Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program
Program Guidance
December 2012
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of the Army
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

This Program Guidance reflects a coordinated, joint effort between the Department of the Army
and the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
(DHS/FEMA) to develop guidance and implement policy for executing the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) at the Federal, State, and local levels.
This document updates and consolidates the CSEPP Programmatic Guidance and CSEPP
Planning Guidance documents issued in June 2008. The Department of the Army Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense and the Technological Hazards Division
of DHS/FEMA have reviewed and agreed upon the concepts, guidance, and policies promulgated
in this document.
We encourage the CSEPP community to continue to improve the Program Guidance by
recommending changes. Changes to CSEPP guidance will be added through change sheets and/or
future updates.
Branch Chief
Preparedness Branch
Technological Hazards Division
National Preparedness Directorate
Director
Preparedness Program
Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical
and Biological Defense
Table of Contents
Preface
Chapter 1: Background
History
Organization
Management Structure
3
7
12
Chapter 2: Technical Background
19
Chapter 3: Administration
29
Planning
Programming
Budgeting
Execution
Program Closeout
31
32
33
34
36
Chapter 4: Personnel
43
Chapter 5: Coordinated Plans
45
Authorities and Responsibilities

Consistency with National Planning Initiatives
Zone Basis for CSEPP Planning
Special Planning Issues
46
48
52
54
Chapter 6: Medical Preparedness
59
Chapter 7: Training
69
Chapter 8: Exercises
75
Chapter 9: Communications
81
Chapter 10: Automated Data Processing
89
Chapter 11: Alert and Notification
97
Chapter 12: Emergency Operations Centers
107
Chapter 13: Public Outreach and Education
115
Chapter 14: Protective Action
125
Appendix A: Blue Grass Risk Snapshot
A-1
Appendix B: Pueblo Risk Snapshot
B-1
Appendix C: Glossary of Terminology and Acronyms
C-1
Appendix D: CSEPP Policy Papers
D-1
CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE
Table of Contents
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Preface to this Document
Preface
This document updates and consolidates the guidance provided in the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Planning Guidance (2008) and CSEPP
Programmatic Guidance (2008) and supersedes these documents. This guidance has also been
reorganized into a structure consistent with the CSEPP National Benchmarks.
This document provides the basis for Federal, State, and local program managers to implement
CSEPP in keeping with the Department of the Army (Army)/Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) CSEPP Strategic Plan. References have been made throughout this document to
the following function-specific guidance documents that serve as its technical companions:
Annual CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance
CSEPP Exercise Policy and Guidance (December 2012), (aka The Blue Book)
CSEPP Medical Resource Guide
CSEPP Public Affairs Compendium Workbook
This document will be reviewed every two years.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the statutory and programmatic history of CSEPP, the
organizational roles and responsibilities, and the management structure.
Chapter 2 provides a summary of the hazards and risks associated with the U.S. Army chemical
weapons stockpile.
Chapters 3-14 provide guidance on each of the twelve CSEPP National Benchmarks. They are
intended to provide a description of the critical components of each benchmark to assist program
managers at the Federal, State, and local level in assigning responsibilities and developing
budgets.
Appendices A and B provide a summary of the specific hazard and risk associated with the
stockpiles at Blue Grass (Kentucky) and Pueblo (Colorado).
Appendix C provides a glossary of the terminology that may be unfamiliar and a list of acronyms.
Appendix D explains how the Policy Papers that originally guided the program have been
incorporated into CSEPP Guidance.
Preface to this Document
Chapter 1:
Background
History
CSEPP Origins
In 1985, Congress (see DOD Authorization Act, 1986, Public Law 99-145) directed the
Department of Defense (DOD) to dispose of its lethal unitary (pre-mixed) chemical agents and
munitions while providing maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the
personnel involved. To comply with this requirement, the U.S. Army decided to expand an
existing program that was already addressing disposal of the M55 rocket stockpile. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) was retained to prepare the necessary documentation under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). A series of public meetings was held in the spring
and summer of 1986 to gather public input on the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (DPEIS). Hearings were also held in each of the eight affected communities. The
DPEIS contained detail on risks of stockpile storage and disposal, including the potential
consequences of an accidental release. Extensive public input was received regarding the need for
enhanced emergency preparedness around the stockpile sites.
In 1987, the Army released a Draft Emergency Response Concept Plan (ERCP), which presented
a basis for the development of local emergency response programs and examined various
methods of emergency planning. The Army also prepared a Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Implementation Plan and requested funds to implement enhanced emergency preparedness onpost and off-post for all chemical stockpile sites. FEMA joined the Army in implementing
CSEPP through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in August 1988. This MOU
was reaffirmed in 1993 and revised in 1997 and 2004. (Memorandum of Understanding between
the Department of the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of
Homeland Security: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, March 23, 2004.)
Evolution of CSEPP
The history of CSEPP to date can be divided into four phases: initial development, program
development, program maturation, and sustainment/closeout. A more detailed history of the
program may be found in History of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program,
Interim Report 2012, Volume I: Summary of Program (May 2012).
Initial Development (late 1986 through early 1990s)
The ERCP was initially developed by a team of contractors with assistance from the Army,
ORNL, and FEMA. ERCP development began in November 1986, and a draft was presented to
the Under Secretary of the Army in September 1987. In attendance at that meeting were
numerous FEMA officials, including the Director of FEMA. The FEMA Director proposed that
the U.S. Army and FEMA join forces to implement the concepts discussed in the ERCP. This
meeting initiated the process that led to the 1988 MOU between FEMA and the Army. The final
generic ERCP was included in the final programmatic environmental impact statement (FPEIS)
when it was published by the Army in 1988 (Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement).
Between 1986 and 1992, ORNL developed a series of technical studies for the Army that
addressed many of the concepts outlined in the ERCP including topics such as protective action
options and effectiveness, emergency responder protection, rapid accident assessment and
protective action decision making, and warning system effectiveness. [See Evaluating Protective
Actions for Chemical Agent Emergencies, ORNL-6615; Communication of Emergency Public
Warnings, ORNL-6609; Assessment of the Need for Dual Indoor/Outdoor Warning Systems and
Enhanced Tone Alert Technologies in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program,
ORNL/TM-12095.]
Following execution of the 1988 Army/FEMA MOU, ORNL developed a series of draft technical
standards for critical program areas. These draft standards were presented for review by the Joint
Army/FEMA Steering Committee, and were combined and released as interim draft program
guidance for the CSEPP in 1991. Also during this period, Argonne National Laboratory
developed site-specific ERCPs for each of the eight participating communities, applying the
ERCP concepts to the unique nature of each community and each installations chemical
stockpile. In 1991, the Army published Pamphlet 50-6 (rescinded in October 2012), which
established guidance for installation commanders in response to chemical warfare agent
emergencies. The first CSEPP Policy Paper defined the Congressional maximum protection
mandate as avoidance of fatalities to the maximum extent practicable and was also published
jointly by FEMA and the Army in 1991.
Program Formalization (early 1990s to 2000)
During this time, management structures at FEMA and the Army went through a series of
changes: the program became more formalized; State, tribal, and local CSEPP organizations were
established, and program fundamentals such as annual exercises were established.
One of the hallmarks of this phase was an evolving management structure at both FEMA and the
Army. The early Steering Committee structure with multiple functional subcommittees proved to
be unwieldy because of its size, and program policy became more centralized between FEMA
and Army management. There were many differences of opinion between the Federal partners
during this period. In response, the involved states became better organized and began meeting as
a bloc to discuss program issues and to advocate for their positions with the Army and FEMA
management.
Also during this period, a series of U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports were
issued that were critical of program management systems and the limited results that had been
accomplished to date. These reports resulted in a restructuring of the program in 1997 to address
the GAO recommendations, and to confirm FEMA as the lead agency for off-post preparedness
in Section 141 of Public Law: 105-261. One of the more significant outcomes of this restructuring
was the commitment to use both national and community Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) to
manage the program and resolve fundamental issues.
During this period, heavy emphasis was also placed on developing emergency plans; designing
and delivering training; hiring dedicated State and local staff; building infrastructure, including
automation systems, warning systems, communication systems, and emergency operations
centers (EOCs); and purchasing personal protective equipment (PPE).
Program Maturation (2000-2005)
From 2000 until 2005, CSEPP was in a program maturation phase. New management at both
the Army and FEMA CSEPP offices produced a more team-oriented approach, and the
relationship between the Federal partners became much more cordial. The new program
management initiated a re-baselining of CSEPP in early 2000, which included development of
a new standardized CSEPP State-specific life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) process where CSEPP
State agencies and counties took their annual cooperative agreement-detailed line item budget
requests and expanded them into multi-year LCCEs. Also in 2000, a CSEPP Planning Conference
was held that established a prioritized list of unresolved program issues and established a series of
working groups to address each priority issue. These working groups ultimately evolved into
functional, national-level IPTs and developed landmark innovations, including the CSEPP Portal,
automated shelter-in-place (SIP) decision tools, reentry and recovery guidance, risk
communication programs, and other planning tools and performance measures. During this
period, FEMA also initiated development of an enhanced grants management software tool that
ultimately evolved into a central web-based financial management tool used by FEMA and the
off-post communities to manage budgets, track grant expenditures, and report performance.
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 placed additional emphasis on the vulnerability of the
U.S. chemical warfare agent stockpile and led to renewed efforts to speed up the disposal process.
As a result, plans to neutralize the bulk stockpiles at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland,
and Newport Chemical Depot (NECD), Indiana, were expedited. During this period, several of
the baseline incineration sites received their operating permits and began disposal operations.
Sustainment and Closeout (2005-present)
Since 2005, the program has been in a phase of sustainment of capabilities and closeout of sites.
Development of major new initiatives and infrastructure investments gave way to a focus on
planning for a smooth program closeout while maintaining a high level of public safety and
replacing obsolete systems as required. The Aberdeen, Newport, Pine Bluff, Umatilla, Anniston,
and Deseret stockpiles have been eliminated and the CSEPP operations for those communities
have been closed out. Construction of the Blue Grass and Pueblo disposal facilities is underway
and disposal operations at both facilities will begin once testing has been completed. Program
planning efforts have been focused on redefining what a two-site CSEPP should look like, and
adjusting the Federal management structure so as to maintain efficiency while ensuring that the
maximum-protection mandate remains fulfilled.
Congress has set parameters for ending CSEPP as demilitarization is completed at each site. In
2008, the National Defense Authorization Act amended 50 U.S.C. 1521(c)(5) to state that
assistance may be provided to State and local governments in developing capabilities to respond
to emergencies involving the storage and destruction of lethal chemical agents and munitions
until the earlier of the following:
1.
The date of the completion of all grants and cooperative agreements (CAs)
with respect to the installation or facility for purposes of this paragraph
between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State and local
governments concerned.
2.
The date that is 180 days after the date of the completion of the destruction of
lethal chemical agents and munitions at the installation or facility.
CSEPP funding will continue until the Army has completed the destruction of each installations
stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. Until expiration of the statutory limit, the
Army and FEMA will continue to request and expend appropriated funds to assist emergency
preparedness and response to a chemical accident or incident (CAI). The most important
objective for these funds remains to develop and maintain the capabilities required to avoid
injuries and fatalities should an accidental release of a chemical agent occur. Further details on
the closeout process are provided in the CSEPP Closeout Guidebook (August 2010).
Organization
CSEPP involves the participation and cooperation of multiple agencies. The principal
organizations and levels of government are the Army, FEMA, and State and local governments.
The roles of each are described below.
U.S. Army JPEO-CBD

The Joint Program Executive Office - Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) is
responsible for the Armys portion of the Chemical Demilitarization Program, including chemical
stockpile emergency preparedness efforts. The JPEO-CBD is part of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and that it is responsible for
U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA).
U.S. Army HQ level

The Army CSEPP Office resides within the CMA, a separate reporting activity of the AMC. Safe
storage of the Armys stockpile of lethal chemical weapons is a principal mission of CMA. The
CSEPP Office reports to the CMA Director of Stockpile Operations.
The CMA CSEPP mission includes:
Providing support and oversight of chemical emergency preparedness at the chemical

installations and in nearby communities. This is accomplished by providing direct
technical support from CMA CSEPP staff; contractor support; and funding for CSEPPspecific personnel, equipment, and operating expenses.
Providing oversight of CSEPP training and exercises on the Army side. This includes
training Army CSEPP personnel, co-directing CSEPP exercises, and evaluating Army
performance at CSEPP exercises.
Coordinating with FEMA on all aspects of the program, including funding requests and
provision of funds for community preparedness, program policy, exercise programs, and
meetings and workshops.
U.S. Army Installation Level

The remaining chemical stockpile installations in the U.S. are the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD)
and the Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA). At Pueblo, chemical weapon storage and disposal
is the facilitys main mission. At Blue Grass, the Chemical Activity is a tenant activity on the
Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), a larger facility with multiple operations relating to
ammunition and protective equipment. BGAD is part of the Joint Munitions Command (JMC), a
major subordinate command of AMC.
The Army maintains emergency response resources on its installations. In a chemical emergency
at an Army installation, these resources would be the primary ones to provide damage
assessment, rescue, firefighting, and containment of hazardous materials. Specially trained and
equipped Army crews are maintained for this purpose. Local off-post police, fire, and emergency
medical service (EMS) personnel would not be requested to respond to the chemical limited area.
PCD and BGCA each maintain an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and a cadre of trained
CSEPP staff. The installations are full participants in CSEPP exercises, agreements, automation
systems, and IPTs. They also maintain meteorological equipment and computer systems to model
the dispersion of any chemical release and provide recommended protective actions.
Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facilities

At both Pueblo and Blue Grass, the chemical demilitarization (demil) facilities are administered
by a separate Army organization, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA)
program. The ACWA Program Office is officially referred to as the U.S. Army element, ACWA,
which is a separate Reporting Activity under the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The Program
Manager reports directly to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Threat Reduction and
Arms Control).
The ACWA demil facilities are the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant
(BGCAPP) and the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP). Demil facility
construction and operations are being carried out by contractors. The system contractor for
BGCAPP is Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass Team for PCAPP it is the Bechtel Pueblo Team.
Further information about ACWA and the demil facilities is available from the program website,
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/index.html.
FEMA
In FEMA, CSEPP resides within the Technological Hazards Division (THD) of the National
Preparedness Directorate. This Division consists of two main programs: CSEPP and the
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program for communities near nuclear power plants.
FEMA takes the lead in assisting, promoting, and evaluating preparedness in the off-post CSEPP
communities. FEMAs role is executed through a national office within THD and through
personnel in the Regional offices where the chemical installations are located. Pueblo is in FEMA
Region VIII (based in Denver) and Blue Grass is in Region IV (based in Atlanta).
FEMAs CSEPP mission includes:
Providing support and oversight for chemical emergency preparedness on the part of
State and local governments in CSEPP communities. This mission is accomplished
through direct technical support provided by FEMA CSEPP staff; contractor support; and
funding for CSEPP-specific personnel, equipment, and operating expenses.
Administering grant funding to State governments for CSEPP. Funds are transferred from
the Army to FEMA for pass-through to off-post CSEPP communities; FEMA manages
the process by which off-post communities apply for and receive funding, and monitors
progress of funded activities.
Developing and implementing appropriate training for off-post responders.
Co-directing and evaluating CSEPP exercises on the off-post side.
Coordinating with the Army on all aspects of the program, including budgeting and
funding, program policy, execution of the exercise program, and meetings and
workshops.
Army/FEMA Coordination
The respective program roles of the Army and FEMA are defined through an interagency MOU.
The MOU was first signed in 1988 and was updated in 1993, 1997, and 2004. The current MOU
describes the agency roles (similarly to the descriptions above) and also defines the following
areas of cooperation to which both agencies are committed:
1.
Jointly developing a readiness posture at the stockpile storage installations

and in the surrounding communities on the basis of assessments, validated
requirements, and available resources at the earliest practicable date.
2.
Assuring the continuance and success of a collaborative approach to

decision making and problem solving by supporting Integrated Product and
Process Teams, in accordance with the provisions of Public Law: 104-201.
3.
Assuring the integration and compatibility of on-post and off-post emergency

preparedness and response procedures, to include information and
communication systems.
4.
Assessing and improving the effectiveness of Federal, State, and local

response systems and procedures through the design, conduct, and evaluation
of exercises.
5.
Keeping the public involved and informed through public information and
education programs, including JICs/systems activities and an active
community relations program.
6.
Providing reciprocal technical support for joint initiatives, as well as

initiatives requested by installations and State and local governments.
7.
Collaborating in the preparation of Army and FEMA CSEPP budgets to be

presented and defended before the Congress each year. This effort will
facilitate maintenance of a joint LCCE for CSEPP, which includes on-post
and off-post emergency preparedness program funding requirements, as well
as technical support funding requirements.
8.
Using site-specific risk analyses in conjunction with defining readiness and

funding requirements for site-specific chemical materiel emergency
preparedness programs.
The MOU is implemented through the Army-FEMA Strategic Plan, which is discussed in the
Management Structure section below.
State and Local Governments

CSEPP is built on the fundamental principle that State and local governments are in the best
position to understand their communities and to provide first response to natural and humancaused emergencies. When such events occur, local agencies such as county or municipal law
enforcement, fire, EMS, HazMat teams, and public works are generally the first to respond, as
they are literally closest to the problem. If local resources are overwhelmed, the town or county
may request assistance from neighboring local jurisdictions or from the State. The State maintains
a variety of emergency response resources such as an emergency management agency, law
enforcement (State police), and public health. The State also typically has some specialized
resources that may not exist at the local level, such as environmental sampling and analysis
capability. In addition, the Governor may activate local National Guard units to assist with
response.
In an emergency involving the chemical stockpile, local authorities would have primary
responsibility for taking immediate measures to protect the nearby off-post population, including
public warning, protective action instructions, blocking entry to the potential hazard area,
managing evacuation, and providing initial reception and shelter for evacuees. The States role
would be to assist with personnel, equipment, and resources to support local functions; provide
emergency powers and authorities through an emergency declaration; request a presidential
declaration under the Stafford Act; and provide other State resources for managing long-term
protective actions and recovery processes, if needed.
10
Figure 1: CSEPP program management employs a common budgeting, cost accounting, and
performance management system to integrate the activities of the Army,
FEMA, and State and local agencies
Preparedness funds are provided to each community through CSEPP CAs, based on a negotiated
annual work plan between the States and the FEMA regional offices. Under the CAs, each State
identifies its needs, develops proposed projects to meet those needs, requests funds from FEMA,
and disburses these funds to the various State offices and local governments involved in the
proposed projects. The States are responsible for financial accountability, adherence to Federal
grant management rules, and providing quarterly financial reports and narrative performance
reports addressing the capability improvement realized through the funds. Local jurisdictions
(counties) are sub-grantees under the State as grantee. State and county governments currently
participating in CSEPP are listed in Table 1 and illustrated in the community maps provided in
Appendix A and B.
Table 1: CSEPP State and Local Jurisdictions
Site
Associated Jurisdictions
Blue Grass
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Clark, Madison, Estill, Garrard, Powell, Rockcastle, Fayette, Jackson,
Jessamine, and Laurel Counties.
Pueblo
State of Colorado
Pueblo County
11
Management Structure
Strategic Plan and Benchmarks
CSEPP operates under a Strategic Plan (available on the CSEPP Portal) that reflects a
coordinated, joint effort between the Armys CMA and FEMAs THD to develop and implement
a customer-centered planning process for the program. The Strategic Plan is the basic framework
for execution of CSEPP at the State, local, and installation level. It includes a comprehensive
mission and vision statement; a general description of goals and objectives and how these will be
achieved; a description of performance measures (indicators) used; and identification of key
factors that could affect achievement of the general goals and objectives.
The Strategic Plan defines 12 program benchmarks:
Administration
Communications
Personnel
Automation
Coordinated Plans
Alert and Notification
Medical Preparedness
Emergency Operations Center
Training
Public Outreach and Education
Exercises
Protective Actions
The benchmarks are used to assess the status of CSEPP capabilities at and around each of the
chemical stockpile sites. The goal of the program is to achieve full capability for each benchmark
and to sustain this capability throughout the disposal of all chemical agents and materials at each
site. Assessment of benchmark capabilities is governed by the principle of functional
equivalency, meaning that it is not necessary to have identical resources in every jurisdiction as
long as the overall emergency management capabilities meet the program benchmarks. Each of
these benchmarks is described in more detail later in this document (see Chapters 3-14).
In addition to the CSEPP Strategic Plan, the benchmark system is reflected in the programmatic
LCCE, annual budgets, quarterly performance reports from grantees, and employee work plans.
The CSEPP CAs are managed using these benchmarks (refer to the Administration chapter below
and the CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance on the CSEPP Portal for more information).
Collaboration and Coordination

The Army and FEMA work together to jointly develop a readiness posture at the stockpile
storage installations and in the surrounding communities based on assessments, validated
requirements, and available resources. The two agencies use site-specific risk analyses to provide
12
the basis for defining readiness and funding requirements for site-specific emergency
preparedness programs. Both provide technical support for joint initiatives as well as initiatives
requested by installations and State and local governments. They collaborate in the preparation of
a joint LCCE for CSEPP, which includes on-post and off-post emergency preparedness program
funding requirements as well as technical support funding requirements. The LCCE facilitates
preparation of Army and FEMA CSEPP budget submissions to be presented and defended before
Congress each year.
Army and FEMA management have established three basic structures for coordinating activities
across the program:
Community IPTs for the Blue Grass/Kentucky and Pueblo/Colorado sites;
Functional/Working IPTs and workgroups as necessary; and
A Program Management Team (PMT)
Integrated Process Teams (IPTs)
To help carry out its mission, CSEPP uses IPTs, mandated under Public Law: 104-201 (National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997) and implemented under an Army/FEMA Joint
Memorandum for the Record Use of Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) (May 1998). IPTs allow
Army, FEMA, Federal, State, and local CSEPP personnel to collaboratively address integration
and compatibility of on-post and off-post emergency preparedness and response procedures. The
teams serve as a management tool for programmatic planning and issue discussion and enable
stakeholders to share knowledge across the program. IPTs bring together stakeholders, staff, and
other experts to design and implement new processes and create new products to improve
program operations.
The Community IPTs in Colorado and Kentucky form the heart of the program and reflect the
bottom-up philosophy of CSEPP. They consist of representatives from the State, immediate
response zone (IRZ) and protective action zone (PAZ) counties, chemical installation (depot),
FEMA Region, Army and FEMA HQ, and other organizations within the whole community.
They can establish their own sub-IPTs and working groups to address specific issues of concern.
Functional/Working IPTs exist at the discretion of the national program managers to address
crosscutting issues for the functional areas of the program. In the past, functional IPTs have been
established to address various topics (e.g., Finance, Monitoring, Protective Actions, Closeout),
and were disbanded when those issues were adequately addressed. The program currently
supports functional IPTs for Automation and Public Affairs, as well as working groups for
exercises and medical issues. Each IPT develops its own charter and annual work plan (subject to
the approval of the Program Management Team) that establishes its mission, membership, voting,
and other factors including an exit strategy. Less formal coordinating workgroups and teams have
also been established on an as-needed basis.
13
CSEPPs Teams: Best Practices and Lessons Learned (2004, available on the CSEPP Portal)
discusses the best practices and lessons learned that are available for use by all CSEPP IPTs.
Tailored, short-term training and technical assistance are also available upon request to all IPTs
through the Army chain of command.
Program Management Team (PMT)
The PMT was established in 2011 as part of the transition to a two-state program. It supersedes
the former State Directors/Program Managers group, and includes additional membership to
enable better coordination within the reduced scope of the program. (See Memorandum to CSEPP
IPT Co-Chairs [May 2011] on the CSEPP Portal.) The PMT meets twice a year and consists of
representatives from the organizations shown in the figure below.
Figure 2: Program Management Team
Representatives from other members of the program partnership are welcome to attend PMT
meetings.
In addition to the day-to-day and week-to-week coordination activities at the sites, CSEPP
partners conduct regular coordination meetings throughout the year, including meetings and
14
conference calls for the Community IPTs, Functional/Working IPTs and sub-IPTs, and the
Program Management Team. A comprehensive schedule is maintained on the CSEPP Portal.
Representatives from partner organizations are strongly encouraged to participate in these
activities; travel funding can be provided through the annual budget. Given the nature of
emergency management and increased travel restrictions at all levels, meeting hosts should also
ensure that means are in place to enable remote participation, including teleconferencing,
webinars, web meetings, and video teleconferencing, if necessary. If they are not readily
available, FEMA can provide access to such services upon request.
Requests for Federal Technical Support

The Army and FEMA have developed protocols for the provision of technical support and
information in response to requests from off-site CSEPP communities. This includes requests for
both medical and non-medical technical information. Requests for technical information can be
grouped into three types:
Requests that require a simple response to a technical question
Initiation of technical assistance/support that has been previously approved, and can be
accomplished within the ability of existing CSEPP funds
Initiation of technical assistance/support that has not been previously approved, and/or
falls outside of the current CSEPP budget
For simple technical information requests received from local or State governments or from
CSEPP sections of FEMA regional offices, CMA is the approval authority with FEMA HQ
receiving notification of the request. CMA is the approval authority for simple technical
information requests from FEMA HQ, the Army, or the military installations. No notification of
other agencies required.
For requests for approved/funded CMA technical support received from local or State
governments, the CSEPP sections of FEMA regional offices are the approving body, with FEMA
HQ receiving notification of the request. For similar requests received from FEMA HQ, DASA
(ECW), or military installations, CMA will execute the requests as funded and inform both
FEMA and DASA staff of the results.
For requests for unapproved/unfunded CMA technical support received from local or State
governments, or from CSEPP sections of FEMA regional offices, both FEMA HQ and DASA
(ECW) will approve the request prior to CMA executing the task. For similar requests from
military installations, CMA, FEMA HQ, or DASA (ECW), both FEMA HQ and DASA (ECW)
must approve the request prior to CMA executing the task.
15
CSEPP National Benchmarks and Organization of this Guidance

The following twelve chapters provide guidance on each of the CSEPP National Benchmarks
listed below. Each chapter provides an overview of the benchmark derived from the CSEPP
Strategic Plan and three elements in addition to the more specific guidance:
A chart illustrating the connection between each benchmark and the following two
classification systems for emergency management activities:
o
The Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) established by Department of Homeland

Security (DHS)/FEMA under the National Response Framework (NRF)
(http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework);
The Core Capabilities established by FEMA under Presidential Policy Directive 8

(http://www.fema.gov/ppd8);
A Guidance box listing the key Federal guidance resources associated with the
Benchmark (including CSEPP) and links to where items can be accessed online; and
A Training box listing the key training resources associated with the benchmark
(including CSEPP) and links to where items can be accessed online.
These chapters are intended to provide a description of the critical components of each
benchmark to assist program managers at the Federal, State, and local level in assigning
responsibilities and developing budgets. For detailed guidance on day-to-day activities intended
for functional specialists, refer to the Federal guidance listed in each chapter.
The benchmark chapters have been organized to group related program activities in the following
order:
16
Administration: Administrative support for each installation, State, and IRZ and PAZ
county.
Personnel: Personnel, such as CSEPP coordinators, public information/public affairs

officers, planners, and ADP specialists, to support CSEPP activities on the installation
and in the state and IRZ counties.
Coordinated Plans: Coordinated plans conforming to established CSEPP guidance for

each installation, State, and IRZ and PAZ county.
Medical Preparedness: A medical program for off-post medical preparation and

response to a CSEPP incident/accident.
Training: Training programs consistent with the FEMA State Training Plan (for off-post
jurisdictions) and Army certification requirements (for on-post installations), and
maintained proficiency of emergency services providers/responders and CSEPP staff, as
defined and measured by CSEPP guidance.
Exercises: An exercise program that is consistent with the Exercise IPT approved
exercise policy.
Communications: Functioning communications system for IRZ counties and

installations, as well as between EOCs, military installations, JICs, and states.
Automation: Functioning automated data processing (ADP) system connecting critical
installation facilities, on-post EOC, off-post EOC, Joint Information Center (JIC), and
State EOC.
Alert and Notification: Functioning alert and notification system for installation, IRZ,
and transition zone.
Emergency Operations Center: Functioning EOCs for each installation and IRZ
county.
Public Outreach and Education: A public outreach/education program for public

information and education.
Protective Actions: Protective action strategy conforming to established CSEPP

guidance for each jurisdiction.
The benchmarks are used to assess and report the status of CSEPP efforts at and around the
Armys chemical stockpile sites within the United States. The goal is to achieve full compliance
within each benchmark and to sustain this capability throughout the disposal of all chemical
agents and materials at each site. CSEPP Program Managers should track the obligation of their
CSEPP resources by these national benchmarks to facilitate this reporting. The composition and
scope of each benchmark is governed by the principle of functional equivalency; it is not
necessary to provide identical resources to each jurisdiction as long as their emergency
management capabilities meet the CSEPP Benchmarks.
17
18
Chapter 2:
Technical Background
Effective emergency response planning under CSEPP requires an adequate technical

understanding of the chemical agents and materials involved and the way they are stockpiled.
This chapter describes aspects of the chemical agents and stockpiles pertinent to emergency
planning. The stockpile is described in terms of the amount of agent stored at each location, the
various munitions and containers in which the agents are stored, and the general physical
characteristics of the storage areas. This section also addresses related technical systems,
including automated data processing systems, meteorological instrumentation, and assistance
available from CMA.
Properties of Chemical Agents

The agents of primary concern in this guidance are the nerve agents GB and VX and the blister
agents H, HT, and HD. Both nerve and blister agents are in the stockpile at the Blue Grass
Chemical Activity, whereas the Pueblo Chemical Depot stores only blister agents. The chemical
and physical properties of these agents have a direct bearing on emergency planning and
response. The chemical and physical properties determine the agents volatility, behavior in
explosions and fires, and persistence in the environment. Agent toxicity determines the impact on
human, animal, or plant life. All community and installation EOCs should maintain copies of the
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) on these agents (copies are available on the CSEPP Portal).
Physical and Chemical Properties
All of the agents are liquids at normal indoor temperatures, although most sulfur mustards (H and
HD) freeze at ambient temperatures below 13 to 15C (55 to 59F). The sulfur mustard agent
blend, HT, freezes at ambient temperatures below 0 to 1.3C (32 to 34.3F). The mustard agents
have relatively high boiling points from 215 to 217C (419 to 423F) for agents H and HD, and
greater than 228C (442F) for agent HT. The mustard agents have significant vapor pressures
only at ambient temperatures above their freezing points; therefore, they generally will only pose
an inhalation hazard at those higher ambient temperatures.
19
In pure form, the nerve agents (GB and VX) are usually odorless, colorless (agent VX may be
pale amber), and tasteless. GB is a non-persistent nerve agent that primarily presents a vapor
hazard since it can be carried downwind quickly. Under most release and meteorological
conditions, GB produces the greatest downwind hazard distance when compared to other agents
in the stockpile. Thermal decomposition of GB begins at approximately 130C (266F), and it
completely decomposes in 2.5 hours at 150C (302F).
Nerve agent VX is a persistent agent that presents both a vapor and a percutaneous (skin
absorption) threat. VX is not very volatile, so it presents much less vapor hazard than GB;
however, it is 100 times more toxic by the percutaneous route. Therefore, if VX is aerosolized
due to an explosive release, it presents a percutaneous downwind hazard. In practical terms, a
toxic dose of VX is more likely to result from skin rather than respiratory exposure; however, all
nerve agents are sufficiently volatile to pose an inhalation hazard. At concentrations of 30 mg/m3
(milligrams per cubic meter) or greater, VX median lethal inhalation doses can be attained in a
few minutes.
Persistence of chemical agents in the environment varies with the agent, the environmental
medium, and other conditions such as pH and temperature. Blister agents (H, HD, and HT) and
the nerve agent VX persist in soils and on vegetation, although the persistence varies. Nerve
agent GB degrades within a relatively short period. Mustard agents can permeate ordinary rubber
and may permeate other protective materials over time, but are not regarded as water
contaminants due to their low solubility.
Public Health and Environmental Impacts
Severe human health effects and environmental impacts could result from a chemical agent
release. The magnitude of the impact would depend on a number of variables: the amount and
type of agent released; the method of release (e.g., spill or explosion); meteorological conditions;
the number of unprotected people potentially exposed to the agent(s); distance from the chemical
event to the unprotected individuals; age, gender, and health of exposed populations; route and
duration of exposure; and timeliness of decontamination and medical treatment.
Agent effect dose-rate values are based on the assumption that the majority of the dose is
absorbed by inhalation and that the individuals exposed are wearing clothing. In the case of VX,
the lethality estimates for human exposure through the skin change dramatically as a function of
the amount of clothing worn and the wind speed. Although the majority of the potentially
exposed population would be expected to be clothed, many individuals would be expected to
have portions of their bodies exposed. Thus adjustments to the toxicity levels should be made in
some modeling applications for civilian populations. Certain members of the population may be
more susceptible to agent exposure (e.g., infants, the elderly, and individuals debilitated by
chronic disease).
20
In addition to the concern over human health effects, emergency response planning must consider
impacts on drinking water sources, food supplies, and the environment. Additionally,
environmental contamination might affect the time period required before evacuated personnel
could begin to re-enter the affected area after termination of the immediate airborne health
hazard.
Data on persistence of chemical agents indicate attention should be given to potential effects on
food supplies, livestock, and croplands. It is very unlikely that such contamination would occur,
but State and local emergency responders should be prepared to address the possibility as well as
public perceptions of it. Contamination of public water supplies should be of concern only if a
spill of liquid agent occurred directly into the water body. Groundwater supplies could be
affected if there was a direct spill or leak into a well or spring. Such releases are extremely
unlikely. Persistent chemical agent (e.g., sulfur mustard or nerve agent VX) contamination of
land surfaces, while highly unlikely beyond installation boundaries, poses a threat of potential
contamination to the surface of exposed food items (e.g., fruit or leafy vegetables) in areas where
high-level plume deposition could occur. Toxic effects to grazing animals can be expected from
ingestion of forage, or dermal contact with objects contaminated by the persistent chemical
agents. Volatile GB is not considered a source of significant surface contamination.
Chemical Stockpile Sites

Chemical warfare agent stockpiles were originally stored at eight continental United States
(CONUS) Army military installations: Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Pine Bluff Arsenal,
Arkansas; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; Anniston Army
Depot, Alabama; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; and
Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky (see Table 2). Only the Pueblo and Blue Grass facilities are
still active stockpile storage sites.
The chemical agents were stored in three basic configurations:
Projectiles, cartridges, mines, and rockets containing propellant and/or explosive

components
Aircraft-delivered munitions that do not contain explosive components
Steel one-ton containers
Most of the stockpile was in the last form. The current stockpile at the Blue Grass and Pueblo
sites contains projectiles, cartridges, and rockets. All of the agents are at least 40 years old; some
are more than 50 years old.
Chemical agents and munitions are stored in a specific area within each installation, which is
referred to as the chemical limited area. The stockpile is kept on pallets, in boxes, or in cans,
and is stored in earth-covered bunkers (igloos) specifically designed to protect the munitions
21
from external forces (environmental factors and attack) and contain the force of an explosion. The
igloos have lightning protection systems and steel doors and are equipped with multiple locking
systems. Usually, only a single, agent-specific munition type is stored in an individual igloo (e.g.,
VX rockets in one igloo and GB rockets in a separate igloo). Access is strictly controlled by
security forces, augmented with intrusion detection devices, barricades, and perimeter lighting.
Table 2: Original Locations and Compositions of CONUS Chemical Stockpile Sites
Chemical
Activity/Depot
Edgewood Chemical
Activity, MD
Anniston Chemical
Activity, AL
Blue Grass Chemical

Activity, KY
22
Munition
Configurations
Disposal
Technology
Percentage
of Original
Stockpile
Ton containers
Neutralization
5.2
HD, HT,
GB, VX
Artillery cartridges
Artillery projectiles
Ton containers
Rockets
Mines
Incineration
7.2
H, GB, VX
Rockets
Neutralization/
Supercritical
Water Oxidation
1.7
Chemical
Agents
HD
Newport Chemical
Depot, IN
VX
Ton containers
Neutralization
4.0
Pine Bluff Chemical

Activity, AR
HD, HT,
GB, VX
Ton containers
Rockets
Mines
Incineration
12.2
Pueblo Chemical
Depot, CO
HD, HT
Neutralization/
Biotreatment
8.3
Deseret Chemical
Depot, UT
H, HD, HT,
Lewisite,
GA, GB,
VX
Aerial bombs
Ton containers
Rockets
Mines
Spray tanks
Incineration
43.2
Umatilla Chemical
Depot, OR
HD, GB,
VX
Aerial bombs
Ton containers
Rockets
Mines
Spray tanks
Incineration
11.8
Worker Safety Standards

Safety standards for workers who work with or may encounter chemical agents have been
developed by the Army, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
The Army has responsibility to ensure that chemical agent operations are conducted in a safe,
secure, and reliable manner under AR 50-6. In the execution of these duties, the Army is
committed to providing a safe and healthful environment for the general population and workers
at the chemical stockpile sites.
The CDC has promulgated Airborne Exposure Limits (AELs) for workers for both nerve and
blister agents. [Final recommendations for nerve agents, 68 Fed. Reg. 58348, 9 Oct. 2003, and
interim recommendations for mustard agents, 69 Fed. Reg. 24164, 4 May 2004.] The nerve agent
AELs became effective on January 1, 2005. The mustard AEL was effective as of July 1, 2005.
[The Army adopted the AEL criteria recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [CDC] guidance in the Fed. Reg.,Volume 68, No. 180, 17 September 2003, for nerve
agents GB and VX, and Fed. Reg., Volume 69, No. 85, 3 May 2004, for H, HD, and HT.
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response, 29 CFR, Part 1910.120. Available online
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=standards&p_id=9765.]
The AELs include three general safety standards (see Table 3).
Table 3: Worker Airborne Exposure Limits
Agent
IDLH
STEL
WPL
0.0001 mg/m
0.00003 mg/m3
0.003 mg/m3
0.00001 mg/m3
0.000001 mg/m3
0.7 mg/m3
0.003 mg/m3
0.0004 mg/m3
GB
0.1 mg/m
VX
H, HD
The first is Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH), which is defined as an

atmospheric concentration of any toxic, corrosive, or asphyxiant substance that poses an
immediate threat to life or would cause irreversible or delayed adverse health effects or would
interfere with an individuals ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere. (Hazardous Waste
Operations and Emergency Response, 29 CFR, Part 1910.120.) The purpose of establishing an
IDLH is to ensure that the worker can escape from a given contaminated environment in the
event of failure of the respiratory protection equipment, (NIOSH Respirator Decision Logic,
1987) allowing an individual to be exposed to such a concentration for up to 30 minutes without
death, serious or irreversible health effects, or impairment/impediment to the ability to escape.
The point of the IDLH level is that respiratory protection must be used at that level or higher, and
that a rescue system must be in place in case of respiratory protection failure.
23
The Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL), established by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) is the maximum concentration of a chemical to which workers may be
exposed continuously for up to 15 minutes without danger to health or work efficiency and safety.
The concentration is developed on a time-weighted average (TWA), which is the maximum
concentration of agent to which employees may be exposed averaged over a specified length of
time. Monitoring is conducted in those areas involving operations where workers may be exposed
to levels of chemical agent escaping into the operating environment and exceeding the STEL.
Similarly, the Worker Population Limit (WPL) is the maximum allowable eight-hour
concentration that an unprotected chemical worker could be exposed to for an eight-hour
workday and 40-hour week for 30 years without adverse effect. [Implementation Guidance Policy
for New Airborne Exposures Limits for GB, GA, GD, GF, VX, H, HD, and HT, Department of
Army Safety Office, 18 June 2004.] Again, monitoring is performed for identified areas where
workers may be exposed to chemical warfare agents. The worker safety standards developed for
chemical agents are taken into account and used for monitoring both storage and chemical
disposal facilities (CDFs).
CSEPP funds may be used by installations to procure personal protective equipment (PPE) and
monitors to comply with worker safety requirements. However, off-post emergency responders
should not plan to enter contaminated areas or potentially contaminated areas. Therefore, CSEPP
communities should not procure PPE and monitors for the purposes of re-entering or monitoring
potential hazard areas.
In addition to the worker population limits described above, the CDC has issued General
Population Limits (GPLs) for chemical agent exposure. The GPL is the maximum concentration
to which the general population may be exposed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for a 70-year
lifetime (see Table 4). This applies to the entire general population, including all ages and
medical conditions. These values are used in developing risk management efforts to ensure
measures are developed to protect against chronic exposure of the general population to chemical
warfare agents during day-to-day operations of the disposal facility.
Table 4: General Population Limits for Chemical Warfare Agents
Agent
General Population Limit, 24-hour

TWA (12-hour period for mustard)
GB
0.00000100 mg/m3
VX
0.00000060 mg/m3
H, HD, HT
0.00002000 mg/m3
OSHA/NIOSH Interim Guidance (February 2006)
24
Off-post emergency responders must abide by the hazardous waste operations and emergency
response (HAZWOPER) regulation. The HAZWOPER regulation requires use of appropriate
protective equipment and procedures for emergency workers responding to any hazardous
material incident, including a CAI. Additional guidance on emergency worker protection is
located in the CSEPP Medical Resource Guide.
It should be made clear that there are different agent concentration standards for emergency
planning as opposed to agent concentration standards for worker and public health protection and
safety. Worker agent standards (with the exception of depot chemical workers) and the GPL are
generally not used for emergency planning or response. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
(AEGLs), discussed in the following section, are specifically designed for the protection of the
general public for emergency planning purposes.
Acute Exposure Guideline Levels

In November 2001, the Army and FEMA adopted AEGLs as the toxicity criteria to be used by the
CSEPP community for the purposes of emergency planning and response activities in the event of
a chemical agent release. These AEGLs are not safety standards, but rather decision guidelines
for the implementation of protective actions. The agent AEGLs have been reviewed and approved
by the National Research Council and the CDC. AEGLs should not be confused with worker
safety levels, GPL, or other regulatory standards. They are to be used in air dispersion models to
establish potential areas at risk from CAIs.
The AEGLs include three threshold levels, from AEGL-1 to AEGL-3, associated with
increasingly severe potential health effects. They are used in conjunction with plume-dispersion
modeling to identify and prioritize areas for protective action. As such, CSEPP emergency
responders should not plan to procure monitors and PPE for the purposes of monitoring AEGLs.
In general, the AEGLs may be used to prioritize actions as follows:
Priority should be given to prevent exposures above AEGL-3, which could result in
severe, incapacitating, and possibly lethal outcomes.
Protective actions should be directed toward preventing or minimizing exposures above

AEGL-2, above which some temporary, but potentially escape-impairing effects could
occur.
AEGL-1 boundaries identify those areas where, at or below the expected concentration,
no action is required to protect the public. This information may be used at the discretion
of local emergency decision-makers to alert and notify communities.
AEGL thresholds have been set for nerve and blister agents in the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile (Table 5). CSEPP policy is to use AEGLs for protective action decision making.
25
Table 5: Chemical Agent AEGLs (concentrations in PPM [mg/m3])
Nerve Agent GB (Sarin)

10 min
30 min
60 min
4 hr
8 hr
AEGL-1
0.0012
[0.0069]
0.00068
[0.0040]
0.00048
[0.0028]
0.00024
[0.0014]
0.00017
[0.0010]
AEGL-2
0.015
[0.087]
0.0085
[0.050]
0.0060
[0.035]
0.0029
[0.017]
0.0022
[0.013]
AEGL-3
0.064
[0.38]
0.032
[0.19]
0.022
[0.13]
0.012
[0.070]
0.0087
[0.051]
10 min
30 min
60 min
4 hr
8 hr
AEGL-1
0.000052
[0.00057]
0.000030
[0.00033]
0.000016
[0.00017]
0.0000091
[0.00010]
0.0000065
[0.000071]
AEGL-2
0.00065
[0.0072]
0.00038
[0.0042]
0.00027
[0.0029]
0.00014
[0.0015]
0.000095
[0.0010]
AEGL-3
0.0027
[0.029]
0.0014
[0.015]
0.00091
[0.010]
0.00048
[0.0052]
0.00035
[0.0038]
10 min
30 min
60 min
4 hr
8 hr
AEGL-1
0.060
[0.40]
0.020
[0.13]
0.010
[0.067]
0.0030
[0.017]
0.0010
[0.0083]
AEGL-2
0.090
[0.60]
0.030
[0.20]
0.020
[0.10]
0.0040
[0.025]
0.0020
[0.013]
AEGL-3
0.59
0.41
0.32
0.080
[3.9]
[2.7]
[2.1]
[0.53]
Source: EPA AEGL program: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/.
Nerve Agent VX
Sulfur Mustard
0.040
[0.27]
In summary, priority for protection of the general public is at the AEGL-3 level and above and a
protective action (evacuation or shelter) should be provided to the general public at AEGL-2 and
above. These criteria reflect Army/DHS/FEMA recommendations and are consistent with
planning recommendations for all Extremely Hazard Substances by FEMA, EPA, and the
Department of Transportation. Site-specific decisions for off-post responses using AEGLs for
protective action strategies are a local CSEPP community decision. State and local emergency
managers selecting alternative decision criteria should document the criteria and rationale and
coordinate associated planning with the Army and FEMA. The Army will provide modeling and
software capability and output based on the described decision criteria.
26
Risk Assessment
CSEPP employs its own detailed, site-specific analyses of hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks to
the surrounding community at each of the stockpile sites. These analyses provide information that
CSEPP communities can use as they conduct their five-step Threat and Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment processes (see FEMAs Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201).
Risk assessment snapshots for the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites may be found in Appendices A
and B, respectively. Each of these snapshots provides a summary of the location, contents,
potential health effects and risks of the associated stockpile.
27
28
Chapter 3:
Administration
Objective for this benchmark:
Each subgrantee/grantee shall establish

administrative support for the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP)
ESF: N/A
Core Capabilities: N/A
Funding for CSEPP is provided through the Department of Defense Chemical Agents and
Munitions Destruction appropriation. Approval and distribution of CSEPP funding involves
several Federal organizations including the DOD, the Army, DHS, and FEMA. An understanding
of the financial processes used by these organizations to request and distribute funding is
necessary to be effective in obtaining CSEPP funding. These financial processes include:
DODs Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process of resource

allocation (which affects all CSEPP organizations); and,
Volume 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations Uniform Administrative Requirements

for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments (which affects
CSEPP State and local governments).
Most Federal, State, and local government organizations prepare budgets on an annual basis to
obtain and allocate required resources. However, since 1962, the DOD has been using a multiyear programming process to obtain and distribute resources within the DOD. As described in the
following paragraphs, there are four phases in the PPBE process that all apply to the CSEPP
funding process.
Planning: consists of CSEPP plans developed by State agencies and local governments to
meet and sustain full compliance. It also consists of the Army guidance developed for
responding to chemical accidents/incidents involving the chemical weapons stockpile;
29
Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Administration benchmark:
FEMA Grant Regulations at 40 CFR Part 13
CSEPP WEBCA Users Guide
CSEPP Closeout Guidebook
Annual CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance
Annual Department of Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts
Annual award memo from FEMA Regional Office
Programming involves translating plans into requirements for future years. For CSEPP
this means LCCEs are developed and maintained for CSEPP organization surrounding a
chemical weapons stockpile site until all the chemical weapons at that site are destroyed;
Budgeting takes the first year of the programming years and translates it into a budget
document which together with all of the other Chemical Demilitarization requirements
will be submitted to Congress for that fiscal years appropriation; and,
Execution is accomplishing the CSEPP mission through the execution of the plans and
budget using the appropriated funding for the current fiscal year. For CSEPP States, it
also involves quarterly performance and expenditure reporting.
Figure 3 illustrates the current DOD PPBE process that translates an annual state and local budget
request into a budget award. The following are a few points of interest from this process from the
perspective of FY 2013:
In FY 2013, the PPBE process develops/updates plans and life-cycle cost estimates for
the five programming years FY 2015-2019.
Figure 3: Continuous Cycle of the DOD PPBE Process as of FY 2013
30
Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Administration benchmark:
CSEPP WEBCA training and tutorials
Funding for FY 2013 will come from the FY 2013 Defense Appropriation Bill marked up
and approved by Congress during 2012 and signed into law by the President. The PPBE
process for this request began five years earlier when the original cost estimate was
developed. In the subsequent years, the cost estimate was revised until it was turned in to
Congress as part of the FY 2013 Budget Submission in February 2012.
The budget for FY 2014 will be submitted to Congress in February 2013 and reviewed
and marked up by Congress during 2013 as they develop the FY 2014 Defense
Appropriation Bill.
Once the CSEPP budget for a FY is submitted to the Army and incorporated into the Department
of Defense Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Budget Estimate Submission, it is locked
against any additional budget requests. Flexibility exists during the execution year to allow
financing for unfunded requirements and to meet unforeseen needs or changes in operating
conditions, but there are severe restrictions on spending for purposes other than those originally
justified and approved. There is a greater probability that funding will be available for the
budgeting and execution phases if it is identified earlier in the PPBE process. The following
sections provide a more detailed description of all four phases of the PPBE process as they relate
to the CSEPP funding process.
Planning
Because the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been designated a Major Defense
Acquisition Program within the DOD, a baseline LCCE must be established for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program. This, in turn, requires a CSEPP LCCE that estimates financial
requirements for each year the program is scheduled to exist, which can be beyond the FYDP
time span. To be effective, these estimates must be based on well thought out operational plans.
For CSEPP, the off-post planning phase of the PPBE process is used to develop and maintain
CSEPP plans for State agencies and local governments. These plans aim to meet and sustain full
compliance as defined by the Community Profile process. Applying for a CSEPP CA requires
developing narrative items with a plan of action including results or benefits expected for each of
the CSEPP National Benchmarks. Work plans for CSEPP employees are also required to describe
the work they will be doing. Through this process, CSEPP local and State governments program
into their respective LCCEs the resources needed to support their plans. Installations must
31
similarly evaluate the needs of their plans in order to know what requirements to program in their
respective LCCEs.
Programming
During this phase of the PPBE process, CSEPP funding requirements for Army and FEMA
support, State and local government, and installations are described in their respective LCCE
spreadsheets as line-item entries organized by CSEPP benchmarks for each year that chemical
demilitarization operations are scheduled. Funding amounts are expressed in base year dollars for
the year the LCCE is being developed or updated. For example, LCCEs updated in 2013 will use
Base Year 2013 dollars (what an item costs in 2013) for estimating the cost of all items for all
years in the LCCE. This eliminates the need for developers of LCCEs to estimate the inflated cost
of an item for the future years. Inflation, based on indices developed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and used by all Executive Departments and Agencies of the
Federal Government, is added by the Army to the future year estimates before the FYDP and
budget estimates are submitted to Congress.
CSEPP uses two different types of appropriated fundsOperations and Maintenance (O&M)
and Procurement when programming its requirements. Most CSEPP programmed funds are for
O&M and are used for salaries, supplies and materials, maintenance of equipment and real
property, rental of equipment, and fuel. O&M funds should also be programmed to purchase
investment items such as equipment costing less than $250,000 and minor construction projects.
Procurement funding should be programmed for investment items costing more than $250,000.
Each year, State and local governments update their respective CSEPP LCCEs and enter into
negotiations with FEMA to determine the requirements the agency will validate and submit to the
Army. The FEMA CSEPP Office also develops its own support requirements for the CSEPP
LCCE, as do Army CSEPP installations and the Armys CMA CSEPP Office. All of these
requirements are consolidated by the CMA CSEPP Office into the CSEPP LCCE for inclusion in
chemical demilitarization programming/budgeting documents. Following that action, the CMA
finance management office develops the Program Office Estimate (POE), which is a
consolidation of the LCCEs for all of the Chemical Demilitarization Program projects including
CSEPP. After being approved by the leadership in the Chemical Demilitarization Program, the
POE is used as the basis for the Chemical Demilitarization Program input to the Armys Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), which states Army program requirements for the next five
program years.
In the POM submission, the Army can, as needed, move program year resources between
appropriations and program elements, but not between years. The total program year funding
must stay within the total obligation authority set by the DOD. During the programming phase,
the funding requests for each program year are reviewed against Congressional language, the
32
approved Army POE numbers, and the updated LCCE changes. Once the five-year POM is
formulated and approved by the CMA Director, it is submitted to the Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for inclusion in the DOD POM. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Resources Board reviews the POMs, and the results of their
review are documented in Program Decision Memorandums. These reviews can direct the
adjustment of a POM by increasing or decreasing the approved funding for the program years
based on DOD funding limits and overall priorities within DOD. After adjustments are made to
the POM, the POM is incorporated into the approved DOD FYDP.
Budgeting
The first program year of the FYDP provides the data to transition from programming to
budgeting. The CSEPP funding requirements are reviewed and, if necessary, the cost data is
adjusted. The result is the CSEPP input to the Department of Defense Chemical Agents and
Munitions Destruction Budget Estimate Submission. After extensive review by OSD and OMB,
the Budget Estimate Submission is included in the Presidents Budget, which is transmitted to
Congress in February.
Funding requests that were not in the FYDP can be difficult to get into the Budget Estimate
Submission if offset funds are not available to keep the Chemical Demilitarization Program from
exceeding its total funding allocation for the Budget Estimate Submission FY. This highlights the
importance of the LCCE part of the process to ensure the best projection of funding needs is used
in the Planning/Programming phase of the PPBE. Funding requirements identified in the
Planning/Programming phase of the PPBE establish precedence and have more credibility than
requirements that are not identified until the budgeting phase.
Each year while Congress is deliberating the CSEPP funding requests in the Department of
Defense Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction budget submissions, State agencies and
local governments prepare their budget requests using the budget year in their respective LCCEs
as their starting point. In preparing their budget requests, State agencies and local governments
follow the CSEPP Cooperative Agreement guidance, which is produced annually and posted on
the CSEPP Portal. This document includes guidance pertaining to the period of performance,
available funding, cost sharing, funding restrictions, allowable and unallowable costs, indirect
costs, and other requirements.
CSEPP budgeting is a bottom up process initiated as local governments prepare their requests and
submit them to their respective State agency responsible for CSEPP. The State agency, after
developing a budget for its own operations, rolls the local government requests into the States
request. Prior to submitting the State CSEPP requirements to FEMA, Federal, State, and local
participants in the process meet to discuss and negotiate any final adjustments to the States
request. Finally, the State CSEPP requirements are forwarded to CSEPP program managers at
33
FEMA regional offices and FEMA HQ for validation at the Federal level. The goal is to have
CSEPP State budgets submitted and validated prior to the start of the new FY on October 1st.
Ultimately CSEPP funds will be awarded to the State agencies through CAs. CAs are used
instead of grants to support the ongoing collaboration and negotiation between FEMA and the
State and local governments when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.
To expedite and standardize the
budget preparation, review,
submittal and approval, all CA
applicants use the software provided
on the CSEPPWebCA web site:
https://www.cseppwebca.net. This
software automates the application
process as well as the subsequent
management of the Cooperative
agreement including quarterly
reporting, reallocations and
amendments, and closeout.
CSEPPWebCA user accounts may be established

by submitting a request to the IEM Help Desk at
HelpDesk@cseppwebca.net. After obtaining
approval from FEMA for the new account, the IEM
Help Desk will set up the account and provide the
requestor with login information.
Self-help is available on the web site including
computer-based training. CSEPPWebCA technical
support is available via the IEM Help Desk, Monday
through Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Central
Standard Time at (888) 784-6610 (toll-free). The
IEM Help Desk can also be reached by e-mail at
HelpDesk@cseppwebca.net.
The Army installations perform a

similar analysis of their CSEPP
requirements, using their latest LCCE as their starting point. Their respective budgets are
reviewed by the CMA CSEPP Office and approved by the CMA Resource Allocation Committee,
which meets each spring prior to the FY for the budget being reviewed.
Ideally, Congress passes and the President signs the Defense Appropriations Bill prior to the
beginning of the new FY in October. However, if the Defense Appropriations Bill is not law by
October 1st, a Continuing Resolution (CR) Bill is usually passed by Congress and signed by the
President. A CR Bill keeps the Defense Department operating at the same level of effort as the
last FY until the Defense Appropriations Bill is enacted into law. If a CR Bill is required, a
portion of the CSEPP budget necessary to pay salaries and keep vital operations functioning will
be advanced to CSEPP States and installations. The amount provided will depend on the need of
the organization and the length of the continuing resolution. The CA award will be reduced by the
advanced CR amount after the Defense Appropriations Bill becomes law and the balance of
funding is available to award.
Execution
Budget execution begins on October 1st of each year. During the execution phase, appropriated
funds are apportioned, allocated, issued, obligated, and expended to accomplish the CSEPP
mission. After Congress approves and the President signs the Defense Appropriation Bill, the
34
Office of Management and Budget must apportion the appropriations providing obligation/budget
authority to the DOD. The apportionment process is a fiscal management tool used by OMB to
achieve the most effective and economical use of appropriations and prevent agencies from
obligating funds in a manner that would result in a deficiency or require a supplemental
appropriation. After receiving the obligation/budget authority from OMB, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) must make the appropriations available to the Army so that it can issue
Funding Authorization Documents (FADs). FADs for CSEPP off-post O&M funding, on-post
O&M funding and any Procurement funding for off-post or on-post are issued by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller to CMA through
the Army Material Command. After receiving the FAD, CMA sends the off-post funding to
FEMA. Before funds can be awarded to the states through CAs, FEMA must apply for and
receive apportionment authority from the OMB for distributing the CSEPP funds received from
the DA.
FEMA can award two different types of appropriated funds to the states through their respective
CAs depending on type of CSEPP appropriations in the Defense Appropriations Bill. Each type
of appropriation has a defined obligation period, also known as the period of availability. CSEPP
O&M appropriations may be one or two years. The obligation period/period of availability for
Procurement funds will usually be three years. These obligation periods/periods of availability are
important to the states because they define the period of time the states have to change the scope
of their requirements if it should become necessary. Once the obligation period/ period of
availability expires, the state must obligate the awarded funding for the stated requirement in the
CA or return the funding to FEMA as un-liquidated obligations.
The period of time available to expend the obligated funds is determined by the CA performance
period, which can be adjusted by the FEMA Region Assistance Officer. If grantees need
additional time to expend their funds they should apply for an extension of their performance
period before the current performance period expires. Grantees can also request amendments to
their CAs to reallocate funding or to change the scope of their requirements. Grantees must
account for their expenditures to FEMA by entering outlays by budget line-item and benchmark
status information into CSEPPWebCA. The software will automatically generate the required
quarterly financial status and performance reports in accordance with Section 13.41 of the Code
of Federal Regulations. [http://www.gpo.gov]
If a CSEPP State or local installation is not able to obligate all of its awarded funds by the end of
the obligation period/period of availability, these funds may be reallocated to address unfunded
requirements if the unusable funding is returned a few months before the end of the obligation
period/period of availability. This does not guarantee that the budget will accommodate all
unplanned funding emergencies that arise. However, the Army and FEMA will work together to
address unfunded requirements as best they can, given the availability of funding.
35
Figure 4 illustrates the cycle of the entire CSEPP funding process from beginning to end. This
process will continue until the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons is completely destroyed.
Figure 4: CSEPP Annual Funding Process Cycle
36
Program Closeout
At the end of the performance period for each CSEPP CA, the grant goes through a closeout
process. In addition, as the conclusion of the final CA approaches, there is an overall closeout
process for the program at the site. The primary objectives of this overall program closeout are to:
Maintain maximum protection for the at-risk citizens in the surrounding communities
until the chemical weapons stockpile at each site is completely destroyed;
Complete the administrative closeout of all CSEPP CAs; and
Provide assistance to State and local governments to support these activities in

accordance with the terms of FY 2008 Department of Defense Authorization Act.
CSEPP has developed a Closeout Guidebook to assist communities by compiling these

requirements, as well as approaches, questions to consider, tools, and lessons learned appropriate
to these activities. The national Program Closeout IPT prepared this Guidebook to support all
phases of the closeout process. The IPT has expanded the Guidebook to reflect new concerns,
provide additional tools, and support the transition of State and local jurisdictions to a sustainable
post-CSEPP emergency management program. The Guidebook is available on the CSEPP Portal.
Adjusting the CSEP Program

In the course of disposal operations, as chemical agents and munitions are destroyed, the overall
risk to the community is reduced. The intent of adjustments to the CSEP Program is to maintain
maximum protection throughout demilitarization operations while reducing CSEPP requirements
in line with the quantified reduction of risk to the public. As risk is reduced, there may be
opportunities to reduce the role of individual jurisdictions, as well as the resources provided to
them. This is not intended to be a continuous process. At the end of the nerve agent disposal
campaigns, where a major drop in risk is anticipated, the Army will update the Quantitative Risk
Assessments (QRAs) to reevaluate the level of risk and to identify the most credible event
scenario for future planning purposes.
Figure 5: Oversight and Review Process
Based on the QRAs, the site IPT should lead the discussion on any proposed risk reductionrelated efforts, with the goal of joint acceptance of the results. The group may wish to consider a
redefinition of their risk-based planning zones, as successfully demonstrated by Marylands IPT
in 1996. Another example is Alabamas development of an emergency action risk criterion for the
37
protection of its citizens. The Alabama CSEPP community adopted the quantitative measure of
4x10-7 fatalities per year, or one fatality in 2,500,000 years. In Utah, the community developed a
Glidepath to Closeout documenting their agreement to future changes in the roles of two counties
(based on the ongoing destruction of the stockpile) without a formal redefinition of planning
zones. Arkansas also combined its program adjustment and closeout planning efforts to develop
separate schedules for the closeout of its IRZ and PAZ counties.
The Army and FEMA HQ should work with the site IPTs throughout the process of reassessing
the program requirements. FEMA HQ should work with the FEMA regional office and CSEPP
jurisdictions to assess the potential impact of CAIs based on the updated QRAs and validating
how these changes affect the required CSEPP capabilities. This should include identification of
appropriate planning bases and adjustment of the community concept of operations and required
response resources based on the remaining components of the original stockpile. As part of this
process, the site LCCE will be updated to reflect the timeline for executing any reduction of
capabilities as well as associated revisions to local and State plans and procedures. It is not
expected that the percentage of reductions in overall funding or personnel will correlate to the
percentage of risk reduction from the stockpile.
In any CSEPP adjustment, a core CSEPP emergency preparedness and response capability must
be maintained to ensure the maximum protection practicable for the general population. The
value of reducing the CSEPP effort at these sites prior to the end of disposal operations is twofold. First, gradually dismantling unnecessary equipment, such as collective protection systems
and communication devices for counties that are no longer at risk from CAIs, will ease the burden
of completing the closeout of CSEPP efforts when disposal operations are complete. Secondly,
reducing the CSEPP effort at these sites demonstrates that the Army, FEMA, and States are being
good guardians of public funds.
Transition to Closeout
CSEPP jurisdictions should plan for a smooth and controlled shutdown of the program because
successful accomplishment of the chemical demilitarization program will eliminate the need for
resources specific to responding to stockpile incidents. Jurisdictions should formally discuss and
develop a coordinated closeout strategy addressing the future of existing CSEPP infrastructure,
personnel, and capabilities. Communities may want to begin formal closeout planning in
conjunction with the start of demil operations. Large-scale planning and inter-jurisdictional
coordination can be achieved through the Community IPT or a designated workgroup. At the
jurisdictional level, wider participation will likely be necessary to enable the involvement of other
organizations affected by closeout (e.g., hospitals) where additional time may be required.
Although the closeout strategy may undergo refinement over time, an interim plan will be critical
to ensuring that any associated funding requirements are addressed in the LCCE process.
38
Closeout planning focuses on two major areas: personnel and property. Prior to closeout, an
assessment of staffing levels during preparedness and closeout periods can help to identify and
ensure funding for critical positions. In addition, jurisdictions should consider how their CSEPPfunded personnel and experience can be transferred to other applicable emergency preparedness
and response programs, or what severance and termination procedures may be available.
As early as during the acquisition process, jurisdictions should consider the long-term usefulness
of CSEPP-funded facilities, equipment, and systems (e.g., sirens and collective protection
systems) and alternative funding sources to support their maintenance. An inventory of
equipment and systems (per 40 CFR, part 13) must be maintained and updated every two years;
this will be a valuable tool to assist in requests for final disposition of property and transfer of
property from a county to an individual department or office during closeout. Special attention
may be needed for facilities or any equipment attached to real property (i.e., land). Whether or not
any redistribution is envisioned, Federal, State, and local equipment inventory and disposition
requirements will need to be reviewed.
Management and timing of contracts, leases, and licenses supporting all phases of operations will
also need to be addressed. Plans, procedures, training, and exercises will need to be modified to
reflect post-CSEPP risks and response capabilities. Timely communication of anticipated changes
in emergency services to elected officials and the public will be especially important (see
Appendix A of the Closeout Guidebook for more information). CSEPP should support the
completion of transitional activities intended to maintain specific community response
capabilities after CSEPP to the extent possible. These issues are addressed in extensive detail in
Chapters 2 through 4 of the Closeout Guidebook.
Post-Operations Closeout
The regulatory requirements governing CAs (see 44 CFR, part 13) describe the activities
necessary to close out the CSEPP CA. Each CSEPP community must work with FEMA to
complete all required reports, dispose of or return all federally-owned assets, and adjust any
monetary awards that are not obligated or spent under the CA. For example, all financial,
performance, and other reports required as a condition of the CSEPP CA must be submitted
within 90 days of the end of the performance period (although this is an extendable timeframe).
Within 90 days of receipt of the CSEPP grantees final report, FEMA should make any upward or
downward adjustments to allowable costs. The CSEPP grantee must then refund any balance of
un-obligated cash advanced.
39
Figure 6: Post Implementation Process
As the Army establishes its demilitarization schedule, CSEPP jurisdictions should document
specific activities (with associated timeframes and funding requirements) that need to be
implemented in conjunction with the completion of disposal operations. These activities may
include, but are not restricted to, the dismantling of collective protection systems and sirens,
transition of communication systems, and disposition of excess equipment. As necessary, any
resources required to support these activities should be identified by each jurisdiction in the
LCCE. The funding for those activities intended to begin in advance of the closeout year should
be requested in the appropriate year. All activities that will be initiated following the completion
of demil (even if they may extend into the next Federal fiscal year) should be budgeted in the
closeout year. More details on closeout and the LCCE are provided in Chapter 2 of the Closeout
Guidebook.
Grantees should prepare and submit a CA application for their final CSEPP program year, the
year in which disposal operations are to be completed. The associated budget and staff work plans
can incorporate up to a full year of preparedness costs to address potential small-scale slippage in
the disposal schedule. The package should also include any expenses associated with closeout,
which may necessitate discussion about an extension of the associated period of performance. All
closeout projects will need to be completed within the performance period, after which no new
CSEPP-reimbursed expenses (except un-liquidated obligations such as bills for previously
contracted services) can be incurred.
If circumstances arise during the final year that significantly delay the completion of disposal
operations, another CA application may need to be prepared and submitted to cover the
continuing preparedness costs. To address expenses associated with closeout, FEMA should work
with the community (based on the revised demil schedule) to determine whether an extension of
the previous performance period, or funding of new line items, is more appropriate.
40
Funding Implications
All closeout-related activities must be performed in accordance with the applicable legal
requirements. Under the public law that authorizes CSEPP, as amended in the FY 2008
Department of Defense Authorization Act, the following restriction has been placed on the
availability of CSEPP assistance to State and local governments:
Assistance may be provided under this paragraph for capabilities to respond to

emergencies involving an installation or facility as described in subparagraph (A) until
the earlier of the following (emphasis added):
o
(i) The date of the completion of all grants and CAs with respect to the installation or
facility for purposes of this paragraph between the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the State and local governments concerned.
(ii) The date that is 180 days after the date of the completion of the destruction of
the lethal chemical agents
The term lethal chemical agent and munition is defined as a chemical agent or munition that is
designed to cause death through its chemical properties to human beings in field concentrations.
Destruction of these agents and munitions is defined as demolishing, dismantling, or other
disposal so as to make them useless for military purposes and harmless to human beings under
normal circumstances.
This definition does not include storage facilities, disposal facilities, or secondary waste products
that are created as a result of disposal operations. Destruction of these facilities and waste
products is a process of the chemical demilitarization program but is not expected to create a risk
to the general population as chemical agents and munitions do.
Because of these issues, it is important that the community understand what is meant by the
destruction of the stockpilethe conditions at the site under which the stockpile will be
considered destroyed (e.g., the status of agents, munitions, containers, waste products, and
facilities and equipment) and the associated risk. At several sites, there was an agreement to date
the start of the 180-day period based on a letter from the Chemical Activity/Depot Commander to
U.S. Army HQ announcing the end of surety operations. Funds are available for obligation until
the end of the performance period for the associated CA.
Each CSEPP community and each jurisdiction within these communities has established and
maintains an LCCE to identify anticipated funding requirements on an annual basis until the end
of the program. Until the Army has completed the destruction of each installations stockpile of
lethal chemical agents and munitions, the Army and FEMA should continue to request and
expend appropriated funds to provide assistance to each State that hosts an active chemical
destruction effort for the purposes of emergency preparedness and response to a CAI. The most
important objective of these funds is to develop and maintain those capabilities required to avoid
41
fatalities to the maximum extent practicable, should an accidental release of chemical agent
occur. The Army and FEMA will fund efforts to complete the closeout of CSEPP following the
end of disposal operations in accordance with public law and the CA guidance as discussed in the
previous section.
42
Chapter 4:
Personnel
Objectives for this benchmark are:
ESF: N/A
Establish an administrative system for

performing day-to-day operations.
Ensure employee job descriptions are developed
as needed, detailing each positions specific
assignments in the event of an emergency or
disaster.
Develop and update employee work plans yearly as part of the Cooperative Agreement
package for program funding.
Ensure that vacancies occurring in CSEPP-funded positions are promptly filled with
qualified personnel.
Ensure CSEPP personnel coordinate chemical event notifications and other relevant
information between installation and community EOCs in compliance with Army
guidance and local MOUs.
Trained and qualified personnel are essential to the successful sustainment of installation, county,
State, and Federal response capabilities. Plans, procedures, and equipment are useless without
people overseeing the effort who are prepared to implement procedures and coordinate response
actions. These CSEPP-funded personnel run the day-to-day execution of the program, including
the periodic program management tasks required to ensure that emergency responders are
adequately trained and equipped to complete their missions.
43
Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Personnel benchmark:
Annual CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance, FEMA
State and Local Personnel policies, regulations, and laws
CSEPP funding will not be provided for public or private sector first responder positions.
However, jurisdictions have requested and received support for part-time or full-time personnel
associated with CSEPP Benchmarks as well as the following Incident Command System (ICS)
positions:
Administrative Specialist
Communications Officer
EOC Manager
Exercise Officer
Hazard Analyst
IT Coordinator
Logistics Officer
Medical Coordinator
Operations Officer
Planner
PPE Specialist
Public Information Officer
Training Officer
Position-specific work plans for all funded positions must be updated annually in CSEPPWebCA
as part of the annual budget request. These work plans describe the connection between the
projects and the personnel supported under the annual CSEPP Cooperative Agreement.
Allowable and unallowable costs under the Personnel benchmark are specified in the annual
CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance.
44
Chapter 5:
Coordinated Plans
ESF # N/A
Identify assignments for primary and support
roles and responsibilities for all key emergency
Core Capabilities: Planning
functions.
Develop procedures for implementing responses
to CSEPP events for all emergency officials in
public, private, and not-for-profit-sector organizations.
Develop procedures for local implementation of the JICs concept for emergency public
information.
Describe the standard chemical event emergency notification systems being used, as well
as appropriate response actions based on each notification level.
Develop policies for the local implementation of a public alert and notification system, in
accordance with the local protective action strategy.
Specify the relevant emergency personnel, units, and organizations, and list associated
equipment/systems assigned to support response operations.
Ensure personnel are familiar with all letters of agreement, mutual aid plans, and any
Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) or MOUs between local officials and other public,
private, and not-for-profit organizations that can provide or direct resources to support a
response.
45
Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Coordinated Plans benchmark:
National Disaster Recovery Framework
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) - 8
National Incident Management System (NIMS) document
National Response Framework
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101
National Contingency Plan at 40 CFR part 300
Army Regulation 50-6: Chemical Surety
CSEPP Recovery Workbook
CSEPP plans should capture and document each communitys protective action strategies and the
specific steps and responsible parties that will implement them. Army installation, State, and local
emergency planners should work closely together to develop coordinated plans and related
procedures, ensuring that all personnel and resources that may have a role in responding to
chemical emergencies are included. These plans should outline CSEPP-hazard-specific roles and
responsibilities; relationships between Federal, State, and local governments; and resources and
actions required. The plans should be updated regularly and tested during annual exercises to
ensure that plans are synchronized and assigned personnel understand their roles and
responsibilities.
CSEPP emergency plans must also prescribe mechanisms that minimize the time required to
determine the existence and potential consequences of a chemical emergency, pass this
determination to appropriate officials, and recommend appropriate responses. Therefore, three of
the most critical actions addressed by CSEPP plans should be (1) accurate assessment of the
chemical emergency and its potential impact; (2) timely notification of officials and the
community; and (3) making and issuing recommendation for appropriate protective actions.
Authorities and Responsibilities

Plans should reflect the allocation of responsibilities and authorities under statutory authority.
There are multiple sources of authority and responsibility for chemical agent response.
Environmental response (spill response, assessment, and cleanup) is authorized by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and
carried out according to the National Contingency Plan (NCP); immediate actions to warn and
protect the public, and decision making regarding off-post protective actions and recovery, are the
46
Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Coordinated Plans benchmark:
CSEPP Training Video: Comprehensive Planning for Technological Emergencies
G-235 Emergency Planning
IS-800 series on ESF Functions
G-358: Evacuation & Re-entry Planning
G-311: Hazardous Materials Contingency Planning
responsibility of State and local officials as governed by State law; and Federal disaster assistance
is coordinated by FEMA under the Stafford Act and the National Response Framework.
Federal Authorities
CERCLA and the NCP govern assessment, response, and cleanup of spills of hazardous
substances. CERCLA authorizes the President to act, and the President, in Executive Order
12580, delegated cleanup authority to DOD for spills that occur on or from DOD facilities.
DOD in turn has delegated authority and responsibility for cleanup to the Army for events that
take place on Army installations.
The NCP implements CERCLA and outlines procedures for environmental response. Under the
NCP, an On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is designated to oversee response. The Army installation
commander will be the initial OSC in a chemical event. CERCLA and the NCP authorize the
OSC to call upon other Federal agencies to provide assistance.
Army regulations and guidance pertaining to execution of OSC responsibilities are found in AR
50-6 and AR 200-1. Emergency planning and preparedness for Army installations is also required
by AR 525-27.
The Stafford Act authorizes Federal assistance to communities affected by an emergency or
disaster. The usual procedure is that when a disaster occurs, the Governor of the affected State
assesses the damage and requests a Presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster.
However, the FEMA Associate Director or a FEMA Regional Director can also request an
emergency declaration, or another Federal agency can make such a request through FEMA when
the emergency concerns a Federal Government matter. Federal disaster assistance is carried out
according to FEMA regulations and the NRF. Some portions of Federal assistance may be carried
out by other agencies, including the Small Business Administration (SBA) for assistance to
47
businesses and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for assistance to agricultural
operations.
State/local Authorities
Each State has an emergency management act that creates the emergency management agency
and infrastructure for emergency response; mandates that emergency plans and procedures be
developed; designates certain officials as responsible for taking action to protect the public in an
emergency (the Governor, and generally a CEO at the county level); and provides a mechanism
for declaring a State of Emergency always at the State, often also at the local levelthat
activates special response authorities. Responsibility for protecting the health and safety of the
publicincluding measures such as activating alert and notification systems; ordering evacuation
or shelter-in-place; closing roads, schools, and parks; and declaring curfews and other protective
measuresfalls to State and local officials. Exactly who is authorized to make such decisions and
their particular emergency powers is a function of State and local law and policy.
Consistency with National Planning Initiatives

On-Post Planning: On-post planning should be conducted in accordance with applicable Army
regulations and guidance.
Army Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance

(CAIRA) Response
The Army has specific functions, responsibilities, organizational requirements, and procedures
for responding to CAIs and HazMat incidents in general. Key documents include AR 50-6,
Chemical Surety; and AR 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement. Installation
emergency plans for responding to a CAI are referred to as CAIRA plans.
The Armys CAIRA effort includes actions to save lives, preserve health and safety, prevent
further environmental damage, protect property, secure the chemical agents, and maintain public
confidence in the Armys ability to store and secure chemical agent and related materials. The
Armys response effort includes some key off-post concerns such as public information, event
assessment, emergency notification, and coordination of response activities. The term CAI
includes any event where a chemical agent is released and threatens or has the potential to
threaten unprotected personnel. This can include (1) non-deliberate events (accidents) where
safety is of primary concern, and (2) deliberate criminal or terrorist acts (incidents) where
security is of concern in addition to safety.
Under CAIRA, the Army establishes, trains, and maintains an Installation Response Force (IRF)
at each chemical agent stockpile location to respond to chemical events. In addition, an Army48
wide Service Response Force (SRF) is established, trained, and maintained for deployment in the
CONUS as needed. The IRF, under the command of the Army Installation Commander, is
prepared to implement CAIRA procedures for immediate response to a release of chemical
agents. If a follow-on response effort is required, the SRF is activated to provide sustained
operations. The SRF, under the direction of a general officer, includes the IRF and additional staff
and teams from various agencies.
Under the CERCLA and the NCP, the Army as facility owner is responsible for response to and
cleanup of any hazardous materials spill, including a CAI. When a notice event occurs, the
installation notifies the National Response Center as part of initial notification process (along
with notifications to State and local authorities, and Army headquarters).
The Federal OSC coordinates NCP response. In the event of a CAI, the OSC will be the
Installation Commander while the IRF is operative. If the Armys SRF is activated, the OSC
position transfers to the general officer in charge of the SRF.
The NCP provides for assistance from other Federal agencies, particularly the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The OSC coordinates and directs all Federal efforts under the NCP,
including efforts to reduce (mitigate) the risk of further releases, assess the hazard to public health
and the environment, and clean up any contamination.
Off-post planners should be familiar with the installation CAIRA plan, especially those parts of
the plan that relate to off-post activities (e.g., emergency assessment and notification, protective
action recommendations [PARs], and coordination with off-post actions). Regular meetings and
dialogue between community and installation CSEPP staff will help ensure that each organization
understands the other organizations roles, structures, and terminology.
Federal Response under PPD 8 and the NRF

Effective planning, as described in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, spans the following:
Protection/Prevention/Mitigation Planning
Emergency Response Planning
Recovery Planning
Planning should ensure that operations in all phases mesh with one another. CSEPP Protection,
Prevention and Mitigation planning are the primary responsibility of DA. Emergency Response
and Recovery planning are the joint responsibility of on-post and off-post as described in the
following sections.
Depending on the severity and circumstances of the event, a CAI may result in activation of the
NRF. The NRF may be activated in response to a request from the Governor of an affected state,
49
or on the Presidents own initiative. Activation of the NRF allows the Federal Government to use
certain resources to assist with temporary housing, financial aid, and other disaster response
measures. If the NRF is activated, a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) will coordinate Federal
assistance under it. The FCO works with the Governor-appointed State Coordinating Officer
(SCO) to prioritize and coordinate Federal assistance. A Principal Federal Official (PFO) may be
appointed as a liaison to national assets, depending on the magnitude of the response. The DOD
can provide Defense Support to Civilian Authorities as provided for in the NRF. NRF response
will be conducted according to the NIMS, which provides a system for coordination of Federal
response efforts with State and local efforts.
State and Local Response

In the event of a CAI, elected State and local officials have primary responsibility for choosing
and implementing protective actions for the off-post population, including decisions regarding
sheltering, evacuation, and subsequent reentry to evacuated areas. Each state has an emergency
management statute that specifies which officials may exercise emergency powers, including the
power to declare a state of emergency and implement protective actions. Emergency
management statutes also typically assign responsibility for emergency planning and
preparedness to particular officials and agencies. Under CSEPP, State and local authorities are
responsible for developing CSEPP emergency plans (generally as an appendix to an existing allhazards plan) and coordinating planning and operations with the Army installation.
Army assistance to State and local governments should be provided in accordance with Federal
law, Presidential Directives, the NCP, the NRF, DOD and Army regulations and guidance, and
local agreements.
Off-Post Planning: Off-post planning should be conducted in accordance with applicable FEMA
policy and guidance, including the National Planning System concept and the Whole Community
approach. CSEPP plans must be consistent with:
50
NIMS: CSEPP policy is to conduct planning in accordance with the NIMS. Plans should
reflect use of the ICS to manage response.
National Response Framework: CSEPP policy is to conduct planning in accordance

with the National Response Framework. Plans should take account of the use of the ESF
structure for coordinating outside assistance.
National Disaster
Recovery Framework:
CSEPP policy is to
conduct planning in
accordance with the
National Disaster
Recovery Framework.
Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide
101 (CPG 101): Each
CSEPP organizations
Emergency Operations
Plan and its CSEPP
appendix/annex should
be prepared in
accordance with CPG
101.
FEMA Core
Capabilities: CSEPP
plans should address
FEMA Core
Capabilities appropriate
to the hazard.
CSEPP EOPs
In August 2004, CSEPP senior management adopted an
approach aimed at bringing CSEPP off site EOPs into
conformance with provisions of HSPD-5 and NIMS.
Henceforward, CSEPP plans would become part of the
community's broader all-hazards plans. CSEPP communities
should now rely on use of FEMA planning guidance in
developing their EOPs and address CSEPP-specific needs in
the context of their all-hazards plans. This is possible provided
the following points are addressed:
The CSEPP planning process, which relies on collaborative

effort through Community IPTs, conforms to the plan
development processes described in CPG 101.
CSEPP-specific requirements addressed in the Technical

Background and Protective Action chapters provide the
basis for a CSEPP hazard-specific annex to the
community's all-hazards EOP. Further, as provided for in
Chapter 10, CMA will respond to technical assistance
requests from CSEPP communities.
The EOPT provides CSEPP communities with a

mechanism for developing and maintaining all-hazards
CPG 101-based EOPs with a CSEPP hazard-specific
annex.
Communities not using the EOPT should ensure that their

plans address the requirements of CPG 101 Appendix C
and the elements of Chapter 4 pertaining to children,
animals and persons with access and functional needs.
CSEPP-specific planning
requirements should be
addressed in a CSEPP-specific
appendix or annex to the organizations all-hazards Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). The
CSEPP appendix or annex should be based on the installation and communitys assessment of the
hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with the chemical weapons stockpile. It should be
designed in accordance with local, State, and Federal requirements, as applicable, and should be
promulgated by the jurisdictions chief elected or appointed official.
The all-hazards EOP or the CSEPP-specific appendix or annex should provide the following:
Administrative elements including a signature page, a record of changes, lists of

abbreviations and program-specific terminology, a table of contents, and a record of
receipt form.
Assignments for the primary and support roles and responsibilities for all key emergency
functions.
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Detailed agency-specific or position-specific procedures for implementing whole of

community responses to CSEPP events for all emergency officials in public, private, and
not-for-profit-sector organizations.
Procedures for the local implementation of the JIS/JICs concept for emergency public
information.
Descriptions of the standard chemical event emergency notification systems being used,
as well as appropriate response actions based on each notification level.
Policies for the local implementation of the public alert and notification system, in
accordance with the organizations protective action strategy.
Specification of relevant emergency personnel, units, and organizations, and lists of the
associated equipment/systems assigned to support response operations in the jurisdiction.
A schedule for periodically updating annexes and associated standard operating

procedures (SOPs).
Inclusion of, and references to, letters of agreement, mutual aid plans, and any MOAs or
MOUs between local officials and other public, private, and not-for-profit organizations
that can provide or direct resources to support a response in the organizations
jurisdiction.
Zone Basis for CSEPP Planning

The extent and type of emergency response actions change as the distance from the source of a
potential chemical release increases. Greater distance means that more time is available to
implement protective actions. In addition, exposure to the hazard also decreases with distance as
the concentration of agent becomes lower.
Recognizing that risk varies with distance from the source, emergency planning should be
focused on geographic areas close enough to the installation to be considered potentially at risk.
These areas are defined to serve as the basis for planning public warning and instruction, public
protective actions, and protection of people with access and functional needs.
Two concentric zones are defined around each Army chemical installation. The inner zone is the
Immediate Response Zone (IRZ), and the outer zone is the Protective Action Zone (PAZ). The
IRZ encompasses an area requiring less than a one-hour response time when exposed to a
planning base agent release under conservative most likely weather conditions, and extends to
approximately 10 to 15 km (6 to 9 miles) from the potential chemical source. The PAZ extends
from the outer edge of the IRZ to approximately 15 to 50 km (roughly 10 to 30 miles) from the
potential chemical event source, depending on the nature of the stockpile, site meteorology and
terrain, and population distribution. The PAZ is the area in which public protective actions may
52
still be necessary in case of a release of chemical agent, but more time is expected to be available
for implementation of protective actions.
Although the considerations described above give representative distances for the boundaries of
the IRZ and PAZ, in general the actual boundaries should accommodate local considerations. At
most locations, zone boundaries have been adjusted to follow familiar landmarks and boundaries
such as roads, rivers, and town or county boundaries. Following familiar landmarks and
boundaries simplifies planning and allows emergency instructions to the public to be couched in
familiar terms.
CSEPP communities should also have designated sub-zones that divide the IRZ and PAZ into
smaller units. Dividing the IRZ and PAZ into smaller units allows instructions to the public to be
directed to the affected area based on conditions (e.g., wind direction) at the time of the accident.
As part of the CSEPP planning process, the IRZ, PAZ, and zone designations should be
integrated into evacuation planning, emergency public information messages, and public
education materials.
Specific descriptions for the Pueblo and Bluegrass sites are given in Appendices A and B.
Protective Actions
CSEPP emergency plans should address the full range of protective actions for installation
workers, the public including people with access and functional needs, and emergency responders
that are deemed appropriate for the community based on the nature of the chemical hazard and
the specific characteristics of the community. Detail on protective action options and guidance on
their suitability is provided in Chapter 15. Selection of a protective action strategy for each
CSEPP community should be a coordinated and interactive process involving planners and
decision makers from the Army installation, the State, and affected local jurisdictions, and be
documented in their respective plans.
Coordination
CSEPP plans should be integrated into other all-hazard plans with as much commonality as
possible. Plans for the Army installation, counties, and the State should be coordinated with each
other. Agreements (MOAs, MOUs) should be incorporated by reference.
Particular points of coordination that should be covered include:
On-post/off-post coordination of Alert & Notification.
On-post/off-post coordination on protective action decisions (PADs) and implementation.
Coordination of evacuation, reception, and mass care.
53
Public education and emergency public information.
FEMA Core Capabilities.
CSEPP has developed additional guidance and tools applicable to coordinated planning:
Emergency Operations Planning Template: The CSEPP Emergency Operations

Planning Template (EOPT) is an on-line tool that allows organizations to develop and
maintain their emergency operations plans consistent with current FEMA guidance. The
EOPT contains several all-hazards plan outlines drawn from CPG 101 together with
reference material specific to each plan section as well as relevant NIMS requirements.
The EOPT is designed to allow planners to collaborate on-line to develop and update
their EOPs.
MOA/MOU Guide: The CSEPP Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of

Understanding (MOA/MOU) Guide (May 1999) offers further guidance on agreements to
support CSEPP-related preparedness. It gives general information about the process of
developing agreements and provides example agreements for nine CSEPP-related
functions: information exchange, alert and notification, firefighting, traffic and access
control, medical support, joint information systems, sheltering of evacuees, off-post
monitoring, and support from other military organizations.
Special Planning Issues

Re-entry and Recovery Planning
CSEPP plans should include provision for re-entry and recovery following a chemical event.
While much would depend on the details of the event (e.g., the amount of agent released,
weather, area affected, time of year), some planning can be done in advance in order to expedite
implementation of the re-entry and recovery process.
Unified Recovery Plan Recommended
It is recommended that a single, overarching recovery plan be developed to coordinate the

activities of the installation, and State and local jurisdictions at a given site. The integrated
approach is more efficient from a planning perspective (compared to separate, parallel plans for
each jurisdiction) and will facilitate coordination among the organizations. Also, many aspects of
recovery must be coordinated in order to be effective. For example, if several jurisdictions put in
competing requests to the Army for monitoring services, confusion might result and some
important monitoring activities might be delayed. A coordinated plan would ensure that
monitoring is conducted in proper order of priority. A single integrated recovery plan can be
designed to accommodate the decision-making prerogatives of all included organizations.
Jurisdiction-specific annexes may be appropriate in some cases to accommodate the unique needs
of particular jurisdictions.
54
Resources for Recovery Planning
There are a number of resources for recovery planning, some specific to CSEPP and some more
general.
The CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook (April 2003) is designed for use by CSEPP communities
and provides a template for recovery planning. The template includes a basic recovery plan and
covers recovery hazard assessment and decision making; management of access to restricted
areas; protection of food and water; medical and social services; relocation of residents; public
information; claims and disaster assistance; and environmental remediation. The Workbook also
provides background, explanatory, and reference materials to aid planners. The Workbook is
available as a Microsoft Word file or as part of a recovery planning software package.
The CSEPP Recovery Sampling and Analysis Plan Protocol (April 2008, available on the CSEPP
Portal) provides guidance on developing a recovery sampling and analysis plan. It lists necessary
components for such a plan and covers pre-event and post-event sampling plan development, data
validation procedures, and documentation/archiving.
The CSEPP Exercise Policy and Guidance (aka Blue Book) (December 2012) addresses recovery
functions in Appendix C, under Outcome 8. Appendix F provides specific background
information for exercise evaluators about recovery functions that may be demonstrated in a
CSEPP exercise. The recovery tasks listed in Appendix C and explained in Appendix F give a
summary of recovery procedures. They include initiating environmental remediation, initiating
accident investigation, managing access to restricted areas, making and implementing ingestionpathway decisions (food and water restrictions), medical screening, securing disaster assistance,
temporary shelter for evacuees, monitoring and sampling, recovery-phase protective action
decisions, implementing reentry, public information during recovery, support services for the
Army community, and claims services.
The National Disaster Recovery Framework (September 2011) contains FEMA recovery
concepts and doctrine, and guidance for pre- and post-disaster recovery planning. It aligns with
the NRF and replaces the NRF ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery).
The CSEPP Guide for Assistance and Compensation Following a Chemical Event (June 2009) is
a resource on how to seek Federal assistance to those who might experience injury or loss in the
unlikely event of a release of chemical weapons agent from one of the storage installations in the
continental United States. This guide was developed as a result of emergency exercises indicating
that preparedness will be enhanced if an inventory of possible Federal resources is available. The
guide is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as legal advice.
55
Planning for Access and Functional Needs Populations

Preparedness for a chemical emergency includes protection of individuals and groups who require
special consideration in emergencies. This includes working with facilities that host such
populations (e.g., schools, preschools and day-care centers, nursing homes, and hospitals) and
provision for individuals with access and functional needs who are living independently. Plans
should take account of access and functional needs populations at each stage of the preparedness
and response process so that access and functional needs populations are protected at least as well
as the general population.
For CSEPP purposes, individuals
with access and functional needs
include, but are not limited to: the
sensory, mobility, or mentally
impaired; unattended children;
children in preschool facilities;
school students; hospital patients;
nursing/convalescent home
residents; individuals in
correctional facilities; individuals
living at home with special
equipment needs due to medical
conditions; chronically ill persons
particularly susceptible to agent
exposure; people who do not have
access to an automobile; and
people with limited Englishlanguage proficiency.
It is FEMA's policy in accordance with Section 308 of the

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, as amended (Stafford Act), and Federal law
to ensure that the Civil Rights of all persons receiving
services or benefits from agency programs and activities are
protected. Discrimination on account of disability is
prohibited. For more information see the FEMA publication:
Accommodating Individuals With Disabilities In The
Provision Of Disaster Mass Care, Housing, And Human
Services Reference Guide.
Also, a recent Federal court case ruled that the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires consideration of the
needs of disabled individuals in an emergency
preparedness program. See CALIF v. City of Los Angeles
(CV 09-0287 CBM [RZx] U.S. Dist. Ct., Central Dist. CA)
(February 2011).
Plans should include measures designed to serve access and functional needs populations as
appropriate based on their needs, protective actions that might be required, and available
resources for assistance.
During the planning and review process, emergency planners should solicit and incorporate input
from special population representatives. The process should include representatives of special
population facilities such as school districts, daycare operators, colleges, and hospitals, as well as
local representatives from organizations concerned with the interests of people with disabilities.
State and local plans should be coordinated with emergency plans for school districts and other
local institutions that host access and functional needs populations.
56
Planning for Pets

Disasters and emergency situations can have a direct effect on the well being of humans, as well
as their household pets and service animals. Although the care and safety of humans must be the
primary focus in an emergency, planning for pet evacuation, pet-friendly and temporary animal
sheltering is of great importance. CSEPP plans should include a focus on providing rescue,
evacuation, shelter, and care to these animals. Every plan should include information on the
transporting of household pets during evacuations, pet identification/tracking, congregate
household pet sheltering operations, emergency veterinary services, pet search and rescue,
emergency feeding, and reporting requirements.
Additional Guidance for Access and Functional Needs Populations

FEMAs Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 includes a detailed checklist of issues to address to
incorporate consideration of individuals with access and functional needs in emergency planning. CSEPP
planners should consult this guide to ensure this need is adequately addressed. Additional guidance and
information pertaining to emergency preparedness for access and functional needs populations may be
obtained from the following sources:
A training curriculum for an all-hazards approach for medical responders in CSEPP communities available at:
https://www.cseppportal.net/subsites/Medical.aspx.
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Disability Rights Section. An ADA Guide for Local
Governments: Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People
with Disabilities. 30 Sept. 2004. Available online at www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/emergencyprep.htm. See also
ADA Toolkit for State and Local Governments, Chapter 7: Emergency Management under Title II of the ADA,
available at http://www.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/toolkitmain.htm.
National Organization on Disability. Functional Needs of People with Disabilities: A Guide for Emergency
Managers, Planners, and Responders (2009). Available online at
http://nod.org/research_publications/emergency_preparedness_materials/
FEMA, U.S. Fire Administration. Emergency Procedures for Employees with Disabilities in Office
Occupancies (FA-154). Available online at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-154.pdf.
FEMA advice to pet owners: http://www.ready.gov/caring-animals
FEMA policy on eligible costs related to pet evacuations and sheltering: Disaster Assistance Policy (DAP)
9523.19 (October 24, 2007)
Pets Evacuation and Transportation Act (PETS Act), P.L. 109-308 (October 2006).
Red Cross: homepage for pet safety in disasters: http://www.redcross.org/prepare/disaster/pet-safety
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Application of the general planning principles presented in FEMAs CPG 101 should be extended
to household pets and service animals planning. This Guide includes a detailed checklist of issues
related to incorporating issues related to household pets and service animals in emergency plans.
Particular attention should be paid to building a comprehensive planning team with a broad base
of knowledge in various disciplines including animal control, animal health monitoring,
veterinary medicine, mass care, public information, public health, public safety, government,
legal, and other such partners necessary for response.
Collective Protection
In specific circumstances, institutional populations such as schools and hospitals have been
safeguarded through the use of collective protection systems. These systems involve both air
filtration and over-pressurization components that minimize the potential for exposure of
occupants to a chemical agent plume. Under contract to FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers maintains these systems.
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Chapter 6:
ESF #8
Develop medical guidance that addresses the
relevant aspects of worker protection and patient
Core Capabilities: Public
care for individuals potentially exposed to a
and Private Services and
Resources
chemical agent release.
Develop regular medical training for personnel to
perform specified patient care activities, such as
screening, triage, treatment, decontamination, transport, disposition, and patient
tracking.
Develop medical emergency operations that are in accordance with CSEPP guidance
and Federal, State, local, and generally accepted standards for patient care and worker
protection.
Coordinate medical plans and procedures, as appropriate, with the CSEPP alert and
notification system, the JIC, and the JIS.
Ensure that medical personnel participate in community response and recovery planning
and community-based exercise and evaluation programs.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Medical benchmark:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) HAZWOPER Standard at 29 CFR
1910.120OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard at 29 CFR 1910.134
EPA HAZWOPER Regulations at 40 CFR 311
Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning
CSEPP Medical Resource Guide
CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guides
OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents
Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
NFPA 472: Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass
Destruction Incidents
NFPA 473: Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of
Mass Destruction Incidents
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5
A critical component of any communitys ability to respond to an incident involving the release
of a chemical agent is the ability to meet the medical needs of those individuals who may have
been exposed to the agent. While the chance that such an incident would occur off-post is
considered extremely unlikely, a coordinated response by the first response community and
hospitals is essential.
As part of the CSEPPs ongoing efforts to improve medical preparedness and response, the
CSEPP Medical Work Group (MWG) has developed revised medical guidelines. These
guidelines do not supersede current medical or public health practices and requirements. Local
health and emergency management officials, working with Army personnel, must analyze the
nature of possible releases at each location, determine what kinds of intoxication and what level
of contamination might be possible, and match local or regional resources to the potential task.
60
Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Medical benchmark:
A training curriculum for an all-hazards approach for medical responders in CSEPP communities available at:
https://www.cseppportal.net/subsites/Medical.aspx
CSEPP Training Video: Dont be a Victim! Medical Management of Patients Contaminated with Chemical
Agents
CSEPP Training Video: Exposure and Contamination - Factors Affecting the Toxicology of Chemical,
Biological and Radiological Agents
U.S. Army Public Health Command Toxic Chemical Training Course
Any chemical event will likely place a significant additional strain on local medical service
providers, even if off-post areas are not affected by a release. If off-post populations are affected
by a chemical release, local medical service providers will have to provide specialized screening
and care for large numbers of persons who may or may not have been exposed to chemical agent.
The following conditions should be considered in developing CSEPP medical planning:
The deliberate or accidental release of a chemical agent from a chemical storage facility
may significantly impact local medical resources.
Emergency medical, public health, mental health, and hospital services could be called
upon to evaluate and treat a large number of actual or potential casualties.
The chemical agent treatment and resources may be a significant extension of normal
duties and will likely overwhelm the local medical and EMS community.
Preparation for medical response should include written plans, policies, MOAs, MOUs,
and procedures at CSEPP hospitals, field triage and decontamination points, and other
locations where responders may encounter potentially exposed individuals.
Care of chemical casualties may involve identification of agent, decontamination,

administration of antidote (if appropriate), burn care (if appropriate), emotional support,
and definitive care.
Chemical agent exposure may result in physical medical consequences as well as longlasting emotional and psychological effects.
In case of chemical agent casualties, removal of remains (both human and animal) may
need to be anticipated.
61
Preparedness Tools
Medical Resource Guide
The CSEPP Medical Resource Guide was developed as a comprehensive tool to provide the prehospital and hospital communities with an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness that
emphasizes chemical recognition, decontamination, and treatment. This guide includes tools,
regulations, guidelines, references, and web links. This document is posted on the CSEPP Portal
to ensure that the integrity of the resources listed remains intact.
The Medical Resource Guide identifies many fundamental documents necessary for the CSEPP
medical community to assist with planning, including standards and guidelines, planning tools, a
comprehensive medical concept of operations (CONOPS), response and recovery information,
and learning strategies. This guide features three general steps to assist with the development of
emergency management plans:
1.
Pre-incident Planning and Preparedness Medical preparedness staff has

identified a comprehensive discussion of plans, regulations, and accreditation
organizations that deliver guidance to emergency management. Training and
exercises provide additional guidance to appropriate emergency response
efforts.
2.
Incident Response and Recovery Medical preparedness staff has provided a

detailed discussion of the medical CONOPS and recommendations to aid in
the transition from response to recovery.
3.
Learning Strategies Medical preparedness staff has compiled a collection

of best practices and opportunities for improvement.
CSEPP All-Hazards Medical Curriculum

An all-hazards approach for medical responders in CSEPP communities has been developed.
Using a modular approach, it builds content based on the educational requirements of the student.
Individual modules are chemical, biological, radiological signs/symptoms and treatment, special
considerations for mass-casualty incidents, decontamination, and PPE. Information contained in
these modules is important to communities to provide answers to planning and response issues.
The curriculum is available on the CSEPP Portal.
Medical Evaluation Guidelines

Medical Evaluation Guides (MEGs) for pre-hospital and hospital planners have been created for
self-assessment purposes. The CSEPP pre-hospital and hospital MEGs are all-hazard,
comprehensive guides that outline the critical elements of a medical response plan. These tools,
62
which are available on the CSEPP Portal, guide pre-hospital and hospital planners in performing
an inventory of their capabilities.
OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers

The OSHA document Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass
Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances provides practical information
to help hospitals address employee protection and training as part of emergency planning for
mass-casualty incidents involving hazardous substances. Individuals who believe they have
sustained chemical contamination may arrive at the hospital and require decontamination before
medical care can be provided. First receivers at hospitals are different than first responders in the
sense that first responders respond to the incident site and first receivers do not. This being the
case, there may be slight differences in what is required of each entity in respect to level of
training, regulations, and standards of practice. The Best Practices document includes guidance
on victim decontamination, PPE, and employee training.
Medical Workgroup CSEPP Portal Page

The Medical Workgroup Portal Page provides a repository of historical and current documents
helpful to those seeking first responder/hospital information.
Definition of Medical Providers

First Responders
The provision of on-scene medical care and decontamination by first responders may include
firefighters, EMS, and police officers. First responder emergency services are regulated by State
licensing or certification requirements, SOPs, and contractual agreements. Emergency services
plans and procedures should be well integrated into the community-wide response to a chemical
incident to include integration with community hospital planning.
Emergency Medical Services that would have a responsibility in a CSEPP event need to develop
and maintain a medical readiness to competently respond in case of a CSEPP event. These
services need to maintain the capabilities to treat and transport patients injured by a chemical
agent event. Capabilities include but are not limited to appropriate equipment, supplies, training
and participation in exercises.
Hospitals
CSEPP hospitals maintain capabilities to treat patients injured by chemical agent, including
appropriate equipment, supplies, training, and participation in exercises. CSEPP hospitals may be
63
designated by two different mechanisms: by the Army Chemical Installation through an MOA or
through the FEMA/CSEPP approval process.
The hospitals emergency planner should have a clinical background or access to medical subject
matter experts and understand the principles of emergency management. The planner should
know where to access local plans and formulate a relationship with the local emergency manager.
CSEPP planning has been most effective when hospital plans are integrated into community and
State plans.
Public Health
The role of public health in any chemical or biological incident is of paramount importance
because these services provide cornerstone resources for early detection, diagnosis, and treatment
of health concerns, and strategies for protection against health threats. Public health activities
occur at a local, county (regional), tribal, State, and Federal level. Public health strategies for a
healthy community include planning, preparedness, and response and recovery activities.
Other Healthcare Providers

In all CSEPP communities it is important to acknowledge that other health care providers exist
such as free-standing medical facilities and mental health agencies. Freestanding facilities may
include Insta-Care walk-in emergency clinics, public health clinics, rural health clinics,
community health centers, and private physician offices. Mental health facilities may include
hospitals, outpatient clinics, and components of disaster relief agencies, private practices, and
governmental entities. These health care providers are part of the CSEPP medical community and
should be incorporated into the CSEPP medical CONOPS and receive periodic education on
related issues.
Continuum of Victim Care

Medical planning begins with the on-post medical plans and procedures to handle the most
probable event and continues with plans and procedures to mobilize on and off-post medical
personnel and EMS in response to a maximum credible event (MCE). Civilian emergency
medical response resources include, but are not limited to, local ambulance services (ground and
air), local fire services, law enforcement, local and regional hospitals, mental health resources,
other healthcare providers, and State/county health departments (public health and coroners
office). The continuum of victim care begins on-post, or at any entry point to the medical system,
and continues until final patient disposition occurs.
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Veterinary resources may also be a part of the community medical response. MOAs between the
installation and certain off-post medical treatment facilities may be required in order to ensure
coordination for the continuum of victim care.
Medical Preparedness and Planning

Preparing for an unlikely off-post chemical incident should incorporate Federal regulations, State
regulations, and agency accreditation standards. Medical planning for each CSEPP community
involves integration of pre-hospital and hospital services. The CSEPP medical program includes
not only hospitals but also public health resources and first responders such as law enforcement,
fire, and EMS. Local emergency managers can also provide important information.
Medical Concept of Operations

Medical preparedness should be based on plans and procedures that detail the medical CONOPS
and coordinated response actions to prepare for and respond to a CAI. These medical plans and
procedures should be integrated with State and local emergency response plans and those of the
Army installations. These plans should include anticipated response, necessary resources, and
appropriate training.
The CONOPS should consider as a minimum the following factors:
The continuum of victim care begins on-post or at any entry point into the medical
system (which includes EMS) and continues until final patient disposition occurs.
The number and type of potentially exposed individuals in the projected plume area.
The implementation of protective action strategies (e.g., evacuation, sheltering, and

collective protection).
Medical screening, triage, decontamination, appropriate treatment, and transport to

CSEPP hospitals or medical facilities for exposed individuals, to include plans for
administration of antidote where necessary.
Strategies for the appropriate use of decontamination equipment.
Procedures for decontamination of patients and emergency responders per OSHA

standards.
Tracking of victims through the continuum of care.
Integration with existing HazMat and/or CAI response plans, mass casualty incident
plans, and other disaster plans.
Strategies for incorporation of public health into community planning, response, and
recovery efforts.
65
Management of a CAI using the ICS.
Integration of a medical component into the JIS.
Medical training should be included as part of existing State and local programs and should be
coordinated as part of an all-hazards approach. Training should be structured to take advantage of
existing Federal, State, local, and Army training programs. The Medical Resource Guide and the
CSEPP Portal contain lists of CSEPP educational opportunities.
Decontamination Planning
In the rare case where persons originating off-post may have received agent contamination,
proper decontamination will be necessary to prevent secondary contamination and chemical
injury to medical and rescue personnel. The basic competencies required for decontamination of
potentially contaminated persons are the same as those for other hazardous materials
emergencies. Additional decontamination guidelines for persons who may have been exposed to
chemical warfare agent are located in the Medical Resource Guide.
Medical Funding
CSEPP requirements for medical equipment, personnel, supplies, training, and exercises should
be incorporated into the individual states LCCEs and the annual FEMA CA process. CSEPP
regional review and comment on the states requirements is a key element of the validation
process. Details as to those items considered eligible or ineligible for full or partial CSEPP
funding will be identified in CA guidance documents.
Medical Program Assessment

A self-assessment of medical capabilities throughout the community is provided using the
Community Profile Tool. Areas to consider include, but are not limited to:
Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays
Medical Services First Response
Medical Services Transportation
Medical Services Medical Facilities
Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of Evacuees
Individual Item Status:
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Selected PPE (Kappler suit, Army boots and gloves, approved powered air purifying
respirators) on-hand
Appropriate stocks of antidote on-hand
Emergency medical staff at hospitals trained (CSEPP curriculums)
CSEPP MEGs assist pre-hospital and hospital planners in the performing an inventory of their
capabilities.
Exercise Participation
Evaluation of the elements of victim care as defined in the Blue Book begins on-post, or at any
entry point to the medical system, and continues until final patient disposition occurs. CSEPP
hospitals are required to participate in the communitys annual CSEPP exercise. They are
evaluated according to the criteria described in the Blue Book, as well as the emergency
preparedness standards set by their accrediting organizations.
Recommendations for a Full-Scale Exercise

The following elements should be included in each hospital and field decontamination sites extent-ofplay agreements for a CSEPP exercise. Responder/receiver organizations should consider
demonstrating:
A very limited use of simulation (the only situations where simulation should occur are in the
administration of medications and when, in the opinion of the evaluators, a safety risk exists).
A demonstration stressing its emergency preparedness systems with multiple patients presenting
with chemical and conventional illness and injury.
A demonstration stressing its emergency preparedness systems with multiple patients exhibiting
psychological signs and symptoms.
Emergency triage, patient tracking, and stabilization prior to decontamination.
Ambulatory and non-ambulatory decontamination or the demonstrated rationale of why

decontamination is not needed.
Patient tracking throughout the continuum of care.
Decontamination and antidote administration identification processes.
Treatment of casualties, including antidote therapy, if indicated.
Patient disposition.
Collection and decontamination of human remains.
Disposition of human remains.
Use of the ICS and its EOC or Hospital Command Center (HCC).
PPE donning and doffing procedures.
Proper use of equipment, i.e., chemical agent detectors.
Communication with the JIS.
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68
Chapter 7: Training
Chapter 7:
Training
ESF # N/A
Conduct training needs assessments to inventory
and track the needs and skill levels of CSEPP staff
requiring specific training or specialized skills.
Identify training coordinators for each installation,
state, and county to ensure annual training is
available as required and that appropriate training materials and measurement tools are
used.
Employ competent training instructors based on the needs assessment, ensuring that all
training is job-specific and documented.
Assess the effectiveness of each training course and each trainees performance and
ability to meet course objectives.
This guidance addresses training for personnel at the State and local level with specific CSEPP
responsibilities. While training related to many program activities is conducted in joint fashion
for on- and off-post personnel (notably hazard assessment, exercise evaluation, and public
information), Army installation personnel also receive training related to separate Army
requirements.
CSEPP training includes both general emergency management subjects and critical programspecific training that addresses a unique hazard responders are not likely to encounter in their
everyday experience. Each jurisdiction should have a training program that develops the skills
and knowledge necessary for its emergency management and response personnel to plan for and
respond to a chemical event. Training should include a combination of classroom and online
courses, hands-on activities, drills, and exercises. Training should be conducted in accordance
with a training plan and tracked to ensure that all personnel receive initial and refresher training
appropriate for their position. CSEPP should provide tuition and travel support for necessary
training within available resources.
69
Chapter 7: Training
Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Training benchmark:
CSEPP Exercise and Training Crosswalk with NIMS Integration
Training Coordinator
Each jurisdiction should identify a training coordinator responsible for developing and updating
the training plan, arranging and tracking training, and maintaining training records. This may not
be a full time position, but it is a critical duty for the betterment of the entire jurisdiction.
Training Plan
Each CSEPP jurisdiction should have a training plan that is based on a position-specific needs
analysis. For each position in the organization that will respond to a chemical event, it is
important to know what training is required for that position (and what would be desirable to
have). By conducting a needs analysis, jurisdictions should be able to develop a training schedule
that lists both required and optional training for each position, including both initial and refresher
training.
Training Records
State and local governments should maintain the following CSEPP training records as a
minimum:
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Training rosters citing the following:

o
People requiring training. (This includes volunteers because they are a critical part of
many emergency operations.)
People completing training, including the class or type of training, the dates, the
instructors, and other relevant information.
Performance tests and course evaluations used by jurisdictions in conducting posttraining evaluations.
The total number of classes, students, and course offerings available in a given year.
(These yearly training totals should be available for the purpose of budget preparation for
the Annual Report, and/or to be forwarded to a regional office upon request.)
Chapter 7: Training
Complete records of all expenses for each training activity.
A file copy of all reports submitted to FEMA.
Performance-Based Evaluation
Each jurisdictions training program should include a performance-based evaluation process to
assess the effectiveness of each training course (e.g., structure, instructor, and materials) as well
as to assess each trainees performance and ability to meet course objectives. Most states have
created a basis for inclusion of outside training into their approved training. These requirements
will probably be centered on performance-based training and may establish minimum passing
scores and validity review of any tests. Classes taught under CSEPP should meet local and state
requirements. Any performance deficiencies noted during CSEPP training drills and exercises
should also be included in the evaluation.
Continuous Review and Improvement

CSEPP reflects the principles of the National
Preparedness System components. CSEPP is
a mature program where training builds and
sustains capabilities and then aids in
validating those capabilities. The cycles of
exercise and training should overlap as both
share a goal of creating a more capable
responder, whether paid staff or volunteer.
The exercise is part of the performance-based
training and should be included in the
training process.
Each jurisdictions training program should
include a continuous assessment process that
tracks completed training, reviews the
current training plan, and identifies new
training to incorporate.
Available Training
The Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP)

develops and delivers advanced training for
emergency response providers, emergency
managers, and other government officials from
State, local, and tribal governments. Located in
Anniston, Alabama, the training focuses on incident
management, mass-casualty response, and
emergency response to a catastrophic natural or
human-caused disaster. The CDP offers the only
program in the nation featuring emergency response
training exercises using chemical agents and nonpathogenic biological materials. The CDP also
operates the only hospital facility in the United States
dedicated solely to preparing the healthcare, public
health, and environmental health communities for
mass casualty events related to terrorism or natural
disasters. Training at the CDP campus is federally
funded at no cost to State, local, and tribal
emergency response professionals or their agency.
For more information or to register for CDP
specialized programs or courses, see
http://www.cdp.dhs.gov.
Available training courses and

recommendations for particular emergency
management positions are listed in the
CSEPP Crosswalk with NIMS and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
(HSEEP) Integration. The Crosswalk is designed to aid CSEPP trainers, planners, and managers
by listing emergency preparedness tasks and showing their relationships to available planning
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Chapter 7: Training
guidance, training resources, and exercise requirements. There are hundreds of courses overall,
including dozens of CSEPP-specific courses, designed to help CSEPP participants get the best
use of all materials that have been produced for the program.
The CSEPP Crosswalk has been improved with updated content from the latest references,
expanded NIMS integration, and the addition of HSEEP target capability references. Revised in
2012, the CSEPP Crosswalk:
Identifies 36 emergency preparedness and response tasks associated with CSEPP

incidents, and
Cross references each task with:

o
Potential Users
CSEPP Policy Planning Guidance Sections
CSEPP Training Materials and Publications
CSEPP Exercise Policy and Guidance Exercise and Evaluation Guides (EEGs)
National Incident Management System (NIMS) Sections
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Target Capabilities
There are five CSEPP Crosswalk Appendices:
Appendix A CSEPP Training Courses
Appendix B NIMS Training Courses
Appendix C Publications and Other Resources
Appendix D Training Recommendations by Personnel Category
Appendix E Acronyms and Abbreviations
CSEPP-specific training is intended to supplement not replace or duplicate general purpose

emergency management training available to CSEPP jurisdictions from other sources (e.g.,
FEMA emergency management training). To the extent possible, CSEPP jurisdictions are
encouraged to take advantage of existing training available from other sources.
Training Required to Accompany Field Monitoring and

Sampling Teams
State and/or local personnel may accompany Army sampling and monitoring teams to conduct
off-post sampling missions under the condition that they are properly trained, qualified, and
equipped in accordance with the OSHA HAZWOPER regulations. Additionally, State or local
personnel observing or accompanying the Army sampling teams must be fully trained and
certified by the Army in chemical agent awareness and Army chemical agent sampling
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Chapter 7: Training
procedures. This training should be made available, as resources permit, to State or local
personnel who are already trained in accordance with HAZWOPER requirements. CSEPP should
not fund HAZWOPER training solely for off-post responders to accompany Army sampling
teams.
Additional Venues for Training and Public Education

Training and public education are critical components in the preparedness of a community to any
hazard. Different levels of training and education should be available for all citizens who may be
affected by a CSEPP emergency. Public outreach and education (described in detail in Chapter
13) lets people know what to do to protect themselves and their families during an emergency.
An informed public helps the entire community of responders to more effectively deal with any
emergency that may arise.
CSEPP has videos on sheltering-in-place, evacuation, protection of pets and service animals,
planning considerations for people with access and functional needs, and response protocols for
hazardous materials and medical professionals during chemical incidents. These CSEPP training
videos can be streamed live or downloaded through the CSEPP Portal and should be shared with
the public (when appropriate) as well as with medical personnel who will be involved in the
response or recovery from a chemical accident.
Medical personnel and volunteers require training on
both their specific duties and the larger response and
recovery plan. Understanding the whole of the response
plan will help responders to be more pro-active and
allow them to better integrate their specific duties with
the roles of other responders.
CSEPP does not credential

emergency management or
response personnel. FEMA
guidance on credentialing of
response personnel can be
found in the NIMS Guideline for
the Credentialing of Personnel.
As with other professional specialties within CSEPP,

there are training courses for medical personnel (as
described in Chapter 6). It is important that medical personnel receive this training to better
understand the types of conditions or situations they may deal with as responders to a chemical
release emergency. Volunteers also need additional training so that they understand the limits of
their duties and know when to call in professional specialists.
CSEPP developed video training designed for emergency personnel who develop plans for
administering assistance to individuals with access and functional needs during an emergency.
This video was developed with assistance from FEMAs Office of Disability Integration and
Coordination and was released in FY 2011. This video was awarded a 2012 Aurora Award, an
international competition honoring excellence in the film and video industry. By the end of FY
2012, the CSEPP program will release a video on Technological Hazards. This video summarizes
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Chapter 7: Training
the collective knowledge from both CSEPP and its sister program, the Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Program (REPP), about emergency response to technological hazardseither
accidental or intentional. A great deal of technical and practical information related to response to
both chemical and radiological accidents has been generated by the staff of both programs, and
this video captures and preserves this body of knowledge for the emergency management
community.
CSEPP Training Videos

The following CSEPP-produced training videos are publicly available and can be streamed live or
downloaded from http://orise.orau.gov/CSEPP:
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Animals in Emergencies for Owners and Planners (also available in Spanish)
Business Shelter-In-Place
Communicating Public Information in Emergencies
Comprehensive Planning for Technological Emergencies
Dont be a Victim! Medical Management of Patients Contaminated with Chemical Agents
Emergency Planning for People with Access and Functional Needs
Evacuation Planning
Exposure and Contamination - Factors Affecting the Toxicology of Chemical, Biological and
Radiological Agents
Operations Level Training: A Refresher for Responders
Residential Shelter-In-Place
Chapter 8:
Exercises
Develop and execute exercises that comply with all

ESF #15
requirements found in Exercise Policy and Guidance for
the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program (the Blue Book).
Information and Warning
Evaluate emergency plans, response capability, and
training adequacy.
Identify opportunities to improve plans, policies,
training, or response resources.
Demonstrate communication, cooperation, and coordination between the Army and the
surrounding civilian community.
Ensure continued active participation of key community organizations, the Army, FEMA,
State, and local jurisdictions.
Evaluate exercise development and conduct to ensure NIMS compliance
Serve as visible demonstrations of the Army, FEMA, States, and local jurisdictions
commitment to protect the public.
Fulfill Army regulatory requirements for exercises, while designing exercises consistent
with initiatives in other hazard programs for greater efficiency and benefit.
Develop exercise planning personnel and processes that can be sustained during the life
of the program and after the CSEPP mission is complete.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Exercises benchmark:
Exercise Policy and Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (Blue
Book). U.S. Department of the Army and FEMA. December 2012
DHS Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
Exercises allow personnel, from first responders to senior officials, to validate training, plans,
policies and procedures and practice strategic and tactical actions in a risk-reduced environment.
Exercises are the primary tool for assessing preparedness and identifying areas for improvement,
while demonstrating community resolve to prepare for major incidents. Exercises aim to help
organizations gain objective assessments of their capabilities so that gaps, deficiencies, and
vulnerabilities are addressed prior to a real incident. They are a critical component of the
continuous cycle of program management that is necessary to maintain readiness.
The Army-FEMA MOU requires a cooperative effort to assess and improve the effectiveness of
federal, state, and local response systems and procedures through the design, conduct, and
evaluation of exercises. As part of this effort, each CSEPP community conducts an annual
exercise to demonstrate its capabilities to respond to a chemical agent release. These exercises
follow the structure for planning, conducting, evaluating, and reporting outlined in the CSEPP
Exercise Blue Book. An after-action report with corrective actions (described below) is
developed at the conclusion to document the results and refine preparedness planning efforts.
A NIMS-compliant response structure requires exercises to validate the procedures and processes
adapted by the NRF and NIMS at the community level. Structures to be implemented and
exercised within the ICS include the Incident Commander, Unified Command (UC), Area
Command (AC), and Multiagency Coordination System (MACS). DOD and healthcare agencies
also use similar command structures. Specific guidelines for evaluation of the hospitals that are
part of the CSEPP community are referenced in the Medical Resource Guide.
The Exercise page on the CSEPP Portal provides a repository of historical and current exerciserelated documents including exercise reports and the controller/evaluator database.
Types of CSEPP Exercises

There are three types of federally-managed CSEPP Exercises: full-scale exercises (FSE),
functional exercises (FE) which are scalable, and tabletop exercises (TTX). They are discussed
below. Traditionally, each annual CSEPP exercise is an FSE. FEs and TTXs may be conducted,
as required, to meet programmatic needs at either the national or community level. In addition to
76
Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Exercises benchmark:
CSEPP 101 (Integrated Performance Evaluation)
Master Exercise Practitioner Program (MEPP) Series
E-131 Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning
E-132 Discussion-Based Exercise Design and Evaluation
IS-120 - An Introduction to Exercises
G-146 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Training Course
FSEs and FEs, installations and off-post responders may conduct tabletop remediation and
recovery exercises.
An FSE is a mandatory, federally-evaluated demonstration of a communitys full

capabilities to respond to a chemical emergency. The exercise is driven by an Extent of
Play Agreement (XPA), a scenario, and related events that allow for realistic participant
response. The negotiated XPA for an FSE is developed to ensure that the community, as
a whole, will address all applicable CSEPP emergency response outcomes (EROs).
CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes
Outcome 1: Preparedness
Outcome 2: Emergency Assessment
Outcome 3: Emergency Management
Outcome 4: Hazard Mitigation
Outcome 5: Protection
Outcome 6: Victim Care
Outcome 7: Emergency Public Information
Outcome 8: Remediation and Recovery
The scale of an FE will be determined by the community and the Co-Directors. Like the
FSE, an FE initiating event should be related to the stockpile. The FE may be scaled to
include a series of evaluated out-of-sequence demonstrations, TTXs, or other training
venues as long as the community participates in the Army installations IRFX, allowing
the Army installation to exercise with the community emergency response system (e.g.,
include A&N, communications, providing of HA information). All CSEPP jurisdictions
should participate in the FE.
A TTX can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems
needed to guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined incident.
HSEEP guidance should be consulted for conduct of a tabletop exercise.
77
The exercise planning team, under the lead of the Army and FEMA Co-Directors, is responsible
for exercise planning. The Army and FEMA co-directors are responsible for exercise conduct,
evaluation, and the after-action report.
Installations have an Army-mandated schedule of exercises (e.g., quarterly CAIRA exercises).
Current Army regulations require at least two CAIRA exercises per calendar year that incorporate
the appropriate government and/or non-government off-installation emergency response
authorities/agencies identified in plans as having jurisdiction in the IRZ. The CSEPP exercises are
conducted annually to test the entire emergency response effort (to include select off-installation
emergency response capabilities), evaluate the interaction of all components, and demonstrate the
ability of communities to respond to a CAI in coordination with installation procedures. CSEPP
exercise staff should assess on- and off-installation response procedures in accordance with
established exercise objectives and EROs. Off-post jurisdictions are encouraged to participate in
all exercises they consider appropriate.
States and other participating jurisdictions and entities may demonstrate emergency response
functions for CSEPP exercise credit at other times (e.g., actual events, CAIRA exercises,
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program exercises, HSEEP, or other FEMA Grant
Programs Directorate [GPD] funded exercises). This must be done in accordance with established
FEMA policy and as approved by the FEMA Exercise Co-Director. This will be documented in
the annual CSEPP Exercise Report.
Exercise Planning, Conduct, Evaluation, and Reporting

The exercise scenario includes the initiating event and other key events that provide the
framework for the exercise response to take place. The exercise planning team has primary
responsibility for development of the scenario. Any sensitivity that the installation or surrounding
communities may have regarding the contamination of certain areas, particular initiating events,
or other restrictions should be discussed before the scenario is developed. The initiating event and
meteorological conditions chosen for the scenario must be within the CSEPP planning base to
allow demonstration of the emergency response by the community. The CSEPP planning base
refers to a table that enumerates all acceptable possibilities for an accident scenario and is derived
from the quantitative risk assessments prepared by the Army. The requirement for a potential offpost impact may force the choice of some low-probability, high-impact initiating event.
Planning the Exercise
An effective exercise program can only be developed and implemented through the close
coordination of representatives from all participating organizations. Planning the exercise is a
whole community event that brings together the co-directors from the regional office and the
Army, State exercise coordinators along with the communities involved. Each member of the
team brings critical skills, resources, and guidance to bear on the exercise program. CSEPP has
adopted the HSEEP methodology and encourages the states and communities to take a major role
78
in the planning of the exercises. This process takes the better part of a year and is based on the
schedule established in the Blue Book.
Conducting the Exercise
The CSEPP community will be required to demonstrate all applicable emergency response plans,
policies, and procedures during the exercise. This requirement applies to the community as a
whole, not to just individual jurisdictions. However, each jurisdiction should demonstrate for
evaluation all actions in order to support the scenario.
Evaluation
The CSEPP exercise evaluation methodology is organized around a standard set of eight EROs
and is used in planning for and evaluating of each CSEPP exercise. Each ERO is divided into a
series of tasks (called Exercise Evaluation Guides) to aid the evaluator in collecting data needed
to determine if the outcome was successfully demonstrated during an exercise. EROs, Exercise
Evaluation Guides, and supporting performance criteria are provided in Appendix C of the Blue
Book.
After-Action Report
The CSEPP exercise report documents the results of the exercise. The report provides a means for
recommending improvements, tracking performance, and addressing findings noted in prior
exercises. The exercise evaluation and development of the exercise report consists of analysis
from the evaluators who observed the exercise play and may include player self-assessment.
Development of accurate, useful information requires cooperation and candor between the
evaluators, controllers, and players. The format and guidelines concerning the content of the
exercise report are found in Appendix A of the Blue Book. For FSEs and FEs, the Army and
FEMA CSEPP co-directors are responsible for developing and publishing the exercise report.
Community Profiles
In reporting the annual status of CSEPP efforts, the communities CSEPP Program Managers
provide a self-assessment of their capabilities prior to their annual exercise. This profile matches
the current CSEPP National Benchmarks. Assessment of capability is based on community
negotiations with the exercise co-directors. The Community Profile should be prepared at least 45
days prior to the exercise for incorporation into both the Exercise Plan (ExPlan) and the final
After-Action Report, as described in Appendix A of the Blue Book. This profile is a tool for the
exercise evaluation team to gain an insight into the communitys capabilities, as well as for the
community to determine areas needing attention.
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Profile capabilities for each of the 12 National Benchmarks are identified as capable, partially
capable, marginally capable, or not capable. Each is defined below:
Capable: fully able to perform emergency response activities (able to respond) in

accordance with its plans, policies, and procedures;
Partially Capable: able to respond, but needs minor improvement;
Marginally Capable: able to respond, but needs major improvement, or
Not Capable: unable to respond.
FEMA HQ reports on the chemical stockpile sites Community Profiles, along with discussions
of how the communities are improving and sustaining their capabilities, in the annual CSEPP
Report to Congress.
The exercise, when combined with the National Benchmarks and other functional areas, assists in
developing the overall Community Profile. The exercise results and the Community Profile
present annual assessments that drive actions toward improving CSEPP performance over the
next exercise cycle.
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Chapter 9:
Communications
ESF #2
Maintain primary and alternative direct
communications systems, providing the maximum
Core Capabilities: Operational
practical reliability when used among the
Communications
jurisdictional EOC, the State, and all off-post
jurisdictions.
Use the communication systems to provide public alert and notification and the delivery
of other emergency-related public information.
Ensure the availability of back-up power for its communications systems and maintain
24-hour operational capability for its communications linkages.
Develop, maintain, and adhere to standard operating procedures for sending, receiving,
recording, disseminating, and validating communications.
Develop and implement a program of regular preventive maintenance of all
communications equipment, including a program of regular testing of all
communications links.
Background
Reliable and fully functional communication capabilities are necessary to successfully manage
and coordinate emergency response activities. The purpose of CSEPP communication systems is
to enable timely, reliable interagency and inter-jurisdictional communications. CSEPP provides
for: 1) separate and dedicated primary communication links between the Army installation EOC
and off-post warning points, and 2) backup communication links. The dedicated links should be
tested daily.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Communications benchmark:
DHS SAFECOM Interoperability Basics: State/Region/Urban Area Tactical Interoperable
Communications Plan Template
Understanding Wireless Communications in Public Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues,
Planning, and Management (2nd Edition, January 2003)
How-To Guide for Managing the Radio System Life Cycle
NENA Minimum Standards for Emergency Telephone Notification Systems
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules
Plain Language Guide Making the Transition from Ten Codes to Plain Language
State and Federal privacy statues and regulations (fair credit reporting, Health Insurance
Portability)
State and Federal Freedom of Information statues and regulations
State and Federal labor statues and regulations
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
For all communications systems in place to support a CSEPP event, plans and procedures should
provide for periodic testing, maintenance, and evaluation in order to support all the emergency
response communication capabilities contained in the benchmarks for alert and notification, EOC
operations, emergency public information, ADP systems, and protective actions. All systems used
for public alert and notification should receive preventive maintenance on a regular schedule and
should be tested at least monthly (daily for dedicated links as noted above). Siren systems should
be periodically evaluated to ensure they are of sufficient volume to be heard above ambient noise
levels.
The emergency communication system life cycle includes the initial purchase, upgrades, and
continuing maintenance of communications equipment and technologies. CSEPP grantees and
sub-grantees should comply with the most recent cooperative agreement provisions on
communications. The current FY CSEPP CA should be in accordance with and have links to the
latest DHS SAFECOM Guidance on Emergency Communications Grants for purchasing and
funding the maintenance of communications equipment. SAFECOM fosters the purchase of
equipment and planning for interoperability within the framework of the grantees statewide
interoperability communication plans which should apply to all disaster response.
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Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Communications benchmark:
IS-247.a Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS)
IS-704 NIMS Communications and Information Management
In consonance with DHS guidance, the FY 2013 CSEPP CA Guidance includes links to the
SAFECOM website (http://www.safecomprogram.gov), which has provisions on technical
standards that ensure and enhance interoperable communications and the Project 25 suite of
standards. [Project 25 Technology Interest Group, http://www.project25.org; Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International, http://apcointl.org.] Each CSEPP
jurisdiction should maintain or be part of a regional Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan
that includes governance structures, technology assets, and usage policies and procedures for
operation during a CSEPP event. [Interoperability Basics: SAFECOM,
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/library/lists/library/DispForm.aspx?ID=140]
Interoperability is expected to be further enhanced as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning
System (IPAWS) is implemented both within CSEPP and nationally. (IPAWS is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 11.)
Important documentation should be retained and maintained on CSEPP communication systems.
On-post documentation should follow Army policy. Off-post jurisdictions should develop and
maintain documentation to include, as a minimum:
System as built details and diagrams
Communication path maps and studies
Propagation studies
Routine testing results
MOUs between or among agencies
All contracts and agreements for equipment and services used by the communications
systems (e.g., maintenance agreements, site leases, and access agreements)
Equipment inventories
FCC Licenses and station files
Life cycle plan including cost estimates for all equipment
83
All jurisdictions should ensure provisions are in place to maintain the reliability, security, and
protection for its systems.
Communications systems require various forms of power. Critical systems should have
service from both commercial and emergency power sources.
Communications systems should have robust grounding. More information on power and
grounding can be found in the EOC chapter.
The communications capability should be self assessed at least annually by the community using
the Community Readiness Profile as provided for in the Blue Book. The Communications
Benchmark should be assessed during each CSEPP exercise. Communications crosses most of the
EROs, which have specific emergency evaluation guidelines (EEGs) relative to communications,
including both the systems and how those systems are employed in transmitting information. The
communitys self-assessment should be combined with the exercise formal evaluation and used as
the basis for the Communications Benchmark input for the annual Report to Congress.
FEMA and the Army are available to assist with the technical requirements, interoperability
implementation, IPAWS, and other issues as they arise.
Concept of Operations
Communications is the process of transmitting information through verbal, written, or symbolic
means. Throughout all phases of CSEPP operations, good communications are vital. The
communications benchmark focuses on the need for a highly reliable means to transmit
information. Other benchmark chapters deal with the substance and nature of the information to
be communicated relevant to specific subject matter and audiences (e.g., A&N, Medical, PA, and
Outreach).
Critical communications functions require redundancy. A communications network, consisting of
redundant telephone and radio systems, should link the Army installation notification point
(usually its EOC) with the EOCs and notification points of all IRZ counties and states. Regardless
of whether the telephone or radio system is designated the primary method of communication, the
other system must be provided to serve as a backup. Both primary and alternate systems must
have high reliability.
On- to off-post initial notification should be handled in a way that gains the attention of the offpost personnel and provides needed information. This initial notification must go to a facility
staffed around the clock, capable of further disseminating the messages and activating resources
within time frames that will ensure protection of the population at risk. Systems must also provide
for timely interagency and inter-jurisdictional communications.
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Once off-post coordinating agencies have received the initial information, they must be able to
communicate with, activate, and mobilize their respective response units, such as law
enforcement, fire, emergency medical, rescue, and other public safety resources, as well as
governmental, health, school, and other special facility authorities. Communicators must be able
to handle information related to chemical emergencies accurately and quickly because of the
nature of the hazards. As local emergency plans are updated, internal communication protocols
should be reviewed and modified as needed to ensure rapid and accurate information transfer.
Applications
The types of communications systems in Table 6 are listed with some of their key features. A
combination of these applications can be used as a part of CSEPP to send messages based on the
availability of the system, users ability, and the intended audience.
These systems can be one-way or two-way communications systems. Two-way communications
provide the ability for the user to get immediate feedback to verify that the audience understood
the message. One-way systems do not allow for immediate feedback, and require very careful
message development. Emergency information provided by such one-way messages must be
easily understood by the recipient (e.g., temperature stated in Fahrenheit or Celsius). One-way
communications should always state who, what, where, when, and why using clear simple
language.
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Application
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Primary/
Secondary
Table 6: Communications Systems Applications
Intended
User/Audience
Time
Frame
Description
Public Safety Radio

System
EOC, Dispatch,
Responders
Immediate
Two-way system used by field users. This

has the benefit of being familiar to the users
but may be impacted by interference and
failure.
Amateur Radio
EOC, Shelters
Immediate
Two-way system operated by specially

trained volunteers. Usually operators have
good technical skills but may not understand
the environment or operational impact.
Hot Lines
EOC, Fixed
locations
Immediate
Two-way system can operate from fixed

locations. These systems provide indications
of where a call originates.
Telephones
(landline)
EOC, Shelters,
Fixed locations
Immediate
Two-way system that can be used at many

locations. Is open to the public and can
congest quickly. Use of GETS is
recommended.
Telephones
(wireless)
EOC, Shelters,
Responders
Immediate

locations but requires coverage from
providers infrastructure. Is open to the
public and can congest quickly. Use of WPS
is recommended.
Telephones
(satellite)
EOC, Shelters,
Responders
Immediate

locations but requires coverage from
providers infrastructure. Usually there are a
limited number of devices in key locations as
back up communications.
Facsimile
EOC, Shelters,
Fixed locations
Near term
One-way system that relies on the telephone

system.
Teleconference
bridges (telephone
and video)
EOC, Shelters,
Responders
Near term
Two-way systems that allow multiple users

to communicate at the same time.
Web-based EOC
Software
P
or
S
EOC
Near term
One-way system that can be used to gather

information from various locations to store in
a central location.
Primary/
Secondary
Intended
User/Audience
Time
Frame
EOC
Immediate
Two-way system used to share plume

modeling data, scenario information, PARs,
and PADs, and other critical event
information. May also be used as an event
notification system if followed up by a human
in the loop confirmation. Limited to fixed
sites with access to the appropriate server.
Alert Sirens/PA
Public
Immediate
One-way system for alerting the public of

emergencies. Limited information available
and must be followed up with where to get
detailed info. Visitors may not know the
intended meaning of messages.
Tone Alert Radios

(TARs)
Public
Immediate
One-way system that can be used to alert

the public and provide some additional
information of actions required. Limited to
fixed sites that have these devices.
Pagers
P
or
S
EOC, Shelter,
Responders
Near
Term
One-way system that can be used to notify

users of actions needed. These systems are
often best-effort delivery and have some
latency based on the system and usage
levels at the time of use.
E-mail
EOC, Shelters,
Responders
Delayed
One-way system that can be used to send

long messages or detailed information such
as lists. Is best-effort delivery and relies on
the receiver to take an action to see the
information.
Emergency Calling
Systems
EOC Staff
Near term

levels at the time of use.
Emergency Calling
Systems
Public
Near term

levels at the time of use. Transmission of
TTY signals is required for equal access.
EAS
Public
Near term
One-way system for alerting the public and

providing a limited amount of information. Is
constrained by the available types of
messages the system allows.
Application
WebPuffTM
Description
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Primary/
Secondary
Intended
User/Audience
Time
Frame
Public
Near term
One-way system for inputting messages to

other systems used for alerting the public
and providing a limited amount of
information. Is constrained by the available
types of messages the system allows.
CMAS
Public
Near term

constrained by the available types of
messages the system allows. This uses text
messages to wireless phones and as such
may reach visitors easier.
Highway Traffic
Radios
Public
Near term

allows more detailed information. Is
constrained by the available transmitters in
the area and the public to tune to these
stations.
Message boards
Public
Near term

constrained by the size of the sign and the
ability of a driver to read the sign.
Social Media
Public
Delayed
One-way system that can be used to provide

information to the public. This can be used
to help reduce rumors, and in some cases
as a method to get reports from the public.
Press Release
Public, Media
Delayed
One-way system that allows for information

to be sent to the media. Although
information is sent, that does not mean it will
be relayed to the public.
Press Conference
Public, Media
Delayed
Two-way system that will allow the media to

give feedback and expand their
understanding of the situation. Not all of the
information from the press conference may
get to the public.
Application
IPAWS
Description
Chapter 10:
Automated Data Processing
ESF # 2
Adopt an integrated ADP system that supports an

Core Capabilities:
accredited Army chemical hazard prediction
Operational
modeling software system, the communitys
Communications
protective action recommendation procedures,
alert and notification protocols, and event
notification and management to meet specific
community needs.
Ensure that the ADP system incorporates emergency management software and chemical
hazard prediction software, featuring a browser-based interface and appropriate security
features.
Ensure that the ADP system meets State and county information technology standards
and requirements for hardware and software.
Ensure that the ADP system meets Army network security requirements, as defined by the
Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process
(DIACAP).
Ensure all automated communications are CAP-compliant and consistent with the
Incident Command System.
Automation Systems
Information management systems collect, store, organize, and archive data to provide decision
makers with selective data and reports to assist in managing and controlling projects, resources,
activities, and results. Automated Information Systems (AISs) can provide important assistance in
performing many of the planning functions described in this document. The quickness with which
a chemical agent incident could affect Army and civilian populations necessitates use of
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Automation benchmark:
CSEPP Portal User Guide
WebPuff 5.0 BOM
WebPuff User Guide
WebPuff System Architecture
DIACAP Department of Defense Instruction Number 8510.01, DOD Information Assurance
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), 28 November 2007
automated tools to help perform complex analyses during planning and managing the deployment
of personnel and resources for response efforts. AISs can assist in the development of plans and
procedures by organizing information pertaining to response personnel and resources so that it
can be rapidly recalled and acted upon during response.
State and local jurisdictions are strongly encouraged to make maximum use of automation tools
that have been developed for CSEPP, as well as evaluating commercial off-the-shelf systems. As
new tools are developed or made available they should be rapidly evaluated and integrated into
operations if they are found to be of worth.
Background
All chemical stockpile sites (to include HQ CMA) and local and State EOCs require functional,
automated data processing systems that can rapidly produce a hazard prediction of a chemical
agent incident, as well as to communicate this information rapidly among EOCs and JICs. This
requires a validated, verified, and accredited automation tool that is reliable (functional when
needed) and can be employed with minimal training requirements. (DA Pamphlet 385-61 requires
a specific methodology for the chemical plume model; CMA verifies and validates the model and
the Army Safety Office provides accreditation.) The success of using such software depends on
its ability to predict the behavior of chemical agent plume travel using local, real-time
meteorological conditions for the determination of all zones impacted, while accounting for local
protective action strategies, daily work plans, event alert and notification procedures, and
documenting EOC actions in status boards and logs. These decision-support tools provide
decision makers and emergency responders with valuable data formatted for rapid assessment,
which can then be communicated over the alert and notification system to the zones impacted and
other EOCs.
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Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Automation benchmark:
WebPuff *
DETech 23 Introductory Chemical Hazard Prediction (CHP) Using WebPuff
DETech 36 Scenario-Based Chemical Hazard Prediction (CHP) Training
A three-year curriculum of recommended training is available on the AIPT page of the CSEPP Portal.
To ensure this capability is sustained, all EOCs must adopt an integrated automated data
processing system that supports an accredited Army chemical hazard modeling software system,
PAR determination and alert and notification protocols, and event notification and management
to meet specific community needs. Such systems should incorporate emergency management
software and hazard-prediction software, featuring browser-based interfaces and appropriate
security features. They also should meet State and county information technology standards and
requirements for hardware and software systems.
Capabilities to be provided by emergency management automation systems developed for CSEPP
should address the following issues:
The system should be robust and reliable and function when needed.
The automation system should be capable of projecting the chemical plume path and
timing, identify zones impacted, and develop a PAR for each impacted zone.
The automation system should continuously transmit local, real-time meteorological data
for use in chemical plume projection and display and archive the data.
There should be a continuous exchange of information between the Army depot and
affected civilian jurisdictions to coordinate planning, exercise, response, and recovery
actions. During an event notification, there should be an immediate exchange of
information followed by positive confirmation.
The automation system should be used for both daily operations and emergencies,
documenting actions in work plans, status boards, and logs.
In addition to the automation system, there should be an alternate means of

communication between the on-post EOC and a local point of contact that can be used to
alert the local off-post EOC of an imminent notification. Despite the fundamental
requirement for an automation system to manage emergency management information,
the primary means of notification of an emergency remains telephonic (need reference).
Future automation system capabilities are endorsed by the Automation IPT and approved
and prioritized through the WebPuffTM Configuration Control Board.
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The Automation IPT page on the CSEPP Portal provides a repository of historical and current
documents related to Automation issues.
Infrastructure and Applications

WebPuffTM
Computerized tools are especially valuable in performing complex modeling (including chemical
plume projection, general public protective actions, and sheltering/evacuation modeling) to assist
planners and decision makers in developing the most effective protective action and response
strategies. Atmospheric dispersion models, although imperfect, are the best tools for the
estimation of the hazard in the event of a chemical agent incident. Emergency response
procedures can be input into an automated system where their adequacy and comprehensiveness
can be tested and they can be organized for rapid activation during an emergency. In addition,
routine operations such as meteorological data, chemical agent monitoring logs, and status boards
can be automated to ensure that significant changes in conditions are recognized quickly and
acted upon appropriately.
Automation can assist in these efforts through organizing and analyzing the data collected and
using computerized models to identify the extent of the area impacted and the degrees to which
various portions of this area have been impacted. The results will help decision makers complete
the response phase of the emergency (e.g., exit shelters) and determine what actions, if any, are
needed for the recovery phase, when people may safely return to affected areas.
WebPuffTM is an automated information system jointly used by U.S Army (on-post) and civilian
(off-post) jurisdictions. The purpose of WebPuffTM is to make a sufficiently detailed and reliable
prediction of the effects of a chemical agent release so that informed decisions can be made as to
whether the surrounding population should seek shelter, evacuate, or do nothing in response to
the event.
WebPuffTM is an Internet Protocol network-based system that consists of server applications and
associated data and workstations running a web browser such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or
Mozilla Firefox. Using the browser, users have full-functional capabilities to create and publish
scenarios, protective action recommendation and decisions, daily work plans, logs, and status
boards. Each CSEPP depot or arsenal has an EOC with a WebPuffTM server. The on-post depot
EOC coordinates with off-post EOCs in surrounding counties as well as State centers. All of the
off-post EOCs also have WebPuffTM servers and workstations. The depot server communicates
with the off-post servers. Within WebPuffTM, D2-Puff is the software algorithm (method or
formula) used to make predictions concerning the dispersion pattern, timing, and concentration
levels of a release of a chemical agent into the atmosphere. More information on WebPuffTM is
available on the Automation page on the CSEPP Portal.
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Meteorological Towers
CSEPP maintains a meteorological network on the Army depots and in the bordering county to
support chemical plume modeling and protective action strategies of the local communities. The
network consists of towers, instruments, data control platforms, radio transmission equipment,
and servers dedicated to assemble, display, and archive the data. Local real-time meteorological
data provides critical information for plume models on the potential path and severity of a
chemical plume. The data is used within the atmospheric dispersion model to predict the location,
timing, and concentration of the chemical plume. The meteorological data is provided
continuously and automatically through the automation system to the D2-Puff model for realtime, continuous projections of potential plumes. With the addition of county data, the model
provides reliable plume projections for all potential impacted areas from a chemical incident. To
ensure the data is real-time, the data should be updated every 15 minutes.
The functional specifications for automation systems only require off-post authorities to
have access to data from Army meteorological towers. Essential meteorological
information is to be obtained from both the on-post and off-post meteorology systems via
the automation system. Off-post authorities have access to both sets of meteorological
records though the MetViewer tab of WebPuffTM.
Initial hazard projections are the responsibility of the on-post authorities, using weather
data from the site of the incident.
WebPuffTM provides off-post authorities with access to data from existing on-post
meteorological towers. Data from both the on-post and the off-post meteorological towers
are available through the MetViewer tab of WebPuffTM.
Each state participating in CSEPP may be provided with a limited wind monitoring
capability.
The provision of this apparatus should not entail the funding of additional staff for the
affected jurisdiction(s).
Off-post wind monitoring should include up to four anemometer units, one at each
monitoring site. Each off-post monitoring station should include the capability to transmit
meteorological data to the EOC for the IRZ jurisdiction. Additional meteorological
instruments to monitor temperature, humidity, and/or pressure are not required, but may
be included under this policy.
Support for the off-post meteorological monitoring stations should include: automated
data checks, and manual data inspection. Maintenance and calibration of the monitoring
stations should occur twice a year, approximately once every 6 months.
WebPuffTM includes functionality to allow individual instruments and/or entire

monitoring stations to be disabled. This is important when problems are discovered with
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measurements from a particular monitoring station. This prevents bad and/or suspect data
from being used in the hazard prediction.
Network Security
Automated data is exchanged between Army and civilian jurisdictions through a dedicated
network, called the Chemical Stockpile Wide Area Network (CSWAN). The primary purpose of
the CSWAN is to provide enhanced connectivity between each local Army storage facility and
the surrounding State and county EOCs. The CSWAN also provides connectivity between the
chemical depots and CMA HQ, as well as connectivity to the Non-Classified Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNET).
The CSWAN must meet all Department of Defense IT information assurance (IA) requirements,
specifically the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation
Process (DIACAP). DIACAP is the DOD procedure for identifying, implementing, validating,
certifying, and managing IA capabilities and services, expressed as IA controls, and authorizing
the operation of DOD information systems.
Figure 7: DOD Information Systems Life Cycle Phases
The three-year DIACAP Life Cycle Phases of an IT system are shown in Figure 7.
Both the software application (WebPuffTM) and the network (CSWAN) meet the DIACAP
requirements and both maintain a separate DOD Authority to Operate.
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CSEPP Portal
The CSEPP Portal, www.cseppportal.net, is a web-based information sharing and collaboration
site using Microsoft SharePointTM software. It sustains the close, regular collaboration and
communication necessary between partners across the nation that support the sites in Colorado
and Kentucky. The Portal consists of two elements:
An external side provides the emergency management community with access to CSEPP
training and other resources, as well as general program information (and links to
community web sites) for members of the public.
An internal side hosts a vast library, including presentations from stakeholder meetings, a
program-wide event calendar, news coverage, photo library, as well as the Army, FEMA,
and other Federal guidance. As a Portal, it links to all CSEPP-related web sites and Social
Media at the local, State, and Federal level. It also enables communities and working
groups to collaborate remotely on projects with their own document libraries, task lists,
calendars, and links.
Access to the internal side is available via password to all program partners on request from the
Webmaster. Although individuals can post information on their own, each component of the
Portal also has its own identified Content Manager from the community to provide technical
assistance. For those unfamiliar with Microsoft SharePointTM, the CSEPP Portal User Guide and
task-specific tutorials are located on the support page. In addition, user- and project-specific
training is available from the Webmaster.
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Chapter 11:
ESF # 5
Develop and maintain alert and notification
procedures addressing specific roles and
responsibilities, including initial activation of
warning systems, selection of warning messages,
confirmation of activation, repetition of warnings,
and issuance of all-clear messages.
Develop and maintain scripted, system-specific warning messages based on the sites
chemical event emergency classification system and a predetermined protective action
strategy.
Maintain the ability to control the alert and notification from two systems.
Maintain a 24-hour operational capability for both initial and ongoing alert and
notification activities.
Maintain a current program of regular preventive maintenance and testing of all
elements of the primary and alternate alert and notification systems.
Evaluate the effectiveness of the alert and notification system periodically to ensure that
alert signals and notification messages in each area of the IRZ are of sufficient volume to
be heard above ambient noise levels.
Alert and Notification (A&N) addresses the notice and information dissemination process
implemented when a real or possible chemical event takes place. When activated, the process
pushes information to on-post and off-post populations believed to be at risk. It addresses the
time-critical functions that are the publics primary protection in the event of a chemical agent
release.
The expected outcome of this benchmark is that each CSEPP facility (on-post) and affected offpost jurisdiction has the ability to provide timely warning and notification to at-risk populations.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Alert and Notification benchmark:
Army Regulation 50-6: Chemical Surety
EPA AEGL Guidance
FCC Regulations at 47 CFR part 11
CSEPP Site Alert and Notification MOA, Notification Form, and SOPs
This section provides initial background and terminology, then presents key components of the
A&N Concept of Operations, including: procedures for alert and notification of the public,
warning point communications and protocol, format and content of notification messages,
measures for special populations, restrictions on release of information in suspected terrorism or
criminal events, and other notifications. This section also addresses alert and notification
infrastructure including notification systems and testing.
Background
A real or possible CAI will first be noticed on the Army installation where it takes place.
Installation personnel will then be responsible for notifying other on-post personnel and off-post
authorities on a time-critical basis. If protective action is needed, alert and notification to the onpost and off-post public becomes a vital and time-critical process to minimize potential health
impact.
Communications that are critical for public alert and notification take priority over other urgent
notifications. These other notifications (see Other Army Notifications below) occur as time
permits among local, State, and Federal agencies, including higher authorities within the Army.
Terminology
CSEPP alert and notification procedures incorporate the following terms:
AEGLs are developed by the National Research Councils Committee on Toxicology. The AEGL
criteria take into account sensitive individuals and are meant to protect nearly all people who may
be exposed to a toxic chemical. The guidelines define the following three-tiered AEGLs:
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AEGL 1: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the
general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable
discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects. However, the effects

are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.
general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or
other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.
general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening
health effects or death.
AEGLs have been set for nerve and mustard agents. Information about AEGLs in general, and
specific information about the chemical warfare agent AEGLs, may be obtained from the U.S.
EPAs AEGL webpage: http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/aegl/index.htm.
Chemical Event Notification Levels
A standard system for classifying chemical events is used to simplify and clarify emergency
communications from the Army installation to the off-post community. Four Chemical Event
Notification Levels (CENLs) are used in notifications:
1. Non-surety Emergency
2. Limited Area Emergency
3. Post Only Emergency
4. Community Emergency
The CENLs are defined according to expected hazard, as shown in Table 7. Note that chemical
effects, a term used in the table, may refer to AEGL-1 or AEGL-2, depending on local
agreement.
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Table 7: Chemical Event Notification Levels
CENL
Definition
Non-surety Emergency
Events are likely to occur or have occurred that may be perceived

as a chemical surety emergency or that may be of general public
interest but which pose no chemical surety hazard. This includes
non-surety material emergencies.
Limited Area Emergency
Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent

release outside engineering controls or approved chemical
storage facilities with chemical effects expected to be confined to
the chemical limited area.
Post Only Emergency

release with chemical effects beyond the chemical limited area.
Releases are not expected to present a danger to the off-post
public.
Community Emergency

release with chemical effects beyond the installation boundary.
Alert and notification are two separate steps: (1) attracting the attention of the public (alerting)
and (2) providing specific, appropriate protective action instructions (notifying). Public education
programs should stress this two-step process so that when alerted, people will listen for protective
action instructions from designated notification systems.
Warning Point
The term off-post warning point or warning point, as used in this section, refers to an off-post
location where warnings and protective action recommendations (PARs) from the Army
installation would be received. A 24-hour warning point, such as a 911 communications center,
allows for person-to-person contact from the Army installation. Warning point staff must be able
to either directly activate public alert and notification systems, or quickly contact those who can.
There may be multiple warning points for multiple jurisdictions.
Execution of warning and instruction functions following a CAI requires a well-planned system
that is regularly tested and exercised. Specific standards and procedures are provided below.
These outline standards for content and timing of initial warning messages, reliable and redundant
systems to be used for emergency communications, information and timing standards for alerting
and protective action instructions for the public, and measures to ensure that persons with special
needs receive emergency alerts and instructions.
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This section also addresses restrictions on release of information that may apply under certain
circumstances, and notifications to higher Army headquarters and other response authorities.
Standards and Procedures for Community Emergency

Perhaps the single most important function of CSEPP is to ensure that procedures and systems are
in place to provide timely alert and notification to the population at risk in the event of a CAI that
affects the on-post and off-post population. This function should be carefully planned to allow for
prompt action when time is of the essence. To that end, the following standards and guidelines
should be used in establishing alert and notification systems and procedures. These apply to any
event known or expected to constitute a Community Emergency. (Local authorities should also be
notified of other CENLs, particularly if on-post sirens are sounded or personnel are evacuated
from the site. The timing and manner of such notifications should be as negotiated between the
Army and local authorities, consistent with Army guidelines.)
Each CSEPP site should have the ability to activate and control alert and notification systems
from two locations.
Transmission of Warning and PARs for the IRZ to the Off-Post Warning Point
The Army installation accident reporting system should be designed to provide a warning and
PAR to the off-post community warning points for the affected IRZ:
Within five minutes at Blue Grass, and
Within ten minutes at Pueblo.
The five or ten minute period begins when any individual who is responsible for identifying and
reporting CAIs to the proper installation authority becomes aware of an event that might
constitute a community emergency, and when that individual has the means to safely report it to
the proper installation authority. The five or ten minute period ends when the Army installation
has provided the following information to the appropriate off-post warning points:
1.
The CENL;
2.
The identity of the agent and the predominant wind direction;
3.
The zones where the population is at risk; and
4.
An appropriate initial PAR (evacuate, SIP, or no action) for each affected

zone in the IRZ.
Alert Signal and Protective Action Instructions for the IRZ
Systems and procedures should be in place to make a protective action decision (PAD) and
provide an alert signal and appropriate protective action instruction to the population in the
affected zones of the IRZ within eight minutes of receipt of the warning and PAR from the
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installation. This eight-minute period begins when the installations five- or ten-minute period
ends (i.e., when the information in item 1 above has been transmitted and received).
Alert and Notification of the PAZ
Alert and notification in the PAZ is equally important but slightly less time-critical. At all sites, in
the event of a community emergency, the Army installation should provide PARs for the affected
zones in the PAZ to the appropriate off-post warning points within 10 minutes after a responsible
individual becomes aware of the event. Procedures for generating and providing PARs for the
PAZ may be combined with those for the IRZ. Off-post officials should activate available
systems and initiate planned measures to alert and notify the PAZ public within eight minutes of
receipt of PARs for the PAZ from the installation.
Installation Activation of Off-post Systems
For certain contingencies or situations it may be prudent to have plans for activation of off-post
alert and notification systems by the Army installation. A 1994 Army Departmental
Memorandum sets out conditions for Army direct notification and instruction to the public. Army
direct notification and instruction may be requested by off-post authorities, and should be
documented in an MOA that is included or incorporated by reference in both on-post and off-post
plans.
Subsequent Notifications and Coordination
Once initiated, procedures to alert and notify the public (for example, sirens, alert radios, and
EAS) should be repeated, and updated if required, at regular intervals in each affected zone or
area, at least every 12 minutes for the first hour and every 20 minutes thereafter, until the danger
to the public is determined to be past in that zone or area. (Area refers to the possibility that
areas smaller than an entire zone may be targeted in subsequent messages to the public.)
Guidance for plans and procedures to make timely initial alert and notification discussed above
also apply to critical updates as conditions and circumstances change. For example, during the
response to the chemical event, information may be obtained that changes the initial estimate of
the amount of chemical agent released. That in turn may lead to changes in the recommended
protective actions for certain zones and areas. Similarly, during response to a chemical event,
another event may occur that places additional zones at risk. In such cases the time standards for
warning, PAR, and alert and notification apply to the new PARs and new instructions to the
public.
Also, alert and notification concerning when and how to end SIP in all zones where a population
was instructed to take any initial protective action (evacuate or SIP) needs to be done in sufficient
time to enable the population to end SIP to avoid fatalities to the maximum extent practicable.
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Notification to Installation of Off-Post Protective Actions
Off-post jurisdictions should notify the Army installation when a PAD is made and implemented
by off-post authorities, regardless of whether the PAD followed the installations PAR.
Knowledge of actual off-post protective actions is essential for on-post situational awareness and
response decisions.
Sample Alert and Notification Timeline
This example text description and timeline (see Table 8) assume that the installation has five
minutes to complete alert and notification of the appropriate off-post warning points (rather than
ten minutes).
Table 8: Sample Alert and Notification Timeline
Minutes
Event
Start point: Individual who is responsible for identifying and reporting CAIs to the proper
installation authority becomes aware of an event that might constitute a Community
Emergency, and has the means to safely report it to the proper installation authority.
Initial verbal warning, information, and PAR provided to appropriate community warning
points for IRZ. (Includes CENL, identity of agent, zones at risk, and initial PAR for each
affected zone in the IRZ.)
10
Follow-up IRZ PAR written notification sent to appropriate community warning points.
10
Initial PAR provided verbally to community warning points for PAZ. (Zones at risk and initial
PAR for each affected zone in the PAZ.)
13
Community has sounded warning sirens and provided initial PAD for affected IRZ zones via
TARs and EAS.
15
Follow-up PAZ PAR written notification sent to community warning points.
18
Community has activated available systems and initiated planned measures to alert and
notify affected PAZ public.
25
Community repeats sirens/TARs/EAS message for IRZ (and every 12 minutes thereafter for
first hour, then every 20 minutes).
Warning Point Communications and Protocol

The plan should describe procedures and equipment used for notifying the off-post warning
points, including the following:
Separate, dedicated primary and backup communication links between the Army
installation EOC and off-post warning points;
Daily testing of all dedicated links; and
A verbal report of the event and associated information (e.g., CENL, agent, wind
direction, and PARs for each affected zone) to off-post warning points as the primary
notification, which is then confirmed by transmission of a hard copy of the information
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via e-mail or fax. The plan should provide for the hard copy to be sent to the warning
points within five minutes of the verbal notification. Automated electronic systems may
also be used as the primary means of reporting the event and associated information to
off-post warning points, provided that the systems are always on and are monitored
continuously by trained operators at all off-post warning points, and that verbal
confirmation of the report is accomplished immediately after the electronic notification.
Format and Content of Notifications to the Public

Because of the importance of correct and timely protective actions and the limited warning time
that may be available, instructional messages should be prerecorded or pre-scripted (i.e., written
out ahead of time) to cover all plausible conditions and circumstances. Instructions should include
a brief statement of the authority for the message, the nature of the threat, specific protective
actions to be taken by the public, and the areas to which the instructions apply. Areas should be
described in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries. Instructional messages should refer to
public education materials that have been distributed to the community, and the protective action
instructions in the messages should be consistent with the content of the public education
materials. However, instructional messages should not rely on the publics ability to find and read
the previously distributed public education materials in an emergency.
EAS equipment may place a practical limit on message length. FCC regulations for EAS
equipment require a capability to record and store messages of up to two minutes in length [see
FCC regulations at 47 CFR 11.33(a)(3)(i)]. The equipment in use generally fulfills this
requirement but does not exceed it. Pre-scripted instructional messages should stay within the
length that can be accommodated by local EAS equipment.
Measures for Special Populations

The alert and notification system should include the means to alert and notify special populations.
Potential measures to consider include:
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Placement of emergency-activated communication devices (e.g., TARs, weather alert

radios) in institutions that house special populations;
Providing public notifications in languages other than English where there are significant
non-English-speaking populations (emergency instructions should be translated into a
foreign language if the State determines through survey or other means that one percent
or more of the population at risk speaks that language but does not speak English); and
Making mechanisms available to sensory-impaired individuals (e.g., vibration devices,

flashing lights and teletype devices for the hearing impaired) to allow them to receive
emergency instructions in a timely manner.
Restrictions on Release of Information

Suspected criminal or terrorist activity, or loss of chemical agent or munitions, should not be
reported to the public without approval by Army Headquarters. This restriction is not intended to
prevent alert and notification of the public when there is a danger to the community, but only to
delay transmission of information regarding the criminal or terrorist origins of the incident. In
other words, if a chemical incident that poses a danger to the public is the result of criminal or
terrorist action, the public should still be immediately notified and given protective action
instructions, but information regarding the cause of the incident should not be distributed until the
appropriate approval is obtained.
Other Army Notifications

A CAI triggers numerous notification requirements under Federal law and Army regulations.
Planners should be aware of these requirements and the Armys responsibilities under them. In
particular Army procedures require notification to:
The Local Emergency Planning Committee/State Emergency Response Commission

(LEPC/SERC);
The National Response Center (NRC);
Army Operations Center (AOC) (per AR 50-6: Chemical Surety, Sec. 11-3.a.); and
Public affairs offices at the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA), Army
Materiel Command (AMC), and Army Headquarters (per AR 360-1: Army Public Affairs
Program, Sec. 12-7).
Infrastructure & Applications

The plan should include a description of the methods and systems used to alert and notify the
public in the event of a CAI. The primary alert and notification system for the IRZ (including the
Army installation) should consist of a network of outdoor warning devices covering all populated
areas of the zone, along with indoor devices in each regularly occupied building. The outdoor
warning devices should be 360-degree electronic sirens designed to provide an alert signal of at
least 10 decibels above ambient noise levels. Outdoor warning devices should cover all frequently
occupied areas, including not only residential areas but also commercial, industrial, and
recreational areas. Indoor devices should have the capability to provide an alert signal and voice
instructions when activated by local authorities. They must be able to respond to a CAI but may
also include all-hazard alert warning capabilities. (Such devices may be referred to as TARs,
adviser alert radios, or weather radios.) These indoor and outdoor devices should be
supplemented with other mechanisms as appropriate, such as EAS broadcast messages, email,
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commercial mobile-telephone alert system (CMAS), crawl messages on cable television, textdisplay highway signs, or other systems, to ensure the fullest possible coverage.
EAS procedures should be described, including:
What radio and television broadcast stations and what cable operators will disseminate
local emergency notifications; and
How the EAS is activated and who (what positions) can activate it.
Alert and notification systems for the PAZ should include EAS and other means as needed to
ensure that persons in the PAZ can receive alert and notification in a timely fashion to implement
protective actions. Methods such as route alerting, that would likely take too long to implement in
the IRZ, might be reasonable to use in the PAZ where distance from the source means more time
is available to complete notification.
In all, the variety of alert and
notification options has increased with
rapidly advancing communications
technology. In addition to adjusting to
the impact of national systems such as
IPAWS, affected agencies can choose
from a growing array of A&N systems
established to communicate with the
public in a variety of environments and
situations. Table 6 at the end of Chapter
9 identifies many of the options
available to response agencies and
briefly describes when each may be an
appropriate option.
The Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

(IPAWS) is intended to give public safety officials
an integrated approach to alert and warn the
public using the EAS, CMAS, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather
Radio, and other public alerting systems from a
single interface. Using IPAWS may allow local
officials to simplify the CSEPP A&N process while
ensuring maximum coverage and consistency of
messages across all media. Federal, State,
territorial, tribal, and local alerting authorities may
choose to use IPAWS and may also integrate
local systems that use Common Alerting Protocol
(CAP) standards with the IPAWS infrastructure.
For all implemented A&N systems, plans and procedures should provide for periodic testing,
maintenance, and evaluation to support a continuing capability for alert and notification. All
systems used for public alert and notification should receive preventive maintenance on a regular
schedule and should be tested at least monthly. Siren systems should be periodically evaluated to
ensure they are of sufficient volume to be heard above ambient noise levels.
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Chapter 12:
Emergency Operations Centers
ESF # 5 & 7
Provide adequate facilities with the necessary

Core Capabilities:
space to support the operations of the ESFs for
Operational Coordination
extended periods of time.
Situational Assessment
Provide appropriate communications
infrastructure and equipment to allow
communications from higher and lower agencies.
Provide a regular schedule for testing and
maintaining the EOC equipment.
Provide adequate supplies to support operations and adequate storage space for
medicines, food, additional office supplies, and any other equipment needed.
Provide sanitary facilities and, if required, sleeping accommodations adequate for half
the total assigned staff at a time.
Provide an emergency power source with an independent fuel supply adequate for
operating all necessary equipment.
Provide a potable water supply adequate to support the fully staffed EOC, which is not
dependent on commercial power or susceptible to disruption by disaster conditions.
Provide a food supply adequate to feed the full staff for several days, which may be
delivered from outside and/or stocked within the EOC.
Ensure effective physical security measures including access control and badging, to
prevent unauthorized entry.
Provide an enhanced single point grounding system and a rooftop lightning protection
system to ensure that people and communications systems are protected from electrical
surges.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Emergency Operations Centers
benchmark:
NIOSH Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Attacks
American Society for Testing Materials E2668 10 Standard Guide for Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) Development
FEMA Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program: EOC Assessment Checklist (2002)
FEMA 361 Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters
FEMA 452 A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, January
2005
IAEM Response Capability Multi-Agency Coordination (EOC Management) Guide (Draft, 2009)
Motorola R56 Standards and Guidelines for Communication Sites
NFPA 90A Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
NFPA 90B Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air Conditioning Systems
NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems
NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction
NFPA 1221 Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services
Communication Systems
NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System
NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs
NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code
National Response Framework State and Local Partner Guides
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-141-04 Department of Defense Emergency Operations Center
Planning and Design
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 Department of Defense Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings
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Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Emergency Operations Centers
benchmark:
CSEPP Training Video: Emergency Planners Companion: Command and Control
E-947 Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Incident Management Team (IMT) Interface
G-191 Incident Command System/Emergency Operations Center Interface (ICS/EOC)
IS-253a Overview of FEMAs Environmental and Historic Preservation Review
IS-701a NIMS Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) Course
IS-775 EOC Management and Operations
The EOC is the central command and control facility for response to a CAI. Such facilities must
be adequately equipped to support communications between higher and lower agencies, allowing
personnel to warn the general public, plan and execute required protective action strategies and
response actions, and coordinate the reentry and recovery of areas affected by a CAI.
During such an event, the EOC provides direction and support to the emergency responders.
Local installations, counties, and states must ensure their EOCs are established in accordance
with NIMS guidance regarding EOC core functions, facilities, organization, and situational
awareness, as well as with EOC guidance in CPG-101 regarding Communications (ESF#2) and
Emergency Management Direction, Control, and Coordination (ESF#5). EOCs may be organized
by major discipline, by ESF, by jurisdiction, or by some combination thereof. An ESF
organization may be most appropriate because it will foster the request and delivery of Federal
resources and is consistent with Federal EOC organization at the regional and national level.
CSEPP plans should address communication and coordination between multiple jurisdictions
using a multi-agency coordination system. The NIMS document, (Component II,
Communications and Information Management), describes a number of mechanisms for multiagency and multi-jurisdictional coordination, including use of EOCs, Unified Command (UC),
Unified Area Command, and Multi-Agency Coordination Groups (MAC Groups). CSEPP
jurisdictions should incorporate one or more of these mechanisms into plans and procedures, as
agreed upon among the members of the local CSEPP Community.
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Each CSEPP community jurisdiction should:
Identify the officials authorized to activate the plan, activate the off-post EOC, represent
the jurisdiction in the UC, and designate a chain of command for these activities.
Ensure plans address coordination between multiple EOCs, separate EOCs, and interEOC communication into a MAC system.
Ensure plans address the establishment of UC structure to aid in integrating Federal,

State, and local jurisdiction leadership for effective allocation of resources and
prioritization of response activities.
Infrastructure
Building Design
The EOC building design should center on a hardened core where the critical areas required for
the EOC to function in an emergency will be located.
Emergency Operations Room
Auxiliary Communication Service (ACS), including Radio Amateur Civil Emergency

Services /Amateur Radio Emergency Services (RACES/ARES)
Emergency Management Warning Point
Communication and Equipment Server Room
Building System Rooms supporting the above areas
Where possible the following design guidelines should be considered and implemented:
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Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-141-04- DOD Emergency Operations Center Planning
and Design
UFC 4-010-01 DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
FEMA 361 Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters
FEMA 452 A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings,
January 2005.
NIOSH Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical,

Biological, or Radiological Attacks
Building Systems
Building systems should be designed following the best practices, threat and vulnerability
assessments, and management methodologies relevant to the potential threats for the proposed
facility as outlined in the following resources:
FEMA 452 A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings.
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1221 Standard for Installation, Maintenance,
and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems, 2010.
The building systems are then designed to mitigate these threats to ensure that the facility is
operational during a disaster. Key building system design criteria are not limited to, but should
include, the following:
Redundant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) for critical building areas
with outside air shutoff.
Provisions to continue operations when there is infrastructure damage; prudent practices

include alternate power supplies, backup generators, alternate communication
transmission systems, independent power systems for repeater sites, and backup
information storage capabilities.
Generator and fuel supply for critical building areas.
Technology Systems
All technology systems needed to ensure a fully functioning EOCincluding activation of alert
and notification, hazard modeling and protective action decision-making, and tools to automate
EOC business operationsmust meet design guidelines provided in industry codes and standards,
most notably NFPA 1221.
Grounding
Due to the nature of the facilities being built and the communication system required, the
facilities are required to have an enhanced single point ground system as well as a rooftop
lightening protection system. This grounding system will ensure that the people and the
communications equipment are protected from electrical surges occurring naturally from
lightning or though the power companys electrical mains. An improperly grounded
communications system can be completely destroyed with a single lightning strike. The
grounding system should be designed to a 3 ohm resistance and follow Motorola R56: Standards
And Guidelines For Communication Sites.
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Communications Towers
Since all EOCs rely heavily on communications, it is recommended that a communications tower
be located close to the facility. This communications tower will be used for mounting
communication antennas, microwave dishes, satellite dishes, and GPS equipment. The towers
need to be designed and constructed to the proper standards for loading, wind and ice factors, and
a host of other design criteria outlined in the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)222, Revision G, Structural Standards for Communication Towers.
An external communications shelter is recommended with a tower or as a standalone building
where the communications equipment can be terminated (thus reducing the possibility of power
surges if the communications equipment or tower is hit by lightning). If a tower is not available,
the equipment should be mounted on the shelter. The grounding of the shelter and
communications equipment should following the Motorola R56 standards for communication
sites. If a tower and communication shelter is not possible and the equipment is mounted on the
roof, proper lightning and grounding protection protocols must be followed.
Applications
Since EOCs are the central command and control facilities responsible for carrying out the
mission of emergency preparedness and emergency management functions, they are technology
rich. Listed in Table 9 are different technologies that can be included to enhance the
communications within and external of the EOC.
Table 9: EOC Communication Technologies
Application
Sub
Audio Visual
(AV)
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Description
Audio visual systems can be made up of multiple types of
systems
TV Display Walls
Large walls with multiple screen capability
LED Projectors
Small or large wall displays
Smart Boards
Interactive display boards
TV
Single displays
Video
Teleconference
(VTC)
Supports remote video meetings
Application
Sub
Description
Video Matrix
Format and provide consolidated control of the video ins

and outs for the AV systems
Audio Systems
Support audio need of the video system and paging
Telephone
Phone system supports internal and external phone

communications
911 Phone
system
Support emergency call taking, act as warning point for

the public
Administrative
phone system
Main phone system for the EOC, act as warning point

and general communications
Direct Phone
lines
Phone line circuits connecting directly between facilities
Satellite Phone
Redundant phone device that does not rely on land

based infrastructure for communication between phones
Radio
Radio communications with emergency and support

personnel
ACS
Amateur Radio system act as backup for main radio

systems can consist of UHV, VHF and HF radio systems
Radio systems
Main radio system for communications with first

responders, emergency and support personnel.
Time Systems
GPS time system for accurate time. Required by 911

systems
Furniture
Furniture for different areas

Radio
Dispatch/911
EOC/Conference
rooms
Custom Consoles to allow for ADA requirements and

allow system to lift to adjust to the personnel utilizing
th
Furniture designed to meet the needs of the EOC design
including built in power and network connections for easy
Construction Requirements
There are specific requirements for using Federal grants for any construction project, including
compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local permits as well as environmental
planning and historical preservation clearances. As provided in 44 CFR part 10, FEMA is
required to consider the potential impacts to the human and natural environment of projects
proposed for FEMA cooperative agreement funding. Recipients of CSEPP funds shall provide all
relevant information to FEMA to ensure compliance with applicable Federal Environmental and
Historic Preservation (EHP) requirements. Any project with the potential to impact natural or
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biological resources or historic properties cannot be initiated until FEMA has completed the
required EHP review. Information on EHP compliance may be found at http://www.fema.gov.
Construction projects must be identified, justified, and approved during the LCCE process. The
current CSEPP CA Guidance should be consulted and followed prior to starting any construction
project. FEMA HQ and Regional personnel are available to assist with these requirements.
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Chapter 13:
ESF #15
Develop and implement a Joint Information System

(JIS) that will function as an information-sharing
and mutual support network for public affairs
officers.
Develop a Joint Information Center (JIC) plan that
will help participating jurisdictions to coordinate
and disseminate rapid and accurate information
during an emergency from a central facility to media outlets and the public.
Develop media products and messages to improve the publics knowledge and
acceptance of protective actions.
Achieving an informed public requires research to gain an understanding of the publics current
levels of protective action knowledge. Based on that research, a public education program can be
designed and implemented to increase the publics knowledge of emergency protective actions
and the relative risks associated with an event. In addition, an effective outreach program should:
Maintain residents trust in emergency management;
Foster two-way communication between CSEPP and program stakeholders; and
Communicate to the community the risks posed by the stockpile.
The public education program should be periodically evaluated over its life to determine whether
it is achieving these goals and to provide a basis for improvements to public education efforts.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Public Outreach and Education
benchmark:
CSEPP Public Affairs Program Guidance Compendium Workbook
Senior elected officials, emergency managers, and on-post military commanders play an
important role in the development and implementation of CSEPP public education and
emergency public information programs. Without senior management collaboration, there is a
risk of communicating mixed messages to the public and causing confusion about which
emergency protective actions are appropriate. This chapter describes the mechanisms for
developing, coordinating, and distributing information to the public.
Tools and Processes

The CSEPP Public Affairs IPT has developed a step-by-step process for communities to develop
public outreach campaigns. The process begins with identifying knowledge gaps, setting goals
and metrics for the outreach, and evaluating and implementing outreach strategies and follow-up
studies to measure campaign success. Detailed guidance on implementing an outreach campaign
is located in the CSEPP Public Affairs Program Guidance Compendium Workbook. Public
education is more effective when it involves two-way communication. The publics concerns
must be acknowledged and addressed by both the Army installation and off-post emergency
management officials. Open communication between the on- and off-post communities fosters
trust and credibility. Technical jargon and acronyms should not be used to convey the intended
messages.
Figure 8: Each communitys public affairs team should develop an outreach strategy that identifies
target audiences, their information needs, and the most effective methods of reaching them.
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Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Public Outreach and Education
benchmark:
CSEPP Training Video: Communicating Public Information in Emergencies
CSEPP Advanced Information Technology Course
IS-250 ESF #15 External Affairs
G-290 Basic Public Information Officer (PIO)
E-105 Public Information and Warning
E-388 Advanced Public Information Officers
CSEPP public education campaigns should enlist the support and aid of trusted sources of
information in the community, including public officials and the news media. Participation and
support of community officials is essential to any preparedness program. The news media are
important channels for communication and outreach in any preparedness program. Because of the
large audience the media can instantaneously reach, the CSEPP community should anticipate the
needs of the news media, especially local outlets, and accommodate their requests whenever
possible.
The Public Affairs IPT page on the CSEPP Portal provides a repository of historical and current
documents related to public outreach and education, public information, and other topics.
Tailoring a Program to a Communitys Needs

CSEPP public education programs should be tailored to each community based on research that
identifies the communitys needs. For example, diverse ethnic and socioeconomic groups may
require a variety of approaches. Education programs should also follow existing Federal
guidelines on providing information to these groups. Public education programs may include:
Printed public information materials such as calendars, telephone directory inserts, and
brochures distributed to residents and special facilities such as schools, nursing homes,
and hospitals (with specific information such as relocation points, special facility plans,
and items to take to a mass care center);
Posters and displays in areas where transient populations pass;
Presentations before civic and fraternal organizations and other formal and informal
groups;
Public meetings;
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Programs designed for specific audiences, including school children, local media, and
community leaders;
Paid advertising to disseminate specific outreach messages; and
Social media.
Emergency Public Information

The principal objective of an emergency public information program is to minimize fatalities,
injuries, and property damage by ensuring appropriate instructions are distributed to the public in
a timely manner during a CAI. Research and case studies show that accurate, consistent, and
timely information calms anxieties and reduces potentially problematic public reactions such as
spontaneous evacuation. Before an emergency occurs, communities should consider what
information will be needed by the news media and public, and then develop a strategy for
gathering, coordinating, and disseminating that information quickly and accurately.
In the event of a CAI, emergency public information should be disseminated in stages. The initial
stage should focus on immediate, urgent protective activities such as shelter-in-place or
evacuation. As off-post response facilities (e.g., shelters) become operational, emergency public
information should center on response. Response will evolve into recovery. Each new phase will
likely have a different focus and involve different information. Similarly, specific population
groups will have varied information needs. For example, non-English speakers and those with
visual, hearing, or speech impairments have special requirements. The emergency public
information program should include provisions for meeting the unique needs of special
population groups.
Initial, urgent action messages are distributed over dedicated systems such as EAS and TARs, and
social media is increasingly used to disseminate and share emergency public information.
However, over the course of an emergency and its aftermath, the news media will be the publics
primary source of information, relying on both official and non-official sources. Ensuring the
news media receives accurate, consistent and timely official information from the outset requires
careful planning and considerable advance preparation. It is important to build and maintain a
strong working relationship with the news media. This relationship should include a clear
commitment that government representatives will be immediately available to provide
information over the course of an emergency.
In order to reach as many members of the public as possible, public information staff should, in
addition to working with the news media, use other methods of information dissemination such as
blogs, web sites, community bulletin boards, email lists, text messages, and social media sites.
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Given the many demands that occur in the immediate aftermath of an emergency event, there will
not be time to develop a comprehensive emergency information program after an incident occurs.
In order to ensure a coordinated process, a JIS and JIC are required.
Joint Information System

A JIS is a network that allows multiple organizations involved in an emergency response to
communicate and coordinate with one another regarding information to be provided to the public
and news media. The elements of a JIS must be put into place before an emergency occurs. This
includes the plans, protocols, and structures used to provide information during incident
operations. It encompasses all public information operations related to an incident, including
those performed at the Federal, State, local, and private organization levels.
It is important that the public information presented during an emergency be clear, accurate, and
consistent. Considering the number of agencies and jurisdictions that are likely to be part of a
response to a CAI, these qualities can be ensured only through careful coordination and planning
among the agencies and jurisdictions involved. In the pre-emergency phase, each agencys or
jurisdictions procedures for disseminating public information should be coordinated and made
compatible with the strategies developed by all other agencies and jurisdictions that may be
affected by a chemical agent event.
Joint Information Center

A JIC is a physical location where public information specialists from the Army and Federal,
State, and local jurisdictions, as well as volunteer and nongovernmental agencies, meet to
coordinate the release of emergency public information. An effective JIC will gather, verify,
produce, and disseminate information using all available means, and should be large enough to
accommodate expected staff and news media. JIC staff should monitor public phone calls and
analyze news and social media coverage of the emergency, with a rapid response team addressing
identified gaps in information, misinformation, or unconfirmed information (i.e., rumors or
speculation) that may detrimentally affect the response and recovery effort. As with the JIS,
senior management buy-in of the concepts of communicating through a JIC is imperative for the
center to work effectively.
Identified JIS members should train and exercise the JIC structure as often as possible, including
cross-training in the specific JIC functions. All CSEPP exercises should include a proactive
public information program. The JIC should also be activated in emergencies whenever feasible
so that even in limited responses it becomes a familiar tool for Public Information Officers
(PIOs), emergency responders, and the news media. This will allow for any glitches in procedures
and protocols to be identified and fixed. Pre-event planning should also address surge situations
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where staffing, facilities, equipment, and other resources may be inadequate to meet the needs of
the news media or public.
Key programmatic elements of a JIC include:
Provision for the facility. Designate one or more JIC facilities near the installation, but
preferably outside the IRZ. Typically arrangements are made to secure use of a suitable
existing facility in the event of a CAI. An alternate location should be provided in case
the primary location cannot be used. A mobile JIC equipment package could serve to
fulfill this role, or be used to augment a primary JIC or another CSEPP sites JIC or
mobile JIC.
Coordinated planning. JIC staffing, equipment, and supplies should be provided for in
emergency plans. Planning for the JIC should anticipate that Army, Federal, and State
PIOs may be unable to report to the JIC, or that additional JICs may be established by
other response organizations. For complex incidents spanning a wide geographic area,
multiple JICs may be necessary. In particular, the Army installation may need to rely on a
separate media center.
Communication systems. Equipment and systems should be provided for

communications to support the JIC. Adequate phone, radio, computer, and Internet
linkage among all JICs and EOCs is critical.
Training and exercises. The JIC structure should be exercised as often as possible, and
the JIC concept should be explained to local news media representatives.
Plans for a virtual JIC that link all participants through technological means will offer greater
flexibility and expanded resources for 24-hour staffing. This in turn will reduce the need for
volunteers in most CSEPP JICs and allow for CSEPP-trained PIOs in other jurisdictions to assist
during any CAI.
Remediation and Recovery

Once the immediate response to an emergency has been completed, a longer-term remediation
and recovery phase will begin. This phase, which can last for days, weeks, or months, is
characterized by information regarding residual hazards, protective actions, care and services
available to the public, cleanup, remediation, and claims procedures.
Planning for the remediation and recovery phase should provide for a transition from the
emergency response to a longer-term recovery mode. A key focus will be the development of a
staffing plan that covers a potentially lengthy JIC activation and anticipates possible public affairs
resources and support from the State and/or Federal government.
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During this period, the remediation and recovery plan should support CSEPP public information
staff in:
Gathering information and coordinating with public information staff of all organizations
involved in the recovery effort;
Obtaining advice from experts in recovery fields such as environmental remediation,

claims, and social services; and
Disseminating recovery information to the public and news media via news releases,
interviews, news conferences and briefings, and responses to traditional media, social
media and public inquiries.
Collaboration and Coordination

As in other CSEPP program areas, public affairs employs the whole community concept of
collaboration and coordination. Successful implementation of a JIS and adequate staffing of a JIC
require ongoing coordination by public information professionals in the CSEPP communities. To
facilitate coordination, CSEPP PIOs should employ an all-hazards approach to emergency
readiness and response to ensure each community has a network in place for any emergency and
can work together toward an end goal of a better-prepared public. This methodology will also
benefit the community when the CSEPP mission is complete because a solid working relationship
among public affairs staff will remain. Agencies such as hospitals, schools, utilities, higher
education institutions, response agencies, local government entities, and chambers of commerce
are all partners during a community emergency. PIOs from each of these agencies should attempt
to meet regularly as a group. Annual activation of the JIC during a CSEPP exercise allows the
group to practice its emergency message coordination with qualified individuals on hand to
evaluate the response.
In addition to building all-hazards partnerships, CSEPP PIOs benefit from developing working
relationships with other public affairs practitioners who are directly involved with the stockpiles.
Federal agencies such as FEMA, CMA, and ACWA (and its Outreach offices) employ subjectmatter experts who will have a critical messaging role before, during, and after any chemical
event. Familiarization with each agencys roles and responsibilities and pre-planning of crisis
communication is critical to effectively coordinating public information. In an effort to ensure
there is ongoing networking among these agencies, and between the two stockpile states, the
information officers have identified a continuing need for a Public Affairs IPT. The Public
Affairs IPT has a responsibility to develop a work plan, mentor incoming CSEPP PIOs/Public
Affairs Officers (PAOs), communicate public affairs efforts throughout the program, and share
best practices and lessons learned with each other.
This collaboration and coordination can occur in a number of ways. Public information
professionals can support each other in person by coordinating outreach activities and supporting
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emergency public information efforts; over the phone by mentoring each other and conference
calling on specific issues; and via the Internet by sharing lessons learned, new products, and
situation monitoring as needed.
Finally, when partnerships are pursued, it is vital for the public information team to consider
members of the news media among those partners. The professional relationship between a PIO
and local print, television, and radio reporters is vital because each is a direct link between
CSEPP and the public. To ensure a positive relationship, a PIO must be available, honest, and
responsive to inquiries when working with the news media. Maintaining an open line of
communication with this specific partner will facilitate conversation and should encourage
reporters to consider the PIO a valuable asset when information relevant to our mission is
requested by the public, or when controversial issues emerge. It also increases the likelihood that
overall coverage of stockpile storage and demilitarization activities will be more accurate as
reporters become familiar with and knowledgeable about CSEPP.
Social Media
Social media allows PIOs to share information on public education activities, daily public
information operations, and emergency incidents. There are several tools to choose from that fall
into the social media realm including, but not limited to, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and websites.
These tools, and many others, enable PIOs to reach a large audience quickly with accurate, and in
some cases, lifesaving information.
The benefits of using and supporting social media as a tool for information sharing include the
ability to access social media tools from mobile sites, making it a low-cost, accessible option for a
wide variety of audiences. This allows PIOs to share information and messaging quickly with a
large number of people and through a variety of social media tools at the same time. Public
information officers use social media as a situational awareness tool to monitor new events in the
community and the reaction to those events. Social media allows PIOs to evaluate how current
messaging is being received and acted upon in the community. This also allows for engagement
with members of the community, like residents, business owners, and community groups. The
PIO is able to direct and manage the messaging about an activity or event directly with the
community and with all levels of traditional news media (local, State, and National). This tool
allows PIOs to manage rumors and misinformation quickly and efficiently so the community has
accurate information with which to make the safest choices for themselves. It is important that
organizations establish a social media role in their community before a disaster or emergency
occurs in order to be a trusted source of information.
Each agency should develop a formal policy on the social media tools they will use, specifying
how they are to be used, for what purpose, and the staff who will have access to them. Social
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media should be included in the communication plan as a method for sharing emergency
information, daily operations, and public education messaging.
There are challenges for implementing and using social media as part of a communication plan.
Most importantly, the effective use of social media requires the strong support of management
and incident command. Social media toolsand the PIOs responsible for administering them
must be used and trusted in order to have an impact during the communications process.
Identifying staff to monitor and post information can also be a challenge. Social media
participation involves both sending information out and having staff to monitor and respond to
messaging coming into the organization. Since social media will continue to evolve to meet the
needs and demands of the community, there must be a commitment to ongoing staff training and
involvement with the tools available.
Professional Development
Regular training for CSEPP PIOs and PAOs is a critical element of professional development and
may take many formssuch as formal classes, field deployments, and meeting attendance and
participation. Training helps public affairs staff in CSEPP communities expand their expertise
and learn new ideas and methods for maintaining an effective all-hazards public information
program. CSEPP public affairs staff should strive for a comprehensive training approach that
integrates the entire community including, when possible, members of local, statewide, and
national public information groups. By involving all relevant partners in training opportunities,
coordination will be improved, familiarity with emergency response procedures increased, and
available resources maximized.
CSEPP public affairs professionals have access to a wide range of trainingboth directly through
the program, and as members of the larger public affairs networks and associations that exist in
their states and at the national level. It is important that program managers support, to the
maximum extent possible, the ongoing professional development of PIOs and PAOs and
recognize it as a primary job responsibility. Training is an investment that must be made during
periods of routine operations in order to yield dividends when an incident occurs. There is
additional training available through CSEPP that targets decision makers, program managers,
elected officials and technical experts, emphasizing their unique roles in communicating before,
during, and after an emergency.
To identify what opportunities exist for professional development in the area of public
information, both CSEPP-specific and other courses presented at the local, State or national level
should be considered. For off-post jurisdictions, the PIO and/or training officers for the primary
IRZ county, the State, and the FEMA Region will be the best sources of information about what
is available and how it can be accessed. For the installation, the Army chemical stockpile PAO
should be consulted. Training requests should be coordinated through the appropriate on- or off-
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post points of contact, who in turn should work with counterparts in the FEMA or Army Program
Office. Courses sponsored directly by CSEPP are generally funded by headquarters and presented
at no cost to local participants. While the administrative requirements for non-CSEPP training
will vary, those courses are also often available at little or no cost.
CSEPP-specific public affairs training is generally provided through contractor-delivered classes
and support services. (A listing of the courses offered can be found in the CSEPP Public Affairs
Program Guidance Compendium Workbook.) Additional professional development regularly
occurs through the CSEPP Public Affairs IPT, where lessons learned and best practices are
routinely exchanged. The regular attendance and participation of all CSEPP staff who have either
full- or part-time public information responsibilities is strongly encouraged at IPT meetings. The
IPT is also responsible for development and distribution of the RSA Notebook, through which
public affairs-related news is shared, including a calendar of scheduled training. Likewise, the
CSEPP Annual Meeting is an ongoing forum through which significant professional development
occurs.
Beyond CSEPP, and often under the purview of local, statewide or regional public information
groups and professional associations, additional training is frequently made available. CSEPP
PIOs and PAOs should be actively engaged with their fellow practitioners, with the support of
their managers. At the national level, FEMA offers a broad array of courses, both online and in
the classroom. These courses are aimed at people for whom public information is a primary
responsibility (as well as others who communicate with the public and news media on a more
limited basis). The website for FEMAs Emergency Management Institute (EMI) has information
available about the various course offerings, which are available at no cost to participants
(provided that eligibility criteria are met). The EMI training program is designed to build upon
itself, so that new PIOs can gradually work their way through increasingly advanced classes and
course material. The Army has similarly comprehensive training available for PAOs as part of its
Defense Information School.
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Chapter 14:
Protective Action
ESFs #4, 6, 10, 11, 13
Outlining procedures for the annual review and

Core Capabilities:
adjustment of guidelines for potential protective
Environmental Response/
actions for each chemical event, emergency
Health and Safety
notification level, and accident category on a zoneMass Care Services
by-zone basis.
Proof that it is derived from scientifically sound
risk assessment methodology for blister and nerve
agents, such as the Acute Exposure Guideline
Levels (AEGLs).
Describing the coordinated local decision-making process for selecting and
implementing protective actions that can be rapidly implemented on a 24-hour basis.
Addressing the selection and implementation of access and traffic control points.
Addressing the selection and implementation of protective measures for access and
functional needs populations.
Addressing criteria for selecting an incident-specific combination of evacuation and/or
in-place sheltering as public protection measures.
Identifying procedures for the safety and protection of emergency workers.
Identifying measures to address potential impacts on domesticated animals, crops, and
water supplies.
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Guidance
The following guidance is important to the capabilities outlined in the Protective Actions benchmark:
FEMA, Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the Provision of Disaster Mass Care,
Housing, & Human Services Reference Guide, accessed at http://www.fema.gov/accommodatingindividuals-disabilities-provision-disaster-mass-care-housing-human-services.
FEMA, Guidance on Planning for Integration of Functional Needs Support Services in General
Population Shelters (November 2010), accessed at
www.fema.gov/pdf/about/odic/fnss_guidance.pdf.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local Governments, Chapter 7,
Addendum 2: The ADA and Emergency Shelters: Access for All in Emergencies and Disasters
(2007).
U.S. Dept. of Justice, ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local Governments, Chapter 7,
Addendum 3: ADA Checklist for Emergency Shelters (2007).
OSHA HAZWOPER Standard at 29 CFR 1910.120
OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard at 29 CFR 1910.134
EPA HAZWOPER Regulations at 40 CFR 311
HHS/NIOSH Guidance on Emergency Responder Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for
response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Incidents
FEMA Guidance for Individuals with Access and Functional Needs
FEMA Guidance for Pet Owners
FEMA Disaster Assistance Policy on Pet Evacuations and Sheltering 9523.19 (October 24, 2007)
Pets Evacuation and Transportation Act (PETS Act), P.L. 109-308
American Red Cross Pet Safety
CSEPP Protective Action Toolkit
The primary goal of CSEPP is to establish an ability to protect the public health and safety in
accordance with the Congressional maximum protection mandate. The ability to rapidly
implement effective protective actions for the public, on-post populations and emergency
responders is the over-arching goal of the entire program and the benchmark that all other
benchmark areas support.
A CAI triggers a sequence of actions both on the Army installation and in the surrounding
communities. When protective actions are necessary to protect health and safety, installation
authorities should provide on-post warnings and recommend actions to protect individuals located
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Training
The following training is important to the capabilities outlined in the Protective Actions benchmark:
CSEPP Training Video: Operations Level Training: A Refresher for Responders
CSEPP Training Video: Animals in Emergencies for Planners
CSEPP Training Video: Business Shelter-In-Place/Residential Shelter-In-Place
CSEPP Training Video: Evacuation Planning
CSEPP Training Video: Emergency Planning for People with Access and Functional Needs
CSEPP Training Video: Comprehensive Planning for Technological Emergencies
on the installation, and also notify off-post warning points and provide a protective action
recommendation (PAR) for any affected off-post zones. Off-post authorities are responsible for
making a protective action decision (PAD) and alerting and notifying the public in affected zones;
however, some of these actions can be delegated to the Army installation in accordance with local
agreements. The process of developing and implementing protective actions should be carefully
planned between the installation and off-post authorities so that they can be executed quickly and
effectively in an emergency.
This chapter describes protective action options for CSEPP, including evacuation and shelter-inplace (SIP), and planning considerations for choosing and implementing chemical emergency
protective actions. It addresses the following topics:
Principles of Protective Action
Protective Action Decision Making
Protective Action Options
Protective Action Implementation
Access and Functional Needs Populations
Reception and Care of Evacuees
Emergency Worker Protection
Principles of Protective Action

Protective actions are activities that a population at risk engages in to obtain the best outcome in
the event of a chemical emergency at Army chemical storage/disposal installations. The principal
desired outcome is the avoidance of fatalities to the maximum extent possible for the conditions
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and circumstances of the emergency, due to timely and appropriate actions taken by Army and
off-post officials, emergency workers, and the population at risk. Another desirable outcome is
minimization of harm to property and the environment.
Protective actions will provide the best outcomes if
they are derived from a balanced protective action
A balanced protective action
strategy, appropriate to the unique nature of the
strategy consists of an appropriate
hazard and risk at each site, which is developed
mix of immediate evacuation and
jointly between the Army installation and
temporary SIP, with appropriate
community officials. This strategy should be
follow-on actions to end SIP at the
best time and in the best way to
embedded in plans, agreements, training, exercises,
minimize fatalities.
public education, and emergency response actions
throughout each CSEPP community.
Initial recommendations, decisions, and directions
to take a specific protective action in particular
zones should be based on previously agreed upon protocols and chemical hazard modeling and
related calculations. While these initial recommendations, decisions, and directions might be
based on incomplete information, the alternative of waiting for complete information (i.e.,
definitive monitoring or more sophisticated modeling results) will almost certainly jeopardize a
good outcome. Subsequent recommendations, decisions, and directions to modify initial
protective actions (e.g., evacuate a larger area or end SIP in a specific area) must be developed
and promulgated as thoughtfully and quickly as initial protective actions. A balanced protective
action strategy also assumes that some percentage of a population at risk may act contrary to
direction, and that people with access and functional needs might need special consideration.
These concerns should be addressed in plans and agreements, and taken into account as the
response evolves.
Protective Action Decision Making

Responsibility for Decision Making
When a chemical emergency occurs, PADs must be made for individuals on the Army installation
and within the affected areas of the off-post community. The Installation Commander has the
responsibility and authority for initial chemical event response on-post; for the protection of onpost personnel; and for mitigation of the events consequences. The Installation Commander is
also responsible for providing appropriate PARs to the off-post community. PARs must be
situation-specific and must be updated as the situation warrants. PARs should include
recommendations to end SIP at the appropriate time.
State and local officials are responsible for making PADs for the off-post community. Off-post
officials may choose to delegate authority for initial off-post PADs to Army installation officials
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in situations where a quick decision is needed to save lives. Any such delegations should be
carefully developed and fully documented.
Time Available for Decisions
During any emergency, quick response is of the essence. A reasonable PAR or PAD that is issued
quickly, based on the pre-approved criteria of the communitys Protective Action Strategy and
current community conditions, is better than a perfect PAR/PAD that is issued too late to be
effective. Any delay in making PADs can occur at the expense of fatalities in areas closest to the
storage site. Detailed guidance on the timing of making PADs and alert and notification may be
found in Chapter 11: Alert and Notification.
Coordination of Decision Making
Because of the limited time available to make this complex decision during an emergency, it is
important that the process is carefully planned. It should be anticipated that there will be very
little time for staff activation, consideration, discussion, coordination, or confirmation of
circumstances before a decision must be made and implemented. Plans and procedures should
document the method for quickly determining the preferred protective actions, and the areas to
which they apply, based on information that is expected to be available before and immediately
after the event.
The decision process should be documented in an MOU that includes all relevant organizations.
The MOU should indicate who will make PADs and how they will be communicated to the
public, including the circumstances, if any, under which the Army installation will initiate
activation of public alert and notification systems (see Chapter 11: Alert and Notification).
To prepare for the possibility of a chemical emergency,
at least once per workday the Army installation should
develop a hazard estimate based on the maximum
credible event (MCE) for storage operations, or
emergency response planning scenario (ERPS) for
demilitarization operations for that days planned
operations. The MCE/ERPS, along with real-time
meteorological data, should be used with the Armys
approved hazard models to develop a provisional PAR.
The MCE/ERPS may change during the day, for
example, if there is a change in planned operations or a
significant change in meteorological conditions. In that
case an updated hazard assessment and provisional PAR
should be generated and transmitted to off-post
authorities.
After a provisional PAR has

been provided, if an actual
chemical event occurs, a new
PAR should be rapidly
provided based on updated
information. The new PAR will
likely differ from the
provisional PAR since the
updated source term,
location, and meteorological
information may not match
the information on which the
provisional PAR was based.
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It is recommended that the Army installation and off-post authorities develop an MOU that
describes when and how the installation provides daily work plan information, including the
MCE/ERPS, to the appropriate points of contact (POCs) off-post. Similarly, off-post authorities
should provide daily information to the installation EOC regarding road closures or other
conditions that might affect emergency response for the installation.
Determining the Appropriate Protective Action
A balanced protective actions strategy that includes provision for evacuation and SIP should be
incorporated into on-post and off-post CSEPP plans. Detailed guidance for developing a balanced
protective action strategy can be found in the Report of the Shelter-in-Place Work Group and the
Shelter-in-Place Protective Action Guidebook. Hazard modeling using approved Army model(s)
should be used to estimate the hazard for PAD-making purposes. Additional information on
protective action options and implementation of protective actions follows this section.
When a chemical event occurs, preferred protective actions for each affected zone should be
chosen based on the following factors, as applicable:
The identity of the chemical agent involved;
Projected areas affected by each AEGL threshold;
The time that the hazard is projected to reach each affected zone;
How long it will take to implement protective actions, including evacuation time
estimates, and time needed to implement SIP, as applicable;
The degree of protection offered by local housing stock and other populated structures;
and
The current traffic situation (e.g., inclement weather or road closures that might impede
evacuation).
Any SIP PAD must always include provision for terminating SIP to minimize exposure. In
essence, SIP is a two-part decision that is not complete until the end SIP recommendation is
made, and an end SIP instruction is broadcast.
Zone Based Protective Action Strategies
The most effective and appropriate protective action may vary depending upon the distance from
the hazard and the time required for a hazard to arrive. For example, evacuation may not be
feasible for areas where the chemical plume arrives before a significant number of people at risk
are able to evacuate the zone. Each CSEPP plan should sub-divide the IRZ and PAZ into smaller
sub-zones or response areas to permit more granular protective action decision making. Army and
off-post officials should evaluate the relative effectiveness of all available protective action
options (detailed in the next section) to determine whether a single protective action is
appropriate at all times for certain sub-zones or whether the optimum protective action for a subzone will vary depending upon the circumstances of the release and prevailing meteorological
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conditions. The full range of protective actions appropriate for each sub-zone should be
documented in plans and procedures and used in conjunction with the Army hazard assessment
model at the time of an actual emergency to determine zone-by-zone protection strategies. Zonebased decision making for protective action strategies should be applied during both Response
and Recovery phases of a chemical emergency.
The zone basis for CSEPP Emergency Planning is described in detail in Chapter 6: Coordinated
Plans.
Protective Action Options

There are three basic protective actions in a chemical emergency: evacuation, SIP, and no action.
Any or all of these actions may be appropriate for different areas depending on factors such as
time available before toxic plume arrival, protection afforded by shelters, and evacuation time
estimates.
Important considerations for these options include, but are not limited to:
The threat level at which to warn the public.
Who needs to be warned.
How they are to be warned.
What specific actions are to be taken.
Whether to issue a precautionary message.
How multiple protective actions are communicated to different audiences.
How updated protective actions are communicated.
Evacuation
Evacuation consists of temporarily leaving an area of actual or potential hazard for a safe area. It
is the most effective of all protective actions, provided it is completed before the arrival of the
toxic plume. Evacuation may be precautionary or responsive in nature. A precautionary
evacuation is one that is based on risk of a toxic release, but that takes place before any release
has occurred. A responsive evacuation is one that occurs after a release. Both types entail similar
planning tasks: estimating the number of potential evacuees, with particular emphasis on people
with access and functional needs; identifying the most appropriate evacuation routes; designating
needed traffic control; estimating the time needed for evacuation; and anticipating potential
problems.
Access control points (ACPs) and traffic control points (TCPs) should be designated ahead of
time based on the pre-designated EPZs. However, instructions to evacuate should not be delayed
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pending the establishment of ACPs and TCPs. Staffing and equipment to set up and maintain the
ACPs and TCPs should be identified in the plans and procedures.
Shelter-in-Place
Shelter-in-place is accomplished by isolating the individual from exposure to a hazard. Shelters

may be congregate (for many people) or individualized (a home). Shelters may be existing
structures, with or without upgraded protective measures, or facilities specifically designed to
provide shelter from toxic chemicals. In CSEPP there are four types of SIP: normal, expedient,
enhanced, and pressurized.
Normal SIP involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and
turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room.
The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
Expedient SIP is similar to normal SIP except that, after going into the room selected as
a shelter at the time of an emergency, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at
which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around
doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets with plastic. Effectiveness is
improved if an interior room is selected as a shelter. The shelter should be opened up or
abandoned after the plume has passed.
Enhanced SIP is similar to normal SIP except that it involves taking shelter in a
structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to
permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into the structure.
Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened
up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
Pressurized SIP is similar to normal SIP except the infiltration of contaminated air is
effectively prevented by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes
chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air
is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.
The duration of protection offered by unpressurized shelters is limited. Because such shelters
cannot be made completely air tight, they will eventually be infiltrated by chemical agent. People
in the shelter will be exposed to gradually increasing concentrations of agent, and exposure will
continue even after the chemical agent plume has passed outside of the shelter. Consequently, the
protection offered by unpressurized shelter depends on exiting the shelter at the appropriate time;
the dose-reduction advantage of SIP can be minimized or lost if the shelter is not exited at the
right time. The Army has responsibility to notify the off-post communities as to optimal times to
exit these shelters.
Standby / Stay at Home
Some CSEPP communities include a standby or stay-at-home recommendation among their

protective action strategies. A stay-at-home option would be employed when there is an event
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on-post that might create public concern, but the expectation of hazard off-post is not sufficient to
warrant evacuation or sheltering in place. The public would be requested to stay away from the
depot, limit travel, limit telephone calls, and wait for more information.
A standby instruction to persons in certain protective action zones to remain where they are and
monitor emergency information may be issued to allow directly affected zones to evacuate
quickly. The goals of a standby or stay-at-home strategy are to keep the public informed and to
facilitate response by keeping local roads clear for emergency vehicles and evacuation traffic.
Like any protective action option, if it is to be used in an emergency, the standby or stay-at-home
option should be addressed in plans, training, and public education materials.
Protective Action Implementation

Evacuation
Plans and procedures for implementing evacuation should include the following:
Time estimates for evacuating portions of the IRZ and PAZ;
Designated evacuation routes associated with each zone;
Public instructions developed for each zone, including designated evacuation routes,
reception center locations, and brief instructions on what to take alonginstructions
should be consistent with public education materials;
Provision for law enforcement personnel to assist with traffic management, and TCPs
should be identified at key intersections along evacuation routes;
Designated evacuee reception locations (reception centers) should be set up for evacuees
or persons relocating after shelterguidance on setup, staffing, and services provided at
reception centers may be found in the Reception Center Functions section of this
document;
Provision for people with access and functional needs. (See the subsection below: People
with Access and Functional Needs);
Provision for measures to help people who, for whatever reason, did not evacuate after
the recommendation was given; and
Provision for companion animals.
Shelter-in-Place
Plans and procedures for implementing SIP should include:
Public instructions, which are consistent with public education materials that have been
distributed, and cover the following points:
o
The importance of prompt compliance
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Brief instructions for expedient shelter
Reference to public education materials that have been distributed
Use of sheltering kits, if they have been distributed
The importance of having a radio to receive exit-shelter instructions
Control of access to the sheltered area. TCPs should be identified along with resources
(e.g., staff and barricades) to implement control.
Instructions should also take into consideration transient populations in the area at the time of the
event. There may be considerable numbers of persons who lack exposure to prior public
education efforts.
Planning for implementation of SIP should also include provisions for relocation after termination
of SIP. Relocation implementation measures are similar to those for evacuation and should
include designated routes, reception centers, traffic management, provisions for people with
access and functional needs, and provisions for companion animals.
Maintaining Shelter-in-Place
The expected time to remain in shelter is likely to be brief (30 minutes to 4 hours); therefore,
most individuals will have no need to collect supplies, such as medications, prior to sheltering.
Once established, the integrity of the shelter should be maintained to protect against air
infiltration. It is permissible to briefly open an entry to the shelter to allow someone to enter after
the shelter integrity is established if the alternative is to deny shelter to someone in need. It is
unlikely that this will significantly decrease the protective value of the shelter. Occupants should
not leave the shelter (or the room within the shelter that provides for the least air infiltration) for
any reason other than an immediate life-threatening medical emergency, or until instructed to do
so.
A device to monitor EAS or alert radio broadcasts is essential in the shelter. In addition, a phone
or might be useful. To avoid overload of local telephone services, the telephone should not be
used while in a shelter except for a dire medical emergency or to report clear symptoms of nerve
agent exposure. Local plans and public education materials should cover who to call in the event
of a medical emergency while sheltered, and what range of responses are likely.
The public education program should include the above information on maintaining shelter.
Ending Shelter-in-PlaceTiming
Ending SIP at the appropriate time is key to its protective effect. For each zone where the public
has been instructed to take a protective action, the Army installation should provide a timely
recommendation to exit shelter. Exit-shelter recommendations should be based on chemical
plume modeling to estimate hazard levels at downwind locations. The model should have the
following characteristics:
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It should be based on when the plume concentration outside becomes less than inside
shelters.
Consider the dose-response relationship that is most relevant to the effects of the agent on
a sheltered population.
Consider exposure before, during, and after SIP.
Provide information to minimize fatalities.
In addition, it should be noted that the timing for ending SIP is most crucial for areas close to the
source of the release, where dangerous concentrations are more likely to be encountered. The
procedure for ending SIP should be able to distinguish between close-in areas and areas further
away from the release source.
Ending Shelter-in-PlaceMethod
Recommendations on how to end SIP will depend on several variables. Ventilation of the shelter
is important if the shelter is within the hazard wedge or risk envelope, and the occupants are
going to remain inside because they cannot exit. If they are going to exit or relocate, ventilation is
not that important, and the additional time involved might result in additional harmful exposure in
the process. In addition, some people might be reluctant to leave their homes unsecured and delay
their exit and relocation while they secure their valuables, or collect their valuables to take with
them. Below are options for how to end SIP:
Resume normal activities with no restrictions. Resuming normal activity with no

restrictions would be an appropriate action for persons who were never in danger, but
who were sheltered as a precaution. This is the usual interpretation of all clear.
Ventilate the shelter but remain indoors. In some cases the best action to end SIP might
be to remain indoors but ventilate the building by opening doors and windows, removing
tape and plastic installed during expedient sheltering, and turning on ventilation
equipment. This might be the only option for disabled persons or people with access and
functional needs who lack the mobility to exit the shelter. This option also might apply
when the weather is so dangerous that remaining outside for an extended period is
inadvisable or when there is believed to be some other hazard outdoors to be avoided.
Exit the shelter and remain nearby. In order to decrease the overall exposure, it might be
appropriate to instruct the public not to take the time to open windows, remove tape, and
turn on ventilation equipment prior to leaving the building. Rather, they should simply go
outside and let the building ventilate itself gradually. The potential for aerosol deposition
(creating a contact hazard) should be a minor consideration, since it is such a remote
possibility and not likely to be a safety factor at great distances from the source, even if
an agent aerosol is generated by the event. This might also be the best option for persons
who lack transportation to relocate.
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Relocate to a designated facility. Local officials may direct that upon the termination of
SIP, sheltered populations should relocate to designated facilities to be accounted for and
medically screened for agent exposure symptoms. In that case, the instructions would be
to exit from shelters and proceed immediately to a place where this follow-up can occur.
Instructions should identify the routes to take to avoid encountering the plume again and
traffic bottlenecks. Designated routes and facilities for relocation might not be the same
as for an initial evacuation. In dire circumstances, such as if the duration of the release is
longer than originally expected and SIP is no longer a good choice, sheltered persons
might be asked to relocate immediately to a safer place.
Collective Protection or Overpressurization
Where pressurized shelters have been developed, protective action procedures should ensure that
separate instructions are issued for persons in those shelters. Persons in pressurized shelters are
not subject to the same time constraints as those in unpressurized shelters; the protective
properties of the shelter will continue for a longer period than in an unpressurized shelter.
Access and Functional Needs

As indicated in Chapter 5, emergency plans should take account of persons with access and
functional needs at each stage of the preparedness and response process so that these populations
are protected at least as well as the general population. Recommended preparedness measures for
these populations include:
Maintaining contact information;
Measures to ensure alert and notification is received;
Selection and implementation of protective actions; and
Measures to ensure accommodation at reception centers and mass care facilities.
Maintaining Contact Information
In order to provide assistance to access and functional needs populations, it is necessary to

maintain information about their locations and needs. The plan should include lists of special
facilities, with contact information, and mechanisms for updating the list (i.e., by contacting the
agencies that license them). Planners should also make an effort to collect and maintain
information on access and functional needs individuals not in special facilities, including contact
information and the nature of their access and functional needs, through self-identification.
Mechanisms to obtain such information are:
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Having tear-off notification cards in public education materials; and
Working with welfare or social service agencies, religious, fraternal, social, and service
organizations, and volunteer and nonprofit groups at the State, county, and community
levels. While the need for confidentiality generally prevents such agencies from
providing direct information, they may be willing to provide questionnaires, referral

information, and assistance to their clients who can then identify themselves to
emergency planners.
Information about access and functional needs individuals and the arrangements made on their
behalf must be protected from public disclosure; it should be available to emergency responders
but limited to those with a need to know. Plans should also include mechanisms for updating this
information at least annually.
Assistance to Access and Functional Needs Populations
The following should be considered when providing protective action plans for those with access
and functional needs:
Assistance or special equipment for notification. Persons with sight or hearing

impairments may need special equipment in order to receive alert and notification. See
Chapter 11 for further discussion of alert/notification measures for access and functional
needs populations.
Provision of educational materials and emergency instructions in languages other than

English. Education materials and emergency information should be translated into a
foreign language if the state determines through survey or other means that one percent or
more of the population at risk speaks that language but does not speak English. An effort
should be made to have translation services available at key response locations such as
reception centers, medical centers and mass care shelters.
Special equipment for alert and notification of special facilities. For example, it may be
appropriate to provide TARs to special facilities, even where they are not provided to the
public generally.
Separate PADs for access and functional needs populations. In some cases (e.g., for
facilities or individuals where evacuation would be difficult, time-consuming, or
dangerous), it may be appropriate to plan for recommending SIP for those facilities or
persons, even though the general public is recommended to evacuate. Where protective
action options are limited, it may also be appropriate to consider providing for enhanced
or pressurized shelter.
Assistance with carrying out protective actions. If resources are available, either through
emergency response agencies or from volunteers, arrange for assistance to access and
functional needs individuals for implementing protective actions (e.g., rides for
evacuation or help with carrying out expedient SIP).
Host facilities for special facilities. Where special facilities may be evacuated, host
facilities outside the PAZ should be identified that can accommodate the access and
functional needs of the evacuated facilities occupants.
137
Schools are an example of a distinctive type of special facility. Measures to protect children in
such facilities should be carefully planned and well publicized. In particular, special attention
should be given to informing parents about arrangements for the protection of children. Major
safety problems could occur if parents attempt to pick up their children at schools during an
evacuation. Parents need to be confident that their children are being cared for and know where
the children can be found after the evacuation. This information should be included in public
education materials and in emergency instruction messages such as EAS messages.
Reception and Care of Evacuees

Persons advised to evacuate (or to shelter in place and then relocate) should be advised to proceed
along designated routes to locations where they can receive further emergency services, including
reception and mass care. Reception, as used in this guide, refers to a process in which evacuees
receive a very quick evaluation for medical needs, expedient decontamination if necessary, are
referred for further medical care if needed, are registered for tracking purposes, and are referred
to a mass care shelter if they need a place to stay. A reception center, as used in this guide, refers
to a location where reception functions are performed. A reception center can be at a facility or at
a TCP. Mass care, as used in this guide, refers to providing shelter, food, and other services in a
temporary residential setting.
Reception Center Functions
Reception centers should be located as close as possible to the area affected by the emergency.
The farther away they are, the longer it takes to get there, which may be detrimental to evacuees
who need help (e.g., those suffering effects of agent exposure). Reception centers should be
located where large flows of traffic can be handled quickly and efficiently. Reception center
staffing should include law enforcement personnel for security and traffic management.
Upon arrival at the reception center, evacuees should be quickly evaluated for signs of agent
exposure or other medical distress. Speed is essential for this process since there may be a few
people with potentially serious medical problems among a very large number of relatively
unaffected people. The reception center should be designed and staffed to promote this quick
evaluation (e.g., an EMT-trained greeter might perform a quick visual exam of incoming
evacuees, and ask them a few questions, such as where they came from, when they left, whether
they were sheltered-in-place first, and whether they are experiencing a short list of agent systems
such as dim vision or headaches).
Evacuees showing symptoms of agent exposure should be offered immediate expedient
decontamination and referred for further medical treatment, which might include complete
personal decontamination. Expedient decontamination, as used in this guide, refers to removing
the outer layer of clothing, washing exposed skin and hair with soap and water, and providing a
suitable replacement for outer clothing. Complete personal decontamination refers to washing the
entire body with soap and water and a complete change of clothing.
138
Evacuees showing other signs of distress (not apparently agent exposure related) should also be
referred for further medical treatment. Preferably, there should be EMTs and at least an expedient
decontamination capability at the reception center.
Evacuees who do not need immediate medical attention should be offered the following services:
Registration to establish that they arrived at the reception center, account for their
personal safety, and allow for reuniting families who have been separated;
Mass care for those who need a place to stay; and
Decontamination (at least expedient decontamination).
To the extent that these services are provided at the reception center, the reception center should
be arranged and managed so that evacuees waiting for these services do not cause a bottleneck
that slows down the medical screening process for subsequent arrivals.
Mass Care Functions
Based on past evacuations from various natural and technological emergencies, generally about
15 to 30 percent of evacuees receive assistance at mass care centers. Mass care centers are
typically operated by the American Red Cross (Red Cross) pursuant to national and local
agreements. The Red Cross has established guidelines for selecting facilities for use as mass care
centers, and has procedures and training on how to operate them. Red Cross guidelines prohibit
co-locating a decontamination operation with a mass care facility. Facilities to be used for mass
care should be pre-designated and generally should be located outside the PAZ.
Red Cross activities in the mass care centers must be coordinated with other emergency response
functions. Therefore it is desirable to have a Red Cross liaison at one or more off-post EOCs to
handle inquiries about missing persons, track the number of persons at mass care centers, and
coordinate with other response organizations. Mass care centers may need support from local
jurisdictions for law enforcement, traffic management, transportation, medical care, and other
functions.
Reception and Care for Persons with Access and Functional Needs
Accessibility of all emergency services, including reception and mass care, is required under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and FEMA policy. CSEPP planners should think through
the entire process of evacuation, reception, and mass care in terms of access for persons with
access and functional needs; in addition, planners should seek participation in the
planning/review process by representatives of organizations for the disabled.
Extensive guidance and review criteria are available on the subject of accommodating persons
with access and functional needs in emergency planning generally, and mass care shelters in
particular. Planners should consult FEMAs Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the
139
Provision of Disaster Mass Care, Housing, & Human Services Reference Guide, and U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local Governments,
Chapter 7: Emergency Management under Title II of the ADA. Addendum 2 to the latter is
entitled, The ADA and Emergency Shelters: Access for All in Emergencies and Disasters.
Addendum 3 is a checklist for reviewing accessibility of emergency shelters. CPG 101 also
addresses accessibility issues in its review criteria for shelters (see Chapter 4, Step 5).
The DOJ best practices guide includes a mainstreaming conceptpeople with access and
functional needs should be accommodated, as far as practicable, in ordinary public shelters, rather
than in a specialty facility. FEMA has developed a guide specifically on this topic: Guidance on
Planning for Integration of Functional Needs Support Services in General Population Shelters
(November 2010).
Provision for Pets and Service Animals
In the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Act (PETS Act), (Public Law 109-308; October 2006),
Congress established policies to include pets and service animals in emergency planning and
response. The PETS Act promotes incorporation of pets and service animals into Federal, State,
and local emergency plans and preparations, and makes pet-care expenses eligible for Federal
reimbursement in presidentially-declared emergencies and disasters.
Accommodation of Pets. Most Red Cross shelters do not accommodate pets. FEMA and Red
Cross policies encourage people to provide private arrangements for care of their pets in an
emergency. However, in a large-scale evacuation it may be anticipated that there will be some
pets that need emergency shelter separate from their owners. The plan should identify agency
responsibilities for coordination of pet care and resources for care of evacuated pets (e.g., animal
control shelters, nonprofit household pet rescue shelters, private breeding facilities, and kennels).
CPG 101 contains a detailed checklist of points for review of mass care plans with respect to pets
and service animals. [See FEMA CPG 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations
Plans (November 2010), Chapter 4 and Appendix C.]
Service Animals. Under the ADA, service animals must be accommodated in mass care shelters
(unlike pets). Service animals include the familiar seeing-eye dogs and other animals that may
provide a variety of services to someone with a disability. Examples include alerting people who
are deaf or hard of hearing to sounds; pulling wheelchairs; carrying or retrieving items for people
with mobility disabilities or limited use of arms or hands; assisting people with disabilities to
maintain their balance; and alerting people to, and protecting them during, medical events such as
seizures. An animal that has been trained to work or perform tasks for a person with a disability
qualifies as a service animal and must generally be allowed to accompany its owner anywhere
other members of the public are allowed to go.
140
Emergency Worker Protection

The U.S. OSHA establishes regulations for workplace safety, including rules for when particular
types of PPE are needed and what types of protective equipment may be used. OSHA rules
governing emergency workers who may be exposed to toxic materials are found in subsection Q
of the HAZWOPER rule at 29 CFR 1910.120. [State and local government employees are not
under OSHAs jurisdiction, but are subject to U.S. EPA rules. The U.S. EPA has issued a rule (40
CFR 311) that incorporates the HAZWOPER requirements. In other words, State and local
government emergency workers are subject to the HAZWOPER requirements via the EPA rule.]
OSHA encourages states to administer their own workplace safety programs, and
reviews/approves state plans to do so. Kentucky has an approved State plan and thus administers
workplace safety regulations within the State. In Colorado, occupational safety rules are
administered by the Federal OSHA.
As is the case for any response situation potentially involving hazardous materials, protective
equipment and work rules for CAI response should be selected based on a hazard analysis that
includes consideration of the specific tasks to be performed. Different response tasks may require
different levels of protection. Operationally, personnel protection is the responsibility of the
Incident Commander, with advice and assistance from the Safety Officer.
NIOSH has published a summary of standards applicable to PPE for emergency responders
facing the potential for chemical or radiological exposure: Guidance on Emergency Responder
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Incidents, HHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2008-132. This document
is a good starting point for researching applicable standards.
141
142
Appendix A:
Blue Grass Risk Snapshot
Blue Grass Army Depot

The Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) is located approximately 25 miles southeast of Lexington,
Kentucky, near the town of Richmond. The depot size is approximately 15,000 acres, with 255
acres dedicated to the storage of chemical weapons.
The BGAD chemical stockpile consists of two types of chemical agent: a blister agent (mustard)
and two nerve agents (GB and VX). The nerve agent GB is commonly called sarin.
Storage of mustard agent began in 1944, and nerve agent storage commenced in the mid-1960s.
The stockpile is stored in 45 concrete structures (igloos) inside a secure, restricted area. The
igloos store approximately 523 tons of chemical agent in ~102,000 projectiles and rockets. The
chemical agent will be destroyed on-site at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot
Plant (BGCAPP), which borders the chemical storage area.
Blue Grass Army Depot
Storage and Destruction

The Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA) mission is the safe storage of its stockpile of
chemical weapons. The chemical agent igloos are located near BGADs northern boundary in an
area of approximately one square kilometer.
A-1
Destruction of the chemical stockpile is managed by the Assembled Chemical Weapons

Alternatives Program Manager in Edgewood, Maryland, and the BGAD. The Bechtel Parsons
Blue Grass is the systems contractor that will design, build, and operate the BGCAPP. The
chemical agent will be destroyed by chemical neutralization followed by super critical water
oxidation.
Vulnerability
BGAD is located in a heavily-populated section of Madison County, which has an estimated
population of 82,916 and 30,756 households (2010 Census). Madison and Estill Counties have
been designated as IRZ counties for planning purposes. Other counties in the CSEPP footprint
include Powell, Clark, Garrard, Jessamine, Rockcastle, Jackson, Fayette, and Laurel.
Hazard Description
Sulfur mustard (agent HD) is an alkylating chemical vesicant that affects any epithelial surface it
comes in contact with; it has been developed and used as a warfare agent. Mustard agent has a
relatively high freezing point (58 F) and due to its low aqueous solubility, it is persistent in the
environment. Mustard vapor has a garlic-like odor.
Exposure to sulfur mustard vapor may result in irritation and damage to the eyes, respiratory
tract, and skin. The toxic effects of sulfur mustard are temperature- and humidity-dependent; for a
given exposure, the effects could be greater with increasing temperature and humidity. The eyes
are the most sensitive organ/tissue; deaths resulting from sulfur mustard exposure are more often
the result of respiratory tract involvement. Mustard agent is classified as a carcinogen.
Nerve agents are toxic ester derivatives of phosphonic acid containing a cyanide, fluoride, or
sulfur substituent group; they are commonly termed nerve agents as a consequence of their
anticholinesterase properties. These compounds were developed as chemical warfare agents, and
one (sarin) was used by terrorists in the 1995 Tokyo subway system incident. Toxic effects may
occur at vapor concentrations below those of odor detection. Agent VX is an amber-colored
liquid with a vapor density of 9.2 (air = 1) and is considered odorless. As a consequence, agent
VX vapor possesses no olfactory warning properties. VX is approximately 2,000 times less
volatile than nerve agent GB. As a consequence, agent VX is a persistent, terrain denial
military compound with the potential to off-gas toxic vapor for days following surface
application.
Exposure to acutely-toxic concentrations of nerve agents can result in excessive bronchial,
salivary, ocular, and intestinal secretions and sweating, miosis, bronchospasm, intestinal hypermotility, bradycardia, muscle fasciculations, twitching, weakness, paralysis, loss of
A-2
consciousness, convulsions, depression of the central respiratory drive, and death. Minimal
effects observed at low vapor concentrations include miosis (contraction of the pupils of the eye,
with subsequent decrease in pupil area), tightness of the chest, rhinorrhea, and dyspnea.
Daily Planning/ Worst-Case Maximum Credible Event

(MCE) Plume
The Army assigns risk to categories in a Risk Assessment Code (RAC), accounting for the hazard
probability (ranging from frequent to unlikely) and the hazard severity (ranging from negligible
to catastrophic).
BGCA uses the RAC in daily planning for all chemical
operations. For each chemical operation, BGCA plans for
a potential accident (called the Maximum Credible
Event). Using the current meteorological conditions, the
BGCA projects a hypothetical chemical plume assuming
the MCE occurs (using the WebPuffTM model). If the
AEGL-3 chemical threshold level is projected to exceed
the BGAD boundary (and hence reach the general
population), the operation is prohibited from being
M55 rockets in storage
conducted. MCEs are typically either a spill of chemical
agent or an explosion of a chemical munition. These
hypothetical MCE plumes generally do not exceed the BGAD boundary. However, because of its
design and aluminum construction, the M55 rocket MCE includes a second sympathetic
detonation of a second rocket and damage to an entire pallet of 15 rockets. These hypothetical
plumes could exceed the BGAD boundary and require more detailed planning and monitoring
than the other munitions in the stockpile.
Risk Description
DHS defines risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. For CSEPP, risk is
primarily a function of the chemical stockpile characteristics (i.e., physical and toxicological
properties of chemical agent) combined with the probability of an accident release and the
community emergency response characteristics (e.g., ability to evacuate and effectiveness of
shelters). The risk results combine all possible chemical stockpile accidents with all possible
weather conditions.
Due to the nature of potential accidents involving the chemical munitions, the physical properties
of the chemical agents, and the distance to the BGAD boundary, chemical agent in liquid or
A-3
droplet form is not expected to reach the BGAD boundary. The risk to the general public is
limited to exposure to potential chemical agent vapors.
The largest contributors to public risk from the BGAD chemical stockpile are external events that
involve a large number of munitions: lightning-induced fires (71%) and seismic events (27%)
comprise the bulk of the storage risk.
The risk from the chemical stockpile can be expressed in a number of ways. The two common
methods used within CSEPP are risk of fatality and exceedence of occurrence of an exposure
threshold (e.g., AEGL-2).
Select risk results include:
For the public closest to the stockpile, the individual risk of fatality is an estimated ~ 0.7
in 1 million per year, which is slightly less than the common acceptable risk measure of
1 in 1 million per year. The risk decreases with increasing distance from the stockpile. At
a distance of 15 km (10 miles) the approximate extent of the IRZ the individual risk
of fatality is ~1 in 100 million per year (note: Madison County EMA selected the
standard 1 in 100 million for maximum protection for collective pressurization of
schools).
The estimated frequency of occurrence for the AEGL-3 (threshold for severe symptoms)
at the nearest BGAD boundary is one event every 40,000 years. The frequency of the
AEGL-2 (threshold for mile-moderate symptoms) is one event every 25,000 years.
In Fayette County, the AEGL-3 frequency is generally less than 1 in 1 million per year.
Although the BGAD chemical stockpile poses a very real risk to the surrounding general
public, the results indicate that the risk is low.
References
A-4
Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, Volume 3, The
National Academies Press, 2003
Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards, Department of Army Safety Pamphlet 385-61,
17 December 2008
DHS Lexicon
Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant Screening Quantitative Risk

Assessment for Public Risk, SAIC, May 2009
Kentucky Requirements Analysis for AEGL Adoption, IEM, March 2003
Appendix B:
Pueblo Risk Snapshot
Pueblo Chemical Depot

The Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) is located on 23,000 acres of land approximately14 miles east
of Pueblo, Colorado. The depot size is approximately 33 square miles, with 600 acres dedicated
to the storage of chemical weapons.
The entire chemical stockpile consists of a single type of chemical agent, a blister agent called
mustard.
Storage of mustard agent began in the 1950s. The stockpile is stored in 102 concrete structures
(igloos) inside a secure, restricted area. The igloos store approximately 2,611 tons of chemical
agent in ~780,000 cartridges and projectiles. The chemical agent will be destroyed on-site at the
Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP), which borders the chemical storage
area.
Storage and Destruction

The PCD mission is the safe storage of its stockpile of chemical weapons. The chemical agent
igloos are located near PCDs northern boundary in an area of approximately one square mile.
B-1
Destruction of the chemical stockpile is managed by the Assembled Chemical Weapons

Alternatives Program Manager in Edgewood, Maryland, and the PCD. The Bechtel Pueblo Team
is the systems contractor that will design, build, and operate the PCAPP. The mustard agent will
be destroyed by chemical neutralization followed by biotreatment.
Vulnerability
PCD is located in a lightly-populated section of Pueblo County, which has an estimated
population of 159,063 residents and 61,418 households (2010 Census). Pueblo County has been
designated as an IRZ county for planning purposes.
Hazard Description
Sulfur mustard (agent HD) is an alkylating chemical vesicant that affects any epithelial surface it
comes in contact with; it has been developed and used as a warfare agent. Mustard agent has a
relatively high freezing point (58 F) and due to its low aqueous solubility, it is persistent in the
environment. Mustard vapor has a garlic-like odor.
Exposure to sulfur mustard vapor may result in irritation and damage to the eyes, respiratory
tract, and skin. The toxic effects of sulfur mustard are both temperature- and humidity-dependent;
for a given exposure, the effects could be greater with increasing temperature and humidity. The
eyes are the most sensitive organ/tissue; deaths resulting from sulfur mustard exposure are more
often the result of respiratory tract involvement. Mustard agent is classified as a carcinogen.
Daily Planning/Worst-Case Maximum Credible Event

(MCE) Plume
The Army assigns risk to categories in a Risk Assessment Code (RAC), accounting for the hazard
probability (ranging from frequent to unlikely) and the hazard severity (ranging from negligible
to catastrophic).
PCD uses the RAC in daily planning for all chemical operations. For each chemical operation,
PCD plans for a potential accident (called the Maximum Credible Event). Using the current
meteorological conditions, the PCD projects a hypothetical chemical plume assuming the MCE
occurs (using the WebPuffTM model). If the AEGL-3 chemical threshold level is projected to
exceed the PCD boundary (and reach the general population), the operation is prohibited from
being conducted. MCEs are typically either a spill of chemical agent or an explosion of a
chemical munition. These hypothetical MCE plumes generally do not exceed the PCD Chemical
Limited Area and are not expected to reach the PCD boundary. Accidents that threaten the
general public have a lower probability than MCEs.
B-2
Mustard 155 mm munitions in storage
Risk Description
DHS defines risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. For CSEPP, risk is
primarily a function of the chemical stockpile characteristics (i.e., physical and toxicological
properties of chemical agents) combined with the probability of an accident release and the
community emergency response characteristics (e.g., ability to evacuate and effectiveness of
shelters). The risk results combine all possible chemical stockpile accidents with all possible
weather conditions.
Due to the nature of potential accidents involving the chemical munitions, the physical properties
of the chemical agents, and the distance to the PCD boundary, chemical agent in liquid or droplet
form is not expected to reach the PCD boundary. The risk to the general public is limited to
exposure to potential chemical agent vapors.
The largest contributors to public risk from the PCD chemical stockpile are external events that
involve a large number of munitions (e.g., airplane crashes and seismic events).
The risk from the chemical stockpile can be expressed in a number of ways. The two common
methods used within CSEPP are risk of fatality and exceedence of occurrence of an exposure
threshold (e.g., AEGL-2).
B-3
Select risk results include:
For the public closest to the stockpile, the individual risk of fatality is an estimated 1 in
100 million per year. This risk is much less than the common acceptable risk measure
of 1 in 1 million per year. The risk decreases with increasing distance from the stockpile.
The estimated frequency of occurrence for the AEGL-3 (threshold for severe symptoms)
at the nearest PCD boundary is one event every 1 million years. The frequency of the
AEGL-2 (threshold for mile-moderate symptoms) is one event every 200,000 years.
Although the PCD chemical stockpile poses a very real risk to the surrounding general
public, the results indicate that the risk is very low.
References
B-4
Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, Volume 3, The
National Academies Press, 2003
Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards, Department of Army Safety Pamphlet 385-61,
17 December 2008
DHS Lexicon
Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant Phase 1 Quantitative Risk Assessment,

SAIC, December 2011
Technical Analysis for Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) Adoption, Pueblo
Chemical Depot Site, IEM, May 2003
Appendix C: Glossary of
Terminology and Acronyms
Access and Functional Needs PopulationsPopulations whose members may

have additional needs before, during, and after an incident in functional areas,
including but not limited to: maintaining independence, communication,
transportation, supervision, and medical care. Individuals in need of additional
response assistance may include those who have disabilities; who live in
institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse
cultures; who have limited English proficiency or are non-English speaking; or
who are transportation disadvantaged.
Alert and Notification SystemA combination of sirens, tone alert radios, and
other means to be used in the IRZ and selected portions of the PAZ to provide
alert and emergency instructions to the public.
Chemical Accident/Incident (CAI)Unintentional chemical event where
chemical agent is released into the ambient atmosphere and either threatens
unprotected personnel or has the potential to threaten unprotected personnel. It
includes chemical accidents resulting from non-deliberate events where safety is
of primary concern, and chemical incidents resulting from deliberate acts or
criminal acts where security is of concern.
Chemical AgentA chemical substance listed in Appendix B of AR 50-6 that is
intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a
person through its physiological properties. Excluded from consideration are
industrial chemicals, riot control agents, chemical herbicides, and smoke and
flame munitions.
Chemical Demilitarization ProgramThe overall DOD program that is
responsible for eliminating all stockpile and non-stockpile chemical agents,
munitions, and related materials in U.S. states and territories. This program
includes the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, the Alternative Technologies
and Approaches Project, the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Product, the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, and the Assembled
Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program.
C-1
Chemical EventThe term encompasses chemical agent material accidents,

incidents, and other circumstances where there is a confirmed or likely release to
the environment, exposure of personnel, leaking munitions, threat to the security
of chemical agents, or incident of concern to the local Commander.
Chemical Event Emergency Notification SystemA tiered system by which
the Army classifies chemical surety emergencies according to expected
downwind hazard distance and provides appropriate notification to off-post public
officials.
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP)A congressionally-mandated
program that requires the Army to dispose of all of its unitary chemical agents and
munitions at its chemical stockpile sites while ensuring maximum protection to
the environment, the general public, and personnel involved in the destruction
effort.
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP)A joint
Army/FEMA program designed to enhance existing local, installation, State, and
Federal capabilities to protect the health and safety of the public, work force, and
environment from the effects of a CAI involving the U.S. Army chemical
stockpile.
Chemical SuretyA system of control measures designed to provide protection
to the local population, workers, and the environment by ensuring that chemical
agent operations are conducted safely; that chemical agents are secure; and that
personnel involved in those operations meet the highest standards of reliability.
ContaminationHaving a substance get on ones clothing, shoes, hair, exposed
skin, or eyes. Contamination may lead to continued chemical exposure and may
expose others to the same hazard.
CSEPP CommunityThe combined area of one military installation, its
surrounding local jurisdictions, and the State agencies involved in executing
CSEPP for that area.
CSEPP HospitalA hospital in the vicinity of a chemical installation that has
been designated for participation in the CSEP Program by the CSEPP regional
office or by MOU with the Army.
CSEPP JurisdictionThe smallest area of geography within which political
authority may be exercised with regards to CSEPP (e.g., a county or city).
DecontaminationThe process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on
any person, objective, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating,
or removing chemical agents.
DemilitarizationThe mutilation, destruction, or neutralization of chemical
agent material, rendering it harmless and ineffectual for military purposes.
C-2
Emergency Alert System (EAS)A system created by the Federal

Communications Commission that uses communications facilities to alert the
public to emergencies (formerly known as the Emergency Broadcast System).
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)The physical location at which the
coordination of information and resources to support incident management (onscene operations) activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary
facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility,
perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be
organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and
medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, State, regional, city, county), or
by some combination thereof.
Emergency PlanThe ongoing plan maintained by various jurisdictional levels
for responding to a wide variety of potential hazards.
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)A geographical area delineated around a
potential hazard generator that defines the potential area of impact. Zones
facilitate planning for the protection of people during an emergency.
Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs)The CSEPP EROs are set of metrics
and performance measures to assess the ability of CSEPP communities to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from a chemical weapons event emanating from an
Army installation. They are documented in the Exercise Policy and Guidance for
the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (Blue Book).
EvacuationOrganized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or
removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their
reception and care in safe areas.
ExposureContact by a person or animal with chemical agent in either liquid or
vapor form through inhalation, contact with the eyes or skin, or ingestion of
contaminated food or water. Vapor exposure does not necessarily lead to
contamination. For each route of exposure and potential contamination by a
chemical, the risk of injury depends on several factors. These include:
The toxicity of the chemical involved.
The amount and/or concentration of the chemical.
The duration of the contact.
The route of exposure.
The individuals age and general health.
First ReceiverHospital employees, who may be termed first receivers, work at

a site remote from the location where the hazardous substance release occurred.
The location and limited source of the contaminant distinguishes the first
receivers from other first responders (e.g., firefighters, law enforcement, and
ambulance service personnel) who typically respond to the incident site (i.e., the
C-3
Release Zone). OSHA recognizes that first receivers have somewhat different
training and personal protective equipment (PPE) needs than workers in the
hazardous substance Release Zone, a point clarified through letters of
interpretation.
First ResponderLocal and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency
personnel who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the
protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment,
including emergency response providers as defined in Section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 101), as well as emergency management, public
health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as
equipment operators) who provide immediate support services during prevention,
response, and recovery operations. First responders may include personnel from
Federal, State, local, or nongovernmental organizations.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)A mandatory, federally-evaluated demonstration of
a communitys full capabilities to respond to a chemical emergency.
Immediate Response Zone (IRZ)The emergency-planning zone immediately
surrounding each Army installation. It generally extends to about six miles from
the installations chemical storage area.
Initial Response Force (IRF)An emergency actions organization tasked to
provide first response to a CAI at an installation assigned a chemical surety
mission or in the public domain. Under the command of the Installation
Commander or Commander of the nearest Army installation, the IRF is composed
of command and control elements and emergency teams capable of providing
emergency medical services and initiating those actions necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate hazards to public health and safety or to the environment.
Joint Information Center (JIC)A facility established to coordinate incidentrelated public information activities and that serves as a central point of contact
for the news media.
Joint Information System (JIS)A system to integrate emergency information
and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent,
coordinated, accurate, accessible, timely, and complete information during
accident or incident response.
Local GovernmentA county, municipality, city, town, township, local public
authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of
governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as
a nonprofit corporation under State law or not), regional or interstate government
entity, agency or instrumentality of a local government; an Indian tribe or
authorized tribal entity or, in Alaska, a Native Village or Alaska Regional Native
Corporation; a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public
entity.
C-4
Mass Casualty IncidentAn incident that generates more patients than

available resources can manage using routine procedures and that will require
assistance from outside agencies.
Mutual Aid and Assistance AgreementWritten or oral agreement between
and among agencies/organizations and/or jurisdictions that provides a mechanism
to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment,
materials, and other associated services. The primary objective is to facilitate
rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support prior to, during, and/or after
an incident.
National Contingency Plan (NCP)Officially titled the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, this is the Federal
Governments blueprint for responding to oil spills and hazardous substance
releases. Activities under the NCP are overseen by an on-scene coordinator.
Off-postThe area outside the boundaries of a military installation or facility.
Off-siteThe area surrounding the on-site area.
On-postA military installation or facility.
On-siteAn area around the scene of a chemical event under the operational
control of the On-site Commander, Technical Escort Officer, or the IRF or SRF
Commander. Includes any area established as a National Defense Area.
Protective Action Decision (PAD)Those decisions by State and local officials
on what protective action instructions to recommend to the public, based upon
hazard information, specific emergency planning zones, recommendations from
the Installation Commander, and other information.
Protective Action Recommendation (PAR)Those initial and subsequent
recommendations by the Installation Commander to off-post community officials
in response to a CAI. These recommendations may include evacuation, shelter-inplace, and exit shelter-in-place.
Protective Action Zone (PAZ)A second emergency planning zone beyond the
immediate response zone (IRZ). It generally extends to about 18-35 miles from
the installations chemical storage area.
ReleaseAny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment, including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant. For purposes of the NCP, release also means threat of release. There
are exclusions to this definition (see NCP).
C-5
Re-entryThe entry of persons into an affected area following a hazardous

materials incident. Re-entry can be restricted (entry of monitoring crews) or
unrestricted (unlimited public access).
Relocation PointsAreas to which a population or community can be
temporarily or permanently removed in response to an emergency or disaster.
Relocation is distinguished from evacuation in that during an emergency, the
potential for a release exists; in contrast, during the relocation phase, there is no
passing plume.
RestorationIncludes those efforts and resources needed to return a
contaminated area to a condition safe for unprotected public access and use.
Shelter-in-Place (SIP)A protective action that involves taking cover in a
building and taking steps to limit natural ventilation in order to reduce exposure to
a hazard. Different categories include normal, expedient, enhanced, or pressurized
shelters.
StateWhen capitalized, refers to the government of any state of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States.
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)As described in HSEEP guidance, an exercise used
to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to
guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined incident.
VolunteerAny individual accepted to perform services by the lead agency,
which has authority to accept volunteer services, when the individual performs
services without promise, expectation, or receipt of compensation for services
performed. See 16 USC 742f(c) and 29 CFR 553.101.
C-6
Acronyms
CSEPP Benchmarks:
ADM
PER
COP
MED
TRA
EX
COM
ADP
A&N
EOC
POE
PRO
Administration
Personnel
Coordinated Plans
Training
Exercises
Communications
Automation (automated data processing)
Emergency Operations Center
Protective Actions
Alphabetical Listing
AC
ACPs
ACS
ACWA
ADA
ADP
AEGLs
AELs
AISs
AMC
AOC
APG
ARES
BGCA
CA
CAI
CAIRA
CAP
CBRN
CDC
CDFs
CENLs
Area Command
Access control points
Auxiliary Communication Service
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives
Americans with Disabilities Act
automated data processing
Airborne Exposure Limits
Automated Information Systems
Army Materiel Command
Army Operations Center
Aberdeen Proving Ground
Amateur Radio Emergency Services
Blue Grass Chemical Activity
Cooperative Agreement
Chemical Accident or Incident
Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance
Common Alerting Protocol
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
chemical disposal facilities
Chemical Event Notification Levels
C-7
CERCLA
CFR
CMA
CMAS
CONOPS
CONUS
CPG 101
CSEPP
CSWAN
DHS
DIACAP
DOD
DOJ
DPEIS
EAS
EEGs
EMI
EMS
EMTALA
EOC
EOP
EOPT
EPA
ERCP
ERO
ERPS
ESF
ExPlan
FADs
FCC
FCO
FEMA
FPEIS
FSE
FY
FYDP
GAO
GETS
GPD
GPLs
C-8
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act
Code of Federal Regulation
Chemical Materials Activity
commercial mobile-telephone alert system
concept of operations
continental United States
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
Chemical Stockpile Wide Area Network
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and
Accreditation Process
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
Emergency Alert System
emergency evaluation guidelines
Emergency Management Institute
emergency medical service
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
emergency operations center
Emergency Operations Plan
Emergency Operations Planning Template
Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Response Concept Plan
Emergency Response Outcome
emergency response planning scenario
Emergency Support Function
Exercise Plan
Funding Authorization Documents
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Coordinating Officer
final programmatic environmental impact statement
full-scale exercises
fiscal year
Future Years Defense Program
Government Accountability Office
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
Grant Programs Directorate
General Population Limits
HazMat
HAZWOPER
HCC
HIPAA
HSEEP
HVAC
IA
ICS
IDLH
IPAWS
IPTs
IRF
IRZ
JIC
JIS
JMC
JPEO-CBD
LCCE
LEPC/SERC
MAC Groups
MACS
MCE
MEGS
MOA
MOU
MSDS
MWG
NCP
NECD
NEPA
NFPA
NIMS
NIOSH
NIPRNET
NOAA
NRC
NRF
O&M
OMB
ORISE
ORNL
Hazardous Materials
hazardous waste operations and emergency response
Hospital Command Center
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
information assurance
Incident Command System
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
Integrated Process Teams
Installation Response Force
Immediate Response Zone
Joint Information Center
Joint Information System
Joint Munitions Command
Joint Program Executive Office Chemical and Biological Defense
life cycle cost estimate
Local Emergency Planning Committee/State Emergency Response
Commission
Multi-Agency Coordination Groups
Multiagency Coordination System
maximum credible event
Medical Evaluation Guides
Memorandums of Agreement
Memorandum of Understanding
Material Safety Data Sheets
Medical Work Group
National Contingency Plan
Newport Chemical Depot
National Environmental Policy Act
National Fire Protection Agency
National Incident Management System
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Response Center
National Response Framework
Operations and Maintenance
Office of Management and Budget
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
C-9
OSC
OSD
OSHA
PAD
PAO
PAR
PAZ
PCD
PETS Act
PIO
PMT
POCs
POE
POM
PPBE
PPD
PPE
QRAs
RAC
RACES
Red Cross
SBA
SCO
SimCell
SIP
SOP
STEL
TAR
TCPs
THD
TIA
TTX
TWA
UC
UFC
USDA
WPL
WPS
XPA
C-10
On-Scene Coordinator
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
protective action decision
Public Affairs Officer
protective action recommendation
Protective Action Zone
Pets Evacuation and Transportation Act
Public Information Officer
Program Management Team
points of contact
Program Office Estimate
Program Objective Memorandum
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Presidential Policy Directive
personal protective equipment
Quantitative Risk Assessments
Risk Assessment Code
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
American Red Cross
Small Business Administration
State Coordinating Officer
Simulation Cell
shelter-in-place
standard operating procedure
Short-Term Exposure Limit
Tone Alert Radio
traffic control points
Technological Hazards Division
Telecommunications Industry Association
tabletop exercises
time-weighted average
Unified Command
Unified Facilities Criteria
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Worker Population Limit
Wireless Priority Service
Extent of Play Agreement
Appendix D:
CSEPP Policy Papers
This document incorporates and replaces the CSEPP policy papers developed prior to 2005, and
represents updates and modifications to approved Army/FEMA policy papers. Table 10 identifies
where the policy papers still in effect in 2005 have been incorporated into this document.
Table 10: Cross-Reference of All Current Policy Papers
Policy
Paper
Number
1
Paper Title
Definition of Maximum Protection
Referenced
at Page # or
in other
Guidance
Document
4
Policy Paper 1 defined the Congressional Maximum

Protection mandate under Public Law 99-145. This is
addressed in the CSEPP phases section of Chapter 1.
Environmental Sampling to Determine Chemical Agent

Contamination
46
Policy Paper 2 established the CSEPP policy on environmental

monitoring and sampling in the event that lethal chemical
agents are released to the environment. This is addressed in
the Authorities and Responsibilities section of Chapter 5.
Not issued
N/A
Roles and Responsibilities of Joint Steering Committee

Subcommittees
N/A
County Public Information Officers for CSEPP
N/A
Not issued
N/A
D-1
Policy
Paper
Number
7
Referenced
at Page # or
in other
Guidance
Document
Paper Title
Interim Policy Regarding Off-Post Meteorological Towers for

CSEPP
93-94
This paper is to establish an interim policy regarding off-post

meteorological towers ("met towers") for the states
participating in CSEPP. The issue is addressed in the
Meteorological Towers section of Chapter 10.
Review of CSEPP Exercise Initiating Events
Public Information in Connection with CSEPP Exercises
N/A
Policy Paper 9 stated that, It is the position of the CSEPP

Public Affairs and Exercise Subcommittee that a proactive
public information program be conducted in connection with
CSEPP Exercises. Public affairs participation in CSEPP
exercises is discussed in the Collaboration and Coordination
section of Chapter 13.
10
Not issued
11
Compensation for Volunteer CSEPP Exercise Participants
121-122
and
CSEPP Public
Affairs
Compendium
and Workbook
N/A
CA Guidance
The description of allowable compensation for exercise

volunteers is being relocated to the table addressing allowable
and unallowable costs in the CSEPP Cooperative Agreement
Guidance.
12
CSEPP Exercises
N/A
13
Elimination of Dual Exercise Types
N/A
14
Designation of Public Affairs as Core Objective
N/A
15
Off-Post Medical Preparedness Capability

Policy issues pertaining to the CSEPP Exercise Program are
addressed in the CSEPP Medical Resource Guide. Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program; Department of
the Army; Department of Homeland Security, May 29, 2012.
CSEPP
Medical
Resource
Guide,
CA Guidance
16
CSEPP Modified Exercise Schedule
N/A
17
Protocols for Communication with Army SBCCOM CSEPP

Technical Support Staff
15
Policy Paper 17 established protocols for the Army to provide

information support to the offsite community. This is addressed
in the Technical Support from U.S. Army Chemical Materials
Activity section of Chapter 1.
D-2
Policy
Paper
Number
18
Paper Title
CSEPP National Benchmarks
Referenced
at Page # or
in other
Guidance
Document
16-17
The CSEPP National Benchmarks established through this

policy paper are described, briefly, in the Strategic Plan and
Benchmarks section of Chapter 1. They are discussed in
greater detail in the Army/FEMA Strategic Plan.
19
Community Profile
Blue Book
Policy issues pertaining to the CSEPP Exercise Program are

addressed in the Exercise Policy and Guidance for the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. U.S.
Department of the Army and DHS/FEMA. December 2012.
20
Adoption of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)
25-26
This Policy Paper stated that, effective November 2001,

CSEPP adopted the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
(AEGLs) for chemical warfare agents as published in the
Federal Register. This is addressed in the Acute Exposure
Guideline Levels section of Chapter 2.
HQDA CSEPP Termination Policy

Joint Memorandum on Integrated Process Teams
N/A
13-14
Use of Integrated Process teams as a vehicle for Army/FEMA

collaborative decision-making is discussed in the Army/FEMA
Coordination and Integrated Process Teams section of
Chapter 1.
D-3
D-4

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

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Chemical Stockpile Emergency

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Department of the Army

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

Chapter 2: Technical Background

Chapter 5: Coordinated Plans

Authorities and Responsibilities

Chapter 6: Medical Preparedness

Chapter 10: Automated Data Processing

Chapter 11: Alert and Notification

Chapter 12: Emergency Operations Centers

Chapter 13: Public Outreach and Education

Chapter 14: Protective Action

Appendix A: Blue Grass Risk Snapshot

Appendix B: Pueblo Risk Snapshot

Appendix C: Glossary of Terminology and Acronyms

Appendix D: CSEPP Policy Papers

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

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CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Preface to this Document

Annual CSEPP Cooperative Agreement Guidance

CSEPP Medical Resource Guide

CSEPP Public Affairs Compendium Workbook

This document will be reviewed every two years.

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Preface to this Document

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CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Program Formalization (early 1990s to 2000)

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

U.S. Army JPEO-CBD

U.S. Army HQ level

Providing support and oversight of chemical emergency preparedness at the chemical

U.S. Army Installation Level

Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facilities

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

FEMAs CSEPP mission includes:

Developing and implementing appropriate training for off-post responders.

Co-directing and evaluating CSEPP exercises on the off-post side.

Jointly developing a readiness posture at the stockpile storage installations

Assuring the continuance and success of a collaborative approach to

Assuring the integration and compatibility of on-post and off-post emergency

Assessing and improving the effectiveness of Federal, State, and local

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Providing reciprocal technical support for joint initiatives, as well as

Collaborating in the preparation of Army and FEMA CSEPP budgets to be

Using site-specific risk analyses in conjunction with defining readiness and

State and Local Governments

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Table 1: CSEPP State and Local Jurisdictions

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Alert and Notification

Emergency Operations Center

Public Outreach and Education

Collaboration and Coordination

CSEPP PROGRAM GUIDANCE

Community IPTs for the Blue Grass/Kentucky and Pueblo/Colorado sites;

Functional/Working IPTs and workgroups as necessary; and

A Program Management Team (PMT)

Integrated Process Teams (IPTs)