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OPOSA VS FACTORAN Facts:

This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 34 children, through their parents, claiming that
they bring the case in the name of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice. The
minors filed the action for themselves as representing their generation as well as generations yet
unborn.
Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country
and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.
The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae (parent of the nation).
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them
was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation."
The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts. In the
lower court, the government argued that no legal right of the petitioners had been violated and that the
issue of whether to grant or not to grant timber licenses was not a matter for the courts to decide but
for political departments, namely Congress and the President.
The case was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue:
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file
the case based on the concept of inter-generational responsibility, their right to a healthy environment
carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. The Court,
on the basis of Section 16 linked with the right to health, recognized a right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on nonimpairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
public welfare.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.


Section 5, Art VIII | Judicial Review: Locus Standi
Facts:
Principal plaintiffs, now principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI).
o Petitioners assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.
Orginal defedndant was the Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then DENR
secretary, substituted by the new Secretary Hon. Angel Alcala.
This complaint prays for the judgment that all existing timber license
agreements in the country be cancelled and that defendant and his

CHUA.TENGCO.MELLA.RELOJO.LENCIO.BRIONES.DANAO.LIM.DU
MA.3/3CONSTI3DIGESTS320113
!

agents cease and decist from receiving, accepting, processing,


renewing, or approving new TLAs, and other reliefs.
The complaint as instituted as a taxpayers class suit and alleges that
the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests.
The minors also claim that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.
Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss based on 2 grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.
2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question.
Petitioners maintain that:
1. The complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action.
2. The motion is dilatory.
3. The action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendants abuse of discretion.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss.
Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing.
Held: Petitioners have legal standing.
Ratio:
Petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
" Every generation had a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology.
" The minors assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Note (side issue): Re definiteness of the specific legal right involved
While a right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of State Principles and State Policies (Section 16, Article
II) and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter.

Fernando Poe, Jr. v Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo


Section 4 | Election and Canvass
Facts: Before the election protest of FPJ could be decided, he died. Mrs. FPJ
claims that because of the death of her husband and in his representation
and for the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is need to
substitute/intervene for FPJ, who died, to ascertain the true and genuine will
of the electorate in the 2004 elections.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for FPJ who died during the
pendency of his protest case?
Held: No
Acc. to Rule 14 of the PET Rules: Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice President who received the 2nd or 3rd
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President.
They are the real parties in interest concerning an on-going
election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor

intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory


application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court,
and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of
Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative.
o Mrs. FPJ seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant.
o However, we have every time ruled that a public office is
personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death.
o Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or
the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
during the pendency of the protest.
! Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias: we recognized
substitution upon the death of the protestee but
denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they
are not the real parties in interest.
! De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections: we struck
down the claim of the surviving spouse and children
of the protestee to the contested office for the same
reason. Even in analogous cases before other
electoral tribunals, we denied substitution by the
wife or heirs.
This does not mean that death of the protestant stops the pending
action. An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to
the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention
but only by a real party in interest.
o A real party in interest is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit.
! Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v.
Javier we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor
since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest
considering that if the protest succeeds and the
protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to
the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the
one duly elected cannot assume office. Thus, given
the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that
protestants widow is not a real party in interest to
this election protest.
A contest before election tribunals has two aspects: First, it is in
pursuit of ones right to a public office, and second, it is imbued
with public interest.
She avers that she is pursuing the process to determine who truly
won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her
noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the
electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an
election protest but whether he is a real party in interest.

Marbury vs. Madison


Section 5 | Judicial Review
(Marbury is a Justice of Peace in Columbia and Madison is the Secretary of
State of the US)
1803
Facts:
At the December term 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay,
Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel severally
moved the court for a rule to James Madison, secretary of state of the
United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue
commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several
commissions as justices of the peace in the district of
Columbia.
The applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their
said commissions but the Secretary of State did not comply.
The court, through Chief Justice Marshall, reviewed the case
considering the following questions: (1) Has the applicant a right to the
commission he demands? (2) If he has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? (3) If they do
afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The answers that were given are as follows: (1) Mr. Marbury, then,
since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the
secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave
the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the

appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which
are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission,
therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative
of a vested legal right. (2) ...having this legal title to the office, he has a
consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
(3) To enable this court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to
be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
Issue:
W/N an act repugnant to the constitution (in this case, issuing a mandamus
in an original jurisdiction) can become part of the law of the land
Held:
NO
Ratio:
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not
create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in
effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore
seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act
establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of
mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the
constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so
conferred, can be exercised.
Connection to Art. VII:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all
cases arising under the constitution.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only
which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to
all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
Note:
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court
awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver
the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus
significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the
Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of
fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of
the law.
In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the
commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus
exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the
Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise
the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order
would be flouted.

TAN v. MACAPAGAL
Section 5, Art VIII | Judicial Review
FACTS:
A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan,
Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City,
Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly
suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people
They filed a five-page pleading it is understandable, therefore, why
the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit. The Court
issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day of that month a
printed thirty-two-page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that
petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to
be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.
Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had
the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the enactment of the
statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed
amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe
for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off.
ISSUE:
Assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the
range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have
this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of
the Constitution and Republic Act 6132,
to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which
seek to revise the present Constitution through the
adoption of a form of government other than the form
now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention
being] merely empowered to propose improvements to

the present Constitution without altering the general plan


laid down therein."
HELD: Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Such a principle (separation of powers) applies as well when the
inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the Constitutional
Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility
according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be
respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function well. Such
should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also
because its powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for
popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the organization and
functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much
more imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until
the appropriate time comes.
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still
unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight.
Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification
may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid
of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by
this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or
a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the
rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot therefor be
sustained.
RATIO:
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments
being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as
Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain
executive [or legislative]
action ... ."
The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its
advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in
the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but
only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding."

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and
ROBERTGOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instanceof Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine:
implied consent
Date:
May 22, 1985
Ponente:
Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,Zambales. The
base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreementbetween the Philippines and the
United States.

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoondamages. Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids andcomplied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that thecompany did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previousunsatisfactory performance rating
on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boatlandings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, WilliamI. Collins
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.The complaint is to
order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work onthe projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to orderthe defendants to pay damages. The company
also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with thirdparties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioningthe jurisdiction of
this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of
the complaint being acts and omissions of theindividual defendants as agents of defendant United
States of America, a foreignsovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for
the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included anopposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposedthe motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice toreconsider but to
no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in CivilCase No. 779-M
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s
:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions tobe able to
invoke state immunity
Held
:WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are setaside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of theprinciples of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of InternationalLaw are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because theactivities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-betweensovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietaryacts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jureimperil
(sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings ariseout of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities oreconomic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the levelof an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued onlywhen it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates tothe exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
thePhilippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are notutilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the
legal nature of the act.

Co v. House Electoral Tribunal || Citizenship FACTS:

The grandfather of the respondent, Ong Te, came to the Philippines from China. Ong Te resided in
Samar and was able to obtain a certificate of residence.

The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China, but grew up in Samar. He got married to
a Filipina and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen when the respondent was nine years old.

The respondent, Jose Ong Jr., studied and worked in Manila. But he frequently went home to Samar,
where he grew up. He later on married a Filipina.

The respondent registered as a voter of Laoang, Samar. He voted there during the elections of 1984
and 1986.

In 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the 2


nd
district of Northern Samar and won.
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The respondents citizenship was questioned. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) declared that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Samar.

Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the HRET.


ISSUE:
WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that Jose Ong Jr., is a natural-born
citizen and a resident of Samar
HELD:
The HRET did not act with grave abuse of discretion because Jose Ong Jr. is a natural born citizen
based on Article IV of the Constitution.
RATIO:

Section 3 of Article IV
provides that:
"
Natural-born Citizens
are those who: a.

are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship
b.
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 of Section 1

Paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article IV


provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are considered natural-born citizens.
"
Under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
Filipinos. However, those born with Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens
but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
"
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
women.
"
This provision is curative in nature. It has a retroactive effect anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are considered natural-born Filipino citizens.

Petitioners argue that respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship when he reached the age of
majority.
"
HOWEVER, we have jurisprudence that states that election is both a
formal
and an
informal
process. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioners argue that respondents father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen.
"
HOWEVER, the respondent traces his natural-born citizenship through his mother, not through his
father.
"
The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determin WON the respondent elected Filipino
citizenship.

Valles v Comelec || Citizenship


FACTS:
Private respondent is running for governor of Davao Oriental. Her
citizenship is questioned by the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that Lopez cannot run for governor since she has
renounced her Filipino citizenship by applying for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICCR), and
for having an Australian passport.
Petitioner also claims that if Lopez did not renounce her Filipino
citizenship, her dual citizenship disqualifies her from public office, as
stated in Section 40 of the Local Government Code which disqualifies from
running for any elective local position those who have dual citizenship.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Western Australia.
Her father is a Filipino, while her Mother is an Australian.
ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Respondent is a Filipino citizen.
RATIO:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
(child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth).
o Thus, private respondent, having been born to a Filipino father, is
a Filipino citizen.
o The laws in force at the time of the private respondents birth
were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law. According to
such organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
On renunciation of Filipino Citizenship
o In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express.
o The mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship.
On Dual Citizenship
o The Court clarified that dual citizenship as a disqualification as
used in the Local Government Code refers to dual allegiance
(Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution). Persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
o ALSO, the filing of their certificate of candidacy is suffice to
renounce foreign citizenship.
" In the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is
a Filipino citizen and the he/she will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance.
o Private respondent also executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship and the Australian passport of the
respondent was cancelled. These acts are enough to settle the
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Lopez.

Bengzon v. Cruz || Citizenship


FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
He enlisted in the Unites States Matine Corps and, without consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan.
Petitioner asserts that Cruz cannot run for public office since he can no

longer be considered a natural-born Filipino.


ISSUE: WON the respondent, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
HELD: The respondent can still be considered a natural-born Filipino.
RATIO:
There are 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct
act of Congress.
o Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due
to:
1. Desertion of the armed forces
2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien
5. Political and economic necessity
Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry.
o Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originall a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
statues as a natural-born Filipino.
ALSO, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens.
o Under the present Constitution, there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law.
o The absence of a separate category for persons who reacquired
citizenship means that they are either natural-born or naturalized.
o Respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
Dissenting Opinion (Sandoval-Gutierrez)
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation,
the citizen cannot be considered natural-born.
o The term natural-born Filipino citizen refers to those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship and to those who
elect Philippine citizenship.
o Repatriation is the resumption of recovery of the original
nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.
o Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.
o Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no room for interpretation.
Respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again
become a Filipino citizen (taking of oath of allegiance, registering oath
with the local civil registry, renouncing citizenship, executing affidavit of
reacquisition).

BANAT v. COMELEC
GR No. 179295, 21 April 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
COMELEC applied the
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
formula upon the completion of the canvass and party-list results, thereby proclaiming 15 party-lists
to have obtained 21 seats in Congress. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives (all 55
seats have to be proclaimed) provided by the Constitution before the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC denied the said petition, stating that it had already become moot and academic.
Issues: 1.W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 2.
W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. 3.
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 4.

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
HELD:
Petition is partially granted. The COMELEC resolutions dated Aug. 3, 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 and
July 9 2007 in NBC No. 07-60 are set aside. The two-percent threshold in the distribution of additional
party list seats is declared unconstitutional. Allocation of additional seats under the Party-list system
shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision. Major political parties are
disallowed from participating in party-list elections.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1.
W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.
YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections. 2.
W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.
NO. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. The Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. The Court strikes down the 2% threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of RA 7941.1 The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed: (1)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
1 Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for the
second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, that those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three seats.

NO. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the
party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines. Neither the
Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, RA 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the partylist elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and RA 7941. Furthermore, under Section 9
of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty,
destitution, and infirmity as there is no financial status required in law. It is enough that the nominee
of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. According to Chief
Justice Punos dissent, the party-list representatives are no match to our traditional political parties in
the political arena; and that if major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list system
electoral process, the voices of the marginalized would be surely suffocated, and that the democratic
spirit of the Constitution would be betrayed. He cited the 2001 party-list elections where the major
political parties figured in the disproportionate distribution of votes. 8 Justices concurred. Additional
Note: Justice Nachura concurs with Justice Carpio and further adds that the 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a political party-list group to a seat in the HR in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional because, according to him, there will never be a situation where the number of partylist representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district representatives. He then
submits the standard of proportional representation and the adoption of a gradually regressive
threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats. He
proposes this new formula for the threshold: 100% (total number of votes cast for party-list) 1.818%
55 party-list seats And that the minimum vote requirement should gradually lessen as the number of
party-list seats increases.
Doctrines:
A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters:
1. 20% allocation. The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
2. 2% threshold. Only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
3. Three -seat limit . Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
4. Proportional representation. The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes. In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional,
the Court does not limit the allocation of additional seats to the two- percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats (the difference between the
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two-percenters).

The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to
a partys share in the remaining available seats.
Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. Finally, the three-seat cap is applied to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC || Residence


Qualification
FACTS:
!
Imelda Marcos filed her COC for Representative of the 1
st
district of Leyte on March 8, 1995.
!
Private Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo (incumbent Rep.) filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification of Marcos on the basis of she lacks he constitutional requirement of residency.
!
Marcos entered seven months in her COC, she changed it to sincechildhood She said it was an
honest misinterpretation, since shealways maintained Tacloban City as her Domicile or residence.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was a resident, foe election purposes of the 1
st
district of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of May 9, 1995 elections.
HELD:
Petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for office. Petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during
!"#$%&%'()!*+')$&#,!")-&..')%&."/").&#!0")1%0"#&()2'#'").0-)2+-') 4 !"#($0 20,&($( 5677 !"#$%&
%'()!*+')$&#,!")-&..')%&."/").&#!0")1%0"#&()2'#'").0-)2+-') 4 !"#($0 20,&($( 5677
the past four decades. And none of those point to her intending to abandon her domicile in Leyte.
RATIO:
!
Article 50, CC: domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.
!
Ong v. Republic: Domicile=permanent home; Domicile: physical presence and animus manendi.
!
Fact of residence should be decisive in determining the constitutional requirement of residency.
!

The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study, or to do other things of
a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence
. (Despite the fact that she lived outside metro manila)
!
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN is not easily lost except when (needs a clear and positive proof): 1.
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2.
A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one. 3.
Acts which correspond with the purpose
!
Art. 110 CC: concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields
nothing, which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.
Art, 110 : The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should lie abroad unless in the service of the

Aquino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
FACTS:

The Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy in the Second District of Makati City
for the
1995
elections.

Petitioner leased a condominium unit in the area. The terms in the leasing agreement is 2 years but his
intention was really for only 1 year, because he has other residences in Manila and Quezon City.

COMELEC en banc found in the petitioners Certificate of Candidacy for


1992
elections that:
o

he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992,


o
he was resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election,
o
he was a registered voter of the same district, and
o
his birth certificate places Conception, Tarlac as birthplace by his parents Benigno and Aurora.

It was clear and unassailable that is domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most
recent Certificate of Candidacy was in Conception, Tarlac.
ISSUE:
WON the one year residency of Aquino in the Second District of Makati enough to qualify him as a
candidate for Representative of the same.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as candidate, he must prove that he has established not just
residence but
domicile of choice.
(COMELEC)
RATIO
:

The intention of the petitioner was not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing of a condo unit instead of buying one.

The fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the
short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condo in Makati, indicate that the
sole purpose of Aquino in transferring physical residence
is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but
to only qualify as candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
.

The lease agreement (he entered into) was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for his candidacy by establishing a commencement dated of his
residence. [NOTE: The petitioners contention that it legally impossible to impose the 1-year
residency requirement in a newly created political district lacks basic logic because the district was not
created out of thin air. People actually were domiciled in the area before the district was created.]
Domino v. COMELEC | 1-year Residency Requirement G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 FACTS:

This case is a petition for preliminary injunction of the Resolution of COMELEC declaring the
petitioner (Juan Domino) disqualified as
!"#$%&%'()!*+')$&#,!")-&..')%&."/").&#!0")1%0"#&()2'#'").0-)2+-') 4 !"#($0 20,&($( 5677 !"#$%&
%'()!*+')$&#,!")-&..')%&."/").&#!0")1%0"#&()2'#'").0-)2+-') 4 !"#($0 20,&($( 5677
candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the
11 May 1998

elections.

The petitioner alleged that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the 1-year residence requirement.

The petitioner maintains that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997(more than 1 year).

COMELEC disqualified DOMINO on the basis of the ff. findings:


o
Petioners Voters registration Record is dated
22 June 1997
(less than 1 year preceding the election) and his address indicated 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City.
o
Petitoner ran for the same position in the 3
rd
District of QC during
1995
elections.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the judgement of Metropolitan Trial Court of QC declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani
and not QC id final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the COMELEC; 2.
WON petitioner has resided in the Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the 1998
elections; 3.
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.
HELD:
1.
The contention of Domino that the decision of MTC of QC in declaring him a resident of Sarangani
and not QC is final and conclusive upon COMELEC
cannot be sustained
. [reason: held#3] 2.
The SC holds in the negative. Not a resident of Sarangani for 1 year. 3.
COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus Election
Code.
RATIO:
Issue 1 & 3: 1.
The judgement of MTC of QC is neither conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as voter in any other election because COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the petition as provided in Sec. 78, Art IX of the Omnibus Election Code.

COMELEC has the competence to determine whether a false representation as facts was made in the
Certificate of Candidacy.

The MTC of QZ merely determined the right of Domino to be included/excluded from the list of
voters in the precinct within it territorial jurisdiction, and does not preclude the COMELEC in the
determination of Dominos qualification as a candidate to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement. Issue 2:

Record show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 1991 he
acquired new domicile in Quezon City (as shown in his previous Cert. of Candidacy)

A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not deemed lost until a
new one is established.

The mere absence of a person from his permanent residence, no matter how long, will not result in
loss or change of domicile.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile.

Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in QC (gives rise to strong presumption of residence)

While the fact that the petitioner did the ff. he still fell short of the 1 year residency requirement under
Sec.6, Art. VI of the Constitution.
o
bought the house he was renting (4 Nov 1997)
o
sought cancellation of his previous registration in QC (22 Oct 1997)
o
applied for transfer of registration to Sarangani ( 30 Aug 1997)

Senate v. Ermita
Section 22 | Executive Privelege
Facts:
From sept 21-23, Various executive officials were invited by the committee
of the senate as a whole to appear on sept 28 05 as resource speakers in a
public hearing to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. The Senate
Committee in National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations on
sept 22 to several AFP officials to attend the public hearing on matters
relating to the role of the military in the "gloriagate scandal", 05 election
fraud and the wire-tapping of the president scheduled on sept 28.
On the 28th of september, AFP chief of staff Senga requested for the
postponement because the invited AFP officers, including him are attending
to urgent operational matters. The North Luzon Railways Corporation also
requested for the postponement to wait for the UP Law Center's is secured.
Exec Sec Ermita likewise requested for the postponement to allow invited
officials to prepare. Sen Pres Drilon however said the notices had been
issued and preparations had already been completed.
On the same day of sept 28 pres. Arroyo issued EO 464 which provides that
senior officials of exec depts, generals and flag officers of the AFP, PNP
officers, and senior national security officials shall secure prior consent of
the president prior to appearing before either House of the Congress
pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, executive privilege and
respect for the rights of public officials.
Drilon received letters from Ermita and Senga saying that no invited official
will be able to attend in obedience to EO 464. The president has not
authorized then to appear before the any congressional hearing
The constitutionality of mentioned EO is challenged. Petitions for certiorari
and prohibition were filed.
Issues:
1. WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
2. WON it violates the right of people to information on matters of public
concern
3. WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing
EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circ
Held:
1. Sections 3 and 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated. No infirmity can be
imputed to sec 2(a).
2. The impairment of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464
is direct.
3. The challenged order must covered by the publication requirement.
Ratio:
Definition muna!! [Executive privilege] is the power by the president and
high-level branch officers to withhold information from congress, the courts

and ultimately the public. It is recognized only in relation to certain types of


information (military, diplomatic, national security matters and closed-door
Cabinet meetings).
1. Sec 2(b) virtually states that exec privilege covers persons, a misuse of
the doctrine. Exec privilege may only be invoked in relation to specific
categories of info and not to categories of persons. also, the requirement of
securing the president's consent is construed as a declaration that the president or office head
has determined that the requested information is
privileged. Therefore an invocation of EO 464 is an implied claim that the
info withheld is by the authority of the president on the basis of exec
privilege.
In ermita's letter the claim of privilege is implied. However it does not
suffice that the President or an authorized office head has determined that it
is so and that the president has not overturned that determination. It
threatens the congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive
branch is not providing it with the info that it has requested.
There must be a statement of specific basis of a claim of exec priv to
determine if it should be respected. The claim of priv under EO 464 is invalid
for only implying and not asserting. It severely frustrates the power of
inquiry of the congress.
2. The exec order limiting disclosure of info from investigations in aid of
legislation, which are generally public, necessarily deprives the people of
info which they can use in formulating opinion which they can communicate
to their reps. This deprives the public of being able to formulate its will
intelligently.
3. The exec order has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern even though it applies to executive
officials only. It is a matter of public interest and due process requires that
the people should have been apprised prior to its implementation.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and


Investigations
Section 22 | Executive Privilege

Facts:
On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified
for about 11 hours on the matters concerning theNational Broadband Project, a project
awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered
by Abalos a bribe
of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the
attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he
was probed further on PGMAs and petitioners discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The
questions that he refused to answer were:
1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project.
2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it.
3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.
The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees
upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the
questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issues:
1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege
in our legal system?
- YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the constitution.
- The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke
exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of
E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. In this case, it was the President
herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a
specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and
China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked.
- If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly
within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that
the same be recognized.
2. WON there is a factual or legal basis to hold the communications elicited
be covered by the exec. Priv.
-Respondent alleges that the elements of the presidential
communications privilege are not present.
a) Power to enter into executive agreement is a quintessential and nondelegable
presidential power
- quintessential: most perfect embodiment of something
- The fact that the President needs to secure a prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, which shall submit to the Congress its report before
agreeing to the foreign loans, DOES NOT DIMINISH the EXECUTIVE

nature of the power.


- Doctrine of separation of powers: checks and balances
- Final decision is still lodged in the office of the President.
b) Doctrine of operational proximity
- Precisely to limit the scope of presidential communications; not
conclusive (in re: sealed case)
- Privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring
that the confidentiality of the Presidents decision-making process is
adequately protected.
- Not everyone can qualify for the privilege: ( but only to the white house
advisors staff who have broad and significant responsibility for
investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President on
the particular matter to which the communications relate.
In the case at bar: officials involved: cabinet = advisor of the
President
- In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to
the president, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of
their positions in the Executives organizational structure.
- The fear that the scope will be expanded is unfounded
c) Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on
generalized interest; the Court did not disregard the 1987 consti:
transparency, accountability and disclosure of information
- Re: letter of exec.sec. ermita : The information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with china.
- Privilege character of diplomatic negotiations: Chavez v. PCGG
information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest. PMPF v. Manglapus the
President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign
countries.
- No executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the
face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the
Presidents decision-making process.
- The Constitutional right of the people to information and the
constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency: twin
postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government
3. WON the communications elicited in the questions covered y exec.priv.
are critical to the exercise of the respondents functions.
- The respondent simply generalized that the information re: 3 questions is
pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and nonspecific
reference to pending senate bill.
- the information being elicited is not so critical after all.
- The general thrust of the three questions is to trace the alleged bribery to
the OP. While it may be worthy, it is not the job of the legislature to
perform. Legislature: make laws and not adjudicate or prosecute.
- Legislative inquiries (Sec 10, Senate rules and procedures) are not subject
to exacting standards of evidence to arrive at accurate factual findings to
which to apply the law.
4. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order?
- YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked executive generates its own abuses.
- Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of
the executive to function effectively.
- The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus
prevent roving commissions. ( kilbourn v. Thompson)
- When a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look

into the Congress compliance. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible


violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
- The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature,
must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring
compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must
be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order
was w/o concurrence of the majority.
Held: RESPONDENTS COMMITTEES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DATED 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED.

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