1st of 4th Batch

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE
PHIL,defendants-appellees.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint.

FACTS:

Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation
or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of theportion of her lot which had been appropriated by
the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his
9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a q u o acomplaint ,against
the Republic of the Philippines
and Nicolas
Cuenca
(Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot. The
defendants denied the plaintiffs allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the
claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the
recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for
moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its
consent to be sued; and( 4 ) t h a t i n a s m u c h a s i t w a s t h e p r o v i n c e o f C e b u t h a t
a p p r o p r i a t e d a n d u s e d t h e a r e a i n v o l v e d i n t h e construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff
had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding
that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership
of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither
original
nor
appellate
jurisdiction
to
hear
and
decide
plaintiff's
claim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government;
a n d t h a t i t h a d l o n g prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government
had not given its consent tobe sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE : W/N the appellant may properly sue the government
RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of
her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question
at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As
regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price
of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In
addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be
fixed by the trial court after hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including
attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE
PHIL,defendants-appellees.

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a lot which,

without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by
the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against
Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for
compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by
prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

2nd of 4th Batch

Merittvs Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

Facts:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, collided with an
ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without
having sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had
undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The inquiry at
once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting there
from even if the collision was due to the negligence committed by an agent or
employee of the government which is the chauffeur.

Issue:
Whether or not the Government may be held in this case.

Held:
No. That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based
on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in
sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the
second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ.,146.) It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the
Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that
the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

3rd of 4th Batch

Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping
Waiver of sovereign immunity
FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
G.R. No. L-6060
September 30, 1954

Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. To secure the payment of the balance of the
purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said
vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said
vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in
its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission.
Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question
but the latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his
complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances,
and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ
of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason
that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to
the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an
action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of
the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the
chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issues:Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.
Discussions:When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of
the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so,
it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff
to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the state.

5th of 4th Batch

United States of America vs. Ruiz
136 SCRA 487

Facts:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US
from the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to
another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him
against the US.

Issue:
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and
private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now
extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its
sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes

6th of 4th Batch

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by
Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his
bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club
manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An
information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a
result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages
against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military
officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up,
handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that
respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
ISSUE:Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles
are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed
to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from
suit with its implied consent.

7th of 4th Batch

Santiago vs Republic
87 SCRA 294 Political Law Constitutional Law Immunity of the State from Suit; When is it Deemed Waived

FACTS:
In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to
the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau
should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished
by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said
lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This
prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of
donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.

HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied
by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a
beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau
of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such,
therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard.
Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to
equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

8th of 4th Batch

Republic vs. Villasor
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the
Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
respondents.
Facts:

The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd,
Gavino Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final
and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.

Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution

was issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.

The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and
allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations
of AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and
void.

Issue:

Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is

valid.

Held:

No

Ratio:


What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.

9th of 4th Batch

PHIL. NATIONAL BANK vs. JAVIER PABALAN
G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978

Issue;
The petitioner is requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon
Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration.

Facts;
Philippine National Bank invoked the doctrine of non-suability in behalf of PVTA. It is to be
admitted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental
doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued
without its consent." In addition, the amount held by said bank is subject to garnishment.

Held;
The certiorari was dismissed without cost by the Supreme Court saying that the funds held by
PNB is subject for garnishment, thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately. The nonsuability clause raised by PVTA being a government owned corporation was also denied citing
previous decisions held by the Supreme Court specifically citing that of Manila Hotel Employees
Association vs Manila Hotel Company and to quote 'it is well-settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any
other corporation.'

PNB v. Pabalan
GR No. L-33112; June 15, 1978

FACTS:
Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).
Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment
of the funds of PVTA. The full amount mentioned in such writ is P12, 724.66. Philippine National
Bank allege that such funds are public in character, thus, the doctrine of non-suability of a state
is applicable.

ISSUE:Is the respondent exempt from garnishment by virtue of the doctrine of non-suability of
a state?

HELD:It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. Petitioner
cannot set bar to the garnishment for funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued,
as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.

10th of 4th Batch

Merrit vs Government of the Phil. Islands
34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts of special agents Political Law NonSuability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability

FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was
excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he
was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have
been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured
beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and
that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized
Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

11th of 4th Batch

PALAFOX VS ILOCOS NORTE GR No. L.10659 January 31, 1958

FACT: Protacio Palafox work as a construction worker of a road was hit by a truck driver
employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte. The injury caused in the course of the
performance of a government function, as a rule,unless there is an existing statute on that
matter, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith.
ISSUE: The government of Ilocos Norte a municipal corporation can be held liable for the
injury of the third person.
RULING: The municipal corporation which is Ilocos Norte Municipality has no duty to pay
monetary consideration due to the performance of the duty honestly and in good faith or that
they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
PALAFOX V PROVINCe OF ILOCOS NORTE
Leonardo Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte

Facts:

SabasTorralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the
Office of the District Engineer.
While driving his truck, he ran over ProcetoPalafox and the
victim died. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he
pleaded guilty.
The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against the Province, District
Engineer, Provincial Treasurer and SabasTorralba.
Issue: WON the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable? NO
Ratio: This case highlights the general rule that local government units are not liable for
negligent acts of its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In
this case, the driver Torralba was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which
was a governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act.

Facts: SabasTorralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of
the District Engineer. While driving his truck, Sabas ran over ProcetoPalafox resulting to the
latters death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he
pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the District
Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.
Issue: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.
Held: NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligentacts of its
employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case,
the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental
duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to
pay monetary consideration. (Palafoxv.Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil 1186)

12th of 4th Batch

Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
and Dionisio Mayor
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission

Facts:

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al.

were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On

Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between
the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

13th of 4th Batch

Jean Arnault vs Nazareno

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in
1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee
created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a
partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate
investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the
same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate
adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as
answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a
writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their
duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during
the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be
too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

14th of 4th Batch

IN RE DICK, 38 Phil. 41
Facts
:R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a periodical

published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper
which tends to obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the
prosecution
of
the
war between the United
States and the German Empire, and other articles which have
tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained
because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation
but before the Governor-General gave his order, there was an
investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative
Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged
from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the Governor General could exercise the deportation power in the absence of
statutory authority?

Held:
Yes,
the
Governor-General
has
the
power
i n s t i t u t e a n d m a i n t a i n d e p o r t a t i o n proceedings.

to

The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state,
having been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him upon his own
opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of
the Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole
and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re
examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

15th of 4th Batch

In re: Sotto
January 21, 1949

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he
should not be punished for
contempt
i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s written
statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which
was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality. Sotto was given
ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although
his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said
answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been
published.
He
however,
contends
that
under
section1 3 , A r t i c l e V I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h c o n f e r s u p o n t h i s S u p r
e m e C o u r t t h e p o w e r t o p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g pleading,
practice,
and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to impose correctional
penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue
of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to
attack the honesty or integrity of any one.

Issue:

Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false
imputations
against
its
members.
He
accused
them
of
suchd e p r a v i t y a s t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d " b l u n d e r s a n d i n j u s t i c e s d e l i b e r a t
e l y . " H e h a s m a l i c i o u s l y b r a n d e d t h e m t o b e incompetent,
narrowminded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the
opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to
be
needing a lesson
i n l a w, t o b e r e n d e r i n g
an intolerablesentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified
justices.R e s p o n d e n t h a s n o t p r e s e n t e d a n y e v i d e n c e o r o f f e r e d a n y t o s
upport his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer
showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact. It is also well
settled
that
an
attorney
as
an
officer
of
the
court
isu n d e r s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n t o b e r e s p e c t f u l i n h i s c o n d u c t a n d communic
ation
to
the
courts,
he
may
be
removed
from
office
ors t r i c k e n f r o m t h e r o l l o f a t t o r n e y s a s b e i n g g u i l t y o f f l a g r a n t misconduct.

16th of 4th Batch

SPRINGER vs OVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is interested essentially an
executive act)

ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of Act No.
2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.
HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined
exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive branch of the government
which it has set up in the Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of
Act No. 2822 is unconstitutional and void
RATIO: The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of that Act,
and in decisions interpretative of it. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general distributing
clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly
incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by
this court. No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any
of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true that the
Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the
Government into three departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed
or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that each of the branches of the
Government is in the main independent of the others.
The Organic Act vests the:
a.) EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.
execute the law
power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive
function
he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the
government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United
States operative within Philippine Islands.
By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged
with the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through
the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to law."
b.) LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.
make the law.
c.) JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First Instance, and inferior courts.
construe the law

18th of 4th Batch

Gualberto De La Llanavs Manuel Alba
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law
involved BP 129

FACTS:
In 1981, Batas PambansaBlg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be
one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security
of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it

properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.

19th of 4th Batch

ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 Phil. 368 (1949)
84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the
judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from
proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma.
Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50]
pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the
national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs
issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative
ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive

Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first
regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such
subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new
legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon
reconvening or upon early repeal.

20th of 4th Batch

Eulogio Rodriguez vs Vicente Gella
92 Phil. 603 Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in
1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and
the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to
have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said
EOs. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to
AranetavsDinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same
was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still
subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme
Court in the same case of AranetavsDinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671
shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities
emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such
invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be
attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the
intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For
while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall
them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No.
671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent.
Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
ARTICLE VII DELEGATION OF POWERS
Facts:
Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on November 10, 1952, the
first appropriating the sumof P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and thesecond

setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, drought,earthquakes and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtueof C.A. No. 671
The Emergency Powers Act.
Issue:WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid?
Held: NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides thatin times of war or other
national emergency, the Congressmay by law authorize the President, x xx to
prescribe/promulgate rules and regulations to carry out adeclared national policy. The said
powers are limited in the prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as thePresident
may want to be.

21st of 4th Batch

MAURICIO CRUZ,petitioner-appellant, vs.STANTON YOUNGBERG , Director of the
Bureau of Animal Industry,respondent-appellee. OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila
for theissuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau
of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of tenlarge
cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked theconstitutionality
of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle fromforeign countries into
the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of theenactment was to prevent
the introduction of cattle diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a causeof action. The demurrer was based on two
reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declaredunconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not
be entitled to the relief demandedbecause Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective
and would prohibit therespondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155
was constitutionaland, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioners
failure to fileanother complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg
contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the factalleged by the
petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to importcattle from Australia for
the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional,Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective.
ISSUES:1.WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional2.WON the lower court erred in not holding
that the power given by Act No. 3155 to theGovernor-General to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition provided in theact constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative
powers3.WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING:1.No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of
laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it
isnecessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The
latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the countryand to prevent
the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle.It is now generally
recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of
the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government
of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the

promotion of the general welfare and thepublic interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was
promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature
exceeded its power in passing the Act.
2.No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, whichnecessarily
involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority ordiscretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Thefirst cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the
case at bar.
3.No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. Itdoes
not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not
an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.
nd
th

22 of 4 Batch

Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint
for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular
No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers. The authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing
Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to

entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
EASTERN
SHIPPING
LINES,
INC.,
vs.
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA)166 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 76633, October 18,
1988Petitioner:
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
Respondents:
1.Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA
2.Minister of Labor and Employment3.

Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accidentin
Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797
and Memorandum Circular No. 2of the POEA.The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued
that the complaint was cognizable not by thePOEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State FundInsurance.The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of theparties ruled in favour of the
complainant.The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining orderdated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseasworker.2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power.

Held:

1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive
OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment
of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier
underArticle 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the
POEAis vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims,involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contractinvolving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the
1985Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for
death,disability and other benefits arising out of such employment.

23rd of 4th Batch

United States vsAng Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

FACTS:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution
of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published
on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a
rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher
than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged
for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor

General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication
of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation
of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must
be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

US v Ang Tang
Facts: vThe Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,authorizing the
governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1,

1919, theGovernor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, AngTangHo was caught
selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found
guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Issue: Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?
Held: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized theGovernor-General
to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effectthelaw. The said Act was not complete when it left
the legislature as it failed to specify whatconditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said
Act states for any cause. It also failed to define extraordinary rise that such proclamation by theGovernorGeneral aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures by the Governor-General.

24th of 4th Batch

People vs Rosenthal and Osmea, 68 Phil 238
. Constitutional Limitations - Art.III, Bill of Rights1) Due process and equal protection - Sec. 1a. Void of vagueness

FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and NicasioOsmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual
tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of
Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or
corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and
papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.Section 5, on the other hand,
provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the
examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the
right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue
to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person,
partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such
person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities
named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when
ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal
from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of
Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide
said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion
the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the
Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to
follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or

permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions
of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a
certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to
public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes,
and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

25th of 4th Batch

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)

FACTS

This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners

claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers
Corp. (NAFCO).

Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of

P15,000.00

NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to

petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.

This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the

government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on
two grounds:
o
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to
P15,000/year.
o
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over

Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under
R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is
Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative

power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to

streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was

promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with
costs

26th of 4th Batch

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

70 pHIL 726

Facts:
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission,
prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer
legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest.

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise
of such discretion is the making of the law.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

Facts: In July 17, 1940 the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 AM to 12:30 PM and from 1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 AM to
11 PM; one year from the date of opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Director of Public Works recommended to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to
the portion extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street during the
same hours as indicated for a period of one year from the date of opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.

Issue: Whether CA 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes undue delegation of

legislative power and infringes upon constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all people;
Whether there is unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridging of the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

Held: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby DENIED.

Ratio: According to Judge Ranney: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done to the latter no valid objection can
be made.

The Legislature cannot delegate a power to make law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make,
its action depend. To deny this would stop the wheels of the government.
By consideration of public convenience and welfare the National Assembly enacted CA 548.
Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the State. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The State has exercised its Police Power in this case.

27th of 4th Batch

People of the Philippines vs Vera
Posted by kaye lee on 1:31 PM
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has
not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING: Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office."

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of
a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to
make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those
provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation
officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided
or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and
this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer,
probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

28th of 4th Batch

Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest
RESTITUTO
YNOT
-petitioner;
an
owner
of
carabaos
Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau
of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above
measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court.
However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could
no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner appealed the decision to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed

4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President.
HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency
showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destrcution
3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid
exercise of police power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and was immediately condemned and punish

29th of 4th Batch

: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said
executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the
respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does
not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative
department.

RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive
department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

30th of 4th Batch

Tatad vs. Garcia
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMENA and RODOLFO G. BIAZON vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD.G.R. No.
114222 April 6, 1995

Facts:
1.

In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA.
2.
No bidding was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify.
3.
The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this
particular undertaking.
4.
An agreement was then made between the government, through the DOTC, and EDSA LRT
Consortium.
5.
The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957,
amended by RA 7718).
6.
Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall
supply the train cabs.
7.
Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the
same for 25 years.
8.
By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT
Consortium.
9.
Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
10.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation
as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA
railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities..

Issue: Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public
utility?

Ruling:What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities

to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is
not their ownership but their use to serve the public.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However,
it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long
as it does not operate them to serve the public.Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of
which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by
law or the concurrence with the rights of another.The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is
limited by law so that a property cannot be operated a used to serve the public as a public utility unless
the operator has a franchise. While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate
the EDSA. LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility. In view of this incapacity,
private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date, private respondent will immediately
deliver possession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall

31st of 4th Batch

Abakada Guro vs Ermita
Abakada Guro v. ErmitaG.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005J. Puno En Banc

Facts:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et
al.,insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no passon provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the
onehand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the
saleof service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement
thatthe VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As
to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that
the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in
the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with
something that does not exist.Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337
grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under
Section 24 of Article VI of theConstitution when the Senate introduced amendments not
connected with VAT.Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by
authority to theExecutive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power grantedto the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power. They submit thatthe recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance
in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as
a benchmark necessarily andinherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as
policy making.Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a
property right.Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a
statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Issue:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that
Allappropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
localapplication, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

32nd of 4th Batch

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
B. Supremacy of the Constitution enforced through judicial review NATURE: Original action in teh
Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of prohibition torestrainand prohibit the Electoral Commission,
one of the respondents from taking further cognizanceof the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent against the election of said petitioner asmember of the National Assembly for the first
assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

FACTS: IN the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara and respondents, Pedro Ynsua,Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of theNational Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Taybas.. On October 7, 1935 petitioner Angara was proclaimed as
member-elect of the National Assembly and he later took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On
December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 8 which declared with finality the
victory of petitioner. On December 8, respondent Ynsuafiled before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
of Protest" against Angara praying that said theformer be declared elected member of the National
Assembly or that the election of the saidposition be nullified. On December 20, Angara filed a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest" arguingthat a) Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative toprescribe the period during which protests against the election of its member
should be presented; b) that aforesaid resolution has for its object and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and c) protest was filed out of the prescribed period. The ElectoralCommission
denied petitioner's motion. Thus, this action in the present case.

ISSUE:1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdictionoverteh Electoral Commission and teh subject matter of
thecontroversy upon the foregoing facts;
2.WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion having entertained aprotest
after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which declared the deadline of filing of protests.

HELD:1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. NOt taking cognizance of saidcontroversy
would create a void in our constitutional system which may in the long run provedestructive of the entire
framework.In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutitonl organ which can be
calledupon
to
determine
the
proper
allocation
of
powers
between
teh
several
departmentsandamongtehingral or constituent units thereof.2. The Electoral Commission did not exceed
its jurisdiction. It has been created by thewConstitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction todecide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly". Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must
conform to their ownprescribedrules and the National Assembly cannot divest them of any such
powers.Wherefore, petition DENIED

Angara vs Electoral Commission

Posted by kaye lee on 3:28 PM
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas
province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect
of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of
office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with
finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of
the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day
for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec.
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of
the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as
regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy;

Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.