3.) ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO v. HON. FATIMA G.

ASDALA and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES

APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO and
ELEANOR R. DIONISIO, herein represented by ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO)
FACTS: Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio,
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint 2 against herein
petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and
Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject
property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the
name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith,
claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property.
Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property.
It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged
property was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute
owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of subject property to
them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay actual and moral damages,
and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss3 said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.The MeTC then issued an Order4 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that,
under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions involving title to or possession of real property of small value. MR likewise denied. Petitioners
assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in its Decision5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the
MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending
B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves
recovery of ownership and possession of real property with an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00.
MR was denied. Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that
both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the
same. CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they
should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. MR was denied.
ISSUE: WON the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respodents complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria
HELD: YES. Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been entertained from the very
beginning. The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should
be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was,
therefore, the correct remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by
Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition must, therefore, fail. 11

For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition
for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead
of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves
"title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is
divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property
involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the
RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice." 13 Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled
correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint forAccion Reivindicatoria.

8.) THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS: On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and
Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan
Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is P38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for
the design and construction of passenger terminal, and P20,200,000 for the design and construction of
the jetty port facility.5 In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional
works. The scope of work under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent. 6
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of
Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for
Phase II is P2,475,345.54.7 On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount
of P22,419,112.96 which petitioner allegedly failed to settle. On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City (Civil Case No. 06-1122-MK) to collect the aforesaid
amounts.9 On August 17, 2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. 10
Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted that the sums being
claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial
Governor. Also cited was respondents June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from liability for any cost
in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project. 11 RTC rendered a judgement in favor of
plaintiff Jody King Construction And Development Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan.
MR likewise denied. On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff IV
Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment of P67,027,378.34 and tender
the same to the respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of garnishment on Land Bank
of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in
Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited under the account of
petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant
provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary liabilities,
their enforcement and satisfaction.17
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 111754. On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal filed on December
1, 2009. MR likewise denied. On May 20, 2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA
questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
114073. CAs First Division dismissed the petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower
courts issuance of the writ of execution. MR was likewise denied by the CA. The CA also held that
petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COAs
primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.

ISSUE: WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in this case and WON the writ of execution
was proper.
HELD: YES. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents money claims. Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdictionThe doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is
supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. 22 It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. 23
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question
or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. 24 The court may raise the
issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to
argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative
bodies and not for the convenience of the parties. 29 Respondents collection suit being directed against a
local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. 30 Hence, the RTC
should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover,
petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal
and before the CA.
NO. Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction is void
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. 34 All acts
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be
final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. 35
13.) ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC. v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
FACTS: Under a loan agreement1 dated November 19, 1996, Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI)
obtained a loan amounting to P442,500,000 from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) for the construction
of Asian Star Building, a 20 storey commercial condominium built on lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967
and 2059692 located at the Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. As security for the loan,
AAHI executed a security agreement3 or real estate mortgage dated November 19, 1996 over its property
consisting of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969 and the condominium built thereon
including all units, parking slots, common areas and other improvements, machineries and equipment. On
November 17, 1999, AAHI entered into a contract to sell 4 with petitioner for the purchase of Units 1004
and 1005 covered by CTC No. 546665 and CTC No. 546676 , respectively, and the right to the exclusive
use of parking slots P515, P516, P517, and P514 covered by CTC No. 54986, 7 CTC No. 54987,8 CTC
No. 54988,9 CTC No. 5498510 (the subject properties), respectively, for a total purchase price
of P23,571,280.
On December 22, 1999, the parties executed an addendum 11 to the contract to sell whereby AAHI
assigned to petitioner the right to the exclusive use of parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975 for a
consideration ofP600,000, which petitioner paid on even date. By separate letters 12 dated March 23,
2000, AAHI and Solidbank informed petitioner of the real estate mortgage forged by them and was
advised to remit its monthly amortizations for the units and parking slots it purchased to Solidbank.

Petitioner was also requested to inform Solidbank of the total installments it had paid for these units and
parking slots and the balance still due thereon13 Petitioner which occupied the condominium units as its
place of business had, by October 2001, fully settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount
of P26,588,409.30.14
On October 21, 2000, as AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank), to which the banking operations of Solidbank were integrated, filed before the Muntinlupa
RTC a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage. 15 AAHI not long after filed on
October 30, 2000 also before the Muntinlupa RTC a complaint 16 against Solidbank, for Specific
Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-196, and raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC.
On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the highest bidder,
Metrobank.17 On January 24, 2002, Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession19 of the properties subject of the foreclosed mortgage. The petition was granted and a writ of
possession was issued on April 9, 2002.20 Also on April 9, 2002, petitioner filed before Branch 256 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 00-196 (AAHIs complaint against Solidbank for Specific Performance with
Preliminary Injunction) a motion for intervention,21 to which it attached a complaint-in-intervention 22 with
prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to
consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties.
The court Sheriff on April 15, 2002 issued a notice to vacate 23 which was served on May 16, 2002 upon all
building occupants who were advised to make the necessary arrangements with Metrobank regarding
their occupancy.24 In the meantime, the Motion for Reconsideration of the April 9, 2002 Order of Branch
276 filed by AAHI was denied by Order25 dated May 13, 2002, prompting it to file before the appellate
court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed on June 18, 2002 a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate court, 26 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71217, also to
enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch 276 of the Muntinlupa RTC. In its
petition, petitioner alleged that its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 pending in Branch
256 is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from implementing the writ of
possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with the
appellate court.27 On August 22, 2002, the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals granted petitioners
prayer for, and issued a temporary restraining order 28 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71217. By Decision29 of January
22, 2003, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals denied, however, petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the
subject properties. MR denied. Before this Court on a petition for review, alleging that the appellate court
committed grave and palpable error in denying its prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in flagrant
violation of laws and jurisprudence.32
ISSUE: WON the CA has jurisdiction over an original action for injunction.
HELD: NO. An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however.
Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments
of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.35 The appellate courts jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions
or proceedingspending before it.

In the case at bar, petitioners complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before
Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court. Petitioners petition before the appellate
court does not show, nay allege, that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as either one for
certiorari36 or prohibition.37 Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should
have been dismissed outright. At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction is not appealable.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 33 Petitioners only prayer in CA-G.R.
No. 71217 is "for the preservation of the status quo, that is, petitioner, having in possession over the
subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the controversy [Civil Case No. 00196 before the said trial court [Branch 276, RTC of Muntinlupa City] has been finally resolved and
respondents be prevented from taking over such possession." Clearly, what petitioner filed with the
appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary
remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
18.) IRENE SANTE v. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL and VITA N. KALASHIAN
FACTS: On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for
damages4 against petitioners. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged
that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other
persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as
follows, "How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!" Bert
refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained
at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close relative. Petitioners also
allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral
damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys
fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim
for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for
exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim. On June 24, 2004, 6 the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss that the total claim of respondent amounted toP420,000.00 which was
above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila MR likewise denied
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 85465, before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her
husband filed an Amended Complaint11 increasing the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00
to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but
the trial court denied their motion in an Order12 dated September 17, 2004. Hence, petitioners again filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition13 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87563, claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the
complaint to increase the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The case was
raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations
show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount

was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of
claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case
because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her
claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be
excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, rendered a decision
affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam.
In the said decision, the appellate court held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the
complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners
posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees are merely incidental to the main
cause and should not be included in the computation of the total claim. The Court of Appeals additionally
ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original
complaint and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.
ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case and WON the granting of amendment of the
complaint was proper.
HELD: YES. RTC had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then
still a matter of right. At the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional
amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00. In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 is
instructive:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by
respondent by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is
settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. 20 It is clear,
based on the allegations of the complaint that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary
relief prayed for in the complaint.
23.) EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES,
APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T.
JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES v.
HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA
MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN
FACTS: On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated
"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are coowners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40

square meters, more or less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein
petitioners and private respondents.
Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF
PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and
perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property
whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null
and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. 1
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 2 the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00
which under section 33 (3) 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of Liloan, Compostela. 5
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 6 saying that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended. 7
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. 8 A Motion
for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is
contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an
action to annul a document or declare it null and void, 9 hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation
falling within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for
reconsideration. MR was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
HELD: YES. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had
the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of
first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; 14 also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, 15 annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid 16 and for rescession,
which is a counterpart of specific performance. 17

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically
mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real
property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the
value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of
a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null
and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint
also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration
of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
28.) VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA
FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in
Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Caete. On March 3, 1996,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldans name. 3 At the
time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. 4 By 2002, Vivencio secured a
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering
the same parcel of land.5 On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report,
Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldans
certificate of title. To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation
proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of
the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Sharia District Court. 7 In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a
Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it.
He prayed that respondent Fifth Sharia District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Sharia District Court granted in its order 9 dated
January 30, 2008.10It ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of
land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay P10,000.00 as moderate
damages and P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Sharia Distict
Court issued the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision. He received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008. 13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Sharia District Courts may only
hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldans
action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Sharia District
Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake. 16
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived] his right to defend
himself."17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following: Roldans

motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth Sharia District Courts decision dated June 11,
2008, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail the
decision via certiorari."18 Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court
denied Vivencios petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008. Vivencio received a copy of the order
denying his petition for relief from judgment on June 17, 2009. 22 On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the
petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with this court. 23In the
resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencios petition for
certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
the writ of execution against Vivencio.
ISSUE: WON the 5th Shariah Disctric Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is a
non-muslim.
HELD: NO. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts is the Code of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary
contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims
In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a
Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did
not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on
record, the court shall dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldans action because
not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldans action
for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. 59 The reason is that
"jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action."
33.) RE: HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO
FACTS: This refers to an undated indorsement of Honorable Hernando B. Perez, Secretary of the
Department of Justice, concerning a hold-departure order issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido, Municipal
Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato in Criminal Case No. 19418 titled "People of the Philippines v.
Jinky A. Besorio" for estafa. The said judge granted the motion of the private complainants and ordered
the Bureau of Immigration to cause the issuance of a hold-departure order against the accused.

When required to comment on the matter, herein judge explained that at the time he issued the holddeparture order, he was unaware that he had no authority to do so. He further explained that he issued
the questioned order based on his belief that he was authorized to do so.
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, after finding that MTC Judge Sardido erred in issuing the
subject hold-departure order, recommended that he be (a) reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely, and (b) advised to keep himself
abreast with the latest issuances of the Court.
ISSUE: WON a Hold-Departure Order may be issued by an MTC judge.
HELD: NO. The recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator is well-taken. Circular No. 39-97
provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts. Clearly then, Municipal Trial Courts do not have jurisdiction to issue holddeparture orders and it was an error on the part of MTC Judge Sardido to have issued one in the instant
case.
To ensure the strict implementation of the Circular, the following guidelines. were promulgated:
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in inconvenience
to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of
an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are issued contain
complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall furnish the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the
Department of Justice with a copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within
twenty-hour (24) hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest available means
of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following information: .
a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth
and the place of last residence of the person against whom a Hold-Departure
Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in which the HoldDeparture Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a Hold-Departure
Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined
should also be included.

4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed, the
judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of the
Hold-Departure Order issued. The courts concerned shall furnish the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of the judgment of
acquittal promulgated or the order of dismissal twenty-four (24) hours from the time of
promulgation/issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.
All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs with their
respective lists of active Hold-Departure Orders are hereby directed to conduct an inventory of
the Hold-Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform the government agencies
concerned of the status of the Orders involved.