How Do We Change From Unitary To Federal?

There are no clearer marching orders given to

Congress than the pronouncement of President
Rodrigo Duterte in his recent SONA that the
Philippines should adopt a federal-parliamentary
government modeled after France, with a strong
President. Federalism was a major rallying cry for
then presidential candidate Digong (the other was
peace and order). We are looking at a leader who is
keeping his word. There is a slight variation between
the French model that PRRD and his Political
Party (PDP Laban) wants and the findings and
conclusions of the 2005 Consultative Commission (A
50-member group established through Executive
Order No. 453 during President Arroyos time)
which the Centrist Democratic Party (CDP)
advocates. We did away with a strong universally
elected President. While the President prefers a
federal-parliament with a strong President, we from
the CDP & 2005 ConCom found the opposite works
better for a parliamentary government with the head
of government, the Prime Minister, having an
ascendant role. A universally elected President
assumes a post that comes with the gravitas to
compete with the Prime Minister, and that could
create friction between them even if both come from
the dominant or majority party. Even for a
ceremonial position, which PRRD says he prefers,
the parliamentary President elected at large vests any
national politician with a stature that carries much
prestige. Over time, there will be an inevitable
encroachment into power bestowed on the
presidency, transforming its ceremonial nature to one
that competes with the head of government. Two big
egos in the playground spell trouble over time. The
French themselves have a problem with their French
model, but that is part of their political history. The
same is alien to us. On the other hand, there are

harmonies with President Digongs wishes

with those of the CDP and the 2005 ConCom
conclusions foremost of which, of course,
is that we need to shift from the unitary to
the federal-parliamentary system. Let us
dwell on the commonalities.
The process of federalization (the
framework): Contrary to the slogans hurled
during the course of the 2016 election
campaign, federalism is a multi-step process
that must be clearly written in the
Constitution. We cant just legislate
Federalism or just write in the Constitution
that we are a de-facto Federal Republic
tomorrow. What we can write in the new
Constitution when we revise the 1987 Cory
Constitution is THE FRAMEWORK, the
step-by step process, the roadmap as it were
to attaining the Philippine Federal Republic;
beyond the term of President Digong and
even in the next decade or so.
So even with President Digong gone, we will
have planted today the seeds of our Federal
Republic. Let me simplify and perhaps,
shock some of the true believers. Ushering in
federalism requires the revision of the 1987
Constitution. The critical question is how to
make the transition from a unitary to a
federal system successful, less painful,
sustainable and beneficial to the Filipino
people. Our proposal has three critical steps:
Step 1: Put in place four (4) preconditions.
First is the indispensability of real political
parties. Not the type we have today or have

had in the past several decades. Political parties are

primarily formed not only to contest elections and
hold power in government but they must possess an
ideological core, aggregating the needs and
aspirations of a diverse segment of our society. We
must reform our political party system through the
passing of the Political Party Development and
Financing Act (SB 3214 & HB 6551 languishing in
the last Congress), which will:
1) Penalize turncoatism (or the switching of
political parties, balimbing, political
butterfly);
2) Enforce transparent mechanisms providing and
regulating campaign financing to eliminate graft,
corruption, and patronage (corporate and individual
contributions); and through
3) State subsidy that will professionalize political
parties by supporting their political education and
campaign initiatives.
Second is to enact a law banning political dynasties as
mandated in article II section 26 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Immediate passage of an
Anti-Dynasty law will level the playing field and
provide equal opportunities to other emerging capable
leaders to serve; practice transparent nomination
among political parties with candidates willing to
contest in the local elections; and most especially, ban
concentration of powers by the few dynastic families
in the barangay, local, and national positions. If
Congress does not again pass an enabling law, then
what should be written in the revised Constitution
should be self-executory.

The third is the passage of the Freedom of

Information Bill (FOI) to enforce transparency in all
transactions in government (not only through
Executive Order). This law will allow public access
to information (regardless of physical form or
format) pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, government research data used as a basis
for policy development; and compel transparency
and accountability in public service by requiring
financial information such as SALNs of public/civil
servants to be posted in government offices or
websites.
The fourth is initiate electoral reforms that will put in
place a system that will not pervert the will of the
populace. The Comelec must be reformed, including
the Civil Service Commission, in order to merit
competence and quality leadership in our future
public leaders.
These preconditions have a high probability of
passage while we have a President endowed with
tremendous political capital and has the political will
to act decisively. But this Presidents enormous
political capital, as in anything that is valuable, is
likewise fragile and could erode; therefore there is a
need to act now, and fast. If these preconditions are
not put in place and we proceed with a transition to a
federal government, then we may have a government
much worse than we currently have. Consider the
scenarios:
a. We would have allowed the same personalities and
political parties controlled by dynasties into the
federal states, each establishing their fiefdoms,
possibly with their own private armies and
untrammeled looting of the States resources.

b. Control by the local elite and oligarchy of

the economy and the political structure
would result in regulatory capture of
government agencies. This would all be
fortified by a patronage system flourishing
within a much smaller State area and
population.
This will result in inequality, a greater gap
between the haves and the have-nots,
weaken citizens participation in
governance and eventually destroy
democracy. Then the mantra Change is
Coming would have been a total disaster!
(The second part of this three-part series will
appear next Thursday)
Among the four preconditions, the most
important to a shift from unitary to a federal
system is the creation of real political parties
free from the clutches of political dynasties.
In our current unitary system, we have a
political phenomenon that occurs every
presidential cycle the lemming-like
migration of political parties to the winning
Presidents political party. As a case in
point, PDP Laban has three incoming
members of the House and a lone secondtermer senator. In less than a week after the
candidate Digong became the presumptive
President Duterte, and even before he was
sworn in, he declared that he wanted
Congressman Alvarez as the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. Days prior to the
Presidents assumption of office, the LP
and some members of the other political
parties have jumped ship to the PDP Laban
super-majority. Perhaps there is nothing

wrong with that from the point of view of Philippine

politicians and their brand of traditional politics
because, really, our dysfunctional system calls for it
but it is stretching credulity to a shameful level
when one particular (LP-LAKAS-KBL) politician
paraphrased President Quezon and proclaimed: My
loyalty to my part ends when my loyalty to my
country begins or something dramatic to that
effect. He would have salvaged a shred of self-respect
if he simply declared, I want to be with the winning
brand for my self-interest and maybe the interest of
my constituency. This political butterfly or the
balimbing spectacle, however, has been the norm
in the modern Philippine political scene. In 1986,
when Cory won, the dominant Marcos KBL was
decimated, though Cory did not believe in a political
party which was tragic they gravitated to her in
droves. In 1992, Fidel Ramos, whose LAKAS-TAO
party reportedly could all fit into one taxicab,
built a rainbow coalition of NUCD-CMD-LAKAS
and remained in power up to GMAs KAMPI
administration. That party was dominant until PNoy
took power in 2010 decimating the NUCD-CMDLAKAS- KAMPI, giving rise to the new Liberal
Party. Today, we have a not so new kid in the
block; PDP Laban with more than 100 LP
swearing allegiance to the principles and ideology of
this left-of-center party. I bring these episodes
not to disparage individual politicians but to
emphasize that corrective measures were seriously
proposed in the last two congresses The Political
Party Reform and Financing Act (principally authored
by our CDP President). This law was intended to
assure the emergence of real political parties ones
that would aggregate the hopes, interest and
aspirations of the citizenry and bring these into open
transparent competition for legitimate political power.
Alas, this bill was aborted by the ruling LP of the

outgoing administration. The new Federal

constitution that will be written under this
administration must include these deleted measures.
If we have the same kind of political parties existing
today when we have become federalized, then we
allow the Federal States to be run by the very people
whose vested interests are those against the common
good. If and when political party reform and the three
other preconditions are achieved immediately, then
we can proceed to activate the next step of the
federalization process THE IMMEDIATE
TRANSITION TO A PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT. (I am lifting the following features
verbatim from our 2005 Consultative Commission
Draft Constitution on the features of the
Parliamentary system).
a) Briefly, a parliamentary system is known, too, as
Party Government as the political parties have
ascendancy over personalities and because of the
pivotal role of political parties in parliamentary
elections, governance and public administrations.
b) In our proposal, the legislative and the executive
powers are fused in a unicameral parliament; and the
Head of the Government: is the Prime Minister
with his Cabinet recruited from among the members
of parliament.
c) The President is the Head of State and is
elected from among the members of parliament; and
upon taking his oath he ceases to be a member of
parliament and any political party. He serves a term
of five years and is commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. (Here, PRRD wants a universally elected
President).

d) A unicameral parliament is composed of

elected members from the parliamentary
districts, plus those chosen on the basis of
proportional representation by the
political party, according to the votes each
party obtained in the preceding elections.

the term shall forfeit his seat and will be replaced by

his political party.

e) The members chosen by the political

parties (party list) shall constitute 30 percent
of the total number of Members of
Parliament.

k) This vote of no confidence is a much easier

process of replacing a head of government in a
parliamentary system than the current impeachment
process of replacing a President.

f) The political parties shall ensure that in the

30 percent party list, the labor, peasant,
urban poor, veterans indigenous people
communities, women, youth, differentlyabled, except the religious sector, are
properly represented.

It is still being debated whether or not the country

should adopt a federal-presidential form or a federalparliamentary form. However, PARLIAMENTARY is
a far superior system to that of a PRESIDENTIAL
one in overall government performance. A
parliamentary government can: (1) prevent gridlock
and promote consensus in governance, (2) ensure the
stability and continuity in governance, (3) strengthen
accountability in governance, (4) promote cohesive
and disciplined political parties, (5) and promote
broader based and inclusive politics through a multiparty system. Before the time Candidate Digong came
forward with a genius strategy of going for the
Presidency with his urong-sulong, now you
see him, now you dont campaign approach, only
a few people have really heard of federalism. I
suspected Manila voters were at first indifferent to the
idea. However, it was a different case with people in
the provinces and outlying areas outside of Metro
Manila, particularly in Mindanao. Federalism was a
catchword for freedom from the clutches of
Imperial Manila. And in fact, it is really a cry for
justice of some sort to correct the decades-old
dominance of the national central government, where
power and authority are concentrated over the
regional and local governments. When he delivered a

g) Our current political parties are personal

factions and alliances of politicians, united
mainly for elections and patronage; they
have no mass memberships and no
sustainable and exclusive serious platform of
government that differentiate them from one
another. They are not responsible and
accountable for their performance in and out
of office.
h) For these reasons, they dont have
loyalties to their parties and migrate to the
political party of the winning President. This
spectacle is known as turncoatism or
political butterfly.
i) As proposed, any elective official who
leaves his political party before the end of

j) A mechanism to replace a Prime Minister is for

Parliament to withdraw its confidence and by electing
a successor by a majority vote of all its members.

down-to-earth message on his favored system of

government for the Philippines, federalism seems to
be a well understood concept by the ordinary people
using his 70-30 percent formula, which simply states
that 70 percent of the regions income goes to them
and the remaining 30 percent sent to the central
government.
Step3: Creating federal states, through autonomous
territories
But then again, the question is no longer why change
the system, but how to change the system.
Federalism, while seen as a solution to the systemic
deficiencies in the country, requires a process as
emphasized in the first and second parts of this
column (step 1 four preconditions to federalism
and step 2 immediate shift to parliamentary
government), which we propose, should be followed
by a more important step that will complete the
roadmap to a Federal Republic of the Philippines
the CREATION OF AUTONOMOUS
TERRITORIES. The Consultative Commissions
out of the box version of a federal state has its
roots on the concept of autonomy, subsidiarity and
self-determination. In our version, adopted by the
Centrist Democratic Party (CDP), we allow the
provinces and highly urbanized component cities to
evolve first to an autonomous territory, with the
decision to group themselves coming from the
grassroots level (PINATUBO). Self-determination
is central to this decision. Although the Philippines
may eventually end up with, from 8-12 federal states,
Parliament cant impose on the current provinces
and cities. They are merely given the general
guidelines for such formation based on criteria to be
embedded in the revised Constitution, such as
common culture, language, custom, contiguous areas
and economic viability. Therefore, it is necessary that

these contiguous provinces/cities need to

negotiate among one another. In other words,
the citizens within a contiguous territory,
with a common language and culture, must
decide in a referendum that they want to
become completely autonomous. Petitions
are passed by their local legislative
assemblies. Once a referendum is passed,
within a year, Parliament must enact an
organic law defining the autonomous
territorys land area, powers, obligations
and sources of revenues (taxes). The
autonomous territory then writes its own
Constitution to be approved in a plebiscite by
its own people. If 3/5 (60 percent) of the
provinces and component cities of the
Philippines become autonomous territories,
then the Federal Republic of the Philippines
is created.
Whats in a name?
Reaching the 60 percent hurdle rate may take
years depending on how fast the other
provinces and component cities can become
autonomous territories. The slower ones may
take time negotiating with their neighboring
provinces and cities. But for all intents and
purposes, the autonomous territory already
exercises the rights, privileges and
prerogatives of a federal state. It has its own
Constitution, defined boundaries, its own
government structure and sources of income
and independence from the central
government. Provinces and cities that have
not agreed among themselves to become an
autonomous territory will be disadvantaged,
but the success of its neighboring
autonomous territory would be a huge

motivation for them to likewise convert into one.

Critics on Federalism claim that the federal system
will result in inequality among various regions. Yet,
in a response by Dr. Jose Abueva, chairman of the
ConCom, Right now, under our unitary system and
presidential government, there are serious inequalities
among our 16 administrative regions and the ARMM
in their economic and social development
which our existing political system has not only failed
to reduce but has actually made worse over the years
because of its weakness and ineffectiveness. The
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) listed 11
Mindanawan provinces out of the 20 poorest
provinces in the country. One important aspect of
federalism, aside from self-determination for regions,
is that it emphasizes respect for the socio-cultural
diversity of the people and seeks solidarity and
cooperation in governance, nation-building,
modernization and development. The Bingham
Centre for the Rule of Law studied that many scholars
have cited Indias federal constitution as a reason
for its success in managing its multiethnic and
multireligious polity; Pakistan has recently
strengthened its Constitutions federal
characteristics; Sri Lankas best chance for a
durable peace with justice between the Sinhalese
majority and the Tamil minority was when it explored
constitutional reform based on federalism between
1996 and 2004; Nepal,following a decade-long
conflict that ended with a peace agreement in 2006, is
working on the details of a new Constitution that will
introduce a federal, secular, democratic republic. The
Malaysian and Indonesian Constitutions contain
federal features while Malaysia has started
discussions on federal type reforms to address
minority aspirations in these countries. They say that
a federal system will strengthen ethnic regionalism or
the cultural division of the nation as Tagalogs,

Visayans, Ilocanos, Bicolanos, Moros, etc. However,

ethnic regionalism among Filipinos as
emphasized by Dr. Abueva, is the natural feeling
people have in identifying with their place of birth
and native language and culture. According to Dr.
Abueva, this is good for the people and the nation if
the people also identify with the nation and the
country as a whole, as many actually do. This is why
the CDP firmly supports the passage of the Basic
Law on the Bangsamoro (BBL), since what is good
for the Bangsamoro is good for the Bangsa Ilocano,
Bangsa Tagalog, and all other regions that exhibit
self-determination, autonomy and subsidiarity. As a
final note, I will quote from the Mister Pideral of
Mindanao, Rey Teves: Federalism is an idea whose
time has come. But by no means is a federal system
perfect, of course. Indeed, there is no perfect political
system in the world. But there are effective systems
as there are lousy ones. There are relevant and
responsive systems as there are abusive and
oppressive ones. For the CDP and the ConCom,
the proposed federal system, along with the four
preconditions; immediate shift to parliamentary
system; and creation of autonomous territories, will
contribute to the improvement of governance and
political leadership, to their effectiveness and
accountability, and to the peoples empowerment so
they can demand better service and performance by
the leaders and the government. The creation of the
Federal Parliamentary Philippines would be the
fulfilment of the vision of many of its adherents,
dating back to the Philippine Revolution and the birth
of a nation; and would be the lasting legacy of
President Duterte. An apt finish to his mantra
Change is coming it has.
FEDEDERALISM IS NOT A SOLUTION: The
concept of Federalism has recently been getting

special attention in Philippine political

circles. Judging by the constant talk about it,
it appears our elected officials are
determined to push efforts to adopt a form of
Federalism through Constitutional
amendment as the new basis of the political
and economic union of the Filipino people.
As early as 2009, however, when I organized
a national political party called Buklod, I
have taken the view that Federalism is not a
solution to the countrys economic and
political problems. As I indicated in the
Objectives and Beliefs of Buklod,
Federalism is, in fact, a step backward. I
believe that this idea of Federalism gained
traction as a consequence of feelings of
frustration about the failure of past
governments and elected leaders to lift the
country to a high level of economic
development that it deserves, and of
desperation in the fruitless search for a
solution that works. Federalism is now seen
as the solution. But I am afraid it is not and I
beg to disagree. I am convinced, in fact, that
its adoption will only prolong the economic
hardships of a large number of our people
who find themselves stuck in poverty. My
position against Federalism as the solution is
anchored on two broad factors which I will
now discuss, setting aside less significant
details for the time being. These two factors
are, one, the incompatible condition of the
present political and economic setting from
where the proposed Federalism will rise and,
two, the huge complexity of the resource
allocation that its successful implementation
will entail. The advocates of Federalism
must, of course, clearly define the form of

Federalism that they wish to put in place. However,

that is not important at the moment for purposes of
this paper. Suffice it to say that in its economic form,
the Federal subdivisions or states will have a greater
authority in deriving their respective revenue than the
present provinces have and each Federal subdivision
has sole authority in deciding where to spend such
revenue. There will therefore be a clear dividing line
between the fiscal authority of the central government
and the fiscal authority of the Federal subdivisions. In
effect, through their powers of deriving and allocating
revenue, in theory, the states will have a strong
influence in shaping the respective economic
development of the people within their geographical
jurisdiction. As to political form, there could be a few
options. References could be made from the existing
countries in the world that have a Federal form of
political union. But the important consideration, I
suppose, is choosing the political structure that can
best deliver the desired economic prosperity while
maintaining even improving, hopefully the
freedom of the people in each state.
A motion in reverse direction
Regarding the first factor, I believe that the
introduction of Federalism in the Philippines is a
motion in reverse direction as compared to the
forward motion pursued by the currently
federated countries in the world today. These
federated countries are composed of previously
independent or autonomous/semi-autonomous
entities that had existed for many years before
they decided to form a political union to pursue a
common cause. Good examples are the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States of
America. The states comprising the present
Federal Republic of Germany used to be
independent states which were component parts

of a loose confederation, the Holy Roman

Empire, until this was disbanded by Napoleon in
early 19thcentury but was succeeded by another
loose German Confederation after Napoleons
fall. These independent states had existed for
hundreds of years and had even fought each
other under various alliances. The present
Federal Republic has its origin from a unification
drive taken under the leadership of Prussia, with
Bismarck pushing it, after a successful war
against Austria in 1866. In sum, a new German
Federation (now excluding Austria), which
subsequently became the German Empire in
1871, was formed through Prussian conquest of a
few German states and peaceful accession to the
Federation by the other German states. The 13
colonies that first formed the United States of
America were political units independent of each
other and each one was governed under the
British crown and government across the
Atlantic. Many of them, if not all, existed for
more than a hundred years before they found a
common cause to form a then loose
confederation to fight the British army for their
independence. After the revolutionary war ended
in 1788, these states came to realize that the
loose confederation did not work well and
adopted a constitution that became the basic
political instrument of the United States. The
birth pangs of this new Republic were not easy to
deal with and there were continuous substantive
issues between these states and the Central
Government, as well as among the states
themselves, which culminated in the horrible
Civil War of 1861. There is, of course, another
example near our own doorstep, Malaysia. The
present Peninsular Malaysia was already a
Federation, consisting of nine sultanates and

Penang and Malacca, when it was

granted independence by Great Britain
in 1957. Earlier, right after World War II,
Great Britain established the Malayan
Union putting together all these states to
form a single colony and stripping the
sultans of their sovereignty. This move
was strongly resisted by the Malays and
the British gave in by organizing the
Federation of Malaya, with the role of
the sultans restored in some form. This
Federal form of government became a
convenient structure when Malaysia was
created in 1963 to include the separate
British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and
Sarawak. Singapore was pushed out two
years later. Why are these comments
relevant in the forming of Philippine
Federalism? There are several reasons.
Firstly, unlike the component parts of the
Federal countries I have described, the
Philippines, I believe, is already one
unified country. So why are we thinking
of, in effect, subdividing it? We would,
therefore, be pushing the country in a
reverse motion. I cannot recall of any
country in the world that had done such
reversal. If this is true, then we are
putting the Philippines on a path that has
not been traveled before anywhere in the
world and, as such, the journey will be
full of unknown dangers and risks. On
the other hand, if there is such a country
or countries, then it will be prudent to
study first their experiences before we
embark on a trip of no return. Secondly,
each of the independent or
autonomous/semi-autonomous states

cited above that formed a federal union already

had a separate government with its own
institutions and bureaucracy that had been
functioning and serving its own people, in most
cases, for hundreds of years. Thirdly, these
predecessor states, except perhaps the states
comprising Malaysia, already had fiscal
autonomy and had long experience in imposing
taxation and allocating the tax revenue for
various uses, including economic development
purposes. Clearly, under these conditions, it will
not be difficult for the federated union to function
well immediately as the composing states, in
most cases, were already functioning
independently by themselves. In fact, the
federating states were surrendering part of their
previous independence by sharing power with the
Central Government and foregoing some revenue
to fund it. Fourthly, in spite of this ease of
amalgamation, during at least the early period,
the path towards meaningful and mutually
beneficial confederation is difficult to travel, like
in the case of the USA. And fifthly, it shall be
noted that the motivation for the federation was
not economic. In the case of Germany, it was a
projection of German power in Europe. For the
United States, it was the severing of political link
with the mother country. In the case of Malaysia,
the purpose was to consolidate the previously
almost separate political entities under a central
government. The motivation for a Federal
Philippines is nothing like those cited above. As I
have stated earlier, the direction Federal
Philippines plans to take is opposite to the
direction taken by the countries mentioned above.
The component parts of these Federal countries
came together to achieve unification to gain
greater strength as one nation. In the case of the

Philippines, it could be described as splitting the

country apart to some extent for the purpose of
each subdivision to have a greater authority for
its own internal purposes, which, I believe, are
largely economic. The Philippine circumstances
and its motivation for Federalism are therefore
starkly different from those of the Federal
countries I mentioned above.
The present government institutions and bureaucracy
(referred to as institutions subsequently for brevity)
of the Philippines as a unitary whole remain weak in
spite of many decades of trying to improve them.
Their ability to provide adequate and efficient
services to the citizens is still very much wanting in
many respects. More importantly, the Philippine
citizenry views them as functioning with an allpervading system of corruption. The collection of
national taxes still has to reach its optimal level in
spite of greater efforts exercised in recent years.
Recent Asian regional statistics show the Philippines
at the bottom of the list in terms of tax revenue to
GDP ratio. The allocation of tax revenue also lacks
judiciousness, effectiveness, and efficiency as
evidenced by constant outcries about pork barrel
allotments to legislators, inadequate infrastructure
spending, inadequate funding for poverty reduction,
housing, education and the like. And of course, there
are significant leakages in such allocations as a result
of corruption. With these less than desirable
performance at the national level, it is not difficult to
see that if much of the functions and activities of
these institutions are devolved to the Federal
subdivisions, the performance of the equivalent
institutions at the state level may worsen at least
during the medium term.

Institutions at the state level still have to be

organized
The institutions at the state level still have to
be organized and developed, unlike in the
Federal countries mentioned earlier, where
the federating states already had existing and
functioning state government at the time of
federation. The initial resources for the state
institutions of Federal Philippines will
necessarily be drawn mainly from the
existing national institutions and partly from
the existing provincial bureaucracy which, I
believe, is much weaker than the national
institutions. But the resources coming from
these sources will not be enough as the
Federation necessarily results in creating an
additional level of government and therefore
will need more personnel and other resources
that need to be procured from the outside.
Each state will need to develop its own
expertise in formulating policies and
programs relating to economic development,
taxes, infrastructure and similar areas. It
needs to develop the capability for
budgeting, collecting taxes, contracting for
construction and other services and many
other areas of government activity. All these
put together need organization and
development of resource capability and
capacity. These organizational and
developmental activities require time to put
the state institutions at a reasonably
functioning level. When that level is reached,
I do not think these will function any better
than the performance of the present national
institutions. As such, the increased economic
performance that is being sought will be set
back for some time before it can move

forward. On this consideration, the present unitary

form of government, given the chance, may in fact do
better than if it were to be subdivided into states.
Federalism will create disruption in the present order
of things and require reorganization and
redevelopment on the subdivided parts. The second
factor the allocation of financial resources among
the Central Government and the various states is a
much more daunting challenge. The difficulties will
not only occur at the beginning of Federalism but also
for many years to come. As shown in the statistics
developed by the Philippine Statistics Authority, the
regional distribution of GDP in 2014 is hugely
disproportional. NCR alone earned 36.3% of the total
2014 GDP. Together with Region III (Aurora, Bataan,
Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac and
Zambales) and Region IV-A (Southern Tagalog),
these three regions have 62.8% of total Philippine
2014 GDP. Even when the architects of Federalism
allow each state to impose income tax on income
earned in its territory and collect the VAT on value
added to economic goods sold in the state, I anticipate
that these three regions will collect more than half of
the total tax revenue of Federal Philippines. This is so
because the distribution of GDP shown above is
highly indicative of the volume of taxable economic
activities in each region. As such, it is very likely that
post-Federalism, transfers, or more descriptively,
subsidies, will have to be made from some states to
the others. Additionally, there is still the question of
how the central government will get its own share of
revenue and what proportion of total revenue that
share would be. This picture of highly disproportional
distribution of GDP alone indicates that it is illogical
to divide the country into semi-autonomous regions,
which I assume will be composed of contiguous
provinces. Under such condition, no matter how the
tax revenue is divided up among the Central

Government and each of the various Philippine

states, there will be universal dissatisfaction. The rich
states will try to retain as much of what they have
earned and will complain if much is taken away from
them. The poor states will want to have more and
will complain if they get less than what they want.
Those are just normal reactions and these problems
will fester for a long time as the development of the
poor states predictably will take long because they
lack resources to begin with and can only stay afloat
through subsidies coming from the rich states.
Moreover, such subsidies if large in amounts and
continue for a long time is not consistent with the
idea of Federalism which is for each state to fend for
itself. What is worse is that the poor states may get
accustomed to such subsidies and, therefore, such
dependency defeats the purpose of Federalism. In
creating Federalism, we will unwittingly disturb the
lying sleeping dogs. Trying to resolve this huge
revenue allocation problem may just result in
eventual secession by one or more Philippine states
or, God forbid, a civil war. I am not trying to
exaggerate. But these possible consequent future
scenarios should not be ignored. At the very least,
before plunging into Federalism, its advocates must
construct a prototype of their concept of Federalism
which must include a clear illustration of the money
flows. If the prototype indicates that the political
subdivision and money flows do not make sense and
cannot be reasonably sustained, then obviously we
should not embark on that experiment. In the event
that the advocates will plunge this country into
Federalism without first developing such a prototype,
I believe that will be taking a terribly irresponsible,
reckless action. Putting all these analyses together,
Federalism is not the solution. If for some reason or
another, the advocates persist in putting Federalism
in place, I would rather as the gates would have

been opened anyway advocate dividing

the Philippines into two or three independent
countries, with a customs union and with or
without a common currency. This division
should be done in a peaceful and mutually
acceptable manner, the way the former
Czechoslovakia did it. The probability of
success of this scenario for the divided parts
is much greater, I believe. As I have said
earlier, I believe the idea of Federalism was a
consequence of frustration and desperation.
My own observation is that this idea is
strong in Mindanao and to some extent, in
the Bicol region, which regions, for the most
parts, are comparatively poor. I empathize
with the sentiments of our fellow citizens in
these regions. I agree that these places were
neglected for many years, but the economic
development and poverty problems in these
areas can be fixed if we exert strong political
will. Federalism, by itself , will not solve
these problems.
Our elected leaders must be less selfish
To me, the solutions under the present
unitary form of government are easy to find,
but our leaders do not want to pick them. We
are now in an era of plain talk and I will
embrace it. First of all, much of the solutions
relate to the mindset of our elected leaders.
They have to be less selfish. The prevailing
dynastic rule must be stopped. At the
moment, the entire country is probably ruled
continuously by 100 or so families, making
the Philippine state an oligarchy. We have an
incestuous condition in our midst and being
incestuous, it cannot bring good results. It is
always good and desirable to have new faces

in the political system on a continuing basis. They

provide fresh ideas and bring stronger will. The pork
barrel system in whatever form must be eliminated
and the money saved channeled towards better uses,
like more allocations to poverty reduction and
education. Moreover, such practice only leads to the
preservation of the dynasties. Our leaders must
restrain their self-interest when promulgating or
amending laws designed to promote a cleaner and
better-run government, such as the laws regarding
anti-money laundering, bank secrecy, Freedom of
Information and the like. The current leaders must
also permit the passage of a law to strengthen
political parties by providing effective penalties to
those party members who transfer to another party
before an election and after being elected to any
elective position. In this manner, the political parties
may develop into the kind that embrace and stick to
their chosen political and economic ideologies so that
during elections, the contest also becomes a battle of
ideologies. At present, we have a system of
perpetuating the self-interest of politicians. Whenever
there is a new president, the elected members of the
legislature change party affiliation or allegiance to the
winning presidents party or group. As a result, we
see the same faces who were loyal to the previous
president and even to the predecessor of theprevious
president becoming immediately supportive of the
new president. Why is this so? It is clearly not in
pursuit of ideology. It is clearly because of the
resulting benefits of adhering to the current power.
This kind of situation can never be favorable to longterm political and economic development. This is one
of the important reasons why our countrys peers
continuously overtake us and may eventually leave us
at the lowest rung ofthe ladder in the foreseeable
future. Without strong political parties, I do not think
we can achieve the desirable level of political

development. Sad to say, Federalism alone cannot

solve all the foregoing issues. The other strong
impediment to success is our system (form and
structure) of unitary government. We copied it
essentially from the system of government of the
United States, apparently, at Federal level, and
applied it on our unitary form of government. That by
itself raises a question as to whether the system we
adopted fits Philippine conditions and culture. At the
US Federal level, the US Constitution chose to create
a President in an adaptation of the role at that time of
the British King. As such, it created a system of
checks and balances, not only between the
presidency and the legislature but also between the
two houses of Congress. It created a Federal Senate
as an equalizer to the Federal House of
Representatives to protect the interest of the smaller
states. Each state, irrespective of size, sends two
senators to the Federal Senate, while each state sends
representatives to the Federal House on the basis of
population proportional representation. (As a result, a
small state may send two senators and one
congressman to the US Congress, while a large state
may send two and more than 50, respectively.)
Election becomes a popularity contest
As practiced in the Philippines, the senators,
composing a small number, are elected nationwide
and the election becomes a popularity contest. After
each election, the Senate becomes a club of aspiring
presidents. As mentioned earlier, the Philippine
Congress, as a whole, has been ineffective in dealing
decisively with important issues relating to political
development which is a necessary element in the
pursuit of economic development. Because the two
houses essentially have the same powers, they pass
bills independently of each other and many times, for
important legislations, the two separate versions bear

significant differences which are reconciled

by a few legislators who, in effect, become
the final deciders. Is this process a fair and
transparent way of enacting a law that binds
all the citizens? The Philippine Supreme
Court, the equivalent of the US Federal
Supreme Court, has become the destination
of all losers of practically all cases decided
in lower courts. As a result, it takes ages for
the final outcome to come out. It appears that
the US Federal Supreme Court does not
work that way. We can go on and on. Suffice
it to say, the present system of government
under our unitary state,in my opinion, does
not fit the political and economic
developmental needs of the Filipino people
and its culture. Now that our leaders are
talking about amending the Constitution,
they should seriously consider changing the
system of our Government but without
subdividing the country into Federal states. I
believe that a system that has a strong
parliament at the core will be good for us.
Under such a parliamentary system, the
legislative function is fused with the
executive function. This arrangement will
result in much quicker focusing on urgent
and important matters and much faster
approval process and subsequent
implementation. This country urgently needs
a decisive government working at a fast
tempo, especially at this time. To work
effectively, such a parliamentary system
must be accompanied by a strong party
system and by a limitation of the number of
qualified political parties during an election
contest to minimize the chance of a coalition
government. To prevent abuse, the

parliamentary system should provide for the

dissolution of the parliament in case of a vote of no
confidence on the existing government and for the
consequent election of a new parliament.
Additionally, a second legislative chamber should be
provided, but which should not have equal powers
with the parliament. The specifics of the role of the
second chamber may take a number of forms, which I
will not dwell with at this time, but suffice it to say,
the role of this legislative chamber should provide a
review of the bills passed by the Parliament under a
process by which its opinion is given by the
parliament serious consideration and action.
A head of state without executive powers
This parliamentary system should provide for a Head
of State, without executive powers, who should be
elected nationwide. We need not call this Head of
State President. We may call this person a Sultan or a
Rajah to portray our pre-Hispanic past. The Head of
State will be the symbol of the Filipino nation. We do
not need to reinvent the wheel. There are many
references we can use, particularly, among the
countries of the present EU,except France (which has
a strong presidency), butincluding the UK. We can
also look at Japans government system. What is
important is to choose features of a strong
parliamentary system that may effectively work under
the present Philippine economic conditions and
cultural setting. To provide a truly fresh start and to
inject new thinking, the necessary constitutional
change must be done through a constitutional
convention with a requirement that the elected
delegates shall not include those who were elected to
the national and local governmentsduring the last four
presidential elections and eight congressional
elections. The current and past leaders already had
their chance during the last 70 years after

independence from the US. They must give way to a

new set of concerned citizens to form a new system
of government that will forge the economic and
political welfare of the current and future generations
of the Filipino people. Let me conclude by citing a
comment made by a well-known contemporary
political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, in his foreword
to the 2006 edition of the book Political Order in
Changing Societies by Samuel P. Huntington,
considered as one of the foremost political scientists
of his generation. Fukuyama saidHuntington is
further correct that political development follows its
own logic independent of economic development.
While there is evidence that long-term economic
growth breeds stronger democratic institutions (or,
more exactly, makes them less vulnerable to
setbacks), this is true only at a relatively high level of
per-capita GDP. For poor countries, political order
and competent institutions are a precondition for
economic growth. The challenge therefore for the
Philippines is to find the right vehicle for developing
competent institutions in the fastest way possible. I
dont think that vehicle is Federalism.Federalism at
this time will just set us back.
PRESIDENTIAL- PARLIAMENTARY It is
unfortunate that enlightened debate about the
proposed shift in the form of government has been
hampered by allegations of hidden motives by Senate
leaders and by a public suspicious of an unspoken
agenda of certain politicians. The senators fear that
the proposal is a means to cut short their political
careers. The public, in turn, suspects that the plan has
been advanced to secure the political futures of those
who hold higher political ambitions, as well as to
prolong the careers of those affected by the term
limits set by the Constitution. These reservations are
not baseless nor unfair, given the embarrassing way

patronage, narrow and self-interested politics

have dominated the political way of life of
the country. And while President Ramos has
openly declared that any consideration of a
change in government should not result in an
extension of his term of office, his
assurances have not prevented influential
sectors of society,prominently the media and
the business sectors, from calling for the
abandonment of the effort. They instead urge
more attention to the critical task of
economic recovery and development. For a
populace tired of the wrangling and
positioning of politicians, the call to focus on
pressing economic problems is
widespread. Unfortunately, the appeal is
premised on the erroneous assumption that
rebuilding the economy can proceed without
reforming political institutions and political
markets. The premise here is that the genuine
democracy is founded not only on social and
economic conditions, but also on the design
of political institutions. The Philippines, or
any other country similarly going through a
difficult phase of transition, will be unable to
cope without effective political institutions.
Strong political institutions make for
effective governance. They do not guarantee
the best policies,but they do ensure that the
government will be able to make policies of
some kind and that it will not be mired in
endless standoffs. Research on the
relationship between economic reform and
democracy has shown that the strong
political institutions are vital to
accomplishing economic reform. While the
socio-cultural and economic policy
challenges faced by new democracies are

important, these challenges cannot be met without

strong political institutions.For these reasons,
informed debate and research on constitutional
reforms is important.The principal question that will
be addressed is this: Why is a parliamentary system
a more appropriate framework of government,
compared to a presidential system, in improving the
capacity of government to function more effectively
and in facilitating the consolidation of democracy in
the Philippines? Three important assumptions in
this question ought to be clarified: First, despite the
proliferation of non-governmental development
institutions and the insistence of the business sector
on a market-determined growth strategy, government
will continue to play a central and dominant role in
the development of the country.With an
underdeveloped legislature, the initiative for policy
making will have to emanate from the executive.
With a limited manufacturing and industrial base,
government will have to provide the infrastructure,
the environment, and the push for economic recovery
and growth.In our fractured and divided society,
government must play a delicate mediating role in
forging compromise and peace in the country.
Second, the government will have to function
effectively to carry out these crucial roles. In the
past,successive governments have been criticized
with good reason-for inefficiency, for lacking both
economic an political competency, and, more
importantly, for being unable to govern outside
narrow political and economic interests. Effectiveness
can refer to a range of competencies. These
capabilities will be defined and limited in the context
of institutional reforms necessary to strengthen and
consolidate our fragile democracy.
Consolidation refers to the process by which
democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly

legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to

break down. It involves behavioral and institutional
changes that normalize democratic politics and
narrow its uncertainty (even to the point of rendering
it rather boring). Consolidation involves the
development of appropriate institutions so that
democratic norms and practices take hold in the
country. Other questions also come to mind about the
relationship between government structure and
effective governance: Will the change in the system
of government instantly bring about the capabilities
that will enhance government effectiveness? If not,
what other factors or influences will have to be
considered? This chapter has benefited immensely
from a growing literature on the impact of
institutions on promoting democratic consolidation
and in enhancing effective governance. Interest has
been focused particularly on the growing debate
about the appropriateness of a presidential or a
parliamentary system or a hybrid of either in
new democracies. The writer has studied the
experience of Latin American presidential
democracies to prove a hypothesis: that the basic
deficiencies of the presidential system that are not
culture-bound and peculiar to the Philippines are, in
fact, inherent in the system of government itself.
These are three reasons for focusing on Latin
America first, countries in that region have had a
long experience with democratic presidential
systems. This is particularly true for those, which
obtained their independence from Spain and Portugal
early in the nineteenth century. In fact, in Latin
America one finds the greatest concentration of USstyle presidential democracies. Finally, and most
important, there has been a similar process of debate
has taken place in the region about the wisdom of
shifting to a parliamentary system or adopting
applicable features of it within a semi-presidential

framework. The writer has also looked into

the performance of democratic parliamentary
regimes in Western Europe, particularly
Britain, France, and Germany, where the
parliamentary tradition is deeply rooted. To
eliminate the possibility that economic
growth and development would
independently influence political stability,
the writer has also looked into the experience
of parliamentary systems in certain
developing countries in the Caribbean and in
Africa. Before proceeding further, there is a
need to briefly establish the debate in the
context of the history of constitutional
reform in the Philippines.
I. Historical Context of the Debate: Many of
the proponents of the presidential system
argue as if the system of parliamentary
government is totally alien to the process of
constitutional formation and the reform in
the Philippines. Far from it. In fact, in past
exercises in constitution making the
Constitution of Biak-na-Bato of 1897, the
Constitution of Makabulos, the Malolos
Constitution, the Commonwealth
Constitution of 1935 and the martial lawdisrupted Constitutional Convention of 1971
the issue of a parliamentary versus
presidential structure of government has
been at the heart of the deliberations.
THE 1898 PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION: At
the turn of the century, Filipino
revolutionaries were at the point of driving
the Spanish colonizers out of the islands and
establishing an independent republic. At that

stage, the revolutionaries were contemplating the

adoption of a constitution that had the main features
of a parliamentary form of government. They drew
their ideas of government from English and European
sources, the Malolos Constitution, the Constitutions
of Biak-na-bato and Makabulos, as well as the
constitutional plans prepared by Apolinario Mabini
and Mariano Ponce. The Revolutionaries envisioned a
constitution that made the legislature the dominant
department of government, with the executive powers
vested in a President elected by a majority of the
assembly of representatives. Along with the
revolutionaries struggle for genuine independence,
this desire for a parliamentary structure of
government ended in December 1898 when the
Philippines was formally ceded by Spain to the
United States. To justify its colonization of the
islands, the US government issued theProclamation
of Benevolent Assimilation after a bloody
pacification campaign. This began the process of
implanting American political institutions in its new
colony.
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION: Even then, until the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution, features of
parliamentary system were incorporated into a civil
government, called the Philippine Commission,
which had been established by the US. The
Commission exercised both legislative and executive
functions, as a result, were also legislators in a
unicameral law-making assembly.After the passage of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, however, a bicameral
legislature was created, with the Commission as the
upper chamber and a newly-instituted Philippine
Assembly as the lower chamber. The Jones Law of
1916 put an end to this arrangement and vested
legislative power in an all-Filipino bicameral

legislature with the Senate as the upper chamber and

the House of Representatives as the lower chamber.
But the members of the legislature continued to be
appointed as heads of executive departments and sat
in the Cabinet. The semi-parliamentary features of
government persisted until 1935, when, by virtue of
the Tydings-McDuffie Law, also called the Philippine
Independence Act, a new constitution was adopted.
The 1935 Constitution was patterned after the US
system and created a powerful executive, the
presidency, in which executive power was solely
vested. The President served for a fixed term of four
years with only one reelection.
THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION:
The presidential system characterized the system of
government until 1972. A year later earlier, in1971,
amidst a climate of protest and political instability, an
elected Constitutional Convention convened to draw
up a new constitution. Once again, a re-examination
of governmental structure was in the agenda of the
Convention. On September 21, 1972, however,
before the Convention could complete its task,
President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law,
assumed extraordinary powers and began 14 years of
profligate and repressive dictatorial rule. Despite the
tense atmosphere and volatile political situation, the
Convention continued with its deliberations. To
circumvent a constitutional ban on a second
reelection, Marcos and his followers employing a
combination of bribes, intimidation and arrests
manipulated the Convention to scrap presidential
system and replace it with a French-inspired semiparliamentary government. But it was only in1978
when Marcos was finally able to convene an interim
Batasang Pambansa(National Assembly). After the
1984 legislative elections, the Assembly attained

regular status. The Assembly was generally

perceived as a rubberstamp and a farce, as
Marcos continued to exercise legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. In fact, during martial rule,
Marcos issued more decrees that the
Assembly passed laws. Proponents of
presidentialism who refer to this anomalous
and undemocratic period of governance as
our bad experience in parliamentary
government to discredit the parliamentary
system are grossly mistaken. After a decadeand-a-half of forced rule, Filipinos finally
mustered enough collective courage to shout,
Tama Na! Sobra Na! (Stop!
Enough) and marched in the millions in a
non-violent show of defiance against the
Marcos regime.
The People Power Revolution of 1986: The
unprecedented People Power Revolution in
February 1986 ousted Marcos and installed
Corazon C. Aquino in power, it also created
another opportunity for constitutional
innovations and reforms. On May 1987,
President Corazon Aquino convened an
appointed Constitutional Commission to
draft a new constitution to replace her
Freedom Constitution under which she
ruled with an extraordinary powers.
But as the eminent constitutionalist and
Commissioner member, Rev. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., observed. The year 1986,
when emotions were high and a major
preoccupation was how to ensure in the
speediest way possible the restoration of the

democratic processes, was not the best time to engage

in protracted debates, especially about fundamental
government structure. Seven years after the 1987
Constitution was ratified, formal structures of
democracy have been restored and the highly unstable
political situation has settled down considerably.
Filipinos have had enough experience with, and
learned enough lessons from, the new constitution.
For many, it is time to take a second look at the
fundamental law of the land. The initiation of debates
on the appropriate governmental structure is an
important phase of this process.Before comparing the
two systems according to their capacity To promote
effective governance and to facilitate the
consolidation of democracy, a review of the basic
characteristics of the two systems is in order.

II. Presidential vs.

Parliamentary: Essential
Differences: The central
difference between a
parliamentary and a
presidential system lies
in the relationship
between the executive and
legislative branches.
PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE: In a
presidential or separation of
powers system, the chief
executive, or the president, is
elected for a fixed,
constitutionally prescribed term.
He or she cannot be forced by the

legislature to resign,except for

cause through the highly unusual
and exceptional process of
impeachment.Being directly
elected by the people, the
president has full claim to
democratic legitimacy. The
legislature is an assembly of
elected representatives
similarly enjoying fixed and
constitutionally prescribed
terms. As such, it cannot be
dissolved by the president and
possesses as much democratic
legitimacy as the executive.
Because of this essential
characteristics, Linz has
described the presidential
regime as a system of Dual
democratic legitimacy to
emphasize the autonomy and co
-equal position of the executive
and legislative branches of
government. Similarly, Stepan
and Skach have called the
presidential regime a system of
mutual independence. In a
parliamentary system, the head
of government, the prime
minister, is chosen from within
the ranks of the legislature. He
or she must, therefore, be
supported by, and is dependent
upon, the confidence of the
legislature. The prime minister
can fall and be dismissed from
office by the legislatures

vote of no-confidence. On
the other hand, he or she
(normally in conjunction
with the head of state) has
the power to dissolve the
legislature and call for
new elections. Because of
the need for close
collaboration between the
executive and the
legislature for their
mutual survival, Stepan and
Skach have referred to
parliamentary democracy as
a system of mutual
dependence.
OTHER BASIC DIFFERENCES: Apart
from this basic difference
in the relationship between
the executive and the
legislature, there are
other important
differences:
1. In a parliamentary system, the executive is
divided into a prime minister, who is the
head of government, and a monarch or
president , who acts as head of state. Unlike
a prime minister, a president or monarch has
fewer powers and plays an important role as
an above-politics leader. He or she also
plays a stabilizing and mediating
role,especially in times of crisis. In a
presidential system, on the other hand, the
executive is undivided: the head of the
government is also the head of the state. 2. In
a parliamentary government, the prime

minister appoints the ministers, but because the

government is a collegial body, he or she is
merely primus inter pares or is regarded as a first
among equals. In a presidential government, on the
other hand, the president is one-person executive. He
or she also appoints the heads of departments, but
they are his or her subordinates or alter egos. 3. While
ministers are drawn from the elected members of the
legislature in a parliamentary system, department
heads in a presidential system are constitutionally
banned from becoming members of the legislature
and vice versa. 4.The president, unlike a prime
minister, is not responsible to the assembly; instead,
he is ultimately responsible to the constitution by the
process of impeachment. 5. The legislature, in a
presidential government, is ultimately supreme over
the other branches of government. It approves the
appropriation of government, may impeach the
president if the latter behaves unconstitutionally and,
in the event of conflict with the judiciary, may assert
its will since it has the right to amend the
constitution.In a parliamentary system, the
government and the assembly cannot dominate each
other. The government depends upon the support of
the assembly to stay in power,but if the government
chooses, it may dissolve the parliament. 6. The
presidential executive, being directly elected by the
whole body of electors, is directly responsible to the
electorate. The parliamentary government, while
being directly responsible to the assembly, is only
indirectly responsible to the electorate. 7. Finally in a
parliamentary system, the focus of power in the
political system is the parliament. In a presidential
government, there is no focus of power since power is
diffused in the three co-equal and coordinate branches
of government: the executive,the legislative and the
judiciary. It is important to remember that these basic
features are more than categories. They are also

defining and constraining conditions within which

the vast majority of developing democracies must
somehow work out substantial socio-economic
reforms and develop their democratic institutions.

PARLIAMENTARY VS. PRESIDENTIAL:

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In attempting to answer the question, Why is a
parliamentary system a more appropriate framework
of government, compared to a presidential system, in
improving the capacity of government to function
more effectively and in facilitating the consolidation
of democracy? As bases for comparison, five
capacities that are necessary for effective governance
in the Philippines will be used. These are the
capacities to: (1) prevent gridlock and promote
consensus in governance, (2) ensure stability and
continuity in governance, (3) strengthen
accountability in governance, (4) promote cohesive
and disciplined political parties, and (5) promote a
broader based and inclusive politics through a multiparty system.
For sure, this is not an exhaustive list of capabilities.
Limitations of time and space only permit a selection
from a broad range of possible capabilities, which are
critical at this stage of the countrys development.
Considerable weight is placed on the values and
capabilities that Filipinos would like to see
characterize their government and which lie at the
heart of their dissatisfaction with the presidential
system. The most bewailed feature of the presidential
system is a good starting point.

1. CAPACITY TO PREVENT GRIDLOCK AND

PROMOTE CONSENSUS: The chronic

problem of gridlock that

has afflicted the
Philippine presidential
system with its cumbersome
process of checks and
balances has earned a bad
name for politicians and
political institutions.
Evidence of this poor
credibility is the
consistently low ratings
that political
personalities and
institutions, like Congress
and political parties,
register in surveys.
Respondents invariably
point to their frustration
over the seemingly endless
political squabbling among
legislators and between
government and Congress on
almost any major policy
issue that comes up for
deliberation. Proponents of
the shift to a
parliamentary system have
repeatedly hammered on this
problem of wasteful and
time consuming stalemates
to justify the change.
Validly they point out that
these crippling standoffs
have prevented the country
from responding in an
efficient and timely manner
to the many challenges and

opportunities it faces as it
struggles to catch up with the
rest of the advancing economies
in Southeast Asia. The criticism
hits an issue that fundamentally
distinguishes the parliamentary
and the presidential systems: the
relationship between the
executive and the legislature.
Linz attributes this problem to
an inherent structural weakness
in a presidential system: the
tenure of the president is fixed
independent of the legislature
and the legislature can survive
without fear of the dissolution
by the executive. This feature
derives from the separate but coexisting democratic legitimacy
enjoyed by the executive and the
legislative branches, being both
directly and popularly elected.
Lijphart goes along with this
view, but at the same time holds
that this is only part of the
explanation. For him, the real
problem is that everyone
including the president, the
public at large, and even
political scientists feels
that the presidents claim (to
legitimacy) is much stronger than
the legislatures. Consequently,
the feeling of superior
democratic legitimacy may make
the president righteously
unwilling and psychologically

unable to compromise. This

problem is aggravated by the
inability of presidential
democracies to obtain strong
congressional cooperation
through majority control of the
legislature. As a result, the
legislature rests in the control
of politicians who represent a
constituency with a different
political choice from rests in
the control of politicians who
represent a constituency with a
different political choice from
that of the constituency that
supports the president. Stepan
and Skach confirm this
propensity of presidential
governments to rule with
legislative minorities in a
study of all non-Organization of
Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries
that qualified as democracies
for at least one year during the
1973 -1987 period. The OECD
countries were excluded to
neutralize the effect of
economic development as an
intervening variable that might
independently influence
political stability. The
findings show that in
presidential democracies, the
executives party enjoyed a
legislative majority less than
half of the time (48% of the

democratic years), while in

parliamentary democracies
in sharp contrast the
government was in control
of the legislature at 83%
of the time. The
inability of the executive,
in a presidential system,
to gain congressional
control has often led to
basic differences in policy
positions. These conflicts
then degenerate into a
prolonged and unproductive
impasse. In such a
situation, the inevitable
question arises: Who, on
the basis of democratic
principle to resolve this
question. Repeatedly faced
with these stalemates and
the expectation of their
inevitability, presidents
have learned to cope with
them and have accepted that
it is to their interest
and perhaps survival to
adopt anti-party
practices to secure
approval of their policies.
In the Philippines, this
practice has
institutionalized the much
detested, yet enduring
practice of pork barrel
politics and the ritual of
party-raiding and party-

switching that predictably

follows every presidential
elections. David Wurfel blames
this habitual practice of
turncoatism to the primary
preoccupation of legislators with
their re-election. Recognizing
the presidents almost absolute
discretion in the release and
transfer of funds to build
schools, bridges, roads and other
infrastructures, legislators find
various ways including
changing party loyalties to
endear themselves to the
president.The case of the 1992
Philippine Congress is no
exception. At the time of the
proclamation of congressional
winners in 1992, the party of the
administration, Lakas-NUCD, was a
minority in the House of
Representatives with only 39 out
of 200 seats, or around 20%. The
rest of the seats were spread out
to seven other parties, with the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP), the National Peoples
Coalition (NPC) and the Liberal
Party controlling the majority of
the seats with 87, 39 and 13
members respectively. After a
year of intensive recruitment by
the administration, Lakas-NUCD
gained 69 more seats to control
the lower house with 108 seats,
while the LDP was reduced to less

than a third with only 25 seats.

The ordinary voter has come to
accept the proliferation of
political butterflies as a
justifiable act of political
survival in a system that
rewards, not party loyalty, but
a politicians ability to
ingratiate himself to an allpowerful, spoils-dispensing
president. In a number of
developing countries, when the
legislature is intransigent and
refuses to compromise or bow
down to political pressure and a
serious crisis threatens to
embroil the country,the
administration stalemated,
powerless and deeply frustrated
is often left with no other
choice but to resort to extraconstitutional measures. Martial
law, or rule by decree, becomes
an option.The case of Alberto
Fujimori in Peru comes to mind.
Fujimori, to justify martial
rule and ruling by decree on
April 1992, blamed the lack of
progress in Peru squarely on
uncooperative congress. In1972,
Marcos used the same excuse for
closing down Congress and
imposing constitutional
authoritarianism in the
Philippines. The reverse may
also be the case. When an
unpopular and discredited

president refuses to resign

and civilian authorities
are unable to resolve the
standoff, the military
exploits the situation and
takes over from the
civilian authorities. The
two coup attempts in 1992
that ultimately led to the
ouster of President Carlos
Andrs Prez of Venezuela
prove this point. In the
same manner, in 1986, the
attempted coup by the
Reform the Armed Forces
Movement (RAM) ignited the
popular uprising that
eventually ousted Marcos.
But perhaps nowhere was
this more flagrant than in
the case of Ecuador. In the
period 1931-1988, 13
presidential governments
were forced to resign,
seven were overthrown, one
was impeached, while only
12 completed their terms.
Under the parliamentary
system, the powerlessness
and deep frustration that
generally characterize
presidential government is
more exception than the
rule. The difference lies
in the ability of the
parliamentary government to
muster a majority in the

legislature and command support

and cooperation from it. More
important, the mutual dependency
relation in parliamentarism
creates effective constitutional
devices to break deadlocks or
remove inefficient governments.
Frustrating, unproductive and
long impasses are thus avoided.
Thus, as a system that can better
avoid deadlocks, discourage coup
attempts and promote better
cooperation in policymaking, a
parliamentary democracy is
superior and should be preferred
over a presidential system.
2. CAPACITY TO ENSURE STABILITY AND
CONTINUITY IN GOVERNANCE: In
arguing for the stability of the
presidential system, critics of
parliamentary democracy point
tothe frequent crises and changes
in the prime ministers in
parliamentary democracies, such
as the French Third and Fourth
Republic, the frequent government
turnovers in Italy and India
today, and more recently, in
Portugal. While accepting the
rigidity that presidentialism
introduces into the political
process, its proponents view this
more as an advantage than a
liability. This feature, they
contend, reduces the
uncertainties inherent in

parliamentary democracies, where

multiple political players can,
at anytime between elections,
effect basic changes, bring
about realignment of forces and,
above all, change the executive,
the prime minister. Thus, in the
critics view, the pinning for
stability and predictability
that normally accompany periods
of transition and uncertainty
seem to favor a presidential
system. But again it must be
emphasized that presidents are
elected for a period of time
that, under normal circumstances
cannot be modified: not
shortened and sometimes, due to
ban on reelections, not
prolonged. The political process
then becomes broken into
discontinuous, rigidly
determined periods without the
possibility of continuous
readjustments as political,
social and economic events may
require. Thus, unexpected events
may intervene, like fundamental
flaws in judgment or political
process. Does the system adjust
better to crises? Most likely
not, especially when the
president is unyielding.There is
the option of voluntary
resignation through pressure
from party leaders, the media
and public opinion. But given

the psychology of
politicians, resignation is
highly unlikely to
happen.Moreover, the move
will encounter opposition
from the constituency that
brought the discredited
president to power. Then
there is the extreme
measure of impeachment,
which is difficult and
complicated to execute
successfully. Apart from
the heavy burden of
establishing sufficient
evidence of misconduct, it
also seems implausible that
a legislative majority will
support these proceedings,
since members of the
presidents party would
have to go along with the
impeachment process. Thus,
it is almost impracticable
to remove even the most
corrupt and inefficient
president from office. The
cases of Brazilian
President Collors
impeachment in 1992 on
charges of widespread
corruption in his
government of the late U.S.
President Richard Nixons
resignation under threat of
impeachment in 1973 in
connection with the

infamous Watergate wiretapping

may defy this assertion, but
these are clearly more the
exception than the rule. In sharp
contrast, a parliamentary
government because of the
mutual dependency between the
executive and the legislature
inherent in the system permits
flexibility in responding to
changing situations and
unexpected events. Proponents of
presidentialism, in their
critique of parliamentarism,
overlook the continuity of
parties in power, the reshuffling
of cabinet members,the
continuation of a coalition under
the same premier, and the
frequent continuity of ministers
in key ministries in spite of
cabinet crises. Moreover, it is
also forgotten that the
parliamentary system permits the
removal of a prime minister who
has lost party support or has
been discredited and whose
continuance in office may lead to
serious political conflicts.
Without engendering a serious
constitutional crisis, the prime
minister can be replaced in a
variety of ways by his or her
party, by the formation of a new
coalition, or by coalition
partners withdrawing support of
parties tolerating the minority

government. Through these means,

a new prime minister is bound to
surface, perhaps with some
difficulty and delay, but
definitely with much greater
certainty than had the crises
taken place in a presidential
democracy. Thus, the problem
that arises as a result of the
so-called instability of
parliamentary democracies are
simply crises of government,
not regime. The availability
of deadlock-breaking devices
anddecision mechanisms in a
parliamentary regime help ensure
that issues of government do not
deteriorate into crises of the
regime. The absence of these
self-correcting devices in the
presidential regime leads to a
paralyzing stalemate that
ensures that nothing substantial
gets done until new government
is elected to replace the
previous one, that is, if the
people are patient enough to
wait until the next election
cycle. In many instances, most
notably in Latin America, either
the president bypasses the
legislature and the rules by
decree or a military coup
overthrows the government. In
both situations, the
institutional framework
collapses and those who take

power rule
extraconstitutionally. The
Stepan and Skach study
covering 53 non-OECD
countries, which they had
classified as having been
democracies for at least a
year between 1973 and 1989,
confirm these tendencies.
Of the 53countries, 28 were
pure parliamentary, 25 were
pure presidential and none,
surprisingly, were either
semi-presidential or mixed.
Only five of the 25
presidential democracies,
or 20% were democratic for
any 10 consecutive years in
the 1973-1989 period, but
17 of the 28 parliamentary
democracies, or 61% were
democratic for a
consecutive 10-year span in
the same period. Cearly,
parliamentary democracies,
with a rate of survival
more than three times
higher thanpresidential
democracies, demonstrate
greater capacity for
ensuring continuous
democraticgovernance. in
the same study,
presidential democracies
were twice as prone to
breaking downthrough
military takeover than

parliamentary democracies. (See T

able 3) This difference points to
a greater ability of
parliamentary regimes to
accommodate conflicts and crises
in government without leading to
a rejection of the regime. The
same study presents further
evidence of the durability of the
parliamentary system in a survey
of 93 countries that became
independent between 1945 and 1979
and that were continuous
democracies from 1980 to 1989.
Forty-one countries functioned as
parliamentary systems in their
first year of independence, 36
were presidential systems, three
semi-presidential systems and 13
ruling monarchies. During the 10year period between 1980 and
1989, only 15 countries were able
to develop as continuous
democracies and all of them were
countries that functioned as
parliamentary systems in their
first year of independence. Not
one of the 52 countries that was
not a parliamentary government
evolved into a continuous
democracy. Stepan and Skach
examined all ministerial
appointments during the years of
democratic rule in Latin America,
Western Europe and the United
States between 1950 and 1980. The
result was two major findings.

First, the percentage of

ministers who serve more than
once in their careers, or what
they term the return ratio
of ministers, is almost three
times higher in parliamentary
than in presidential
democracies. The case of the
U.S. is most striking, although
probably not exceptional in
presidential systems. Since 1945
except in the case of
Johnsons retention of the
cabinet after the assassination
of Kennedy only two cabinet
members served under different
presidents. This results from
the almost total revamping of
the bureaucracy that normally
follows when a new presidential
administration takes over.
Second, the average length of
service of a minister in any one
appointment is almost twice as
long in parliamentary
systems. The findings hold even
if the study was limited to
countries with more than 25
years experience in
uninterrupted democracy. The
evident conclusion is that
ministers in presidential
democracies have far less
experience than their
counterparts in parliamentary
democracies. As a result, every
presidential administration

brings with it a contingent

of amateurs with little
experience in managing the
bureaucracy and in dealing
with politicians. This
inadequacy is felt most in
areas such as foreign
policy and macroeconomic
policy management, as well
as in every weak ties to
the legislature, whose
support they cannot do
without. In addition, the
valuable wisdom that the
new acquire on the job is
not available to their
successors. Such is not the
case in a parliamentary
system, where a large pool
of potential leaders is
available. The reasonable
chance of becoming prime
minister or a key cabinet
official among leaders of
all major parties,
particularly in a multiparty setting, encourages a
greater number of aspirants
for leadership positions to
enter parliament. Moreover,
even between elections,
unless the government has a
tight hold on the media,
the parliamentary process
such as debates, motions
of censorship, votes of no
confidence, and other

public actions provides

potential leaders with numerous
opportunities to gain visibility
and practice.
a. Switzerland and Finland are mixed
systems. (Editors Note: Finland is now a fullparliamentary system, while Switzerlands system is
a Council Parliamentary or Directorate
system which is still collegial like a parliamentary
system)
b. According to Stepan and Skach, Austria, Ireland
and Iceland are parliamentary rather than presidential
regimes because parliamentary is the political
practice. (Editors Note: Austria, Ireland, and
Iceland are pure Parliamentary Systems as their
presidents are purely ceremonial)
c. Traditionally in Kiribati, all candidates for the
unicameral legislature the Maneaba have
fought as independents. In 1985, various Maneaba
members who were dissatisfied with the government
policies formed a Christian Democratic opposition
grouping. The government grouping then is generally
known as the National Party although it does not
constitute a formal political party.
Even leaders who have lost power do not end up with
nothing, unlike in a presidential system. They are
practically always assigned seats in the legislature
and sometimes have the status of leader of the loyal
opposition. In presidential elections, defeated
candidates, regardless of the number of votes they
garnered, are likely to be considered unattractive
candidates for the next election and thereby lose their
leadership position in the party. If they desire to

continue with their political career, they will have to

wait for the next cycle of election without any access
to executive power and to patronage.

3. CAPACITY TO STRENGTHEN
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE: In
calling for the retention of the
presidential system, respected
constitutionalist and Senator
Arturo M. T olentino argues
that, in a presidential system,
accountability is easier to
locate. The chief executive, the
president, is directly elected
by the people and singularly
represents the government. The
voter is thus in a position to
know whom he is voting for and
who will govern in case his
candidate wins. Moreover, the
functions of the government are
neatly divided among its three
branches: the legislature sets
down policy, the executive
implements it and the judiciary
interprets it. So responsibility
is easier to pinpoint. By
implication, in a parliamentary
system, presumably the voter
electing representatives of a
party will, in no way, know who
the party will select as prime
minister. And in a multi-party
system, where the party is not
expected to obtain a clear
majority, the voter is not in a

position to determine which

parties will ultimately
coalesce to choose the
prime minister and to
govern the country.
Furthermore, since the
executive and the
legislature are fused in
the parliament, the lines
of responsibility are
blurred and accountability
for performance is
difficult to locate. While
these arguments may, in
theory, be correct, reality
negates most, if not all,
of them. In presidential
elections, the candidates
do not need and often do
not have any prior record
as political leaders. This
has given rise to the
phenomenon of
presidential outsiders,
defined by Linz as
candidates not identified
with or supported by any
political party, sometimes
without any governmental or
even political experience,
and who ran for office
simply on the basis of a
populist appeal. To a great
extent, former Presidents
Aquino and Ramos fall in
this category, not having
been members of any

political party before running

for office. Similarly, the two
presidential aspirants who
figured in a tight race with
Ramos, Miriam Santiago, and
Eduardo Cojuangco, were, in this
sense, also outsiders. Often,
presidential candidates are
elected on the basis of opinion
about them or their promises or
about the image that they
project. The latter is
increasingly true in the age of
what Sartori calls the new
politics of videopolitics
as a result of which a
presidential election is reduced
to a video match eminently
decided by good looks and
soundbytes lasting a few
seconds. Outsiders Fujimori
of Peru and Collor of Brazil
benefited immensely from the use
of video technology in their
political campaigns. The problem
with such candidates, according
to Linz, is that they have no
support in the congress and no
permanent institutionalized
continuity (due to the principle
of no re-election) and therefore
find it difficult to create a
party organization. They tend to
organize their party around
themselves such that when they
leave the political scene, so
does the party. ON the other

hand, leaders in parliamentary

democracies have to struggle to
take hold of, and retain over
many years, leadership over
their parties. They, therefore,
truly represent Not just
themselves but, more
importantly, their parties,
which precede and survive them,
also, the voters in a
parliamentary election are well
aware that eventual winners will
be drawn from the party.
Usually, the cabinet members are
already established leaders of
the party with vast experience
in politics and government. The
contention that the voter in a
parliamentary election will be
hard put to determine who will
eventually govern is
contradicted by the fact that
parties are usually identified
with highly visible political
leaders. Elections are
increasingly focused on the
leader aspiring to be prime
minister. So a vote for British
Conservatives is a vote for Mrs.
Thatcher, SAP for Willy Brandt
of Germany, PSOE for Felipe
Gonzales of Spain, or Labor
Party for Gro Brundtland of
Norway. While in this sense,
personalization of leadership is
not exclusive to presidential
politics, the big difference is

that leaders of
parliamentary governments
have to be loyal party
members in good standing.
It may be argued that such
choice may be ignored by
the party choosing another
leader. This may happen but
normally the party will not
invest so much to build up
the stature of a party
leader only to replace him
or her subsequently unless
the leader has proven
ineffective. And even then,
the party and its leaders
can be ultimately held
accountable to the voters
for such action. As to the
difficulty in parliamentary
systems of determining who
will govern in the
coalition, again this
contention is not generally
true. Before the election,
parties commit themselves
to a coalition and the
voter of the parties knows
who the chancellor will be.
The voter is also aware
that unless a party
establishes an absolute
majority, all the parties
in the alliance will have
representatives in the
government. In a
parliamentary system,

government formation takes a

short time because of the
presence of a well-known shadow
cabinet. In a presidential
system, the organization of a new
government takes longer as the
president-elect begins his or her
search for, and formation of, a
cabinet and key officials only
after the elections. And add to
this delay the confirmation
hearings which can be
protected and humiliating that
all major appointments go
through. Linz summaries the above
points aptly: The
identifiability in
presidentialism is of one person;
in parliamentary government, most
of the time it is of a pool of
people and often a number of
well-known sub-leaders.
Finally, presidentialists argue
that accountability in a
presidential system is greatly
enhanced by the fact that a
president not the cabinet, not
a coalition, and not the leaders
of the party is directly and
solely responsible for governance
during his tenure in office. In
response, a president who cannot
run for reelection will be
difficult to hold accountable.
(Generally, in presidential
democracies, including the
Philippines, presidents cannot

run for reelection. He or she no

longer fears punishment by
election defeat nor looks
forward to the reward of
reelection for good performance.
And because the executive branch
is intimately identified with
the person of the president,
even the partys new
presidential candidate or the
party that supported the
incumbent cannot be called to
account. Even when reelection is
allowed, the incumbent can
always conveniently pass the
blame to congress regardless
as to whether congress is
dominated by his or her party or
by an opposition majority.) In a
parliamentary democracy, because
of strong party discipline and
clear lines of responsibility,
passing the blame somewhere else
or avoiding accountability
cannot be done. While
accountability is hard to
pinpoint in case of unstable
governments or frequently
shifting alliances, and no party
is clearly on top of the
coalition formation process,
this situation is more the
exception than the rule. Even if
presidents are not barred from
reelection, voters can only wait
until his or her term ends
before they could demand for an

accounting, unlike a prime

minister, who at any time,
can be made accountable to
his or her own party and
the parliament by the vote
of no confidence. Finally,
the separation of powers
among the three branches of
government in a
presidential system is also
the very cause of diffusion
of responsibilities that
makes it often difficult
for voters to identify whom
to hold accountable for
particular decision or
actions. This process has
led one political scientist
to refer to it as the
institutionalization of
buck -passing.
4. CAPACITY TO PROMOTE COHESIVE
AND DISCIPLINE PARTIES:
Philippine scholar Carl
Lande, commenting on the
immature state of the
Philippine party system,
wrote: The absence of a
strong, responsive and
responsible party system is
o ne of the major flaws of
the Philippine democracy.
Indeed, what dominates in
the country is a system of
loose, fractious,
clientelistic or

personalistic parties. These

formations are in reality
political clans, factions,
cliques and alliances that are
distinguished not by any coherent
ideology and program of
government, but by political
personalities who lead them.
Political representatives often
behave not on the basis of any
issue-oriented platform but in
pursuit of parochial and selfinterested objectives. The
history of democratization has
shown that the development of
political parties and their
legitimation are necessary for
democracy to take root. For in
stable democracies, political
parties are the viable and
meaningful channels that closely
link the state and society. This
is certainly not the direction to
which Philippine political
parties are headed. Those who
oppose the shift to a
parliamentary system have
invariably pointed to this
condition as justifiable reason
to insist on the status quo.
Correctly, they have pointed out
that the strength and viability
of a parliamentary regime rests
on mature and disciplined
political parties. Without
genuine parties, the
parliamentary system will be a

sham and will only lead to

greater concentration of
political power in the hands of
the already too powerful
political elite, they would add.
The logical prescription then is
for institutional reformers to
postpone any change and to
concentrate instead on political
and institutional reforms to
strengthen the party system. The
assumption of this proposition,
of course, is that a mature
party system can be nurtured
within a presidential system of
government. But is this
possible? Does the framework of
government have an important
bearing on the quality of the
party system? Linz asserts that
more disciplined and cohesive
political parties are
structurally compatible with the
parliamentary systems, but would
be in conflict with
presidentialism. They are
essential in the formation and
maintenance of a system of
independence and cooperation
that is the hallmark of
parliamentarism. Without this
condition, the executive
constantly faces a threat from
being removed from office. In
Satoris words: what a
parliamentary democracy needs is
to be serve by parliamentary

fit parties, that is to

say, parties that have been
socialized (by failure,
duration and appropriate
incentives) into being
relatively cohesive or
disciplined, into behaving,
in opposition, as
responsible opposition, and
into playing, to some
extent, a rule-guided fair
game. According to Weaver
and Rockman, party
cohesion in parliamentary
systems is no happy
accident. These they
attribute to greater
mechanisms of control over
legislators. In
proportional systems, for
example, legislators are
usually chosen from a party
list generated by the
central party
organizations. T hose who
did not tow the party line
in crucial votes in the
legislature may find
themselves removed from the
party line-up in the next
elections. In the case of
single-member constituency
system, legislators usually
rely extensive on the
central party organization
for the ratification and
financing of their

campaigns. In practically all

parliamentary systems, a
legislator cannot advance in his
political career without the
support of his party leaders. So
for both his survival and
advancement in his career, a
legislator depends heavily on his
party, in the same manner that
his party cannot govern or
perform its role in government
without his cooperation and
support. In a presidential
system, or the system of
separation of powers, it is not
necessary for the president to
prevail in Congress on all
critical votes to be able to stay
in power. Consequently, control
over individual legislators is
not as critical, and legislators
have more leeway to vote for
their own benefits or the
interest of their own
constituencies. In addition,
Weaver and Rockman found that
central party organizations in
presidential systems play a
weaker role in the recruitment of
candidates and in financing their
campaigns. Legislators,
therefore, have much more leeway
to build a personal vote for
themselves through constituency
service and by voting the
interest of their district or
their economic class over that of

the party. The job security and

career advancement of
legislators (both within the
legislature and outside in
seeking other offices) also
depend much less on cooperation
with party leaders. As a result,
incentives to cooperate are much
less. As a consequence, even in
a situation where the
presidents party or coalition
has majority control over the
legislature, this advantage is
no guarantee that the
legislature will automatically
cooperate to pass administration
measures. In the Philippines,
nowhere was this more pronounced
than during the term of
President Aquino. In 1987, an
overwhelming majority of
legislators from both chambers
of congress ran and won under
President Aquinos coalition,
Lakas ng Bayanor Laban! ; in
fact, a significant number of
them could not have won without
Aquinos personal endorsement.
But despite this enormous edge,
Aquino drew more opposition than
support for her measures in
Congress. Many of her major
policy proposals, like the
comprehensive agrarian reform;
economic liberalization;
recognition of and support for
NGOs; and the ratification of

the Philippines-Us bases

treaty, never got past the
legislature, and even if
some did, they were
severely watered down.
Frustrated but determined
to asserTher leadership, in
early 1990, she brought
together key leaders from
the bureaucracy, local
governments, NGOs, churches
and business community and
organized a political
movement called Kabisig as
counterforce against
Congress. But before
Kabisig could even take
off, the more politically
sophisticated legislators
scuttled it by subtle
warnings to Aquinos
advisers that the move
would be counter-productive
and would only aggravate
the already sour
relationship between the
president and Congress. The
situation is worse when the
president has to govern
with a legislative
minority, As earlier
pointed out, this is, in
fact, the situation in
minority of the times: that
presidents usually have to
face an opposition
legislature. Confronted

with an adversarial congress,

presidents would see it to their
interest to have to deal with
weak parties. And if the parties
are stubborn and refuse to
cooperate, it is not uncommon for
presidents to employ antiparty tactics to bend their
will. The tactics include
distributing or withholding
pork barrel funds, dispensing
political appointments, provoking
schisms and factions within
parties, or doing openly hostile
acts such as outright raiding of
party membership. For this
reason, Linz has concluded that:
The weakness of parties in many
Latin American democracies,
therefore, is not unrelated to
the presidential regime but,
rather, a consequence of the
system. In so concluding, he may
well have spoken of the party
system, too. Presidentialist
asserts that the Philippine
political terrain is not totally
bereft of relatively more
disciplined and cohesive parties,
as evidenced by the emergence of
parties like the revitalized
Liberal Party (LP), the Partido
Demokratiko ng Pilipinas-Laban
(PDP-Laban) and the Partido ng
Bayan (PnB). These parties posses
defined ideological and political
programs and positions on social,

economic and political issues.

Rejecting the traditional brand
of guns-goons-and gold
politics, they have been key in
promoting a new kind of
politics, one that elevates
the level of political debate
beyond Vague, populist rhetoric
and political praxis away from
patronage and opportunism.
Unfortunately, the prevailing
political culture and
institutional environment have
worked against their
transformative style of
politics. As a result, except
for the LP, these
alternative parties have
been relegated to the periphery
of the political arena. Beyond a
change in political
personalities and political
thinking, it will take
institutional reforms to enable
emerging parties to play more
substantial roles in Philippine
politics. As pointed out, the
constraining structures of a
presidential system may not
provide the environment for this
necessary change. The
parliamentary system of
government has more promise in
bringing this about.
5. CAPACITY TO PROMOTE A MULTI-PARTY
SYSTEM: Political stability is

key to democratic
consolidation. The ability
of a political society to
achieve this condition rest
on the existence of
political vehicles that
enable significant
political forces to be
represented in the
mainstream of political and
economic decision-making.
In the formal democratic
arena, this means the
presence of vibrant
political parties. It is
difficult to govern
democratically unless these
forces are recognized and
meaningfully represented in
the party system. Peace and
stability has eluded the
Philippines for close to
half a century already
because of an exclusionary
brand of politics that few
elite families fight to
maintain. This has
effectively shut off the
greater part of the
population from the
political process. With no
stake in the system,
disenfranchised groups have
turned to armed struggle as
a means of getting heard
and of achieving justice. T
hus from the 50s to the

present, a Maoist-inspired
communist insurgency movement
the only surviving one is
Southeast Asia has thrived in
the countryside. In the late
60s, the much neglected and
exploited Muslims in southern
Philippines, in Mindanao island,
also turned to armed
confrontation to press for
secession. Since formal
independence in 1946, the elite
controlled and dominated twoparty system has effectively
closed the door to other social
classes in the country. Elections
have been reduced to intra-elite
competitions. The framers of the
1978 Constitution tried to
address this problem by
providing, among others, for
multipartism within a
presidential system. This
arrangement similarly exists in
most presidential democracies in
Latin America. From a cursory
observation, it would seem that,
based on the outcome of the 1978
congressional and 1992
presidential elections, that
multipartism has been
successfully instituted in the
country. But a closer look
reveals that the change has been
more a quantitative increase in
the number of parties than a
development of real, multi-

dimensional and ideologically

distinct parties. True, more
program-oriented and
ideologically cohesive parties
have emerged in the political
arena. But they represent more
the exception than the rule. In
fact, the Liberal Party, since
independence, had been one of
two premier parties in the
country. But when its party
leaders begun to practice
seriously its call for
alternative ways of doing
politics principled position
on issues and rejection of the
politics of guns-goons-andgold it begun ironically to
lose considerable support. In
addition, as has been observed
in Latin American presidential
democracies, a minority
government tends to be the
inevitable result of a situation
characterized by the presence of
weak and undisciplined parties
in a multi-party setting within
a presidential system. The case
of 1992 presidential elections
in the Philippines is a case in
point: President Ramos, running
against five other major
presidential aspirants, won with
only 24% of actual votes cast.
This means his constituency in
the electorate was much less at
the time of his victory.

Conscious of his narrow

political base, he had to
devote practically his
first year in office to
expand his political base
of support. So a question
arises: Is a presidential
system of government
compatible with a multiparty system? Can it create
a political atmosphere
conductive to the growth of
distinct and genuine
political parties? Studies
indicate that the two-party
system is congruent with a
presidential government,
while a multi-party system
is more associated with a
parliamentary government.
This is borne out again by
Stepan and Skach on the
relationship of party
systems and consolidated
democracies. The study
covered consolidated
democracies in the world
between 1979 and 1989, of
which there were 34
parliamentary democracies,
five presidential and two
semi-presidential. The
study found that of the 34
parliamentary democracies,
11 has between three and
seven effective political
parties. None of the

presidential democracies had more

than 2.6 effective political
parties, while both the semipresidential system had between
three and four effective
political parties. The absence of
any long-standing presidential
democracy with three or more
effective political parties may
explain why continuous
presidential democracies are so
few. This empirical study
confirms the earlier finding that
parliamentary democracies are
more associated with a large
number of parties than
presidential democracies.
According to Lijphart, this
tendency is due to the zerosum, winner-take-all nature of
presidential elections where the
presidency is the biggest
political prize to be won. Only
the largest parties have a chance
to win it. This creates an
impulse towards a two-party
system and away from a multiparty system. This evidence is
not conclusive though. The case
of Finland and Chile prove
otherwise. But then in both
countries, the party system is
well-structured and
institutionalized. This cannot be
said of most Latin American
countries and the Philippines

where the party system is loose

and weak.

III. Conclusion: Political

institutions are critical
in strengthening
governmental
effectiveness,
particularly in
developing countries like
the Philippines. For this
reason political
institutional reforms
cannot be, and should not
be taken for granted, but
must be made part and
parcel of a comprehensive
set of social, economic
and political reform
program. A strong case
can be made that a
parliamentary form of
government is a more
supportive evolutionary
framework for developing
effectiveness in
governance and for
consolidating democracy.
From both the standpoints

of theoretical
predictability and
empirical evidence,
the parliamentary
form of government
has shown: (1) Better
ability to prevent
gridlock and promote
a cooperative
relationship between
the executive and
legislature in
policy-making (2)
greater capacity to
ensure stability and
continuity in
governance and
prevent military
coups and extra
constitutional action
by the executive. (3)
better capacity to
ensure accountability
in governance; (4)
greater propensity to
create a political
environment

conductive to the growth

of coherent, disciplined
and strong political
parties, and (5) greater
ability to encourage a
multi-party setting and
promote a more open and
plural politics.
While the distinct advantages of the parliamentary
over the presidential system have been presented, the
writer is inclined to look beyond a pure model of the
parliamentary towards what Maurice Duvergere calls
a new political system model: semi-presidential
system government. According to Duvergere, a
political regime may be dominated as such if the
constitution which establishes it combines three
elements: (1) the president of the republic is
popularly and directly elected by the people, (2) he
wields substantial power, and (3) there is instituted a
dual executive system, where opposite the president
there is a prime minister and ministers who exercise
executive and government powers and remain in
office only with the continuing approval of the
parliament. The most prominent representative of
this model, of course, is France, although the
historical precursor of the French system
was Germany under the Weimar Republic. Other
outstanding examples of this model are Finland,
Austria, Iceland and Ireland. (Correction: Austria,
Iceland, and Ireland are strictly parliamentary
republics with ceremonial, powerless
presidents.) More recently, Portugal, inspired by the
French model, adopted this system.(Correction,
Portugal is now considered a pure parliamentary

system) In Latin America, while variances of this

system have figured seriously in discussions about
constitutional reform, no country has so far adopted
the model. Should shifts in government structure take
place in Latin American presidential democracies.
The movement would not be towards a pure
parliamentary form but, most likely, towards a semipresidential model, with a dual executive system.
And the reason will be mainly pragmatic: the long
tradition and intense desire of the ordinary voter to
elect personally and directly his or her president.
Peruvians expressed it best when they called the
principle of popular election of the president
sacred and the sine qua non of the presidentialist
system and the basis for governmental authority
election by the congress (of the president) would
divert from the people what they consider their
principal form of political participation. Until the
recent 1993 plebiscite in Brazil where people were
asked to choose from a presidential, parliamentary or
monarchial system, the Brazilian elite did not fully
appreciate the importance of this sentiment. In
surveys conducted over a three-year period from
1989 to 1991, Brazilian businessmen, labor leaders,
journalist, intellectuals, public sector managers,
politicians, navy and air force officers voted
overwhelmingly (more than 3 to 1) for
parliamentarism over presidentialism. Yet in the 1993
national plebiscite, the result was completely the
opposite: 55% chose presidentialism while only 23%
went for parliamentarism. Analysts widely attribute
this result to a perception by the voters. depicted
and encourage aggressively by the presidentialist
that the parliamentary proposal was an attempt to
deprive them their basic right to vote directly for the
head of state. Similarly in the Philippines, without
the benefit of a survey, a similar preference by the
social, economic, and political elites for the

parliamentary system is apparent, for the

same bases argued in this paper. But for
reasons akin to the Brazilian plebiscite
experience, the average Filipino voter will
most likely opt for the retention of the
presidential system. Another important point
to consider is that this chapter focused
mainly on the issue of governmental
structure, that is presidential versus
parliamentary debate. Being the focus of the
debate on institutional reform in the
Philippines, this issue is a good starting point
for further inquiry into more complex, but
clearly related influences on governmental
performance. For this reason, weaver and
Rockman have called the presidential vs.
parliamentary debate the first tier of the
inquiry about the nature and effect of
institutions and their impact on effective
governance. But Weaver and Rockman also
refer to second and third levels or tiers of
influence that also impact on governmental
capabilities. The second tier refers to
variations within parliamentary and
presidential systems. They are different ways
in the modal pattern of government
formation, or regime type, which tends to be
durable over time, but is not unchangeable.
A parliamentary regime, for example, may
come about through a multi-party coalition,
party government or a single-party dominant
government. Within each regime, there may
be alternation over time among several
government types, by which government is
formed. This may be through two or more
parties governing in minimum winning
coalitions (e.g., Germany), or two major
parties alternating majority control of

government. (e.g.,Britain or the Philippines during the

glory days of the Liberal Party and Nacionalista
Party), or a dominant party rulling alone or as a
dominant coalition partner For prolonged periods
(e.g., PRI in Mexico, or the LPD in Japan before its
recent breakup) correspondingly. The important point
to remember is that both modal regime type and
parliamentary type prevailing at any particular period
may have substantial influences on a countrys
decision-making structures, processes and
capabilities. The third tier or level of influences refers
to broader institutional and non-institutional factors.
The former pertains to broad framework institutions,
such as judicial review, federalism, unicameralism
and similar institutions, while the latter relates to
factors such as political context and policymakers
goals, socio-economic and demographic conditions,
and past policy choices. What these three-tiered
influences on government capacity imply is that
effective institutional reform requires a more
comprehensive and complex approach. It necessarily
involves a careful matching of a particular countrys
priorities, policy problems and the societal conditions
that influence how institutions will function, and the
institutions themselves. In this light, the two-step
process adopted by the proponents of a French-style
parliamentary system (technically, it is called
French-Style Semi-Presidential System) in the
House of Representatives-first, from bicameral, then,
from presidential to parliamentary may be too
simplistic a response to a complex situation. That is
why the campaign for parliamentarism has been more
notable for exposing the deficiencies of the
presidential system than for presenting a welldesigned and clearly focused parliamentary
alternative. A final point: the route to
reform. Constitutional change, in any setting and
however beneficial, always invites controversy and

enormous problems. Reformers need a strong case to

justify any alteration to the fundamental law of the
land. For example, the 1986 People Power
Revolution, because of massive failure in the
government, enabled President Aquino to discard
Marcos 1973 Constitution and rule under a decreed
Freedom Constitution. The latter was
subsequently replaced by the 1987 Constitution
drafted by a Commission of appointed delegates. The
euphoria and sense of urgency that surrounded these
exercises in constitutional reform and formation no
longer exist. A strong case for a new round of
constitutional amendments needs to be presented.
Whether the current situation in the Philippines
presents such a case is debatable. But proponents of
either a parliamentary or semi-presidential system do
not have to wait for such a situation to ripen, if,
indeed, it does not exist yet. They can begin the
process of institutional reforms through legislative
initiatives, such as reform of the campaign finance
rules, simplification of the election process,
institutionalization of the party list system,
amendments of party formation and affiliation rules,
among other enactments. Apart from living the
institutional foundation for amendments in the
constitution, legislative reforms will also address the
reservations of those suspicious of the changes. Most
important, the reform will demonstrate the will,
commitment and sincerity of the reformers.

support of the legislative

before it can pass
legislation. Since the
executive is voted into
office according to the
partys manifesto, this
institutes the will of the
people more easily than
other political systems.
2. Passage of Legislation Requires Coalition:
There should be a coalition of parties before
passage of any legislation. This prevents
partisanship in that the alliance of more than
two parties compels them to work together
towards their interests. As a result, special
interests are set aside for the greater good.
3. Beneficial to Racially, Ethnically or
Ideologically Diverse Nations: Ethnically or
ideologically diverse nations benefit greatly
from parliamentary democracy because
unlike in a presidential system, power is
more divided and more evenly spread. A
prime minister does not have as much
importance or power as a ruling president,
and the people get to elect a party and not an
individual.

Cons of Parliamentary Democracy

Pros of Parliamentary Democracy: 1.
Quick and Easy to Pass
Legislation: Parliamentary
systems including parliamentary
democracy generally quicken
legislative action because the
executive branch requires the

1. Indirect Election of the Head of

Government: Parliamentary democracy is
highly criticized since the head of
government or prime minister is not directly
voted for by the electorate but by the
legislature. There is a degree of certainty as
to who wins the prime minister position

since it is already known who the party campaigns for

as head of the government.
2. Parliamentary Systems Can be Unstable:
Parliamentary systems are often unstable as in the
case of Israel, Canada, and Weimar Germany where
effective governance is constantly challenged by
issues such as demanding minority parties, votes of
no confidence and unstable coalitions. Some people
argue that proportional representation, political
culture and highly polarized voters are some of the
leading causes of instability. Flexible scheduling of
elections under parliamentary democracy is prone to
abuse, and a ruling party may delay elections to
overcome risk of unpopularity.
3. Voice of the Minority is Often Ignored: Ruling or
bigger parties are prone to ignore the concerns of the
smaller parties mainly because this does not offer
substantial incentives. In this case, the dominant party
may pass legislation without considering the smaller
parties. In addition, the less direct representation and
great degree of separation make it harder for
politicians to act for the greater good with the lack of
accountability. It is futile to categorize parliamentary
democracy as bad or good, advantageous or
disadvantageous. It has its own share of positives and
negatives, as briefly pointed out here, and it is just a
matter of taking responsibility as a citizen when it
comes to electing a party and as a politician when it
comes to using the power vested during elections.
Presidential system advantages: National Head of
State, Clear demarcation between Executive and
Legislative branch, Allowing for more effective set of
checks-and-balances to be placed on both branches.
cont on.. Presidential system Advantages: Executive
branch have clear power to hierarchy, President is

free to make major policy decisions without public

support.
Presidential system of Government disadvantages:
May fall to authoritarianism.
Runs risks of vesting all the authority
Could lead President to tyranny .
cont on Presidential system Disadvantages:
Separation of Powers indicates limited level of
accountability, Could end up making both Executive
and Legislature branch blame each other
Advantages of Parliamentary systems: Faster and
easier to pass legislation, Attractive features for
nations that are ethnically,racially, or ideologically
divided.
Power is evenly spread out in the power structure,
Prime Minister has higher focus on voting for a party
and its political ideas.
Less prone to authorization collapse.
Disadvantages of Parliamentary systems: In most
cases the head of the Government is not directly
elected, Can place too much power in the Executive
entity, System may be bicameral, Can sometimes be
unstable.
cont on disadvantages of Parliamentary system: No
independent body to oppose and veto legislation
passed by the parliament, Lack of inherent
Separation of Powers.
Proportional representation: an electoral system in
which parties gain seats in proportion of the number
of votes cast for them.
coalitions: an alliance for combined action,especially
a temporary alliance of political parties forming a
Government of states.
multiparty in comparing the frameworks: the goal of
this field is to create methods that enable parties to
jointly compute a function over their inputs.Which

system do I prefer? I prefer the United States

systems of government,because the people
who live in a place were it is Presidential,
have more say so in who they elect and what
goes on.

4. The two-party system is easier to grasp: With only

two parties that hold opposing views on major issues,
falling into one category or the other is a no-brainer.
And because parties are based on corresponding
ideologies, people will find it easier to align with one
of the two.

MULTI- PARTY BI- PARTY

List of Pros of a Two-Party

System
1. The two-party system helps people decide
whom to vote: Because there are only two
parties to choose from, voters would have an
easier time deciding whom to vote.
Clarifying issues and simplifying choices
would also be easy, helping the people
determine who has a better platform and who
can lead the country better. Without these
two political parties, the public would have
to go through a maze to find their way.
2. The two-party system makes it easier for
worthy candidates to run for public office.
Aside from coming up with the campaign
funds, these political parties can provide a
base of support and help mobilize materials
to entice people into supporting their
candidates.
3. The two-party system makes the
government more effective: These political
parties link different branches of the
government in all three levels: federal, state
and local. These organizations enable
politicians to form coalitions and accomplish
their plans.

5. The two-party system promotes common

positions.: Each political party has to find common
positions that represent a large group of voters. This
forces each group to take a centrist view, not radical
extremes, to avoid endangering their respective
parties. But when a party is radicalized by way of
thought, voters will favor the other group. This makes
it clear that people do not support such views,
resulting in the system self-regulating itself to ensure
that it actively combats extremist views.
6. The two-party system makes organizing elections
simpler: Of course, there are fewer groups to contact
and collaborate, making it easier to schedule events
and inform the public in advance. Fewer groups also
increase the potential for more debates and more
public awareness of major issues that need to be
tackled.

List of Cons of a Two-Party System

1. The two-party system self-perpetuates through a
pluralist system: Forty-eight out of the fifty US states
are given electoral votes on a n all or nothing basis. If
a candidate wins 51 percent of Florida votes, then that
means he gets all of the electoral votes. This system
could be easy to find out where the votes are going,
but it limits the chances of a third party to get its
candidate recognized, much less voted, by the people.
Should there be any problem with the two-party

system, the pluralist system is can make the change

quite challenging.
2. The two-party system limits debate: There are
several ways to look at things. But with a two-party
system, a larger consensus within the group glosses
over the finer points on certain topics. This can result
to limiting debate in the country, as it is could only
be focused on the opinions of just two parties.
3. The two-party system could lead to partisanship:
In countries where there are multiple parties, the
winning candidates have to form a coalition with
those who lost to effectively run the country. This
does not happen with a two-party system because
they spend most of their time undermining the other
group. This could result in unnecessary legislations
being passed while the government works with less
efficiency.
4. The two-party system makes the people feel like
they have no other choice: In the United States, it is
common to consider voting for a third-party a waste
of vote, a disengagement from the normal political
process and voting for people who dont deserve to
win.
PROS: MULTI PARTY
(1) The nation is not divided into two camps: Where
there is multiple party systems, there are many types
of ideologies and there is no rigid discipline among
the parties. If a member leaves one party or if he is
turned out of the party, he can join another party
which has views almost similar to his own views. In
this way, because of the freedom of the views, the
nation is not divided into two rival groups.

Parliament does not become a puppet in the

hands of the cabinet: In a multiple party
system, one party Government is not formed
but several parties form a coalition
Government, and it has to depend upon the
goodwill of the Parliament. Therefore, the
cabinet cannot get the work done at will, by
the Parliament by establishing its
dictatorship.
All shares of opinion are reflected in the
House: In a multiple party system, there is
freedom of views. Because of this freedom,
all shades of opinion get representation in the
Parliament and views of all the classes are
heard in the House.
Wider choice before the electorate: Where
there are many parties, there is a wider
choice before the electorate because they
cast their votes in favour of only the likeminded parties.
In it the chances of Cabinet dictatorship are
minimized: In a multiple party system,
Coalition Governments are formed. Since
one-party Government is nor formed, the
parties in the coalition work by adopting the
policy of compromise.
The workers is more free in this system: If
his own party does not care for him, he can
join a like-minded party.

CONS: Weak Government: The Coalition

Governments are basically weak and they are
dissolved soon.
Indefiniteness of Policy: Because of the rapid change
of the Governments, there is indefiniteness of the
policy.
No long-term planning: Due to rapid changes in the
Governments, long- term planning is not possible.
Weak position of the Prime Minister: In this system,
the position of the Prime Minister is weak, because
the Government is formed not by one party but many
parties form the Coalition Government. Therefore, all
the parties in the Government are to be appeased.
Since the policies and programmes of these parties
are different, the Prime Minister has to face a great
difficulty in satisfying them and keep them with him.
If some party refuses to support the Prime Minister
the fall of the Government becomes inevitable and the
parties who enjoy a majority in the legislature, try to
form the Cabinet.
Lack of administrative efficiency: In a multiple party
system there is lack of administrative efficiency,
because the Governments change very often.
In this system trading in votes and formation of
Government undermines the political morality.