Introduction

Comparing to the other strategic mode of entries, IJV (International Joint Venture)
is often regarded as one of the higher failure rate alliance between firms. (Makino
& Beamish, 1998) Despite the
fragile IJV survival rate, it has become
increasing popular mode of overseas market entry and expansion for Multi-Nation
Enterprise (MNE) in recent years. (Beamish & Delios 1997) Therefore there is
strong hint implicating that high failure in IJV reported may be somewhat
misleading as such failure is costly for partners involved; firms would want to
avoid using this strategy if this entry mode is proven to be a high risk of failure. In
order to analysis more in depth, this paper firstly analysis the motivation of IJVs
formation between firms (Section one); the high failure rate in IJVs is further
analysis and discuss why the statement can be misleading. (Section two).
Section One
IJV Definition
Joint Venture (JV) is a selection between two or more firms can transact among
alternative modes such as acquisition, supply contract or licensing. (Kogut, 1988)
The companies involved invest a portion of their resources either financially or by
other means to run a business and jointly bear both the responsibility for risk
relating to management and financially. An International Joint Venture (IJV) is
defined as JV that involves firms from different countries operating across national
boundaries. (Yan & Luo, 2001) This can be a partnership of the firms from outside
the country with local, or partnership of firms from different countries venturing to
cross-border market. In some cases, JV formed by partners from the same country
but operate in a foreign country other than their parents' should also be
considered as an IJV (Geringer & Hebert 1989) Although a majority of IJVs involve
only two firms, some ventures may have multiple partners. For example, many
early IJVs in China were three-way partnerships consisting of a local Chinese
company, a foreign multinational company, and a partner from Hong Kong. (Yan &
Luo, 2001) IJVs can be even more complex in some cases where the one or more
partners are a separate JV formed and operate in another country. Example Fuji
Xerox is an American-Japanese JV formed in Japan; the firm also forms an IJV,
Xerox Shenzhen with Xerox China Ltd in China. Comparing to other forms market
entries such as licensing, franchising and acquisition, IJVs is considered the most
complex choice among them as it involved cross border partner relationship
management. Despite the complexity, the number of firms using this mode of
market entry continues to exist.
Reasons why Companies go into International Joint Ventures (IJVs)
Firms choose to enter into IJVs among the other mode of entry to the foreign
markets based on the advantage it can offer; among them some benefits derived
from IJVs including cost reduction, new market entry, and learning. (Kogut 1988)
(Makino et al., 2007) suggest in summary there is four main purposes for IJV
formation are resource/labor seeking, capital seeking, market seeking, and
strategic assets seeking. Example using the resource/labor seeking intention;
many developed countries' firms look to developing countries for cheaper
operating cost, untapped market and access to raw materials. However, in the
case where foreign ownership restriction exists, the necessity to involved local
partner become mandatory. (Beamish & Lupton, 2009) For instance, during the
first decade when China allowed foreign investments, it is restricted to equity joint
ventures with local firms. From a market seeking prospective, on the other hand
foreign company can gain access to a new market more efficiently by utilizing the
resources and market knowledge of a local partner through such alliance. Without
a local partner, it is difficult to understand the foreign country's consumer
behavior, distribution structure, and marketing strategies and culture practice.
(Yan & Luo, 2001) For example in Japan, foreign companies are strongly
encouraged to set up partnerships with Japanese companies due to its distinctive
marketing and distribution practices. Firms seeking strategic assets such as
technology, strengthen their competitive edge through the formation of JV with a

firm which already possess the technology or assets they required. For example,
accessing to JV partner's developed products allow firms to expand their
application range without having to develop in-house. Other than the benefits,
risk sharing factors also motivate IJV formation between firms. In the case of risky
ventures which involved high financial risks such as oil exploration, firms opt for JV
in order diversify the risk among the partners as it may be too risky for a single
firm to handle. (Yan & Luo, 2001) From business environment perspective, JV with
local partners reduced the risks for the foreign firms especially for countries with
uncertain political situation or policies against foreign investment. For instance,
firms can also enter into a foreign market by setting up wholly owned subsidiaries
(WOSs) as a mode of entry. However, in highly uncertain foreign markets, IJVs
tends to outperform WOSs because of the local partners. (Brouthers, 2002) It is
more effective for local partners to take appropriate counter actions against
situation change whenever necessary. From another perspective, JV between two
or more smaller firms enabled them to achieve the economies of scale similar to
those big organizations by pooling their financial resources. Concurrently the
nonfinancial resources such as research and development can be shared between
the firms to achieve the economies of scope. In the event shall the new venture
failed, the JV can go bankrupt without much harm except the parent company
except the investment. While the foreign firms benefit from the IJVs with local
partners, local firms also benefit from new technology and operation knowledge
from their foreign counterparts in developed economies. In many cases, it is the
objective of the local partner to gain access to the international market through a
JV with a multinational firm. (Yan & Luo, 2001)
Underlying theories for IJV formation
Various theoretical perspectives of IJVs formation motives ranging from economic
to organization theories and game theory. (Yan & Luo, 2001) The motivation of
joint ventures explains why this particular mode of transaction is chosen over
other alternatives such as acquisition, supply contract, licensing or spot market
purchase. (Kogut, 1988) The underlying theories that motivate firms to enter IJV
are discussed as follows:
Transaction Cost of Economics
Transaction cost theory is most commonly used to explain the mode selection to
enter a foreign market. (Brouthers, 2013) Transaction cost can be referred as the
expenses incurred in enforcing contracts, haggling over terms and contingent and
for administering a transaction. (Williamson, 1979, 2012) The basic concept is to
find the lowest cost alternatives to minimize from the sum of transaction cost and
production cost, thus it is necessary to justify the cost benefits achieved through
JV is significantly higher compare to internal development or acquisition. (Kogut,
1988) For firms entering to foreign countries may choose to enter JV with local
partners in order to become more cost effective and rely on other firms for
activities which they have comparative advantages. (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990)
In some cases, transaction cost theory with a combination of other considerations
such as institutional and cultural context motivate the IJV formation. (Brouthers,
2013) Using the Danone and Wahaha's IJV example, Danone is able to reduce the
amount of investment by tapping on Wahaha's existing resources such as their
factories through JV agreement. The foreign company is able to gain access to the
new market with minimum resources without having to investment factory as the
primary motivation. In additional, the IJV with a local company also provide
Danone the access to China market and overcome the barriers of cultural
difficulties. In return, the local firm gained production technology and expand their
product range to the market.
Resource-Based View
Perspective from the resource-based theory, the alliance rational between firms is
for value maximization by pooling and utilizing their valuable resources. (Yasuda
2005) Comparing to transaction cost theory where firms look to reduce cost,

foreign firms can improve their competitiveness through a joint venture to achieve
their objectives in the shortest possible time from this perspective. Firms come
together with the intention to maximize efficiency and enhance their competitive
positioning in the market. (Kogut 1988) From the perspective of firms entering to
foreign markets, this reduced the risk of investment by tapping on the local
partner infrastructure and speed up the process of market entry. For example
when Pfizer decided to enter to China market; the company selected local Chinese
pharmaceutical company, Zhejiang Hisun to form a JV company. By tapping on
their local partner's existing resources and gaining access to raw materials,
manpower, and technology. On the other hand using the pharmaceutical industry
example, smaller biotechnology firms can tap on the bigger pharmaceutical firms
for the capital resource and their existing distribution network. They are able to
reduce the time and cost required to enter the market using their partner's
resources. (Das, et al. 2000) From the bigger firm's perspective, the motivation
factor to enter IJV very much depend on the instead of acquisition depends on
whether the unwanted' assets of the targeted firm can be easily separated.
Resource Dependency Theory
JVs are established to manage the interdependence between firms for
complementary resources and maintain an existing linkage. (Yan and Luo, 2001)
Such alliance usually occurs between a firm and supplier who are very dependent
on each other. Through JV with the supplier company, firms can control the
resources which are vital and lower the dependency on other organization for the
supply of resources. Such vital resources can be in term of scarce raw materials,
special skilled personnel and unique machinery or technology which supplier
company can offer and is critical to the operation of the firm. Such partnership is
formed to benefit the JV partners from the synergistic. (Chi, 1994) Example,
company can control the supplier firm to ensure undisrupted supply of goods or
services it sought after; in additionally prevent competitors gain control of such
supply from risk management perspective. The supplier company on the other
hand, can secure long-term stable supply of goods. No organization can be selfsufficient and must engage other organizations for critical resources in order to
survive. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
Organizational Learning Perspective
From an organizational learning perspective, JV is viewed as a means to build
strategic capabilities through learning from their partners (Kogut 1988). The
motivation for JV is to acquire the knowledge that is lacking within the own
organization from partners through the alliance. Firms strengthen their
competitive position through extraction and internalize the knowledge and
competencies of their partners. (Hamel, 1991) Example General Motors(GM)
formed IJV company, with TOYOTA in United States (US) to provide them an
opportunity to learn about efficient manufacturing process from their Japanese
partner, while TOYOTA gained entry to the US market where they studied the local
operation and utilize it opened their WOS soon after. However, this learningoriented motive may result in competition and conflict over time after either one
of the partners got what they required. The alliance ended after both parties
decide to pull out of the JV in 2010. TOYOTA has since gone into another JV with
Tesla Motors to study the development of electric car based on the same
organizational learning motivation.
Institutional Theory
This is applicable for firms entering a foreign market where local government is
protective of the local industries. Institutional pressures by the government for
foreign companies to form JV with a local partner in order to invest in the country
are common, especially in developing countries. Even though joint ventures with
majority foreign ownership might be legally allowed, it is common foreign firm
form the JV with local owning equal or majority to reduce the risk and get their
commitments as local firms can handle local policies more efficiently. (Yui &

Makino 2002) For example in the initial stage when China allowed foreign
investors, many IJVs followed the 5050 shared equity JV to get the local partners'
commitment even though this is not required by the Chinese law. Local partners'
ability to handle the local government policies and social, cultural, or industrial
norms thus their involvement is very important.
Real option Theory
Foreign firms may wish to take this opportunity to study the market knowledge
using their partners to determine the feasibility. (Kogut, 1991) By alliance with a
partner with the option to buy-out partners at a later stage, this can be a lower
risk entry strategy to the uncertain market comparing to setting up WOS from the
initial stage. (Brouthers et al. 2008) suggest real option theory offers the cost
minimization which transaction cost theory emphasizes and value creation by the
focus on the uncertainties. This approach allows foreign firms to have the option
to turn existing IJVs to WOSs through internalization only upon a favorable
situation in the IJV host country is present. For example when IJV is generating
good sales performance and high profitability; or alternatively foreign company
already obtained the necessary knowledge to operate in host country without
their local partner.
Post IJV Formation and Termination
Firms enter into IJVs based on the various theoretical motivations discussed
above; consequently after the formation, such motivation may erode over time
and result in IJV termination. (Brouthers, 2013) For instance, foreign firms with
transaction cost based motivation enter IJV with local firms as they are uncertain
or unable to estimate the cost involved at entry stage. Over the IJV operation
time, they may terminate the IJVs and convert them to WOSs based on the same
motivation; reduce cost through internalization. Alternatively from organization
learning perspective, insufficient learning due to over protective of partners' know
how; or either partner firm already acquired the necessary know-how may result
in the premature termination of the IJV. IJVs formed based on theoretical concepts
may find the actual complexity in the real world does not match the expected
results against intention and resulted in the dissolution of the alliance either
through liquidation or acquisition. Termination of IJVs is commonly seen as IJV
failure; in the following section, failure in IJV will be further discussed and analysis.
Section Two Definition of Failure in IJVs
There is no clear definition of the failure in IJVs; researchers have different
perspectives in regards to this context. Many studies proposed the linkage
between partners' performance evaluation in the JV and the success of the
venture. In contrast, Failure' is the result of poor JV performance in term of ability
to meet its intended objectives which may result in its dissolution. However out of
the numerous researches conducted to study the performance of IJV, only a few
have focused on the selection of the performance measures. (Larimo, Nguyen and
Tahir Ali, 2015) In general, performance measurement is categorized by
researchers under objective and subjective. (Geringer and Hebert, 1989)
Objective measurement of performance is more straightforward referring to the
clear indicator such as IJV survival and financial result. While subjective
measurement can be very complex, the factors for the measure are subjective to
the parent companies' discretion. In most cases, the end of an alliance between
IJV partners is considered as failure (Park, S. and Ungson, G. 1997) due to the fact
it is the most easily obtained data for performance measure and less subjective to
different viewpoints. Since IJVs is often associate as the marriage' and the
longevity of the alliance to the success of a JV (Yan and Luo, 2001) and the failure
of IJVs in this aspect is defined as termination or divorce' of the alliance. (Peng
and Shenkar, 2002)
Reasons for IJV Failure

Common reasons for failures of IJV can be due to internal and external factors.
Internal factors mainly due to the partners' differences such as strategic goals,
commitment level and disputes over unequal sharing. Therefore selection of local
partner very much determines the success of IJVs in emerging economies. (Luo, Y.
1998) The diversion of strategic goals among partners will result in usage of
distributive strategies during the JV operation rather than cooperation with each
other. The most vital reason for IJV survival is the cooperation and tolerance
between partners. (Yan and Luo, 2001) On the other hand, the end of JV alliance
between firms in some cases is influenced by external factors and had no
relationship to partners' differences, disputes and organization factors. The
changes in the political, economic and cultural environment in which the IJV is
operating in may result in the premature termination. For instance interference
from the local government of the country which the IJV is operating may also
affect its survival. The example in China, the institutional pressure for JV with local
partners no longer exists after 2001. Many foreign firms decide to end the existing
IJV by buying out the local partners and convert to WOS.
Why the statement Failure rate for IJVs is very high' can be misleading?
As defined above, the end of the alliance between the JV firms generally
categorizes as IJV failure (Nemeth and Nippa, 2013) however the survival of the
IJV is only one of the performance indexes. (Yan and Luo, 2001) argued
termination of JV between firms may not necessarily represent failure or divorce',
partners may leave the alliance from time to time as the JV evolved. IJV failure
based on its longevity aspect is often misleading, overlooking the positive impacts
the alliance may have before the dissolution and this should not be considered as
a failure. It can be easily misunderstood as total lack of success for the partners'
firm without further clarifications. (Makino et al., 2007) suggest the differentiation
between intended and unintended dissolution of IJVs would clarify whether the IJV
is failure or success upon its termination. The formation of IJV with unintended exit
usually comprises of IJV partners with expected returns of their investment in term
of financial and non-financial aspects through long-term alliance; thus unintended
dissolution is usually seen as IJV failure since the alliance from the beginning is
designed to survive. The longevity of alliance, in general, can reflect the
performance of IJV in this aspect. On the other hand, the intended exit from the
alliance is generally seen as either of the partners had already successfully
achieved the objective for the IJV. (Ren et al., 2009) also, highlight the positive
impact for one or more parent partners despite the dissolution. Short lived
alliance does not equate to failure in IJV from this aspect, it is necessary to
consider the other type IJV performance measures to be used besides IJV
longevity, and other factors such as different partners' perspectives which are
usually not clearly defined.
Other performance measure of IJV
As discussed above, the performance evaluation should be considered based on
the purpose of the IJV formation in the first place. For example in general firms
expand their business operation through IJV to create wealth; the performance
measure in term of the financial result is important in this perspective. (Beamish
and Delios, 1997) IJV financial performance in term of sales targets, operating
profits and other achievements such as the market share growth, shareholder
value and return on investments during the alliance should be considered as one
of the important performance measure. However some suggest financial
measures cannot reflect the JV company competitiveness (Christoffersen et al.,
2014) and effectiveness, Despite many criticisms, financial results are one of the
most popular and conventional measures of performance if provided available due
to the sensitivity in many companies. Alternatively in some cases, where financial
measures failed to fulfill the non- financial goals deem more important by the JV
partners; intangible gains such as operation and technology knowhow are
considered as performance measure of IJV instead. For another instance, many
foreign firms' main objective to go into IJV with local partners is to learn and study

the market knowledge while local firms want to learn their foreign counterpart on
the advance technology and operation. Using the example of General Motors (GM)
and Toyota JV in US, the alliance allows GM to study the manufacturing process of
the Japanese firm while Toyota gain access to the market and learn the local
cultural, institutional challenges through their partner. The JV may have ended but
from Toyota's perspective, they have gained enough local knowledge to start their
own WOS; GM also successfully implemented the Japanese manufacturing process
to their own production plant from knowledge they gained. The transfer of
knowledge occurs between partners during the alliance period; this has fulfilled
partner firms' objectives and future ventures' requirements from their
perspectives. TOYOTA and GM gained new knowledge from a learning aspect, not
necessarily has any link to the IJV financial performance. Performance measures
of such intended termination can refer to the set of objectives that motivate the
IJV formation; termination should be viewed positively rather than failure'. On the
other hand, the possibility of unexpected positive impact not related to the initial
intended gains which the firms may experience during the alliance which can be
overshadowed by the IJV exit and deem as failure'. For instance, IJV set up for the
purpose of knowledge learning as its main objective may experience unexpected
financial returns during its operation which offset the initial investments of the
partners. The IJV performance evaluation should focus on the achievements or
benefits experience by the parties involved in the duration of the alliance rather
than the longevity. Regardless the tangible or intangible benefits gained through
the alliance, they are often overlooked upon the termination of the JV.
Different partners' perspectives
Since IJV comprises of two or more partners, the factors for performance
evaluation can be subjective due to the different partners' perspectives. For
instance, one partner firm may obtain certain positive results from their
perspective may not necessarily reflect the same opinion from another partner
(Beamish and Delios, 1997) Using the example of IJV formation based on
organization learning, the different learning speed of partner firms may result in
the premature termination. From different partners' perspective, the IJV result
reflects differently. As briefly mentioned in the definition section, subjective
measurement can be very complex comparing to objectives measures.
Time frame Definition
Another factor often not clearly defined is the time frame, certain IJVs alliance
designed from the initial stage with the intention to exit. (Makino et al., 2007)
proposed the likelihood of IJV termination depends on the purpose of the
formation. For instance, firms seeking strategic assets such as local market and
operation knowledge which are possessed by their partners is expected to exit
upon achieving their objectives. IJV termination does not equate to failure but
planned exit upon the success of completing the purpose of the formation. In
contrast, the alliance longevity very much relies on how quickly the firms can
accomplish their objectives; in this aspect the longer the duration may, in fact,
reflect as poor performance from another perspective. Alternatively using the
example in the case of project based JV between firms; they have a limited life
span with specific and welldefined objectives. This type of alliance is designed to
end' upon the completion of the given project and there is no need to continue
the JV unless there is a contractual requirement specifying the necessity. From this
perspective, the consideration factor of the success or failure of JV is the ability to
complete the project within the given duration rather than the longevity of the JV
itself. The performance during the alliance should be considered as a determinate
factor whether the IJV is a failure. (Geringer and Hebert, 1991)
Conclusion
IJV high failure is often associated with dissolution of the alliance as it is the most
simple and straightforward compared to the rest of performance measures. There
is no unified method of performance measurement combining various

consideration factors till date with researchers having different perspectives due
to the complexity. However based on this paper finding, the interpretation of
failure based on the survival of IJV solely often overlooked the positive aspect and
possible benefits the partners obtained through the alliance despite the
dissolution. Hence without further clarification and generalize IJV termination as
failure in IJV is a misleading statement.

Note: Word count 3,999

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