Set 7 Final

It does not matter where I came from nor where I am heading.what matters is I AM STILL HERE !!!
POWERS of CONGRESS
General Plenary Powers
---------------------------------G.R. No. 176951
November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY
OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,
CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY
OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499
November 18, 2008
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056
November 18, 2008
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
It does not matter where I came from nor where I am heading.what matters is I AM STILL HERE !!! 2
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog,
and Jerry P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood
Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale
for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the
Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved
the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the
President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than
five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA
9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids
in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like
the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.
Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government
Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15
Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue
Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal
standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful
expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what
the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirtythree cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without
the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29
filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual
cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed
into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became
effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the
cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of
non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood
Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in
any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law,
not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that
the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment
the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100
million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after
the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption
must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to
implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same
share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed
because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government
units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain,
clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the
law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice,
then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills
were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to
go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the
various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended
exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not.
This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an
amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the
conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the
Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other
law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption
found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters
in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private
corporation through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became
mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the
11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th
or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become
functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the
next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the
bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first
time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished
Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its
consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be
resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the
term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100
million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation
of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code,
could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in
the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local
Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City
of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one
sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood
bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy
the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification
between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related
to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only,
and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not
a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual
income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had
they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These
municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now
convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is
illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In
Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and
may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples
are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to
the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or
laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged
provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest
of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a
given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees
do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the
provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business.
In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of
the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the
exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491.
SO ORDERED.
--------------------------------------------
Doctrine of Non-delegation of Legislative Powers

-------------------------------------------------------
People of the Philippines vs Vera
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937

En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of
United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng
for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the
judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed
an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative
of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The
private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards
through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial
fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs
no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can
be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation
system.
-------------
US v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Facts:
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1, authorizing the
governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue
and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho
was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53.
Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
Issue:
Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying
out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures
is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under
what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left
to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or
what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of
facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which
rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There
may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been
an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and
rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand. The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different
prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power
to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies,
who are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the
delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any
cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice
or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to
grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature
did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or
corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because
the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the
price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
----------------------------
Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
[Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which
stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in'
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
----------------
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569
Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat
of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can
he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created
by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without
creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec.
68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such
will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as
the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
--------------------------
Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil
industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any
person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or
domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such
crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff
rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.
Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own
refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined
crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit.
Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the
market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of
increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart
before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with
heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in
our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as
it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to
meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
--------------Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
[Nov. 5, 1997]
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug.
12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of
Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not
provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n
the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully
deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided
that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline as meaning to take a
downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards
set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is
bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no
powers to make laws.
--------------------G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD,
and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the general public.
They are enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to their comfort and
convenience. As such, public utility services are impressed with public interest and concern. The same is true
with respect to the business of common carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that
there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation when private properties are affected with public
interest, hence, they cease to be juris privati only. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
the control by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. 1
An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government agencies of their functions as the instant petition
seeks to show, is indeed lamentable. Not only is it an unsound administrative policy but it is inimical to public
trust and public interest as well.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars
and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney
operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the
LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix
and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a
presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience (CPC) and place on the
oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of
Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be
"just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden
to prove his own affirmative allegations. 3 The offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances
pointed out by petitioner, have resulted in the introduction into our highways and thoroughfares thousands of
old and smoke-belching buses, many of which are right-hand driven, and have exposed our consumers to the
burden of spiraling costs of public transportation without hearing and due process.
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a)
DOTC Memorandum Order 90-395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme
for provincial bus services in the country; (b) DOTC Department Order No.
92-587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services; (c)
DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to implement Department
Order No. 92-587; (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, providing implementing guidelines on the
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587; and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112.
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within
a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. The text of the
memorandum order reads in full:
One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the thrusts and the priorities set out in the
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 1992) is the liberalization of regulations in the
transport sector. Along this line, the Government intends to move away gradually from regulatory policies and
make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies are already charging passenger rates above and
below the official fare declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is in this context that some form of
liberalization on public transport fares is to be tested on a pilot basis.
In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial
bus routes in country (except those operating within Metro Manila). Transport Operators shall be allowed to
charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%) below the LTFRB
official rate for a period of one year.
Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be prepared by LTFRB in coordination with the DOTC
Planning Service.
The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start on 6 August 1990.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted
the following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit:
With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19
July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in
the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" that will allow operators "to charge passengers
within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one year" the undersigned is respectfully adverting the Secretary's attention to the following for his
consideration:
1. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and determination of rates
(a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there should be a publication
and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the
fixing of the rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare range scheme on August 6 without complying
with the requirements of the Public Service Act may not be legally feasible.
2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen (15%) above the present LTFRB fares in the
wake of the devastation, death and suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted
and will be politically unsound; most likely public criticism against the DOTC and the LTFRB will be triggered by
the untimely motu propio implementation of the proposal by the mere expedient of publicizing the fare range
scheme without calling a public hearing, which scheme many as early as during the Secretary's predecessor
know through newspaper reports and columnists' comments to be Asian Development Bank and World Bank
inspired.
3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) the implementation of the proposal
will instead trigger an upward adjustment in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) at a time when hundreds of
thousands of people in Central and Northern Luzon, particularly in Central Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio City,
Nueva Ecija, and the Cagayan Valley are suffering from the devastation and havoc caused by the recent
earthquake.
4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies involved in public transportation can consider
measures and reforms in the industry that will be socially uplifting, especially for the people in the areas
devastated by the recent earthquake.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned respectfully suggests that the implementation of the
proposed fare range scheme this year be further studied and evaluated.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos
(P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%)
percent over and below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare
range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per
kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought.
On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board
increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the
drop in the expected price of diesel.
The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that
the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the
rate of return of the proposed increase in rates.
On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in
accordance with the following schedule of fares on a straight computation method, viz:
AUTHORIZED FARES
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
VISAYAS/MINDANAO
REGULAR P1.60 P0.375
STUDENT P1.20 P0.285
FIRST CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.385
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.405
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415. 4
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes
Prado issued Department Order No.
92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text of the said order is
reproduced below in view of the importance of the provisions contained therein:
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as the primary policy, planning, regulating and implementing agency on
transportation;
WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and dependable transportation system, the
transportation regulatory agencies under or attached to the DOTC have to harmonize their decisions and adopt
a common philosophy and direction;
WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the successful liberalization measures pursued over the last
five years and bring the transport sector nearer to a balanced longer term regulatory framework;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws to the DOTC, the following policies and principles
in the economic regulation of land, air, and water transportation services are hereby adopted:
1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no franchise
holder shall be permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A minimum of two franchise holders shall be
permitted to operate on any route.
The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate of public convenience, shall be: proof of
Filipino citizenship, financial capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover to protect the riding public.
In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant.
The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the oppositor(s).
In the interest of providing efficient public transport services, the use of the "prior operator" and the "priority
of filing" rules shall be discontinued. The route measured capacity test or other similar tests of demand for
vehicle/vessel fleet on any route shall be used only as a guide in weighing the merits of each franchise
application and not as a limit to the services offered.
Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested road space in urban areas, or at airports and ports,
the use of demand management measures in conformity with market principles may be considered.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as a business decision, subject only to the filing of
appropriate notice and following a phase-out period, to inform the public and to minimize disruption of
services.
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually from government controls. Passenger fares
shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (normally third class passenger
transport) for which the government will fix indicative or reference fares. Operators of particular services may
fix their own fares within a range 15% above and below the indicative or reference rate.
Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on specific routes, or for the transport of particular
commodities, maximum mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be set temporarily by the
government pending actions to increase the level of competition.
For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall contract such services in the most advantageous
terms to the public and the government, following public bids for the services. The advisability of bidding out
the services or using other kinds of incentives on such routes shall be studied by the government.
3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a matter of policy, the government shall not
engage in special financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for fleet acquisition and
expansion. Only when the market situation warrants government intervention shall programs of this type be
considered. Existing programs shall be phased out gradually.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime Industry
Authority are hereby directed to submit to the Office of the Secretary, within forty-five (45) days of this Order,
the detailed rules and procedures for the Implementation of the policies herein set forth. In the formulation of
such rules, the concerned agencies shall be guided by the most recent studies on the subjects, such as the
Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study, the Civil Aviation Master Plan, the Presidential Task Force on the
Inter-island Shipping Industry, and the Inter-island Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study.
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours)
On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the
adoption of rules and procedures to implement above-quoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down
deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector. Attached to the said memorandum was a
revised draft of the required rules and procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii)
Rate and Fare Setting, with comments and suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise,
resplendent from the said memorandum is the statement of the DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules
and procedures is a pre-requisite to the approval of the Economic Integration Loan from the World Bank. 5
On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The
Circular provides, among others, the following challenged portions:
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience.
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of public
need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that there is no need for
the proposed service shall be the oppositor'(s).
xxx xxx xxx
V. Rate and Fare Setting
The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of
service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public
hearing.
A. On the General Structure of Rates
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys
shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or
reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first class and premier services.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours).
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first
having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase
of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16,
1994.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus
fares.
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby DISMISSES FOR
LACK OF MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this case was resolved with
dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the legal remedies or options it is
entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing
respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum
circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior
to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of
buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.
Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus
twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without
having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a
presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove
public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.
In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by the
petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the
petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs
prayed for.
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant
suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish
a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
In Lamb v. Phipps, 7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between
parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of
locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and
substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision
so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers in his behalf. 8
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable
injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has
shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the
challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and
jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They
are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected,
not neglected nor ignored.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside
this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party.
In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., 9 we ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
[G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta
v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner
of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)], this Court
brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino
vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is
not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680
[1972]) or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA
333 (1976)].
xxx xxx xxx
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as
it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and
to elective officials of both Houses of Congress (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA
479 [1965]); (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which
allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act (Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991];
(d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections (Osmea v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA
750 [1991]); (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the
ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and order (Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]).
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the validity
or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No.
3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and
1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the
COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976 (Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi,
Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the
Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site
of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha
only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374 [1989];
Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of
the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs,
and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties
(Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 [1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6
December 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did
not allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454
[1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil products
(Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections
concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians (De Guia vs.
Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the
Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]).
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its
unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to
pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia
v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a
standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the
importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the
apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."
Now on the merits of the case.
On the fare range scheme.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have power, upon
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations
and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed
thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed
by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within
thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected:
Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily
for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation
with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. (Emphasis ours).
xxx xxx xxx
Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power
of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested
with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order
authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates
and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of
administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of
determining sensitive and delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the
power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may
implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither
have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over
and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. 10 A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. 11 The policy of
allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a
chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them
or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. In Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., 12 where
respondent Philippine Railway Co. was granted by the Public Service Commission the authority to change its
freight rates at will, this Court categorically declared that:
In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine Railway
Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so in order to meet the
competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or to regard its present rates
as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to
its advantage to do so.
The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it is
untenable. The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of
public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that power to a common
carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved
or fixed by the Public Service Commission, and any change in such rates must be authorized or approved by
the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may,
of course, propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make
said new rates effective without the approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service
Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce new rates without the prior approval of said
rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are submitted to it, if the
evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission
cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co. will be just and
reasonable, because it does not know what those rates will be.
In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight rates at will.
It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to meet
competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a procedure would create a most
unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the public service law. 13 (Emphasis ours).
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators
will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the
authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare
that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB authorized provincial bus operators to collect a thirtyseven (P0.37) centavo per kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the same time, they were allowed to impose
and collect a fare range of plus or minus 15% over the authorized rate. Thus P0.37 centavo per kilometer
authorized fare plus P0.05 centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 centavos) is equivalent to P0.42 centavos, the
allowed rate in 1990. Supposing the LTFRB grants another five (P0.05) centavo increase per kilometer in
1994, then, the base or reference for computation would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05
centavos). If bus operators will exercise their authority to impose an additional 20% over and above the
authorized fare, then the fare to be collected shall amount to P0.56 (that is, P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus
20% of P0.47 which is P0.29). In effect, commuters will be continuously subjected, not only to a double fare
adjustment but to a compounding fare as well. On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a bigger chunk of
the pie. Aside from fare increase applied for, they can still collect an additional amount by virtue of the
authorized fare range. Mathematically, the situation translates into the following:
Year** LTFRB authorized Fare Range Fare to be
rate*** collected per
kilometer
1990 P0.37 15% (P0.05) P0.42
1994 P0.42 + 0.05 = 0.47 20% (P0.09) P0.56
1998 P0.56 + 0.05 = 0.61 20% (P0.12) P0.73
2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94
Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that
requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable
rate acceptable to both the public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into
consideration before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an
operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities
to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments.
On the other hand, a rate which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate,
therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of
commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and
profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The people,
represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to
any fare increase.
The present administrative procedure, 14 to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory
arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested
party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due
process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. 15 Discarding
such procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.
On the presumption of public need.
A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land
transportation services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act,
as amended, the following requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant
must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company
constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or paid-up
capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of
undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation; and (iii) the
applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business
will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper
notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC.
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92009, Part IV, provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. The
guidelines states:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of public
need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need
for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. (Emphasis ours).
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public
Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and
hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable
manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline states that the presumption of public need for a public service
shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order,
the former must prevail.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need.
16 As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the
proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing
facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or
non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by
evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public
hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look
out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is founded on the condition that after full-dress hearing
and investigation, it shall find, as a fact, that the proposed operation is for the convenience of the public. 17
Basic convenience is the primary consideration for which a CPC is issued, and that fact alone must be
consistently borne in mind. Also, existing operators in subject routes must be given an opportunity to offer
proof and oppose the application. Therefore, an applicant must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity
and capability to furnish the service which he has undertaken to
render. 18 And all this will be possible only if a public hearing were conducted for that purpose.
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled and
institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the
proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the offending provisions of
the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another
disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court. Such usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. 19
Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may not be ideal at all in our country given the
present circumstances. Advocacy of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is tantamount to an
abdication by the government of its inherent right to exercise police power, that is, the right of government to
regulate public utilities for protection of the public and the utilities themselves.
While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the
transport sector, we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum
Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the
said administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on
March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and
effect. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No.
90-395 and DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications
between administrative officers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum
Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary
to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney
operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a
presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and
placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined
the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars,
memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------------
Abakada Guro v. Ermita

Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 168056) - Digest
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took
effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response
to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of valueadded tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication
by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI
Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be
included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls
or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to
republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of
Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law
also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify
the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a
complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to
determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the
manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made
the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It
leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order.
Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any
of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear
directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by
December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the
national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of
these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such
information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary
of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of
the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done,
who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the
law.
-------------------------------
ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. With this backdrop, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:(1) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying
or implementing its own laws.
On pork barrel Issue

-------------------G.R. No. 164987
April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO
PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA,
GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO,
ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS
MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA
SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE
ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in
representation of the Members of the Congress, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of
the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.)
9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of
political, economic or social monopoly in the country,1 also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of
Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the
Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.
On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed a
Reply thereto.2 On April 26, 2005, both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder P
8,327,000,000.00
Xxxxx
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such
amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized
allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be
purchased from the National Food Authority.
Petitioners Position
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual
Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. "In
previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main features of the pork barrel system
technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present
law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004).3 In its memorandum, LAMP insists that "[t]he silence in the law of direct or
even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive
and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork barrel system."4 In other words, "[t]he omission of the
PDAF provision to specify sums as allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus
signifying an omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply."5 Hence, LAMP is
of the conclusion that "the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004."6
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM illegally
made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of Congress; and
2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded
by PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was
made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress cannot "virtually tell or dictate upon
the Executive Department how to spend taxpayers money. Further, the authority to propose and select
projects does not pertain to legislation. "It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,"8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. The
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation
granted to Congress as a collegial body, "does not include the power of the Members thereof to individually
propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which
essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department."9 By allowing the Members of Congress to
receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual
spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally
repugnant.
Respondents Position
For their part, the respondents10 contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although
they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that the former should not be equated with "pork
barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording political
opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot
stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media
reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators
have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners
plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in
the guise of "pork barrel," is a source of "dirty money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who
tend to misuse their allocations. These "facts" have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition
accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the
claim that Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF
allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved
budget for a particular project. 13 Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF
must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF
directly or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.
Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are "appropriations for substantially similar, if not the same, beneficial
purposes," 14 the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,15 where CDF was described as an imaginative
and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects specified in the law. In
Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority
projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that
individual members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to
be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
The Issues
The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and legal basis to
support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial reviewan actual case or controversy.
The Courts Ruling
To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise
of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of
Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to
wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.16
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts
are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed
by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of
actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.17
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of
Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed
execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds.
Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality
would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to
taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of
PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to
recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice
to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a
concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes.
The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists
a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.18 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."19 In public suits,
the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing
as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."20 Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.21 Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.22
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. The case of
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works23 is authority in support of the petitioner:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis
supplied.]
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
Now, on the substantive issue.
The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this
supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional.24 The
Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.25
With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question: In allowing the
direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed
projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the
laws?
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption
of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Farias v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held that:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and
just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the
party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it."27 This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must
be struck down.28
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of
the PDAFs enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the
Members of Congress and the latters encroachment on executive power in proposing and selecting projects to
be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in
favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the
truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case
like this, the Courts hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits
unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to divine from
scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie.29 Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing
the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, "not because of any issue as to their truth,
accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules
of evidence."30
Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was committed, much
less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular
government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughout the
implementation of the GAA of 2004. The process was explained in this wise, in Guingona v. Carague:31
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the
estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the
constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities
and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Each
agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the
general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of interest rates (e.g.
LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon
issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year
for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates
an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.
xxx
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation
of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this
phase of the budget cycle.
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially
approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the
targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that
appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments.32 While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted
by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it
may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of
legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it,
by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch
which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked
for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment
schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. "The
DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested
by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted
by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities set by the Executive."33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress
receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot
be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the
practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to
propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no
need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between
the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of
valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of
Congress. Again, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute,
it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."34
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
------------------G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district
and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7
Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of
the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may
also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary,
"with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of
said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item
hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of
fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the
public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects
selected by Members of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either on their own account
or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or
Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the
amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount
was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the
bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the
Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was
declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the
Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the"
Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government
Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said
ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue
the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or socalled "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall
under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional
Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development
Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the
funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that
the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of
P2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects
and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that
by 1992, Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18
Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard
or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the
first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were
allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund
release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded
from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter.
The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis
for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in
the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for
the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional
Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda.37 It has been articulated
that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance
and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the
"Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior
consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF
provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision
ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply
an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of
the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with
Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In
2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard,
the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for
the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be
funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program
and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned
Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental
Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million
allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The
same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it
was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated
June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66
the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure
whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with
an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted
out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million
for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100
Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was
included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government,
Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as
the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency
(priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would
choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF
Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had
been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies
if they have the technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative
district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of
project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the terms
usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by
Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993
on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund
has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in
1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money
that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks
were SOP (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting,
and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93
"The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the
petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that
JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs
were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three
(3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents
of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and
the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and
the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-ownedand-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion
in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP
releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co As
findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which
are as follows:103
Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their
respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower
House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters endorsement and without
considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves
but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount
to P6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in
the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining
respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact
legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may
be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante,
Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure
under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the
CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP
from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from
2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects
identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments,
such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation,
and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was
docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring
public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO)
enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their
authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment)
of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2,
2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties
for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the
present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with
him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its
implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to
appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the
parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the
Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;
(b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos.
113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114
(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also
tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law
states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013
GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing
from this description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains
legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF"
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional
authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law
may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I
am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether
or not that (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop
the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the
PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because
of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside,
outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising
precisely the duty .
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it,
or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially
allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to
address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as
not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v.
CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it
was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which
is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative
agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases,
the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling
on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the
CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that
all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly,
so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with
constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage
of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the
issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution
of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance
of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the
Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from
re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying
the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that
"the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the
foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of
Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response
to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."140
The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are
within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a
duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In
Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on
the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative
to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change
are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial
restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any
of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the
taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that
the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149
amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient
locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to
its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This
required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for
a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners
therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds
to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent
evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or
reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata
principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same
issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994
CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the
power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the
CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making
of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and,
three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once,
it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On
the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF
and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the
intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only
those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the
main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose
and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may
be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation
is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should
exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been
passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this
wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as
it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and
current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous
ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress
on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155
(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view
of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be
discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has
not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In
fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork
Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the
ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary
powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up
the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual
officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague,
overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular
part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary
public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and,
second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines
the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lumpsum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control
certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In
particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since
it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court
shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that
the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has
no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy
and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from
lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must
be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with
the others performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words,
there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another departments functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v.
Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise
the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to
blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which
is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1wphi1 In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179
They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute
and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa
case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to
recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special
Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would
be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well
as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu
feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as
long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision
2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a
more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which
the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects
outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"188 and
thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification
"shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing
special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators
to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5
which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others,
that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may
be ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of
the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr.
puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and,
as such, respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents
through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments have admitted that the
identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a
funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution
process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the PDAF of the
legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I
would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How
can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must
identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and
his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed
throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that
neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the
DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now
surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past
practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the
PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral
body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative
power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of
powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lumpsum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process
known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
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(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power
of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for lawpassage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after
the required publication."205
Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral
part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative
act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the
will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto
in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.
(Emphases supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent logrolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branchs
role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard
the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which
may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation
as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money,
not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to
exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence
Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as
"line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be
considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may
even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose,
e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed
sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they
follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added
that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect
to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lumpsum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said
that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper
line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable,
or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be
amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing
authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose
of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to
appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of
the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President
the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are
essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that
the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textuallygrounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since
the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lumpsum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and
hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to
the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item
veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget
or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a
greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not
justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular,
they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the
smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in selfperpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such
"funds are indeed quite useful, to well, accelerate the decisions of senators."220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a
public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the
peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may
be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223
or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before
another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his
PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-tocase basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and
the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide
a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has
not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the National Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the
national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our
local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations
are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened
sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by
undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials
and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition
that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating
that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the
national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23,
2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives
to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits
are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been
taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and
Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional
Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their
office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions
should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the
post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own,
and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not
only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further
weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993),
which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations
laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from
the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the
"primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8
thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12
of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and
Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without
any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose
stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by
law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to
be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona,
Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law,"
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words,
in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as
well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.
An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose.
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal
provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular
public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts
and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus;
all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on
service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources,
shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or
60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the
General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8
of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy
Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains postenactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law"
since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the nondelegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same
section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for
a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to
ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called
the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the
"sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase
is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class
and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for
such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test
since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless
be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used
as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has
already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless,
since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the
Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its
lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services and
facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as
well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the
context of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use
Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x
x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential
Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus.
As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and
the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to
information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like."
In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The
pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform
the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would
form the bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that
said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded
as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the
release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes
that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the
parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests
of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents
which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid
statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it
nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to
the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executives Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to
the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally
deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released
funds. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM
Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to
the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of
PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by
the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve
the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they
cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO
by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO
should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF
Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a
permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for
2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has
a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of
whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be
disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by
an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in
its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter
into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to
liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for
the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the
projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released."
In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs,
and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined
and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed
even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional
source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but
not released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto,
and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact
doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the
recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely
"reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the
final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power
; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill,
it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to
veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake
in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes
he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by
any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think
that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its costewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time
of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it
may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path
forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course.
After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles
and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively
organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages
of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision
of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional
oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous
PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum
allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine;
(d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and
(2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all
previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The
remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related
to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners access to official documents
already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but
merely subjected to the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This
denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals
for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all
funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED
-------------------On DAP Issue
--------------------
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

G.R. No. 209287
February 3, 2015
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects.
The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for
the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and
49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the
DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power
to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit
(which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in
the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no crossborder transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project
in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are nonexistent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although
some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by
the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may
cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it
is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.
------------------c. on taxation
d. on constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court
e. no law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed
------------------------Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba
148 SCRA 208
Political Law Transfer of Funds
Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This
Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may
be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
-----------------
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing
Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
-----------------
REPUBLIC v. COCOFED,
G.R. No. 147062-64, December 14, 2001
(Coconut levy funds are prima facie public funds which should be subjected to COA audit)
Facts:
The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of
allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. Among the properties sequestered by
the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of
the alleged one million coconut farmers, the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF
companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of the said
UCPB shares, the PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.
On November 15, 1990, upon Motion of Private Respondent COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that herein private respondents in
particular, COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies had not been impleaded by the PCGG as partiesdefendants in its July 31, 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR No.
96073 in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of
elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a
Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order
and ordered the UCPB to proceed with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the
sequestered shares to be voted by their registered owners.
On February 23, 2001, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. filed the Class Action Omnibus Motion referred
to earlier in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F, asking the court a quo:
1. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more
than one million coconut farmers; and
2. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the 14 CIIF holding companies
including those registered in the name of the PCGG.
Issue:
Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their reversion to the State is pending in
the Sandiganbayan?
Ruling:
This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those shares inasmuch as they
were purchased with coconut levy funds funds that are prima facie public in character or, at the very least,
are clearly affected with public interest.
General Rule: Sequestered Shares Are Voted by the Registered Holder
At the outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner of the shares of a
corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. (Sec. 24, BP 68) This principle applies even to
shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a
general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares
registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy
the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo (G.R. No. 115352, June 10, 1993) and PCGG v.
Cojuangco Jr., (133197, Jan. 27, 1999) as follows:
(1) Is there prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the State?
(2) Is there an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by
the PCGG, while the main issue is pending with the Sandiganbayan?
Sequestered Shares Acquired with Public Funds Are an Exception
From the foregoing general principle, the Court in Baseco v. PCGG (Baseco) and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas, G.R.
No. 91925, April 16, 1991) (Cojuangco-Roxas) has provided two clear public character exceptions under
which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in
their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands.
The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to truth; that public
property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie
beneficial owner should be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of
ownership.
The public character test was reiterated in many subsequent cases; most recently, in Antiporda v.
Sandiganbayan. (G.R. No. 116941, May 31, 2001) Expressly citing Cojuangco-Roxas, this Court said that in
determining the issue of whether the PCGG should be allowed to vote sequestered shares, it was crucial to
find out first whether these were purchased with public funds, as follows:
It is thus important to determine first if the sequestered corporate shares came from public funds that landed
in private hands. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities
are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when
the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1)
originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then
the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco
Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares.
UCPB Shares Were Acquired With Coconut Levy Funds
In the present case before the Court, it is not disputed that the money used to purchase the sequestered
UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut
levy funds. This fact was plainly admitted by private respondents counsel, Atty. Teresita J. Herbosa, during
the Oral Arguments held on April 17, 2001 in Baguio City. Indeed in Cocofed v. PCGG, this Court categorically
declared that the UCPB was acquired with the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund in virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 755, promulgated on July 29, 1975.
Coconut Levy Funds Are Affected With Public Interest

Having conclusively shown that the sequestered UCPB shares were purchased with coconut levies, we hold
that these funds and shares are, at the very least, affected with public interest. The Resolution issued by the
Court on February 16, 1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96073, stated that coconut levy funds
were clearly affected with public interest; thus, herein private respondents even if they are the registered
shareholders cannot be accorded the right to vote them. We quote the said Resolution in part, as follows:
The coconut levy funds being clearly affected with public interest, it follows that the corporations formed and
organized from those funds, and all assets acquired therefrom should also be regarded as clearly affected
with public interest.
The utilization and proper management of the coconut levy funds, raised as they were by the States police
and taxing powers, are certainly the concern of the Government. It cannot be denied that it was the welfare of
the entire nation that provided the prime moving factor for the imposition of the levy. It cannot be denied that
the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the
States concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the
population but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic
stability. The coconut levy funds are clearly affected with public interest. Until it is demonstrated satisfactorily
that they have legitimately become private funds, they must prima facie and by reason of the circumstances
in which they were raised and accumulated be accounted subject to the measures prescribed in E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
and 14 to prevent their concealment, dissipation, etc., which measures include the sequestration and other
orders of the PCGG complained of. (Italics supplied)
To repeat, the foregoing juridical situation has not changed. It is still the truth today: the coconut levy funds
are clearly affected with public interest.
To stress, the two-tiered test is applied only when the sequestered asset in the hands of a private person is
alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth. Hence, in PCGG v. Cojuangco, we allowed Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr. to vote the sequestered shares of the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in his name but
alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth. We did so on his representation that he had acquired
them with borrowed funds and upon failure of the PCGG to satisfy the two-tiered test. This test was,
however, not applied to sequestered SMC shares that were purchased with coco levy funds.
In the present case, the sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not
with alleged ill-gotten wealth. Hence, by parity of reasoning, the right to vote them is not subject to the twotiered test but to the public character of their acquisition, which per Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan cited earlier,
must first be determined.
Coconut Levy Funds Are Prima Facie Public Funds
To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, this Court will even be more categorical and positive than its earlier
pronouncements: the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima
facie public funds. Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of the
State; more specifically, taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of law for the support of the
government or for the discharge of its obligations. (Beckner v. Commonwealth, 5 SE2d 525, Nov. 20, 1939)
Undeniably, coconut levy funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following reasons:
1. Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State.
2. They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers.
3. Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were purchased with public funds.
4. The Commission on Audit (COA) reviews the use of coconut levy funds.
5. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), with the acquiescence of private respondents, has treated them as
public funds.
6. The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.
We shall now discuss each of the foregoing reasons (among others), any one of which is enough to show their
public character.
xxx
3. Respondents Judicially Admit That the Levies Are Government Funds.
Equally important as the fact that the coconut levy funds were raised through the taxing and police powers of
the State is respondents effective judicial admission that these levies are government funds. As shown by the
attachments to their pleadings, respondents concede that the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF)
and the Coconut Investment Development Fund constitute government funds x x x for the benefit of coconut
farmers.
4. The COA Audit Shows the Public Nature of the Funds.
Under COA Office Order No. 86-9470 dated April 15, 1986, the COA reviewed the expenditure and use of the
coconut levies allocated for the acquisition of the UCPB. The audit was aimed at ascertaining whether these
were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended. Because these funds have been subjected to
COA audit, there can be no other conclusion than that they are prima facie public in character.
Having shown that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, but are in fact prima facie
public funds, this Court believes that the government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares,
because they belong to it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner.
In sum, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and
effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the
sequestered UCPB shares which are prima facie public in character.
The Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order SET ASIDE. The PCGG shall continue voting the
sequestered shares until Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F are finally and
completely resolved.
---------------------------PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such
expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon
the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained
in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal;
and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the
main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the
subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from
the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an
expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each --advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
---------------------Procedural Limitations
a. One subject Title
---------------------------
Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles ofBills; Subject shall be expressed in the title
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That
the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras
however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is
constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that
they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant
to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure
that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit
the business of cabarets.
------------------------
TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

151 SCRA 208
Principle: Requirements as to title of bills
151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission
(G.R. No. 75697)
--------------------------------------------TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Citation: 151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; June 18, 1987
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.
DOCTRINES:
Validity of law; title of bill The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each
and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
Taxation; security against oppressive taxation The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so
searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever,
except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts
upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but
also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around
P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional
source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also
an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
Undue delegation of legislative power The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to
"solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the
Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the
BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned
being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the
source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality
occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
FACTS:
Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled
"An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".
P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the gross
receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this
decree is set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes,
discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection
of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals,
sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry, ...;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire
financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an additional source of revenue for the
Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and
present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of
the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people [AGAIN, READ:
PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted
with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and certain passages omitted)
ISSUES:
The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:
1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter
of the law.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and
HELD:
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject and title.
Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to,
and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation
of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is
not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of
the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.
Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the
same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly
tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.
The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.
Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has
authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions
for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.
This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the
Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being
"subject to the direction and control of the Board."
The petition was DISMISSED.
---------------------------Tobias vs Abalos,
G.R. No. L-114783
December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the
enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution.
First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as
well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it
also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of
San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of
Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that
within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not
a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In
addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so
as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision
of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
----------------------3-reading rule
-----------------------
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added
Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as
HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate
for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its
own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House
Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco
[however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note
also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR
version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that
it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
---------------------------
Presidential Veto:
-----------------
Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia

11 SCRA 486
Political Law Veto Power Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television
(channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then
Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed
that because of CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated
by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation
allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencias
department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And
even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional,
it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
------------------------
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

GR 87636
Facts:
December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the
president
December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions
and Sec 55, a general provision.
February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the
constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only.
April 11, 1989 this petition was filed
January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition same issues
but included SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831)
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the
GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same
with the additional legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670
that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of
appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY
1990 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the
mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the
court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and
therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be
struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the
executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The provisions are inappropriate because: (1) They do not relate to particular or distinctive
appropriations; (2) Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the
bill; (3) It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation.
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the
legislative - the subject matter of the provisions should be dealt with in separate and
complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that manner
they attempt hide it in the GAB
If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD
resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

-------------------------
Philconsa vs Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663,
entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETYFOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Section 25, Article 7 of
the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void the provision under
Article 16 of the Countrywide Development Fund and the veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Department of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer and questions the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the
veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of (1) the veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH,
and National Highway Authority
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive.
HELD:
The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of
acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they
belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be
questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a claim that the contract in question
violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of
Congress.
---------------------------Executive Order No. 200, s. 1987
Signed on June 18, 1987
MALACAANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR
EFFECTIVITY.
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x
x x;
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official
Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in
Taada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986), when it observed that
[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership;
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that [u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
SEC. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines,
and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official
Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO
Executive Secretary
Source: Presidential Management Staff
Office of the President of the Philippines. (1987). [Executive Order Nos. : 171-390]. Manila :
Presidential Management Staff.
-----------------------------------Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Judge Vega
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001
[Effectivity and Application of Laws]
FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners
filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening
the bank.
In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite
the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or
15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into
law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent
publication was not necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general
application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the
petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause
unless otherwise provided.
--------------------------
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in
the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must,
as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress,
the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Facts:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project).
The President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation
of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
Issues:
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
and
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Held:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is
co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation
and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations
in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.
3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the
same is exempt from the need for publication.
----------------------------Jose Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
203 SCRA 767
Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among
others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO,
PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over
various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil
case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a
letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and
malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have
an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave
and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec.
5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether
or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not
really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
---------------------------G.R. No. 167173 December 27 2007
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARARAMESH,
OWEN BELMAN, SANJAYAGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR,MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN
VICTOR,CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS,RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELOAGUILAR, and
FERNAND TANSINGCO,
Petitioners, vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ONBANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ANDCURRENCIES, as represented by its
Chairperson,HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
Respondent.
Facts:
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by Edgardo Angara.
Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said. Respondent
is is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its
inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No.166; (2) compelling petitioners who are
officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be
conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any holddeparture order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that
judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoena testificandum and duces tecum
issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and
testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth
before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799)
and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan,
the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced
P.S. Resolution No. 166,
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES,TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED
AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS
OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the
initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the
speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing,
requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to
respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that
there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative
inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry. On
February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among
those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile
moved that subpoena be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate
request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an
HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded
the motion and the motion was approved. Respondent then proceeded with the investigation
proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement
that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients
for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents
mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases
regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
Issue:
Petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered
foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases,
the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in
these courts.
Ruling:
Contention is UNTENABLE.P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last
three Whereas clauses thereof. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the
said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a
privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made
more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged
the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence
of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a quasi- judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct
--------------------Standard Chartered Banks Vs Senate Committee on Banks Facts: Senator JPE accused SCB of
violating the Securities Regulation Code (R.A.8799) for selling unregistered foreign securities. This
has led the committee to conduct investigation in aid of legislation. Petitioner SCB refused to attend
the investigation proceedings on the ground that criminal and civil cases involving the same issues
were pending in the courts.
Issue: Whether the Senate Committee on Banks can conduct investigation against SCB despite
criminal and civil cases against the latter pending in courts
Held: No. Petition is Denied Citing Bengson Jr vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the petitioners
claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is
already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the committee by
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts. Bengson is not
applicable in this case since JPE's accusation is not grounded on any suggestion of any
contemplated legislation. It merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of
Section 5 RA 3109.
------------------------------Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative v Sangguniang Panglungsod,
155 SCRA 421 1991
SP DUMAGUETE CASE (1987)
G.R. No. 72492
Promulgated:
Petitioners:
ARTURO UMBAC
November 5, 1987
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and
Respondent:
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS UYPITCHING
FACTS
Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be conducted by
the respondents Committee in connection with the operations of public utilities specifically the
Negros Orriental Electric Cooperative II. Due their failure to appear at the said investigation,
petitioners were reproving for legislative contempt.
ISSUE
Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and
order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena?
HELD
NO. The Constitution and the Local Government Code do not express its provision the granting of
power to subpoena and punish contempt for witnesses. Local legislative bodies do not have the
contempt power of the legislature since it is sui generis. The said power does not attach to its
legislative function but to its character as a distinct and individual power of one of the branches of
the government. The same would not be applied to the local legislative bodies which are creations
of law. To allow such local legislative bodies to exercise such power without statutory basis would
deem be conflict in the doctrine of the separation of power.
WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation
should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared
null and void for being ultra vires.
---------------------------Arnault v. Nazareno,
G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was
the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American
citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only
amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of
the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce
it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness
gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject
of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already
indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to
a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx
xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with
the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the
very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . .
There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3.
NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we find
no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate
him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception
of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to
determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him
to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the
same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.
----------------------------------Gudani vs. Senga
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
[Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been
given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered
them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of
a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that
the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash
may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with
the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
---------------------Gudani vs. Senga G.R. 170165 (2006)
Facts of the Case:
Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including General
Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the
discretion of the President, AFP Chief of Staff Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General
Gudani and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
However, General Gudani and Colonel Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance with
Senator Biazon.
Issue:
Can the President can prevent military officers from testifying a legislative inquiry?
Court Ruling:
YES. By virtue of her power as a commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has the constitutional authority to prohibit members of the AFP
from attending a Senate hearing.
This is also under her prerogative as the highest official of the AFP. Note that it is not an invocation
of her executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power to control the actions and speech of
the members of the AFP. Non-compliance of the military subordinates would violate the principle
that 'the civilian authority is supreme over the military authority'.
--------------------------NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in
one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for
his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to
a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy
decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
---------------------

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It does not matter where I came from nor where I am heading.what matters is I AM STILL HERE !!!

---------------------------------G.R. No. 176951

November 18, 2008

November 18, 2008

November 18, 2008

Doctrine of Non-delegation of Legislative Powers

People of the Philippines vs Vera

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA

Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Abakada Guro v. Ermita

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

On pork barrel Issue

April 24, 2012

November 19, 2013

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

Coconut Levy Funds Are Affected With Public Interest

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

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