CONFLICTS 01.30.

16
1.

Personal Relations
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for
such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in
the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the
separate properties. (111a)

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property
of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good
faith. (117a)
1.

Property Relations

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad

Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of
absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall
govern. (119a)

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136. (121)
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is
recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties. (122a)

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations
of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration
of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the
Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting
property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic
validity. (124a)

*** CASE: COLLECTOR VS FISHER

2.

Dissolution of Marriage
a.

Annulment

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party,
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious
and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the
time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism

existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party
has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge
of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a
lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from
the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a
written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of
the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for
appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article
44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of
the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and
void.chan robles virtual law library
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate.
b.

Absolute Divorce

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)

***CASES 2-13
3.

Legal Separation

TITLE II
LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act
complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act
constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause. (102)

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is
highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either
of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership

property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as
those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49
shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common
children. (105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds
shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the
provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the
donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation
of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in
the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered
in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property
shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance
beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the
time the decree of legal separation become final. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly
signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following
consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; and

(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and
any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the
spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil
registries. (108a)

Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding
Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the
same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named
therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of
creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not
listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the
creditor's
claim. (195a,
108a)

4.

Capacity to Remarry

5.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
(5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

6.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

CASES

Collector vs. Fisher

Facts:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the
deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in
the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on
January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February
22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and
established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San
Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California
on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the
following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the
Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted
to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the
properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of
Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the
waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares
of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in
the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two
parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value. After allowing the
deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of
P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector
assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax,
or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate.
The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in
pursuance of his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for
the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses,
Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return. This
return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22,
1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit:
(1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as
provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the
ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption
from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in
the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate claimed

that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax
and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector
denied the claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said
amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax
Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision :
that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property
as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted
from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the
National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the
estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of
section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax
Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of
the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the
spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be
entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.

petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg - Blankenese and granting the custody of
the children to the father.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support
and custody of the children can be determined in our courts?
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing
party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the
German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court
held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the
parental custody.

Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our jurisdiction?

3. Recto v. Harden
100 Phil 427

Ruling:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of
proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these
laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that
case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California
who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the
part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents'
witness.

Facts:

2. ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ

Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void, mainly, upon the grounds
that:

Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional services wherein the latter
engaged the services of the former as her counsel against her husband for a claim in their
conjugal property. Mr. Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. The Court awarded
Mrs. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis expensae.
Subsequently however, Mrs. Harden ordered her counsel to vacate all orders and
judgments rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal
partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden. Later, she entered into an amicable
settlement with Mr. Harden agreeing to a share of a lesser amount.
Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden alleged that the purpose of the said instruments,
executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for
which reason, he prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees.

Facts:

1.

Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in

Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Private respondent filed a

2.

that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husbands
consent; c
that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent
fees; c

3.
4.

that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce,
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.

S. 475), and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show,
to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the
differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or
defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs.
Harden.

Held:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek
to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound
herself or assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of
her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee
any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is
simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already
been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly
sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila
Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics
by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for
contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is
only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that
such a claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd
ed., p. 276.)
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or
by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate
or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file
in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly
citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed
pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at
the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the
contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the personal law of the party, is
given universal recognition. Therefore, aliens can sue and be sued in our courts
subject to Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their status and
capacity. However, the law to be applied by Philippine courts in determining their
capacity and status is their personal law.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks
equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C.J.

4. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355

Facts:

Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. 24, 1948 in Cebu City. As of June
1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. Vicenta left for the US and filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the Pastor in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."

A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. Later on, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30,
1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta and her
parents in the CFI-Cebu.

HELD:

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine laws under Art. 15 of the New
Civil Code. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce but only provides for legal separation.

For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino

citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially
in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, of the New Civil Code which reads: Prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their
object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Moreover, recognition would give rise
to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those
members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Philippines.

Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
5.

SIKAT V. CANSON
67 PHIL 207

Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage and lived together as husband and
wife until 1911 when they separated.
During the same year the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her spouses, but
the case was dismissed without the court passing upon the merits thereof.
At the time of their marriage in 1904, John Canson was an Italian citizen but on February
27, 1922, he became a naturalized Filipino citizen.
In 1929, he went to Reno, Nevada, United States of America, and on October 8, of that
year, he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of desertion.
Hilaria, in 1933, filed another action, civil case No. 5398 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, wherein she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly pension of P500
as alimony or support.
Canson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery on the part of the plaintiff: (2) absolute
divorce obtained by the defendant as decreed by the court in Reno, Nevada, United
States of America; and (3) that the defendant did not have the means to pay the
allowance sought. The lower court dismissed the complaint and declined to accord
validity to the divorce obtained in Reno but found that Hilaria Sikat had forfeited her right
to support because she had committed adultery.
This judgment was not appealed and it became final.
On June 1, 1934, the present action was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant to obtain the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The action is predicated on the existence of a final
decree of absolute divorce rendered by the court of Reno, Nevada, since 1929.

Held:

It is not, however, the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers
jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil. 851). And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the
State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this did not confer
jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction
nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still
domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person. (Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil. 26, and Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) This
was not a proceeding in rem to justify a court in entering a decree as to the res or
marriage relation entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
Plaintiff-appellant had made her choice of two inconsistent remedies afforded her by law:
(1) to impugn the divorce and file an action for support, or (2) uphold the validity of
the divorce and sue for a liquidation of conjugal partnership. She chose the first

remedy when she filed her action for support. She lost the case and should take the
consequences.
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for
under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the
ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws.
That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court to decide.
(Barretto Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez, supra.)
The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies restricts the
judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative
policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and
has been upheld by this court;
6.

ARCA V. JAVIER
95 PHIL 579

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give
a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them
attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court
attributing five errors to the court below. The facts are not disputed.

Javier and Arca got married in Manila. Javier, an enlisted US Navy personnel left for the
States 7 years after the birth of their first born. At such time, Arca lived with Javiers
parents. However, due to strained relations with the latter, she left and transferred to her
hometown. Thereafter, Javier filed a case for divorce in Alabama against Arca alleging
abandonment. Arca made her reply claiming among other things that she never
abandoned her husband and that their separation was due to a physical impossibility
which justifies her separation if the husband moves to ultra-marine colonies. The divorce
however was granted.
Javier got married the 2nd time but was subsequently divorced. After a few years, he went
back to the Philippines, and believing that the first two divorces were valid, remarried the
3rd time.

Issue:
Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction of both spouses and effectively
rendered a judgment in rem when it granted divorce to Javier?
Held:

No, one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be
acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted
(Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).

While it is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the
Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action
cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only
purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence
at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to
her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a special
appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over
the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to
determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143)
The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the
court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence
in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of
obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil.,
855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not
binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of
Manila;
7.

Ramirez v. Gmur
42 Phil 855

Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff. Whereas Ana Ramirez
was the latter's widow to which they had no children. Leona was married to Kauffman. They
had 3 children, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto. Later, Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland
to recuperate her health. A few years later, she fell for a Dr. Mory to whom she had a child,
Leontina. She informed Kauffman that she no longer wished to stay with him to which the
latter obtained a divorce in France where Leona was in default. Leona, after the divorce got
married in London, and after which bore two children from which the last childbirth caused
Leona her life. The heirs of Leona from the first marriage and the second now claims the
Estate of Samuel to which Ana Ramirez opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural
child.
Held:
The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff is fully and
satisfactorily shown.

With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children, it is enough to say that they
are legitimate children, born to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore
entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she
had survived the testator.
The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by
the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of
the Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the
dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by person domiciled here, such marriage
being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the defendant in default, for failure
to answer, and there is nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire, a
permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the
spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other.
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere.
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in
the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse
leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a
divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the courts of that State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is
one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile.

8.

MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO

FACTS:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On
November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada
dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March
26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to
the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila.
On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on
Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.

Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by
the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her
marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.
Trinidad questioned the levy on the property since the property in question was her
paraphernal property.

Held:

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 13, NCC, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are
valid according to their national law.

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondents from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Court said that Ours is not only a court of law but also a court of equity. The Court
could not turn its back on its citizen when the foreign national itself benefited from such
divorce decree;

Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband who is entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets.

To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal properties. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal?
RULING:
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is
not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the
matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved,
although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent
marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular
properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be
deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of
respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to
Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void
marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the
subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties,
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
9.

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

139 SCRA 139

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a US citizen; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972; after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2 children; Alicia
filed for divorce in Nevada; the parties were divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and
petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property.

10. PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

174 SCRA 653
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their

marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show that under German
law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chua as early
as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".

Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already been a finality of a
divorce decree.
Held:

The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground
for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is

concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

11. LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines.
Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where
through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered
that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as
illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California
in which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25
years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will
be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia
his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter
and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of
whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not national law shall apply?

RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its
own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no
other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)

Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula.
Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article
15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in
their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that
governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after
he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law.
12. GARCIA V. RECIO
October 2, 2001

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in Malabon Rizal.

However, on 1989, they got divorced in an Australian family court.
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married Petitioner in 1994 in
Cabanatuan City.
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce decree in Australia.
Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved based on the subsequent divorce decree
obtained by the respondent.

Issues:
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven;
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner;
Held:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles; Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522
and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at bar,
Respondent only presented the divorce decree;
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal
of a foreign country.
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected to by the petitioner, thus by
virtue of such waiver, is deemed admitted as evidence.
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof lies with "the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." It is a well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence
to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further determination of legal capacity and
to receive evidence to determine if bigamy has been committed;

2nd Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?

13. G.R.
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although
an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry
on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

No.

193902:

June

01,

2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
NACHURA,

J.:

FACTS:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the
two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the
RTC,
Quezon
City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which
issued
a
Decree
of
Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in
her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum),
her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in
Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage,
Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before
Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with
progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum

turned sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement
which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining
visitorial
rights
thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases
against Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for
bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to
hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was
filed
against
Zamoranos
before
the
RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC,
rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De
Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital
relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known
as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences,

and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her
marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the
truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both
lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a
second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At
the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should haveuspendedtheproceedings
until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage
before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and
effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State
shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation
of
its
policies."

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum was bigamous.

HELD:
CIVIL

NO.
LAW:

Bigamous

marriages,

Muslim

Divorce

Law

First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the

conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that
his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of
which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it
was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy,
should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De
Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further
declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage
ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are
officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have
jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the
effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial
bond,
entitling
one
to
remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as
confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested
to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos
for
the
crime
of
Bigamy.
GRANTED.
14. GARCIA VS RECIO
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,
1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the
Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen.
Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994.

Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly
dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and
Recio dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso factocapacitated him to
remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the
records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen
was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare
her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The
SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
Code.

15. REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live in San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the

petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of
its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and

2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
3.

Legal Separation

Civil Code:
Art. 97.

A petition for legal separation may be filed:

Art. 99.
1.

For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part
of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or

2.

An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n)

No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in

the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the
cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this
Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)