G.R. No.

L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of
statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus
reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a
Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court
on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the
alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies
of legislation of Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision.
When the petition for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6,
1958, it was held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. 2
Accordingly, we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos
Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal
Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the
transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda.
de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her
death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September
29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending
investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax
liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were
claimed as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts
of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the
ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of
P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated
February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the
intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and
received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere
principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical
correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue
that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision
states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person
properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been
recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this Court,
on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The
dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both
subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable
property'. In order that this Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax

Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the
reception of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace
'intangible person property', as used in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence submitted by the administrator
petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or
incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment of any
death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter back to
us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963. Respondent presented no evidence." 7
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a
transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as
vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country". Deference to the
De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of
law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress
is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it
and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted
area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal
order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did
opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the
filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign
country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance
tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of
international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18
What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who
thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents
submitted to it proof of the laws of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not
residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene
being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling: "The Collector hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this
country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above
quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an
exemption where conditions are such that demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,
AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C.
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF

G.R No. 187167

Present:

THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF

LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE
ALFERES, CZARINA MAY
ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO,
SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR
BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE
PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN
MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN
DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,
ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH
KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,
MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY
RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,
MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III,
Petitioners,
- versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
Respondents.
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
July 16, 2011

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines
and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the
framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II)
proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, 9 as the case may be, assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclearfree policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices
the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure
to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial
review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of
Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1

Preliminarily

1
2

Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to
test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15
nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with
constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution.
Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus
satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that
the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and
resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20
Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in
the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of
procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the
Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of
the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of
UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris,
the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS
III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago.24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features
are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime
zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic
baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the
configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA
9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the
KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone)
by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as
amended, taking into account the Treaty of
Paris delimitation (in square nautical
miles)

Extent of maritime area using

RA 9522, taking into account
UNCLOS III (in square nautical
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters

166,858

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone
TOTAL

382,669
440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular
demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The
Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located
at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states:
The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating
baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still
allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan
Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the
location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including
the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1

2
3

The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the
maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of
125 nautical miles.
The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an
additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points,
particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and
drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446,
which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice
to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1
2

The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.

xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air
space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom
of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage 45 does not place them
in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty.
More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) 48 must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
x x x.49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution.
Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to
substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51) and
subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS
III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53
UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and
second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189868

December 15, 2009

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND V. PALATINO, ALVIN A. PETERS, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUSP), MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA, CHAIRPERSON OF THE STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP),
VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, VIJAE O. ALQUISOLA, PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD
OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP), DIANNE KRISTEL M. ASUELO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE KABATAANG ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA KALAYAAN
(KARATULA), KENNETH CARLISLE EARL EUGENIO, ANA KATRINA V. TEJERO, VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO, JACQUELINE ALEXIS S. MERCED, and
JADE CHARMANE ROSE J. VALENZUELA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the threshold once again is the right of suffrage of the sovereign Filipino people the foundation of Philippine democracy. As the country prepares to elect its next set
of leaders on May 10, 2010, the Court upholds this primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 85141 which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December
15, 2009 as the period of continuing voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 85852 on February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that
it needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009, 3 petitioners challenge the
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan Party-list, sues as a member of the House of Representatives and a concerned
citizen, while the rest of petitioners sue as concerned citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first
instance, claiming that based on National Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age group 18-19
and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of
continuing voter registration under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996, reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and
ninety (90) days before a special election.
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the voter registration until
January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among other things, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power
to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646) 4 and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 8436 (RA 8436)5 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voter registration; and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that the
October 31, 2009 deadline of voter registration was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC6 wherein the Court denied
a similar prayer for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the
fullest extent possible, in every national and local election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article solely therefor:
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a
function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them,7 bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.8
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and
ninety (90) days before a special election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the
COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper
allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of
the precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the campaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and
distribution of Voters Information Sheet. Such determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power, which this Court is bound to respect. And the
COMELECs rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.9
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing
voter registration under RA 8189. This Courts primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed by the other. The presumption is against
inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For Congress is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to enact inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.10
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same
cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage the
common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189,
Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to
exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.11 In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying
the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners
filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a twoday registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth that the therein petitioners could have, but had not, registered during the period between the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the COMELEC and before the start of the 120-day prohibitive period prior to the election date or January 13, 2001, thus:
[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be
registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the
Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent
COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of
the firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the Courts pronouncement in Akbayan-Youth is that had the therein petitioners filed their petition and sought an extension date that was before
the 120-day prohibitive period, their prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing
of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal
impediment to the extension prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010
elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA
FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and
register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long
before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine
Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad
not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be
eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in
response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of
suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18
September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among
others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,
petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be
expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual
citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and
academic. 7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such
political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as
absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others
who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL 8 - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot,
as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those
who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal
of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants
and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the
ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his claim [where] the Court
held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a
condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not
be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket
added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country"
because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to
exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required,
there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof
of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that
he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 11
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights,
specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct
to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the
clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a
Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC argues:
4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of
foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a
second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1)
the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the
Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is
supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred
under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile."
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of
the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore
kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad."
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the
proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is a qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says "In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election."
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six
months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is
not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of
Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is
an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence "residency" has been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile."

But the third more practical reason, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to
overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and
empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee
voting. According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other
countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the
day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of
"duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason
why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied
the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.
ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA
DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN
D. NATIVIDAD,
Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 162759

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 4, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the
mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 20031 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow
them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among
others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in
such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts
abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would
likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in
response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot
exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely
re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who
have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,
petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment,6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be
expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual
citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and
academic.7
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such
political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as
absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners
and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2
authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding
section, be allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL 8 - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who
cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
(a)

Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

(b)

Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

(c)
Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one (1) year, including those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .;
(d)
An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e)

Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket

added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional
challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals 9 to support his claim [where] the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform
a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution
on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.10 (Words in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized
as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of
origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit
to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all

8
9
10

citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required
in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but
more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. 11
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1)
Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws;
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3) xxx
(4) xxx

xxx
xxx

xxx.
xxx;

(5)
That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a)
citizens; and/or

are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized

(b)
are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as
an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first
blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189
which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights,12 COMELEC argues:
4.DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
4.01.

11
12

The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their
Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed

their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship ( i.e., Filipino) then,
duals must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age
abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of
Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in
fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the
sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the Philippines. They are permanent
immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this
committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with
the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a
Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States,
for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the
Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to
overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there
is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall
provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words, anything that we may do or say
in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the
qualification, they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot
vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. .

13

As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the
transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the
constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the sixmonth/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee
voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that
one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence residency has been interpreted as synonymous
with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally
and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the
country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and
empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee
voting. According to the poll body:
1.05
With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who
are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:

Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the
next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor
reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be
denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act
No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

14
15

x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,

vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions,
the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of
the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the

certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code "Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections" and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be
a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793,
"An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the VicePresident-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President
of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or VicePresident. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in
the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and
with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it
so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. "(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain
in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the
first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on
or before 11 April 1899.24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the
first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act,
also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 "That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns "Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated
by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified
him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ,
Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
"uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents,
the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted
in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that "Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will,
or a public document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that "In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by
the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as
his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document."
In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition
may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood
brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official)
or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x

xxx

x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of
that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of
this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in
the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the
mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private interests."37
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found
in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law 41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old
Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood
was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge
on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides "Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to
prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one
house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:

"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise
in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being
a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent
and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year
later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, 43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs.
Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The
stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but
was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino,
Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate
child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for
no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither
justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for
lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th
May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this
Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 666

January 14, 1902

In the matter of the petition of J. GARCIA BOSQUE for admission to the practice of law in the Philippine Islands.
Oscar Sutro, attorney for petitioner.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been agreed upon by the parties to the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the compulsory subjection of the subjects
of the ceding power to the new sovereign followed as a logical consequence. The status of these subjects was not uniform, as in addition to the natives there were others
who were merely residents but who, equally with the natives, had interests and rights inherent in the nationality of the territory. With respect to these the special
agreement contained in article 9 was established, by virtue of which it was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave the country, thus freeing themselves of
subjection to the new sovereign, or to continue to reside in the territory, in which case the expiration of the term of eighteen months without their making an express
declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter, such persons thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same
manner as the natives of these Islands. The period of eighteen months began to run from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty that is to say, from
April 11, 1899, and expired on the corresponding day of October, 1900. The petitioner absented himself from these Islands on May 30, 1899, and remained absent
therefrom during the whole period. It was in January, 1901, that he returned to these Islands.
From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that he elected to take the first of the two courses open to him under his right of option. Neither the Government
nor the courts can place any other construction upon the facts above related. Having left the islands he had no occasion to make any declaration of his intention to
preserve his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him on his departure. This nationality could be forfeited only by a continued residence in the ceded territory and a
failure to make a declaration of intention to preserve it within the term fixed therefor. The conditions which gave rise to the presumptive change of nationality were
residence and the lapse of eighteen months without express declaration to the contrary; these two conditions not being fulfilled there was no change of national status.
Neither by the Government of Spain nor by that of the United States could the petitioner be regarded as a Filipino subject. By absenting himself from the territory he
continued to be a Spaniard.

To native-born subjects of the territory no such right of option was accorded; it was expressly refused them upon the rejection by the American Commissioners of the
proposition in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded territories made by the Spanish Commissioners in Annex No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol. (Conference of
December 10, 1898.) The native subject could not evade the power of the new sovereign by withdrawing from the Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein make
declaration of his intention to preserve the Spanish nationality enjoyed under the former sovereign. Neither the Government of the United States nor that of Spain can
consider them as other than Filipino subjects. This is expressly stated by the Spanish Government in article 1 of its royal decree of May 11, 1901.
The dates fixed by the treaty by which the sovereignty of one nation is ceded to another are of the highest importance, they being part of the contract, and are not within
the control of the subjects as are those relating to their individual rights by reason of the fact that the political rights of the contracting nations themselves are the subject
of the agreement. It is for this reason that the Government of Spain in the royal decree above cited has always taken the dates fixed in the treaty of Paris as the starting
point, and, moreover, expressly declares therein that persons who are natives or residents of the ceded or relinquished territories can not, in their relations with the
Government or authorities of such territories, lay claim to Spanish nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said decree, except with the consent of such
Government, or under treaty stipulations. (Art. 5.) The Government and courts of these Islands should not act with less circumspection in the matter, and invade the
sovereign rights of Spain by giving the presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the treaty of Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions upon which it
depends, to wit, residence coupled with failure to make an express declaration to the contrary. The ordinary provisions of local laws in their normal operation with regard
to the effect of absence upon the retention of a residence or domicile can not therefore be relied upon, nor the presumption as to the intention of an absentee recognized
by civil codes and international treaties, although the most general and almost the only proof allowed by statute as evidence of an intention to preserve a residence or
domicile in a country is the maintenance of a dwelling or commercial establishment therein, upon which point, as also upon the fact that the petitioner became a member
of the bar of Barcelona upon his arrival in that city, we made no decision, not regarding it as of any moment in view of the conclusions above expressed. The fact is that
one is not to be regarded as having submitted to the new sovereign by the mere failure to make an express declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the
declaration is of no significance, having been established for the express purpose of overcoming the effect of a continued residence, an act which in itself implies
subjection to the new sovereign by giving rise to the presumption of waiver of Spanish nationality and the adoption of that of the territory.
The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to have lost his Spanish nationality by reason of his residence in the territory after the 11th of October, 1900, and his
failure to make declaration of his intention to preserve it within the period agreed upon by the high contracting parties to the treaty of Paris, and to have adopted the
nationality of the native subjects under the presumption arising from the conditions expressed. He can only acquire it through voluntary renunciation of his present
nationality by seeking to become naturalized in these Islands; but upon this matter this court can decide nothing, there having been no legislation upon the subject up to
the present.
The status of the petitioner with respect to the new sovereignty of the territory having been defined, it remains to determine the question raised as to whether Spanish
subjects resident therein constitute an intermediate class between other foreign residents and the native of the country in whose behalf some specially favorable
conditions have been stipulated. Upon this point no proposition was made, even incidentally, nor was any reference made to it in the discussions which preceded the
treaty of Paris. The American Commissioners, referring to Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, simply said: "Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property
and remove from the territory or remain therein to continue to be Spanish subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory." (Memorandum annexed to Protocol No.
22.) "They shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and profession, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other
foreigners." (Art. 9 of the treaty of Paris.) The laws applicable to other foreigners were, prior to that treaty, the Law of Foreigners for the Ultramarine Provinces of July 4,
1870, and article 27 of the Civil Code. The first of these laws in its thirty-ninth article authorized all foreigners to engage in any kind of industry in the Spanish ultramarine
provinces subject to the laws prevailing therein, and to practice any profession for which the laws did not require a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish
authorities. No one can doubt that the legal profession is one of those for the practice of which the law required a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish
authorities. The second law cited provides that foreigners in Spain shall enjoy the rights which the civil laws accord to Spaniards, subject to the provisions of article 2 of
the constitution of the State. Article 2 of the constitution of 1876 establishes the same restriction or limitation as the law of foreigners. Hence if other foreigners could not
then engage in the practice of law, and by the express prohibition of the Code of Civil Procedure in force can not do so at the present time, neither can Spanish subjects
do so, they being in every respect upon the same footing as other foreigners.
If, then, the petitioner upon his departure from these Islands on May 30, 1899, did not take with him the nationality or the native inhabitants impressed by the treaty of
Paris, which had been in force from the 11th of April of the same year; if he departed as a Spaniard and continued to be a Spaniard, by taking the first course left open by
the right of option stipulated in the treaty of Paris, without being affected by the presumptive nationality of the territory arising from the fact of residence and the lapse of
the time fixed; if he had not elected to adopt this nationality of the territory by express declaration within the same period; if after the expiration of that period it is expressly
provided that the right of option shall no longer be available, and that the only course is naturalization, as to which subject upon equal footing with other foreign residents
he can not practice the legal profession under the law either prior or subsequent to the treaty of Paris, it is evident that this court can not regard the petitioner as
possessed of the qualifications alleged.
The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar of these Islands must therefore be denied, and it is so ordered.
Torres, Cooper, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Ladd, J., did not sit in this case.

G.R. No. 183133

July 26, 2010

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO CABILING MA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath
of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be
considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a
Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.
The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein petitioners.
The Facts
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma
(Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.2
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957,
respectively.3
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and
secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father;
they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.4
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). 5
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides
that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15
August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge,
Surigao, Surigao del Norte.6 On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. 7 In 1978,
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March
2005.8
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is
a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. 9 On the other
hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.
Individual certifications10 all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are
registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the
mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in
Barangay Washington, Surigao City.11
Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953 12 and 1959,13 respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a
Certification to the effect that the documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986.
However, no other supporting documents appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.
The Complaint

On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit14 of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven
(7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint
against them was politically motivated because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections. 15
On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7)16 and 45(e)17 of Commonwealth Act No. 613,
otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The Charge Sheet18 docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in
part:
That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and continuously failed to present any valid document to show their respective status in the Philippines. They
likewise failed to produce documents to show their election of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the country.
That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade the requirements of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI),
composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections
37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively.19
The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June 1941, they were
governed by the following rules and regulations:
1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer authorized to
administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil registry;20 and Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of
Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,21 detailing the procedural requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 195622 of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration with the
CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;
3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be
forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination and review. 23
As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration24 requires that ACR, E-series, be issued to foreign
nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950. 25 According to public respondents,
any foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented aliens and may be proceeded against in
accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.26
Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents concluded that Felix, Jr.
Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.27
Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any evidence to show
that they are properly documented aliens. For these reasons, public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 28
The dispositive portion29 of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:
1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann
Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese], under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031
and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively;
2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and
Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);
3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the
Immigration Blacklist; and
4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under
C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis supplied.)

In its Resolution30 of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g).31 However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his children. 32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They sought the nullification of the issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2 February 2005,
ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion
of the petitioners from the Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition33 after finding that the petitioners "failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law providing for the
procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals."34
On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution35 denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.
To reiterate, a persons continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public official cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 36
Our Ruling
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx;
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. 37
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching,38 we determined the meaning of the period of election described by phrase "upon reaching the
age of majority." Our references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice. 39 We
pronounced:
x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 40 In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the
age of majority.41 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 42
However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice,43 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years
is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority.44
We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,45 a case in which we adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, whose citizenship was
in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that "the belated submission to the
local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the
delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained."46
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil
registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare, 47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,48 and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.49
In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 50 The Court of Appeals,
however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would
be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen,51 and that Esteban was born in 192952 prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625.53
In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in the Philippines. 54 Again, such circumstance, while similar to
that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have resulted in absurdity,
because the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him55 as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was issued to his father. 56
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late election of Philippine
citizenship.57
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith and "informal election" unacceptable and held:
Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1 October 1999], is obviously flawed.
It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was
emphatic in pronouncing that "the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.58
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship
has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed
if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century
by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
For what purpose is registration?
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,59 we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:

To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to record formally
and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list."60 In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict
sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.61 Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification.62
Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it)
operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others." 63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties."64 It lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the
partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnerships juridical personality. 65 An unregistered contract of partnership is
valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed
that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract.66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a
requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. 67
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the
settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 68
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of
the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage.69 Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of
birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered
with the designated government agency.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a
pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of
any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any
national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new
requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented.70 On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR
because it would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage,
election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners
election of Philippine citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on
time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship.
The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority, 71 upon the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos72 and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx.
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.73

Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2,
Article IV thereof provides:
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof74 shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
xxxx
x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
even, apparently, if the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages involving an alien father and a
Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention upon
reaching the age of majority. I understand that the committee would further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee seemingly proposes to further
liberalize the policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those who became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of intention to choose their mothers citizenship
upon reaching the majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.75
xxxx
xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the 1935? 76
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a certain male chauvinism,
and it was for the purpose of remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not penalize the mother of a child simply because she fell in
love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we
recognize the right of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches the age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control. But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a certain point, a child be made to
choose. But I do not think we should penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention of the modification made in 1973 of the
male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution.77
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen by election, which the Committee is now planning to consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so
the moment he opts for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all he had was just an inchoate right to choose
Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under
the Gentlemans proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen?78
FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this
individual in the situation contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose.79
xxxx
[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x. 80
We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the
election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the
conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.1avvphi1
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.

The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting
their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this
case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of
Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment
dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE
with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice within which to
COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all
requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative fines;
REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7011

October 30, 1912

TRANQUILINO ROA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.
C. W. Ney and M.M. Levering, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino Roa, to the custody of the Collector of Customs and
declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to China as being a subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and reside in the Philippine
Islands. There is no dispute as to the facts.
The appellant, Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of
China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the
appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his
mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of
Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.
After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject of the Emperor of China and not entitled to land. On
appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and the Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings remanded the
appellant to the Collector of Customs.
On appeal the appellant, through his counsel, assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands upon his claim that he is a native inhabitant who has on
attaining his majority exercised his right of election as between the jus sanguinis and jus soli.
2. That the board of special inquiry at Cebu abused its authority and discretion in ignoring the declaration of the appellant of his election to be and of his being
a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
The question presented is whether a child born in the Philippine Island in July, 1889, of parents, one of whom (the father) was a Chinaman and the other a Filipina, who at
the time of his birth were permanently domiciled and resided in the Philippine Islands and were not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of
China, becomes, at the time of his birth, a citizen of the Philippine Islands by virtue of law, and whether he can, on reaching his majority, elect to become a citizen of the
country of his birth.
The pertinent part of the decision of the board of special inquiry reads:

In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock, he takes the nationality of his father, and his father was not a subject of the King
of Spain on April 11, 1899, the applicant, acquiring the nationality of his father, becomes a subject of the Emperor of China and not a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
Upon appeal the Insular Collector of Customs in his decision dated February 17, 1911, said:
Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality of their parents. Therefore, the legitimate
children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of China are Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty.
Therefore, the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and of the Philippine Bill with reference to Spanish subjects have no application in determining the citizenship
or nationality of the children of Chinese subjects in the Philippine Islands. Under the Chinese Exclusion Laws, a person of the Chinese race and descent is not
entitled to enter the Philippine Islands except under the terms and conditions expressly provided for. No abuse of authority or discretion on the part of the
members of the board of special inquiry having been claimed or appearing, their decision in this matter is sustained as being correct and proper on the
showing made and in accordance with the law. The said Tranquilino Roa is therefore refused landing.
In the Chinese and Immigration Circular No. 288, issued July 19, 1909, the Insular Collector of Customs said:
In the Wong Kim Ark case (169 U.S., 649), it was held that the Constitution of the United States must be interpreted in the light of the common law. It would
seem reasonable therefore that the Acts of Congress should be construed in the same light and it would necessarily follow that the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, should, as far as possible, have applied to its construction and enforcement the common law doctrine of citizenship by birth, and useless such Act
clearly excludes from its terms persons born within the Philippine Islands, such persons should be considered as citizens thereof.
Attention is also invited to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, both of which set forth in the
most explicit and comprehensive terms the principle of citizenship by birth, and to the fact that the courts have construed both of these to be but a reiteration of
the common law doctrine on the subject of citizenship.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. . . .
The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on this subject which were in force in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899, are as follows:
ART. 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those who, without said papers may have acquired a domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
ART. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority, have the nationality of their parents.
In order that the children born of foreign parents in Spanish territory may enjoy the benefits granted them by paragraph 1 of article 17, it shall be an
indespensable requisite that the parents declare, in the manner and before the officials specified in article 19, that they choose, in the name of their children,
the Spanish nationality, renouncing any other.
ART. 19. Children of foreign parentage born in Spanish domains must state, within the year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to
enjoy the Spanish nationality granted them by article 17.
Those who are in the kingdom shall make this declaration before the official in charge of the civil registry of the town in which they reside; those who reside
abroad, before one of the Consular or Diplomatic Agents of the Spanish Government, . . .
The second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provides:
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninetynine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
All admit (1) that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself and according to its own constitution and laws what classes of persons shall be
entitled to its citizenship; and (2) that if the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands, the Chinese Exclusion Acts do not and cannot apply to him.
The interpretation and construction of the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States were involved in the leading case of United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark (169 U.S., 649.) The facts in the case were: Wong Kim Ark was born in 1873 in the city of San Francisco and was a laborer. His father and
mother were persons of Chinese descent, and subjects of the Emperor of China; they were, at the time of his birth, domiciled residents of the United States; and they
continued to reside and remain there until 1890, when they departed for China. During all the time of their residence in the United States they were engaged in business
and were never employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China. Wong Kim Ark ever since his birth had but one residence, to wit, in California;
and had there resided, claimed to be a citizen of the United States, and had never lost or changed the residence or gained or acquired another; and neither he nor his
parents acting for him ever renounced his allegiance to the United States or did or committed any act or thing to exclude him therefrom. In 1890 when he was still a minor
he departed for China on a temporary visit and returned in the same year and was permitted by the Collector of Customs to enter the United States upon the ground that
he was a native-born citizen of that country. After such return he remained in the United States claiming to be a citizen thereof until 1894, when he again departed for
China on a temporary visit and with the intention of returning. He did return in August, 1895, and applied to the Collector of Customs for permission to land and was
denied such permission upon the sole ground that he was not a citizen of the United States. It was conceded that if he was a citizen of the United States the Acts of
Congress known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, prohibiting persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers, from entering the United States, did not and
could not apply to him.
Wong Kim Ark filed a petition in the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was a citizen of the United entitled to enter that country as
such , and that he was illegally detained by the Collector of Customs. The writ was issued, and after hearing the petitioner was directed to be discharged from custody.
The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. That court, after a very exhaustive examination of the questions presented, affirmed the judgment of
the district court, saying:
The fourteenth amendment (to the Constitution of the United States) affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the
allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or
born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of
members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. the amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born,
within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.
The questions presented in this case were definitely settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. According to the doctrine here enunciated, it is quite clear that if
the appellant in the case at bar had been born in the United States and was now trying to reenter that country, he would be entitled to land upon the ground that he was a
citizen of the United States. By the laws of the United States, citizenship depends generally upon the place of birth. This is the doctrine of jus soli, and predominates.
Consequently, any person born in the United States (with certain specific exceptions) is a citizen of that country, owes it allegiance, and is entitled to its protection.
"The right of the expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people." (Act of Congress, July 27, 1868.) Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance. The Act of Congress of 1868 does not define what steps must be taken by a citizen before it can be held that he has become denationalized. In
fact, there is no mode of renunciation of citizenship prescribed by law in the United States. Whether expatriation has taken place in any instance in that country must be
determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. No general rule that will apply to all cases can be laid down. Once a person becomes an American
citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen of the United States, and this assumption stands until the contrary is
shown by some voluntary act on his part. But when he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself, he then becomes an alien to the United States, and can regain his
lost citizenship only by virtue of the same laws, and the same formalities, and by the same process by which other aliens are enabled to become citizens. The result is
that a child born in the United States of Chines parents, as in the case of Wong Kim Ark, supra, he is a citizen of that country and continues to be such until his parents
during his minority, expatriate him, or he, after becoming of age, by some voluntary overt act or acts, expatriates himself. If this is done by his parents during his minority it
might be (a question we do not decide) that he could, on becoming of age, elect the nationality of his birth (the United States).
A reading of article 17 of the Civil Code, above copied, is sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus
soli. The second, that of jus sangguinis; and the last two that of free selection, with the first predominating. Article 18 provides that children, while they remain under
parental authority, have the nationality of their parents. A married woman follows the condition and nationality of her husband. (Article 22.) Consequently, according to
those provisions, the children, during their minority and while they are under parental authority, have, as general rule, the nationality of their father. In order that children
born of foreign parents in Spanish territory might enjoy the benefits appertaining to Spanish nationality, it was necessary for their parents, if they were minors, to make a
formal declaration before the proper authorities to the effect that they choose for their children that nationality and renounce all others. The children, within one year after
becoming of age or after emancipation, could elect the nationality of their birth and enjoy the benefits pertaining thereto by making the declaration required in article 19
and in the manner set forth therein. In either instance a positive, over act was essential. In the absence of any such acts, it was not assumed that the children or their
parents for them elected the nationality of the country of their birth. The contrary rule prevails in the United States.

According to the second paragraph of article 22 of the Civil Code, a Spanish woman who married a foreigner could, upon the dissolution of the marriage, recover her
Spanish nationality by complying with the requisites mentioned in article 21. This latter article provided that a Spaniard who had lost his citizenship by acquiring the
nationality of a foreign country would recover it upon returning to the Spanish Kingdom by indicating before the proper official the domicile which he elected as his
residence and by renouncing the protection of the flag of said country. As a general rule under Spanish law there was no question about the nationality of a married
woman following that of her husband. There might have been cases of marriage, however, where neither the nationality of the wife nor that of the children would follow
that of the husband and father. Such, for instance, would be the case if the laws governing citizenship of the country of the father prohibited the nationalizing of the wife
and children. It would there necessarily follow that the wife did not lose her nationality upon marriage, nor would the nationality of the children follow that of the father. But
with this class, if there be such, we are not now dealing.
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might hereafter be lawfully nationalized, shall be deemed a citizen." The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen" in said section, or as it was in the Act of 1855, "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen," while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as
by the judgment of a competent court upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account any the less a citizen. The word
"deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be deemed or taken as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When Congress declared that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
deemed an American citizen, the effect, when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being nationalized directly by an Act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed. (Leonard vs. Grant, 6 Sawy., 603; 5 Fed., 16.)
The Supreme court of the United States said in Kelley vs. Owen, 7 Wall., 496, that the object of the Act was to allow the citizenship of the wife "to follow that of her
husband without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her part."
Under statute and these decisions, an alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States is "deemed" a citizen. Is the converse of this rule true? Does an American
woman become an alien by marriage to a foreigner? There is no statutory declaration to that effect.
This question is one which has not been definitely solved, and the contrariety of opinion upon it shows it to be difficult of solution the doubt arises as to what effect should
be given to modern statutes on naturalization and expatriation. In the case of Shanks vs. Dupont (28 U.S., 242), decided in 1830, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
Neither did the marriage with Shanks produce that effect; because with an alien, whether a friend or an enemy, produces no dissolution of the native allegiance
of the wife. It may change her civil rights. but it does not affect her political rights or privileges. The general doctrine is, that no persons can, by any act of their
own, without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens. If it were otherwise, then a feme alien would by her marriage become,
ipso facto, a citizen, and would be dowable of the estate of her husband; which are clearly contrary to law.
In Pequignot vs. Detroit (16 Fed., 211) it was decided (in 1883) by the United States Circuit Court than an alien woman who has once become an American citizen by
marriage which is subsequently dissolved, may resume her alienage by marriage to a native of her own country. In this case, Judge Brown (later associate justice of the
United States Supreme Court) expressed doubt as to the binding force of Shanks vs. Dupont (supra), because, as he said, the two reasons given for that decision have
ceased to exist, viz.: (1) that the general doctrine is "that no persons can by any act of their own without consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become
aliens;" (2) that "if it were otherwise, then a feme alien would by marriage become ipso facto a citizen and would be dowable of the estate of her husband, which are
clearly contrary to law." In view of the Act of July 27, 1868, expressly recognizing the right of expatriation, and the Act of February 10, 1855, declaring that any woman
married to an American citizen shall be "deemed" a citizen, Judge Brown continued by saying it seemed to him "that we ought to apply the maxim, Cessante ratione legis,
cessat et ipse lex, to this case, and are not bound to treat as controlling authority the case of Shanks vs. Dupont. We should regard the sections above mentioned as
announcing the views of Congress upon this branch of international law, and ought to apply the same rule of decision to a case where a female American citizen marries
an alien husband that we should to a case where an alien woman marries an American citizen."
In Ruckgaber vs. Moore (104 Fed., 947) of the United State Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the political status of a native born American
woman who married a citizen of France, and removed with him to that country followed that of her husband. The woman having died in France, the court declared that
she must be regarded as having been a non-resident alien at the time of her death. Upon this point the court said:
By the several statutes of America, France, and Great Britain, the marriage of a citizen of such country with an alien wife confers upon the latter the citizenship
of the husband; and this policy of the three great powers, in connection with section 1999 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which proclaims that
expatriation is an inherent right, establishes that the political status of the wife follows that of her husband with the modification that there must be withdrawal
from her native country, or equivalent act expressive of her election to renounce her former citizenship as a consequence of her marriage. Some serious
objections to this, or even the opposite conclusion, exist, but it has been reached after due consideration of the subject, and pertinent authorities, including
Shanks vs. Dupont (supra), Pequignot vs. Detroit (supra), and Comitis vs. Parkerson (56 Fed., 556).
In Comitis vs. Parkerson (supra), decided in 1893, the plaintiff, a native citizen of Louisiana, married a native born subject of Italy who had come to Louisiana and
engaged in business without intending to ever return to Italy. He never became naturalized. After the marriage, the woman and her husband, until his death, lived together
in Louisiana with no intention on the part of either to depart from the United States. After the husband's death the widow continued to reside in Louisiana. The court held
that expatriation must be effected by removal from that country and that in the absence of any Act of Congress authorizing it, there can be no implied renunciation of
citizenship by an American woman marrying an alien.

In Jenn vs. Landes (85 Fed., 801) it appears that the complainant was born in the State of Washington, lived with her father until the year 1896, when she permanently
removed from the State of Washington, and was married to a British subject. That she and her husband resided in Canada and had their domicile in the city of Victoria.
The Canadian statute of 1886 declared that " a married woman shall within Canada be deemed to be a subject of the state of which her husband is, for the time being a
subject." The court held that the complainant became an alien as respects the United States, so as to enable her sue in a federal court.
Secretary Fish, in a letter to the President, dated August 25, 1873, said:
Chief Justice Marshall (Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 119) says that when a citizen by his own act has made himself the subject of a foreign
power, his status is completely changed, and the act certainly places him out of the protection of the United States while within the territory of the sovereign to
whom he has sworn allegiance. Hence, it would seem that the marriage of a female citizen of the United States with a free subject of a country by whose laws
marriage confers citizenship upon the wife of its subject, and her removal to and residence in the country of her husband's citizenship, would divest her of her
native character of an American citizen. (Van Dyne on Citizenship of the United States, 134.)
In 1886 Mr. Bayard, in the case of Mrs. Zografo, held that a native-born American woman who marries a Turkish subject and takes up her residence in Turkey becomes a
Turkish subject. Upon the death of her husband, in order to revive her American nationality, she must leave Turkey and take up an American residence. (Idem, 136.)
In February, 1890, in the case of Carl Heisinger, Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, said that the Department had several times taken the view that the marriage of an
American woman to a foreigner does not completely divest of her original nationality; that her American citizenship was held for most purposes to be in abeyance during
coverture, but to be susceptible to revival on her return to the jurisdiction and allegiance to the United States. (Idem, 137.)
In an instruction to the United States consul at Sagua la Grande, June 7, 1895, Acting Secretary Uhl said:
The view has been taken by this Department in several cases that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not completely divest her of her American
citizenship, but that the same is only suspended during coverture, and reverts upon the death of her husband, if she is residing in the United States, or upon her returning
to this country if she is residing abroad. (Idem, 137.)
Secretary Sherman, in an instruction to the United States minister at St. Petersburg, march 15, 1897, said:
By our statute, an alien wife of an American citizen shares his citizenship. By the usual rules of continental private international law a woman marrying an alien
shares his status, certainly during his life, but thereafter, on widowhood, reverts to her original status unless she abandons the country of her origin and returns
to that of her late husband. (Idem, 138.)
From the foregoing it appears that the decided weight of authority is to the effect that the marriage of an American woman to an alien confers upon her the nationality of
her husband during coverture; but that thereafter on the dissolution of the marriage by death, she reverts ipso facto to her original status unless her conduct or acts show
that she elects the nationality of her deceased husband. The rule under the Spanish law was to the effect that the widow must not only return to the kingdom but she must
also make declaration before the proper officials that she renounced the protection of the flag of the country of her deceased husband, and desired to resume Spanish
citizenship.
The result is that both the United States and Spain have recognized, affirmed, and adopted the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth, by blood, and election,
with the first predominating. Children born in the United States of foreign parents, are citizens of that country, and it is assumed that they and their parents desire that
such citizenship continue; and this assumption stands until the contrary is shown. Under Spanish law, the contrary rule prevails. In both countries, the nationality of the
wife follows that of the husband. In the United States, the wife, on the dissolution of the marriage by death, ipso facto, reacquires her original status unless she elects
otherwise. In Spain, the widow must regain her Spanish citizenship in the manner prescribed by law. In the United States, the nationality of the children does not, by
operation of law, follow that of our parents, while in Spain the converse is true. In both countries, the parents may elect the nationality of their children while they are
under parental authority, and after the children are released from such authority they may elect for themselves their nationality. The mode of making that election in both
countries is materially different. What changes in these matters have taken place in the Philippine Islands by reason of the acquisition of the territory by the United
States?
Articles 17 to 27 , inclusive of the Civil Code deal entirely with the subject of Spanish citizenship. When these provisions were enacted, Spain was and is now the sole
and exclusive judge as to who shall and who shall not be subjects of her kingdom, including her territories. Consequently, the said articles, being political laws (laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the former sovereign), must be held to have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States.
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in
their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899.)
While the municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chapter, 34 par. 14.) However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or

by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U. S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142.) In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton
(1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with
their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which
transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may de dominated political, is necessarily changed, although that
which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-created power of the State.
Again, said articles of the Civil Code were laws which pertained to the prerogatives of the Crown of Spain.
It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be
admitted that they (the United States) have capacity to receive or power to exercise them." (Pollard's Lessee vs. Hagan, 3 How. (44 U.S.), 212, 225, 11 L. Ed.,
565, 571.)
And again, we now have no governmental machinery by means of which the provisions of the second paragraph of article 18 can be enforced. The only express
provisions of law now in force contained in the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of March 23, 1912, the latter being reenactment of section 4
of the former, with the addition of a proviso reading as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
An American citizen of Spanish subject means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the United States or Spain. Permanent allegiance is used to distinguish the
allegiance of an American citizen or Spanish subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is domiciled within the domains of either of one of these countries,
owes a qualified temporary allegiance to that country. A natural born American citizen or Spanish subject means an American citizen or Spanish subject who has become
such at the moment of his birth. Citizenship, says Moore on International Law, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal law and denotes the possession within the
particular state of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications, such as minority, sex, etc. The conditions on which citizenship are acquired are regulated
by municipal law. There is no such thing as international citizenship nor international law (aside from that which might be contained in treaties) by which citizenship may
be acquired. It therefore follows that the only law applicable to the questions presented in the case at bar is the Treaty of Paris and Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
The relations which the inhabitants of ceded territory shall bear to the acquiring state are generally determined by the treaty of cession. Every treaty of cession to which
the United States has been a party, with the exception of the Treaty of Peace of 1898 with Spain, ceding Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands that the inhabitants of the
territory ceded may in whole or in part become citizens of the United States either immediately or under certain conditions agreed that the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands shall be determined by the Congress of the United States. The contracting parties further agreed that all Spanish subjects,
natives of the Peninsula, who were residing in the Philippine Islands at the time Spain relinquished her sovereignty over this country may continue to reside here and
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by so declaring within the time and in the manner set forth in article 9. In conformity with the provisions of this Treaty
Congress, by the Act of July 1, 1902, providing for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, enacted section 4, above quoted. Here
Congress declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Island continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th of April, 1899, and then resided in this
country, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of this country. According to those provisions it is not necessary for such
person to do anything whatsoever in order that they may acquire full citizenship. The same is true with reference to Spanish subjects who were born in Spain proper and
who had not elected to retain their allegiance to the crown. By section 4 of the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United States was
extended to the Philippine Islands, but with limitations. In the United States every person, with certain specific exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that
country. Under section 4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country
are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands. From the reading of section 4 and taking into consideration the Act of March 23, 1912, it is
clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the Philippine Islands who did not come within the provisions of said section, and also that Congress did not
then by express legislation determine the political status of such persons. Therefore, the inquiry is Did Congress intend to say that all of the inhabitants who were not
included in section 4 are to be "deemed and held to be" aliens to the Philippine Islands?
Congress by the Act of April 12, 1900, establishing civil government for Porto Rico provided that:
All inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain on or before the 11th day of April, 1900, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain entered into on the 11th day of April, 1899; and they, together with such citizens of the United States as may
reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of The People of Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred, and with
power to sue and be sued as such.
The treaty provisions and the Act of Congress of April 12, 1900, were construed by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York in October,
1902, in the case of Gonzales (118 Fed., 941) upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts in this case were as follows: The petitioner, un unmarried woman, a
native of Porto Rico, 20 years of age, arrived in the bay of New York by steamer from the island of Porto Rico on August 24, 1902. she was detained at the immigrant

station, was duly examined by a board of special inquiry, and was excluded from admission into the United States upon the ground that she was liable to become a public
charge. The court said that the only question open for discussion on that application was whether or not the petitioner was an alien. After examining the law applicable to
the case the court concluded by saying: "This legislation (Act of April 12, 1900) has certainly not operated to effect a naturalization of the petitioner as a citizen of the
United States. Being foreign born and not naturalized, she remains an alien, and subject to the provisions of law regulating the admission of aliens who come to the
United States."
The writ was dismissed. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and held that Miss Gonzales was not alien to the
United States within the meaning of the laws governing the subject. (192 U.S., 1.)1awphil.net
It will be noted that section 7 of the Act of April 12, 1900, provided that "all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th of April, 1899,
and then resided in Porto Rico" shall be deemed to be citizens of that country. It was contended by some that all native Porto Ricans who were not actually residing in the
Island of Porto Rico on the 11th day of April, 1899, do not come within the provisions of the Act and cannot be "deemed and held to be citizens" of Porto Rico. The State
Department has held otherwise. In the case of Marrero, a native of Porto Rico, who had resided in Chile Since 1884, and who proposed in 1901 to return to Porto Rico to
perform the duties of citizenship there, it was held by Acting Secretary Hill that the language of section 7 of the Act of April 12, 1900, was to be construed in its general
legal sense, in which continued personal presence is not necessary to constitute continuos residence, and that a native of Porto Rico, who makes it his permanent
domicile does not therefore lose the benefits of this law because he was temporarily abiding elsewhere when it went into effect. (Acting Secretary Hill to Mr. Lenderick,
April 29, 1901.) And Attorney-General Knox (24 Opinions Attorney-General, 40) held that a native Porto Rican temporarily living in France who was not in Porto Rico on
April 11, 1899, is under section 7 of Act of April 12, 1900, a citizen of Porto Rico.
The cession of the Philippine Islands definitely transferred the allegiance of the native inhabitants from Spain to the United States (articles 3 and 9 of Treaty of Paris).
Filipinos remaining in this country who were not natives of the Peninsula could not, according to the terms of the treaty, elect to retain their allegiance to Spain. By the
cession their allegiance became due to the United States and they became entitled to its protection. The nationality of the Islands American instead of Spanish.
The Philippine Islands prior to April 11, 1899, had been for many months under military occupation by the United States as a conquered country when by the third article
of the Treaty of Paris the whole archipelago was ceded to the United States. The President, in the exercise of his war power, proceeded to establish a civil government
and for that purpose appointed the Philippine Commission, consisting at first of a president and four members. This Commission, acting under instructions of the
Secretary of War, established the three independent and coordinate department of the government executive, legislative and judicial and provided means for
carrying on of a complete civil government. A governor-general and vice-governor-general were appointed and qualified. Positions of secretaries of the various
departments were made and filled. Courts were provided for, with power to hear and determine all cases arising in the Philippine Islands. In fact, a complete government
was established with all the necessary departments for the protection of the life, liberty and property of all inhabitants. The government thus established was administered
through American and Filipino officials and classified civil service employees, all of whom before entering upon the duties of their office took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. Thereupon Congress by the Act of July 1, 1902, approved, ratified and affirmed the acts of the President in establishing the civil government. Provisions
were made in this act for bringing into existence of the Philippine Assembly and for the election of Resident Commissioners who would receive their salary from the
United States. Other provisions were made for the disposition of public lands, both agricultural and mineral, and the Act sets forth the bill of rights for this country. The
Philippine Islands is and has been since the passage of said Act completely under control of the Congress of the United States and all the inhabitants owe complete and
full allegiance or a qualified temporary allegiance, as the case may be, to the United States.
The appellant was, as we have stated, born in the Philippine Islands in 1889. His father was a domiciled alien and his mother a native of this country. His father died in
China about the year 1900 while he was still a minor. His mother sent him to China for the sole purpose of studying and on reaching his majority he returned to the
country of his birth and sought admission. From the date of his birth to the time he returned to this country he had never in a legal sense changed his domicile. A minor
cannot change his own domicile. As minors have the domicile. As minors have the domicile of their father he may change their domicile by changing his own, and after his
death the mother, while she remains a widow, may likewise by changing her domicile change the domicile of the minor. The domicile of the children in either case as
follows the domicile of their parent. (Lamar vs. Miccu, 112 U.S., 452.) After the death of the father the widowed mother became the natural guardian of the appellant. The
mother before she married was a Spanish subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her husband, which
occurred after the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, she, under the rule prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the
Philippine Islands, being that of her native country. When she reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth the appellant was a minor and neither he nor his mother
had ever left this country.
Again, it is insisted that as the appellant was born in the Philippine Islands he under Spanish law became a Spanish subject by reason of the place of his birth, but that
the rights and privileges incident thereto could not be exercised during his minority unless the father made the declaration required by law. Taking this view of the case,
the Spanish nationality of the appellant was suspended during his minority in the absence of a declaration on the part of his father. If this were not true (a question which
we do not decide) the appellant, by reason of the place of his birth, acquired at least an inchoate right to Spanish nationality. He could have within one year after reaching
his majority become a Spanish subject, but conditions have so changed (not true any act on the part of the appellant) that he can not now acquire Spanish nationality.
Under these circumstances can it be said that Congress in enacting section 4 of the Philippine Bill intended to prohibit the appellant who happened to be temporarily
absent from the Philippine Islands from reentering this country? Surely, such could not have been the intention of Congress. To so hold would have the effect of excluding
the appellant from his native country, from home and all that home means, from his mother, brothers, and sisters, and compel him to live in practically a strange country
and among strange people. If he had actually remained in the Islands, no one would ever have the thought of deporting him as being a subject of the Chinese Empire.
And again, "no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions
of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135).

Would it be in conflict with the provisions of the Act of July 1, 1902, any other Act of Congress, any provision of the Constitution, any doctrine enunciated by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the general policy of the United States, to now declare that the appellant is, by reason of the place of his birth, the death of his father, the
present nationality of his widowed mother, and his election, a citizen of the Philippine Islands? Section 4 of the Philippine Bill must be read according to its spirit and
intent, for a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a civil statute is which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmaker. The intent of the law-makers is the law. The congressional meaning of section 4 is to be ascertained from the Act as a whole. This section cannot be
segregated, but every part of the Act must be construed with reference to every other part. It should be construed to conform to the well-settled governmental policy of the
United States on the subject of citizenship. It is to be given that construction which best comports with the principles of reason and justice. This section declares that a
certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other inhabitants shall not be citizens. Neither does it declare that other
inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare that a person situated as is the appellant shall not be nor shall not
elect to be a citizen of the country of his birth. The appellant could, as we have said, elect to become a citizen of the United States had he been born in that country under
the same circumstances which now surround him. All the laws and the rulings of the courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the United
States. While, it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of Congress do not apply ex propio vigore to this country, but that they must be expressly extended by
Congress, nevertheless, some of the basic principles upon which the government of the United States rests and the greater part of the Bill of Rights, which protects the
citizens of that country, have been extended to the Philippine Islands by the instructions of the President to the first Philippine Commission and the Philippine Bill. The Act
of July 1, 1902, a part of which is section 4, quoted supra, as before stated, ratified and affirmed the civil government established in the Philippine Islands by the
President. It extended the Bill of Rights to the inhabitants of this country. It provided means for the disposition of the public lands and enacted mining laws. In fact, it
approved of, and extended the powers of a republican form of government modelled after that of the United States. Then to hold, after all of this has been done, that
Congress intended by section 4 to declare that the appellant is an alien and not entitled, under the circumstances, to reenter the land of his birth and become a citizen
thereof, would be a holding contrary to the manifest intent of that body. That Congress did not so intend is irresitably inferred from these facts.
Was the appellant a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902? If so, the Act of Congress of that date did not denationalize him. At the time this country was ceded
to the United States, Basilio Roa, father of the appellant, was, let us say, a subject of the Emperor of China, and the nationality of the appellant, let us further say, followed
absolutely that of his father. Basilio Roa died in China in 1900. Tranquilino was then a minor and living with his mother in this country. His mother, before her marriage,
was, as we have said, a Spanish subject. On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that
country and had never left it. She was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. The question now arises, did the nationality of the appellant follow that of his mother,
admitting that before the death of his father he was a Chinese subject? If his nationality that of his mother, it must have been not by reason of the Spanish law, as there
was none in force in this country at the time on the subject, but by means of analogous principles of citizenship in America. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a
female citizen of the United States and a foreigner, she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the United States. There is no statutory
declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be
citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country
until the death of their father. But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she having changed
their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under
the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of their birth.
The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated
himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. 1awphil.net
We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and entitled to land. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant is ordered
released from custody, with costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-47616

October 15, 1941

JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.
Raquiza & Hernando for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor-General B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Lacson for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor-General from the decision of the Court of Jose Tan Chong for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from the custody of the
Secretary of Labor.

It appears that the petitioner was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in the month of July, 1915, of a Chinese father named Tan Chong Hong and a Filipino mother named
Antonia Mangahis; that his parents were legally married; that sometime in 1925 when the petitioner was about ten years old he was taken by his parents to China; that on
January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of Manila and sought entry as a native born citizen. The board of Special Inquiry assigned to hear his case, denied him admission
on the alleged ground that he is a Chinese citizen, and on appeal, the Secretary of labor affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of the petitioner to
the port from whence he came. The petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was granted. Hence, the present appeal by
the Solicitor-General.
The petitioner, having been born in the Philippines before the approval of our Constitution, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen. This conclusion
is in harmony with the policy embodied in the Constitution (par. 4 sec. 1, Art. IV; Torres vs. Tan Chim, G. R. No. 46593, promulgated Feb. 3, 1940; Gallofin vs. Ordoez,
G.R. No. 46782, promulgated June 27, 1940). His sojourn in China did not adversely affect his Philippine citizenship, it appearing that ever since he was twelve years old
he wanted to return to the Philippines but his father would not allow him to come, and he did not have means to pay for his transportation back to the Philippines until the
date of his return. Animus revertendi existed here. (Lim Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 84; Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil., 494; Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15
Phil., 559.)lawphil.net
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Moran and Horrillleno, JJ., dissented on the ground expressed in Torres vs. Tan Chim.

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo,
Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient
proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary
proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus
Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm
the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The
evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.16
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat,
filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition
was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11,
1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above
table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066.
The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but
likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or
sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive
explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission
RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc
Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public

16
17

office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3)
and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions
in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends
that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she
was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in
Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.
Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to
run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the
ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,18 that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 19 and 198720
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can

18
19

also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.
COMELEC21 and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.22
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration
are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. 23 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of
Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. 24 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and
as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship.25 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.26 This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone

20
21
22
23
24
25

terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport
of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was
effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.27 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,28 an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. 29
Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the
issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two
prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
G.R. No. 187567

February 15, 2012

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision 1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The RTC granted the petition 2 filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled "In re:
Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City."
The facts follow:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City 3 and did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance 4
to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation
on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

26
27
28
29

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family
Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter
of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification 5 issued by Atty.
Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle
her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case.6 However, no comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected
Filipino citizenship.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino
citizenship of said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner
raises the following issues:
I
Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,
II
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made "within a
reasonable time" as interpreted by jurisprudence.8
Petitioner argues that respondents petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or
proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on
respondents birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondents petition before the trial court
seeking a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen
which is not allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondents intention in filing the petition is ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered
with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.
Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondents action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship
since her purported election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner points out that while
respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which
was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it
was made beyond the period allowed by law.
In her Comment,9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, she has in fact effectively
elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all
local and national elections from the time she was of legal age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her "election" of Philippine citizenship
was delayed and unregistered.
In reply,10 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been educated
in schools in the country, her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on her
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of
law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a
question of law.11
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to
substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondents petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant
circumstances.
In granting the petition, the trial court stated:
This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City
should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioners election of Filipino citizenship should be
welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China,
however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship
is, in fact, a testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino
citizenship.12
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. 13 There
is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. 14 This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v.
Republic15 citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines,16 where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to
their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.
As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is
required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.19
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It
is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her

nationality.20 An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to
make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. 23
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with
the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine
citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election.25 Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review. 261wphi1
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely
allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief
prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement
of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath
of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as
required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local
civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines,
and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition
before the trial court must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35947 October 20, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM LI YAO, petitioner-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the then Court of First Instance of Manila over twenty years ago, or on July 22, 1971, cancelling the certificate of naturalization of
William Li Yao as well as from the ordered dated December 29, 1971 denying Li Yao's motion for reconsiderations.

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which petition was docketed as Case
No. 8225. 1
After several hearings on the petition were held wherein the Office of the Solicitor General, in the representation of the Republic of the Philippines appeared, the lower
court rendered a decision dated October 25, 1950, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares William Li Yao, for all intents and purposes a naturalized Filipino citizen, it
appearing that he possesses all the qualifications to become a naturalized Filipino and none of the disqualifications provided for by the law.
However, in view of the provisions of Republic Act No. 530, this decision shall not become final and executory until after two (2) years from its
promulgation and after this Court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds,
that during the intervening time the applicant herein has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense and violation of the government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announce policies. After the finding mentioned herein, this decision granting Philippine
citizenship to the applicant herein shall be registered and the oath provided by existing law shall be taken by said applicant, whereupon, and not
before, he will be entitled to all the privileges of the Filipino citizen and the certificate of naturalization shall forthwith issue in his favor by the Clerk of
this Court. 2
On November 20, 1952, acting on the petition of William Li Yao praying for the execution of the foregoing decision and that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen, the lower court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the petitioner has complied, within the two year probation period, with the provisions of Republic Act No. 530, he is
hereby allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen, and Clerk of Court is directed to issue in his favor to the corresponding certificate
of naturalization. 3
About fifteen years later, or on January 5, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of
naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained for the following reasons:
1. At the time of the filing of the petition, the applicant was not qualified to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization because:
a. He was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous relationship (sic) with several women other than
his lawfully wedded wife, by whom he fathered illegitimate children (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, L-25356, November 25, 1967).
b. Nor had he conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in his dealings with the duly constituted authorities:
(i) In contracting marriage, he used the name Fransisco Li Yao (Exh. "J," p. 31, rec.) without prior
judicial authority to use the aforesaid first name Fransisco, the same not appearing to be his baptismal
name (Cosme Co Tian An vs. Republic, L-1983, August 31, 1966).
(ii) He was also known and had used the name and/or alias LI CHAY TOO, JR. before the last World
War, and under which name, a trust fund was created for him (see Decision, Court of Tax Appeals, CTA
Case No. 30, dated July 31, 1956; also Decision, Supreme Court, G.R. No. L-11861, Dec. 28, 1963).
(iii) He evaded the payment of lawful taxes due to the government by underdeclaration of income as
reflected in his income tax returns for the years 1946-1951 (see Decision, Supreme Court, William Li
Yao v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-11875, December 28, 1963).
(iv) He committed violations of the Constitution and Anti-Dummy laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring
real properties by employing dummies in the formation of a private domestic corporation, which
acquired the real properties.
(v) He made it appear, falsely, in the baptismal certificate of an illegitimate son he fathered, named
William Jose Antonio, that the latter's mother is Juanita Tan Ho Ti, his law-mother is another woman
(sic). 4
William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion on July 22, 1971. The lower court, however, without touching on all the grounds upon which the said motion was based, relied
solely on ground (iii) that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the government by underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns for
the years 1946-1951. It issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion of the Republic of the Philippines to cancel Certificate of Naturalization No. 1139 dated November 20, 1952 issued to the
petitioner is hereby granted, and the said Certificate of Naturalization should be, as it is hereby cancelled. Without pronouncement as to cost. 5
William Li Yao filed a motion for reconsideration on December 29, 1971, which the lower court denied. 6
On January 7, 1972, William LI Yao filed a notice of appeal to this Court, manifesting that he was appealing from the order of the lower court dated July 22, 1971, and
from the order dated December 29, 1971. 7
After the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appellant Li Yao died. 8 The case has not, however, become moot and academic since its disposition, either
way, will have grave implications for the late petitioner-appellant's wife and children.
The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government
through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.
The appeal is without merit.
In his motion filed on January 5, 1968, the Solicitor General asked for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of appellant on the ground that it was "fraudelently
and illegally obtained." This based on Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act, which provides that a naturalization certificate may be
cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudelently and illegally."
It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon
any material fact. 9 Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting
of the certificate. 10 Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any
matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof. 11
In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the sole
finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment of income tax.
In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as Citizen of the Philippines, Lim Eng Yu vs. Republic, 12 It was held that the concealment of applicant's
income to evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is not irreproachable, thus disqualifying him for naturalization.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient
ground for lifting the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the
removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned. Thus, paragraph 4 of the decree provides;
4. That after full settlement of the accounts mentioned herein, the taxpayer shall be free of any civil, criminal or administrative liability insofar as his
tax case is involved (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for
denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," 13 to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other
grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.
Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly
maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. 14 More specifically,
the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege
that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." 15 Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which
should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for
divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. 16
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175430

June 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the applicant.1 The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the
requirements of law.2
Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts Decision3 dated May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed the trial courts grant of
citizenship to respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:
With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23, 2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the
instant appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,5 filed a Petition for Naturalization.6 The case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, 7 the
petition was published in the Official Gazette8 and a newspaper of general circulation,9 and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks,10 six months before the
initial hearing.11 The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and authorized12 the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf.13 Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso
and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings below.
Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. 14 He is registered as a
resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration15 and a native-born certificate of residence16 from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously
and permanently residing17 in the Philippines from birth up to the present.18 Ong can speak19 and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.20 He took his
elementary21 and high school22 studies at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are
taught. He then obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.23
On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.24 They have four children,25 namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),26 Kimberley Grace (born
on May 15, 1984),27 Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),28 and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21, 1993),29 who were all born and
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled30 at the Sacred Heart School for Boys31 and Sacred Heart School for Girls.32 At the time of the filing of
the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City.
Ong has lived at the following addresses:33
1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in Grade 2)34

2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970)35

3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until 1992)36
4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998);37 and
5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes, Nasipit, Talamban, Cebu City (present).38
Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.39 When he testified,
however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978.40 Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. 41
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997. 42 Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994;
P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.
Respondent further testified that he socializes43 with Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.44 He is a member of the Alert/ React VII
Communications Group and the Masonic organization.45
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove46 that he is of sound physical and mental health.47 As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of
Investigation,48 the Philippine National Police,49 the trial courts,50 and the barangay,51 he has no criminal record or pending criminal charges.52
Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as his character witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon,
Cebu.53 He has known Ong since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas brother.54 He testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and adopts the
Filipino culture.55 Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has known Ong since the 1970s because they were high school classmates.56 He testified that Ong is morally
irreproachable and possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of the Philippines.57 Carvajal is a businessman engaged in leasing office spaces.58
On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. Among other things, the trial court held that:
xxxx
By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent], the following facts had been established.59
xxxx
x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989 from which he derives an average annual income of more than
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x x60
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes and so holds that [respondent] possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [respondent] KERRY LAO ONG is hereby admitted as citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.61
Republics Appeal
On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.62
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an
average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession
or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or
bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that
respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade.63

Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of income for applicants for naturalization.64 He likewise conceded that the legal
definition of lucrative income is the existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses. 65 It is his position that his income, together with that of his wife,
created an appreciable margin over their expenses.66 Moreover, the steady increase in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully employed. 67
The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:
In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence] which relates [sic] to his lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. Judging from the
present standard of living and the personal circumstances of the [respondent] using the present time as the index for the income stated by the [respondent], it may appear
that the [respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We must be mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996, which is already ten years ago. It is
of judicial notice that the value of the peso has taken a considerable plunge in value since that time up to the present. Nonetheless, if We consider the income earned at
that time, the ages of the children of the [respondent], the employment of his wife, We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to
be able to provide for an adequate support.68
The appellate court denied the Republics motion for reconsideration69 in its Resolution dated November 7, 2006.70
Issue
Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that "there is an appreciable margin of (respondents) income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support."71 The Republic contends that the CAs conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record and by the prevailing law. 72
The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the
years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative income. It is
not sufficient to provide for the needs of a family of six, with four children of school age. 73
Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of Ongs income, much less can they describe the lawful nature thereof. 74 The Republic also noted that Ong did
not even attempt to describe what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and appellate courts shared conclusion that Ong is a businessman is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures.75
The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Decision and the denial of Ongs petition for naturalization. 76
Respondents Arguments
Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings, which review is improper in a Rule 45 petition. 77 He further submits that his tax
returns support the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative trade.78
Our Ruling
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.79 Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.80 The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.81
In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization
Law, which provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
xxxx
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
x x x x82

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge."83 His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."84
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is
immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen."85 Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. 86
Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified
that Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ongs business or described its nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of
his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing of office space). A comparison of their respective testimonies is reproduced below:
Carvajals testimony
Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.
Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?
A: I am into leasing of office spaces.87
Kerry Lao Ongs testimony
Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?
A: Businessman.
Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?
A: After graduation from college.88
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits,
registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to
prove his possession of "some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation." Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of
an applicant for naturalization.
The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial courts decision. The trial court held that respondent Ong "is a businessman engaged in lawful trade
and business since 1989"89 but did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring over the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of citation
is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found in Ongs
petition for naturalization.90 But, on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been a businessman since he graduated from
college, which was in 1978.91
Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ongs tax returns), mistakenly found that Ong "derives an average annual income of more than One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos."92 This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited tax returns show that Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to
1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00, respectively. The average annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only, not
P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that the trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in Ongs petition, 93 but not from the evidence.

As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ongs income, as evidenced by his
tax returns, can be considered lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue, the CA considered the ages of Ongs children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the fact
that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there is an appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses. 94
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. 95 Second, it
failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven
average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that
Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an
appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin
of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his familys expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family "with
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work."96
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.97
The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a review of the factual findings of the courts below. 98 In the first place, the trial court
and appellate courts decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual basis, which is a known exception 99 to the general rule that only
questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicants
qualifications.1wphi1 In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. 100 Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest,
the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A
decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of
naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be
entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the
parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the
light of the law and extant jurisprudence."101 In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that
respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169958

March 5, 2010

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ,BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER and BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS CHAIRMAN
ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., IMMIGRATION ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS and BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS MEMBERS ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN,
TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, JOSE D.L. CABOCHAN, and FRANKLIN Z. LITTUA, Petitioners,
vs.
MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 September 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87271.
The Antecedent Facts

The facts, gathered from the Court of Appeals decision, are as follows:
Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly
a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). Respondent submitted the following
documents before the BI:
1. Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born
on 14 August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
2. Certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of respondents parents dated 9 January 1971, indicating the Philippines as Quintos birthplace;
3. Certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino;
4. Certified true copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the Philippines as his mothers birthplace; and
5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not
been granted Australian citizenship.
On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. In a 2nd Indorsement
dated 28 February 2000, the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) disapproved the order. However, upon respondents submission of additional documents, BI
Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez granted the order as per Recognition Order No. 206679 dated 3 March 2000 which states:
Finding the grounds cited in the instant petition for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines filed on behalf of the applicant to be well-founded and meritorious, we hereby
authorize the recognition of MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article III[,] Section 1, para. 2 of the 1973 Constitution.
Henceforth, applicant shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Once this Order is affirmed by the Secretary of Justice and upon payment of the
corresponding fees, he/she shall be issued an identification Certificate which shall indicate prominently thereon the date of affirmation.
An Exit Clearance Certificate (ECC) fee shall also be assessed against the applicant whenever he/she departs for abroad using a foreign passport or travel documents.
Give the applicant a copy of this Order.
SO ORDERED.3
In a 2nd Indorsement dated 8 March 2000, the DOJ affirmed Recognition Order No. 206679, as follows:
Respectfully returned to the Commissioner of Immigration, Manila, the within records relating to the request for reconsideration of this Departments 2nd Indorsement
dated February 28, 2000, which disapproved the Order of that Office dated February 17, 2000 granting the petition for recognition as a Filipino citizen of MICHAEL ALFIO
PENNISI.
The additional documents submitted (duly authenticated Certificate of Birth of the petitioner and Certificate of Marriage of his parents), together with the original records,
satisfactorily establish that petitioner was born in Queensland, Australia, on March 13, 1975, the legitimate issue of the spouses Anita T. Quintos, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and may, therefore, be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution, in
relation to Section 1(2), Article IV of the present Constitution.
Wherefore, the instant request for reconsideration is hereby granted and the above-mentioned Order of that Office dated February 17, 2000 granting the petition for
recognition as a Filipino citizen of Michael Alfio Pennisi is now AFFIRMED.
This supersedes our aforesaid 2nd Indorsement dated February 28, 2000 on the same subject matter.4
Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).
On 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments (Senate Committees) jointly submitted Committee
Report No. 2565 (Committee Report) recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA
players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the list on the basis of the
following findings of the Senate Committees:

F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to present before the BI and the committees, the documents required in granting recognition of Philippine citizenship, particularly the
birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos;
However, a verification on the authenticity of the above documents reveals highly suspicious circumstances.
His alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for
recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.1avvphi1
According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no
Quintoses or Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said barangay.
Both barangay officials further claimed that even in their census or master list of voters, the family names of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist.
His mothers certificate of birth in the civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija was issued on the basis of an application for late registration, which is ten (10) years after
the date of birth.
Thereafter, the DOJ issued Department Order No. 412 dated 21 September 2004 creating a special committee, with Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras as
Chairperson, to investigate the citizenship of Filipino-foreign players in the PBA. The special committee required respondent to submit a position paper in connection with
the investigation. On 18 October 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking respondents certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin summary deportation
proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-foreign PBA players.
On 20 October 2004, respondent and Davonn Harp (Harp), another Filipino-foreign PBA player, filed a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 268 (trial court), to enjoin the DOJ and BI from instituting summary deportation
proceedings against them. On even date, respondent received a letter from the BI directing him to submit, within five days from notice, a memorandum in connection with
the deportation proceedings being conducted against him. Respondent submitted his memorandum on 25 October 2004.
In a hearing before the trial court on the same date, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the DOJ and BI, manifested that respondent would not be subjected
to summary deportation and that he would be given an opportunity to present evidence of his Filipino citizenship in a full-blown trial on the merits. However, in a Summary
Deportation6 Order dated 26 October 2004, the BI directed the deportation of several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent. Respondent and Harp withdrew
their petition before the trial court without prejudice, which the trial court granted in its order of 4 November 2004. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 September 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
The Court of Appeals noted that respondents citizenship was previously recognized by the BI and DOJ and it was only after four years that the BI and DOJ reversed
themselves in view of the finding in the Committee Report. The Court of Appeals ruled that the "highly suspicious circumstances" stated in the Committee Report referred
to the affidavits of Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman (Soliman) and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta (Peralta) that there were no Quintoses or Tomedas in the
birthplace of respondents mother and that no such surnames appeared in the census or master list of voters. The Court of Appeals ruled that apart from the affidavits, no
other evidence was presented to prove that Quintos was not a Filipino citizen or that her birth certificate was false or fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals ruled
that respondents documentary evidence before the BI and DOJ have more probative value and must prevail over the allegations of Soliman and Peralta. The Court of
Appeals further noted that among the documents presented by respondent were authenticated documents issued by the Commonwealth of Australia attesting that
Quintos consistently presented herself to be a Filipino citizen. The Court of Appeals ruled that the authenticity of the documents issued by the Australian government was
never questioned nor put in issue. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the fact that the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census or master list of voters
did not automatically render Quintos birth certificate invalid. The Court of Appeals ruled that unless a public document is declared invalid by competent authority, it should
be presumed valid and binding for all intents and purposes.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Department of Justice dated October 18, 2004 and summary deportation order of the
Bureau of Immigration dated October 26, 2004 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue

Petitioners raise this sole issue in their Memorandum:8

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that respondent is a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners allege that respondents petition was filed out of time. Petitioners further allege that respondents voluntary departure from the Philippines had rendered the
petition moot. Finally, petitioners allege that the cancellation of respondents certificate of recognition as a Filipino citizen and the issuance of the deportation order against
him are valid.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Late Filing of Petition
Petitioners allege that the petition filed before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed for late filing. Petitioners allege that respondent only had 15 days from 19
October 2004, the date of receipt of the 18 October 2004 DOJ Resolution, within which to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, respondent filed
his petition only on 4 November 2004, or one day beyond the reglementary period for filing the petition for review. Petitioners allege that when the petition was filed, the
18 October 2004 DOJ Resolution had already lapsed into finality.
We do not agree.
A one-day delay does not justify the appeals dismissal where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to the petitioner. 9 The Court
has ruled:
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform
to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to
appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage
thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. 10
Respondent had a valid excuse for the late filing of the petition before the Court of Appeals. It is not disputed that there was a pending petition for prohibition before the
trial court. Before filing the petition for review before the Court of Appeals, respondent had to withdraw the petition for prohibition before the trial court. The trial court
granted the withdrawal of the petition only on 4 November 2004, the date of filing of the petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Under the circumstances, we find
the one-day delay in filing the petition for review excusable.
We reiterate:
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is
always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance
with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an
opportunity to be heard.11
Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in accepting the petition for review although it was filed one-day late.
Mootness of the Petition
Petitioners allege that the petition had been rendered moot because respondent already left the country.
Petitioners cited Lewin v. The Deportation Board12 where the Court ruled:
x x x. Even if the deportation case is to proceed and even if this Court will decide this appeal on the merits, there would be no practical value or effect of such action upon
Lewin, because he has already left the country. Consequently, the issues involved herein have become moot and academic.13
However, we agree with respondent that the factual circumstances in Lewin are different from the case before us. In Lewin, petitioner was an alien who entered the
country as a temporary visitor, to stay for only 50 days. He prolonged his stay by securing several extensions. Before his last extension expired, he voluntarily left the
country, upon filing a bond, without any assurance from the Deportation Board that he would be admitted to the country upon his return. The Court found that he did not
return to the country, and at the time he was living in another country. The Court ruled that Lewins voluntary departure from the country, his long absence, and his status
when he entered the country as a temporary visitor rendered academic the question of his deportation as an undesirable alien.

In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country because his Filipino wife and
children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and before this Court showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage and
citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He was precisely questioning the DOJs revocation of his certificate
of recognition and his summary deportation by the BI.
Therefore, we rule that respondents deportation did not render the present case moot.
Validity of the Cancellation of Respondents
Certificate of Recognition and the Issuance of Deportation Order by the BID
Petitioners allege that the DOJ adduced substantial evidence warranting the revocation of respondents certificate of recognition and the filing of the deportation
proceedings against him. Petitioners likewise allege that the certificate of recognition did not attain finality as claimed by respondent.
We agree with petitioners that the issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, 14 the Court ruled that citizenship
proceedings are a class of its own and can be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the
following concur:
1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.15
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting
the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. 16 When the evidence submitted by a deportee is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. 17 Courts may review
the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the rulings. 18
In this case, we sustain the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented before the BI and the DOJ, i.e., (1) certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Quintos, and
a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos and
Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; (2) certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of respondents parents dated 9 January 1971, indicating
the Philippines as Quintos birthplace; (3) certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino; (4) certified true
copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the Philippines as his mothers birthplace; and (5) certified true copy of the
letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian
citizenship, have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the Senate Committees. The Committee Report on
respondent stated:
F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to present before the BI and the committees, the documents required in granting recognition of Philippine citizenship, particularly the
birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos.
However, a verification of the authenticity of the above documents reveals highly suspicious circumstances.
His alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for
recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no
Quintoses or Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said barangay.
Both barangay officials further claimed that even in the census or master list of voters, the family names of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist.
His mother's certificate of birth in the civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija was issued on the basis of an application for late registration, which is ten (10) years after
the date of birth.19
The memorandum20 of the DOJ special committee also cited only the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta and then concluded that the evidence presented before the Senate
Committees had overcome the presumption that the entries in the certificate of live birth of Quintos are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.21

We agree with the Court of Appeals that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos certificate of live birth, such certificate
remains valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The rule stands that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. x x x."22
We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census, such as they could have been
mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos
certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be
presumed that the certificates late filing was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of
14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien,
indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the Senate Committees.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 30 September 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87271.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153883

January 13, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by
respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,1 which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of
Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested person may appear and show cause
why the petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2 She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was
Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father
were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no
record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and crossexamining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
SO ORDERED.4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision. 5
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO
"FILIPINO" DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.6
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial
corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a

statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent
who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 13
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental
when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is
illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers
misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her fathers
surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known
objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been known
since childhood."
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,16 we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood"
(Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222). 17
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,18 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been
using since childhood.19
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of
name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. 20 In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in the surname that
she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34973 April 14, 1988
YUNG UAN CHU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by the Government seeking the reversal of the Decision of the then Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City * dated December 7,
1971 granting the petition for naturalization of Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung Yu Hui Tin.
Herein appellee Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung alias Yu Hui Tin was born on August 3, 1933 in Iloilo City to spouses Yu Bun Juan and Po Kuan, both Chinese citizens.
She studied, upon attaining school age, at the Chinese Commercial High School Iloilo City where she finished her primary and secondary education.
Records show that on October 1, 1954, she married one Miguel Cupang Jr. admittedly a native-born citizen of the Philippine (Exhibits "U," "U-1," "U-3") which marriage
took place in Iloilo City (Exhibits H). Because of said wedlock and at the time of the filing of the petition, the couple had six (6) children, to wit:
(1) Shirley 15 years old
(2) Henry 13 years old
(3) Terry 11 years old
(4) Wilson 9 years old
(5) Belly 7 years old
(6) Cherry 6 years old
All aforenamed children were registered as Natural born Filipino citizens (Exhibits "O," "O-1" to "O-5") and are all enrolled in public and private schools recognized by the
government and not limited to any race or nationality and where Philippine History, Government and Civics are taught as part of the school curriculum (Exh. "V" and "X").
After their marriage, the couple transferred their residence to Lagao, General Santos City where they engaged in the rice and corn business under the name "General
Santos Rice mill." From the said business they derived an average annual income of P20,000.00. They own real properties worth not less than P5,000.00 and have been
paying their income tax to the government (Exhibit "K," "K-3," "L," "L-3," "M," "M-6," "N," "N-33," and "Q-4").
Petitioner writes and speaks Ilongo and English; believes in the principles underlying the Constitution of the Philippines, and has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines not only with the duly constituted authorities but also with the community in which she
lives. She has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has adopted Filipino customs, traditions and Idiosyncracies She never left the Philippines since her birth (Exhibit "Q,"
"Q-1," "Q-2," "Q-3," "Q-6," "T" to "T-39"). She claims to be a woman of good character, a Catholic in faith and in practice. She is not opposed to organized government nor
is she affiliated with any association or group or persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government, or defend or teach the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of men's Ideas. She is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of
polygamy. She was never indicted nor convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Neither is she suffering from any incurable contagious disease. (Exhibit "Q-5").
After trial, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1971 finding petitioner Yung Uan Chu baptized as Lina Yung, known in school in her registered name as Lina Uan
Chu and now as Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a Filipino citizen and therefore authorized to take her oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the same in the proper civil registrar. (Appellees Brief, pp. 28-34)
On January 5, 1972, the Solicitor General thru his authorized representative, the City Fiscal of General Santos City, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision (Record on Appeal, pp. 34- 41) which Motion the court denied in its Order dated January 26, 1972.
On January 27,1972, the City Fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, filed his Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed his brief on August 7, 1972 but appellee failed to file her brief within the period which expired on September 30, 1972 and the case was
considered submitted for decision without appellee's brief in the resolution of November 10, 1972.

The sole issue raised by appellant is whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that it has jurisdiction to declare petitioner a Filipino citizen based on its
conclusion that if administrative bodies are possessed with such power (to determine the absence of disqualifications on the status of citizenship), there is stronger
reason for the court to have jurisdiction over the case." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6)
The Government thru the Solicitor General submitted that in the case of Moy Yu Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration (No. L-21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292)
this Court thru Justice Antonio P. Barredo, while holding that an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipino provided she is not disqualified
to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473, reiterated the rule that "a judicial declaration that the person is a Filipino citizen cannot be
made in a petition for naturalization and that, in this jurisdiction there can be no independent action for the judicial declaration of citizenship of an individual."
Appellant's claim is impressed with merit.
A careful examination of the records shows that the sole and only purpose of the petitioner is to have the petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. This Court has consistently
ruled that there is no proceeding established by the law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. (Republic v. de la Cruz, 118 SCRA 32
[1982], citing: Danilo Channie Tan v. Republic, 1, 14159, April 18, 1960, 10 Phil. 632; Tan Yu Chu v. Republic, L-15775, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1964; Dionision Palaran v.
Republic, L-5047, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 79; Lao Yup Hun Dick v. Republic, L-19007-19109, September 30, 1964,12 SCRA 107, In re Mallari Adm. Case No. 533,
April 29, 1968; Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971], Wong Sau Mei v. Republic, 38 SCRA 26 [1971], Soria v. Commissioner of Immigration, 37
SCRA 213 [1971]).
Thus, this Court has clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and
a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for
instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child,
although a finding thereon may be made as necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law
permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of
judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan Yu Chu v. Rep. supra)
Hence, a "judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition for naturalization because under our laws there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Such a declaration or pronouncement is beyond the court's jurisdiction." (Lao Yup Hun Diok v.
Republic, supra)
An alien woman married to a Filipino citizen does not necessarily acquire Philippine citizenship. She must prove in an appropriate proceeding that she does not have any
disqualification for Philippine citizenship.
This rule also applies even if her husband is a native born Filipino. (Austria et al., v. Conchu L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336; 121 Phil. 1148)
In Moy Ya Lim Yao (41 SCRA 292-388) the Court adverted to the administrative procedure which up to the present is followed in the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation. The steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration are embodied in Opinion No. 38,
series of 1958 of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Berrera to the effect that "The alien woman must the a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner
and her husband to the effect and thus secure recognition of her status as a Filipino citizen. Judicial recourse would be available to the petitioner in a case of adverse
action by the Immigration Commissioner.
Although as already stated, administrative proceedings should have been undertaken by the appellee, still, in the instant case, We find no necessity therefor because in
this judicial proceeding, it is clear she is already a Filipino citizen.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby ordered to CANCEL applicants alien
certificate of registration.
SO ORDERED,

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p.
162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature
was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full,
clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The
same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or
curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area
of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of
their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where
the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the
Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure
of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang
was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for
public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong
would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having
been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has
more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the
1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the
decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on naturalborn has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him
not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that
provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen
who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we
were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must
prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of
a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially
the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed,
and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one
who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino
since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His
profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself
a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a
central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a
foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention.
Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his
being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country,
was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a
Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A
priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN,
February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to
such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to
produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be
found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof
or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed
documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which
deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan,
and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen.
They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting
the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the
sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges.
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions,
we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the
same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p.
87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution
in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr.
never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their
family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held
that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own
property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of
Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud
were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to
share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many
technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and
meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to
declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second legislative

district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May
1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same
Constitution, for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as Member of
the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E.
Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No.
6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently
thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her
birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of
First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for
naturalization and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations
inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong
Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as
Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh.
G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where
he finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang
whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted
in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No.
4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional
provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and
competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference,
except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process
of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in
which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional
directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications
for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance
of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of

Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional
separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action
that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public
office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15
May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his birth and, consequently
the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without his having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the
spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent
was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution
which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens.
Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen,
having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect
Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the
naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation
of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as
a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that
a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and
after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon
which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the
grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate
purporting to grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which
confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may
be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should
make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for

stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public

office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by
Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and
for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for
naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of
allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a
minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his
mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a
manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the
1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the
conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained effort, according to
petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen. 16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be
endowed, without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively established by the
extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the
constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to
be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights
has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be
contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is
something that has been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971
Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a
natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason
behind that decision was that a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen by
the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that
recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is
simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who
are not naturalized and people who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered
natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their status. 19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:

MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935
Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution, whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973. 20
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when
we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17,
1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also,
those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a
chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a
Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed
equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if
he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours later
maybe because of parto laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and
Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born
of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973
must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the
attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine
citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987
Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine
citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a
voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino
citizenship was judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to elect
Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11)
years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship,
granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter
dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of
private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time
thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation
of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district
of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.

A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding
to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event
that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil.
238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be
found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal
manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. . . . 31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The
tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of
circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far
removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto
D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the
protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the
report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because

a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other
hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a
precise and specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not
qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law.
And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial
functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the
second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this
Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present
controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" and
this appears crucial and central to its decision that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his
descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many
who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their
children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4, Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an
inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in
the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident.
Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue

residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO
PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously
discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship
in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had
to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as
held in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended
by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's
disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification
with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the
Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning,
it was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein)
was groundless and dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the
Minutes of said session as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears
out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately,
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled
Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.
This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate
action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935
Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such
recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such
proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the
electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible
and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave
abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or

not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to
review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the citizenship, and
sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino
citizen having complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing
in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside
therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish subjects
who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.
But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish
nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos.
He was also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although he went back
to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter
was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing certificate, his father, Ong
Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the
1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11,
1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can thus be
drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of
1889 and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been
registered as Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent of
having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks
his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute estoppel
(Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520,
Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary
session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience, because when the Convention approved the Report
in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11
in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to
declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second legislative
district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May
1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.

The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:

1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same
Constitution, for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as Member of
the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E.
Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No.
6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently
thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her
birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of
First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for
naturalization and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations
inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong
Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as
Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh.
G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where
he finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang
whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted
in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No.
4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional
provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and
competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference,
except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process
of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in
which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional
directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications
for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance
of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of
Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional
separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.

It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action
that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public
office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15
May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his birth and, consequently
the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without his having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the
spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent
was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution
which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens.
Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen,
having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect
Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the
naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation
of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as
a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that
a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and
after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon
which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the
grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate
purporting to grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which
confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may
be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should
make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.

The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by
Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and
for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for
naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of
allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a
minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his
mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a
manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the
1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the
conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained effort, according to
petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen. 16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be
endowed, without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively established by the
extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the
constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to
be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights
has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be
contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is
something that has been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971
Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a
natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason
behind that decision was that a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen by
the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that
recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is
simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who
are not naturalized and people who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered
natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their status. 19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935
Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution, whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973. 20
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution, thus:

MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when
we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17,
1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also,
those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a
chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a
Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed
equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if
he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours later
maybe because of parto laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and
Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born
of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973
must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the
attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine
citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987
Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine
citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a
voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino
citizenship was judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to elect
Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11)
years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship,
granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter
dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of
private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time
thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation
of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district
of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding
to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be

declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event
that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil.
238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be
found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal
manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. . . . 31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The
tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of
circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far
removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto
D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the
protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the
report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because

a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other
hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a
precise and specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not
qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law.
And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial
functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the
second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this
Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present
controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" and
this appears crucial and central to its decision that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his
descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many
who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their
children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4, Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an
inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in
the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident.
Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue
residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO
PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously
discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.

Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship
in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had
to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as
held in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended
by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's
disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification
with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the
Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning,
it was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein)
was groundless and dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the
Minutes of said session as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears
out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately,
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled
Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.
This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate
action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935
Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such
recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such
proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the
electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible
and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave
abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to
review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.

As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the citizenship, and
sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino
citizen having complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing
in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside
therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish subjects
who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.
But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish
nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos.
He was also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although he went back
to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter
was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing certificate, his father, Ong
Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the
1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11,
1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can thus be
drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of
1889 and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been
registered as Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent of
having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks
his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute estoppel
(Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520,
Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary
session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience, because when the Convention approved the Report
in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11
in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the
armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period
of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2
refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the naturalborn citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to
prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; 19 services in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5)
political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2)
those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-45375

April 12, 1939

In re Petition of Gloria Baldello for Naturalization as a Philippine Citizen.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
GLORIA BALDELLO, petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Gloria Baldello, a Filipino citizen, married, on November 12, 1921, one Gabino Ordorica, a native of Mexico, then serving in the United States Army in the Philippines, with
whom she had been living continually until August 24, 1924, when she was abandoned by him. On December 31, 1935, she sued out and obtained an order from the
Court of First Instance of Manila, declaring Ordorica presumptively dead for purposes of law, his whereabouts being then unknown for more than eleven years. On June
29, 1936, she filed a petition in the court below wherein she sought a return to the Filipino citizenship. The petition was denied and she appealed.
Under paragraph 2, article 37, of the Constitution of Mexico (Nationality Laws, Flournoy and Hudson [1929], pp. 426, 427), Ordorica had forfeited his Mexican citizenship
by his service in the United States Army. On the other hand, he failed to comply with the requirements of the Act of Congress of the United States of May 9, 1918 (4O U.
S. Statutes at Large, p. 542), by which he might become a naturalized citizen of the United States. Thus, at the time of his marriage with Gloria Baldello, he was neither a

Mexican nor an American citizen a stateless individual in the contemplation of the Law of Nations. The question now is: Did the wife, by that marriage, follow this
anomalous condition of her husband?
We believe, and so hold, that there being no new citizenship imposed upon her by marriage, nothing could have divested her of her original citizenship, and, therefore,
her Philippine citizenship remained unchanged. The general rule that a married woman follows the nationality of her husband presupposes a nationality in the husband.
Where no such nationality exists, the rule does not apply.
Our opinion finds corroboration in the rule indicated in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 315, 324, 325), which is now a legal provision embodied in paragraph 7,
article 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, to the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying a foreigner belonging to a nation the laws of which do
not allow her to acquire the husband's nationality. Were it not for this rule, if a Filipino woman loses her nationality simply by marrying a foreigner, even without acquiring
the foreigner's citizenship, then she would become destitute of nationality. And evidently the purpose of the said rule is to prevent such condition of statelessness in a
Filipino woman married to an alien, a policy that is perfectly applicable in the present case.
We hold, therefore, that appellant Gloria Baldello , is a Filipino citizen, and accordingly her petition for Philippine citizenship is unnecessary.
Judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN
ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After
manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed
the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An
internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court
disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13
December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also
filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for
release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and
desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will
likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13

December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order
dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he
should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December
1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January
1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for
and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In
Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22
resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of
said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings
they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this
has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to
continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the
petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner
herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not
sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.

The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the
claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United
States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial
under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this
requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for
this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining
in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their
fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court
should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced
his citizenship and that he might die if thrown out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the
facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to
summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his
citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced
citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for
convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his
Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most
summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or
who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a
different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported
for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of
voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I .
therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a
Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the exception and was granted
the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.

However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting
of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in
1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind,
do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner
herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not
sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the
claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United
States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial
under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this
requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for
this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining
in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their
fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court
should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced
his citizenship and that he might die if throw out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the
facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to
summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his
citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced
citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for
convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his
Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most
summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or
who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a
different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported
for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of
voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.

The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I .
therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a
Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the exception and was granted
the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting
of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in
1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind,
do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines
after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto
petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not
a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set
the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for

certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on
Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been
filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League
itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself
alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after
his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and
election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support
he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization
created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States,
thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will
after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles
of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public
respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of
Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the
aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial
governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance
at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent
loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued
Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.

Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced"
on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not
find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning
in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner,
held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case
at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice
to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is
habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one
month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which
had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third
state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question
presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this
question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine
under its law who are its nationals."

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his
naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with
the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of
the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized
citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet
been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a
conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned
citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the
petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private
respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was
challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome
back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his
loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the
duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9,
1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Cortes J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should
supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a
person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is
mandatory and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the
proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and
definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such
disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act
which works a forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo
warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 6 Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I
believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most
unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained
to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should
supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a
person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is
mandatory and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the
proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and
definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such
disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act
which works a forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo
warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 6 Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I
believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most
unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained
to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving
as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involve the same issues
and parties.
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the
Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private
respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the
Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of
hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March
16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor
a copy thereof posted.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the
Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private

respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association
(Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8)
Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were
tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with
prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of
the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governorelect of the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections.
Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds:
(1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of
Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the
votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondents disqualification in
the guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered
as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondents name from
the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private
respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary
restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondents certificate
of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial courts decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private
respondents oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a twoyear waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four
months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy and the
deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same
office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be
valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all
petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.
Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory
(Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that
under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond
its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 9235. The quo warranto proceedings sought private respondents disqualification because of his American citizenship.
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.
In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political
atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had
lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the
maneuvers of his political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor
General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the
publicity given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing
the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do
so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private
respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of
procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and

discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and
one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation
of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and
one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation
of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and
posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4)
that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said
law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted
from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order
to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or
contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition
for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a
petition to annul private respondents proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in

accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for questioning the
proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship.
In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the
respondents title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief
that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared
winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE
his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City in Case No. N-96-03-MK, entitled In the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 965 and 263[0].
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at
No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his status as a
citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, applying for
naturalization, he averred that FIRST. - His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition.
SECOND. - His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas, U.S.
THIRD. - His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival here in the Philippines.
FOURTH. - He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto attached as Annex A.
FIFTH. - He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at petitioners residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of their
marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex B.
SIXTH. - He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as Annex C.
SEVENTH. - He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship,
and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the
date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his
relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
EIGHT. - He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of
mens ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any
mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines.
NINTH. - It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen. i
On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January 1997 ii which, along with the
petition and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on 10 May 1996.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by
the trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court

a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other things, that A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who
lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise
show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under R.A. 8171. iii
Concluding, the court ruled:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.iv
After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz:
After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the petitioner is
hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
petitioner upon the finality of this order.
Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, after its finality.
SO ORDERED.v
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed
by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 (AO
285), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A.
8171. The motion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged:
"This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19, 1997.
"The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of repatriating
or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of the Solicitor General as
Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the
application; that if their applications are approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to
have reacquired their Philippine citizenship and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
"The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization.
"The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took
his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner was ordered
repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines.
"On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on March 19, 1997 filed the
herein manifestation and motion.
"The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein petition as the
same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the same is
therefore null and void.
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated
September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
re-filing before the Special Committee on Naturalization.
"SO ORDERED."vi
A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order asseverating that since his petition was filed on 14 March
1996, or months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the President under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to
take cognizance of the case.
In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on
Retroactive Application.
Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization vii filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a
repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03 October 1996.
The contention is not meritorious.
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. The pertinent
provisions of the law read:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 725, viii dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special
Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No.
491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of
27 March 1987, it was not, however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections,ix the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had
merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings x x x under Letter of Instruction (`LOI) 270. x The

Court elaborated:
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in
her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication
are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed `unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever 'judgment the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution' might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress - once created - to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of 'the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only
upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.xi
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; xii hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization
constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, xiii promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was
merely then a confirmatory issuance.
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which
had no jurisdiction thereover. The courts order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality xiv nor could be a source of right on the part of
petitioner.xv It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke
Republic Act No. 965xvi and R.A. No. 2630xvii since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission
in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under
these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil
Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to
hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should
be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should
take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23,
1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March
23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or
holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following disposition 6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of
Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is
canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during
the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June
21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes,"
was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office
of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered
annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On
February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" 15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than
fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as
provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in
the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the
governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen
days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor,
vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and
during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding
and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on
Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725,
with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec,
arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at
2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the
Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at
that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of
policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential
Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication
are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the
new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not
only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29,
1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that
he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the
Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and resubmitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for
repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
In fact, P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is
not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino
who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country
and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our
decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public
office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date

thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or
to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30,
1995 -- the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal
(as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not
of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,
such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official"
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and
Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much
less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore
stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands
to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official
be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .
where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that
the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter
has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988,
1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in
fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995." 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of
the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the
ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's
ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of
"within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.
And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of
allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,
1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this
general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of
public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply
with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws,
and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid
and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble,
P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing
law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by
the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right
to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy
and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the

promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs.
Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered
essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered
by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective
operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for
which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does
not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify
any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo
lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the
more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that
would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special
Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the
same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his
to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation
that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of
the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been
repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11,
1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings
(which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the
Philippines."
We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission
(Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its
Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with
the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995
but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him,
Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment
of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we
are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs.
COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing
Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition
was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is
"a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo
was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the
final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992
when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for
which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as
in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their
voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was,
to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May
11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the
Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a
suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not
a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this
Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not
change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing
Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim
in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days
before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point,
i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78.
Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time.
There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues
that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections.
That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to
lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or
who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The
issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following
settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's
ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such
knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before,
during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials,
and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at
the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a)
were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs.
Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold
however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which
reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr.
Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is
NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor
of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon
this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and
at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or
repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason
of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed
the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing,
of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office.

And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted). 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed
the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and
hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective
local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the
dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating
venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously
entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people
of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs
speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at
the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle
would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly
insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied
in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people
which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies.
Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. 1 It is one of the few principles whose truth
has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state
a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being
crafted by its Filipino framers. 2
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people .
. ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic
spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
"amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty
of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern. 3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco
4
states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given time." 5 Citing Barker, 6 he adds that a more amplified
definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8

xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people"
they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time. 9 For
this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates
vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said
sovereignty has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as
their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the
uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal
issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second
school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about
ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without
transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not
see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due
respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against
the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's
name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I
cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For
three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted
for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992,
they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election
cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must
respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of
established authority." 11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively
repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization
of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders,
issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and
rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No.
725 is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created
under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by
virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until
the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of
legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine
citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with
law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270
and the conferment of the power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the
President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of
executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's
application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed

upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of
office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age
on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way
may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section
39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right
of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who
shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being
a naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and
declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as
there is no showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make
him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no
moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now
to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was
never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or
list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which,
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at
any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of
the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any
voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten
(10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its
invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The
answer is provided in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act
No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the
appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section
7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the
period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods
within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on
petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide
petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during
the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within
the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections
89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by
reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as
such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere
privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino
citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH
THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally
rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought
to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a
subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to
enable a person to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason
of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was
invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship
does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Moreover, it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights.
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it
explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said
insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American
national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or
naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY
KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and
until the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed
dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were
retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire
another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are
commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986
people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article
XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article
XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13),
pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of
people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of
Article II is quite clear on this, thus:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an
attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine
their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of
the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the
executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province,
or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or
municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are
composed of the vast majority of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and
binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people
which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies.
Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. 1 It is one of the few principles whose truth
has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state
a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being
crafted by its Filipino framers. 2
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people .
. ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic
spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
"amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty
of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern. 3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco
4
states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given time." 5 Citing Barker, 6 he adds that a more amplified
definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8
xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people"
they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time. 9 For
this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates
vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said
sovereignty has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as
their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the
uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal
issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second
school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about
ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without

transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not
see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due
respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against
the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's
name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I
cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For
three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted
for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992,
they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election
cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must
respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of
established authority." 11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively
repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization
of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders,
issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and
rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No.
725 is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created
under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by
virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until
the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of
legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine
citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with
law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270
and the conferment of the power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the
President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of
executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's
application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of
office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age
on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way
may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate.

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section
39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right
of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who
shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being
a naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and
declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as
there is no showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make
him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no
moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now
to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was
never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or
list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which,
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at
any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of
the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any
voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten
(10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its
invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The
answer is provided in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act
No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the
appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section
7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the
period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods
within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on
petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide
petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during
the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within
the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections
89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by
reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as
such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere
privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino
citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH
THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally
rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought
to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a
subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to
enable a person to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason
of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was
invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship
does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Moreover, it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights.
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it
explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said
insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American
national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or
naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY
KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and
until the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed
dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were
retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire
another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are
commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986
people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article
XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article
XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13),
pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of
people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of
Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an
attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine
their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of
the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the
executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province,
or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or
municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are
composed of the vast majority of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and
binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
1 Composed of Pres. CoFootnotesmm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; rollo, pp. 110-129.
3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores.
Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this case. However, the Commission
has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.

4 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

5 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, concurring, and
Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business").
6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the
Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the
Philippines" and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028.
7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe,
Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo, pp. 56-57.
8 Rollo, p. 60.
9 Rollo, pp. 61-67.
10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray votes", and thus Lee was held as having garnered the "highest number of votes."
11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case.
12 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).
13 Rollo, pp. 110-128.
14 Rollo, pp. 159-170.
15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.
17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
18 Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners.
19 Republic Act No. 7160.
20 See footnote no. 6, supra.
21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No.
473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."
22 Supra, p. 794.
23 Petition, p. 27; rollo, p. 29.
24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
MEMORANDUM
TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The Director-General
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative authority thereof,
poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated
December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related
laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations.
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino
Manila, March 27, 1987.
25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.
26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).
27 Petition, p. 28; rollo, p. 30.
28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:
MAN I F E S TAT I O N
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995:
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900
2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902
4. Terry Herrera and
Antonio Ching 903
5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905
7. Samuel M. Buyco 906
8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
9. Samuel Villanueva 908
10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909
11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910
29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN
FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed
under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect;

WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after
the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that:
(1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (3) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective
implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
30 See footnote no. 6, supra.
31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
32 The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may
be provided for by law, . . ." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
33 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).
34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on March 19, 1996:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time
that he assumes the office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in
the case of qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 - it says that for purposes of residence it must be reckoned . . .
from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the election. But when we go over all the
provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when,
as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if there is no provision under any existing law which requires that
you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted to
mean that if you are already qualified at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the
office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to
be a registered voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988,
1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter
and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court
twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the
Supreme Court is correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered voter was likewise
questioned before the judiciary. There was a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the Regional Trial Court and he was
sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of
proclamation and not as of the time of the election or at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify
when citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local
positions should be a voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here because he was allowed to vote and he did in
fact vote and in fact, he was a registered voter. (TSN, March 19, 1996.)
35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", as amended, provides for the various qualifications of
voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship.
36 Comment, p. 11; rollo, p. 259.
37 See footnote no. 33.
38 Section 253 reads as follows:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. -- Any voter contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984).
40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states:
Exceptions to Rule. -- Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in
case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating new rights.
41 Id., p. 25.
42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.
43 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953).
44 Memorandum, p. 9.
45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.

46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; emphasis supplied.

47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.
48 Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor General, it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval between
date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten days; the swiftest action was a same-day approval.
49 Sec. 40. Disqualifications. -- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;"
50 p. 11; rollo, p. 259.
51 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121.
52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).
53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on
the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled.
54 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21.
55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; rollo, p. 116.
56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.
57 Art. IX, Sec. 2.
58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/Decision be issued as follows:
a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;
b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;
xxx xxx xxx
59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).
60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992).
61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.
62 Supra, at p. 312.
63 See footnotes 2 and 3.
64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23, 1959).
65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.
66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, despite his not
being of the required age on the day of the election, although he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990, this Court held in Aznar
vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmea held an Alien Certificate of Registration as an American citizen, he was still not disqualified
from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such certificate did not preclude his being "still a Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the
proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect on
January 1, 1992, provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the
point is that to the extent possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.
67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994).
68 This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.
PUNO, J., concurring:
1 The 1987 Constitution added the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.
2 Section 24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which authorized the Filipino people to draft a Constitution in 1934 required that the "constitution formulated and drafted
shall be republican in form."
This Court has observed that even before the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law have ". . . extended the powers of a republican form of
government modeled after that of the United States to the Philippines." Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340 [1912], Severino v. Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383
[1910], US v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27 [1910].
3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p. 68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33 F. 900, 906.
4 Dean of the UP College of Law; later President of U.P., and Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
5 Since, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts, 1954, ed., p. 22.
6 Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.).
7 118 US 356.
8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed.].
9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
10 3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67 CSJ 926.
11 Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199.
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the
Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as
mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition
to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter[1] from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident
visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3,
1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.[2]

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer[3] stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor
because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for
repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May
10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner
did not file one within the required period.[4] Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum[5] subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from
being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:
xxx
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must
not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is
proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No.
320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated
25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to
respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that repatriation shall be effected by
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of
Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken
his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13
(g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his
supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of
doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22
June 1965).
xxx
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear
that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant
to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false
representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. [6]
In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name
deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.[7]
On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for
repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said
office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office
with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioners registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of
the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioners
Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioners reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.[8]
The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19,
Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during
the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondents only evidence was his Certificate of
Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the
petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even
date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004
certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is
therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not
anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2 Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification
Certificate; c) Annex 4 Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex 5 Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate
by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P.
Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of
[misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He
failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron
Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18,
2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification
Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex 3.
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the
requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation
constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such
ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)[9]
On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on
its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim
him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally
preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
In its Comment,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioners name, as a mayoralty
candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa,
was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
In his Reply,[11] petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate
adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions
cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on
Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City
prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his
application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a
prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical use or value.[12] Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.[13]
First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,[14] thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City
only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[15] the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to
another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that
Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was
justified by the Court, thus:
xxx
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations
and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then
there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there
is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
xxx
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect,
and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.[17]
Republic Act No. 8171[18] has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that
repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the
government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying
petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of
repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19,
Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during
the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the
respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.[19]
It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their
Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated
March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, and Tinga, JJ., on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.

[1] COMELEC (First Division) Resolution, Rollo, p. 36.

[2] COMELEC en banc Resolution, Rollo, p. 43.

[3] Rollo, p. 73.
[4] Supra, note 2.
[5] Supra, note 3, at 87.
[6] Supra, note 1, at 39-40.
[7] Id. at 41.
[8] Supra, note 3, at 47.
[9] Id. at 44-47.
[10] Id, at 106.
[11] Id. at 112.
[12] Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004; Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 754, 757 (1996); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76,
77 (1961).
[13] Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, citing Brillantes, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004.
[14] REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including
their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with an association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification
as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
SEC. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that "it is mans basic right for it is
nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully
satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the
United States.
The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was
seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as
from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson
Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in
Manila. 7
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa
was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No. 053854189
issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions
No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8
The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa,
born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on
January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the
United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of
sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9
The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the
abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the
respondents Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked.
By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy
cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum
Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a
final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his
immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940;
and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo
Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12
On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and
restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten
(10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. 13 Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted
the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No.
8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. 15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino
citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968,
there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law
governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling
reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16,
1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that after
petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioners
"repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire
Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily
deported for his being an undocumented alien.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was
enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor
children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or
economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a
former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the children acquire the citizenship of their
parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the
parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship.
On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born
Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The
privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law
and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization.
The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired
citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file
his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
Section 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on
Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees
for the processing of petitions.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in
support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN
to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered,
together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20 At
that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285
designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in
Angat v. Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires
a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or
whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic
necessity should be specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for
naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA
8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former
Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said
phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their
citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA
8171, to wit:
Ms. Domingo: x x x
From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.

The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who
leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those who have committed crimes
and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship
elsewhere.
Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer
abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two typesthe economic and
political refugeesare the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of
problems with these people who left the country because of political persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back
to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back
because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1
of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a "necessary
and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason
other than political or economic necessity." 27
This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically
motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former
Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed
crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek
citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship
was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief
is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for
repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its
citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting
the petition for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or
the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation
of the aliens valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the
Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates
deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of
course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her
to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of
staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the
questioned summary judgment. x x x 29
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent
"repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTE STAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Joaquin J. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary (2003), Art. IV (Citizenship), Sec. 1, pp. 609-610.

Rollo, pp. 8-19.

Rollo, p. 22. Note: The year 1986 (from the CA Decision) is replaced with year 1968 based on the petition filed with the CA (rollo, pp. 27-36, at 32).

Based on petitioner Tabasas Affidavit of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance, and the Certification of facts of his birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar in
Numancia, Aklan (rollo, pp. 37-40), petitioner was born on February 21, 1959, thus making him around 9 years of age at the time he was naturalized as an
American citizen. In the pleadings filed before the CA and this Court, however, petitioner alleged that he was naturalized as an American at the age of seven
(7). This age is used in this Decision for consistency.
5

Rollo, p. 32.

Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged (1993), p. 608.

Supra note 3, at 20.

Id. at 20-21.

CA rollo, p. 95.

10

Supra note 3, at 21-22.

11

Supra note 5, at 27.

12

or 37 years old, see footnote no. 4 of this Decision.

13

Supra note 3, at pars. 2-4.

14

Rollo, p. 150.

15

Supra note 3, at par. 5.

16

Id. at 20-25 (penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez with Associate Justices Pacita Caizares-Nye and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. [now a member of the
Court] concurring).
17

RA 8171, Sec. 1.

18

We quote the opinion of Father Joaquin Bernas in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 & 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA
277, 385-386 regarding the transmissive essence of citizenship as follows:
4.3 The operation of the core principle of transmissibility in blood relation finds affirmation and, more significantly, continuity in the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions in which blood relationship becomes a principal derivation and transmissibility of citizenship. All Constitutions embody this transmissive essence
of citizenship in blood relationship. In the determination as to who are citizens of the Philippines, they have a common provision that those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines are citizens.
xxxx
4.8. The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood relationship or jus sanguinis. On this account, the derivation of
citizenship from a person or the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from a person or the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from the
fact that he is the father. x x x
19

Pertinent portions of the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8171 state:
RULE II

1. Said petition shall be in five (5) copies, legibly typed, and signed, thumbmarked [sic], and verified by the petitioner, with his/her signed photograph in
passport size attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:
a. the petitioner's name and surname and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;
b. his/her present and former places of residence;

c. his/her place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and their residences (if still living), and the reasons for the Filipino citizenship of
his/her parents, if such is the fact;
d. the basis for her being a Filipino citizen at the time of her marriage, if the petitioner is one who lost her Filipino citizenship by marriage, or if the petitioner is
a natural-born Filipino citizen, the basis why he/she was a Filipino citizen at birth;
e. the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in
case of natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified;
f. the reason/s why petitioner is seeking to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation;
g. whether the petitioner is single, married or divorced, or his/her marriage had been annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the date and place of his/her
marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship, and residence of his/her spouses; if widowed, the date and place of death of his/her spouse; and
if his/her marriage had been annulled or he/she had been divorced, the date of decree of annulment of marriage or divorce and the court which issued the
same;
h. his/her occupation, as well as the occupation of his/her spouse, in case the applicant is married;
i. if the petitioner has children, the name, date and place of birth, and residence of each of the children;
j. a declaration: (1) that petitioner is not a person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) that petitioner is not a person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the predominance of their ideas; (3) that petitioner is not a person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or (4) that
petitioner is not a person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
k. a declaration that it is his/her intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the state or country of which he/she is a citizen or subject.
The petition must be accompanied by:
a. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate or other evidences of his/her former Filipino citizenship;
b. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's Alien Certificate of Registration and his/her Native-born Certificate of Residence and Certificate of
Arrival or Re-entry Permit into the Philippines, if any;
c. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certificate, if married; or the death certificate of his/her spouse, if widowed; or the decree
granting petitioner a divorce, if she/he is divorced, or annulling his/her marriage, if such marriage had been annulled;
d. duplicate original or certified photocopies of the birth certificates, the Alien Certificates of Registration, and the Immigrant Certificates of Residence or
Native-born Certificates of Residence (if any) of petitioner's minor children, whenever applicable.
Every page of the petition, as well as all the pages of its annexes and supporting documents and papers, must be signed by petitioner in addition to the
signatures thereof of the persons executing or issuing the same.
2. The petition shall be given a docket number and stamped, indicating the date of filing. The Committee shall record the filing of all such applications in a
record book in chronological order.
RULE III
After receipt of the petition for repatriation, the Committee may call the petitioner for interview, after which the Committee, if it believes in view of the facts
before it that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 shall approve the
petition. Within ninety (90) days after being notified of the approval of his petition, petitioner shall take [an] x x x oath of allegiance x x x
20

Supra note 2, at 12.

21

The Memorandum reactivating the Special Committee on Repatriation reads:

June 08 1995

MEMORANDUM
TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The Director-General, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
You are hereby directed to immediately convene as the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN) created under Letter of Instruction No. 270 (11 April 1975),
as amended, for the limited purpose of processing applications pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 725 (1975) and related laws; which provide for a simplified
procedure for Filipino women, who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, and natural-born Filipinos; to reacquire Philippine citizenship through
an application for repatriation. You are further directed to report, within thirty (30) days from the date hereof and on a monthly basis thereafter, on the actions
taken pursuant to this directive.
For strict compliance.
(Signed) Fidel V. Ramos
22

G.R. No. 132244, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 438, 448-449.

23

Special Committee on Naturalization, Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, (1999) Rule II, (e).

24

Supra note 2, at 14.

25

The pertinent portions of the law are as follows:

Presidential Decree No. 725 (June 5, 1975)

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is
deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married
aliens before said Constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree
and order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of
Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen:
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D");
Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the
late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
(pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private
respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be
raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private
respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it
is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed
elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided
for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by
any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent
was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of
Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private
respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are
not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself
from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other
Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification
from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City,
respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first
in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a
case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he
has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities,
namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University
Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has
no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the
fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law
has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.
Cortes, J., concur in the result.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important
question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather
than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United
States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life,
involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien
is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section
5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal
convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive
from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in
Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing
Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left
her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons,
is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me
nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the
United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a
repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a
citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a
foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar,
Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be
retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her
children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory
at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor
Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born
in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1
express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under
oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct
and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in
Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath,
and verified from the records at the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of
every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of
1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal
treasurers, or at any other office designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had
been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in
the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration,
private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines
and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his
counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934 hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and
in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On
the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous),
then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was
almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person
(and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private
respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government),
there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts
of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof
dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in
the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.
But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run
would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought
about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses,
when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this
choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as
against national or public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be presumed
to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly
what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never
mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions
should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important
question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather
than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United
States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life,
involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien
is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section
5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal
convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive
from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in
Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing
Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left
her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons,
is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me
nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the
United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a
repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a
citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a
foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar,
Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be
retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her
children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory
at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor
Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born
in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1
express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under
oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct
and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in
Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath,
and verified from the records at the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of
every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of
1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal
treasurers, or at any other office designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had
been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in
the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration,
private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines
and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his
counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in
1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the
assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous),
then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was
almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person
(and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private
respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government),
there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts
of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof
dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in
the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.
But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run
would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now providesSec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought
about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses,
when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this
choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as
against national or public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be presumed
to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly
what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never
mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should
be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important
question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather
than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United
States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life,
involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien
is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section
5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal
convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive
from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance
to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in
Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing
Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left
her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons,
is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me
nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the
United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and
voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a
repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine
government as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a
citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a
foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar,
Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be
retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her
children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory
at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor
Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although
supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born
in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1
express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under
oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct
and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration
Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in
Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath,
and verified from the records at the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be
underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of
every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of
1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal
treasurers, or at any other office designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had
been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in
the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration,
private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines
and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his
counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in
1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the
assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous),
then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was
almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person
(and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private
respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government),
there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts
of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof
dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in
the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.
But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run
would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now providesSec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought
about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses,
when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality, and this
choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as
against national or public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be presumed
to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al., I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Ph. Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact,, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia"(p. 7, Decision). And is exactly
what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never
mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gender The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should
be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other
one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of
Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a

Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US
Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati
City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati
City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the
United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss
of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano
obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty
three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or
a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy
five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the
cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the
respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of
vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively,
petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and,
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the
trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its
discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for
the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final
and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of
the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is
that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running
for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati
City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to
have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion
for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed
to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And
so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what
happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the
country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China,
they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who,
by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the
great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a
tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on
Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a
double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of
the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed
out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to
repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as
a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship,
then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I
am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization
Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or
intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged
renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this
provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations.
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF
NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in
Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he
holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on
March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., are on leave.
Pardo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 160869

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND

ADHERENTS
OF
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
FOR
SCHOOL
TEACHERS
AND
ALLIED
WORKERS) MEMBER HECTOR
GUMANGAN CALILUNG,

Present:

Petitioner,

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus -

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,

TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.

THE HONORABLE SIMEON

DATUMANONG,
in
his
official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice,

Promulgated:

May 11, 2007

Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of
Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing
citizenship.30 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled An Act Making
the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
that states, Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on
August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.This Act shall be known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
30

deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned

officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1)
Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine

citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together,
allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that
Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become
foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their
foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 31
The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the
national interest.
31

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely
declares as a state policy that Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual
allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective
renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the
applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided
loyalty to the Republic.32

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations

of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in
drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep.
Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of
debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist
- - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances.
He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public
interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of
retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will
now be a violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the
proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem
of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is
one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case

32

may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no
concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the countrys concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the
bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires
this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines
to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his
foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and
at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is
now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that
this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member
of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary
to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual
allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy
in the bill which states that It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. He stressed that what the bill
does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country
and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his
country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left
it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the
country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the
problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country. 33 (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
33

provision in Commonwealth Act No. 6334 which takes away Philippine

citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has
not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a
law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He
further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual
allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,35 already had
drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.36

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law
on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any
jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 37
34
35
36
37

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a

policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact
the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization.38 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law
that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. 39
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including
this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not

needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for
determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not
set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,40 we said that the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution

38
39
40

and forbearance.41 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We

cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by
Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election
offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition
seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC
En Banc which denied Cordoras motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambuntings Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

41

2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.

36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. 3 (Boldface and capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required
citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in
the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora,
these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii
on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a
Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as an American Citizen on
December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he seeks to be
elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his own statements before the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy.
To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that
he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings
citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting
is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino
culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof
of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambuntings certificates of candidacy is false
because Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended
that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint against Tambunting because
Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American
citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC
En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing
evidence.

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the
findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual
citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy
in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In
its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of
Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and
residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a nonresident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his
certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there is no sufficient and convincing
evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying
the allegations in the complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing
his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.

xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section 74, among other
sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he
underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship.
Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora,
on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate
of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is
not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship
clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx

[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per
se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of
other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual
citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and
one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for
public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
1avvphi1

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of
his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution,
a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing
he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges
other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10
and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and

Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino
parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino
father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both
by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active participation in the naturalization process.
AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to
retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking
an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation of
Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status
of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section
5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective
public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13
Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the
twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambuntings naturalization
as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for
the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to
return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his
certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him.
Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency
requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated
18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182701

July 23, 2008

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the (1)
Resolution1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying
petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio,
Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition 3 before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the
Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence,
ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at
the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5 He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he
possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.6
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio
Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner
provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have
made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay
Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,8 petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are substantially different from the
present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. 9
Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she
lauuphi1

acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under
Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
1awphi1

More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 10 in 2003.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a
public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek
elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his
oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the
same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a
candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent
complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is
authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign
citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as
proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the
United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines. 11
(Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay
Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.12
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in
the Barangay elections of 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179848

November 27, 2008

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner,

vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division 2 disqualifying him
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. 6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before the COMELEC Provincial Office in
Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
In his Answer9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper10 dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy
operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes
for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution 11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The
COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not

automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did
not consider Valles v. COMELEC12 and Mercado v. Manzano13 applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were
dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC,
thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the
Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. 14
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective
renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his
US citizenship.15 The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners Motion in a Resolution16 dated 28 September 2007 for lack of
merit.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, where he presented for the first time an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All
Foreign Citizenship"17 dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship,
separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of
his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the
presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece of
evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled "Oath of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" on 27 June 2007 after he had already
filed his Certificate of Candidacy.18
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
AS REGARDS THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE
FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.19
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing
therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said
Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must
be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of
my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.20
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other
than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon.
Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the
oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think its very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the
Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will
have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also
to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate
in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek
elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles21 and Mercado,22 wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The
ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed by Republic
Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought under another
law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual citizenship" vis--vis the concept of "dual allegiance." At the
time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly
worded requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature. 23
Lopez v. Commission on Elections24 is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same factual milieu.
In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized
US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This
Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless
disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship," 25 which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007,
even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the
Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat he complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation
of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the
earlier position he took before the COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that
there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body
need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. 26 Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate
parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.27
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. 28 Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit
dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any applicable provisions of these
Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory
character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence
not formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and
controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. 29 Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.30
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document, "Oath of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" executed on 27 June
2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June
2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually refused to

reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that
petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is
lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner
himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in
support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the
outcome of petitioners case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the
client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. 31 The only
exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are
when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule
results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of
the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of
a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to
introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from
properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound
by the acts of their counsel.33
Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his
former counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues
even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same
defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position
taken by his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.
Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have
promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February
2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing
his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not
be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of
evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave
to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any
chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.
Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the hearings,
filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere
technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an
untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their
counsel.36
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements
applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense

with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.37 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of
a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 38 The application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.39
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in
SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180088

January 19, 2009

MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 64 1 and 652 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the Resolution3 dated 31 July 2007 of the First Division of public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and the Resolution4 dated 28 September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-568, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or
cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty
was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani
Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and
Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a
citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28
March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991. In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to
the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty
already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American
citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence,
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and
the cancellation of the latters Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer6 to Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the
USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was
approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured
and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his
address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was
registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons Petition in SPA No.
07-568.
Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007
elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. 7
Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolution 8
dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No.
9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on
October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.]
9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or
non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen. 9
The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year
before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:
Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as
he represented in his certificate of candidacy[.]
As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:
"The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but
rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus

manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, 1427(a) of the
United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization: Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) year
immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately
preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time,
and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed
the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the
application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all period referred to in this subsection has been
and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a greencard, which
entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more
reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General on
October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied and was issued a Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a community tax
certificate from the Municipality of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections on May 14,
2007.10 (Emphasis ours.)
The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.11
Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On 28
September 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution 12 denying Japzons Motion for Reconsideration and
affirming the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, on the basis of the following ratiocination:
We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently spurns the same, is by
clear acts of repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.
xxxx
It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that overturns the prevailing status of a citizen, the presumption
of regularity remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of every individuals constitutionally granted rights and
privileges. This is essential in determining whether one has the right to exercise pre-determined political rights such as
the right to vote or the right to be elected to office and as such rights spring from citizenship.

Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed that every person is a citizen of the country in which he resides;
that citizenship once granted is presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and that the burden rests upon
who alleges a change in citizenship and allegiance to establish the fact.
Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it does not raise any new or novel issues. The arguments
made therein have already been dissected and expounded upon extensively by the first Division of the Commission,
and there appears to be no reason to depart from the wisdom of the earlier resolution. We thus affirm that [Ty] did not
commit any material misrepresentation when he accomplished his Certificate of Candidacy. The only ground for denial
of a Certificate of Candidacy would be when there was material misrepresentation meant to mislead the electorate as
to the qualifications of the candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is not enough reason to deny due course
to the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty.13
Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari,
relying on the following grounds:
A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE
PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE
AND RESIDENCE.14
B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY REFUSED TO CANCEL
[TYS] CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE [JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED
MAYOR OF GEN. MACARTHUR, EASTERN SAMAR.15
Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin. Ty did not establish
his residence in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. The burden falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of choice in General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed to discharge. Ty did not become a resident of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.
Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The one-year residency requirement for those running for public office
cannot be waived or liberally applied in favor of dual citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only
remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only
placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Tys
Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient
evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the
14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the
well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court. Ty disputes Japzons assertion that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions, and avers that the said
Resolutions were based on the evidence presented by the parties and consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified from running in the local elections, Japzon as the second placer in the same
elections cannot take his place.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The OSG
opines that Ty was unable to prove that he intended to remain in the Philippines for good and ultimately make it his new
domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still prays for the dismissal of the instant Petition considering that Japzon, gathering
only the second highest number of votes in the local elections, cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to be disqualified from running for the said
position. And since it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC, the OSG prays from this Court to allow the
COMELEC to file its own Comment on Japzons Petition. The Court, however, no longer acted on this particular prayer
of the COMELEC, and with the submission of the Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the
case for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American
citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA,
in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. 16 At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American
and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and,
resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence
of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act
No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the
law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run
for public office.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the
Constitution and existing laws.
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide, among
other things, for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties
of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
Section 39 of which lays down the following qualifications for local elective officials:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
The challenge against Tys qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said
municipality.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)."18
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, 19 the Court
already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA.
Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the
USA, as his domicile of choice.
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in
the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines?

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,20 the Court provided a summation of the different principles and
concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio
in Papandayan are reproduced below:
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has
complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to
determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this
is a determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to
depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the
Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground
that respondents immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence
in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld
his election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In
sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or
"intent to return," stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a
certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not
constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed
that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained that the
determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his
acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of
votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was
disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered
voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one
year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the
province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte,
from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was
no evidence to show that she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her
husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an
intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term
"residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case,
petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It
was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA Peoples Power Revolution of
1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as
to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for public
office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found that Ty
was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired
expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the
COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due
process, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain. 21
The Court even went further to say that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by
courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings,
should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to
place the COMELECcreated and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The factual finding of the COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court. 22
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their
jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.23
The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc,
respectively, were both supported by substantial evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the
local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing
CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since
his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains
that Tys trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA (from 31
October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this Court,
however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.24 The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local

elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Tys avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC, 25 the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty
that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court
already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.
Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak
or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victors right
to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters.26 To successfully challenge Tys disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate
that Tys ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon
failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180048

June 19, 2009

ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition1 for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15,
2007 Resolution2 of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-211, disqualifying
petitioner Roseller De Guzman from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Also assailed is the October 9, 2007 Resolution 3 of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition 4 for
disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant
and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for
dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003.5 Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise
full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on
grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.
Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying
petitioner, which reads as follows:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: x x x"
Hence, under the provisions of the aforementioned law, respondent has validly reacquired Filipino citizenship. By taking
this Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006 before Mary Jo Bernardo Aragon,
Deputy Consul General at the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California respondent was deemed a dual
citizen, possessing both Filipino and American citizenship.
However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of the aforementioned Act also provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
As can be gleaned from the above cited provision, respondent [herein petitioner] should have renounced his American
citizenship before he can run for any public elective position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken
by respondent was for the purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the same time, mean that
respondent has renounced his American citizenship. Thus, at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was, and still is, a dual citizen, possessing both Philippine and
American citizenship. For this reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run for the abovementioned elective position.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
GRANT the instant petition finding it IMBUED WITH MERIT. Hence, respondent (petitioner herein) Roseller T. De
Guzman is disqualified to run as Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and
Local Elections.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on October 9, 2007 by the COMELEC En Banc for
having been rendered moot in view of private respondents victory.
Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01 rendered a Decision, 7 dated November 26, 2007, declaring
petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. It held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring protestant ROSELLER T. DE GUZMAN, as the winner for the
Vice-Mayoralty position with a plurality of 776 votes over the protestee, ANGELINA D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14,
2007 Local Elections in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. With costs against the protestee.
There being no evidence presented as to the damages by both parties, the same are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in
dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being moot.
Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 9 and Mercado v. Manzano,10 that the filing by a
person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation
of his foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the motion for
reconsideration because at that time, there was a pending election protest which was later decided in his favor.
Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Courts rulings in
Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship; and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen and is
therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position under Section 40 11 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners motion
for reconsideration for being moot; and 2) whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with
R.A. No. 9225.
An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be
without practical use and value.12 In this case, the pendency of petitioners election protest assailing the results of the
election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his disqualification. Stated
otherwise, the issue of petitioners citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant
because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines."13 It bears stressing that the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and
declared him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioners citizenship was clearly
necessary. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners motion for
reconsideration solely on the ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to private respondent.
Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2)
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law
provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.14
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No.
9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the
instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,15 the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
1awphi1

Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,16 the Court ruled that a candidates oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of
a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of
Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained
to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think its very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the
Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will
have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but
also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the
one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than
one citizenship.
In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified
from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-Mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections because of his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship pursuant
to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
SO ORDERED.

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