely
academic
retreat
philosophy's
from
thepracticaltaskofphilosophical
Yetbyemphasizing
living.
philosophy
as writing
andreading,
whilesayingnothing
aboutotherforms
of self-perfection,
Cavelldoesnotdo enoughto prevent
philosophy's
reappropriation
as a
textual
merely
activity.
Thereare,ofcourse,
alsoproblems
ingoingbeyond
a philosopher's
texts.
Ifwe assessa philosophy
oflifebyitsreal-life
embodiment,
philosophical
criticism
thenconverges
withbiography.
Heidegger's
contemptible
Nazi
collaboration
becomesrelevant
to his philosophy
of authenticity,
as do
Foucault's
concrete
actsofpolitical
rebellion
andexperiments
with
drugs
and
sadomasochism
to hisphilosophy
oftransgressive
truth.
Theirwriting
on
thesetopicsdoesnotsuffice.
istherangeofbiographical
What,
then,
details
thatcanbe relevant?
Anythatcanbe shownrelevant
bya goodcritic
who
understands
a philosopher
bothwritings
byinterpreting
andlifeinlightof
eachother.
Suchphilosophical
criticism
requires
notonlyanalytic
power
but
alsohistorical
skillsandpsychological
insight.

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Shusterman
/PUTNAMANDCAVELL 211

it is stillmore
on thecritic,
demands
putsadditional
If embodiment
his wayof lifeas
whomustexemplify
on thephilosopher
demanding
andethico-political
exemplary
writing
ashecan,notonlythrough
attractively
andstyle.
appearance
theappealofhisownpersonal
butalsothrough
praxis
of
his
evenin
be
"in
advance
should
age
Thoreau
urges,
"Thephilosopher,"
philosophifor
attractive
The
his
life"
quest
form
of
(W,p.270).
theoutward
ownbody,
notneglect
thephilosopher's
musttherefore
cal embodiment
ofhislife:
andquality
thenature
express
whoseshapeandfunctioning
a style
after
tothegodheworships,
ofa temple,
calledhisbody,
manisthebuilder
Every
instead.
Weareall sculptors
marble
hisown,norcanhegetoffbyhammering
purely
andbloodandbones.(W,p.468)
is ourownflesh
andourmaterial
andpainters,

philofora democratic
exemplar
Whatsortofbodymakesanattractive
butitsimply
extends
question,
sophicallife?Thismayseema ridiculous
of
with"howtolive"toa crucialdimension
andCavell'sconcern
Putnam
bothour
wecanreally"change
Thesomais a sitewhere
lifetheyneglect.
reshaping
livesandthewaywe see ourlives"(RP,p. 200) by literally
toourbodies.22
andourrelationship
ourselves
tothe
canalsocontribute
inthisdimension
self-realization
Independent
newhypotheses
andtesting
ofhowtolivebyoffering
discussion
democratic
aremostrewarding
andemancipaforms
andpractices
somatic
aboutwhich
ofbodily
advertised
standards
ofourhighly
Theconformist
oppression
tory.
Theseissuesofsomatic
canthusbe challenged.
andfunctioning
aesthetics
an
as "somaesthetics,"
belongtothefieldI define
careandimprovement
both
through
critique
taskforphilosophical
butmuchneglected
important
to thefullestlifeof
Bothare integral
practice.23
wordsand embodied
philosophy.24

NOTES
andCavellthatI use herewillbe citedwiththefollowing
1. The textsof Putnam

TheManyFaces ofRealism(LaSalle: OpenCourt,1987),MFR;

abbreviations:
HilaryPutnam,

Realism
With
a HumanFace,ed.James
Conant
(Cambridge,
MA:Harvard
University
Press,
MA:Harvard
1990),RHF;Renewing
Philosophy
(Cambridge,
University
Press,1992),RP;and
Words
andLife,ed. James
Conant
(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
University
Press,1994),WL;

and Romanticism
StanleyCavell, In Questof theOrdinary:Lines of Skepticism
(Chicago:
Handsomeand Unhandsome:
TheConstituChicagoUniversity
Press,1988),QO; Conditions
tionofEmersonian
Perfectionism
(Chicago:ChicagoUniversity
Press,1990),CH; A Pitchof
Philosophy:Autobiographical
Exercises(Cambridge,
MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1994),

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212

POLITICAL THEORY/ April1997

Derrida(Oxford:Blackwell,
AP; andPhilosophicalPassages: Wittgenstein,
Emerson,
Austin,
herearefromQO, pp. 10, 12; RP, p. 200; MFR,p. 50.
1995),PP. The quotations
oftheworld"is basedon
2. Putnam'saccountofthisdemandand"theabsoluteconception
theworkof BernardWilliams,whichhe criticizesin "BernardWilliamsand theAbsolute
oftheWorld,"RP, pp. 80-107.
Conception
to characterize
the
3. I doubtthatDewey wouldhave used theterm"epistemological"
hadforDeweyrather
thatPutnam
findsinhiswork,sinceepistemology
fordemocracy
argument
theterm"logical"in the
He probably
wouldhavepreferred
narrowandnegativeconnotations.
rational
generalsensehe gaveitas ordered,
inquiry.
IllinoisUniversity
4. See JohnDewey,ThePublicanditsProblems(Carbondale:Southern
IllinoisUniversity
Press,1989) LW
Press,1988) LW 2:319; andEthics(Carbondale:Southern
abbreviated
as E. OtherworksofDewey,all in thestandard
Southern
Illinois
7:347, hereafter
Artas Experience
abbreviations:
University
(SIU) editions,willbe citedwiththefollowing
IllinoisUniversity
(Carbondale:Southern
Press,1987),AE (LW 10); Experienceand Nature
andSocialAction
IllinoisUniversity
(Carbondale:Southern
Press,1981),EN(LW 1);Liberalism
to
(Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisUniversity
Press,1987), LSA (LW 11). Otherreferences
in theofficialeditionof his collected
will simplyuse thevolumenumbers
Dewey's writings
IllinoisUniversity
Press.
works-early,middle,andlate(EW,MW,LW) published
bySouthern
is tocriticizeDewey'sethicsfor
thenotionof"right"
5. PartofPutnam'saimin invoking
theidea of rightand dutyto questionsof good consequences.
it by simplyreducing
ignoring
"Like all consequentialist
views," Putnamargues,"Dewey's has troubledoingjustice to
ofright"as opposedtoquestionsofgood.Butthischargeof consequentialism
considerations
shouldnotbe takenheretooseriously.
First,itis validonlyforDewey'searlierethicaltheory.
ofthesecondeditionofhisandTufts'sEthics(1932),Dewey
By 1930andwiththepublication
insistedthatrightand obligation(and also virtue)were "independent
factorsin morals,"
irreducible
toconsequentialist
considerations
ofgood.(Putnammaynothavenoticedthis,since
he citesfromthefirstedition[RP, p. 189].) Moreover,we shouldnotethatPutnamhimself
thepersonalethicalquestionin termsofgoodrather
thanright("whether
formulates
ultimately
do thatthing,"
itis goodthatI, HilaryPutnam,
RP, p. 194).
6. In otherwritings,
Putnamalso linksJames'swilltobelievewithexistentialism
andnotes
James'sownallusionto Kierkegaard,
"theDanishthinker,"
whenadvocating
theindividual's
"therightof the
rightto believein cases "thatcannot... be decidedon intellectual
grounds,"
existentialist
to believeahead of theevidence."The difference
Putnamdrawsherebetween
is thatonlytheformer
andexistentialism
can see one's leap offaithas fallibleand
pragmatism
".subject
torevision.""WilliamJames'Ideas,"RHF,pp. 227,229.
in The FoucaultReader,ed. Paul
7. See Michel Foucault,"Whatis Enlightenment,"
Rabinow(New York:Vintage,1984).
8. I discussRorty'screativemisprisions
of Deweyandemocratic
theoryand ethicsof
in RichardShusterman,
self-realization
"Pragmatism
and LiberalismBetweenDewey and
22 (1994):391-413,andmuchmoreextensively,
PoliticalTheory
Philosophy:
Rorty,"
Practicing
and thePhilosophical
Pragmatism
Life(New York:Routledge,
1997),chaps.2, 4. See also the
The New Constellation
critiquein RichardBernstein,
(Cambridge,
MA: PolityPress,1991),
Two StepsBackward:
230-92,partof whichwas originally
publishedas "One StepForward,
PoliticalTheory15 (1987).
Rortyon LiberalDemocracyandPhilosophy,"
9. But we neverenjoytheradicalfreedomexistentialists
claim,because ourbehavior,
not
desires,andbeliefshavealwaysbeenpartly
prestructured
byhabitsthatareshaped(though
andpastexperience.
By turning
to
mechanically
determined)
byoursocialconditions,
training,
to maintainindividualfreedom
Putnamcourtsan
existentialism
againstsocial determination,

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/PUTNAM AND CAVELL

Shusterman

213

thatthisfreedomis
unhappyoppositionbetweenindividualand societythatrisksforgetting
ofsocialstructures
rather
largelyan emergent
product
thanan autonomous,
force.
oppositional
10.Cavellwouldregardsucha viewas a formofmoralism
inferior
toperfectionism,
morally
"theformofmoralism
thatfixateson thepresenceofidealsinone's culture
andpromotes
them
todistract
onefromthepresenceofotherwise
intolerable
Theotherformofmoralism
injustice."
"is theenforcement
ofmorality,
or a moralcode,byimmoralmeans.""Itis," Cavelladds,"to
JohnDewey's eternalcreditto havecombated,unrelentingly,
bothformsofmoralism"(CH,
p. 13).
11.JohnRawls,A TheoryofJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1973),325.
12.In thisconversation,
"is theideaofthecultivation
ofa newmodeofhuman
perfectionism
being,ofbeinghumanwheretheideais notthatthiscomeslaterthanjusticebutthatitis essential
in pursuing
thejusticeof sharingone another'sfatewithout
reducingthatfate,as it were,to
mitigation"
(CH, p. 25).
13. RalphWaldoEmerson,The Journalsand MiscellaneousNotebooksofRalph Waldo
Emerson,ed. WilliamH. Gilmanet al. (Cambridge,
MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1960-82),
vol. 15,p. 462.
14.Deweyincontrast
a historicist
suggests
outlookforunderstanding
andassessingtheories
ofthegoodlife.Although
he criticizes
forconcentrating
Epicureanism
on theindividual
rather
thanthesocial,herecognizes
thatself-absorption
maybe thebestoptionwhensocialconditions
aretoounfavorable
fora socialrealization
ofself.See hisEthics,202.
15. Such ad hominemarguments
thatappealto theattraction
of a lifecan cutbothways,
involving
thejudgeras well as thejudged.In otherwords,myjudgment
of whether
Cavell's
philosophical
lifeofperfectionism
hasenoughdemocratic
willbe a comment
(orother)attraction
notonlyon hislife,buton myownaesthetic
tasteandthelifeitreflects.
16.AtonepointCavellspeaksoftheself'sneedtoexemplify
itsintelligibility
notonly"when
wordsarecalledfor"butalso "whentherearenowords"(CH xxvii).Butthisvagueideais never
developed,and, as the above citationsindicate,he tendsto identify
the philosophicallife
withtextualactivity.
essentially
17.See mycase forphilosophical
inthepraxisofcultural
intervention
anduniversity
politics,
in Practicing
Philosophy,
ch. 2.
18. See PierreHadot,"Spiritual
Exercises,"in hisPhilosophy
as a WayofLife,ed. Arnold
Davidson(Oxford:Blackwell,1995), 81-125.Davidsonhimselfsuggeststheconnection
betweenthisidea andCavell'sviewofphilosophical
40 n. 91.
writing,
19.AlexanderNehamas,
Nietzsche:
Lifeas Literature
(Cambridge:
MA: HarvardUniversity
Press,1985),233-4.
20. Friedrich
Nietzsche,"Schopenhauer
as Educator,"
in Untimely
Meditations,
trans.R. J.
Hollingdale(Cambridge1983),187.
21. HenryThoreau,Walden,in ThePortableThoreau,ed. Carl Bode (New York:Viking,
1969),270; henceforth
abbreviated
W.
22. PutnamandCavell,ofcourse,recognizeourembodiedcondition.
As Putmancritiques
mind-body
dualism(e.g.,WL,pp.3-61),so CavellpraisesAustin'saccountofexcusesforturning
attention
to "something
philosophywould love to ignore-to the factthathumanlife is
constrained
tothelifeofthehumanbody,towhatEmersoncallsthegiantI alwaystakewithme.
The law ofthebodyis thelaw."Butin treating
embodiment
as governed
byunmodifiable
law
beyondourcontrolandthusconstituting
therealmforexcuses,Cavelleffectively
excludesthe
bodyfromhis perfectionist
project.In contrast
to bodilyefforts,
"thesayingof wordsis not
excusable"andmarkstherealmofresponsibility.
Henceitis herethatCavellurgesperfectionist
striving,
assuming"theunending
responsibility
of responsiveness,
of answerability,
to make

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214

POLITICALTHEORY/April1997

Similar
demands
[oneself]
intelligible."
notfully
(eveniflikewise
directed
achievable)
mightbe
anditishard
toseehowCavellwouldwishtoseparate
toward
somatic
improvement,
words
and
voicefrom
thebodyfrom
which
issueandinwhich
they
resonate.
they
herefrom
Quotations
PP,pp.53,63,65;cf.AP,pp.87,125.
23. I takealltheseissuesupinmyrecent
book,PracticingPhilosophy,
which
contains
a
onsomatic
chapter
Fora comparative
ofsomeoftoday's
experience.
analysis
more
popular
and
ofemancipatory
promising
somatic
techniques
self-realization
(e.g.,Alexander
Technique,
Feldenkrais
andBioenergetics),
Method,
seeRichard
"Die SorgeumdenKorper
Shusterman,
inderheutigen
inPhilosophische
Kultur,"
Ansichten
derKulturderModerne,
ed.A.Kuhlmann
(Frankfurt:
Fischer,
1994),241-77.
ofthevagueandsomewhat
24.Clarification
contested
notion
ofthephilosophical
lifecan
inmybookPracticingPhilosophy,
be found
whichhasprofited
from
Pierre
Hadot's
gready
seminal
ofthisnotion
inancient
SeeHadot,
study
philosophy.
as a WayofLife,ed.
Philosophy
Davidson.
Myunderstanding
ofthephilosophical
lifehasalsobeenimproved
bydiscussions
withAmoldDavidson,
James
Alexander
andJames
Miller,
Conant.
Nehamas,

RichardShusterman
is professor
ofphilosophy
at TempleUniversity
and directeur
de
programme
attheCollegeInternational
de Philosophie,
Paris.His severalbooksinclude
AnalyticAesthetics,
Pragmatist
Sous l'intepr6tation,
Aesthetics,
and mostrecently,
Practicing
Philosophy:
Pragmatism
andthePhilosophical
Life.

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