Gayon vs.

Gayon
Posted on October 10, 2011
GR No. L-28394, November 26, 1970
FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro
Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially
that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed
copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex A whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the
sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein
described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan,
municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five
(5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre
Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor;
that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had,
by virtue of a deed of sale copy of which was attached
to the complaint, as Annex B dated March 21, 1961,
sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for
the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961,
introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he
had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up
to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil
Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the
title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale,
and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in
plaintiffs favor for the consolidation of ownership in and
to the aforementioned property. In her answer to the
complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband,
Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the
institution of this case; that Annex A to the complaint is
fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her
signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased
husband had ever executed any document of whatever
nature in plaintiffs favor; that the complaint is
malicious and had embarrassed her and her children;
that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to employ the
services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred
expenses of at least P200.00; and that being a brother
of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff did not exert
efforts for the amicable settlement of the case before
filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same
be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
damages.
ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon
that an earnest effort toward a compromise before the
filing of the suit is tenable.
HELD:
As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, as an
alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil
Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the
impediment arising from this provision applies to suits
filed or maintained between members of the same
family. This phrase, members of the same family,
should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of
the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her
children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained
in said Art. 217 which should be construed strictly, it
being an exception to the general rule and Silvestre
Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case
at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
purview of Art. 222, and plaintiffs failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
same.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set
aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the
inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre
Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence
of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings,
not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
O Laco vs Co Cho Chit
Breach of Trust; Half-Sisters; Resulting and Constructive
Trusts.
Facts: Emila is the half sister of O Lay Kia who is, as is
her husband Co Cho Chit, a Chinese national and cannot
own property in the Philippines. O lay kia bought a piece
of land and had it named under her sister, Emilia. Emilia
on the other hand sold the property to the Church
without the knowledge of her sister. When O Lay Kia
found out, they immediately filed a case for breach of
contract.
Issue: WoN there was a trust relationship between the
sisters.
Held: Yes. trust relations between parties may either
be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an
intention to create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being express,
are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are super induced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of
equity,independently of the particular intention of the
parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or
constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation
of law.Resulting trusts are based on the equitable
doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are
presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of
the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one
person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is
obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of
another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are
created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy
the demands of justice

and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to

intention against one who, by fraud,duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
hold.In this case, the court cited five instances that
prove a trust relationship. First, spsO Lay Kia were in
possession of all the pertinent documents of the sale
from the beginning until the end of the transaction.
Second, there is a previous case of similar facts involving
O lay kia and her brother on a different parcel of land
decide din her favor. Third, the circumstances leading to
Emilia acquiring a title to the land was dubius. Fourth,
until the sale to the church, Emilia actually recognized
the trust(by promising to take care of the transfer to the
actual owners as soon as she isable.)
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites
concur: (a)the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui
trust ; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the
cestui qui trust ; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear
and convincing.And finally, fifth, Emilia actually had no
source of income to show how it was possible for her to
purchase the land.

Mondequillo vs Breva
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located
at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988,
registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel
of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,
Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters
name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner
alleging that the residential land is where the family
home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this
case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the
judgment sought to be enforced against the family home
is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the
agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority. The residential house in the present case
became a family home by operation of law under Article
153.

Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a

family home.

FACTS:

HELD:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on

March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in
Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the subcontract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioners corporation and private respondent
herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for
the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional
remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a
parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists
that the attached property is a family home having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is
therefore exempt from attachment.

The petitioners contention that it should be considered

a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It
does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from the execution for
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of
the Code. The said article simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the FC. The debt and liability which
was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the
effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under
the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted

from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the
Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner
incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Code and his property is therefore not exempt form
attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that

the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the
petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C.
GOMEZ-SALCEDO vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE
BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INESG.R. No.
132537 October 14, 2005
Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of
Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C.
Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to
Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro

demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice

lands while under the management of Marietta and for
the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property. Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta
and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of the TCT
and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of
execution was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land
in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold
at a public auction wherein Josephine was the highest
bidder.
Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with their children,
filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and
lot sold during the public auction is their family
residence and is thus exempt from execution under
Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that
the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and
Marietta as their family home from the time they
occupied it in 1972
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of
the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among
other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and
Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed
constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her
debts.Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed
constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint
against Marietta was instituted in1986 to for acts
committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose
years before the levied property was constituted as the
family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta
falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of
the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
HUSBAND, CILIA T.MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ABDON GILIGG.R. No. 108532 March 9,
1999Facts:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for
recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two
(2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the
judgment amount of aboutP5,000.00: one was a parcel
of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol,
Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares,
and the other was the family home also located at
Igpit,Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were
sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the
private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently,
after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed
of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968,
definitely selling, transferring,and conveying said
properties to the private respondent. To forestall such
conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5,
1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the
deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their
complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children
and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died

on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984,

respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject
property covered by OCTNo. P-12820 and Free Patent No.
548906. Considering that said property has been
acquired through free patent, such property is therefore
inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the
payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in
continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land
and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in
favor of the private respondent over the subject property
including their family home that was extra judicially
constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the
alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent
was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No.
851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over
the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from
execution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the applicable law,
therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where
registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from
execution, forced sale or attachment. The trial court
found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the
house in question,erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on
January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo
Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that
time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was
not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their
father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of
Article 243 (2)

GR No. 170829
PATRICIO VS. DARIO
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two
children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his
estate. One of the properties he left was the family
home. A new title for the said property was thereafter
issued under the name of the wife and the two children
as co-owners. After some time, the wife and one of the
sons expressed their desire to partition the family home
and terminate the co-ownership. The other son opposed
the partition on the ground that the family home should
remain despite the death of one or both the spouses as
long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the
grandchild of the decedent.
ISSUE:

Whether the partition of the family home is proper where

one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition
on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the
said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live
in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family
home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.
The term 'descendants' contemplates all descendants of
the person or persons who constituted the family home
without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include
the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus,
private respondent's minor son, who is also the
grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be
actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and
grandson of the decedent has been living in the family
home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of
the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability
for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially
his father, herein private respondent who is the head of
his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is
the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Article 155
Family Home
SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs COURT OF
APPEALSG.R. No. 164740July 31, 2006FIRST DIVISION
Facts:
This case has its genesis from a loan transaction
entered into by private respondent Dr. Victoria T. OngOh
and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former
granted a P1,000,000.00 loan to the latter. As a security
for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a
check for the same amount dated 10February 1993 and
promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over
her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT51142. The execution of the deed of real estate
mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to
private respondent. Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said
house and lot to petitioners for P2,500,000.00.
Petitioners paid LedesmaP1,000,000.00 as down
payment, with the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00

to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000.002

starting 15 March1993. In keeping with the foregoing
agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an
additional loan of P450,000.00. When private respondent
presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account was already
closed. Subsequently, when private respondent
presented for payment the check issued by petitioners,
the said check was likewise dishonored because there
was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the
checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the
P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent
came away empty-handed as she did not receive
payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to
Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners.
As a result, private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum
of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust
before the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-93-16003.On 3 April 2000, private
respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the trial
court, the latter granted the same in an Order dated 14
April 2000.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that
their property is exempt from execution.
Held:
The trial court criticized petitioner's claim that the
subject property was their family home. The courtopined
that the claim was never substantiated by petitioners
aside from the fact that they asserted thisdefense only
after two years since the auction sale has transpired. It
added that if not for the privaterespondent's Ex-parte
Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of
Real Property of Sps.Eduardo and Elsa Versola filed on 5
August 2002, petitioners would not have raised the issue
of familyhome before the said court.Article 153 of the
Family Code provides:The family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot fromthe time it is
occupied as the family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as itsbeneficiaries resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution,forced sale or attachment except
as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.Petition DENIED. Judgment of the Court of
Appeals, for lack of merit, AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.