Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the
petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long
as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the
obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law.
ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the
case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the
titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society
which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent

thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it
out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with
the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules
of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482),
recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation;
and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and
subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246,
253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the
question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its
power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based,
either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the
military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the
occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed
to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended
without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the
second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the
sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of
the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over
them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides
in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the
absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to
his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or
sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country,
in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to
the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its
laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen
who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the

citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand,
lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the
protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military
forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands
of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in
abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon,
supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the
occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage;
inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as
those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are
also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be
committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the
offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by
him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not
responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article
114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in
force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public
order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all
the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action,
that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the
protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United
States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military
occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the
territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict
with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in
force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from
him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of
the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,
essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate
government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and
because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of
the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die
if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders
to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight
against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation,
and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be
a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other
words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines
defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a
crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of
the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to
section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . .
shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in
so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government,
though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act
and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by
the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the

Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains
the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the
United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said,
among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the
Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in
fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol.
29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137
U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political
question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which
provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one
of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United
States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in
the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty
although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that
just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty
of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against
the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence,
the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny
the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for
others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if
any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice
Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While
there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable
acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and
self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the
emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm
attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would
be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who
have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be
the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is
advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law,
during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience
to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of
which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United States vs.
Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty
binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and
fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of
protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the
protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may
be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent
allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act,
he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and
an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous
during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed.,
426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to
the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both
expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born
within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their
birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this
reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the
subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection
the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of
rights which they acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be
forfeited but by their own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more
circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an
alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally
permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes
his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign
influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but
citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from
the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government
of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent
ed., 226-227.)
Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen
or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding
on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to
the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the
protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that
duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations
between the government and the citizen.
Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that
which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some
circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local
allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a
time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet,
for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon
attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he
receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to
his state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the
political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons
owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The

persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which
the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally
supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in
Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in
character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the
part of the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal
obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)
Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the
protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the
sovereign, correlative with the protection received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from
liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e.,
absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign,
until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country
owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs.
United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p.
179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of
the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.)
The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that
sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves.
Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are
the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the
powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors,
by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one
of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the
government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although
democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies in the people,
nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the
fundamental law of our people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there
may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy
occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our
government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our
Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic
philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy
occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended
life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very
essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of
"suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy
occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to
her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from
exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the
benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she
freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the
assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home,
may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is
unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752,
ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent
of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by
the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts
did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our
constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been
recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt
approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American
people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that
Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been
sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the
same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it may be added in the drafting
and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future
democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to
the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all
who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in
Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the

Election Code to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong
reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by
tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the
Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any
valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the
Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he
claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia,
and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades
should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's
theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws
punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of
Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of
war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the
allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The
framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when
the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the
survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who
may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the
indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that
the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect
the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is
untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If
that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the
result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized
society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of
course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that
government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of
allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if
the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to
choose the most effective measures of personal protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the
puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75,
Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot
consistently accept petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we
cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino
people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the
only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to
the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we
accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition
has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms,
loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect,
veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the
feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we
owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation,
chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of
political, social and ethical ideologies between our people and the Japanese, making impossible
the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the
Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of
haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their
dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be
further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary
to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human
relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as
human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an
allegiance based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be legally
recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry
and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even a temporary one from a decent
people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case
of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will
notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the
covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion,
weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind
the paladium of the invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory
since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act,
creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security
"committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and
executive departments have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including
the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including

article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should
be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time
the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to
expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner,
could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical
fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and
unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and
that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to
help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally
accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's
admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak
nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the
premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty
are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our
laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is
no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws,
especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution
of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring
his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government,
even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the
idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in
the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under
constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the
Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came
into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that
all our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the
extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the
existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in
order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we
provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress
of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not
meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy.
Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling
effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment
for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be
dismissed without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted
upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality
classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience
revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future
generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be
deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free from all
blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called
Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila
and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the
Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to
the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was
no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundredfold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be
known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their respective
citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war.
During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no
realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to
that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the
nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy,
or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons
accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed
for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and
the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve
the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the
air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their
properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than
61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly
subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of
the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of
"Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no

continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international
law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change
circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to
time in adopting settled principles to new situations.
xxx

xxx

xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to
the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis
came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the
institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was
no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act
on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of
the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and
Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world,
renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the
settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies.
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States
Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war
between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This
means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to
be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the
duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that
very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal
profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has
brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that
unjustifiable war is a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of
1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of
forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an
International crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the
representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of
aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of
1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that
"war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."

xxx

xxx

xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged
in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace.
("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the United States Office of War
Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind
no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a
distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of defense and the war of aggression"
to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice
Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century
generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of
the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a
reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony
with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as
other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the
8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted
a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human
species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and
later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly
unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its
attack against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein
in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those
periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson,
and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war
which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the
first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an
instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other
nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the
then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With the
modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide
by all its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military
occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and

renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and principles of international law
therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically abrogated and
rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the
pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such
a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign
territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive
law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation.
Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its
territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only this
sense should we speak here with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a
burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right
within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize
in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any
legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the
course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the
most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the
appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize
any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a
member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials.
Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the
international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave
no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in
considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six
years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national
policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the
Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to
apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and
principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in
the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that
occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international commission
in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and
peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and
parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the
suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan
occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a
justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of
the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which
the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of
their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the
individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his
allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious
convictions, personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants
to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed.,
pp. 1898-1899.)
. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since
the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary
allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the
occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful
sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful
sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages
of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the
occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand,
he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' . . . willingly
to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the
occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to
compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same
rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according
to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that
obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the
one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred
ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress,
and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be
something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring.
The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the
irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the
invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the
enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people
should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and
loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because
when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled
from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and
loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no
criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before
and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the
Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of
independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article
XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known
as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to
independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter only the name of that
government was to be changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines
were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The
People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in
prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of
the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the
Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the
Constitution which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" of course,
meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines after,
independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the
people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people they are
the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues
to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording
of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon
the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the
Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is
that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence that they
became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a
minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility
for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully
politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party
continues to be the same only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law

adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly,
we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting
political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule
"that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in
abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of
the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will
naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety
of his command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land
Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the
crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our
political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and
practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the
exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or
wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely
different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its
Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military
operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely
disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over
the district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of
February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in
the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until
further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the
Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that
"all laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and
excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present
situation of the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political
purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The
latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the
necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the
powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to
declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the
over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving
statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even
before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action
undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to
himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area

concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various
forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of
normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition,
1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the
displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from
the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the
maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature
as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against
their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the
surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant
and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the
belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since
occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of
war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or
conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised,
1944,p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an
occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize
our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never
submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of
those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright
illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being
simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective
constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to
continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and,
on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out
of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant,
incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of
Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or
extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that
what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's
authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the
military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and
superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot,
even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and

that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing
the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in
question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with
illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the
belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within
the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not
compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere
manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality
of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign,
through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has
ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the
individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second
Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the
inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for
the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against
which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be
prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out
of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the
meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of
our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that
Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military
occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its
revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of
postliminium, because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words
employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the
foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated
completely.
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government,
because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal
provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue
of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto
law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the
Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the

aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was
good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position.
As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human authority on that
subject and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of
Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of
which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of
Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the
mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed
to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812,
between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British
forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and
that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had
been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war
the place by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the
United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there while in
possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have
been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there,
although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and
the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States
(the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this
illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner.
Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in
delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during
its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods
imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be
sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended,
and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory
upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the
inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by
such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no
other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as
respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the
inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such
goods were in no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say,
that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the
United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they
say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon
principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the
conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be
decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this
case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents occupation,
is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain
as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity,

the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering
the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is
even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the
purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory,
and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct
sense done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United
States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty
itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations
in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when
it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in
abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or
otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and
submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect
violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the
belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within
the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot
compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said
to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the
United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even
require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land
Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law
that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not operate to
annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no
longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it,
and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and
obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to
argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation.
Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be
likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is
most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with
his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of
international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the protections
received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the
inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that
States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own
nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that States should
provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish
substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend
to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it

grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate
opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and
judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been
contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose
of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way
for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code,
citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be
"delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable
the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government,
without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the
suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article
52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population
"in the obligation of taking part military operations against their own country." Neither does the
suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and
becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any
imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such world agency
as the United Nations organizations.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators,
an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say
savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the
Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could
have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or
otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our and the American regular
fighting forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that
the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military
unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a
possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of
the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get
food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was
because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and
towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits
of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought
is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During
belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between
the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them.
At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the

inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the
occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel
fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining
ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of
conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a
convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised
Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a
few months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of
the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines
whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on
patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The
law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the
merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol.
III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of
traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen.
Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions
can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to
the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and
died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly
motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The
Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason
statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and
American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who
might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary
consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected
themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or
punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as
war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other
common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal
law, and under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for
they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell
opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous
fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or
American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a
desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and
informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or
political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal,
committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal
sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that
the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in
complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied
force and pressure and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine

Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was
necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated
herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there
were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let
their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took
advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for
the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the
Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after
the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now
existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and
effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who
was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United
States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to
take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the
inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to
the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague
Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all
the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath
of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a
doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection
of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and
protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is
prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the
Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only strong
reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much
freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and
humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during
the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against
the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why
courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a
matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are
determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no
respect for courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just

desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about
punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking
the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea
of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its
forms." These passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page
34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the
Japanese military occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant words
of President Roxas errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not
as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an
affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by
feeling and conscience to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military
occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed
against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none
other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of
sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason,
rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as
contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides
that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government
or the Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence
of the Philippines, was subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution under which, in addition to its many provisions essentially destructive of the
concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over
the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to make said
declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent
Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the
Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of
independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent
country under the Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the
Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed
was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.
The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the
exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs
which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can
be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be
formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not
subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of
sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of
certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a
sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the

governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming

quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is
exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for the
expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State,
and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to
itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus,
States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its
exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is
recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a
grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother
countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully
discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the
cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their
powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a
State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application,
yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create
of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent
States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration
demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to
particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp.
74, 75.).
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of
the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the
United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States
have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and
exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and
that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is
no longer contested.
It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that
such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will
or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of
the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature,
or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution,
the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)
This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the nonsovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic
of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of
the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the
Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty
delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the
Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States.
Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth
Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not
treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was
inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the
Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered,
modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect
that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force,
thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines
to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can
remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact
remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution,
in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the
government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere
instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the
citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To
contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the
United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to
sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held
in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a
sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in
the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301
U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United
States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be
interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother
country, the United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943,
that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a
formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie
Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the

proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing
Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmea who was
with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the
Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government,
extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial
because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against
the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-856

April 18, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on
counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous
decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited,
apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the
purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and
sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput,
Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos
and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it
sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that
on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was
wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet
Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown;
that the accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his
Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his
wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G"
string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force

succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she
was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape
and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel
Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some
Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their
home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by
the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might
select those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means
of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought to the
headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where
Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2
were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not
necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of the allegations in court
No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully
substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the
accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese
Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano
Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and
his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog,
testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and
intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force
against the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she
was delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia
Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to
her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the
accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car
where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda
out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay);
that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her
face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on
arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor
exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls
talked bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said

Governor Hontaosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to
one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was
taken to another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that
Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered
Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee
taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a
certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused
brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the
Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said
Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the
accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her will; that two days, later,
upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought
the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the
darkness, by mean of threat and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on
the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before
Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by
the accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was
conducted into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out
with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was
raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of
said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and
intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her (the
witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back
to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited
house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That
on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters
to be witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that understanding, started for
Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found
them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and
told her that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter

Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused also
raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two
daughter to return home on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in
the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter
returned to her house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both
daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than to have gone to
Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the
res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of
the information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court, there could be no
doubt that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls
would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The
Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been
proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of
the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the
Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers,
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the
Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942,
against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap
officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit best their
fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the
residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on
June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a
revolver and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were
severely reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and receptions
was to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez
whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving
the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be
sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and
pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that
she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora
Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here.

In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended
that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits
the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has
always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of
rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the
annual report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's
company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling
them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without
doubt produces the same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar
manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as
treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts
between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon
their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance
is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly
in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give
money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal
necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against
the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government
of the giver. That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any
more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had
surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power
of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to
strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other
side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in
their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a

vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered
from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia
Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the
offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the
accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by
the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph
17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The
provision in requires that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted
must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the
defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent
of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no element of
surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for
crime different from that designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced,
provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and
afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are
not charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on
count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which
he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to
an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of
P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall
not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399

January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not
guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to
counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with
reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The
defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death
and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single
detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other
Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry
the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind
the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was
taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier.
Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the
American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see
Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off.
Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged

in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances.
The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In
his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with
homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
locating their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham
Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno
was taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he
was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from
there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7
days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military
Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide
and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact
apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and
his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind
their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of the body and
thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was
released the following day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more
was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy
undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio
Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian
Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for
6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2
kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;

7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other
Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing
of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason
law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was
patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One
without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude
the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute
the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is
where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be
regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase
the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since
they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it
is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be
substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial
court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation
of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved
for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and
regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was
not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the

procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the
contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court
to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the
present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to
overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily
imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact,
the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was
not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former
counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a
sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not
cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in
counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly.
In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 28, 1947
G.R. No. L-322
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the
high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the
decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong
Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a
number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the
diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A,
C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed
with rifles and bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January
29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included men, women
and children mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.)
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women the prosecution star
witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ).
Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14,
48, 70, 71, 103, t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small
children, thus killing, among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda,
Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan,
Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.)

Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he
bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez,
respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for
mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them
because they were wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.)
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if
he had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he
proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew
nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing
that the children would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided
to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.)
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses Clarita
Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a
complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
testifying against appellant such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed,
appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the
People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the
People's Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the following to say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple barrio
girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge
or by any desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in their
testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could not
have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they know him so well that
they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro, the painter. They could not
have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of January 29, 1945, in
Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the
burning of the houses and the massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese masters took
place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting moment but during a time
sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event
they could not help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and
convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there
is ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the
massacred residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.).
And appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements one
made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d
MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before
Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.)

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of
the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine
citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold
either contention. We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to
render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of
said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine
citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support
paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
xxxxxxxxx
(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or
Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed
an oath before he was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help
Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that
the oath was in fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot
uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help
Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed
"Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not
need to swear to support the Chinese constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight
Japan. During the first World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines,
pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In
order to carry out that mission although the war ended before this could be done they
surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws of the United States or any
of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems
self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military,
naval, or air service" of Japan.

Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or
Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2,
of said constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis
supplied.)
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a
period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free
to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without
reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare)
that the duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept
could be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the simple expedient of
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and
an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of
such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very
fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and
thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime
would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment
of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never
prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor
render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of
the criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up
arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not
strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian
Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper
to separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of

armed men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise
are of the same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code providing that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the
employment of more than three armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So
that in appreciating the existence of a band the employment of more than three armed men is
automatically included, there being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant
acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal
liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan
as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised
Penal Code compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than
obedience to an illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its
potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters
under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under
the impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less
repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose
of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if the alleged
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely
and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well
remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was
on that occasion even bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters so fate
willed it were the very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who
were destined to become the star witnesses against him on the day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the
crime of treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating
circumstance, that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance
considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed
from, imposing the death penalty, convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000,
an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the
lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the
imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions we modify the
judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and
appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of article 41
of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each
of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result because I am convinced that the appellant is guilty of multiple murder and
he even deserves the maximum penalty.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main facts in this case upon which the prosecution relies are based on the testimonies of
three witnesses, two ten-year-old girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, and Policarpio Tigas.
From the testimony of Maria Paulino we quote:
Q. You said that you are ten years old, do you know what is the meaning of telling a lie? A. I
do not know.
Q. Do you know the difference between falsity and truth? A. I do not know.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Do you know how to read? What, Sir?
Q. How to read. A. No, Sir.
Q. Do you know how to pray? A. I forgot how to pray."(Pages 44 and 45, t.s.n.)
From the testimony of Clarita Perez, we quote:
Q. Please state your name and your personal circumstances. A. Clarita Perez, 10 years of age,
and resident of the Sitio of Banaban.
Q. What town? A. I do not know.
JUDGE NEPOMUCENO:
Q. Is Banaban a sitio in the town of Malolos, or Quigua, or Bigaa? A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You do not know? A. I do not know, sir.
JUDGE ABAD SANTOS:
Q. What province? A. I do not know, sir. (Page 4, t.s.n.)

Witness Policarpio Tigas, municipal policeman, testified that about sixty persons, including his
sister Eufemia, were killed in Banaban, but he was not killed "because I was with my guerrilla
outfit then." He saw the killing "because on the 29th day of January, I came down from the
mountains and went to the barrio to see my family to take them away from the place, but upon
arriving there I saw that the people were being gathered and placed behind the chapel. After
placing the people behind the chapel I saw the massacre of the group begun. In my interest to
ascertain the fate of my sister and so that I would not be seen, I crept to a creek and stayed there
to find out what would be the end of it all. While I was thus hiding in that creek I saw my sister
killed by Pedro Manayao, the painter. After that, convinced of the fate of my sister and knowing
the one who killed her was Pedro Manayao, and because I was afraid that if I stayed there longer
I might be caught by the people and knowing that if I would be caught I would also be killed, I
left the place." (Page 102, t.s.n.) He was fifty meters away from the place of the massacre. "The
dead bodies were burned. I left to go to the mountains. I first put my mother in a safe place, and
after that I joined my companions and together we returned to the town." Eufemia "was buried
by my father" on the "second day after the killing". (P. 103, t.s.n.)
The above are the facts testified in the direct testimony of the witness. That he should come from
the mountains and arrive at the place at the very instant when the massacre was about to be
executed; that he should have remained hidden in a creek, fifty meters away, to find out the final
fate of his sister; that, instead of remaining to witness the gory scene, he did not depart to call his
co-guerrilleros who, according to him, were well armed, in order to attack the mass killers and
try to save those who were gathered to be killed; that he left precisely after he saw his sister
decapitated, notwithstanding which he testified that the corpses were burned but that the body of
his sister was buried by his father the day after the killing, these, besides other details, are
things that lead us to doubt the veracity of the testimony of this witness, thus leaving to be
considered only the testimonies of the two girls.
Although we are inclined to believe that the appellant must have been seen by the two girls at the
place of the massacre in the company of the Japanese, we cannot reconcile ourselves in believing
all the details as narrated by them, so as to justify the inflicting of the supreme penalty upon
appellant. Although we are constrained to believe in the substantial truthfulness of the two grills,
considering their tender age which makes them highly susceptible to suggestions, and the
additional significant fact that Maria Paulino does not know "the meaning of telling a lie" nor
"the difference between falsity and truth," and history and experience have time and again shown
that human fallibility is more pronounced in children of tender age, we vote for the modification
of the appealed decision in the sense that appellant be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
June 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-477
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by
the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island
of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and
there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the said
enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and
aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and
operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined
and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and
engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine
Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and
in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to
Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except
that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is
that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of

personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy.
But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and
other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the
accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with
other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in
Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison
and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with
the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of
treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in
raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to
acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was
a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it
cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two
witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or
just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will,
membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes
for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish
the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the
Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate
Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies."
Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent
and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act
itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary,
except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or
committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its
very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It
furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage
was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind

who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from
that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance
from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the
two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it.
We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of
authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same
overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to
another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the
same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The
opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and
exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different
acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and
Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now
the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the
same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal
Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to
sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act,
movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by
the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court.
To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of

sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason
law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This
provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where
two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or
jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral
conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with
which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive,
flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing
as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness
to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a
literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American
government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the
objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of
the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed
against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's
Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered
the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon
which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be
considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence
is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was
warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to
render proof extremely difficult as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The
provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated
of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be
understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity
as the American forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the two-witness
rule herein, I am constrained to dissent.
As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of the
Philippines referred to in the information, was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt act of
the present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders. That membership
was one and the same from the moment he entered the organization till he was captured. The fact
that he was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a member of the Makapili,
and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a member of the same
organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was different or independent
from his membership on the other day it was the selfsame membership all the way through. A
contrary construction would entail the consequence that the instant defendant, if we are to
believe the allegations and proofs of the prosecution, became or was a member of the Makapili
as many times as there were days from the first to the last.
T.E. Holland defined "acts" in jurisprudence as follows:
Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An "act" may therefore be defined . . . as "a
determination of will, producing an effect in the sensible world". The effect may be negative, in
which case the act is properly described as a "forbearance". The essential elements of such an act
are there, viz., an exercise of the will, an accompanying state of consciousness, a manifestation of
the will. (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., unabridged, p. 25.)
There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an overt act of the
accused. And the fact that no two witnesses saw him being such a member on any single day or
on the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble opinion, work against the singleness of the act,
nor does the fact that no two witnesses have testified to that same overt act being done on the
same day or occasion argue against holding the two-witness rule having been complied with.
My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two witnesses have
testified thereto notwithstanding the fact that one saw it on one day and the other on another day.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the
record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all
touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves
all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods
too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two
young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation,
were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of
the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the
two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the
crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the
grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance,
nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense,
under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial
judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and

sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine
sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and
to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again
done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are
in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time
is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred
and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code,
when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the
effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for
the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to
remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered
to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See
also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were
meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of
the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the
civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar
in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must
necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the
Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the
necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United
States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S.
Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were
content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to
give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no
longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153
and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article
154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an
offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving

themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present
the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that
the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken
into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it
becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women),
but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as
to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced
therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first
instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties
in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ,
accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused- appellant.

G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez,
Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:

That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of Muligin
Island and within the territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi,
Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the abovenamed accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario
Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
alias Peter Power being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3)
daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and
there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the
consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona) properties
belonging to the crew members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767,
consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of passengers
and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the
vessel's compass, navigational charts and instruments amounting to Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned
owners in the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that by
reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the
abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry away the properties abovementioned,
the herein accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior strength,
use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America,
Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi
Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag,
Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao,
Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan,
Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam,
Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim
Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them multiple
gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death and likewise causing
physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H.
Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could
have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident

premeditation, night time and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L61069)

Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted
by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and
sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."

Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However,
he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he
was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of
death."

Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.

After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme
penalty of death."

No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four
defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of contract and
damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several
defendants, including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)

The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.

Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel
M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo
wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the
following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of
the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders
and crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the
vessel.

Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.

Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard
shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on his way through the
engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario
Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's companions
after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel. He
was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew
members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of
Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time, appellant
Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.

Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch,
followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He saw
appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down
the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit,
their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized that he was also
hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till
daytime.

Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the
cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be opened. After
awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid
behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him.
Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in the
bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and
Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to
come out otherwise something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who
ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies
overboard.

About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island
where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to
load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico
Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario
Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian,
boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.

Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it
arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten
dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran
Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.

In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the
trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime
Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to
the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C"
to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in
holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of
piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a
denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00
which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of
Investigation.

There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime
Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.

Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:

SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage

as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:

a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods

shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy
where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the
lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3)
defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
states that:

b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts

regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended

the commission of the deed.

With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit.
Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian
authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau
of Investigation of Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered
in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the defense, aside
from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of
said declarations, thus:

Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?

A Yes. sir.

Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is
that right?

A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.

Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed that
statement, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?

A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)

Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We
likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his participation in the
commission of the offense was positively testified to by the master of the vessel,
Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness,
passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M14 rifle.

Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw
appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew
members in wanton disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there
can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After
his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his participation
as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").

The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On
January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and
brought them to Manila where they executed their respective statements after Rico
Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively,
aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities
also turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.

The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent
to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under investigation
here in connection with the robbery committed on the M/V Noria last August 31,
1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and to
refuse to answer any of our questions here. You have the right to be represented by
counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be represented by
a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you
decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force
or intimidation or promise of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here
maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?

A: No, sir.

3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you so
understand all your rights as above stated and that you do not need the services of
a lawyer?

A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)

Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.

Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H",
"J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his
participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that
conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant

Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance
showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a
consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part,

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being sufficient direct evidence and
positive Identification by eyewitnesses.

I take exception, however, to the statement therein that accused Peter Ponce "was
fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel." The
monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" have been stricken down by the Court as
utterly unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right
to silence and to counsel in People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my
separate concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of People vs. Itlanas
(G.R. No. 60118, prom. February 28, 1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the
Court's requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538) that "the right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently given.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being sufficient direct evidence and
positive Identification by eyewitnesses.

I take exception, however, to the statement therein that accused Peter Ponce "was
fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel." The
monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" have been stricken down by the Court as
utterly unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right
to silence and to counsel in People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my
separate concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of People vs. Itlanas
(G.R. No. 60118, prom. February 28, 1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the
Court's requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538) that "the right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the

assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is knowingly, voluntarily and

intelligently given.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI,
accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.

In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM,
NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple
murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the
information as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful
authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength,
conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with
intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force
upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns
into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time
from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take,

steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise
and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00,
Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein
above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them
to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which
caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and
wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple
Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the
shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said
victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)

An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and
Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one
of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision
of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under
a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)

In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan
Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July
10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn).
The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the
above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to
Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither
paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was
held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de
Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29,
tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his
companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who
were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province
of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they
brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for
Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and
slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).

The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and
Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went
to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep
in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him,
Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.

On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a
place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p.
47, tsn).

The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied
by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and
Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going
ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the

group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the
group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize
(pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with
Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where
Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way
to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green
about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram
turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the
other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons
on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized
them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at BalukBaluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other
pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way
to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their
money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his
companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants
of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It
was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while
Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he
was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him,
injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he
stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of
Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a
fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received
first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).

On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf,
de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he
took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail
to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)

As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of
witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone
prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that

they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility
to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of
which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not
convincing:

1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the
Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice
it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family
immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after
they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.

2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does
not support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important
consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from
Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving
team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact.
The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso
Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the
attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to have
no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the
report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be
true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by
the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing
can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason
why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such
heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The
point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to
whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement
agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing in the
version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted
consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for
investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de

Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that
Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands
were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants'

claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not
the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among
the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in

this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de
Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were
talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two
accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods
to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were
divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained
unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy
and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57;
People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them
the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo
de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a
manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and
when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material.
P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed
as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by
the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death
stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked
wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with
the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the
appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with
armalites.

WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts
and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary
votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the

appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay

and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Aquino, C.J., took no part.

Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.

Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J., dissenting:

considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was
committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J., dissenting:

considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was
committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU,

petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD,
and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled
petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July
1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following
dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727
(Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered
reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement
that the decision did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere
suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid
ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long
existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among
these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is
elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or
sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people
not the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests
made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests
violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons
arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as
those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas
corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or
not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their
questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the
arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting
from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the
power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases
express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon
which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and
(b) of the said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No.
81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of
Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to

commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance
(sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed
struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or
became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at
the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes
Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had
shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow"
(NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would
have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon
their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base

which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the
arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on
"probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of
the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without
warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and
second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant,
based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched
to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that
the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was
among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as

"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes,
Bian, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an
NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named
hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and
supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first
the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually
killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second
a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually
then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records
of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their
immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential
information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital
management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came
from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in
good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace
officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith,
considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official
duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been illmotivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant,
of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest,
without warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents
of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under
judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August
1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo

Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No.
83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched
pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed
firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore,
caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant,
under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned
here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by
announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to
remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former

NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain
house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by
court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was
then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he
was a ranking member of the CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino

in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he
had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque;
17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents
and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her.
18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without
warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato
Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but
failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived
(on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was
believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search
warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the
agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and

Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests
without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2)
safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their
exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as
residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said
arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of
the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons
to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search
warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second:
found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that
he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed
firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents,
and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former
comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances,
the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons.
The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia
Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of
the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya),
no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to
have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers
involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place
them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the
duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to
prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the
nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is
founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with

the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether
the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can
validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the
interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of
them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph
(b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply
with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for
other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on
the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers,
where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the
National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a
nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu
was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting
officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then,

Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that
he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere
in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes
difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and
academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for reinvestigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the
defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the
case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally
dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December
1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil
Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at
7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's

arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988
that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even
without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen
(14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest
without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest
and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same
trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,
Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for
habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the
corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu
and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual
circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by
the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed
the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this
date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution
requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA
courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the
unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of
their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these
admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly
the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant,
are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty
of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to
the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile
should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb
the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security
and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the
communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested
as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into
and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the
arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of
Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall
forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee
shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end
that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by
the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a

Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest
without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned
arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion,
but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of
Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith
of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show,
the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be
right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990,
are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and

Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an
exhaustive evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am
inclined to agree with the, majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration
except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for
the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of
murder.

In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for
subversion or any 'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy
ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was,
in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to sedition. While not conceding
the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that Espiritu was
merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the
authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."

I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which
sanctions warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the
first place, Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime
charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club in
the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly seditious remark
aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp.
23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short
though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension
may not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which
allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed."

The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was
arrested 14 days after the commission of the crime imputed to him.

Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure
what particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is
that law en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the
However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks,
especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be
tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial
on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting
officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person should be
subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived
his action.

Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be
arrested without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a
single act of urging others to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition.
While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question
of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that
any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental
freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of
balancing interests; those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here
lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is
the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to sedition.
Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been
uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should
consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it

should be underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that
the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive organization as
distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27,
1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed
overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices
trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to
believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves
upon the accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not
be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.

It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to
stringent application. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now
requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in
point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact
been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have 'personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of
just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old
rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985,
139 SCRA 349, 408).

I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting

arrests without warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4,
1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a
subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such subversion
and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be strictly construed. We
categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was
provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect
that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).

Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the
Court laid out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
imform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest,
if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to

counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arressted, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon
the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).

These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the

military and civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as
well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his
intervention to preserve peace in the community.

I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of
crimes with a political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not,
triggered by the difficulty in finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny to
pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually have to make long persistent
surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of government and the
maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith should be reposed on the
officials implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to hold any
offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the
performance of their duties. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to
redress their grievances.

If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government

may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court,
mandated b the Constitution to uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting
existing laws and the spirit behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the
dangerous ground of judicial legislation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition

for order, It is disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead
of liberty in har cases coming before us.

People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society
encourages freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real
progress, the theory that enhancing order through constraints on freedom is
deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values Govenment
pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are
fast liberating themselves.

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on
arrests without warrant, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

xxx xxx xxx

Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case
of doubt, the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.

Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving
Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky
Ocaya are concerned, the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended
while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually
committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their motions for
reconsideration.

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias
Espiritu was arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of
transport workers on the ground that that was inciting to sedition.

This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's

freedom of speech. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned
writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual cases. I doubt if there are more
than a handful of policemen in the whole country who would know the full
dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty
to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the
application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national
security and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of
knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition"
requires the ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall
lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously; (3,)
when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what
constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel
against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply because
what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of
government policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court
on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of expression.
At the very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is
essential in this type of offense.

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their
observations regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the
doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons
on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where
the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is
extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found
roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see
how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel
and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the
majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should
be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards.
Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be
indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the
Government.

The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past
events, that the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may
meet does not validate warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities
preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and
pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his
apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the
warrantless arrest.

In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information
that Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers
only on December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has
in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on
warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into
the past and render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right
against illegal seizures is not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed
guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A government of laws must abide by
its own Constitution.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:

(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84;
and G.R. No. 83162;

(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;

(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and

(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.

CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of

those who were arrested in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to
remain in the custody of the military, or voluntarily permitted the search of the
house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable circumstances the
petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.

But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla
vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other
petitioners on the ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of
rebellion and other allied crimes.

We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was
quoted with approval in the original ponencia:

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against govenment forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. (Emphasis supplied.)

The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when
a recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the
rebels, resulting in the application of the laws of war in the regulation of their
relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of
war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate
government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that the processes of the
local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the
Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the
government.

But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate
govenment must treat the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and
entitled to all the rights provided thereunder, including and especially those
guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these in our country are
whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those guaranteeing due process,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and presuming the
innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the
suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time
remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders or combatants is not

justified in the present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as
violators of our own laws. Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however,
all persons suspected as rebels are by such suspicion alone made subject to

summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in

the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial
warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the
authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related
crimes. International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the
relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter.

As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following
pronouncement which this Court has also adopted as its own:

. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to

commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside front their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)

The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities,
usually by simply placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his
eventual apprehension. Once so placed, he may at any time be arrested without
warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process of committing the
"continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the time is a
perfectly innocent act.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and
innocuous act of undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he
was even then, as he lay supine in his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of
rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court says that the arresting
officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital, which
information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the
determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the
absence of a warrant.

My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify

the issuance of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must
be determined by the judge issuing the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it
is not necessary.

In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for
allegedly seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is
not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same
because the remarks were supposed to continue their effects even to the following
day. The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it come
under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the considerable time
lapse.

It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and
no less than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says
that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable
killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from
the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of the Identification of
the suspect.

Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a
warrant if the latter "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been committed." The
requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which, according to
Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made almost
immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the
arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.

I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I
hope will not be the start of another dangerous doctrine:

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of
their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these
admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly
the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant,
are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court.

I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People
vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that
there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery
that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the
soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that

retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and
seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself."

I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the
illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past
when individual rights were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos
dictatorship. It seems some of us have short memories of that repressive regime,
but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate defender of the
Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of
mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national
security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are
entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other
person in this country. That is what democracy is all about.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the
Motion for Reconsideration.

At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements
made by the majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing
crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants. It seems clear that
these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite unnecessary for
sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily
pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the
original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments in
several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority
Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken
the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as
applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements are
obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to some extent
and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights
explored.

1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against

unreasonable seizures of persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of
individual members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing
of a warrant of arrest, the rendition of which complies with the constitutional
procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests made without a warrant issued by
a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure, are prima facie
unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.

2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that

warrantless arrests are unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in
our day, essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer of the law, or a private
person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously securing a
warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113 follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is
important to recall that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b)
must take those provision for what they are: they are exceptions to a vital
constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to such a norm must
be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional
rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully
constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory
provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what
the language in which they are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provision, rather than the exception. 1 This rule
must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary
statutory provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a
guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits
of their language so to keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms
warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this Court, stressing
that:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties
should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the
individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the
rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel,
231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general
rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be
strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d],
353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis
supplied)

held that:

. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable. 4

In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was

possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of
full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be

committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the
offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting
officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing
of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate,
even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the
breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a)
may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in
the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is
properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical
or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt, recognizably
criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting
officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is being
committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that
purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized in overt physical acts
of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to
exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be
an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or
within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be
ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in
other words, not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an
attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to capture the doer of
the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of
warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless
arrest may be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been
committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must
have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has

committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first requirement imports
that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still
visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person
staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may
not ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense
can not be said to have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of
"personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such
knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the arresting
officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person, no
matter what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the
arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person running
away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal
knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the
doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive
through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested
with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the
requirement that the time interval between the actual commission of the crime and
the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. In the first place, the word
"just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the
second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed"
would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime
must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No.
86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of
the killing with which he was charged along with other persons, cannot by any
standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested
without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the
policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may
be substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the time
Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan
City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be
said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require
it, that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the
scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital.

7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the
arresting officer who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the
crime, is in a sense more exacting than the standard imposed by the Constitution
upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers, ascertains "probable cause"
by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer must himself
have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge
of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present

Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal

knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted
standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers.
The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without a
warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the
person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the
offense he was suspected of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point.
Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be
secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed physically
observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust
committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.

8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of

"continuing crimes," shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the
requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact just been presence of
the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the person to be arrested is
suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion of the
majority Resolution reads:

. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of
his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that
subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is
attained. (Emphasis supplied)

9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as

actually found in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine.
More specifically, that doctrine, in my submission, does not dispence with the
requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in character must take place in
the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed when the
arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing
crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does
not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting
in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do
so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in
relation to two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or
not a particular offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; the second problem is that of determining whether a single crime or multiple
crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is raised.

10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the
ingredients or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
one court and some other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the
territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts
has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the essential elements of a crime
take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very nature of the
offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing," then the
court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has
jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense
is deemed to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the
offense occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal
detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as
repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the defendant was
found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of
the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in
terms of whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused.
Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have been committed by
the accused constituted only one and the same crime, the defense of double
jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later
in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused constituted
discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the
double jeopardy defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in
passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the
overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural
offenses, must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its
own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be
invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of
the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested
without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the

pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed

by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely
increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts
with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding
of a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such
problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of,
a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt constitutive
acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance,
the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any
subversive association:" 13

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any

form whatsoever;

c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues,

assessments, loans or in any other forms;

xxx xxx xxx

f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in

furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;

xxx xxx xxx

h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication

to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes

of such association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against
warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police
agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the
Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather to
protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live
with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which
themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to
destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms
which make our polity worth protecting and saving.

REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:

While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I
reiterate such concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the
rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.

It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14

December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113,
since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know
that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."

I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which,
while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest,
specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it."

It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court
were amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.

Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14
December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December
1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II;
that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information
imparted by one of the suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the
requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have had
personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the
arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge
must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests
being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from
third persons who merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such
reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth.

Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest
without a warrant may result from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now
required that the crime must have just been committed. The recency contemplated
here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime
was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and
not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such
commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such
warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more
than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the
arrest, as now required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the
consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal
occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable
knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if
not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his
obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention
of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily
undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the
information he is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such
verification.

It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based
on probable cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to

say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be
taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take exception to
the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied
with in this case. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against
Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for
controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would
be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted
incursions into civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1 the

majority has not shown why the arrests in question should after all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested
without a warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions
of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. According to the
majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense (subversion being
supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge
that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is
supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and
suspicion is supposedly reasonable:

. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2

As I said, I dissent.

First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167,
as amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is
made up of "overt acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as
follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.

As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and
as Ferrer has taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership
in a subversive organization to make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that
for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that above "overt acts" should be visible to
the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise the accused can not be
said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to
justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean
mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere
membership.

I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority

would interpret it, as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is,
"suspicion . . . based on actual facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge means exactly what it says
that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense, in this
case, membership in a subversive organization with intent to further the objectives
thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6)
spoke of simple "reasonable ground" which would have arguably encompassed
"actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority.
Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully
submit that to give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable
ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a

"sparrow man" had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that
that person was Rolando Dural. Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed,
hearsay, information, and needless to say, not personal knowledge.

I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a
similar arrest because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held,
"[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety

from the information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act
differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be
well-taken. Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for
affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the
illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith.
Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in good faith, as
the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest is valid.
Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part
of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority
would quite evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there
truly was an information, and that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;"
10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the alleged informants)
could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We have, it should be
noted, previously rejected such a species of information because of the lack of
"compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant
was.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending
Presidential Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of
acts of violence to "government health authorities" not to the military.

I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if
it did have personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense,
there was no reason for the military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution
after all, gives the authority to issue warrants. As People vs. Burgos held:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no
showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown. 12

I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra,
Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162)
could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As the majority
points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no personal
knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think
that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As
Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary.
As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the
trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this
Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the
majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.

More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so
of the military, and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we
can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the
accused being "NPA's anyway") that would be abdication of judicial duty and
when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential
information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority
referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit
to being NPA's."

It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to

me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be established, since
meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is
something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow
about (a mere "administrative measure").

I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso
Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting
to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:

Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is
"inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that
it is either, but that:

. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then,
Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was
just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in
which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes
difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
14

And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was
after all, protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that
is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are
concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3) we
have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.

First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain
to my mind, it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these
petitions without shirking the Court's constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain,
because it does not contain enough "fighting words" recognized to be seditious. 16
Secondly, it is the very question before the Courtwhether or not the statement in
question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly
legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in
no way a continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted
that it is, either. Of course, the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the
authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing." 17 First, Espiritu was
picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter".
Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make
warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the
contemplation of the Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge
of flight or escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through
the judicial processes, as there was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed
an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be
justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in
this case, titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because it is supported by no
authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and second,
because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty as the
custodian of the Bill of Rights even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of
authority . . . in this case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted
the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases are apparently,
special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us neither. I am wondering
why, apart from the fact that these cases involved, incidentally, people who think
differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's

arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988
that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23

With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious
implications of its pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in
general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the
Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may,
rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.

Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just
committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge."

In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after
it was in fact (allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have

"personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they

have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been
committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal
knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the

exceptional provisions of the Rules.

I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to
suppose that I am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not
saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested without a warrant, can
not be arrested at all but that the military should first procure a warrant from a
judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the
Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general
rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a
judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the broadest
discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24 today it is fourteen
days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade,
would not be in fact unreasonable, following the theory of the majority, since the
military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as the majority did not find
it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25and none
of us can possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative
measure" alonewe are talking of arrests, of depriving people of libertyeven if we
are not yet talking of whether or not people are guilty. That we are not concerned
with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully submit, and it will not
minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases
of Amelia Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission"
(actually, an uncounselled confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's
arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully submit, to approve the military's
action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because Buenaobra confessed for
the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am not to be mistaken for
prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I
can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military
that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.

I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27
have been better days. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them
"where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps with
greater vigor from the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the
majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists."
The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second,
"Communism" and "national security" are old hat the dictator's own excuses to
perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old
excuses. Third, Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be
possibly justified in a regime that respects the rule of law that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the
filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is
evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds
for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by
subsequent jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of
authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended, if they could have been
defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.

"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be
tested as to its legality, via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes
without saying. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply, to offer a small
consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their continued detention. 30
With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be elated.

A Final Word

As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be

reconsidered, I reiterate one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens
without infringing their right against arbitrary State action. "The right of the
people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter likewise states, "values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." 32
The Constitution states the general rule the majority would make the exception
the rule, and the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what
constitutionalism is all about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the
first place, doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than
"confidential information" (manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and
in the second place, any information with which the military (or police) were armed
could no more than be hearsay, not personal, information. I submit that the "actual
facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in
question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the
applicable rule.

Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and
Narciso Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I
indicated, Espiritu was arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition;
Nazareno was picked up fourteen days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority
would approve the police's actions nonetheless because the police supposedly
"found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a
provision that has not been written there.

"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the
majority, "what is important is that the Court be right." 33

Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of
popularity or palatability. Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or not the
military (or police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the
requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of whether or not this
Court, in approving the military's actions, is right.

In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of

disappearances, torture, hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and various
human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for October, 1990,
the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:

An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them
illegally;

Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to
September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;

Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40,
of frustrated salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;

Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in
which 157 were wounded;

The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;

Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;

From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;

One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a
consequence of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military
since 1988. 34

It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little
concern. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving.
Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too late.

Motions denied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11
th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben
Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established

beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree
No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B,
of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as
provided for by law.

As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered

confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.

The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal

possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as
follows:

That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by
the proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one
(1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No.
8.69221, which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New
People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and
violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by
the accused in the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of
New Members to the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.

Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,

composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).

Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.

After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of
three (3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath
said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo
Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and
April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.

Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and

Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).

To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was
presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman
Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions
Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at about 5:00
o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their
purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their
companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72,
Hearing-January 4, 1983).

Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar
Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar
scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his
waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2)
meters away from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that
marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, HearingJanuary 4, 1983).

On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,

Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.

The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.

Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)

Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said

seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)

On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.

Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.

Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by
an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his
having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.

Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any
question propounded or not.

With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)

Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the
lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused
Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.

After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.

On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is
stated in the decision as follows:

From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.

He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as
his own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical
agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect
on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his
body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and
testicle, terribly irritating with pungent pain.

All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,

Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.

After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)

In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of

explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations
and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to
those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of
his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected
by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.

To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced
in the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving
her to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because
on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him.
(TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)

To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of

Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by

the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released
and were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of
allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said,
her husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not
inform him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities,
for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)

On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the

firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, HearingNovember 22, 1983)

After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to

wit:

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL
ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7

Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein
conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime
charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house
of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar
Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army
(NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p.
25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable

invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects.
This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so
important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and

Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as
falling under one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as
follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

about to commit an offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact
that "the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in
subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence
on the matter."

If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the
alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or

anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was

possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered
lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the
information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect
that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily
also tainted.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no
showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown,

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was
no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go through
the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even
more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The
arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not
likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by
the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia
v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda.
de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold

that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation

thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).

That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at
the time of his arrest is evident from the records:

A CALAMBA:

Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an
arrest warrant?

A None Sir.

Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?

A No Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?

A But he was twenty meters away from his house.

Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?

A Yes Sir.

Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?

A Yes Sir.

Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?

A No Sir.

Q What did you tell him?

A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm,
first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it
is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.

Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the
constitution considering that he was purposely under arrest?

A I did not.

Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?

A Yes Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?

A It was buried down in his horse.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?

A Yes Sir.

(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents
were obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as
evidence.

There is another aspect of this case.

In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,

the prosecution presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused
readily admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it
was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily
pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.

Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed
of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused
allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the
subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation
of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the
Bill of Rights winch provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .

The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right
is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers
as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.

The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as
inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been
exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree measures may
not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed
as stated.

The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by

counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out

that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed
under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.

With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive
documents inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only
remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance
of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.

We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond

reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible
and convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the
trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100
SCRA 424):

xxx xxx xxx

. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of
the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight
and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.

The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in
People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):

. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .

In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering

that Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how
eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged
with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home
Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an
interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure
his freedom.

Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA
seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan
and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar
Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive
activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented
any other witness.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):

It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely
by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov
72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People

v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115
SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where
there appears to be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through
armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The
open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate levels
of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as
we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also
remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court
stated:

While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives,
the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.

Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude

towards constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of
subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of
reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith
and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are
ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and

ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines
versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused
Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of
arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads
as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza
and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of
ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in
barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other
private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated
one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez
of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat,
Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis
supplied.)

CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.

Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S.
Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with
Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information
which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3
that is, that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary
Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner
Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last
two elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be
liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order
the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other
agents of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer
when the former made this finding in the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with
the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered
Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such
authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts
that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not
have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6
(2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public official;8 (4)
That he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected
directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio
captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it was only
upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of
Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge
was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later
named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In
various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary
Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass
through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they
told him that he was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman,
bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him
to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the
next day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed
any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16

Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in
the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district
in the performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the
barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to
organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance
of peace and order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this
to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For
public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order,
what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may
take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them,
where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he
may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that
other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty
of this crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are
similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction
is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the
authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera
himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the
arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr.,
can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only
sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do
not appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during

the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of
criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court
held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the
complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash
jeopardy has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of
denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The
accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but
at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case
be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4
and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized
or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents
and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized

from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of
the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in
the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in
the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the
common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other
legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio
(supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could
not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable

against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer
no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand,
if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy
Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has

Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it
being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly
declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared
illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein,
and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants
are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it
is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a
search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return
of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction

and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs.
United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a

man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his
filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the
purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November
13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing
what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland

of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those
between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought
not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in
MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme
Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further.
Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared
that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the
search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to
Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's
books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of
the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . .
(Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In
Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also
the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that
the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of
the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected
the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor
to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The
papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of
these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held
invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the
records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties

seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been
used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use
of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned:
"United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also
Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises
not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were
suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized,
whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The
uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this
Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal
or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing

the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to
the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.

Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants
issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles
used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in

the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory

injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the
other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners'
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents
"will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case
until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..."
2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of
the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning
the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash
said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel
7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules.
In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to
suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.

Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued

on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on
June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time

to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the
filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited
this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust
other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that
everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial
system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On
the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate
the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used
and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an

examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot
and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct
places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution
of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two
search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No.
20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is
keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to
search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides,
the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of
the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for
which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS

Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent
judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be

searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would
seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said
that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve
an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although
the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his
co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc.
were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that
may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of
the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property
must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the
time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or

possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon

application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10
The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under
Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could

not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet

and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in
the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has
in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885,
as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding
of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the

statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the
premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used
and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to
promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in
Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration

constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,

cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to

promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger
to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the

freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and
even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any
person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government
and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful
however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that
no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities
to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of

the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.

Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11,
1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby
ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,

Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same
time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are
the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the
search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses

two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno,
126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will
result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the
highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants
authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of
the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc.
subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in
the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as
there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced
the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants

should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary
rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same
time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are
the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the
search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses

two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno,
126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will
result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the
highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants
authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of
the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc.
subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in
the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as
there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced
the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants

should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary
rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46000

May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ of
mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of
the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was filed of the
following tenor:
The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and
municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique
Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion
committed as follows:
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the
aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio
Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church of
Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in
fact passed, through the chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which
churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said
Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of
the undersigned complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence
by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said
churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open disregard
of the religious feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES
Parish Priest
Complainant

(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)

The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement
regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts and of
the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal,
instead of filing the corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:
The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna.
The said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and
threats, the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the
churchyard of the Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of
one who belonged to the Church of Christ.
The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not
constitute the offense complained of considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code. At most they might be chargeable with having threatened the parish priest, or
with having passed through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice
Albert, commenting on the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of
anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious
ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful."
The mere act of causing the passage through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of
the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor
ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case,
reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another information for the crime found to have
been committed by the accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due course
by the court by virtue of an order of this court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to wit,
that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said church,
and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish priest and
through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of the religious
sect known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he would not
have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the crime defined and
penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the
accused had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act
complained of took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the
fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of

them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a
question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged
only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is
possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while
not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the
view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article
133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts
and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court
may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass
under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General
Orders, No. 58.
The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law,
without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MORAN, J., concurring:
I concur in the dispositive part on the ground that the lower court, without determining if the
churchyard of the Catholic Church is a place devoted to religious worship or not, held that the
passage through the said churchyard of a funeral conducted in accordance with the rites of
another religion is not offensive to the feelings of the Catholic. If that funeral with ceremonies of
another religion had been made to pass inside the church, it would without question be offensive
top the feelings of the Catholics. The lower court, through the provincial fiscal, is thus under a
duty to determine: (1) If the churchyard is a place devoted to the religious worship of the
Catholic Church, and (2) if the funeral held under the rites of another religion was made to pass
through the said churchyard.
If the churchyard of the Catholic Church is like some of those seen in Manila churches where
anyone can pass and where goods are even sold to the public, then it is not a place devoted to
religious worship, and the fact that a funeral to pass through it, does not constitute a violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, but, at most, the offense of threats if it is true that the
parish priest was threatened when he prohibited the passage of the funeral.
LAUREL, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
It is an accepted doctrine of construction that criminal statutes must be strictly interpreted. In
fact, no person should be brought within the terms of the penal law who is not clearly so within,

and no acts should be pronounced criminal unless so defined and penalized by law. The offense
imputed to the defendants herein is defined in article 133 which is as follows:
ART. 133. Offending religious feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who,
in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious
ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
As defined, two essential elements must be present under this article, to wit: (1) That the facts
complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration
of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. It is admitted that the whole incident happened in the "atrio" or "patio" of
the Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. There was no celebration of any religious ceremony
then. The "atrio" coming from the Latin "atrium" means, an open space, generally closed,
fronting a building or a church. In this case it is a churchyard. While occasional religious
ceremonies may be performed in the "atrio", nevertheless this does not make the "atrio" a place
devoted to religious worship under article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, any more than a public
plaza, a street or any other place occasionally used for religious purposes. But assuming that the
churchyard in this case is "a place devoted to religious worship" contrary to what we see and
know (Justice Brown, in Hunter vs. New York O. & W. Ry. Co., 23 N.E., 9, 10; 116 N.Y., 615)
is the act complained of "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful?" The imputed
dereliction consist in that "los acusados arriba nombrados, estando dirigiendo el entierro segun el
rito de una secta religiosa llamada "Iglesia de Cristo", del cadaver de uno que en vida se llamada
Antonio Macabigtas, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente hicieron que dicho entierro pasase,
como en efecto paso, por el a trio de la Iglesia Catholica Romana frente a dicha Iglesia, el cual a
trio es propiedad de dicha Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos de esta Iglesia y esta
dedicado a los cultos religiosos deesta Iglesia, contra la oposicion del infrascrito denunciantea
quien los acusados mediante fuerza y amenazas de maltrato obligaron a cederles el paso del
entierro por dicho atrio." (Emphasis is mine.) As I see it the only act which is alleged to have
offended the religious "feelings of the faithful" here is that of passing by the defendants through
the "atrio" of the church under the circumstances mentioned. I make no reference to the alleged
trespass committed by the defendants or the threats imputed to them because these acts constitute
different offenses (arts. 280, 281 and 282-285) and do not fall within the purview of article 133
of the Revised Penal Code. I believe that an act, in order to be considered as notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings, must be one directed against religious practice or dogma or
ritual for the purpose of ridicule; the offender, for instance, mocks, scoffs at or attempts to
damage an object of religious veneration; it must be abusive, insulting and obnoxious (Viada,
Comentarios al Codigo Penal, 707, 708; vide also Pacheco, Codigo Penal, p. 359).
Why, may I ask, should the mere act of passing of the corpse or funeral cortege in or through a
private property be characterized as notoriously offensive to the feelings of any religion or of its
adherent or followers?
The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed by the name of the Lord. (Job. I.
21.)

In this case, the Lord has recalled the life of one of His creatures: and it must be His wish
that the remains shall have the right of way that they may be buried "somewhere, in
desolate, wind-swept space, in twilight land, in no man's land but in everybody's land.
Rather than too many religions that will make us hate one another because of religious prejudices
and intolerance, may I express the hope that we may grasp and imbibe the one fundamental of all
religions that should make us love one another!
I must decline to accept the statement made in the majority opinion that "whether or not the act
complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which
must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful
ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith."
(Emphasis is mine.) I express the opinion that offense to religious feelings should not be made to
depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but
should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial
criterion .Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective
characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and
in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution."
(Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.)
I think that the ruling of the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the case and in reserving to
the provincial fiscal the presentation of another complaint or complaints under other provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, is correct and should be upheld.
IMPERIAL, J.:
I concur in the preceding dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel