ART 1, FAMILY CODE; CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO,
respondent.

petitioner,

vs.

EDDIE

xxx

P.

ARQUERO,

By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero,

Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for
immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the
MTC Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband
and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree
May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the lettercomplaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate[2] reflecting the names of respondent
and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of
a marriage contract[3] showing that complainant and Dedje Irader contracted
marriage on July 10, 1979.
By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an answer
to the complaint.[4]
By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of
immorality, claiming that it is just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of
complainants hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife.[6] Attached to the answer
were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance[7] executed by complainant in
favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint he had much earlier filed
against her, and complainants sworn statement[8] dated September 13, 1994
acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent
claims, support his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious
scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.
Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise
instituted a criminal complaint against him for adultery which was, however, dismissed
after preliminary investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with
another woman.
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive Judge
Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for
investigation, report and recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara having retired during the
pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y.
Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1)
verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and baptismal certificate submitted
by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the
said baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such
other verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and
recommendation thereon.[10]
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that
the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that
respondent is guilty of the charge.[11] The report focuses on the non-appearance of
complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:

Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per
reliable information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons are no longer
residing in their given address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the
return of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the
baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the
respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had not been testified to by
Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries contained therein, this Court had not
received adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent
herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him, hence, he should be
absolved from any liability.

x x x[12] (Quoted verbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed,
recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended
from office for a period of one (1) year without pay.[13] Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single
man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant,
attended with sexual union (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his
testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje
I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a Kasunduan or agreement
entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either
of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court employee
respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite it having been
notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from her husband
during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an
immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-court-employee at
that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees which provides that public employees of which
respondent is one, xxx shall at times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and
sling mud at complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994,
acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that
respondent would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case.
Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation
and an illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a
relationship with another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein
complainant. However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors only
Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said
affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidence in
his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.

Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the
baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and exintimate friend, he answered, I did not. Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer,
we could infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility that said
child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her paternity.
x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).
While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present case,
the same does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have
been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and
ascertain the truth thereof.[15] For it has an interest in the conduct of those in the
service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its
efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants desistance from
prosecuting the case he initiated.[16]
On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name as father in the baptismal
certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and,
therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations
with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person baptized.
[17] It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to
wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the
truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.[18]
By respondents own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with
complainants wife:
Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Court by
your counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short lived relation
between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression?
A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways already, I
jokingly informed her that she is now being separated, she is now single and is free to
have some commitment. So, I courted her and she accepted me, so we have a short
lived relation and after that we parted ways.
Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?
A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.
Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you
mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?
A: Yes maam.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainants wife with the
spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which
was embodied in a Kasunduan, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced
hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong
gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Brokes (sic) Point,
Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable
lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama
bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang
mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang
makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa
mang hukuman;
x x x[20] (Italics supplied).
Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought
to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity
of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code
provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of
public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.[21]
Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the States policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.[22]
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in
the judiciary.[23] That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of
morality and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.[24] Their
conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility,[25] characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service.[26] It must
be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals.[27]
There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their private
morals.[28]
Respondents act of having illicit relations with complainants wife is, within the purview
of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for
a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense,
his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court of Brookes Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting
that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.

ART 2, FAMILY CODE; CONSENT OF PARTIES; BREACH OF

PROMISE

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and
his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful).
(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and
sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the
civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate
is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First
Reassignment:

Name

consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Cannot

Be

Changed

On

the

Ground

of

Sex

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change
of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be
legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment:
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need
for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees
(such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term
status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts
(such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization),

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn
child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex
is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a wellknown meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity:
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition
were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of
the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its coequal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D.

ALBIOS, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing
the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the

ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February
5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties
never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship
and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the
benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should
be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from
the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits.
In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose"
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was
modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was
not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be
noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent
for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to
stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to
obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that
a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was
not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may
go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent,
which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in
jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will
put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is

ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or

cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the
CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not
be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of

consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such
as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound.
The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios
and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that
only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples
to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same
Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another
man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any
of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may
only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail
to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply
have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again
abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of
Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with
said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness
to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon
her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of
alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to
P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as
the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering

defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral
damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees
for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed
Civil Code:

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to
the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased
to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these
articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed
Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other
particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might
arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that
creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphl.nt

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a
teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost
ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she
gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when
after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married
one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about
October 4, 1954.

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of
Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said
Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract
marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought.

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a
minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the
celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without
just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses
which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or
by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of
the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action
for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is
not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of
the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable
for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.

The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must
be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the
marriage.

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on
account of the promise of the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De
Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the
drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth
in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and

unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of
action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida

1945 pp. 1342 1344

Maryland

1945 pp. 1759 1762

Nevada

1943 p. 75

Maine

1941 pp. 140 141

New Hampshire
California

1941 p. 223

1939 p. 1245

Massachusetts

1938 p. 326

Indiana

1936 p. 1009

Michigan

1935 p. 201

New York

1935

Pennsylvania

p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of
years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the
wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p.
2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of
the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for
breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is,
accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires
in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be
recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil
Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and
the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of
the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirtysix (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a
life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner,

then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love"
for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly
pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income
that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after
the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral
damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the
second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and
medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing
expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to
cost in this instance. It is so ordered.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X.

VELEZ, defendant-appellant
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it
cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail
to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted
for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following
day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan
de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable element. The
court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6,
1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting
a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits
attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense
against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having
been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of
merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was
null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out
that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he
was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil.
787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is
not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from
the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law
may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8).
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed,
with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6;
Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My

mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day,
the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant
would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this
case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:

ART 4, FAMILY CODE; REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs. HON. LUCIO P.
PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDABAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B.
Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married
just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato
Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina
Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that
he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to
him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed
to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy
of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not
illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of
Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the

Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with
the other couples.
The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days
after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already
started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With
respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the
start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of
him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the
marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed
a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6
years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only
18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years
already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must
have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to
believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit
in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest
such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office
of the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be
solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances: Sc

ART 7, FAMILY CODE; WHO CAN SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997,
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside
of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married
and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in
J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our
principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote
the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that
my marriage was not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to
inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of
the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to
his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment,
complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in
said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there,
first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from
Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for
the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former
Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean
were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28,
1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage
license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties
go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would
complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and
venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid
marriage, which respondent found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent
realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good
faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may
be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also
occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of respondent: Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent
left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the
marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate
copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers
relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and
private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly,

respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents
and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her
bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for
a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the
country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so
far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997
marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said
husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems
reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with
the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the
public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing
documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the above
mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would
confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies
of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,
1998 found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that
the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing
out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the
authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family
Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at
a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed
to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and
to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days
after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage
which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted
more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position,
he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that
the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based
merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the
evaluation report of the OCA well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution
thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides,
among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics
ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the
judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was
at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request
made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized
outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record
is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of
Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent
realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,
"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of

the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate
nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization
of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by
marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray
respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed
towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty,
ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to
preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of
judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed
to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus
respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.[7] Scnc m
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.[8]

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in
its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure
that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family
Code which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either
of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent
Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged
with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt
a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
Juris
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.