Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MANUEL
By:
R.
BUSTAMANTE
HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE
19
his
rights
and
give
everyone
in
his
the
due,
18,
2004,
440
SCRA
498
FACTS: A
complaint
was
filed
seeking
to
compel
the
bank
to
pay
the
value
of
checks
issued
to
her
by
Thompson
as
it
refused
to
pay
the
same
despite
repeated
directives
of
the
drawer
to
recognize
the
check
he
issued.
The
bank
filed motion
to
dismiss
alleging
that
the
complaint
failed
to
state
a
cause
of
action
under
Section
189
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Law,
a
check
itself
does
not
operate
as
an
assignment
of
any
part
of
the
funds
to
the
credit
of
the
drawer
with
the
bank
and
the
latter
is
not
liable
to
the
holder
unless and
until
it
accepts
or
certifies
it.
ISSUE: Whether
the
bank
inaction
on
the
drawers
is
liable
instructions.
for
damages
on
the
basis
of
its
HELD: YES.
The
bank
can
be
held
liable
for
damages .
It
was
not
a
suit on
the
value
of
the
check
itself ,
but
how
it
acted
in
relation
to
the
claim
for
payment.
The
allegations
in
the
complaint
that
there
was
gross
inaction of
the
bank
on
Thompsons
instructions
as
well
as
its
evident
failure
to
inform
her
of
the
reason
are
insouciance
(lack
of
concern)
on
its
part.
The
complaint
was
anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code .
When a right is
exercised
in
a
manner
which
does
not
conform
with
the
norms
enshrined
in
Article
19
and
results
in
damage
to
another ,
a
legal
wrong
is
thereby
committed
for
which
the
wrongdoer
must
be
held
responsible.
But
a
right ,
though
by
itself
legal
because
recognized
or
granted
by
law
as
such,
may
nevertheless
become
the
source
of
some illegality.
A person should be protected
only
when
he
acts
in
the
legitimate
exercise
of
his
right ,
that
is,
when
he
acts
with
prudence
and
in
good
faith;
but
when
he
acts
with
negligence
or
abuse.
2
Thus, in order to
elements
must
concur,
(a)
(b)
(c)
be
to
liable
wit:
that
there
is
a
legal
which
is
exercised
in
for
the sole intent of
under
the
abuse
of
right
or
duty;
bad
faith; and
prejudicing or injuring
right
principle ,
three
another.
No.
151866,
September
9,
June
30,
2005,
462
SCRA
466
FACTS: There
was
a
contract
whereby
Valenzona
was
hired
as
a
coach
of
the
Alaska
Basketball
Team
in
the
PBA
for
a
period
of
two
years.
Paragraph
3 of the
contract
provides
that
if
at
anytime
during
the
contract,
the
Coach,
in
the
sole
opinion
of
the
Corporation,
fails
to
exhibit
sufficient
skills
or
competitive
ability
to
coach
the
time,
the
Corporation
may
terminate
the
contract .
During
his
stint
as
head
coach,
the
team
placed
third
in
both
Open
and
All
Filipino
PBA
Conferences
in
1988.
He
was
later
on
served
with
notice
that
the
management
was
terminating
his
services .
Six
years
thereafter,
he
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
asking
for
payment
of
his
compensation
arising
from
the
arbitrary
and
unilateral
termination
of
his
employment.
ISSUE: Whether
paragraph
3
of
the
the right of petitioner
to
terminate
contract
is
respondents
a
legitimate
employment.
exercise
of
HELD:
NO.
The
assailed
condition
clearly
transgressed
the
principle
mutuality
of
contracts,
hence,
it
is
null
and
void .
It
leaves
determination
of
whether
Valenzona
failed
to
exhibit
sufficient
skill
competitive
ability
to
coach
Alaska
team
solely
to
the
opinion
GF Equity.
of
the
or
of
When
one
party
in
an
employment
contract
is
given
an
unbridled
prerogative
to
pre-terminate
the
contract
irrespective
of
the
soundness,
fairness,
reasonableness
or
even lack
of
basis
of
its opinion, it must
be
struck
down.
To sustain
the
validity
of
the
assailed
paragraph
would
open
the
gate
of
arbitrary
and
illegal
dismissals ,
for
void
contractual
stipulations
would
be
used
as
justification
therefore.
Consequently,
since
the pre-termination
of
the
contract
was
anchored
on
an
illegal
ground ,
hence,
contrary
to
law
and
GF
Equity
negligently
failed
to
provide
legal
basis
for
such
pre-termination ,
the
latter
failed
to
exercise
in
a
legitimate
manner
its
right
to
pre-terminate
the
contract ,
thereby abusing
the
right
of
Valenzona,
thus,
entitling
the
latter
to
damages
under
Article
19
in
relation
to
Article
20
of
the
Civil
Code.
2.
CIVIL PERSONALITY
CONTINENTAL STEEL MFG. CORP. vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 621
FACTS: Hortillanos
was
in
the
38th
Hortillanos
unborn
ISSUE: Whether
death
of
his
wife,
week
child.
Marife,
had
of
pregnancy
Hortillano
is
unborn
child.
entitled
pre-mature
delivery
while
she
which
resulted
to
the
death
of
to
bereavement
benefits
on
the
HELD: YES.
Even
a
child
inside
the
womb
already
has
life .
No
less
than
the
Constitution
recognizes
the
life of
the
unborn
from
conception,
that
the State
must
protect
equally with
the
life
of
the
mother.
If
the
unborn
already has
life ,
then
the
cessation
thereof
even
prior
to
the
child
being
delivered,
qualifies
as
death.
3
It
was
not
disputed
that
Hortillano
and
his
wife
were
validly
married
and
that
their
child
was
conceived
during
said
marriage ,
hence,
making
said
child
legitimate
upon
her
conception ,
thus,
Hortillano
was
entitled
to
bereavement
benefits.
3. FAMILY
Article
26
CODE
paragraph
472
SCRA 114
FACTS:
Cipriano
and
Lady
Miros
got
married
in
1981
and
thereafter
were
blessed
with two children . Miros
went
to
the
United
States
and
eventually
acquired
American
citizenship .
Later,
she
obtained
a
divorce
decree
of
her
marriage
with
Cipriano
and
got
married
to
Stanley .
By
reason
thereof,
Cipriano
filed
a
petition
for
authority
to
marry invoking
paragraph
2
of
Article
26
of
the
Family
Code .
The
Solicitor
General
opposed
the
petition
on
the
ground
that
paragraph
2
of
Article
26
is
not
applicable
to
Cipriano
because
it
applies
only
to
a
valid
mixed
marriage, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen
and
an
alien.
ISSUE: Whether
the Filipino
spouse is
legally
capacitated
the
other
party
is
naturalized
as
a
foreign
citizen
obtained
a
valid
divorce
decree.
to
re-marry
and
later
after
on
and
injustice
spouse
who ,
the
Filipino
- - - There
are
two
(2)
elements
for
the
application
of
paragraph
2
of
Article
26,
namely,: (1)
a
valid
marriage
that
has
been
celebrated
between
a
Filipino
citizen
and
a
foreigner ;
and
(2)
a
valid
divorce
obtained
abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
him
or
her
to
remarry. The
reckoning
point
is
not
the
citizenship
of the parties at the
time
of
the
celebration
of
marriage ,
but
rather,
their
citizenship
at
the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating
the
latter
to
re-marry.
- - - Moreover,
it
is
necessary
that
the
naturalization
of
the
other
spouse
and
the
foreign
divorce
decree
be
proven.
The
party
pleading
it
must
prove
the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate
its
conformity to the
foreign law
allowing
it .
Likewise,
it
must
be
shown
that
the
divorce
decree
allows
the
former
spouse
to
re-marry
as
specifically
required
in
Article
26.
Otherwise,
there
would
be
no
evidence
sufficient
to
declare
that
he
is
capacitated
to
enter
into
another
marriage.
Article 40
LUCIO MORIGO
vs. PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
judicial
declaration
the spouse
may
of
nullity
of
validly
contract
the
first
a
second
marriage is
marriage.
4
HELD: NO. In
this
case,
it
was
found
out
that
the
first
marriage
is
void
ab
initio
in
accordance
with
Articles
3
and
4
of
the
Family
Code. This
simply
means
that
there
was
no
marriage
to
begin
with
and
such
declaration
of
nullity
retroacts
to
the
date
of
the
first
marriage.
In
other
words,
for
all
intents
and
purposes ,
reckoned
from
the
date
of
the
declaration
of
the
first
marriage
as
void
as
initio
to
the
date
of
the
celebration
of
the
first
marriage ,
the
accused
was,
under
the
eyes
of
the
law,
never
married.
The
first
element
of
bigamy
requires
that
the
accused
must
be
legally married.
But
in
this
case ,
legally
speaking,
the
accused
was
never
married.
Thus,
there
is
no
first
marriage
to
speak
of.
Under
the
principle
of
retroactivity
of
a
marriage
being
declared
void
ab
initio,
the
two
were
never
married
from
the
beginning .
Accordingly,
accused
was
not
married
to
his
wife
at
the
time
he
contracted
the
second
marriage
with
another
woman.
The
mere
private
act
of
signing
a
marriage
contract
bears
no
semblance
to
a
valid
marriage
and
thus,
needs
no
judicial
declaration
of
nullity.
Such
act
alone,
without
more,
cannot
be
deemed
to
constitute
an
ostensibly
valid
marriage
for
which
accused
might
be
held
liable
for
bigamy
unless
he
secures
a
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
before
he
contracts
a
subsequent
marriage.
What
is
contemplated
by
Article
40
void
marriage
that
must
be
declared
contract
a
subsequent
marriage
is
one
is
void.
of
the
Family
Code
as
the
void
before
a
party
may
that
must
exist
although,
it
Article 41
Whether
the other
a
judicial
declaration
spouse
may
legally
of
presumptive
re-marry.
death
is
necessary
FACTS: On
April
25,
1955,
Clemente
G.
Bailon,
who
was
a
member
of
SSS
and
Alice
P.
Diaz
contracted
marriage .
More
than
15
years
later,
Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively
dead.
The
CFI
granted
the
petition .
Close
to
13
years
after
his
wife
Alice
was
declared
presumptively
dead ,
Bailon
contracted
marriage
with
respondent
Teresita
Jarque.
Upon
Bailons
death,
respondent
thereupon
filed
a
claim
for
funeral
benefits
and
was
granted
P12,000
by
the
SSS .
Cecilia
Bailon-Yap,
who
claimed
to
be
a
daughter
of
Bailon
and
one
Elisa
Jayona ,
contested
before
the
SSS
the
release
to
respondent
of
the
death
and
funeral
benefits.
She
claimed
that
Bailon
contracted
three
marriages
in
his
lifetime,
the
first
with
Alice
Diaz,
the
second
with
her
mother
Elisa
Jayona
and
the
third
with
respondent,
all
of
whom
are
still
5
alive.
In
the
meantime,
a
certain
Hermes
P.
Diaz ,
claiming
the
brother
and
guardian
of
Aliz P. Diaz, filed
before
the
claim
for
death
benefits
accruing
from
Bailons
death.
ISSUE:
Who
between
Alice
to
the
death
benefits?
Diaz
and
the
herein
respondent
is
to
SSS
be
a
entitled
HELD: Respondent
is
entitled
to
the
death
benefits .
The
two
marriages
involved
herein
having
been
solemnized
prior
to
the
effectivity
on
August
3,
1988
of
the
Family Code ,
the
applicable
law
to
determine
their
validity
is
the
Civil
Code
which
was
the
law
in
effect
at
the
time
of
their
celebration.
Under
Art.
83
of
the Civil Code, a
subsequent
marriage
contracted
during
the
lifetime
of
the
first
spouse
is
illegal
and
void
ab
initio
unless
the
prior
marriage
is
first
annulled
or
dissolved
or
contracted
under
any
of
the
three
exceptional
circumstances.
It
bears
noting
that
the
marriage
under
any
of
these
exceptional
cases
is
deemed
valid
until
declared
null
and
void
by
competent
court .
If
follows
that
the
onus
probandi
in
these
cases
rests
on
the
party
assailing
the
second
marriage.
In the case
at
bar,
as
found
by
the
CFI,
Alice
has
been
absent
for
15
consecutive
years
when
Bailon
sought
declaration
of
her
presumptive
death ,
which
judicial
declaration
was
not
even
a
requirement
then
for
purposes
of
remarriage.
Under
the
Civil
Code,
a
subsequent
marriage
being
voidable ,
it
is
terminated
by
final
judgment
of
annulment
in
a
case
instituted
by
the
absent
spouse
who
reappears
or
by
either
of
the
spouses
in
the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code,
specifically Art.
42,
no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary .
If
the
absentee
reappears ,
but
no
step
is
taken
to
terminate
the
subsequent
marriage,
either
by
affidavit
or
by
court
action,
such
absentees
mere
reappearance
even
if
made
known
to
the
spouses
in
the
subsequent
marriage,
will
not
terminate
such
marriage.
Since
the
second
marriage
has
been
contracted
because
of
the
presumption
that
the
former
spouse
is
dead ,
such
presumption
continues
in
spite
of
the
spouses
physical
reappearance
and
by
fiction
of law ,
he
or
she
still be
regarded
as
legally
an
absentee
until
the
subsequent
marriage
is
terminated
as
provided
by
law.
In
the
case
at
bar,
as
no
step
was
taken
to
nullify
in
accordance
with
law,
Bailons
and
respondents
marriage
prior
to
the
formers
death
in
1998 ,
respondent
rightfully
the
defendant
spouse beneficiary
of
Bailon.
Article
36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
(not
the
and
Sexual
infidelity,
per
se,
however,
does
not
constitute
psychological
incapacity
within
the
contemplation
of
the
Family
Code .
It
must
be
shown
that
the
unfaithfulness
is
a
manifestation
of
a
disordered
personality
which
makes
him
completely
unable
to
discharge
the
essential
obligations
of
the
marital
state
and
not
merely
due
to
his
ardent
wish
to
have
a
child
of
his
own
flesh
and
blood.
6
REPUBLIC vs. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE
G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123
There
is
of
course
no
requirement
that
the person
sought
to be
declared
psychologically
incapacitated
should
be
examined
by
a
physician
or
psychologist
as
a
condition
sine
qua
non
to
arrive
at
such
declaration.
If
it
can
be
proven by
independent
means
that
one
is
psychologically incapacitated,
there is no reason
why
the
same
should
not
be
credited.
the
award
of
moral
petitioners
acts
and
fees
and
litigation
and
exemplary
omissions
expenses.
justify
damages
the
award
are
of
HELD: 1. NO. Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances
when moral damages may be recovered . It must be noted that
Article 21
states
that
the
individual
must
willfully
cause
loss
or
injury
to
another.
There
is
a
need
that
the
act
is
willful
and
hence
done
in
complete
freedom.
However,
the
marriage was
declared
void
ab
initio
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity .
The
latter is confined to the
most
serious
cases
of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative
of
an
utter
insensitivity
or
inability
to
give
meaning
and
significance
to
the
marriage.
It
is
contradictory
to
characterize
acts
as
a
product
of
psychological incapacity,
and
hence
beyond
the
control
of
the
party
because
an
innate
inability,
while
at
the
same
time
considering
the
same
set
of
acts
as
willful .
By
declaring
the
petitioner
as
psychologically
incapacitated,
the possibility of awarding
moral
damages
on
the
same
facts
was
negated.
The
award
of
moral
damages
should
be
predicated,
not
on
the
mere
act
of
entering
into
the
marriage ,
but
on
specific
evidence
that
it
was
done
deliberately
and
with
malice
by
a
party
who
had
knowledge
of
his
or
her
disability
and
yet
willfully
concealed
the
same .
No
such
evidence
appears
to
have
been
adduced
in
this
case.
2. NO.
The
acts
or
omissions
of
petitioner
which
led
the
lower
court
to
deduce
his
psychological
incapacity ,
and
his
act
of
filing
the
complaint
for
the
annulment
of
his
marriage
cannot
be
considered
as
unduly
compelling
the
private
respondent
to
litigate,
since
both
are
grounded
on
petitioners
psychological
incapacity,
which
as
explained
above
is
a
mental
incapacity
causing
an
utter
inability
to
comply
with
the
obligations
of
marriage. Hence,
neither
can
be
a
ground
for
attorneys
fees
and
litigation
expenses.
Furthermore,
since
the
award
of
moral
and
exemplary
damages
is
no
longer
justified ,
the
award
of
attorneys
fees
and
expenses
of
litigation
is
left
without
basis.
VILLANUEVA
October
vs.
27,
COURT
OF
2006,
SCRA
505
APPEALS
564
subject
marriage
may
be
annulled
on
the
ground
7
HELD: NO.
To
begin
with,
it
was
only
on
November
17,
1992
or
after
a
span
of
not
less
than
four
(4)
years
and
eight
(8)
months
when
Orlando
took
a
serious step to have
the same marriage
annulled.
Unexplained,
the
prolonged
inaction
evidently
finds
basis
in
Lilias
allegation
that
this
annulment
suit
was
filed
by
Orlando
solely
in
the
hope
that
a
favorable
judgment
thereon
would
bolster
his
defense
in
the
criminal
case
for
bigamy.
Viewed
in
this
perspective,
the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit,
the recourse must have fail. The Court
is
not
convinced
that
appellants
apprehension
of
danger
to
his
person
is
so
overwhelmingly
at
that
time, being a
security guard,
it
is
reasonable
to
assume
that
appellant
knew
the
rudiments
of
self-defense.
Orlandos
excuse
that
he
could
not
have
impregnated
Lilia
because
he
did
not
have
an
erection
during
their
tryst
is
flimsy
at
best
and
an
outright
lie
at
worst.
The
complaint
is
bereft
of
any
reference
to
his
inability
to
copulate
with
Lilia.
His
counsel
also
conceded
before
the
lower
court
that
his
client
had
a
sexual
relationship
with
Lilia.
PARTNERSHIP
FERRER
vs.
PROPERTY
SPOUSES
MANUEL FERRER
or
not
respondents
have
the
obligation
to
reimburse
HELD:
YES.
Article
120 provides the solution in determining
the ownership
of
the
improvements
that
are
made
on
the
separate
property
of
the
spouses
at
the
expense
of
the
partnership
or
through
the
acts
or
efforts
of
either
or
both
spouses.
Thus,
when
the
cost
of
the
improvement
and
any
resulting
increase
in
value
are
more
than
the
value
of
the
property
at
the
time
of
the
improvement ,
the
entire
property
of
one
of
the
spouses
shall
belong
to
the
conjugal
partnership,
subject
to
reimbursement
of
the
value
of
the
property
of
the
owner-spouse
at
the
time
of
the
improvement ;
otherwise,
the said
property
shall
be
retained
in
ownership
by
the
owner-spouse ,
likewise
subject
to
reimbursement
of
the
cost
of
the
improvement .
The subject
property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis
of
Article
120
of
the
Family Code.
8
PROPERTY
disposal of
RELATIONS - Consent
their conjugal property
of
the
Spouse
in
the
No.
141323,
June
8,
FACTS: David
Pelayo,
thru
a
Deed
of
Absolute Sale ,
conveyed
to
Melki
Perez, two parcels of agricultural lands. The sale was witnessed by Davids
wife,
Lorenza,
who
signed
only
on
the
third
page
in
the
space
provided
for
witnesses
of
which
Perez
application
for
registration
of
the
deed
with
the
Office
of
the Register
of
Deeds was
denied.
ISSUE:
marital
Whether
consent.
the
deed
of
sale
was
null
and
void
for
lack
of
HELD: By
affixing
her
signature
to
the
Deed
of
Sale
on
the
space
provided
for
witnesses,
Lorenza
is
deemed
to
have
given
her
implied
consent
to
the
contract
of
sale.
A
wifes
consent
to
the
husbands
disposition
of
conjugal
property
does
not
always
have
to
be
explicit
or
set forth in any particular document,
as
long
it
is
shown by
acts
of
the
wife
that
such
consent
or
approval
was
indeed
given.
In
the present case, although it appears on
the face
of
the deed
of
sale
that
Lorenza
signed
only
as
an
instrumental
witness ,
evidence
shows that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property
and consented to the sale . Under Article 173, in
relation
to
Article
166
of
the
New
Civil
Code,
the lack
of marital consent to the disposition
of
conjugal
property
does
not
make
the
contract
void
ab
initio
but
merely voidable.
HOMEOWNER
AND
G.R. No.
ISSUE: Whether
other
spouse
concerned.
the
is
March
sale
of
conjugal
valid
in
so
11,
property
far
as
without
the
the
consent
of
husbands
share
the
is
February
16,
2005,
451
SCRA 494
FACTS: Josefina
Castillo
married
Eduardo
G. Francisco,
who
at
that
time
was already married
to
Carmelita Carpio.
On August
31, 1984,
the
Imus
Rural
Bank,
Inc.
executed
a
deed
of
absolute
sale
in
favor
of
Josefina
Castillo
Francisco,
covering
two
parcels
of
residential
land
with
a
house
thereon.
On
the
basis of
the
said
deed
of
sale , the
Register
of
Deeds
issued
TCT
Nos.
87976
and
87977
in
the
name
of
Josefina
Castillo
Francisco
married
to
Eduardo
G.
Francisco.
On
February
15,
1985,
the
Register
of
Deeds
made
of
record Entry No.
85-18003
at
the
dorsal
portion
of
the
said
titles.
This
referred
to
an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his
marriage
to
Josefina,
the
latter
purchased
two
parcels
of
land ,
including
the house constructed thereon,
with
her
own savings, and
that
he
was
waiving
whatever
claims
he
had
over
the
property.
On
June
11,
1990,
Eduardo,
who
was
then
the
General
Manager
and
President
of
Reach
Out
Trading
International,
bought
bags
of
cement
from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay
the same.
MIWCC filed a complaint
against
him
in
the
court .
After
the
judgment
in
favor
of
MIWCC
has
become
final ,
the
court
issued
a
writ
of
execution
against
the
aforementioned
parcels
of
land.
In
the
light
of this,
Josefina
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Third
Party
Claim
over
the
two
parcels
of
land
in
which
she
claimed
that
they
were
her
paraphernal
properties
and
that
her
husband
Eduardo had no propriety
9
right or
interest
alleged that she
by Sheriff Alejo.
null
and
void.
ISSUE:
Castillo
over them
as evidenced by his Affidavit of Waiver. She
was
the sole owner of the property levied on execution
Hence,
the
levy
on
execution
of
the
property
was
Whether
the
subject
properties
and
Eduardo
Francisco.
are
conjugal
properties
of
Josefina
HELD:
NO.
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
provides :
In
cases
of
cohabitation
not
falling
under
the
preceding
Article ,
only
the
properties
acquired
by
both
of
the
parties
through
their
actual
joint
contribution
of
money,
property,
or
industry
shall
be
owned
in
common
in
proportion
to
their
respective contributions .
In
the
absence
of
proof
to
the
contrary,
their
contributions
and
corresponding shares are presumed to
be
equal.
The
same
rule
and
presumption
shall
apply
to
joint
deposits
of
money
and
evidences
of
credit .
If
one
of
the
parties
is
validly
married
to
another,
his
or
her
share
in
the
co-ownership
shall
accrue
to
the
absolute
community
or
conjugal
partnership
existing
in
such
valid
marriage.
If
the
party
who
acted
in
bad
faith
is
not
validly
married
to
another,
his
or
her
share
shall
be
forfeited
in
the
manner
provided
in
the
last
paragraph
of
the
preceding
Article.
The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply
even if both parties are
in bad faith.
Indeed, the Family Code
has
filled
the
hiatus
in
Article
144
of
the
New
Civil
Code
by
expressly
regulating
in
Article
148
the
property
relations
of
couples
living
in
a
state
of
adultery
or
concubinage.
The
petitioner failed to prove that she had
any vested right over the property
in question. Since the
subject property was acquired during the subsistence
of
marriage
of
Eduardo
and
Carmelita ,
under
normal
circumstances,
the
same
should
be
presumed
to
be
conjugal
property .
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
also
debilitates
against
the
petitioners
claim
since ,
according
to
the
said
article,
a
co-ownership
may
ensue
in
case
of
cohabitation
where,
for
instance,
one
party
has
a
pre-existing
valid
marriage
provided
that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money , property or
industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon.
We
agree
with
the
findings
of
the
appellate
court
that
the
petitioner
failed
to
adduce
preponderance
of
evidence that she contributed money , property
or
industry
in
the
acquisition
of
the
subject
property
and ,
hence,
is
not
a
co-owner
of
the
property.
subject
property
is
HELD: NO.
All
property
of
the
marriage
is
the
conjugal
partnership,
unless
it
can
pertains
exclusively to
the
husband
or
to
the
name
of
the
husband
or
the
wife
this
presumption.
The separation-in-fact
between
without
judicial
approval
shall
not
affect
The
lot
retains
its
conjugal nature.
the
paraphernal/exclusive
presumed
to
belong
to
be
proved
that
it
the
wife.
Registration
in
alone
does
not
destroy
the
husband
and
wife
the
conjugal
partnership .
Moreover,
the
presumption
of
conjugal
partnership
applies
even
when
the
manner
in
which
the
property
was
acquired
does
not
appear.
The
use
of
the
conjugal
funds
is
not
an
essential
requirement
for
the
presumption
to
arise .
The
presumption
that
the
property
is
conjugal
property
may
be
rebutted
only
by
strong, clear,
categorical, and
convincing evidence -there
must
be
strict
proof
of
10
the
of
exclusive
ownership
proof
rests
upon
NULL
AND
of
the
one
party
VOID
of
the
asserting
OR
spouses,
it.
INEXISTENT
and
the
burden
MARRIAGE
BANGAYAN,
JR.
(1)
(2)
HELD:
there
was
initio
What
Sally?
is
of
(2)
the
filed
the
Benjamin
and
Sally
children.
She
then
simulated
marriage
an
annulment
of
nature
of
What
is
the
property
Benjamin and
Sally?
the
ended ,
Sally
left
for
filed
a
bigamy case
contract
as
evidence .
non-existent
marriage
marriage
relations
(1) The
marriage
of
the
parties
is
was
no
marriage
license,
therefore,
not
committed
and
the
marriage
was
and
inexistent.
of
Benjamin
governing
the
and
marriage
not
bigamous
because
the
crime
of
bigamy
null
and
void
ab
(2) Since
Benjamin
and
Sally
cohabitated
without
the
benefit
of
marriage
while
the
first
marriage
is
still existing ,
their
property
relation
is
governed
by
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code
where
only
the
properties
acquired
by
both
of
the
parties
through
their
actual
contribution of
money,
property or
industry
shall
be
owned
by
them
in
common
in
proportion to their
respective contribution . Since
there is
no proof of
Sallys
contributions
to
their
cohabitation ,
there
can
be
no
co-ownership
under
Article
148
of
the
Family
Code.
course
of
parcel
of
Eventually,
their
psychological
incapacity.
marriage
their
marriage ,
land.
was
Since
there
was
no
more
over
the
property
over
the
partition, but
the
latter
refused.
ISSUE:
Whether
HELD:
YES.
psychological
the
Leonardo
incapacity
action
for
declared
reason
property ,
partition
is
738 SCRA
510
Leonardo
and
void
on
Marrieta
the
to
maintain
their
Leonardo
asked
ground
were
of
co-ownership
Marietta
for
proper.
and
Marrietas
marriage
had been
declared
under Article 36
of
the
Family Code.
void
for
During their
marriage, however, the
conjugal partnership regime governed
their
property
relations.
Although
Article 129
provides
for
the
procedure
in
case
of
dissolution
of
the
conjugal
partnership
regime ,
however,
Article
147
specifically
covers
the
effects
of
void
marriages
on the
spouses property relations.
This
particular
kind
of
co-ownership under
Article
147
a
man
and
a
woman,
suffering
no
illegal
impediment
to
other,
live
exclusively
with
each
other
as
husband
and
the
benefit
of
marriage or
under
a
void
marriage.
applied when
marry
each
wife
without
11
Here,
the
former
spouses
both
agreed
that
they
acquired
the
subject
property
during
the
subsistence
of
their
marriage .
Thus,
it
shall
be
presumed
to
have
obtained
by
their
joint
effort ,
work
or
industry and shall
be jointly owned
by
them
in
equal shares.
Therefore, the
subject
property
remains
to
be
owned
in
common
Leonardo
and
Marietta,
which
should
be
divided
in
accordance
with
rules on
co-ownership.
by
the
No.
123450,
August
31,
2005,
468
SCRA
438
FACTS: Gerardo
and
Ma.
Theresa
were
married
on
December
29, 1989 .
Almost
a
year
later,
Ma.
Theresa
gave
birth
to
Jose
Gerardo .
Gerardo
and Ma. Theresas
relationship
turned
out
to
be
short-lived , however. On
December
19,
1991, Gerardo
filed
a
petition
to
have
his
marriage
to
Ma. Theresa
annulled
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting
when
she
married
Gerardo
and
annulled
her
marriage
to
the
latter
for
being
bigamous .
It
declared
Jose
Gerardo
to
be
an
illegitimate
child
as
a
result.
The
custody
of
the
child
was
awarded
to
Ma.
Theresa
while
Gerardo was
granted
visitation
rights.
ISSUE: Can a child born during
as an illegitimate
child
on
the
a marriage
basis
of
subsequently annulled be
his mothers statements?
declared
HELD:
NO. The
status
and
filiation
of
a
child
cannot
be
compromised .
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear .
A
child
who
is
conceived
or
born
during
the
marriage
of his parents
is
legitimate .
As
a
guaranty
in
favor
of
the
child
and
to
protect
his
status
of
legitimacy ,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167.
The child shall be
mother
may
have declared against
sentenced as an adulteress.
considered
legitimate although the
his legitimacy or may have been
The import of Ma. Teresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate
son
with
Mario
but
her
illegitimate
son
with
Gerardo .
This
declaration
an
avowal
by
the
mother
that
her
child
is
illegitimate
is
the
very
declaration
that
is
proscribed
by
Article
167
of
the
Family
Code.
Gerardo
invokes
Article
166 (1) (b)
of
the
Family
Code.
He
cannot.
He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo .
Only
Ma. Theresas husband, Mario, or
in
a
proper
case , his heirs,
who can
contest
the
legitimacy
of
the
child
Jose
Gerardo
born
to
his
wife .
Impugning
the
legitimacy
of
a
child
is
a
strictly personal right of the
husband
or,
in
exceptional
cases,
his
heirs.
Since
the
marriage
of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was
void
from
the
very
beginning ,
he
never
became
her
husband
and
thus
never
acquired
any
right
to
impugn
the
legitimacy
of
her child.
The
presumption
of
legitimacy
proceeds
from
the
sexual
union
in
marriage,
particularly
during
the
period
of
conception . To
overthrow
this
presumption on the basis of Article 168 (1) (b)
of
the
Family
Code, it
must
be
shown
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
there
was
no
access
that
could
have
enabled
the
husband
to
father
the
child . Sexual
intercourse
is
to
be presumed where personal
access
is
not
disproved ,
unless
such
presumption
is
rebutted
by
evidence
to
the
contrary .
The
presumption
is
quasi-conclusive
and
may
be
refuted
only
by
the
evidence
of
physical
impossibility
of
coitus
between
husband
and
wife
within
the
first
120
days
of
the
300
days
which
immediately
preceded
the
birth
of
the
child.
BELEN
SAGAD
ANGELES
vs.
ALELI
ANGELES
MAGLAYA
any
concrete
HELD:
NO.
A
legitimate
child
is
a
product
of,
and
therefore,
implies
a
valid
and
lawful
marriage .
Remove
the
element
of
lawful
union
and
there
is
strictly
no
legitimate filiation
between
parents
and
child .
Article
164
of
the
Family
Code
cannot
be
more
empathic
on
the
matter:
Children
conceived
or
born
during
the
marriage
of
the
parents
are
legitimate,
12
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R.
ISSUE:
Whether
spouses
pending
is
valid.
No. 155409,
the
the
June
8,
2007,
524
SCRA
166
partial
voluntary
separation
of
property
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
by
the
marriage
HELD: YES.
Under
Article
143
of
the
Family
Code ,
separation
of
property may
be
effected
voluntarily
or
for
sufficient
cause,
subject
to
judicial
approval.
The
questioned
Compromise
Agreement
which
was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed by law .
This conclusion holds true even if
the proceedings for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
was
still
pending.
Finally, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty
of
civil
interdiction.
Article
43
of
the
RPC
enumerates
the
accessory
penalties of
prision correccional
and civil
interdiction
is
not
one
of
them
and
does
not
deprive
the
person
of
the
rights
to
manage
her
property
and
to
dispose
of
such
property inter vivos.
PARENTAL
CONSENT
JOCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005,
FACTS: During
the
pendency
of
of
marriage
of
the
spouses,
that
the
custody
of
their
transferred
to
him.
He alleged
trial
court
awarded
custody
by
the
appellate
court.
ISSUE: Whether
lesbianism
per
custody
of
the
child
below
an
the
child
that
to
461
SCRA
450
action
for
declaration
of
nullity
husband,
Crisanto
Gualberto,
moved
below
age
of
seven
be
his
wife
was
a
lesbian .
The
the
mother ,
but
was
reversed
se
is
a
seven
years
sufficient
ground
old
from
the
to
remove
mother.
HELD: NO.
It
is
not
enough
that
the
woman
is
a
lesbian .
He
must
also
demonstrate
the
she
carried
on
her
purported
relationship
with
a
person
of
the
same
sex
in
the
presence
of
their
son
or
under
circumstances
not
conducive
to
the
childs
proper
moral
development.
Sexual preference
or
moral
laxity
alone
does
not
prove
parental
neglect
or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute
or
has
been
unfaithful
to
her
husband
would
render
her
unfit
to
have
custody
of
her
minor child.
To deprive the wife of custody, the
husband
must
clearly
establish
that
her
moral
lapses
have
an
adverse
effect
on
the
welfare
of
the
child
or
have
distracted
the
offending
spouse
from
exercising
proper
parental
care.
Article
213
of
the
Family
Code
takes
its
bearing
from
Article
363
of
the
Civil
Code
which
prohibits
in
no
uncertain
terms
the
separation
of
a
mother
and
her
child
below
seven
years ,
unless a
separation
is
grounded
upon
compelling
reasons
as
determined
by
a
court.
CONSENT TO
ADOPTION
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006,
ISSUE:
Can
minors
biological mother?
be
adopted
without
493
the
SCRA
written
415
consent
of
their
HELD: NO.
The
general
requirement
of
consent
and
notice
to
the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from
unwarranted
interference
by
interlopers,
and
to
insure
the
opportunity
to
safeguard the best interests of
the
child in the manner of
the proposed
adoption.
Clearly,
the
written
consent
of
the
biological
parents
is
indispensable
for
the
validity
of
a
decree
of adoption.
FAMILY HOME
Article 153
13
JOSE HONRADO vs. COURT
G.R. No. 166333,
November
25,
OF
2005,
476
APPEALS
SCRA
280
FACTS:
The
Family
Home
of
the
petitioner
therein
was
levied
upon
to
answer
for
his
judgment
debt ,
and
the
sale
of
the
said
property
was
set.
Petitioner
was
served
with
a
copy
of
the
notice
of
sale
which
he
opposed.
Petitioner,
however,
allowed
the
sale
at
the
public
auction
to
proceed
and
the
Sheriff
to
execute
a
certificate
of
sale
over
the
property
in
favor
of
the
private
respondent
therein .
The
petitioner
remained
silent
and
failed
to
seek
relief
from
the
Sheriff
or
the
Court
until
one
year
from
the
date
of
the
auction
sale
when
he
filed
his
motion
to
declare
the
property
exempt
from
execution. But
even
in
the
said
motion , petitioner failed did not present
evidence that
the
property
was
a
family
home.
ISSUE:
Whether
execution.
or
not
family
home
may
not
be
exempt
for
the
to
the
20,
2006,
DARIO
III
where
ground
one
that
of
a
HELD: NO.
The
family
home
may
be
preserved
for
a
minimum
of
10
years following
the
death
of
the spouses
or
the unmarried family head
who
constituted
the
family
home,
or
of
the
spouse
who
consented
to
the
constitution
of
his
or
her separate property
as
family
home .
After
10
years
and
a
minor
beneficiary
still
lives
therein ,
the
family
home
shall
be
preserved
only
until
the
minor
beneficiary
reaches
the
age
of
majority .
The
intention
of
the
law
is
to
safeguard
and
protect
the
interests
of
the
minor
beneficiary
until
reaches
legal
age
and
would
now
be
capable
of
supporting
himself .
However,
three
(3) requisites must
concur before
a
minor
beneficiary
is
entitled
to
the
benefits
of
Art.
159 : (1)
the relationship
enumerated in
Art. 154 of
the Family Code; (2) they live in
the
family home ; and (3)
they are dependent for legal
support
upon
the
head of the family.
ALBINO
JOSEF
judicial
of
the
order
family
is
home
legal
for
to satisfy
the
the
14
SIMEON
CABANG
vs.
MR. &
the
property
home.
subject
of
the
controversy
is
duly
HELD: NO.
Under
Article
153
of
the
Family
Code , a family
home
is
deemed
constituted
on
a
house
and
a
lot
from
the
time
it
is
occupied
as
a
family
residence . It
is
likewise
a
given fact
that
the
family
home
must
be
constructed
on
property
owned
by
the
persons
constituting
it.
Since
the
property
on
which
the
alleged
family home
stands is owned by the Odongs,
their
continued
stay
on
the
subject
land
is
by
mere
tolerance
of
the late Felix Odong.
SUPPORT
PENDENTE
LITE
obligation
to
of
the
financial
give
support
devolves
on
the
capacity
of
twin daughters
parents.
HELD; YES.
Respondent
Francisco
is
liable
for
half
of
the amount
of
school
expenses
incurred
by
twin
daughters
as
support
pendente
lite.
The
petitioner
was able to establish , by
prima
facie
proof,
the
filiation
of
her
twin
daughters
to
private
respondents
and
the
twins
entitlement
to
support
pendente
lite
thus
the
next
question
is
who
should
be
made
liable
for
said
award.
Anent
respondents
Francisco
and
Federicos
claim
that
they have
the
option
under
the
law
as
to
how
they
could
perform
their
obligation
to
support
the
twins. Art. 204
provides that the person obliged to give
support
shall
have
the
option
to
fulfill
the
obligation
either
by
paying
the
allowance
fixed,
or
by
receiving
and
maintaining
in
the
family
dwelling
the
person
who
has
a
right
to
receive
support .
The
latter
alternative
cannot
be
availed
of
in
case
there
is
a
moral
or
legal
obstacle
thereto. Under
the
said
provision , Francisco
could
not
avail
for
himself
of
the second
option.
OF
FILIATION
FACTS:
without
Jenie
the
and
Dominique
were
benefit
of
marriage
living
together
as
and
resided
with
husband
and
wife
Dominiques
parents .
15
Thereafter,
Dominique
died.
After
almost
two
month, Jenie
gave
birth
to
Christian.
Jenie applied
for
the registration of the childs birth using the
surname of Dominique in
support of which she submitted affidavit to use
the
surname
of
the
father and
affidavit
of
acknowledgement
executed
by
Dominiques
father.
Attached
to
the
affidavit
is
a
document
entitled
Autobiography
which
was
handwritten
by
Dominique.
The
Civil
Registrar
denied
Jenies
application
because the child was born
out
of
wedlock
and
the
father
unfortunately
died
prior
to
his
birth
and
has
no
more
capacity
to
acknowledge
the
paternity
of
the
child.
ISSUE:
father
Whether
can be
the
unsigned
considered
as
handwritten
recognition
of
statement
paternity.
by
the
deceased
HELD: YES. A
father
who
acknowledges
paternity
of
a
child
through a
written
instrument
must
affix
his
signature .
It
is
clearly
implied
in
Article
176
of
the
Family Code .
However,
special
circumstances
exist
to
hold that the unsigned Autobiography of Dominique substantially satisfies the
requirement
of
law.
First,
Dominique
died
about
two
months
prior to
the
childs
birth.
Second,
the
relevant
matters
in
the
Autobiography ,
unquestionably
handwritten
by
Dominique.
Third,
Jenies
testimony
is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father . These
circumstances
indicating
Dominiques
paternity
of
the
child
give
life
to
his
statements in
his
Autobiography.
3. PROPERTY
FEL ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS
G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 186
ISSUE:
Whether
power
barges
are
considered
personal
properties.
HELD:
NO.
Power
barges
are
real
property
and
are
thus
subject
to
real
property
tax.
Article
415 (9) of
the
New
Civil
Code
provides
that
docks
and
structures
which,
though
floating,
are
intended
by
their
nature
and
object
to
remain at
a
fixed
place on a
river ,
lake,
or
coast
are
considered
immovable
property.
Thus,
power
barges
are
categorized
as
immovable
property
by
destination,
being
in
the
nature
of
machinery
and
other
implements
intended
by
the
owner
for
an
industry
or
work which
may
be
carried
on
in
a
building
or
on
a
piece
of
land
and
which
tend
directly
to
meet
the
needs
of
said
industry
or
work.
and
of
the
the
HELD: YES.
The
only
requirement
for
a
personal
property
to
be
the
object
of theft
under
the
penal
code
is
that
it
can
be
capable
of
appropriation.
It
need
not
be
capable
of
asportation
which
is
defined
as
carrying
away.
Jurisprudence
is
settled
that
to
take
under
the
theft
provision
of
the
penal
code
does
not
require
asportation
or
carrying
away.
Appropriation
of
forces
of
nature
which
are
brought
under
control
by
science
such
as
electrical
energy
can
be
achieved
by
tampering
with
any
apparatus
used
for
generating
or
measuring
such
forces
of
nature.
Luis
was
charged
with
engaging
in
International
Simple
Resale
(ISR)
or
the
unauthorized
routing
and
completing
of
international
long
distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or
air
wave
frequency
and
connecting
these
calls
directly
to
the
local
or
domestic
exchange
facilities
of
the
country
where
destined.
4. CO-OWNERSHIP
16
Article 487
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
454 SCRA 42, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005
* * * It
ejectment.
- - this
co-owners to
was
held
that
is an unqualified
evict
possessors
anyone
of
479
ADLAWAN
SCRA
275,
co-owners
and categorical
or
lessees.
When
the
action
is
brought
by
of
all, a favorable
decision
will
benefit
decision
cannot
prejudice
their
rights.
ARNELITO
the
vs.
one
the
authority
of
of
them
co-owners ,
EMETERIO
G. R. No. 161916,
may
sue
anyone
for
but
the
an
of
for
the
benefit
adverse
ADLAWAN
January
20,
2006
FACTS: Arnelito
Adlawan
was
acknowledged
illegitimate
son
of
Adlawan
who
died
without
an
issue
and
survived
by
Graciana.
Claiming
to
be
the
sole
heir
of
Dominador,
executed
an
affidavit
adjudicating
to
himself
Lot
7226
and
built
thereon. Arnelito filed
an
unlawful
detainer
suit
to
eject
from
the
property
in
his
own
name
and
as
the
sole
the
property.
Dominador
his
wife
petitioner
the house
respondents
owner
of
ISSUE:
Whether
ejectment.
case
petitioner
can
validly
maintain
the
instant
HELD:
NO.
The
late
Dominador
Adlawan
was
survived
not
only
petitioner
but
also
by
the
legal
wife
of the
decedent ,
Graciana,
died
10
years
after
the
demise
of
Dominador
on
May
28, 1987.
- - - By intestate succession, Graciana
7226
under
Article
998
of
the
6, 1997, did
the
share of
to
petitioner
- - - Article
487
provides
action in
ejectment.
one
that
any
of
the
co-owners
for
by
who
of
Lot
the
her
had
co-owners
may
bring
an
- - - this
article
covers
all
kinds
of
actions
for
the
recovery
of
possession: forcible
entry
and
unlawful
detainer
(accion
interdictal),
recovery
of possession
(accion publiciana)
and
recovery
of
ownership
(accion
de
reivindicacion).
A
co-owner
may
bring
such
an
action
without
the
necessity
joining
all
the
other
co-owners
as
co-plaintiffs
because
the
suit
presumed
to have been
filed
to
benefit
his
co-owners.
- - - Where
the
suit
for
the
to
be
the
sole
owner
and
property, the action should be
157767,
September
9,
of
if
benefit
of
the
plaintiff
alone
who
claims
entitled
to
the
possession
of
the
litigated
dismissed. (Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No.
2004).
- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer
in his name alone
and
for
his
own
benefit
to
the
exclusion
of
the
heirs
of
Graciana as
he
even
executed
an
affidavit
of
self-adjudication
over
the
disputed
property.
- - - It
is
clear
therefore
that
petitioner cannot
validly
maintain
the
instant
action
considering
that
he
does
not
recognize
the
co-ownership
that
necessarily
flows
from his
theory
of
succession
to
the
property
of
his
late
father
Dominador.
PUBLIC
DOMINION
DOMALSIN vs. SPOUSES VALENCIANO
G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114
Q:
What
is
the
property
of
public
dominion?
17
A: Property
of
public
Code as follows:
dominion
is
defined
by
(1) Those
intended
for
public
use
such
torrents,
ports and bridges
constructed by
roadsteads and other
of
similar character;
Article
as
the
420
roads,
state,
of
canals,
banks,
the
Civil
rivers,
shores,
(2) Those
which
belong
to
the
State ,
without
being
for
public
use,
and
are
intended
for
some
public
service
or
for
the
development
of
the
national wealth.
Q:
Who
owns
property
of
public
dominion?
A:
Properties
of
public
dominion
are
owned
by
the
general
public .
Public use
is
use
that
is
not confined
to
privileged
individuals ,
but
open
to
the
indefinite
public . As the land in controversy is a portion
of
Kennon
Road
which
is
for
the
use
of
the
people ,
there
can
be
no dispute that same is part of public domain . This being the case, the
parties
cannot
appropriate
the
land
for
themselves .
Thus,
they
cannot
claim
any
right
of
possession
over
it.
5.
IN
SUCCESSION
THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF DELGADO &
RUSTIA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733, January
ISSUE: Are
right
of
grandnephews
representation
27,
2006,
and
grandnieces
in
the
collateral
480
SCRA
entitled
line?
334
to
inherit
by
the
FELIX
AZUELA
vs.
COURT
OF
487
APPEALS
SCRA
119
A
will
whose
attestation
clause
does
not
contain
the
number
of
pages
on
which
the
will
is
written
is
fatally
defective.
A
will
whose
attestation
clause
is
not
signed
by
the
instrumental
witnesses
is
fatally
defective.
The
attestation
clause
is
a
memorandum
of
the
facts
attending
the
execution
of
the
will
required
by
law
to
be
made
by
the
attesting
witnesses
and
it
must
necessarily
bear
the
signatures.
An
unsigned
attestation
clause
cannot
be
considered
as
an
act
of
the
witnesses,
since
the
omission
of
their
signatures
at
the
bottom
thereof
negatives
their
participation.
And perhaps most importantly, a will,
which
does
not
contain
an
acknowledgment,
but
a
mere
jurat,
is
fatally
defective. A jurat
is
that
part
of
an
affidavit
where
the
notary
certifies
that
before
him/her ;
the
document
was
subscribed
and
sworn
to
by
the
executor .
Any
one
of
these
defects
is
sufficient
to
deny
probate .
A
notarial
will
with
all
three
defects
is
just
aching
by
judicial
rejection.
There
is
a
distinct
and
consequential
reason
the
Civil
Code
provides
a
comprehensive
catalog
of
imperatives
for
the
proper
execution
of
notarial
will.
CELESTINO
G.R.
No.
BALUS
168970,
vs.
January
SATURNINO
15,
2010, 610
BALUS
SCRA
178
FACTS: Rufo,
the
father
of
Celestino
and
Saturnino,
mortgaged
a
parcel
of
land
he
owns
as
a
security
for
a
loan
with
the
Rural
Bank .
For
his
failure
to
pay
his
loan ,
the
mortgaged
property
was
foreclosed
and
was
subsequently
sold
to
the
Bank
as
the
sole
bidder.
The
property
was
not
redeemed
within
the
period
allowed
by
law
and
a
new
title
was
issued
in
the
name
of
the
bank.
Later,
Celestino
where
they intended
with
the
Bank.
Saturnino
thereafter,
he
Celestino.
and
Saturnino
to
redeem
the
bought
filed
a
the
subject
complaint
for
executed
property
an
Extrajudicial
Settlement
mortgaged
by
their
father
property
recovery
from
of
the
bank
and
possession
against
18
ISSUE:
Whether
there
ever
a
Saturnino
over
the
subject
property
co-ownership
between
at
any
given
point
Celestino
of
time.
and
HELD: NONE. At
the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement ,
the
subject
property
formed
part
of
the
estate
of
their
deceased
father.
The
rights
to
a
persons
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
moment
of
his
death.
In
addition,
the
inheritance
of
a
person
consists
of
the
property
and
transmissible
rights
and
obligations
existing
at
the
time
of
his
death ,
as
well
as
those
which
have
accrued
thereto
since
the
opening
of
the
succession.
Since
Rufo
lost
ownership
of
the
subject
property
during
his
lifetime ,
it
only
follows
that
at
the
time
of
his
death,
the
disputed
parcel
of
land
no
longer
formed
part
of
his
estate.
RESERVA
MARIA
TRONCAL
694 SCRA
74
FACTS:
Placido
and
Dominga
had
four
(4)
children:
Antonio,
Exequiel
married
to
Leonor,
Apolonio
and
Valentin.
Three
(3)
parcels
of
land
located
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan were registered
in
the
name
of
Exequiel
married
to
Leonor
in
which
Exequiel
was
in
possession
of
the
properties.
After
Exequiels
death,
the
properties
passed
to
his
spouse
Leonor
and
only
daughter
Gregoria.
After
Leonors
death,
her
share
went
to
Gregoria.
In
1992,
Gregoria
died
intestate
and
without
issue
and
these
properties
were adjudicated
to
Julia ,
Leonors
sister,
as
the
sole
surviving
heirs
of
Leonor
and
Gregoria.
On
the
other
hand, the
heirs
of Antonio: Apolonio
and
Valentin
claimed
that
these
properties
should
be
reserved
by
Julia
in
their
behalf
and
must
now
revert
back
to
them
applying
Article
891
of
the
New
Civil
Code
on
reserva
troncal.
ISSUES:
(1)
Who
(2)
Whether
qualifies
(3)
Whether
the
as reservees
HELD: (1) As
persons
are
are
the
person
Julia,
sister
as
reservoir
contemplated in Article
involved
in
reserva
descendant
of
or
or
in
reserve
troncal?
Leonor
and
reservista.
heirs
of
Antonio,
or
reservatarios.
a) the
ascendant
or
property
was
received
gratuitous
title;
b)
the
property;
involved
891 of
troncal:
namely:
the
New
brother
by
the
or
sister
descendant
prepositus
(propositus)
aunt
Apolonio
Civil
from
by
who
of
Gregoria,
and
Valentin
Code, the
following
whom
lucrative
received
the
or
the
c)
the
reservor (reservista), the
other
ascendant
who
obtained
the
property
from
the
prepositus
by
operation
of
law ;
and
d) the
reservee (reservatario)
who
is
within the
third
degree
from
the
prepositus
and
who
belongs
to
the
line
from
which
the
property
came
and
for
whom
the
property
should
be
reserved
by the reservor.
The
ownership
of
the
properties
should
be
reckoned
only
from
Exequiel
as
he
was
the
ascendant
from
where
the
first
transmission
occurred,
or
from
whom
Gregoria
inherited
the
properties
in
dispute
as
the
descendant
who received the properties
by
gratuitous
title.
(2) YES. In
determining
the
collateral
line
of
relationship ,
ascent
is
made
to
the
common
ancestor
and
then
descent
to
the
relative
from
whom
the
computation
is
made.
In
the
case
of
Julias
collateral
relationship
with
Gregoria,
ascent
is
to
be
made
from
Gregoria
to
her
mother
Leonor
(one line/degree),
then
to
the
common
ancestor,
that
is
Julia
and
Leonors
parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her
aunt
within
the
(third
third
line/degree).
Thus,
Julia
is
Gregorias
degree
and
not
her
ascendant.
collateral
relative
19
(3) NO. They
cannot
be
not
relatives
within
the
properties
came.
They
are
fourth
degree
relatives
and
considered
reservee/reservatarios
as
they
third
degree
of
Gregoria
from
whom
first
cousins
of
the
propositus
who
are
not
reservees/reservatarios.
are
the
are
February
11,
JOSE
2010,
612
R. MADARANG
SCRA 340
FACTS: During
the
lifetime
of
Casimiro,
he
transferred
one
lot
by
way
of
Deed of
Donation to his
son , Vicente.
Upon
the
death of
Casimiro ,
an
inventory report of the properties of
the
decedent
was
made
before
the probate
court
excluding
the donated
lot
to
Vicente.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
donated
properties of
the
decedent.
lot
be
excluded
from
the
inventory
of
the
express
provision
of
law
decedent
to
his
son,
of
the
properties
of
the
AMELIA
P.
ARELLANO
then,
the
lot
which
was
Vicente, should
be
included
decedent.
vs.
December
During
the
settlement
of
estate
Miguel
claimed
that
the
parcel
of
his
lifetime
to
Amelia
is
subject
same
as
advance
legitime.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether
are
entitled
the
to
collateral
legitime.
(2)
Whether
the
property
should be formed part
of
death.
(3)
Whether
the
(4)
Whether
among
the
heirs.
property
the
three
FRANCISCO PASCUAL
15,
FACTS: Angel
died
intestate
and single
siblings: Amelia, Francisco
and
Miguel.
2010,
638
leaving
SCRA 826
as
heirs
his
three
(3)
of
the
decedent ,
Francisco
&
land
donated
by
Angel
during
to
collation
and
considered
the
relatives
donated
his estate
donated
donated
in
the
is
estate
of
Angel
(3)
siblings
as
of
by
at
the
Angel
to
Amelia
the time of
his
subject
be
his
decedent
to
collation.
partitioned
legal
or
equally
intestate
who
are
his
legitime
which
(2) NO.
The
decedent
not
having
left
any
compulsory
heir
who
is
entitled to any legitime,
he
was at
liberty to donate all
his properties
to anyone,
even if
nothing was
left
for
his
siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to his sister Amelia
is
valid
as
is
deemed
as
donation
to a
stranger.
(3) NO. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs
and one
of
its
purposes
is
to
determine
the
legitime
and
the
free
portion .
There
being
no
compulsory
heir ,
the
donated
property
is
not
subject
to
collation.
(4) YES. The
decedents
remaining
estate
should
be
partitioned
equally
among his
heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives
pursuant
to
Articles
1003
and
1004
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
provides
that
the
collateral
relatives
shall
succeed
to
the
entire
estate
of
the
deceased . . .
and
should
the
only
they shall inherit
survivors
in equal
be
brother
shares.
and
sisters
of
the
full
blood ,
20
NULLITY OF
JUAN
DIOS
CARLOS
vs.
FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL
1) Whether
or
not
the
annulment of marriage.
2) Whether or
declaration of nullity
summary
not
the brother
of marriage.
judgment
has
the
is
legal
applicable
in
personality
an
to
action
file
the
By
issuing
said
summary
judgment ,
the
trial
court
has
divested
the
State
of
its
lawful
right
and
duty
to
intervene
in
the
case .
Both
the
Civil
Code
and
the
Family
Code
ordain
that
the
court
should
order
the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It
is
at
this
stage
when
the
public
prosecutor
sees
to
it
that
there
is
no
suppression
of
evidence and to make sure the evidence
to be presented or
laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
2) Generally, NO, because
the
rule
makes it
the
sole
right
of
the
husband
or
the
wife
to
file
a
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage, however, the compulsory heir
in order to protect his successional
right
has
the
right
to
question
the
validity
of
the
marriage
of
the
spouses in the settlement of estate proceedings filed in regular court.
The
legal
personality
of
Juan
to
bring
is contingent upon
the
final
declaration
that
adopted
or
illegitimate son
of
Teofilo.
the
nullity
Teofilo II
of
is
marriage
case
not
legitimate,
If
Teofilo II
is
proven
to
be
a
legitimate ,
illegitimate
or
legally
adopted
son
of
Teofilo,
then
Juan
has
no
legal
personality
to
ask
for
the
nullity
of
marriage
of
his
deceased
brother
and
Felicidad.
This
is
based
on
the
ground
that
he
has
no
successional
right
to
be
protected .
The
presence
of
descendant ,
illegitimate
or
even
an
adopted
child
excludes
the
collateral
relatives
from
inheriting
from
the
decedent.
6. CONFLICT
OF
LAWS
Article
15 Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal capacity
of
person
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines even though living abroad.
Article
16 the law
of
Real
properties
as
the
country
where
well
as
personal
it
is
situated.
property
is
subject
to
However,
intestate
and
testamentary
successions,
both
with
respect
to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary provisions ,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration ,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property and
regardless
of
the
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found.
contracts,
laws
of
wills
the
and
other
country
in
public
which
21
to
Domiciliary
Theory
posits
person
are governed
by
his
habitual
residence.
Nationality
nationality
is
governed
that
the
personal
the
law
of
his
Theory
postulates
that
governs
such
OBLIGATION OF
NORMA
succeed
by
the
status
domicile
that
it
is
the
status
and
rights.
law
of
and
or
law
the
nation
rights
of
the
place
of
the
a
of
persons
FACTS:
Norma
25, 1990 and
and
Brinkman
thereafter
were
744
SCRA
516
contracted
marriage
in
Holland
blessed with a son, Roderigo.
ended by
Holland.
virtue
of
on
September
Divorce
Decree
Brinkman
made
a
promise
to
provide
monthly
support
to
their
son
in
the
amount
of
250 Guildene
which
is
equivalent
to
Php17,500.00 .
However,
since
the
arrival
of
Norma
and
her
son
in
the
Philippines ,
Brinkman
never gave his
promised support.
Not
long
thereafter,
Brinkman
Norma sent a
letter
demanding for
receive the letter.
came
to
support ,
the Philippines
and remarried .
however, Brinkman refused to
for
Norma
filed
a
complaint
against
Brinkman
for
the latters unjust refusal to
support his minor
not
According
obliged to
ISSUE:
Whether
under Philippine
violation
child.
of
RA
9262
to
Brinkman,
under
to
the
support his son,
however, he
laws
of
Netherlands ,
he
is
never proved it
in
court.
a
foreign
law.
to
national
is
obliged
support
international
law, the
party
to
a
dispute
or
case
his
who
has
minor
child
wants
to
have
the
burden
of
In
the
present
case,
Brinkman
hastily
concludes
national
of
the
Netherlands,
he
is
governed
by
such
matter
of
provision of
and
capacity to
support.
that
laws
being
a
on
the
While Brinkman pleaded the laws of Netherlands that parents are not obliged
to support their child after the issuance of a divorce decree , he failed to prove
the same.
In
view
Netherlands
in
govern.
of
Brinkmans
failure
to
his
favor,
the
doctrine
prove
the
national
law
of
of
processual
presumption
the
shall
Under
the
doctrine
of
processual
presumption ,
if
the
foreign
law
involved
is
not
properly
pleaded
and
proved ,
our
courts
will
presume
that
the
foreign
law
is
the
same
as
our
local
or
domestic
or
internal
law.
Thus, since
the
to
support has
not
is
presumed
to
be
obligation
of
parents
compliance therewith.
law
of
the
Netherlands
as
regards
the
obligation
properly pleaded and proved
in the
instant
case , it
the
same
with
Philippine
Law,
which
enforces
the
to
support
their
children
and
penalizing
the
non-
REBECCA
G.R.
MAKAPUGAY
No. 163979,
BAYOT
November
7,
vs.
2008,
FOREIGN
COURT
570
SCRA
NATIONAL
OF
APPEALS
472
FACTS: Rebecca
was born in Guam, U.S.A.
to
parents
both of
American
citizenship,
married
Vicente
in
the
Philippines.
They
begot
a
daughter
in
1982. In
1996, Rebecca initiated a
divorce proceeding before the Dominican
Republic
court
which
it
granted
ordering
the
dissolution
of
the
couples
22
marriage
and
requirements,
leaving
ISSUE:
Whether
and Vicente.
the
them
divorce
to
remarry
granted
by
after
the
completing
foreign
court
the
binds
legal
Rebecca
HELD:
YES. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca at
the time
she applied
for
and obtained her divorce from Vicente
was an American
citizen. The divorce granted by the foreign court during which Rebecca is
an American citizen is valid and
binds her
and
her
Filipino husband.
In determining whether
or
not a divorce secured
abroad would come
within
the
pale
of
the
countrys
policy
against
absolute
divorce ,
the
reckoning
point
is
the
citizenship
of
the
parties
at
the
time
a
valid
divorce
is
obtained.
133743,
February
6,
2007,
514
SCRA 294
FACTS: During
his
lifetime,
Felicisimo San Luis
contracted
3
marriages.
His
first
marriage
was
with
Virginia
Sulit
out
of
which
were
born
six
children. Virginia
predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five
years
later,
Felicisimo
married
Merry
Lee
Corwin, an
American
citizen
with
whom
he
had
a
son, Tobias.
However,
Merry
Lee
filed
a
Complaint
for
Divorce
before
the
court
in
the
State
of
Hawaii, U.S.A. ,
which
issued
a
Decree Granting
Absolute
Divorce
and
Awarding
Child Custody.
Felicisimo
married
respondent
Felicidad
then
surnamed
Sagalongos
in
the U.S.A.
He
had
no
children
with
respondent
but
lived with her
for
18
years
from
the
time
of
their
marriage
up
to
his
death .
Thereafter,
respondent
sought
the
dissolution
of
their
conjugal
partnership
assets
and
the
settlement
of
Felicisimos
estate.
She filed
a
petition
for
letters
of
administration .
Petitioner
Rodolfo,
one
of
the
children
of
Felicisimo
by
his
first
marriage ,
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
on
the
ground,
inter
alia,
asserting
that
paragraph
2,
Article
26
of
the
Family
Code
(FC)
cannot
be
given
retroactive
effect
to
validate
respondents
bigamous
marriage
with
Felicisimo
because
this
would impair vested
rights
in
derogation
of
Article
256
of
the
FC.
ISSUE:
Whether
a
Filipino
who
is
divorced
by
his alien
spouse
abroad
may
validly
remarry
in
the
Philippines
considering
that
Felicidads
marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized
before
the
FC took effect.
HELD:
YES.
Firstly,
in
the
case
of
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), the SC held
that after a valid divorce had been obtained by the
foreign husband, the Filipino
wife
should no longer be considered married
to alien
spouse.
Further,
she
should
not
be
required
to
perform
her
marital
duties
and
obligations.
This
principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera where the
Court
recognized
the
validity
of
a
divorce
obtained
abroad . In
the
said case,
it
was held
that the alien
spouse is
not
a
proper party
in
filing
the
adultery
suit
against
his
Filipino
wife .
The
Court
stated
that
the
severance
of
the
marital
bond
had
the
effect
of
disassociating
the
former
spouses
from
each
other,
hence
the
actuations
of
one would
not
affect
or
cast
obloquy
on
the
other.
FELICITAS
February
6,
COURT
2007,
514
FACTS:
Felicitas
married
Orlando.
Thereafter,
they
States of America
and
became
naturalized citizens
of marriage,
Felicitas
and
Orlando
divorced.
Two
Contending
subsisting
declaration
Merope.
APPEALS
607
migrated
thereof .
to the United
After 38 years
months
after
the
divorce,
Orlando
married
respondent
Merope.
that said
marriage
was
bigamous
since
Merope
had
a
prior
marriage with
Eusebio
Bristol ,
petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
of
nullity
of
marriage
with
damages
against
Orlando
and
ISSUE: Whether
or
for
the
declaration
ground
of bigamy.
HELD:
cause
OF
SCRA
not
of
petitioner
nullity
of
YES. Divorce
means
the
arising
after
marriage .
has
the
marriage
personality
to
file
a
petition
of
the
respondents
on
the
legal
dissolution
of
a
But
divorces
are
of
lawful
union
for
a
different
types .
The
23
two
basic
ones
are
(1)
absolute
divorce
or a
vinculo matirmonii
and (2)
limited
divorce
or
a
mensa
et
toro.
The
first
kind
terminates
the
marriage, while the
second
suspends it and
the leaves
the
bond in full
force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be
recognized
in our
jurisdiction, provided such
decree
is
valid
according
to
the national
law
of
the
foreigner. However, before
it
can
be
recognized
by
our
courts ,
the
party
pleading
it
must
prove
the
divorce
as
a
fact
and
demonstrate
its
conformity
to
the
foreign
law
allowing
it ,
which
must
be
proved
considering
that
courts
cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
foreign
laws. If
this
is
done,
the SC
remanded
the
case
to
the
trial
court
for
its
proper
disposition
for
the
determination
of
whether
a
divorce
decree
was
indeed
obtained
in
accordance
with
American
law
and
will
thus,
NOT
restrict
marriage.
7. OBLIGATIONS
Civil Obligation
is
a
juridical
necessity
gives
the creditor
the
legal
right
to
the
performance
of such
obligation.
A natural obligation
is
based
on
legal
right
to
compel
performance
pays
it,
he
cannot
recover
what
to give, to
compel
by
equity
and
thereof
but
was paid.
do and not
an
action
to do. It
in
court
natural
law.
There
is no
if
the
debtor
voluntarily
also
of
fix
the
not fix
inferred
thereof.
period ,
that
a
the
duration
debtor.
of
but
from
its nature
period
was
intended ,
the
period
when
8.
it
under
Once
DOUBLE SALES
Article 1544 - If
the
same
vendees,
the
ownership
shall
have
first
taken
possession
movable
property.
Should
it
be
person acquiring
it
Registry
of
Property.
immovable
who
in
thing
should
have
been
sold
be
transferred
to
the
person
thereof
in
good
faith ,
if
it
property, the
good
faith
ownership shall
first
recorded
to
different
who
may
should
be
belong to
it
in
Should
there
be
no
inscription,
the
ownership
shall
pertain
to
person
who
in
good
faith
who
in
good
faith
was
first
in
possession;
in
the
absence
thereof ,
to
the
person
who
presents
oldest
title,
provided
there
is
good faith.
RURAL BANK OF
the
the
the
the
the
MISSION
ISSUE:
Which
subsequent
but
is
superior,
a
previous
duly
annotated
attachment?
but
unregistered
sale
or
HELD:
The
settled
rule
is
that
levy
on
attachment ,
but
duly
registered,
takes
preference
over
a
prior
unregistered
sale .
This
result
is
a
necessary
consequence
of
the
fact
that
the
property
involved
was
duly
covered
by
the
Torrrens
system
which
works
under
the
24
fundamental
validity
to
principle
that
registration
is
the
operative
the
transferor
creates
a
lien
upon
the
land.
SPOUSES
FACTS:
sale in
SABITSANA
vs.
JUANITO
F.
which
gives
MUERTEGUI
deed
of
On
October
17,
1991,
Alberto
sold
the
lot
to
Juanitos
family
lawyer,
Atty.
Sabitsana,
through
a
notarized
deed
of
sale
of
absolute
sale.
The
sale
was
registered
with
the
Register
of
Deeds
and
correspondingly paid
real property taxes and introduced concrete improvements.
In 1998, Juanito applied for registration of the
Land Act
with the DENR ,
however, Atty. Sabitsana
claiming that
he was the true owner of
the lot.
lot
under the Public
opposed the application
On
April
11,
2000,
Juanito
filed
an
action
for
quieting
of
against
Atty.
Sabitsana
claiming
that
the
latter
bought
the
lot
in
faith
and
was
exercising
acts
of
possession
and
ownership
over
same,
which acts
thus
constitute a cloud over his title.
ISSUES:
1) Whether
Article
1544
on
double
sales
is
in
this
case.
2) Whether
Juanito
has
a
better
right
with
unnotarized
sale
over
the
subsequent
notarized
deed
of
sale
Sabitsana.
deed of
of
Atty.
3)
Whether
consent.
4)
Whether
Juanito
is
entitled
and litigation expenses.
the
sale
is
valid
in
the
for
applies
title
bad
the
absence
the
of
of
marital
award
the
of
Civil
attorneys
Code
does
fees
not
2) YES.
The sale
an
unnotarized
deed
made
via
a
notarized
years
thereafter.
clean
good
title
faith
of the registered
for
value.
owner
to
Juanito was
executed on
Septemer 2, 1981 via
of
sale,
while
the
sale
to
Atty.
Sabitsana
was
document
only
on
October
17,
1991
or
ten
(10)
buyer
Atty.
seller
has
a
better
right
to
Sabitsana
is
null
and
Alberto
was
no
longer
the
void
the
The
fact
that
the
sale
to
Juanito
was
not
notarized
does
not
alter
anything,
since
the
sale
between
him
and
Alberto
remains
valid
nevertheless.
Notarization
or
the
requirement
of
a
public
document
under
the
Civil
Code
is
only
for
convenience
and
not
for
validity
or
enforceability.
3) YES.
Even
admittedly
the
lot
was
a
conjugal
property ,
the
absence
of
the
wifes
signature
and
consent
to
the
deed
did
not
render
the
sale
to
Juanito
absolutely
null
and
void ,
but
merely
voidable.
Since
Alberto
and
his wife were married prior to the effectivity of
the
Family
Code,
Article
173
of
the
Civil
Code
should
apply.
Under
the
said
provision,
the disposition of
conjugal property without the wifes
consent
is not
void but
merely voidable .
In
the absence of
a
decree
annulling
the
deed
of
sale
in
favor
of
Juanito ,
the
same
remains
valid.
to
and
bad
prior
faith.
knowledge
of
the
first
Moreover,
as
Juanitos
family
lawyer,
Atty.
Sabitsana
was
obligation
to
safeguard
his
clients
property
and
not
jeopardize
it .
is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general
agency.
sale
under
Such
25
9.
MACEDA LAW
(Buyers Protection
on
Most
(1)
important
Sales
of
(RA
immovable
6552)
property
on
installments)
features:
After
having
paid installments for
at
is
entitled
to
a
mandatory
grace
every
year
of
installment payments
installments
without
interest.
least
period
made ,
two
of
to
years ,
the
buyer
one
month
for
pay
the
unpaid
If
the
contract
is
cancelled ,
the
seller
shall
refund
to
the
buyer the cash surrender
value
equivalent
to
fifty
percent (50%) of
the total
payments made, and after
five
years
of
installments ,
an
additional
five
percent
(5%)
every
year
but
not
to
exceed
ninety
percent
(90%)
total
payments made.
(2)
In
case
the
installments
paid
were
less
than
2
years ,
the
seller
shall give
the
buyer
period of not less than 60
days .
If
the buyer
fails to pay the installments
due
at
the
expiration
of
the
grace
period,
the
seller
may
cancel
the
contract
after
30
days
from
receipt
by
the
buyer
of
the
notice
of
cancellation
or
demand
for
rescission
by
notarial
act.
a
Contract
despite
of
to
its
SCRA 331
Sell
of
a
certain
property
lack
of
license
to
sell.
at
Flora
had
made
installment
payments
from
March
11,
1992
to
July
1996 in
the
aggregate amount of
P375,295.49 .
She
had defaulted in
succeeding payments.
Moldex
sent
notices
to
Flora
to
update
avail.
Finally,
Moldex
sent
Flora
a
Notarized
Contract to Sell.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether
sell is
2)
What
is
the
valid.
the
contract
right
to
available
sell
to
her
account
but
to
Notice
of
Cancellation
despite
the
lack
Flora
under
the
of
license
Maceda
no
of
to
Law?
Flora
and
the
part
Moldex
of
the
2) Since
Moldex
had
already
sent
Flora
a
Notarized
Notice
of
Cancellation
of
Contract
to
Sell,
the
only
option
available
is
Section
3
(b)
under
Maceda
Law
or
RA
6552,
whereby
Moldex
shall
refund
to
Flora
the
cash
surrender
value
of
her
payments
on
the
property
equivalent to the 50% of the total payments made or P187,647.75.
M. ANGELES
installment
Gatchalian.
payments ,
Angeles
Several
demands
were
made
by
Gatchalian
continually disregarded by Angeles .
Finally, Gatchalian
Notice of Notarial Rescission thru registered mail.
Contract
failed
to
to
Sell
satisfy
from
her
but
the
same
were
served Angeles with a
Consequently,
Angeles
was
furnished
by
Gatchalian
a
demand
letter
demanding her to pay the outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and
occupation of
the house
and lot to
date and to vacate the same .
She
was
informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount
that she is
entitled
to
has
already
been
deducted
with
the
reasonable
value
for
the
use of the properties.
26
ISSUES:
1) Whether
there
is
2) Whether
Angeles
RA 6552.
is
3) Whether
Angeles
installments.
can
HELD: 1) NO.
A
comply
with
the
cancellation and
a
valid
cancellation
entitled
be
to
of
the
ejected
the
benefit
for
valid
and
effective
cancellation
mandatory
twin
requirements
of
refund of
the
cash surrender
Contract
of
to
Maceda
non-payment
Sell.
Law
of
or
monthly
under
RA
6552
must
a
notarized
notice
of
value.
Although there
was a notarial rescission sent thru registered mail
but
it
was
not
accompanied
by
the
refund
of
the
cash
surrender
value
equivalent to
50% of the total payments made.
For
failure
to
refund
the
cash
surrender
value
to
the
defaulting
buyer
Angeles,
Gatchalian
cannot
deduct
the
same
for
the
amount
of
the
rentals
due
to
Gatchalian
as
there
was
nothing
in
the
contract
to
apply compensation under Art. 1279 of the
New Civil Code.
to
of
2) Angeles
is
entitled
to
50%
of
the
total
payments
RA 6552.
3) In
the
absence
between
Gatchalian
and
Thus
the
complaint
for
mandate of
RA 6552.
OPTIMUM
receive
made
the
as
cash
surrender
value
equivalent
provided
for
by
Section 3 (b)
of
a
valid cancellation of the Contract
Angeles ,
the
contract
remains
valid
and
unlawful
detainer
would
be
a
violation
DEVELOPMENT
BANK
vs.
SPOUSES
to Sell
existing .
of
the
JOVELLANOS
Contract
to
Sell
with
house
and
lot
payable
rights ,
A
year
later,
Optimum
issued
a
Cancellation of Contract to Sell
to
Spouses
pay their monthly installments
despite several
title
and
interest
Palmera
for
a
in
the
Notice
of
Delinquency
and
Jovellanos for
their
failure to
written and verbal demands.
A
month
later,
a
final
Demand
Letter
by
Optimum
required
Spouses
Jovellanos
to vacate and
deliver possession of
the subject
property within
seven (7) days, which however remained
unheeded.
from
Optimum
instituted
the final demand
the
action
to vacate.
ISSUE: Whether
the
validity
of
under
RA
6552
lies
within
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
for
unlawful
detainer
within
the
cancellation
of
the
Contract
the
competence or
jurisdiction
HELD: YES.
Under
RA
6552,
the
mechanics
of
cancellation
of
to
Sell
is
based
on
the
amount
of
installments
already
paid
buyer under
the said
contract.
one
year
to
of
Sell
the
Contract
by
the
Since
Jovellanos
had
paid
less
than
two
years
in
installments ,
Section 4 of RA 6552 provides for
three
(3) requisites
before
the
seller
may
actually
cancel
the
subject
contract :
first,
the
buyer
shall
give
the
buyer
a
60-day
grace
period
to
be
reckoned
from
the
date
the
installment
became
due;
second,
the
seller
must
give
the
buyer
a
notice
of
cancellation/demand
for
rescission
by
notarial
act
if
the
buyer
fails
to
pay
the
installments due
at the expiration of the said grace period; and
third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after 30 days from
the
buyers
receipt
of the
said
notice
of
cancellation/demand
for
rescission
by notarial act.
There was
a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell
in
accordance
with
Section
4
of
RA
6552
and
since
Spouses
Jovellanos
had
already
lost
their
right
to
retain
possession of
the
subject
property
as
a
consequence
of
such
cancellation ,
their
refusal
to
vacate
and
turn
over possession to Optimum makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer.
27
10. PRESCRIPTION AND RECONVEYANCE
SPOUSES
SOFRONIO
G.R.
SANTOS
No. 151016,
vs. HEIRS
August
6,
2008,
OF
561
DOMINGA
SCRA
LUSTRE
120
FACTS:
Dominga
Lustre
mortgaged
her
residential
lot
to
Spouses
Santos .
She then sold
the
property
to
Natividad Santos. The cancellation of the
mortgage
and
the
sale of
the
property
were
both
inscribed
in
the
title .
Thereafter, the Spouses Santos transferred the property , by way of sale, to
their
son,
Froilan.
The
heirs
of
Dominga Lustre
filed
a
complaint
for
Declaration
of
inexistence
of
contract,
annulment
of
title and
reconveyance,
averring
that
the
sale
to
Natividad
was
simulated as
Domingas
signature
was
forged
and
that
the
spouses
Santos
also
simulated
the
Deed
of
Sale
transferring
the
property
to
their
son ,
Froilan.
The
Santoses
allege
that the heirs of Dominga Lustres right of action had
prescribed.
ISSUE:
barred
Whether
or
not
by prescription.
the
action
of
the
heirs
of
Dominga
Lustre
is
A
person
acquiring
property
through
fraud
becomes ,
by
operation
of
law,
a trustee
of
an
implied trust
for
the
benefit
of
the
real
owner
of
the
property.
An
action
for
reconveyance
based
on
implied
trust
prescribes
in ten (10) years.
The
prescriptive
to
reconvey
the
possession
of
the
of
the
property,
him.
When
an
action
be
in
a
nature
of
imprescriptible.
period
applies
only
if
there
is
an
actual
need
property
as
when
the
plaintiff
is
not
in
property .
Otherwise,
if
plaintiff
is
in
possession
prescription
does
not
commence
to
run
against
for
reconveyance
is
a
suit
for
quieting
nonetheless
filed ,
it
would
of
title ,
an
action
that
is
to
to
be
the
quiet
in
actual
possession
of
owner
thereof
may
wait
title
is
attacked
before
in
or
owner
is
title
to
in
the
actual
possession
property ,
does
a
piece
of
land
until
his
possession
taking
steps
to
claiming
to
is
disturbed
vindicate
his
vs. GREGORIA
TAGUFA
FACTS: Spouses
Epifanio Tagufa
owned an
untitled
property
containing
area of
539
square meters.
They
mortgaged
the
property
to
DBP.
sold
For
it
failure to
redeem
the
property,
to Atty.
Romulo Marquez.
DBP
foreclosed
On
April
4,
2002,
Mariflor,
the
daughter
of
American
citizen,
purchased
the
subject
property
from
executing
a
SPA
in
favor
of her brother , Runsted,
that
the
latter
will
reconvey
the
said
property
to
demanded.
the
same
an
and
Epifanio
and
an
Atty.
Marquez
by
with
an
agreement
his
sister
when
Mariflor
discovered that
the
same unregistered property
was
titled
the
name
of
Gregoria,
wife
of
Runsted,
under
OCT
No.
P-84609
virtue
of
a free
patent application before
the
DENR.
in
by
28
Because of
fraud,
recovery of property of
Gregoria
a
collateral
principle
of
claimed
that
the
attack
on
the
indefeasibility
of
a
ISSUE:
Whether
collateral attack
HELD: NO. In
respected
as
An
personam,
registered
or
the
Mariflor
instituted
an
the
subject
property.
action
action
for
available
under the
reconveyance
action for
reconveyance
would
title ,
which
was
proscribed
Torrens title.
the
action
for
reconveyance
on
the
validity
of
the
title.
a
complaint
incontrovertible
for
constitutes
for
reconveyance , the
and
is not
being
amount
under
to
the
indirect
or
registration
is
an
decree of
questioned.
reconveyance
is a
recognized
remedy ,
an
to
a
person
whose
property
has
been
Torrens system
in
anothers
name.
What
is
being
sought
is
the
erroneously
registered
in anothers
one with a better right.
The
fact
that
Gregoria
was
able to secure
not operate
to vest
ownership upon
her
of
Registration
not
create
or
ownership.
action
in
wrongfully
transfer
of
the
property
wrongfully
name
to its
rightful
owner
or to
If
the registration of
the
land
is
fraudulent , the
person
name
the
land
is
registered
holds
it
as
a
mere
trustee ,
real
owner
is
entitled
to
file
an
action
for
reconveyance
property.
does
and
of
a
piece
of
land
vest
title,
because
it
a
title
in
the
subject
under
the
Torrens
is
not
a
mode
in whose
and
the
of
the
her name
land.
System
does
of
acquiring
A
certificate of
title
is
merely
an
evidence
of
ownership
or
title
over
the
particular
property
described
thereon.
It
cannot
be
used
to
protect
a
usurper
from the true
owner,
nor
can it
be
used
as
a
shield
for
the
commission
of
fraud ,
neither
it
permits
one
to
enrich
himself
at the
expense of
others.
Its
issuance
in
favor
of
a
particular
person
does
not
foreclose
the
possibility that
the
real property
may be co-owned
with
person
not
named
in
the
certificate
or
that
it
may
be
held
in
trust
for
another
person by
the
registered owner.
11.
ADVERSE
SPOUSES
G.R.
CLAIM
JESUS
No.
CHING
156076,
vs.
September
SPOUSES
17,
2008,
ADOLFO
565
SCRA
ENRILE
402
FACTS:
Spouses Jesus Ching purchased from Raymunda a
property in Las
Pias
City.
The
sale
was
perfected
upon
delivery
of
a
duly
notarized
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
with
the
owners
duplicate copy
of
the
TCT
and
they
immediately
took
physical
possession of
the
subject
property .
The
couple
failed
to
register
the
sale
and
instead
they
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Adverse
Claim
and the same was
annotated at the back
of
the
title.
Three
years
after
the
sale,
Spouses
Ching
received a
Notice
of
Levy
on
Attachment
and
Writ
of
Execution
on
account
of
court
decision
in
favor
of
Spouses
Adolfo
against
the
vendor
Raymunda .
Spouses
Jesus
Ching
filed
a
petition
to
remove
cloud
or
quiet
title
to
real
property,
however,
it
was
countered
by
Spouses
Adolfo
that
the
Annotated
Adverse
Claim
had
already
prescribed
after
a
lapse
of
thirty
(30) days
from
the
date
of
registration.
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
the
levy
on
prevail over
the
Adverse
Claim
earlier
the
title
by
the
mere
lapse
of
30
petition
in
court for its cancellation.
attachment
later
annotated
shall
annotated
at
the
back
of
days
and
even
without
any
HELD. NO.
A
notice
of
Adverse
Claim
remains
valid
even
after
the
lapse
of
the
30-day
period
as
provided
by
Section
70
of
PD
1529.
As
long
as
there
is
yet
no
petition
for
cancellation
for
its
cancellation,
the
notice
of
adverse
claim
remains
subsisting.
After
the
lapse
of
30
days ,
the
annotation
of
the
adverse
claim
may
be
cancelled
upon
filing
of
a
verified
petition
by
the
party
in
interest.
29
The
law
does
not
require
a
person
dealing
with
the
owner
of
registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on
the
notices
of
the
encumbrances
on
the
property
annotated
on
the
certificate
of
title
or
absence of
any
annotation .
Here,
the
adverse
claim
is
annotated
at
the
back
of
title
coupled
with
the
fact
that
the
Spouses
Ching
are
in
possession
of
the
disputed
property.
Spouses
Adolfo
should
have
put
in
guard
and
required
them to ascertain the property offered to them has already been sold to
another
to
prevent
injury
to
prior
innocent
buyers.
NAVOTAS
INDUSTRIAL
G.R.
No.
159212,
CORPORATION
September
12,
vs.
GERMAN
2005,
469
D.
SCRA
CRUZ
530
ROGELIA
No.
130352,
November
3, 1998,
BEN &
298
ESTHER ONG
SCRA
388
ALFREDO
G.R.
SAJONAS
No. 102377,
vs.
COURT
July 5, 1996,
OF
258
APPEALS
SCRA 79
The
general
rule
it
that
a
person
dealing
with
registered
land
is
not
required
to
go
behind
the
register
to
determine
the
condition
of
the
property .
However,
such
person
is
charged
with
notice
on
the
face
of
the
register
or
certificate
of
title.
A person who deals with
encumbrances
including
adverse
12.
RIGHT
by
the
liens
and
OF FIRST REFUSAL
have
been
renting
and
occupying the lot owned
The former built the
house
on
the
subject
lot
lease agreement
with
Gaspar.
When
Gaspar
died,
the
Victorino married to
Esther.
subject
property
was
inherited
by
his
son,
In
the
1980s,
Victorino
wanted
the
Estanislao
family
to
vacate
the
said property, but the tenants refused because of laws
allegedly prohibited
their ejectment therefrom. Resultantly,
Estanislao, with due notice to Victorino,
deposited the amount of monthly rentals
at
Allied Bank under the savings
account in
the name of Victorino.
In
couple
Hence,
remove
the interim, a
Deed of
Donation
was
executed by the Victorino
in
favor
of
their
daughter
Norma
married
to
Damiano
Gudito.
in
October
1994,
Spouses
Gudito
notified
Estanislao
family
to
their house
and vacate the premises within 3 months.
When
Estanislao
the Spouses
Gudito
them.
ISSUES:
family
failed
to
comply
with
filed a
complaint for unlawful
1)
Whether
the
the
Deed of
2)
Whether
the
right
of
Donation.
right
of
possession
first
refusal
is
the
demand
to
detainer/ejectment
established
applies
to
by
vacate,
against
virtue
of
Estanislao.
HELD:
1)
YES.
The
Deed
of
Donation
had
been
prepared
and
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
is
vested
with
public
interest ,
the
sanctity
of
which
deserves
to
be
upheld
unless
overwhelmed
by
clear
and convincing evidence.
30
Thus, the donation made by
of their
right as owner of the
are
legally
entitled to the said
the
2) NO.
The
owner of the
right
of
first
property intends
refusal
applies
to sell
it to
only
to
a
third
a
case
party.
where
Since
the
subject
property
was
donated
by
the
Victorino
couple
to
their
daughter
Norma
and
her
husband ,
Damiano
Gudito,
their
right
to
possess
the
subject
property
for
their
own
use
as
family
residence
cannot be
denied.
13.
QUIETING
SEVERINO
OF
TITLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Severino
The
two
137
bought
two
(2)
lots
are
part
of
After
the
sale,
Severino introduced
certain
improvements
and
started
to
reside
therein
in
1970 .
Since
then
he
actual and physical possession of the
said
two (2) lots.
However,
on
December
7,
1968,
two
months
sold
the
entire
subdivision
including
the
two
Subsequently,
Galeos
informed
Severino
about
the
advised him to pay the
balance of the purchase
lots
directly to
Amores.
lots
on
an
Spring
Village
on
has
said
been
after
the
sale ,
Galeos
(2)
lots
to
Amores.
sale
to
Amores
and
price of the
two
(2)
Thereafter,
the latter
Nemenio
refused
A
complaint
Severino.
for
demanded
from
to do so.
quieting
of
of
in
the
his
Severino
title
was
lots
in
Nemenio.
sale
of
titles
to
the
two
name,
he
visited
to
vacate
filed
by
title
is
the
said
Nemenio
(2)
the
lots
against
ISSUES:
(1) Whether
remedy.
(2)
Whether
the
Amores
action
is
(3) Whether
Nemenio
upon
his
reliance in
HELD: (1) YES. Quieting
removal
of
any
cloud
title to real
property.
for
a
is
the
of
title
upon
or
quieting
purchaser
of
in
good
also
a
purchaser
indefeasibility of the
is
a
doubt
the
best
faith.
in
good
faith
Torrens Title.
common
law
or
uncertainty
remedy
for
with
respect
the
to
Its
purpose is to
secure an
adjudication
that
a claim
of
title
or
an
interest
in
property,
adverse
to
that
of
the
complainant,
invalid,
so
that
the
complainant
and those
claiming under
him may
forever afterward
free from
any
danger
of
hostile
claim.
to
is
be
In
an
action for
quieting of
title ,
the competent
court
is
tasked
to
determine
the
respective
rights
of
the
complainant
and
other
claimants
not
only
to
place
things
in
their
proper
place
but
to
make the one
who has
no
rights to
said
immovable ,
respect
and not
to
disturb
the
other ,
but
also for
the
benefit
of
both , so that he
who has the
right would see every
cloud
of
doubt over the
property
dissipated, and he
could
afterwards without
fear
introduce the improvements
he
may
desire,
to
use
and
even
to
abuse
the
property
as
he
deems best.
(2) NO.
Amores
did
not
act
in
good
faith
when
he
bought
two
disputed lots, however, when he
registered his
title, the
preponderance
of
evidence
supports
the
finding
that
he
already
had
knowledge
of
the
previous
sale
of
the
disputed
lots
to
Severino .
Such
knowledge
tainted
his
registration with
bad
faith.
31
The prior
registration
of
does
not
by
itself
confer
property.
the
disputed property by the second
buyer
ownership
or
a
better
right
over
the
Under
belong
to
registry of
ownership
in
good
Article
1544,
the
purchaser
property.
the
who
of
an
immovable
faith
registers
it
property
first
in
For a
second
buyer to
successfully invoke the protection
1544
of
the
Civil
Code ,
he
must
possess
good
faith
registration of
the
deed
of
conveyance
covering
the
same.
shall
the
by Article
until
the
ELIAS
GALLAR
vs.
certificate of
law
cannot
title
be
is not
entitled to
used as a
shield
HERMENEGILDA
the
for
HUSAIN
Teodoro
sold his
within six
years
shortly
after
the
right to Graciana,
land
in
a
On
January
28,
1919,
Serapio transferred his
deed
of
sale,
Graciana
subsequently transferred her
rights to the land to
Elias
2, 1919 in
exchange for
one
cow
in a
private
document.
on
April
On
the
same
occasion,
April
together
with the
TCT
was
delivered
the
so
bar
On
October
10,
1960,
after
heirs
of
Teodoro
to
execute
that he could get
a
transfer
On
the
other
Elias action.
hand,
the
2,
to
execution
sister
of
1919,
Elias.
of
the
Teodoro.
possession
of
41
years,
Elias
filed
a
a
deed
of
conveyance
certificate of
title.
heirs
of
Teodoro
invoked
the
suit
against
in
his
favor
prescription
ISSUES:
(1)
the
Is
Elias
quieting
(2)
Has
suit
one
of
title?
the
action
for
specific
performance
or
one
for
prescribed?
(3)
If the heirs
of Teodoro
had been the
property (instead of Elias)
would the answer
possessor
be
the
of the
same?
Elias
is
in
possession
of
(3)
If
the
heirs
of
Teodoro
were
property,
Elias
action
would
have
been
action would
not
be one to quiet
title ,
property
which
must
be
brought
within
limitation governing such action.
the
land,
the
action
in
possession
of
prescribed
for
then
but one to recover
the
statutory
period
is
the
the
real
of
never
and
registered.
the
latter
Possession
has
been
Sapto executed
TCT # T-5701
of
in
the
the
land
a
in
land
was
possession
to
32
Thereafter,
Constantino died
death
was
survived
by
his
Vicente.
without
widow
any
and
issue. Samuel
upon
children ,
Laureana
his
and
On
October
19,
1954,
the
widow
of
Samuel,
together
with
their
two children, filed an
action for
the
recovery of the
parcel
of land sold by their predecessors to Apolonio in
1931.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether
an
action for
quieting of
title
would
compel
the sellers successors-in-interest
to execute the proper deed
of conveyance in 1954
in favor of
the buyer.
(2)
Has
the
action
(3)
Whether
the
question, although
binding?
prescribed?
deed
of
was
never
sale
over
registered, is
the
still
land
valid
in
and
HELD: (1)
YES. The
action for quieting of
title
is to remove the cloud
cast
upon the
buyers
ownership
by the refusal of the sellers successorsin-interest
to
recognize
the sale
by
their
predecessors.
Thus, Apolonio,
it
from
that
date
execute
the
proper
may be
registered.
(2)
action
NO. Since
DOES
NOT
being
may
deed
a buyer of
the
land in 1931 who
possessed
still
compel
the
sellers successors-in-interest
to
of
conveyance
in
1954
so
that
the
deed
Apolonio
has
been in possession
PRESCRIBE
or
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
of
the
property ,
the
(3)
YES.
Since
the
property
has
remained
and
still
in
the
possession
of
the
vendee
of
the
property ,
it
is
clear
that
conveyance
between buyer
and his vendors
is valid
and binding upon the
vendors ,
and
is
equally binding
and
effective
against the
heirs
of the
vendors .
To
hold
otherwise
would
make
of
the
Torrens
system
a
shield
for
the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs.
HERMINIO M.
DE
February 11,
FACTS: Sometime in
1980, Serafin and
Josefino
credit
oil
and
lubricating products
from FSPC ,
to
pay for their
credit
purchases
from
FSPC.
FSPC
filed
Josefino
before
a
the
complaint
RTC
of
for
sum
Manila.
After
trial,
decision
was
rendered
to
pay
their
outstanding
obligation
to
final
and
executory.
On
by
TCT
Guzman.
to
on
June
30,
#
3531
INC.
of
de
but
Guzman
purchased on
they
eventually
failed
money
against
Serafin
finding
Serafin
and
Josefino liable
FSPC
and
the
judgment
became
1983,
FSPC
levied
upon
a
in
the
name
of
Spouses
parcel
of
land
covered
Serafin
&
Amelia
de
At
the
public
auction,
the
sheriff
awarded
the
certificate
Tabangao Realty
as
the
highest
bidder and the same
was
TCT # 3531 on
April 13,
1988.
The
Spouses
De
Guzman
within one
year
from registration
TCT
# 3531.
and
did
not
redeem
the
subject
of
the
Sheriffs
Certificate of
of
sale
annotated
property
Sale
on
On
October
19,
2001,
upon
the
deaths
of
Spouses
De
Guzman ,
their
heirs
filed
a
complaint for
quieting of title on
the ground
that
the
Sheriffs
Certificate of
Sale
has lost
its effectivity as it had
been
terminated and
extinguished by
prescription, laches and
estoppel, since more
than
13
years
having
elapsed
from
its
registration
on
April
13,
1988
without
the
buyer
taking
any
step
to
consolidate
its
ownership
and/or
take
possession of
the property.
ISSUE;
instant
Whether
case.
the
action
for
quieting
of
title
would
prosper
HELD:
NO.
For
an
action
to
quiet
title
to
prosper ,
two
requisites must
concur:
(1) the plaintiff
or
complainant
has
equitable
title
or
interest
in
the
real
property
subject
of
in
the
indispensable
a
legal
or
the
action ;
33
and
(2)
the
deed,
casting
a
cloud
on
inoperative
despite its
claim,
his
prima
encumbrances,
or
proceeding
claimed
to
be
title
must
be
shown
to
be
in
fact
or
facie appearance of
validity or legal
efficacy.
Respondent
Tabangao
was
already substituted to
and
acquired
all
the
rights,
title,
interest,
and
claims
of
the
Spouses
De
Guzman
to
the
subject
property on April
13, 1989 ,
when the one year
redemption period
expired.
Upon the deaths of Amelia de
Guzman on January 1, 1997 and
her husband
Serafin de
Guzman on
April
23, 2001,
they had no more
rights, title, interest
and claim to the
subject
property
on by
succession
to complainants as their heirs.
The
execution
of
the
final
deed
of
sale
and/or
conveyance
to
Tabangao is a mere
formality and confirmation of the title
already vested
in
respondent
under
Rule
39,
Section 33
of
the
Rules
of
Court .
There
is
nothing in
the
rules requiring the institution
of a
separate action for
execution
of
such
a
deed .
Therefore,
no
prescription
period
for
any
action has begun to run.
CORP.
CORP.
FACTS: A
complaint
for
quieting of
title
was
filed by Phil-Ville against
CLT
claiming
that
it
has
been
in
actual,
open,
notorious,
public,
physical
and
continuous
possession
of
the
16
parcels
of
land before
1980
up to the
present .
It fenced said parcels
of land in
1980
and
1991.
On
the
other
of
land
known
as
No. 177013.
hand ,
CLT
Lot
26 of
claimed to be the
owner
of
a
parcel
the
Maysilo Estate as evidenced by TCT
However, CLTs
TCT No. 177013, although apparently valid as
effective ,
is
in truth and in
fact, invalid and ineffective
and
unless
declared
by
the Court, will
inevitably prejudice Phil-Villes
title
over its 16 parcels of
land,
as said
title
of
CLT
is
a potential cause
of
litigation between
Phil-Ville
and
CLT
as
both
parties
are
claiming
title
to
the
subject
properties
when
CLTs
TCT
#
T-177013
actually
overlaps
the
16
parcels
of land of
Phil-Villes 16 TCTs.
The
RTC
declared
Phil-Ville
as
the
true,
absolute
and
legitimate
owner
of
the
sixteen (16)
parcels
of
land
and
CLTs
TCT
#
T-177013
was
declared null
and void.
It
was
found out that CLT
purchased
or
acquired its TCT # T-177013
on
December 10, 1988
from its
predecessor
Estrellita
Hipolito who
acquired the
land covered
by her
TCT # R-17994
by
virtue
of
an
approved
Compromise
Agreement
between
her
and
Atty.
Jose B. Dimson wherein the latter
transferred
to
Hipolito on September 2,
1976 Lot
26
of
the
Maysilo
Estate
covered
by
TCT
#
R-15166 ,
which
property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of
an court
order
dated
June 13, 1966
awarding to
him as his
attorneys
fees
whatever
remained undisposed of in Lots
25-A , 26, 27, 28
and 29
of the
Maysilo Estate of
Maria De La Concepcion Vidal . Finally, the LRTC
Verification
Committee
found
that
nothing
more
was
left
for the heirs
of
Maria
dela
Concepcion
Vidal
attorneys
fees
and
consequently,
Dimson
to
convey
to
Hipolito .
null
and void
as no land had
which
was
derived
from TCT #
to
convey
to
Jose
R.
Dimson
as
his
nothing
at
all
was
left
for
Jose
R.
In
short,
Hipolitos
TCT
No.
R-17974
is
been registered and
TCT
No. T-177013
T-17974
is similarly null and void.
imposes
# T-177013
land.
cloud
on
Phil-Villes
titles
to
HELD: YES.
Quieting of title is common law remedy for the
removal of
any
cloud,
doubt,
or
uncertainty
affecting
title
to
real
property
or
any
interest
but
is
in
truth
and
in
fact
invalid ,
ineffective,
voidable
or
unenforceable,
and
may
be
prejudicial
to
said
title ,
an
action
may
be
brought
to
remove such cloud
or to
quiet
title.
In
requisites
equitable
and
(2)
order
that
an
action
for
quieting
of
title
may
prosper ,
two
must
concur: (1) the
plaintiff
or
complainant
has
a
legal
or
title
or
interest
in
the
real
property
subject
of
the
action ;
the
deed,
claim,
encumbrance,
or
proceeding
claimed
to
be
34
casting
cloud
on
his
title
inoperative despite its
prima
must
facie
be
shown
to
be
in
fact
invalid
or
appearance of
validity or
legal efficacy.
Both
requisites
in
order
for
an
action
for
quieting
of
title
have
been met: (1) Phil-Ville
had
established its
equitable
title
or
interest
in
the
16 parcels of land subject of the
action ; and (2) TCT No. T-177013,
found
to
overlap
titles
to
said
properties
of
Phil-Ville ,
was
previously
declared
invalid.
VILMA I.
QUINTOS
vs.
PELAGIA
In
(10)
NICOLAS
a
parcel
318717.
of
land
1990,
Spouses
Ibarra
had
already
passed
away ,
children
ownership over
the
subject property.
Having
failed
to
secure
instead
resorted
to
executing
a
2004 to
transfer
the property in
over
of
#
I.
SCRA 482
consisting
leaving
to
of
their
a
decision
for
partition,
the
siblings
Deed
of
Adjudication
on
September
21,
favor of the ten (10)
siblings.
Subsequently,
respondents
(7
siblings)
sold
their
7/10
the property in favor of the Spouses Candelario.
undivided
share
On
June
1,
2009,
the
petitioners
(remaining
3
siblings)
filed
a
complaint
for
quieting
of
title
against
the
respondents
and
Spouses
Candelario
and
alleged that they have been
in
adverse , open,
continuous,
and
uninterrupted
possession
of
the
property
for
over
four
(4)
decades
and there
are entitled
to
equitable title.
However
in
2005,
the
with
Avico
Lending Investor
of
the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether
ownership over
the
the
respondents
entered into
over the
subject
matter
petitioners
property.
were
able
common
affecting
a
Contract of
Lease
without
the
objection
to
prove
equitable
title
or
law
title
remedy
for the removal
to
real property.
For
an
action
to
quiet
title
to
prosper ,
two
indispensable
requisites
must
concur,
namely: (1) the
plaintiff
or
complainant
has
a
legal
or
equitable
title to
or
interest in the
real property subject of the
action ,
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
doubt on the title must
be shown to be in
fact invalid
or
inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or efficacy.
IMELDA SYJUCO
G.R. No.
FACTS:
The
Syjucos
situated
in
Caloocan
26, 1984.
vs. FELISA D.
BONIFACIO
are
City
the
registered
owners
of
a
parcel
of
land
covered
by
TCT
# T-108530
issued
on
March
They
have been in
open,
continuous and
uninterrupted possession of
the
subject
land,
by
themselves
or
through
their
predecessors-in-interest
since 1926 and they
have been paying the real property taxes over the
subject land since
1949.
Sometime
in
1994,
Syjucos
learned
that
the
purported
owner
subject
land was
Felisa Bonifacio who
was able to
register the
land
in
her
name under TCT
No. 265778
on March 29, 1993.
Bonifacios
1992
by RTC,
to Segregate.
title
was
issued
pursuant
to
Branch 125 of
Caloocan City
an
in
of
the
subject
order
dated
October
8,
the Petition for Authority
For
unexplained
reasons,
the
Registry
of
Deeds
of
Caloocan
issued
TCT
No.
265778
to
Bonifqacio
on
March
29,
1993
even
before
RTC Branch 125
declared its Order
dated October
8, 1992
granting Bonifacios
petition for
segregation final
and
executory on
April 6,
1993.
35
On
July
28,
1994,
to
protect
their
rights
and
interest
over
the
subject
property,
the
Syjucos
lodged
a
special
civil
action
for
quieting
of
title
especially
praying
for
declaration
of
nullity
and
cancellation
of
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778.
Subsequently,
the
land
to
VSD Realty.
by TCT # 285313
in
on
As a result, the
April 25, 1995.
Syjucos
discovered
that
Bonifacio
sold
Bonifacios TCT # 265778
was
cancelled
the name of
VSD Realty.
Syjucos
amended
their
petition
the
and
impleading
subject
replaced
VSD
Realty
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether
an
action
for
attack
on
the
certificates
of
Realty.
HELD:
attack
(2)
Whether
an
action
for
(1)
on
YES.
The
instituted
a
certificate of title
quieting
of
title
is
title
of
Bonifacio
quieting
of
title
has
action
in
this
case
to
real
property.
a
direct
and
VSD
prescribed.
is
clearly
direct
In
their complaint for
quieting of
title,
the
Syjucos
specifically pray
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
and/or
cancellation
of
Bonifacios
TCT
#
265778
and VSD TCT # 285313 over the subject land.
The
relief
sought
is
certainly
feasible
since
the
objective
of
an
action for
quieting of title
as
provided under
Article
476
of the
Civil
Code, is
precisely to
quiet
title, remove, invalidate, annul and/or
nullify a
cloud
on
title
to
real
property
or
any
interest
therein
by
reason
of
any
instrument,
record,
claims,
encumbrance
or
proceeding
which
is
apparently
valid
or
effective
but
is
in
truth
and
in
fact ,
ineffective,
voidable or
unenforceable
and may be prejudicial to the title.
(2) NO. It
is
an
established
doctrine
in
land
ownership
dispute
that
the
filing
of
an
action
to
quiet
title
is
imprescriptible
if
the
disputed
property
is
in
the
possession
of
the
plaintiff.
One
who
is
in
actual
possession
of
a
piece
of
land
claiming
to
be
the
owner
thereof
may
wait
his
possession
is
disturbed
or
his
title
is
attacked
before
taking
steps
to
vindicate
his
right ,
the
reason
for
this
rule
being
that
his
undisturbed
possession
gives
him
a
continuing
right
to
seek
the
aid
of
a court
of
equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse
claim
of
a
third
party
and
its
effects
on
his
own
title ,
which
right
can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
GODSPEED