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Arguments Advanced
1) Whether the death sentence as sought by the government of Erehwon is an
appropriate Punishment for the offence of Sedition as made by the facts of the
present case?
It is humbly submitted that the present set of facts do not make a case for the capital Punishment.
The reasons as to why the penalty of death does not make an appropriate stand for the present set
of facts is envisaged in the further flow of arguments.
Following the common law; following crimes and the offences are penalized by death in India
are listed out below, extensively.
The crimes Punishable by the nature of death penalty are:
A) Crimes Punishable by Death

Aggravated Murder :
In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and Mithu v. State of Punjab 1 , Supreme Court of India has
held that the death penalty was constitutional only when applied as an exceptional penalty inthe
rarest of the rare cases.2

Other Offenses Resulting in Death.

It includes if any member of a group commits murder in the course of committing an armed
robbery, Kidnapping for ransom in which the victim is killed, Being a member of an association
or promoting an association while committing any act using unlicensed firearms or explosives
that results in death, Engaging in organized crime, if it results in death; Committing, or assisting
another person in committing sati the burning or burying alive of widows or women. Under the

1 PRS India, The Arms ActMandatory Death Penalty Declared Unconstitutional,

http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/?s=arms+amendment+bill, Feb. 8, 2012. State Of Punjab vs Dalbir
Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2006, Supreme Court of India,
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/166513655/, Feb. 1, 2012.
2 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) SCR 145(a), Supreme Court of India, 1980.

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Prevention of Atrocities Act, bearing false witness in a capital case against a member of a
scheduled caste or tribe, resulting in that person's conviction and execution.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Resulting in Death. 3

Rape Not Resulting in Death
Under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, a person who in the course of a sexual assault
inflicts injury that causes the victim to die or to be left in a persistent vegetative state is
punishable by death. Repeat offenders of gang rape are also punishable by death. 4

Terrorism-Related Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

Using any special category explosive to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause
serious damage to property is punishable by the death penalty. 5

Kidnapping Not Resulting in Death.

Drug Trafficking Not Resulting in Death.
Espionage.
Military Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

Other Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

- Being a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit a capital offence is punishable by death.6
- Attempts to murder by those sentenced to life imprisonment are punishable by death if the
attempt results in harm to the victim.7
3 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of India, part II, art. 3(2)(i), Act no. 28 of 1987,
1987, amended by Act 43 of 1993. Prevention of Terrorism Act of India, ch. II, art.3(2)(a), Act no. 15 of
2002, 2002.
4 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, sec. 9, Act no. 13 of 2013, 2013.
5 Explosive Substances (Amendment) Act 2001, sec. 3 (b), Act no. 54 of 2001, 2001.
6 Indian Penal Code, ch. V, art. 120B, Act no. 45 of 1860, Oct. 6, 1860.
7 Indian Penal Code, ch. XVI, art. 307, Act no. 45 of 1860, Oct. 6, 1860.

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- Calumniation: Providing false evidence with intent or knowledge of the likelihood that another
individual, or a member of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, would be convicted of a capital offense
due to such evidence8 carries the death penalty if it results in the conviction and execution of an
innocent person. 9

B) Is Death Penalty mandatory?

No. In Mithu v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court ruled that the mandatory death penalty is
unconstitutional.10 A line of cases since the 1980 case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 11 in
which the Court held that the death penalty should only be applied for the most heinous offenses
(the rarest of the rare), illustrate that application of the death penalty is, while not always
predictable, still highly restricted.12 So the Supreme Court has not expressly struck down the
penalty as unconstitutional,

When can death sentence be inflicted?

After 1973, death sentence is the exception while life imprisonment is the rule. Therefore, by
virtue of section 354(3) under CrPC. it can be said that death sentence be inflicted in special
cases only. The apex court modified this terminology in Bachan Singh's13 Case and observed-

8 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, ch. II, art. 2 (1), no. 33 of 1989,
1989.
9 Indian Penal Code, ch. XI, art. 194, Act no. 45 of 1860, Oct. 6, 1860.
10 Mithu v. State of Punjab, 1983 SCR(2) 690 at 703-704, 713-714, Supreme Court of India, 1983.
11 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) SCR 145(a) para. 224, Supreme Court of India, 1980.
12Amnesty Intl., The Death Penalty in India: A lethal lottery: A study of Supreme Court judgments in death penalty
cases 1950-2006 (Summary Report), p. 72-90, ASA 20/006/2008, May 2, 2008.

13 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) SCR 145(a) para. 224, Supreme Court of India, 1980.

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A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life
through law's instrumentality. That ought to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the
alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed...
To decide whether a case falls under the category of rarest of rare case or not was completely left
upon the court's discretion.. One of the very important principles laid down is regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It has been the view of the court that while deciding
the question of sentence, a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in that
particular case has to be drawn. Full weight age should be given to the mitigating circumstances
and even after that if the court feels that justice will not be done if any punishment less than the
death sentence is awarded, then and then only death sentence should be imposed.14
In Machhi singh vs. State of Punjab15 the court laid down:In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the following questions may be asked and answered:
(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for
life inadequate and calls for a death sentence?
(b). Are there circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose death
sentence even after according maximum weight age to the mitigating circumstances which speak
in favor of the offenders?"
The principles laid down by the apex court were reiterated in its latest judgment in Sushil Murmu
vs. State of Jharkhand16:"In rarest of rare cases, when the collective conscience of the community is so shocked that it
will expect the holders of the judicial power center to inflict death penalty irrespective of their
personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty, death sentence
can be awarded."
14 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/deat.htm ; last visited on 02- August- 2016
15 1980) 2 SCC 684
16In the Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appeal No. 947 of 2003

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If upon taking an overall view of all the circumstances and taking in to account the answers to
the question posed by way of the test of rarest of rare cases, the circumstances of the case are
such that death penalty is warranted, the court would proceed to do so.17
C) Judicial discretion:For all the offences, in which death sentence is the punishment, it may be noted that it is not the
only punishment, it is the extreme penalty. Thus, these sections, by virtue of their very wordings
itself, provide for a discretion which is to be vested in the courts to decide the quantum of
punishment. So the ultimate judicial discretion to decide whether death sentence is to be imposed
or not, have been vested in courts right from the inception of Penal Code in 1860.
However the manner of exercising this discretion has undergone various changes with the
changing time and evolution of new principles. There is also a debate going on, about the extent
of this judicial discretion.
In Jagmohan's18 Case the SC held:The structure of our criminal law which is principally contained in the IPC and the Cr.PC.
undertakes the policy that when the legislatures have defined an offence with clarity and
prescribed the maximum punishment, therefore a wide discretion in the matter of fixing the
degree of punishment should be allowed to judges."
Thus the SC was in favor of wide discretion to be given to judges for deciding the degree of
punishment. However, this vide direction was restricted by section 354(3) of Cr.P.C. 1973 which
laid down the law that for death sentence special reasons are to be recorded , meaning thereby ,
that death sentence is to be imposed in special cases only.
In a case the court observed:-

17 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/deat.htm ; last visited on 02- August- 2016

18 1973 AIR 947

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The discretion to impose the sentence of death or life imprisonment is not so vide after all
section 354 (3) has narrowed the discretion. Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only
be imposed for special reasons Judges are left with the task of discovering ' Special reasons'.19
The courts themselves were concerned for the way in which this discretion was being used. The
court expressing its concern in Dalbir Singh V/s State of Punjab20 said:Notwithstanding the catalogue of grounds warranting death sentence as an exceptional measure,
'life' being the rule, the judicial decisions have been differing (and dithering) at various levels
with the result the need for a through re-examination has been forced on courts by counsel on
both sides".
Though this problem was solved by the apex court itself to a very large extent by discussing
various issues at length and laying down few very-very important guidelines.
J.Sarkaria viewed in Bachan Singh's case:"It is imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines
indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane
concern, directed along with high road of legislative policy outlined in Sec. 354(3)....."21
It is submitted that Ms. Bennet organized a public rally on 01 June, 2015. The rally did not
involve any crime of murder or any aforementioned crime as to be appropriate for the application
of the capital Punishment. It is submitted that the basic nature to establish the punishment of
death penalty has to pass from the principle rule laid down.

19 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/deat.htm ; last visited on 02- August- 2016

20 1962 AIR 1106
21 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) SCR 145(a) para. 224, Supreme Court of India, 1980.

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2. Without Prejudice to the above, whether the offences under Section 421-A/351A/210-B of the Penal Code of Camelot have been made out against Ms. Elizabeth
Bennet in the instant case?
It is humbly submitted that the offences under Section 421-A/351-A/210-B of the Penal Code of
Camelot cannot be made out against Ms. Elizabeth Bennet in the instant case as the explained in
the Following Arguments.
A) The Case falls from Procedural Defect
It is humbly submitted that the present matter is constructed on procedural defect. It is humbly
submitted that the section 196 states the provision regarding the prosecution of Public Servant. It
is submitted that the section 196 of the Camelot criminal procedure code provides that the
sanction from the appropriate authority may it be state or central government (as the case may
be) must be taken prior to the prosecution of the accused. It is submitted that two procedural
defects can be found out here:
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1) An MP is an Public Servant under the Union Government thus the sanction of

prosecution a public servant must be in accordance to the section 196 (1) (a). In the
present matter the sanction to prosecute is given wrongly under section 196 (1) (a). The
same defect can be inferred from the statement of Mr. Puddy Jedi, at 2 nd paragraph on the
page 5 of the fact sheet, respectively.
The object of this provision is to prevent unauthorized persons from intruding the matters of a
State by instituting State prosecutions, and to secure that such prosecution shall only be instituted
under the authority of the Government.22

Section 196 0f Camelot Cr.P.C

Section 196 of the Code does not control the powers of a Magistrate under the Code, but only
prevents a Court from taking cognizance of certain offences without there being a complaint
made by the Government. If sanction is not obtained, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a
private complaint. Sanction to prosecute under Section 196 of the Code is a condition precedent
for taking cognizance of any such offence. 23
Also, in latest case of Kerala the court noted that 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
(CrPC) mandates that the government must expressly authorize any complaint filed for an
offence against the State (under Part VI of the IPC) before the Court can take cognizance of such

22 http://www.shareyouressays.com/119526/prosecution-for-offences-against-the-state-section-196-of-crpc; last
visited in 26 July, 2016.

23 http://www.shareyouressays.com/119526/prosecution-for-offences-against-the-state-section-196-of-crpc; last
visited in 28 July, 2016

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an offence. It thus held that the impugned act did not constitute the act of sedition and quashed
the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.24
In Matajog Dube25, the court stated that about reasonable connection between the act and the
discharge of official duty, and that the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused
could lay a reasonable claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. The act
of public speech and rally was intertwined with the Duty of an MP. It is the official duty on
which the alleged offence of Sedition was imposed. Thus the sanction under Section 197(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecution of the accused was necessary.26

Thus it is submitted that the accused Ms. Ellizabeth Bennet has been awarded the wrongful death
penalty for the case which even did not pass with lawful procedure. It is further submitted that
Ms. Bennet had been mentally tortured, tremendously, in the instant and thus it is humbly
requested before this Honble Bench to acquit the Ms. Bennet in the present matter and to
dismiss the case which prima facie lacks the fulfillment of the basic procedures.

B) Offence under Section 421-A Sedition

Genesis of the Sedition law

The law relating to the offence of sedition was first introduced in colonial India through Clause
113 of the Draft Indian Penal Code (Draft Penal Code), proposed by Thomas Babington
Macaulay in 183727. However, given its utility; it was seen as a convenient tool in the hands of
the rulers. Thus, when a penal code was being drafted for colonial India, where the rulers had the
24 P.J. Manuel v. State of Kerala, ILR (2013) 1 Ker 793.
25 Matajog Dube v. H.C. Bahri AIR 1956 SC 44
26 See Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor 1939 FCR 159 (AIR 1939 FC 43)
27 Arvind Ganachari, Evolution of the Law of Sedition in the Context of the Indian Freedom Struggle in
Nationalism And Social Reform In A Colonial Situation 54 (2005).

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task of suppressing opposition, it was only obvious that seditious libel would be imported into
the territory of India. Since it came into operation in 1870, the law of sedition has continued to
be used to stifle voices of protest, dissent or criticism of the government. While the indeterminate
invoking of the provision has put it in the media spotlight, there has been very little academic
discussion with respect to the nature of the law and its possible repeal. Leaving such a
determination to legislative or executive feat only enables a repressive government to undermine
the free speech guarantee.28

Development of Sedition law Post-Independence & Its Constitutionality

In Tara Singh29, the East Punjab High Court relied on the principle that a restriction on a
fundamental right shall fail in toto if the language restricting such a right is wide enough to
cover instances falling both within and outside the limits of constitutionally permissible
legislative action affecting such a right.30 It is almost an accident that Section 124A survived after
Indias Constitution came into force in 1950. The provision must have died a natural death in
view of Article 13 of the Constitution, which states that all laws in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of Part III, dealing with Fundamental Rights, shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void. Those who defend Section124A today must learn from history.

Parliament is unlikely to repeal the provision, for those in power often have needed it and even
benefited from it. An introspective gesture from the apex court alone seems to be the way ahead
for those who believe in the cause of liberty of thought and imagination. It is high time Section
124A was held void, for it is legally unnecessary, constitutionally invalid and democratically
untenable.

28 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech 170 (2006).

29 Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441
30 Id.

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Need to Paralyze Section 124-A

In Ram Nandan vs state of UP31, the Allahabad High Court held the provision unconstitutional on
the grounds of its contrariness to Article 19(2). The court relied upon the decision of Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras; court took into account the interpretation of the word public order
made by the learned bench in the aforesaid case. The court looks into the history of the law, and
its draconian use. They felt that in a free and civilised society, there is no place for such laws.
Relying upon Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. Superintendent Central Prison, Fategarh and held that
right grated under article 19(1) is absolute in nature.
It is true that in a democratic environment we dont need laws like sedition. Sedition is laws
which suppress freedom of speech and expression, and it is the shield for those who are dreaded
by the power of free speech. The democratic society is been found the founding stone of
freedom. Freedom of speech is the essence of it. Hence there is no area of doubt left for the
execution of the law. Despite of the philosophy involved in the interpretation of the law, Supreme
Court overruled the judgement of Ram Nandan in Kedar Nath.32
The country had to pay a heavy price in terms of liberty for retaining Section 124A in the IPC.
The inhospitable history of the provision shows that it was used to stifle democratic dissent. If
Section 124A punishes only the pernicious activities against the state, it is no longer necessary in
the IPC. There are other provisions in the IPC that take care of such offences more effectively. In
Kedar Nath, the Supreme Court has not examined the sufficiency of other provisions even after
noting the inherent dangers of the sedition part.

Sections 121, 12lA and 122 deal with the offence of waging war against Government of India
or in any way facilitating such a war. Going by judicial interpretation, the word war has a wide
and varied meaning. Section 121 says that insurrection against the government is punishable with
31 AIR 1959 All 101
32http://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/law/the-pre-text-of-origin-law-constitutional-administrativeessay.php; last visited on 26 July. 2016.

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death or life imprisonment. Section 126 makes depredation on territories of power at peace with
the Government of India a punishable offence. Chapter VII of the IPC, by way of Sections 131
to 140, deals with offences relating to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Public mischief
and waging war against the State are sufficiently provided for in the penal code.
More importantly, any violence or call for overturning the law and order situation or to disrupt
public tranquility is otherwise punishable under the provisions of the Code, outside the scope of
Section 124A. Thus, the law and order requirement of Section 124A is met by other parts of the
IPC, which is its very basic object. As such, the retention of Section 124A is rendered
unnecessary by the Code itself. Since it is capable of being put to unconstitutional use (not
misuse) as noted by the apex court, its retention defies constitutional logic and empirical
thinking. The lack of a comprehensive analysis of the provisions in the IPC has rendered the
Kedar Nath ratio dangerously incomplete.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

India is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This international
treaty provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. Again, this right is
not absolute, and may be restricted. International law sets out three requirements that need to be
met for restrictions to be permissible:
(a) They must be provided for by law;
(b) They must be necessary;
(c) They must protect respect of the rights or reputations of others, be it for the protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. In the aforementioned second
scenario, the crime of sedition is too vaguely defined to be comprehensible to ordinary people.

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Clarity of Section 124A, therefore, is of particular importance, given the potential penalty of life
imprisonment. In instances where the conduct falls short of actually causing violence or public
disorder, sedition falls short of the international standard of legality.33
Trapping the Innocent
In Kedar Nath identifies two possible interpretations of Section 124A, thereby indicating that the
provision is vague. Vagueness of a penal statute (as distinct from its potential for misuse) is not
sufficient enough to invalidate the provision. The Supreme Court recently accepted this principle
in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India 34, while dealing with the validity of Section 66A of the
Information Technology Act, which the court struck down.
The open-ended and vague terminology in the penal provisions could be even deceptive, for
it might trap the innocent. As held in United States vs. Reese 35, the Constitution does not
permit a legislature to set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the
court to step in and say who could rightfully be detained and who should be set at liberty.
The court in Shreya Singhal also refers to Grayned vs Rocliford 36 to say that vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. It noted the warning by Justice Brandeis that
public discussion is a political duty. Vagueness in itself is a ground to invalidate a statute.
The Court in Kedar Naths case stated that the section related to sedition was a reasonable
restriction both on grounds of public order and security of the state. Further, the addition of
the phrase in the interest of public order in Article 19(2) through the first constitutional
amendment with retrospective application was seen as an attempt to validate the interpretation

33 http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main49.asp?filename=Op300411Not21st.asp
34 (2015) [5 SCC 1]
35 [92 U.S. 214J
36 [408 U.S. 104 (1972)J

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given by Fazl Ali, J. in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi 37 (Brij Bhushan) whereby public order
was allied to security of the state.38
The insertion of the words in the interest of before public order in Article 19(2) was seen as
providing wide amplitude of powers to the State for the curtailment of free speech.39
The fundamental error in KedarNath, however, seems to be that it followed the minority view of
Fazal Ali (J) in Brij Bhushan (1950), which attributed a strange reasoning for not incorporating
sedition as an exception to freedom of speech, as part of Article 19(2). Fazal Ali (J) said:
The framers of the Constitution must have therefore found themselves face to face with the
dilemma as to whether the word sedition should be used in Article 19(2) and if it was to be
used, in what sense it was to be used. On the one hand, they must have had before their mind the
very widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that sedition was essentially an
offence against public tranquility and was connected in some way or other with public disorder;
and on the other hand there was the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee that sedition as
defined in the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any intention or tendency to incite
disorder.
Offence under Section 220-B Criminal Conspiracy

it is humbly submitted that Dr. Shri Hari Singh Gour in his well known 'Commentary On Penal
Law Of India'40, summed up the legal position in the following words:
"In order to constitute a single general conspiracy there must be a common design. Each
conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common
37 Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 : (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1525
38 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, 29.
39 V.N. Shukla, Constitution Of India 135 (M.P. Singh, 2008).
40 Vol.2, 11th edn., p.1138

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purpose. Each one is aware that he has a part to play in a general conspiracy though he may not
know all its secrets or the means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. The evil
scheme may be promoted by a few, some may drop out and some may join at a later stage, but
the conspiracy continues until it is broken up. The conspiracy may develop in successive stages.
There may be general plan to accomplish the common design by such means as may from time
to time be found expedient."

It is humbly submitted that all the statements in the rally were spoken by Ms. Bennet alone. It
was she who delivered the speech (as the matter of Right under Article 19 (1)) in the Public
Rally. It is Humbly Submitted that the present case does not have any agreement, implied or
express, to fulfill an illegal objective or an legal objective in an illegal manner and thus as per the
aforementioned authorities it is requested to discharge Ms. Bennett from the charge of the
alleged criminal conspiracy booked under section 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code.

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