CrimLawRev Case Digest (Batch 1) PDF

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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Article 3 Felonies
DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178512
November 26, 2014
FACTS:
On December 24, 1997, at about 10PM, Alexander Flojo was fetching water below his rented
house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga Street, Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo de
Guzman, brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista, hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila
about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized by saying, pasensya ka na Mang Alex and told the
latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours.
Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15AM, Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While
pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him
on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his
body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to Mandaluyong
Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance
to Alexander. He stayed in the emergency room for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to
the second floor of the hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was
transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected to further medical
examination.
Alexander sustained two stab wounds. One was on the zygoma, left side which was about 1
cm long. The other wound was on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space
at the proximal clavicular line measuring about 2 cm. It penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung
which needed the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to the victims
attending physician, Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the second wound was fatal and could have caused
Alexanders death without timely medical intervention.
The accused denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25, 1997 at
around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. He accidently
Alexanders back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted and a
fistfight ensued between them. They rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek
causing blood to ooze from the latters face.
The RTC convicted Alfredo de Guzman, Jr. of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day prision correctional
as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day prision mayor as maximum. De Guzman was further
ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35
representing the actual and pecuniary loss suffered by the victim as duly proven.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The contention of
the petitioner that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, according to the CA, was
SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Candelaria. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Dizon. Feliciano.
Hermogenes. Navarez. Ongoco. Sison. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte.
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bereft of merit. The appellate court did not give credence to the appeal that de Guzmans intent to
kill was not established and that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted
in the heat of anger during the fist fight between them and he did not inflict the stab wounds
insisting that another person could have inflicted the same to the victim. Nonetheless, the CA
affirmed the petitoners conviction. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was
likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide (YES)
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the RTC and the CA with modification as to the
penalty imposed upon the petitioner.
The elements of frustrated homicide are:
1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault;
2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and
3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder is present.
In as much as the RTC and CA found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder to be
present, the SC immediately ascertained the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denied that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between
him and Alexander. He claimed that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally
emboldened both of them, but he maintained that he only inflicted minor abrasions and stab
wounds that the victim appeared ho have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious
physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently established. He averred that such intent to kill is the main element
that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide, and that the crime is
homicide only if the intent to kill is completely shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations.
The Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the RTC and the CA that intent to kill
was present. Contrary to the petitioners submission that the wounds sustained by Alexander were
not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The
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petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate,
indeed that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the
other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving that
presence of intent to kill. There is also no doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest being
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will i.e. timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

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RIVERA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166326
January 25, 2006
FACTS:
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder.
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April 1998
after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the
television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a
manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II, Dasmarias,
Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled
invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look
for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two
brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit
Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued
mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: Awatin sila! Awatin sila! Ruben felt dizzy but
managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on
board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr.,
signed a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained wounds. The doctor declared
that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to
seven days.
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house and
banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went out of
the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other. He fell to the
ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled away and
brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but
Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went
home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front
of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged
the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother
Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was.
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A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to
the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos shirt and hair, and, in the process, Rubens
head hit the lamp post.
RTC: Finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.
CA: Affirming, with modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads: MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER.
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. They insist
that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill. Petitioners aver that,
based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound, hence, they
should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent to kill
Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of
attempted homicide. On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove
petitioners intent to kill Ruben:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of attempted murder
HELD:
YES, the accused are guilty of attempted murder.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated
or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People vs. Delim, the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time,
or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with
fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to
hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting
in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

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That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not
have produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted
murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally
liable for attempted murder.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1) the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts;
2) he does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3) the offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
1) that there be external acts;
2) such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting
the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died. We reject
petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission of the
felony.
Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking
with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance to
defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three
siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if
the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel
it or defend himself, there would be treachery. Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim because
of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being
conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.

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VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case led to a very
strong clamor to put an end to hazing. Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation
prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. The
intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority,
fraternity, organization, or association. Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory
implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of
hazing punishable or mala prohibita.
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our
criminal justice system "No act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law." Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called
upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on
the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto
Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They went to the house of Michael
Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites.
The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at
any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they
were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included:
1. Indian Run which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
2. Bicol Express which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against
the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs;
3. Rounds in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries"
(the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
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rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows
on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
4. Auxies Privilege Round in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late
in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however,
he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then
subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to
the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he
was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to
keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans.
The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. One accused had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
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3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation (NO)
2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries (YES)
3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO)
HELD:
1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ
of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be
charged with the same or an identical offense.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in
order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of
law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following:
1) there is a valid complaint or information;
2) it is filed before a competent court;
3) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and
4) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.
A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude
of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State,
following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again
in the hope of securing a greater penalty."
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This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions:
1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;
2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or
3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1)
the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as
well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.
What the Petition really seeks is for the Court to re-examine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries.
The CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for
slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four
accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa." Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment
heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature," it was patently erroneous for the court to limit
the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries
that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the
victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a
person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of
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felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be
held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that
the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical
conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven
to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation
of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to
the rule on double jeopardy, the Court therefore gives due course to the Petition.
3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.
Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in
part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill
Lenny Villa.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263
to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of
homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were
liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino
et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and
the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to
get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven
by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in
order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, the
Court deems it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional
felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.

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INTENTIONAL FELONY AND CONSPIRACY
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil. It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. Criminal liability is thus based on the free
will and moral blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and
with power to choose between two things. The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability
to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and
an illicit act. The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.
The element of intent on which the Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve
with which a person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while
intent concerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action
for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of
dolus malus that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil
intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" is to
be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase
"coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another,
an element present only in intentional felonies.
In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or
criminal design. Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. Verily, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in
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se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack
of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple
negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
THE EXISTENCE OF ANIMUS INTERFICENDI OR INTENT TO KILL NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is
a contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the
animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. The Court shall no longer
disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that
the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers
parking space had been stolen by the victims father. As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death
of Villareals brother. The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that
they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and
so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.
The Court cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon
and Villareal were "baseless" since the statements of the accused were "just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "there is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites." The Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
To the Courts understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that
he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and
role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing.
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Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it
must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points
out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity
with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys
co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true
and that Dizon was just making it up." Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of
Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "The cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed
toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation
rites x x x." The Solicitor General shares the same view.
THE EXISTENCE OF ANIMUS INIURIANDI OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO INJURE NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As
an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate
and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
Thus, the Court has ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony.
Indeed, the threshold question in the present case is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a
felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1)
thereof. In People vs. Regato, the Court ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action,
conduct, and external acts of the accused. What persons do is the best index of their intention. It
was also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body
on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. The
Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement
of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their
first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites. The beatings were predominantly
directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
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In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and
to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals.
When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes
were subjected to another "traditional" ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were
designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates. It was their regular duty to
stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their
blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of
facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the
Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what
to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment
would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused
Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution
witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in
the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he
expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation
without consenting neophytes.
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, the Court is constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not
present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of
inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the
elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all
that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional
"rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations
were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused
fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed
pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on
Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation
of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
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presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same
process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment.
Hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering
has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent
a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is
doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo. For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against
the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or
animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his
death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
THE ACCUSED FRATERNITY MEMBERS GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
HOMICIDE
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is
visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.
In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault,
from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here,
the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
THERE WAS PATENT RECKLESSNESS IN THE HAZING OF LENNY VILLA
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries. The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the
heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.
The collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which
made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations
owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts,
we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI
medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered,
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criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to
the infliction of physical injuries.
The Courts finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing
Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the
crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, the Court is constrained to rule according to
existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa. As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his
death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, the ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of
the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from
slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect
to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

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US vs. AH CHONG
GR. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong and the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, were both employed at
Officers' quarters, No. 27, Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was
had with the other part of the house.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened
by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The room was very dark and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought
that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to
be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back
into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen
knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on
the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's
wounds.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook;
and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his
pillow for his personal protection. The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when
either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day. The defendant was
charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide. At the trial, in the court below, the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate but
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

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ISSUES:
1) Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by reason of a mistake
as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act
2) Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code
HELD:
1) The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
2) The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of Article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined,
in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching
liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
shall appear.
A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
Voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime. Thus, while insisting
that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in
the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in the discussion of
the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the
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acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, the
Court thinks that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that, with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act.
It is sufficient to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the
lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of
the doer is clear and beyond question, the statute will not be so construed; and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil
purpose need not be to break the law, and it suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in
fact forbids." But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the
principles of abstract justice.
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the
mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault
or negligence on his part. "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without
fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances
might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise,
upon which he acted. For instance, if, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them,
and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occasion for the extreme
measures. Whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they
appear to him.
In this case, the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that
in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing
no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The Court ruled for the ACQUITTAL of the defendant.

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LONEY vs. PEOPLE
482 SCRA 195
February 10, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President
and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On March 24, 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108 of Republic Act
No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which
constitute legal excuse or justification.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity
of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand (NO)
HELD:
NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply
means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110). There is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing
of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one

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offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against two
or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the
accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." Here, double
jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. However, for the limited purpose
of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote
with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the
RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential
element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior
permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the
proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for
violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual
pollution, or even if it has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or
further, even if it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or
lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was
no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not
follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an
essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required
under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without
permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide
by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by
special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are
mala in se.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such
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as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes
(such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

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Article 4 Proximate Cause Theory and Impossible Crime Doctrine
GARCIA vs. PEOPLE
597 SCRA 392
August 28, 2009
FACTS:
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information. It was said
that around 11am on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking
spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At
around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine
was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy,
this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said "This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a
hand on him."
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not
far from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off
again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let
him live long."
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the
26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner
blurted out "This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today." Later that afternoon, the
group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they
move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chys
sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming
out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly
punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Why did you box me? Im not doing anything to you." But
petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the
nose while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it,
struck the lower back portion of Chys head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered.
Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen
floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the RTC.
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Case
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy (YES)
HELD:
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the
defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioners appeal with favor.
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando
Foz as the author of the victims injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armandos
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns
responsibility for Chys demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infraction. In
support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio that Chys medical condition could
have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight
physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint
us with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded
it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chys myocardial infraction:
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium caused by a
previous heart attack. Said fibrosis or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle
and thickest layer of the victims heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion from
sudden emotion.
It can be reasonably inferred from that the emotional strain from the beating
aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infraction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision are:
1) the intended act is felonious;
2) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
3) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors
wrongful acts.
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioners liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the
case of United States vs. Brobst that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the
mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed
to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
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In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from
the one he intended. The circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the
death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately
committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with
Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating circumstance
in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have
resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latters heart was in good
condition.

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Case

URBANO vs. IAC
157 SCRA 1
January 7, 1988
FACTS:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went
to his ricefield at Brgy. Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated
portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting
grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked
palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo hacked Javier hitting him on
the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed
ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left
leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and
inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there,
Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together
with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal
Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate.
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October
27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their
amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter.
However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a
very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm
which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. Therefore an information was filed and
charging Filomeno Urbano with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged.
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Case
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded
until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death (YES)
HELD:
We give due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm. That on November 14,
1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death.
Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a
period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did
not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound
which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing
got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is
no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in
his palm. Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound
which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an
accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due
to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed,
and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle
out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
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impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a
disabled hand.
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms
that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends
on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not
20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
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Case
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and
its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses
of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential
Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is acquitted of the crime of homicide.

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PEOPLE vs. VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412
September 7, 2011
FACTS:
Danilo Cruz (CRUZ) and Orlito Villacorta (VILLACORTA) were regular customers at Cristina
Mendeja's (MENDEJA) store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread
at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the
left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in
Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed
to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center on January 23, 2002 and Cruz was treated as an outpatient. Cruz was only brought to the San
Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction
against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death
HELD:
The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection and not the stab wound.
In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for
slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease. In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his
right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

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If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form
of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking
incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court
that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. If Cruz acquired
severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot
sooner than 22 days later. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the
remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of
Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form
part of those constituting the offense of murder.
The Court cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder
because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill.
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as
to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The inference that the intent to kill existed
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder
but physical injuries only.

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Case

PEOPLE vs. NOEL SALES
G.R. No. 177218
October 3, 2011
FACTS:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that
affirmed the Joint Decision of the RTC, in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789,
convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries, respectively.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the
permission of their parents. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to
return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8
oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then
whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.
With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them
with a thick piece of wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant
assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack
in Noemars head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the
left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria
tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant
that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to
bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the
junction and waited for a vehicle hospital to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and
because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,
appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried. His body was never
examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate
occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and
told them not to repeat the misdeed.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on
September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information
that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife
could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 oclock in the evening
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Case

of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index
finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his
sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar
lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in
breathing. The pupils of Noemars eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say
that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain
since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died.
Appellant claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was diagnosed
with having a weak heart. On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain. Thereafter,
appellant surrendered voluntarily.
RTC found appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But
the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal. Appellant admits beating his sons as a disciplinary measure, but denies
battering Noemar to death. He claims that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death and
not the whipping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely erred in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries
HELD:
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on
children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. It is
incumbent upon parents to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing
the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

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From the facts of the case, it is clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest
desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger.
This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only
when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness
that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely
not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar
as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears stressing that a
decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the
guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended
to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code states: Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator.
Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical
injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he
expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Moreover, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case. Parricide is
committed when:
1) a person is killed;
2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element. Maria
testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered
from the hands of his father.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element. Junior testified that
Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the
attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his
injuries immediately after the incident
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit
so Grave a Wrong

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The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the
barangay captain reported the death of Noemar.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were
battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head
and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the
death of the victim.
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he,
together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were
tied to a coconut tree.
Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Primavera. When asked how long does he
think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks. But if applied with
medication, the injuries would heal in a week.

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Case

INTOD vs. CA
G.R. No. 103119
October 21, 1992
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the RTC,
Branch 14, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder
FACTS:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that
he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER
CA: Affirmed in toto
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed is an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangans absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible citing Art. 4(2) of the
RPC which provides:
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

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. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), RPC), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3, RPC). Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that
time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED; REVERSED the ruling of the CA
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime. Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:
1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown
to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is
the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.
*Discussion
There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept
and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made them punishable; whereas, in the United States, their Code of Crimes and Criminal
Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing
the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases
generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. In U.S. vs. Wilson the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
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Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid
criminal liability for an attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible for accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of
an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a
crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only
reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it
only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense,
but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

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JACINTO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009
FACTS:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Petitioner,
Gemma Jacinto, along Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited
in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum
of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
Prosecution's evidence
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for
Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.
The check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory
clerk of Mega Foam.
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for
the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had
been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega
Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding
the
bounced
check.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a
plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advice of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the
matter
to
the
owner
of
Mega
Foam,
Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00. Verification from company records showed
that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she
had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored
check.

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Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check
in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown
woman arrived at his house to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for
the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he
was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know
where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out
an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were
marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to
Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 21, 2007, Ricablanca went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping.
Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out
from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching
the
whole
time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft
against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.
Version of the defense
The
defense,
on
the
other
hand,
denied
having
taken
the
subject
check.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time
before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and
her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea
why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby
Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents
arrested
them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on
June 30, 1997. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the
phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino.
Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she
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did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at
the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to
wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca
gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The RTC finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
Three appealed to the CA, but the latter only modified the ruling of the RTC. CA modified
that the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; the sentence against accused Anita
Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium; and the accused Jacqueline Capitle is
acquitted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft (NO)
HELD:
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both
of the Revised Penal Code:
1) the taking of personal property;
2) said property belonged to another;
3) the taking was done with intent to gain;
4) it was done without the owners consent;
5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things; and
6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused
is
to gain from
the
thing
stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises
on
whether
the
crime
of
qualified
theft
was
actually
produced.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod,
the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
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Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized by Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, because of
the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provision read as
follows:
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed
was
either
inadequate
or
ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the
act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must
be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act
in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The crime of theft is
committed or produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by
one with intent to gain. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner
took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is
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Case

not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal
liability.
Thus, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA was modified. Petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto is found guilty of an impossible crime.

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Case

Article 6 Stages in the Commission of a Felony
PEOPLE vs. LIZADA
G.R. Nos. 143468-71
January 24, 2003
FACTS:
Freddie Lizada was accused of raping his step daughter Analia Orilloso in four instances,
sometime in August 1998, on or about Nov. 5, 1998, on or about Oct. 22, 1998 and on or about
September 15, 1998. As to the crime of rape on November 5, 1998, the facts are:
Accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up,
entered the bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her
panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. There was no introduction of the penis of
accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant.However, accused-appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He
berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep. Accused-appellant
then left the room of the private complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness or
attempted rape
HELD:
The accused is guilty of attempted rape.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1) The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4) The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
1) That there be external acts;
2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried
out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority
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Case

of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of
being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime
itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains,
no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act
should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if
it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one
for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the
intended crime.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished
from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an
attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony
under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense.
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous
desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony. The law does not punish him for his attempt to
commit a felony. It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a
malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him
from the crime committed by him before his desistance.
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant
intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accusedappellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt
acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous
desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing
all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so
only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty
only of attempted rape.

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BALEROS vs. PEOPLE
483 SCRA 10
February 22, 2006
FACTS:
MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou, was a medical student of the UST in
1991. Early morning of December 13, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on
the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with
cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking
him until at last her right hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was
able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako.
Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was
the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at
the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like. He was wearing a t-shirt and shorts.
MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the
window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was
now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window, the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building. MALOU testified that her relation with
CHITO, who was her classmate, was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his
feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" and she rejected him.
According to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the
early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a marking on the front of the Tshirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted letters the word 1946 UST Medicine
and Surgery and black shorts with the brand name Adidas and requested permission to go up to
Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking
permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room. He asked CHITO to produce the
required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused but later,
relented. That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph). Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of
December 12, 1991 by the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up. He was able to fix the
time of CHITOs arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door.
At about 6 to 6:30am of December 13, 1991, Joseph was able to talk to CHITO. He
mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being allowed to get
out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310. CHITO did just that. He
followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to
their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. People
from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning. They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph
to go with them to Camp Crame where the two were questioned.
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The trial court convicted the petitioner of attempted rape. Petitioner went to the CA
which affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of attempted rape (NO)
HELD:
It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in
the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. Petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner
was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her
private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his
victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is
still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very
unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to
make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.
The Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing
whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully
covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou
testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after
petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the
petitioner do not determine attempted rape, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light
coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the
dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against
petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. There is no need to allege
malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists
even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad
enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question is whether the
offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the
person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted
rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
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chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in
question.
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and
egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but
Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and
fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13,
1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruders
apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the
bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief
stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a
white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these
items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the
handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes
first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the chemicalsoaked cloth had been pressed.

49
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PEOPLE vs. LABIAGA
G.R. No. 202867
July 15, 2013
FACTS:
Gregorio stepped outside of his home. Shortly thereafter, Labiaga, who was approximately
five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy, one of his daughters, for help.
When his two daughters rushed to his aid, Labiaga shot Judy in the abdomen. Gregorio and Judy
were rushed to the Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full
recovery after treatment.
Labiaga claimed that he acted in self-defense. According to him, Gregorio, armed with a
shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot Labiaga, but the shotgun jammed. Labiaga
tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed
that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
The RTC found Labiaga guilty of murder and frustrated murder. The CA-Cebu upheld
the conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the conviction of frustrated murder (NO)
HELD:
Labiaga is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano vs. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this
manner:
1) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
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2) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is
some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been
fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was
mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident.
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

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VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007
FACTS:
On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known
"Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was
waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with
more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open
parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of
Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a
receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the
duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional
cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites two decisions
rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Dio and People v. Flores. Both
decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as they modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate
court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only (NO-guilty of consummated
theft)
HELD:
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present." It is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted "when the
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offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance."
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an
important characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for
there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as "a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," and "essential for criminal liability." It
follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens
rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law
that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." The criminal
statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our
legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
its elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden
or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely:
1) that there be taking of personal property;
2) that said property belongs to another;
3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including
animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal
property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage.
As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of
detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed
without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating
benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
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Now, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to

inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition
of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that
theft is already "produced" upon the "taking of personal property of another without the
latters consent."
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated
stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due
to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for
theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the
owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in
Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that "in theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the
same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen
delves into the concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains
such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not
all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our
concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves
ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this
particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of
detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the
parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free
disposition of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been
produced. We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated
theft. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under
the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take
considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be
recognized.

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PEOPLE vs. QUINANOLA
G.R. No. 126148
May 5, 1999
FACTS:
In People vs. Orita, this Court has declared that the crime of frustrated rape is
nonexistent. The pronouncement, notwithstanding, the RTC has convicted accused Agapito
Quianola y Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro, herein appellants, of the crime of frustrated
rape, principally on the strength of People vs. Eriia which this Court, has considered to be a "stray"
decision.
Already in force and effect at the time of the averred commission of the crime are the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, amending the Revised Penal Code.
Version of the prosecution
Catalina Carciller , 15 yrs of age, together with her cousin Rufo Ginto and Richard Diaz, went
to attend a dance at around ten o'clock in the evening of 05 March 1994 in Sitio Bangag Tangil,
Dumanjug, Cebu. About an hour later they left the party and were soon on their way home. The
three unsuspecting youngsters stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil
Elementary School. Accused Agapito Quianola a.k.a. "Petoy" and accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a.
"Botiquil" who were both armed with guns suddenly turned up Quianola beaming his flashlight at
the trio while Escuadro stood by focused his attention on Catalina. Quionala announced that he
and Escuardo were members of New People's Army (NPA). Quionala instructed Escuadro to take
care of the male companions of Catalina while he (Quianola) held the latter at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie
face down on the ground and then urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his
pants, Diaz and Ginto were able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile Quianola with his gun pointed
at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school.
Catalina begged that she be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the path
towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quianola forced Catalina to sit on the
ground. She resisted but Quianola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she would not accede
to what he wanted he would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her
denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro
ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quianola unzipped his pants and laid on top of her while
Escuadro held her legs Quianola "started to pump, to push and pull" even as Catalina still tried
desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on the lips of (her) genitalia." When
Quianola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by placing himself on top of Catalina.
Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her) vulva" while he made a push and
pull movement. Quianola, who stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro and Quianola scampered immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to find her
pair of pants and panty. Catalina was left wearing her T-shirt and brassieres. Upon reaching home,
Catalina hid herself behind the door. Baffled by Catalina's strange behavior, her mother and her
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elder sister took turns interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she was raped but she would not
reveal the names of the persons who had committed the dastardly act because of their threat.
Guillermo Zozobrado reported the incident. Still in a state of shock, Catalina initially kept
mum about it; later, when the police officers returned at daytime, she was able to respond to
questions and to disclose that "Petoy," referring to Agapito Quianola, and "Botiquil," the other
accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons who ravished her. The officers later invited her to the
police station to identify a suspect whom she positively identified to be "Botiquil" or Eduardo
Escuadro.
Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer conducted the physical examination of Catalina it
showed that there was "no evidence of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the Subject.
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was "so small as to
preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without producing
laceration".
Version of the defense
Accused Agapito Quianola, testified that he and his wife, Leticia, proceeded to the house of
his parents in Panla-an, Dumanjug, to attend to the construction of their unfinished house.
Quianola helped Vidal Laojan and Nicasio Arnaiz in cementing the kitchen floor of their house.
The work was finished at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening. After Vidal and Nicasio had gone
home, Quianola went to bed with his wife around midnight until the following morning of 06
March 1994. He denied having been in the company of his coaccused, Escuadro a.k.a. "Botiquil," at
any time during the whole day and night of 05 March 1994. According to him, Guillermo Zozobrado,
Catalina's brother-in-law, concocted the rape charge to get even with him.
Accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. "Botiquil" declared that at about seven o'clock in the
evening of 05 March 1994 he and Pablito Cuizon, Jr., went fishing in Tangil Dumanjug Cebu until
about ten o'clock that evening. After partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m., they had a drinking
spree and went to bed at 12:00 midnight waking up at 6:30 a.m. the following day. He denied
having been in the company of Quianola and insisted that the rape charge had been the result of a
mere mistaken identity.
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of frustrated rape since there
was no "conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party in the (a)
Catalina had admitted that she did not spread her legs and (b) the medico-legal officer's findings
showed she did not sustain any extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an
erect average-size penis would not have completely penetrated it would causing laceration. Due to
the existence of "at least six (6) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating
circumstance," the accused should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated rape
(YES)
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HELD:
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge" unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or
that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ
or, as once so said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable
of consummating the sexual act."
In People vs. Escober, while the evidence may not show full penetration on both occasions of
rape the slightest penetration is enough to consummate the offense in fact there was vulva
penetration in both cases. The fact that the hymen was intact upon examination does not belie
rape for a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape nor does the fact that the victim has
remained a virgin negate the crime. What is fundamental is that the entrance of at least the
introduction, of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved.
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so stands, there is no
such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last
act necessary to produce the crime. We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Thus, the felony is consummated. Necessarily,
rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts
of execution were performed. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner
of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly
conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
The pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriia, it appears that this is a "stray" decision
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in our subsequent decisions.
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing with reclusion perpetua to death an accused who
commits homicide by reason or on the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a clear
conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the
other, the crime. Each of them therefore is responsible not only for the rape committed personally
by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well.

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Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 when rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two persons, the crime is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Even while the information has failed to allege the use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be held accountable under that
provision since the information has likewise averred that the "above-named accused," referring to
the two appellants, have conspiratorially committed the crime.
As regards appellant Quianola, the aggravating circumstance of his being a member of the
Philippine National Police would have exposed him to the penalty of death under the amendatory
provisions of Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this circumstance been properly alleged in
the information. The description by the trial court of appellants as being "powerfully, built, brawny
and mean-looking" as against the "short slender easily cowed" 15-year-old victim would not here
warrant a finding that abuse of superior strength has aggravated the commission of the crime.
Neither may nighttime be considered an aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof
of its having been deliberately sought out by appellants to by appellants to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
The fact that one of the appellants has pretended to be a member of the New People's Army
does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or disguise, in the commission of the
crime. Finally, the Court does not subscribe to the view of the trial court that accused appellants
have employed means which added ignominy to the natural effects of the crime, particularly in
stripping the victim of her denim parts and panties and then sending her home in this humiliating
and distressing condition. There is nothing on record that even remotely suggests that accusedappellants so deliberately sought to leave Catalina with bottoms bare that she might be left alone in
shame with only her T-shirt and brassieres on.

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PEOPLE vs. ORANDE
G.R. Nos. 141724-27
November 12, 2003
FACTS:
The RTC convicted appellant for two counts of simple rape, one count of statutory rape and
one count of frustrated rape. The facts of the case where the appellant was convicted by RTC
for frustrated rape are as follow:
On April, 1994, Jessica and her two siblings together with the accused were in their house,
while their mother, Girlie, was in Navotas buying fish. Jessica was watching TV in a lying position
beside her two sleeping siblings, when the accused held Jessicas right hand and jabbed her palm
with his finger. Then he told her to remove her short pants, panty and T-shirt, after which the
accused removed his pants and with a balisong in his hand, he began kissing the sensitive parts of
her body. Then he placed himself on top of her and tried to have sexual intercourse with her. He
succeeded in nudging her sex organ with the tip of his penis, but was unable to accomplish
penetration, due to the resistance offered by her by struggling and kicking him. Nonetheless, the
accused had orgasm and Jessicas sex organ was smeared with his semen.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there is "frustrated rape"
2) Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted rape or consummated rape
HELD:
1) There is no such crime as frustrated rape.
In People vs. Orita, the Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last
act necessary to produce the crime. We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Thus, the felony is consummated. Necessarily,
rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts
of execution were performed. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner
of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly
conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
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Of course, we are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriia where
we found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration
of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a stray decision
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in our subsequent decisions. Likewise, we are aware of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12,
1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate
paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular
provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriia case, might have prompted the lawmaking body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.
2) Appellant is guilty of consummated rape.
It has been held that, to be convicted of rape, there must be convincing and sufficient proof
that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked
the external surface thereof. Nevertheless, we have also ruled in cases where penetration is not
established that the rape is deemed consummated if the victim felt pain, or the medico-legal
examination finds discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora is already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags are no longer visible.
In the present case, the victim testified that she felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable
indications of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of
(consummated) rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.

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PEOPLE vs. PAREJA
G.R. No. 188979
September 5, 2012
FACTS:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA, the 13-year old sister of the common-law wife of
the accused-appellant, was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her
sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but the
appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants,
and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs. The appellant went on top of AAA, and
held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked the
appellants upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on,
and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant
left the room.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAAs brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her
why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead hurled invectives at
CCC. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD and narrated to her what had happened.
Afterwards, AAA and her two siblings went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong
City Police Station and reported the incident.
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled "filling
materials" at his house on the evening of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room
and slept. On the next day, the appellant, accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to
the municipal hall to ask for financial assistance for his wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon
arrival at the hospital, the doctor told him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the
appellant and his companions went to Pasig City to find blood donors.
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the clothes of his son,
two policemen entered his house and informed him that a complaint for attempted rape had been
filed against him. The police brought him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, forced
him to admit the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a detention cell. The appellant added
that he filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against the police officers who beat
him up.
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, explaining
that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that
a slight penetration took place when the appellants penis touched AAAs vagina as he was trying to
insert it.
In his brief, the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime
of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the
victims vagina.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the touching by the appellants penis of the victims private part amount to
carnal knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape
HELD:
The Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape, but instead he is convicted for attempted
rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of
force, threat or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she is under 12 years of age or is demented. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man
having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. Carnal knowledge of the
victim by the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that it is the central
element in the crime of rape.
In People vs. Campuhan, the Court held that touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the
penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape.
As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia
majora or pudendum of the female organ."
In this case, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did not establish that the appellants
penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. From AAA's testimony, the Court finds it clear
that the appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely touched (i.e., "naidikit"), AAAs private part.
In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting
his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that the appellant
was holding the victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was resisting the appellants attempt
to insert his penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not
improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants
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penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims female organ. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other
evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had been
penetration, however slight, of the victims labias.
In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the
appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In People vs. Publico, it was ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime
committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. In the present case, the appellant commenced the
commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her;
removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and
trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. "In rape cases, the prosecution
bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion." Therefore, the prosecution having failed to
discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape, the Court has held the
appellant guilty for attempted rape.

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CRUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166441
October 8, 2014
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not.
Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on
top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to
penetrate the female's vagina.
FACTS:
On December 20, 1993, Norberto (petitioner) and Belinda (wife) employed AAA and BBB to
help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From
Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney
owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez
(driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, in that evening, they parked in front of Maroon
enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order
that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more
goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep.
Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her.
Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested
of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she'll be
killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf
ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful
desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise,
she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to
wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the
private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally
entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early
morning. Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people
around where they can find the municipal building. An old woman pointed to them the place. In that
evening, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name
of "Sabas" and told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned
to the police station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto's wife, Belinda,
arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home
with them and worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to
Lingayen, Pangasinan. On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their
respective sworn statements against Norberto.

64
Case

The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. In a bid to exculpate himself,
accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. On the date of the alleged
incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the"simbang gabi". Considering
the location of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do
the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the
policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants
filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape
despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not
testify. The CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted
rape, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged due to the insufficiency of the
evidence.
The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the
effect that the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching her
private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw
the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that such
lascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court correctly ruled in convicting the accused notwithstanding the
failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
The appeal is partly meritorious. (Convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness only, instead of
Rape)
Attempt under the RPC
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
In People v. Lamahang, the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M. Recto,
eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute an attempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes
is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
65
Case

directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a
juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code, xxxx But it is not sufficient, for
the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into
a concrete offense, x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage
is wanting, the nature of the action intended (action fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution
(action medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature,
by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show
without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts
susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit,
and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot
furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation
existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said
facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained
from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of
injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the
perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the
legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must
commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the
acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they
would be meaningless."
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we
have to determine the law on rape, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of.
Rape
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal
knowledge is defined simply as "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the
rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touches the external genitalia of the female.
It is noteworthy that in People vs. Orita, the Court clarified that the ruling in People vs.
Eriia whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party,was a stray decision for not
having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore,
66
Case

rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a
frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that:
1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony; and
2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.
Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his
victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished,
leaving nothing more to be done by him.
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of
the overt acts for purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People vs. Lizada:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority
of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has
never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed,
and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt
act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended
crime.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of
the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the
accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the
sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape.
He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the
intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
67
Case

towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of
double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People vs. Lamahang, supra, such that it was
not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular
injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and
to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ
deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted
rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly
connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no
connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts
would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could
include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the
other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening
to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule,
preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained
equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with
certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness? Yes.
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female
is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.
Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of
the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the
female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely:
1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of
either sex; and
2) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either
a. by using force or intimidation; or
b. when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or
c. when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form
of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
The information charged that the petitioner "removed her panty and underwear and laid on
top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her
vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing
68
Case

his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any
inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his
own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. The accused
was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not
apparent from the act described," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not
inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to
him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."

69

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