PEOPLE V LACSON (2003)

TOPIC:
DOCTRINE: If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused, the case may be
revived only within the periods provided in the new rule.
On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case
may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such
revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either
viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal
consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.
Please bear with my digest haha super haba since favorite
niya itong case na to 2 pages facts lang- rehash lang
ng yadao etc. I included din all issues in case itanong
niya. Mga 2 pages lang talaga dapat ito if susundan lang
yung topic hehe
FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General
Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press
conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout
with police elements near the fly-over along
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00
A.M.
That day, Delos Reyes claimed that the police team
arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early
morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house
in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after
their arrest, the gang members were made to

board two vans, their hands tied behind their

backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a
decision to summarily execute them was made,
and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they
were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.
However, there were assertions that the killing was
a rubout and not a shootout, hence an investigation
was conducted.
On June 1, 1995, PNP Director for Investigation,
filed murder charges with the Office of the
Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and
personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain
KBG members also filed murder charges against
the same officers and personnel. Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations
for MURDER, docketed against respondent Panfilo
M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All
twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals.
Amended Informations were filed against the same
twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of
respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal
to accessory.
With the downgrading of charges against him,
respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as
none of the principal accused in the Amended
Informations was a government official with a
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of
R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases
transferred to the Regional Trial Court. The
Ombudsman then cited the amendment to RA 7975
by RA 8249 which deleted the word principal as
qualifying the participation of the public official.
Supreme Court, while agreeing that with the

amendment the case should go to the

Sandiganbayan, nonetheless ordered the transfer
of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on
the ground that the Amended Informations for
murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged
therein were committed in relation to, or in
discharge of, the official functions of the
respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.
The cases were raffled off to Branch 81 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided
by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir Jr.
Before the accused could be arraigned, some
prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits
which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder
of the KBG members while others also executed
their respective affidavits of desistance declaring
that they were no longer interested to prosecute
these cases.
Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26)
accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five
separate but identical motions to (1) make a
judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2)
hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and
(3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack
of probable cause.
On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution
dismissing criminal cases. Meanwhile, amendments
on the Rules of Court as to the Criminal Procedure
were being deliberated and the modified Rules on
Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1,
2000.
On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R.
Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the

new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp.

Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng
incident for preliminary investigation.
On the strength of these new pieces of evidence,
on June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for
murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos.
01-101102
to
01-101112.
The
new
Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34)
people, including respondent Lacson and his
twenty-five (25) other co-accused in the previous
cases.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. On
August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special
Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision.
It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 (the previous
cases ) as provisional dismissal, and considered
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as
mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule
117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against
the respondent.
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated as such, granted the petition of
the Republic stating that in light of the lack of or
the
conflicting
evidence
on
the
various
requirements to determine the applicability of
Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to
rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for
multiple murder against respondent Lacson should
be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that
both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson
should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and
to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of

the predicate facts upon which the application of

the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts
and arguable questions of law. The reception of
evidence on these various issues cannot be done in
this Court but before the trial court. Hence, the
cases were remanded to RTC Quezon City.
The petitioners then filed a petition for
reconsideration contending that there was no
provisional dismissal and that Rule 117 Sec 8
cannot be given retroactive application.
On April 3, 2003, in a Resolution, the Supreme
Court favored the petitioners. The Resolution was
prepared by Justice Romeo Callejo Sr. He prepared
the draft for the reason that he was the one who
replaced Ret. Justice De Leon, to whom the Lacson
case was originally assigned. It was here where the
court finally resolved the issues and held that Sec 8
of Rule 117 will not apply to Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102 to 01-101112 because it was not proven
that the respondent Lacson gave consent to the
dismissal of such cases and that the heirs of the
victims were notified. Also, assuming that the said
rule applies, it would be applied prospectively and
not retroactively.
This time it was the turn of respondent Lacson to
file his motion for reconsideration. The respondent
also filed an omnibus motion asking the inhibition
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos appointed SC justices
and a motion to set the case for oral arguments.

ISSUES:
WON the rules on Provisional Dismissal (The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Sec 8, Rule
117) apply in criminal cases 01-101101 to 01101112. - NO

WON Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied retroactively

from the March 1999 dismissal by Judge Agnir or
prospectively from the date of its effectivity on
December 2001. - PROSPECTIVELY
WON the respondents motion calling for the
inhibitions of Arroyo-appointed Supreme Court
Justices should be granted.

RULING:
Having invoked Sec 8 Rule 117 before the
petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the
Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites thereof, namely:
o The prosecution with the express conformity
of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
o The offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
o The court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
o The public prosecutor is served with a copy
of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
Petitioners contend that it will not apply since the
dismissal of the cases was without the consent of
Lacson and that there were no notices given to the
heirs of the victims which are conditions sine qua
non for the application of the said rule.
Respondent, on the other hand, insists that as
found by Judge Agnir, he himself moved for the
dismissal of the cases and that the heirs of the
victims were notified through the public and private

prosecutors since the prosecutors were present

during the March 22, 1999 hearing wherein
respondent moved for the judicial determination of
probable cause.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that
the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689.
The prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For
his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that
under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The respondent, through counsel, even admitted
that despite his plea for equitable relief in his
motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional
dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that
the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr.
was that warrants for his arrest be withheld
pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted
that the judge did not even require him to agree to
a provisional dismissal of the cases.
As to notice, the facts show that the heirs of the
victims were not notified thereof prior to the
hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999.
Respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999
and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely
five days from the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion,
the records do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or that
subpoenae were issued to and received by them,
including those who executed their affidavits of

desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or

Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.
There is as well no proof in the records that the
public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of
said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22,
1999.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the
application of the new rule were not present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution,
the State is not barred by the time limit set
forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.
The State says that if it will be applied retroactively,
it would violate the right of the People to due
process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish
the States substantive right to prosecute the
accused. While the respondent asserts that the rule
may be applied retroactively since there is no
substantive right of the State that may be impaired
since the States witnesses were ready, willing and
able to provide their testimony and that the State
has more than reasonable time to indict him when
the rule took effect on December 2000.
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce
the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had been filed
but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of
the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or

waived its right to revive the case and prosecute

the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto
permanent.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable.
o The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
The new rule is not unreasonable to both the State
and the accused. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced
the societal interests and those of the accused for
the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights
of both the State and of the accused to due
process.
However,
the rule
cannot be applied
retroactively in this case. The time-bar under
the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration
of the criminal justice system for the benefit
of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. The Court agrees with the

petitioners that to apply the time-bar

retroactively
is
inconsistent
with
the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State only had one year
and three months to do so.
This is in consonance with the intendment of the
new rule in fixing the time-bar, to prevent injustice
to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable,
oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice. For it would be a denial of
the States right to due process and a travesty of
justice for the Court to apply the new rule
retroactively in the present case as the respondent
insists, especially considering that the criminal
cases were provisionally dismissed on March 29,
1999 before the new rule took effect on December
1, 2000.
The respondent points out that the following
members of the Court (Renato Corona, Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, Conchita Morales, Romeo Callejo
and Adolfo Azcuna ) were appointed by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19,
2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was
submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts
that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC specifically
provides that it applies only to the divisions of the
Court, it should likewise apply to this case and
accordingly the case should be unloaded by Callejo
and be re-raffled to other SC justice.
The respondents reliance on Supreme Court
Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As
admitted by the respondent, the said circular
is
applicable
only
to
motions
for
reconsideration in cases assigned to the
Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to

the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had

always been and still is, if the ponente is no
longer with the Court, his replacement will
act upon the motion for reconsideration of a
party and participate in the deliberations
thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo,
Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon,
prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court.
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its
newest members to inhibit themselves from
participating in the deliberation of the respondents
Motion for Reconsideration. Although Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and
Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the
Court during the February 18, 2002 oral arguments
before the Court, nonetheless they were not
disqualified to participate in the deliberations on
the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the
instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice
Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of
the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent. When the Court deliberated on
petitioners motion for reconsideration, Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and
Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the
Court. It bears stressing that transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the February 18,

2002 hearing and oral arguments of the parties are

parts of the records of this case, and available to
the parties and their counsels. Besides, the
respondent sought the inhibition of Justices
Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after
they had already concurred in the Courts
Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that
a motion for disqualification must be denied when
filed after a member of the Court has already given
an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale
being that a litigant cannot be permitted to
speculate upon the action of the Court, only to
raise an objection of this sort after a decision has
been rendered.
DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and
Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The
respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its
Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby
DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with
dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively
to try and decide heinous crimes.