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PANCASILA:THE INDONESIANSTATE
IDEOLOGYACCORDINGTO THE
NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT
Michael Morfit
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litical thinking about its present situation, and its future plans. The
article begins with an examination of Pancasila as a political ideologyor with the version of Pancasila that has the official approval of the
present regime and is given in the P4 upgrading course. This is briefly
contrasted with the understanding of Pancasila propagated under the
Guided Democracy of Sukarno. Next, the implications of this ideology
for the development strategy of the government are examined. Finally,
consideration is given to P4 as part of the government's political strategy,
especially with regard to the forthcoming general election in 1982.
The Five Principles
"Pancasila" consists of five principles, succinctly stated in Indonesian but often rather ambiguous when subjected to close analysis and
certainly less suggestive when translated into English. The first principle (or sila) is a belief in one supreme being (Sila Ketuhanan yang
Maha Esa). Thus the Indonesian state is not secular in the Western
sense. However, the belief in a supreme being is left as a general statement, broad enough to encompass a wide variety of religions including
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism-those "great" religions
officially recognized by the state and dealt with by the Department of
Religion. This Sila is the source of considerable controversy. More
orthodox Muslims have frequently favored an explicit commitment to
Islam as the state religion and have felt some dissatisfaction at the general phrasing of this Sila. They have also resisted what they see as an
attempt on the part of the government to equate mere belief or faith
(kepercayaan) with a true religion (agama). This objection is aimed at
many of the traditional and pre-Islamic beliefs of the Javanese, which
are seen as corruptions or denials of the true faith of Islam. This includes both the animistic beliefs of the rural population as well as the
more sophisticated version (kebathinan) of the aristocratic priyayi class.
The second principle is variously described as a commitment either
to internationalism or more literally to a just and civilized humanitarianism (Sila Kemanusian yang Adil dan Beradab). The two interpretations are not as divergent as they might seem at first. A commitment to
just and civilized humanitarianism entails a willingness to treat with
others, even foreigners, in a fair manner, free from suspicion, exploitation, and oppression. When viewed from the perspective of state relations, this becomes a commitment to internationalism in the sense that
it rejects adherence to one of two (or more) opposing political blocs or
support for an international order which is exploitative and divisive.
The third Sila expresses a commitment to the unity of Indonesia
(Sila Persatuan Indonesia). In a vast archipelago stretching 5,000 kilometers across the sea, with 13,000 islands and about 350 distinct ethnic
groups, an emphasis on the unity of the state is understandable. The
attempts of the Dutch to create semi-autonomous states during the 1947-
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The only additional factor that appears in this part of P4 is reference to the role of the Indonesian military (ABRI) in national development ("ABRI segagai modal dasar pembangunan nasional").23
Security as a guiding principle, encompassing ideological security, political stability, economic justice, and social and cultural harmony, is a
primary responsibility of ABRI and a basic precondition for development.24
An examination of P4, then, leads one to conclude that the New
Order government is committed to a concept of national development
that envisions no fundamental change in the social order and that this
preservation of the existing order is to be guaranteed by the military.
Nothing in the political style of the New Order government or the
policies it has pursued suggest anything to the contrary. In short, P4
makes explicit the New Order government's commitment to the "trickle
down" strategy of development, "permerataan" not withstanding. Just
as the vision of the future projected by Pancasila is an echo of the past,
so also the New Order does not contemplate policies that will result in
a future social order markedly different from the present, although it
hopes that this society will be more prosperous.
In this sense, it might be said that Pancasila, according to the New
Order government, is an ideology of containment rather than one of
mobilization. That is, it is conceived in such broad and general terms
that it can embrace the wide cultural and religious diversities of the
Indonesian nation. While it provides an encompassing umbrella of unity, it is not designed to excite mass participation in the development
process or galvanize the nation into action. The Pancasila of P4 thus
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Conclusion
It is impossible now to determine to what extent P4 has succeeded
in achieving the objectives set by the government. At the end of 1980,
Pancasila courses have in general moved from the central government
level in Jakarta to provincial level government offices and universities.
The process can be expected to continue for about another year, especially if sections of the population outside the civil service either or81
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ganize Pancasila courses or are required to join P4. Even in the short
run, therefore, it is too early to come to firm conclusions about the success or failure of the New Order government's efforts to establish Pancasila as the accepted basis of political order and the justification for
development plans.
The above discussion suggests, however, that there are fundamental
problems in the formulation of Pancasila by the present regime, and
with the way it seeks to propagate its views through P4. While there is
little doubt that the regime will prevail through the forthcoming national elections, only time will tell if elements of social change and historical dynamics are infused into its presently static ideology.
What is perhaps most disappointing about P4 is that it reveals the
extent to which the New Order regime has failed to project a future
that is clearly defined and likely to be realized. Over the past two years
there has been discussion of the apparent loss of elan within the government and a growing sense that it has somehow lost both its way and
its confidence in its own capabilities. This assessment of the government's concern and uncertainty has been confirmed by its handling of
a variety of events from the June 1980 Petition of Fifty, to anti-Chinese
riots in central Java in November of that year, to the April 1981 hijacking of a Garuda airliner. The decision to pursue a nationwide program
of political indoctrination may be viewed in this light as a symptom of
growing insecurity on the part of the present regime and of an attempt
to rekindle a sense of its own purpose. If so, the above discussion suggests that this is an effort that must ultimately fail. The failure, if it
occurs, may be one of imagination because the New Order government
has been unable to develop within the doctrine of Pancasila development strategies capable of addressing the inevitability of profound social change or of generating a new, ideological vision for Indonesia.