Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16275
Carrascoso
for
petitioner.
FIRST DIVISION
they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they cannot
be faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAWS; PRESIDENTIAL
DECREES ON EMERGENCY COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCE;
REQUISITES FOR ENTITLEMENT TO ALLOWANCES PROVIDED
THEREUNDER. The various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs to wit:
PDs 1614, 1634, 1678 and 1713, provide on "Allowances of Fulltime
Employees . . ." that "Employees shall be paid in full the required monthly
allowance regardless of the number of their regular working days if they
incur no absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the
amounts corresponding to the absences may be deducted from the monthly
allowance . . ." ; and on "Leave of Absence Without Pay", that "All covered
employees shall be entitled to the allowance provided herein when they are
on
leave
of
absence
with
pay."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "NO WORK, NO PAY" PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE CASE
AT BAR. It is beyond dispute that the petitioners members are full-time
employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of the number of
working days or teaching hours in a month. However, they find themselves in
a most peculiar situation whereby they are forced to go on leave during
semestral breaks. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work
interruptions beyond the employees control. The duration of the semestral
break varies from year to year dependent on a variety of circumstances
affecting at times only the private respondent but at other times all
educational institutions in the country. As such, these breaks cannot be
considered as absences within the meaning of the law for which deductions
may be made from monthly allowances. The "No work, no pay" principle
does not apply in the instant case. The petitioners members received their
regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the aforequoted provision
of law that it contemplates a "no work" situation where the employees
voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, certainly do
not, ad voluntatem, absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather,
indication
of
their
being
unsubstantiated
by
evidence
DECISION
5.
Allowance
for
Unworked
Days.
"a) All covered employees whether paid on a monthly or daily basis shall be
entitled to their daily living allowance when they are paid their basic
wage."cralaw virtua1aw library
x
This provision, at once refutes the above contention. It is evident that the
intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages.
Hence, we have the principle of "No pay, no ECOLA" the converse of which
finds application in the case at bar. Petitioners cannot be considered to be
on leave without pay so as not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated,
the petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of November and
December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral break. This, in
itself, is a tacit recognition of the rather unusual state of affairs in which
teachers find themselves. Although said to be on forced leave, professors
and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened with the task of working during a
period of time supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are
papers to correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods
within which to submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by
the respondent to be on leave, the semestral break could not be used
effectively for the teachers own purposes for the nature of a teachers job
imposes upon him further duties which must be done during the said period
of time. Learning is a never ending process. Teachers and professors must
keep abreast of developments all the time. Teachers cannot also wait for the
opening of the next semester to begin their work. Arduous preparation is
necessary for the delicate task of educating our children. Teaching involves
not only an application of skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a
responsibility which entails self dedication and sacrifice. The task of teaching
ends not with the perceptible efforts of the petitioners members but goes
beyond the classroom: a continuum where only the visible labor is relieved
by academic intermissions. It would be most unfair for the private
respondent to consider these teachers as employees on leave without pay to
suit its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue availing of their
services as they prepare for the next semester or complete all of the last
semesters requirements. Furthermore, we may also by analogy apply the
principle enunciated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code to
wit:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
the place of work or if the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and
gainfully in the employees own interest." (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners members in the case at bar, are exactly in such a situation.
The semestral break scheduled is an interruption beyond petitioners control
and it cannot be used "effectively nor gainfully in the employees interest.
Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as "hours worked." For
this, the teachers are paid regular salaries and, for this, they should be
entitled to ECOLA. Not only do the teachers continue to work during this
short recess but much less do they cease to live for which the cost of living
allowance is intended. The legal principles of "No work, no pay; No pay, no
ECOLA" must necessarily give way to the purpose of the law to augment the
income of employees to enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions
brought about by inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against
the ravages brought by these conditions. Significantly, it is the commitment
of the State to protect labor and to provide means by which the difficulties
faced by the working force may best be alleviated. To submit to the
respondents interpretation of the no work, no pay policy is to defeat this
noble
purpose.
The
Constitution
and
the
law
mandate
otherwise.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
With regard to the second issue, we are called upon to interpret and apply
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 451 to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or other
charges as well as the new fees or charges authorized under the next
preceding
section
shall
be
subject
to
the
following
conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be
approved unless sixty (60%) per centum of the proceeds is allocated for
increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and all other
employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional
development, student assistance and extension services, and return to
investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return to investments
exceed twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental proceeds; . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
x
This Court had the occasion to rule squarely on this point in the very recent
case entitled, University of the East v. University of the East Faculty
Association, 117 SCRA 554. We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In effect, the problem posed before Us is whether or not the reference in
Section 3(a) to increase in salaries or wages of the faculty and all other
employees of the schools concerned as the first purpose to which the
incremental proceeds from authorized increases to tuition fees may be
devoted, may be construed to include allowances and benefits. In the
negative, which is the position of respondents, it would follow that such
allowances must be taken in resources of the school not derived from tuition
fees.
"Without delving into the factual issue of whether or not there could be any
such other resources, We note that among the items of second purpose
stated in provision in question is return in investment. And the law provides
only for a maximum, not a minimum. In other words, the schools may get a
return to investment of not more than 12%, but if circumstances warrant,
there is no minimum fixed by law which they should get.
"On this predicate, We are of the considered view that, if the school happen
to have no other resources to grant allowances and benefits, either
mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining, such allowances and
benefits should be charged against the return to investments referred to in
the second purpose stated in Section 3(a) of P.D. 451."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Private respondent argues that the above interpretation "disregarded the
intention and spirit of the law" which intention is clear from the "whereas"
clauses
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is imperative that private educational institutions upgrade classroom
instruction . . . provide salary and or wage increases and other
benefits
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Respondent further contends that PD 451 was issued to alleviate the sad
plight of private schools, their personnel and all those directly or indirectly on
school
income
as
the
decree
was
aimed
benefits, however, the same do not delineate the source of such funds and it
is only in Section 3 which provides for the limitations wherein the intention of
the framers of the law is clearly outlined. The law is clear. The sixty (60%)
percent incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be devoted
entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary.
The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over
and above the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to
the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase in basic
salary provided by law, an increase intended also to help the teachers and
other workers tide themselves and their families over these difficult economic
times.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
This Court is not guilty of usurpation of legislative functions as claimed by
the respondents. We expressed the opinion in the University of the East
case that benefits mandated by law and collective bargaining may be
charged to the 12% return on investments within the 40% incremental
proceeds of tuition increase. As admitted by respondent, we merely made
this statement as a suggestion in answer to the respondents query as to
where then, under the law, can such benefits be charged. We were merely
interpreting the meaning of the law within the confines of its provisions. The
law provides that 60% should go to wage increases and 40% to institutional
developments, student assistance, extension services, and return on
investments (ROI). Under the law, the last item ROI has flexibility sufficient to
accommodate other purposes of the law and the needs of the university. ROI
is not set aside for any one purpose of the university such as profits or
returns on investments. The amount may be used to comply with other
duties and obligations imposed by law which the university exercising
managerial prerogatives finds cannot under present circumstances, be
funded by other revenue sources. It may be applied to any other collateral
purpose of the university or invested elsewhere. Hence, the framers of the
law intended this portion of the increases in tuition fees to be a general fund
to cover up for the universitys miscellaneous expenses and, precisely, for
this reason, it was not so delimited. Besides, ROI is a return or profit over
and above the operating expenditures of the university, and still, over and
above the profits it may have had prior to the tuition increase. The earning
capacities of private educational institutions are not dependent on the
increases in tuition fees allowed by P.D. 451. Accommodation of the
allowances required by law require wise and prudent management of all the
university resources together with the incremental proceeds of tuition
increases. Cognizance should be taken of the fact that the private
respondent had, before PD 451, managed to grant all allowances required
by law. It cannot now claim that it could not afford the same, considering that
additional funds are even granted them by the law in question. We find no
compelling reason, therefore, to deviate from our previous ruling in the
University of the East case even as we take the second hard look at the
percent incremental proceeds from tuition increases for the same schoolyear
as outlined above. The respondent Commission is sustained insofar as it
DENIED the payment of salaries for the suspended extra loads on
September
21,
1981.
SO
ORDERED.
pending with the CIR, said labor union declared a strike which was ruled
down as illegal by this Court in G.R. No. L-2660 promulgated on May 30,
1950. In view of said ruling, the Union filed a "Constancia" with the Court of
Industrial Relations praying that the remaining unresolved demands of the
Union presented in their original petition, be granted. Said unresolved
demands are the following:
a. Point No. 2.
That the work performed in excess of eight (8) hours he paid an
overtime pay of 50 per cent the regular rate of pay, and that work
performed on Sundays and legal holidays be paid double the
regular rate of pay.
EN BANC
b. Point No. 7.
G.R. No. L-9265
After the parties had submitted exhaustive memoranda, the trial Judge
rendered a decision on February 10, 1955, finding that the company gave
said employees 3 free meals every day and about 20 minutes rest after each
mealtime; that they worked from 6:00 am. to 6:00 p.m. every day including
Sundays and holidays, and for work performed in excess of 8 hours, the
officers, patrons and radio operators were given overtime pay in the amount
of P4 each and P2 each for the rest of the crew up to March, 1947, and after
said date, these payments were increased to P5 and P2.50, respectively,
until the time of their separation or the strike of July 19, 1948; that when the
tugboats underwent repairs, their personnel worked only 8 hours a day
excluding Sundays and holidays; that although there was an effort on the
part of claimants to show that some had worked beyond 6:00 p.m., the
evidence was uncertain and indefinite and that demand was, therefore,
denied; that respondent Company, by the nature of its business and as
defined by law (Section 18-b of Commonwealth Act as amended) is
considered a public service operator by the Public Service Commission in its
decision in case No. 3035-C entitled "Philippine Shipowners. Association vs.
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al."(Exh. 23), and, therefore, exempt from
paying additional remuneration or compensation for work performed on
Sundays and legal holidays, pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities
Employees Association, 79 Phil., 408. 44 Off. Gaz., 1760); and ruled that:
For the above reasons, the aforementioned employees are only
entitled to receive overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 8
hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays.
However, the respondent company has proved to the satisfaction of
the Court that it has paid its employees for such overtime work as
shown above Exhs. 1 to 20-B).
It is, therefore, only a matter of computation whether such over time
pay by the respondent for overtime services rendered covers the
actual overtime work performed by the employees concerned
equivalent to 25 per cent which is the minimum rate fixed by law in
the absence of other proof to justify the granting of more beyond
said minimum rate.
Demands Nos. 11 and 12 regarding the reinstatement to the service of the
employees named therein were denied and respondent Company was only
or to pay the separation pay and overtime work rendered by Ciriaco
Sarmiento, Rafael Santos and Lorenzo de la Cruz, after making the
SEC. 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another
shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not
continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working AND
CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest completely, shall
not be counted.
The requisites contained in this section are further implemented by
contemporary regulations issued by administrative authorities (Sections 4
and 5 of Chapter III, Article 1, Code of Rules and Regulations to Implement
the Minimum Wage Law).
For the purposes of this case, We do not need to set for seamen a criterion
different from that applied to laborers on land, for under the provisions of the
above quoted section, the only thing to be done is to determine the meaning
and scope of the term "working place" used therein. As We understand this
term, a laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in
order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he
"cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will
the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else,
whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these
requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall not be counted.
In the case at bar We do not need to look into the nature of the work of
claimant mariners to ascertain the truth of petitioners allegation that this kind
of seamen have had enough "free time", a task of which We are relieved, for
although after an ocular inspection of the working premises of the seamen
affected in this case the trial Judge declared in his decision that the
Company gave the complaining laborers 3 free meals a day with a recess of
20 minutes after each meal, this decision was specifically amended by the
Court en banc in its Resolution of June 6, 1955, wherein it held that the
claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. including Sundays and holidays, which implies either that said laborers
were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave
the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely. And
such resolution being on a question essentially of fact, this Court is now
precluded to review the same (Com. Act No. 103, Sec. 15, as amended by
Sec. 2 of Com. Act No. 559; Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; Kaisahan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Filipinas vs. Gotamco Sawmill, 80 Phil., 521;
Operators, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 99 Phil, 893, and others).
II. Should a person be penalized for following an opinion issued by the
Secretary of Justice in the absence of any judicial pronouncement
whatsoever?
Petitioner cites Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941 of the Secretary of Justice to
a query made by the Secretary of Labor in connection with a similar subject
matter as the one involved, in this issue, but that opinion has no bearing on
the case at bar because it refers to officers and crew on boardinterisland
boats whose situation is different from that of mariners or sailors working in
small tugboats that ply along bays and rivers and have no cabins or places
for persons that man the same. Moreover, We can not pass upon this
second issue because, aside from the fact that there appears nothing on
record that would support petitioner's assertion that in its dealing with its
employees, it was guided by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, the issue
involves a mere theoretical question.
III. When employees with full knowledge of the law, voluntarily agreed to
work for so many hours in consideration of a certain definite wage, and
continue working without any protest for a period of almost two years, is said
compensation as agreed upon legally deemed and retroactively presumed to
constitute full payment for all services rendered, including whatever overtime
wages might be due? Especially so if such wages, though received years
before the enactment of the Minimum Wage Law, were already set mostly
above said minimum wage?
IV. The members set of respondent Union having expressly manifested
acquiescence over a period of almost two years with reference to the
sufficiency of their wages and having made no protest whatsoever with
reference to said compensation does the legal and equitable principle of
estoppel operate to bar them from making a claim for, or making any
recovery of, back overtime compensation?
We are going to discuss these two issues jointly. Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides:
Sec. 6. Any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or
employee contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be null and voidab initio.
Per month
In the case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
91 Phil., 625, 48 Off. Gaz., 2725, this Court held:
The principles of estoppel and laches cannot be, invoked against
employees or laborers in an action for the recovery of
compensation for past overtime work. In the first place, it would be
contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, under which. as
already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to extra
compensation. In the second place, the law principally obligates the
1. Ambrosio Taada ..
but after passing the examinations
his wages were increased to P225 per
month;
oiler
P82.50
2. Patricio Santiago ..
but after passing the examinations
his wages were increased to P225 per
month;
3. Fidelino Villanueva
quartermaster
oiler
82.50
oiler
82.50
oiler
82.50
cook
82.50
seaman
67.50
quartermaster
82.50
cook
67.50
82.50
4. Pedro Filamor
then his wage was reduced to
P67.50 per month as cook;
quartermaster
82.50
5. Emiliano Irabon .
then his wage was reduced to P60
and he stayed for 1 month only; it was
increased again to P67.50;
seaman
6. Juanito de Luna
oiler
82.50
cook
67.50
7. Benigno Curambao
oiler
82.50
seaman
67.50
8. Salvador Mercadillo
oiler
82.50
quartermaster
82.50
cook
82.50
quartermaster
82.50
seaman
82.50
seaman
82.50
82.50
oiler
82.50
seaman
67.50
seaman
67.50
oiler
82.50
quartermaster
82.50
seaman
67.50
quartermaster
82.50
quartermaster
82.50
oiler
82.50
seaman
67.50
quartermaster
82.50
oiler
82.50
seaman
82.50
can be led or he can muster enough courage to confront his employer with a
demand for payment thereof. Fear of possible unemployment sometimes is
a very strong factor that gags the man from asserting his right under the law
and it may take him months or years before he could be made to present a
claim against his employer. To allow the workingman to be compensated
only from the date of the filing of the petition with the court would be to
penalize him for his acquiescence or silence which We have declared in the
case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. CIR, supra, to be beyond the intent of
the law. It is not just and humane that he should be deprived of what is
lawfully his under the law, for the true intendent of Commonwealth Act No.
444 is to compensate the worker for services rendered beyond the statutory
period and this should be made to retroact to the date when such services
were actually performed.
Anent issue No. VI, petitioner questions the reasonableness of the law
providing for the grant of overtime wages. It is sufficient for Us to state here
that courts cannot go outside of the field of interpretation so as to inquire into
the motive or motives of Congress in enacting a particular piece of
legislation. This question, certainly, is not within Our province to entertain.
It may be alleged, however, that the delay in asserting the right to back
overtime compensation may cause an unreasonable or irreparable injury to
the employer, because the accumulation of such back overtime wages may
become so great that their payment might cause the bankruptcy or the
closing of the business of the employer who might not be in a position to
defray the same. Perhaps this situation may occur, but We shall not delve on
it this time because petitioner does not claim that the payment of the back
overtime wages it is ordered to pay to its claimant laborers will cause the
injury it foresees or force it to close its business, a situation which it speaks
of theoretically and in general.
VII. Should not a Court of Industrial Relations' resolution, en banc, which is
clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and
absolutely devoid of sustaining reason, be declared illegal? Especially so, if
the trial court's decision which the resolution en bancreversed, is most
detailed, exhaustive and comprehensive in its findings as well as most
reasonable and legal in its conclusions? This issue was raised by petitioner
in its supplemental petition and We have this much to say. The Court of
Industrial Relations has been considered "a court of justice" (Metropolitan
Transportation Service vs. Paredes,* G.R. No. L-1232, prom. January 12,
1948), although in another case. We said that it is "more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation" (Ang Tibay
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil., 635). But for procedural purposes,
the Court of Industrial Relations is a court with well-defined powers vested
by the law creating it and with such other powers as generally pertain to a
court of justice (Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103). As such, the general rule that
before a judgment becomes final, the Court that rendered the same may
alter or modify it so as to conform with the law and the evidence, is
applicable to the Court of Industrial Relations (Connel Bros. Co.(Phil.) vs.
National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-3631, prom. January 30, 1956). The law
also provides that after a judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, duly
designated by the Presiding Judge therein to hear a particular case, had
rendered a decision, any agrieved party may request for reconsideration
thereof and the judges of said Court shall sit together, the concurrence of the
3 of them being necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order or
award (See. 1, Com. Act No. 103). It was in virtue of these rules and upon
motions for reconsideration presented by both parties that resolution subject
of the present petition was issued, the Court en banc finding it necessary to
modify a part of the decision of February 10, 1955, which is clearly within its
power to do.
On the other hand, the issue under consideration is predicated on a situation
which is not obtaining in the case at bar, for, it presupposes that the
resolutions en banc of the respondent Court "are clearly unsupported in fact
and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and absolutely devoid of any
sustaining reason", which does not seem to be the case as a matter of fact.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing consideration, the
resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador. Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Juanito de Jesus
Ordinary Seaman
US$120.00
Jorge C. de Castro
Ordinary Seaman
US$160.00
Arnold Miranda
3rd Officer
US$310.00
Maximo Rosello
Cook
US$230.00
Aniceto Betana
3rd Engineer
US$400.00
Petitioners
Rating
Julio Cagampan
2nd Engineer
US$500.00
Silvino Vicera
2nd Engineer
US$800.00
1. As borne out by the records, its former counsel attended all the
hearings before the POEA wherein he raised the basis objection
that the complaint of petitioners was so generally couched that a
more detailed pleading with supporting documents was repeatedly
requested for the latter to submit.
Private respondent has pointedly argued that the NLRC anchored its
decision primarily upon the Memorandum on Appeal.1wphi1 In the case of
Manila Doctors Hospital v. NLRC (153 SCRA 262) this Court ruled that the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter have authority
under the Labor Code to decide a case based on the position papers and
documents submitted without resorting to the technical rules of evidence.
On the issue of whether or not petitioners should be entitled to terminal
pay, We sustain the finding of respondent NLRC that petitioners were
actually paid more than the amounts fixed in their employment contracts.
The pertinent portion of the NLRC decision reads as follows.
On this award for leave pay to the complainants (petitioners),
the (private) respondent maintains that the actually they were paid
much more than what they were legally entitled to under their
contract. This fact has not been disputed by the complainants
(petitioners.) Thus, as mentioned in (private) respondent's
Memorandum on Appeal dated 14 August 1987, their overpayment
is more than enough and sufficient to offset whatever claims for
leave pay they filed in this case and for which the POEA favorably
considered in their favor. For complainant (petitioner) Aniceto
Betana, it appears that under the crew contract his monthly salary
was US$400 while he was overpaid by US$100 as he actually
received US$500. In fine, Betana had received at least US1,400
excess salary for a period of fourteen (14) months which was the
period of his employment. In the case of complainant
(petitioner) Jorge C. de Castro his stipulated monthly pay was
US$160 but he actually received a monthly pay of US$200 or an
overpayment of US$560 for the same period of service. For
complainant (petitioner) Juanito R. de Jesus, his overpayment is
US$1120. Complainant (petitioner) Arnold J. Miranda has also the
same amount of excess payment as de Jesus. Indeed, We cannot
simply ignore this material fact. It is our duty to prevent a
miscarriage of justice for if We sustain the award for leave pay in
the face of undisputed facts that the complainants (petitioners) were
even paid much more than what they should receive by way of
leave pay, then they would be enriching themselves at the expense
of others. Accordingly, justice and equity compel Us to deny this
award.
Even as the denial of petitioners' terminal pay by the NLRC has been
justified, such denial should not have been applied to petitioners Julio
Cagampan and Silvino Vicera. For, a deeper scrutiny of the records by the
Solicitor General has revealed that the fact of overpayment does not cover
the aforenamed petitioners since the amounts awarded them were equal
only to the amounts stipulated in the crew contracts. Since petitioners
Cagampan and Vicera were not overpaid by the company, they should be
paid the amounts of US$583.33 and US$933.33, respectively. Further
examination by the Solicitor General shows that petitioner Maximo Rosello
was also overpaid in the amount of US$420.00.
Hence, with respect to petitioners Cagampan and Vicera, the NLRC decision
must be modified correspondingly.
As regards the question of overtime pay, the NLRC cannot be faulted for
disallowing the payment of said pay because it merely straightened out the
distorted interpretation asserted by petitioners and defined the correct
interpretation of the provision on overtime pay embodied in the contract
conformably with settled doctrines on the matter. Notably, the NLRC ruling
on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that
petitioners never produced any proof of actual performance of overtime
work.
Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed
overtime pay of 30% of the basic salary per month" embodied in their
employment contract should be awarded to them as part of a "package
benefit." They have theorized that even without sufficient evidence of actual
rendition of overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime
pay. Their theory is erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their
thinking even runs counter to the intention behind the provision. The contract
provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for
computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered.
Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be
satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be
computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the
contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to
such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by
the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular
eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the
extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or
even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
We already resolved the question of overtime pay of a worker aboard a
vessel in the case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. CIR (3
SCRA 890). We ruled:
We can not agree with the Court below that respondent Malondras
should be paid overtime compensation for every hour in excess of
the regular working hours that he was on board his vessel or barge
each day, irrespective of whether or not he actually put in work
during those hours. Seamen are required to stay on board their
vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this reason
that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free
living quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on
board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their
employers to pay them overtime even when they are not actually
working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would be entitled
to overtime for sixteen hours each day, even if he spent all those
hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of
duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are
entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on
board and can not leave ship beyond the regular eight working
hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess
of said number of hours. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted ruling is a reiteration of Our resolution in Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union, et al. (G.R. No.
9265, April 29, 1957).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioners Cagampan and Vicera are awarded their leave
pay according to the terms of the contract.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of
additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order dated
March 19, 1959, holding that mealtime should be counted in the
determination of overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay
P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the CIR en banc on the
ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion.
Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the CIR
has no jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation and, secondary
that the CIR did not make "a correct appraisal of the facts, in the light of the
evidence" in holding that mealtime periods should be included in overtime
work because workers could not leave their places of work and rest
completely during those hours.
In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for
overtime pay upon the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act
No. 875), petitioner cites a number of decisions of this Court. On May 23,
1960, however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13206, that
Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all
of them, though not stated in express terms, is that where the
employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be
reestablished because of its wrongful severance, (as where the
employee seeks reinstatement) the Court of Industrial Relations
has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with
the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law
and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of their
relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become
mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts,
We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different
view have been made, but we now hold and declare the principle
set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one governing all
cases of this nature.
This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960.1
A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos, et
al. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., G.R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which
We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the following requisites
must be complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an
employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his
reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the
President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must arise either
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In
default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money
claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, petitioner
does not deny the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
it and the members of the union. Neither is there any question that the claim
is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444, as amended). We
therefore rule in favor of the jurisdiction of the CIR over the present claim.
The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the
evidence, the mealtime breaks should be considered working time under the
following provision of the law;
The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be
of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not
continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and
can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be
counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended. Emphasis ours.)
It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend
for resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though
not the premises2 of his employer, is not counted as working time only where
the work is broken or is not continuous.
The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of
fact which We shall not review as long as the same is supported by
evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as amended, Philippine Newspaper
Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303).
That is why We brushed aside petitioner's contention in one case that
workers who worked under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had enough "free
time" and therefore should not be credited with four hours of overtime and
held that the finding of the CIR "that claimants herein rendered services to
the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, . .
. implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working
place, or that they could not rest completely" (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v.
Luzon Marine Department Union, et al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957).
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what
constitutes compensable work, rather the question is one of fact depending
upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the controverted in
cases. (31 Am. Jurisdiction Sec. 626 pp. 878.)
In this case, the CIR's finding that work in the petitioner company was
continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is
not without basis in evidence and following our earlier rulings, shall not
disturb the same. Thus, the CIR found:
While it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an
employee to work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com.
Act No. 444 such a time for eating can be segregated or deducted
from his work, if the same is continuous and the employee can
leave his working place rest completely. The time cards show that
the work was continuous and without interruption. There is also the
evidence adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees
can freely leave their working place nor rest completely. There is
furthermore the aspect that during the period covered the
computation the work was on a 24-hour basis and previously stated
divided into shifts.
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner
company was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be
counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.
Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single shift
say from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should
they work in two shifts?
There is another reason why this appeal should dismissed and that is that
there is no decision by the CIR en banc from which petitioner can appeal to
this Court. As already indicated above, the records show that petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order of March 19, 1959 was dismissed by
the CIR en banc because of petitioner's failure to serve a copy of the same
on the union.
Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, states:
The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies
within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the
order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same
to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof personally or by
registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer,
in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. (Emphasis ours.)
In one case (Bien, et al. v. Castillo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-7428, May 24,
1955), We sustained the dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed
outside of the period provided in the rules of the CIR. A motion for
reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the adverse party
as required by the rules, stands on the same footing. For "in the very nature
of things, a motion for reconsideration against a ruling or decision by one
Judge is in effect an appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc," the
purpose being "to substitute the decision or order of a collegiate court for the
ruling or decision of any judge." The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103
authorizing the presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or
order of the judge to the CIR, en banc and not direct appeal therefore to this
Court, is also in accord with the principal of exhaustion of administrative
remedies before resort can be made to this Court. (Broce, et al., v. The Court
of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-12367, October 29, 1959).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure
to serve a copy of the same on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en
banc that petitioner can bring to this Court for review.
WHEREFORE, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27,
1959 are hereby affirmed and the appeal is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes,
Dizon
and
Makalintal concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
7:45 A.M. 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)
7:45 A.M. 11:45 A.M. (Saturday).
G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and
SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALUTUCP), respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and
discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice?
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of
automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried
Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association
of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to
the present controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina including
members of private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m.to 3:45 p.m.
with a 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break.
On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based
employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire
Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department
working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992
thus
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case 3 was not applicable to the
instant case because the former involved discrimination of certain
employees who were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest
of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the
discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for
their lunch break.
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the
appeal. 4 However, upon motion for reconsideration by private respondent,
the NLRC, this time with two (2) new commissioners replacing those who
earlier retired, reversed its earlier decision of 20 April 1994 as well as the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. 5 The NLRC considered the decision of this
Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein
petitioner was ordered to pay "the money value of these covered employees
deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks." The public respondent
declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits
of a time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute
paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges
prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition
alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a) in ruling that petitioner
committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the change in the
work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. 3:45 p.m. to 7:45 a.m.
4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in
holding that there was diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch
break was eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby
case affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to
discontinue the practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it
decide to do so; and, (d) in ignoring petitioner's inherent management
prerogative of determining and fixing the work schedule of its employees
which is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement
between petitioner and private respondent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation
and motion recommending that the petitioner be granted, alleging that the 14
August 1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not
discriminatory of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice
on the part of petitioner.
We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules
of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case
petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient
conduct of its business operations and its improved production. 6It
rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch
break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as
they were "on call." Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could
very well be considered as working time because the factory employees
were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working.
With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch
break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this
hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are
conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the
employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break,
there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. We agree
with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the
daily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor
Code. 7 Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory
similarly situated whether they are union members or not. 8
Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to
equate the earlier Sime Darby case 9 with the facts obtaining in this case.
That ruling in the former case is not applicable here. The issue in that case
involved the matter of granting lunch breaks to certain employees while
depriving the other employees of such breaks. This Court affirmed in that
case the NLRC's finding that such act of management was discriminatory
and constituted unfair labor practice.
The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving
discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the change of
work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase
production, constitutes unfair labor practice. As shown by the records, the
change effected by management with regard to working time is made to
apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or
not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it cannot be said
that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private
respondent to self-organization.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it
may devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30452 September 30, 1982
After hearing on the merits, the respondent court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion of the March 30, 1968 decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
resolves that:
1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages
correspoding to the first four hours work rendered on every
other Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays should
be denied for lack of merit.
2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc.. is hereby
ordered to pay the sixty- nine (69) petitioners:
(a) An additional sum equivalent to 25%
of their respective basic or regular
salaries for services rendered on
Sundays and legal holidays during the
period from March 20. 1961 up to June
30, 1962; and
(b) Another additional sum or premium
equivalent to 25% of their respective
basic or regular salaries for nighttime
services rendered from March 20, 1961
up to June 30, 1962.
3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly
employees should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of
merit.
4. Respondent Mariano Que, being an officer and acted
only as an agent in behalf of the respondent corporation,
should be absolved from the money claims of herein
petitioners whose employer, according to the pleadings
and evidence, is the Mercury Drug Company,, Inc.
To expedite the computation of the money award, the
Chief Court Examiner or his authorized representative is
hereby directed to proceed to the office of the respondent
such claim for the reason that the same are contrary to
law. Payment of extra or additional pay for services
rendered during Sundays and legal holidays is mandated
by law. Even assuming that the petitioners had agreed to
work on Sundays and legal holidays without any further
consideration than their monthly salaries, they are not
barred nevertheless from claiming what is due them,
because such agreement is contrary to public policy and is
declared nun and void by law.
Any agreement or contract between employer and the
laborer or employee contrary to the provisions of this Act
shall be null and void ab initio.
Under the cited statutory provision, the petitioners are
justified to receive additional amount equivalent to 25% of
their respective basic or regular salaries for work done on
Sundays and legal holidays for the period from March 20,
1961 to June 30, 1962. (Decision, pp. 119-120, rollo)
Inc.
Mr.
1015
Rizal Ave., Exten.
Nardo
Sta.
1580
Bambang,
Manila
Dayao
Catalina
(Sgd.)
NARDO
(EXH.
"A"
and
(Decision, pp. 114-115, rollo)
"l
DAYAO
")
These contracts were not declared by the respondent court null and void in
their entirety. The respondent court, on the basis of the conflicting evidence
presented by the parties, in effect: 1) rejected the theory of the petitioner
company that the 25% additional compensation claimed by the private
respondents for the four-hour work they rendered during Sundays and legal
holidays provided in their contracts of employment were covered by the
declare the contracts of employment null and void in their entirety. Only the
objectionable features violative of law were nullified. But even granting that
the Court of Industrial Relations declared the contracts of employment wholly
void, it could do so notwithstanding the procedural objection. In Sanchez u.
Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this Court speaking through then
Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the
statutory mandate that respondent Court in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in the exercise of any of its duties or
power is to act 'according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence' informing its mind 'in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' Again,
this Court has invariably accorded the most hospitable
scope to the breadth and amplitude with which such
provision is couched. So it has been from the earliest case
decided in 1939 to a 1967 decision.
Two issues are raised in the second assignment of error
by the petitioner-company. The first hinges on the
jurisdiction of the respondent court to award additional
compensation for nighttime work. Petitioner wants Us to
re- examine Our rulings on the question of nighttime work.
It contends that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to
award additional compensation for nighttime work because
of the declared policy on freedom of collective bargaining
expressed in Republic Act 875 and the express prohibition
in Section 7 of the said statute. A re- examination of the
decisions on nighttime pay differential was the focus of
attention in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. et al., v. Ferrer,
et al (19 SCRA 130). The earliest cases cited by the
petitioner-company, Naric v. Naric Workers Union L12075, - May 29, 1959 and Philippine Engineers'
Syndicate u. Bautista, L-16440, February 29, 196.4, were
discussed lengthily. Thus -
four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing
settlement of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process; but
We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature for extra
compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court.
Withal, the record does not show that the employer-employee relation
between the 64 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the
industrial court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials
and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. City Automotive Co., et
al., G.R. No. L- 11655, April 29, 1959; Prisco vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L13806, May 23, 1960] or for payment of additional compensation for work
rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs. Almin, et
al., G.R. No. L9055, November 28, 1958; Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc.
vs. Felipe Guevara, et al., G.R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957] but has also
supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid
more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the
worker's regular hours of duty, he should also be paid additional
compensation for overtime work. [Naric vs. Naric Workers' Union. et al., G. R
No. L-12075, May 29, 1959, citing Shell Co. vs. National Labor Union, 81
Phil. 315]. Besides, to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls
beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a
further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may
defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor.' [Luis
Recato Dy, et al v-9. CIR, G.R. No. L-17788, May 25,1962]"
The petitioner-company's arguments on the respondent court's alleged lack
of jurisdiction over additional compensation for work done at night by the
respondents is without merit.
The other issue raised in the second assignment of error is premised on the
petitioner-company's contention that the respondent court's ruling on the
additional compensation for nighttime work is not supported by substantial
evidence.
This contention is untenable. Pertinent portions of the respondent court's
decision read:
xxx xxx xxx
NIGHT DIFFERENTIAL
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20838
xxx
xxx
three mentioned employees shows that to were actually working with the
petitioner, although at the time of filing of the motion dated November 25,
l960, for the continuation of the computation of overtime, they were no
longer employees of the petitioner.
Furthermore, the finding of the Court of Industrial Relations to the effect that
the said respondents had worked overtime is a finding of fact which the
Court cannot disturb if it is supported by sufficient evidence. We have
examined the records and We feel that the same is supported by evidence.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations is hereby sustained. Costs against the
petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits; that in the negotiations which led
to the execution of the 1965 collective bargaining agreement, the matter of
the proper interpretation of the phrase "regular base pay" was discussed;
that the petitioner union demanded that the NAWASA ruling should be
applied by including the employees' Christmas bonus and other fringe
benefits in the computation of the overtime compensation; that the
respondent company refused to give in to such demand contending that
(1) the company agreed to a 5% overtime rate, which was higher than the
25% rate required by law, precisely on the condition that the same should be
computed solely on the basis of the employees' basic monthly salary,
excluding Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits; (2) the parties had the
freedom to choose the basis for computing the overtime pay provided that
the same should not be less than the minimum prescribed by law; and (3)
the NAWASA decision was inapplicable to a private corporation like the
Philippine Refining Co., Inc.; that while refusing to grant petitioner's demand,
the respondent company nevertheless agreed to submit to a court for
resolution the issue of the applicability to their case of the NAWASA ruling,
with the undertaking to abide by whatever decision the court would render;
and, that the parties agreed that, in the meantime, they would exclude the
Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits in the computation of the overtime
compensation.
On December 8, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring that the term "regular base pay" in
Section 6, Ararticle VI of Exhibit A refers only to "regular
base pay" and does not include Christmas bonus and
other fringe benefits. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Said court held that while the NAWASA ruling concerning the meaning of the
phrase "regular pay" of the Eight-Hour Labor Law could be applied to
employees of private corporations like the Philippine Refining Company, the
same was, nevertheless, inapplicable to the case at bar which involved the
interpretation of the phrase "regular base pay which was different from
"regular pay". It declared that "regular base pay" referred only to the basic or
monthly pay exclusive of Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits.
Furthermore, the validity of the provision of the 1965 collective bargaining
The pertinent portions of the decision in the case of NAWASA vs. NAWASA
Consolidated Unions (L-18938, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766, 782-783)
invoked by the appellant union read as follows:
It has been held that for purposes of computing overtime
compensation a regular wage includes all payments which
the parties have agreed shall be received during the work
week, including piece work wages, differential payments
for working at undesirable times, such as at night or on
Sundays and holidays, and the cost of board and lodging
customarily furnished the employee Walling v. YangermahReynolds Hardwork Co., 325 U.S. 419; Walling v.
Harischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427. The 'regular rate' of pay
also ordinarily includes incentive bonus or profit-sharing
payments made in addition to the normal basic pay (56
C.J.S., pp. 704-705), and it was also held that the higher
rate for night, Sunday and holiday work is just as much a
regular rate as the lower rate for daytime work. The higher
rate is merely an inducement to accept employment at
times which are not as desirable from a workman's
standpoint (International L. Ass'n. v. National Terminals
Corp. c.c. Wise, 50 F. Supp. 26, affirmed CCA Casbunao
v. National Terminals Corp. 139 F. 2d 853).
Respondent court, therefore, correctly included such
differential pay in computing the weekly wages of those
employees and laborers who worked seven days a week
and were continuously receiving 25% Sunday differential
for a period of three months immediately p g the
implementation of Republic Act 1880. "
The appellant union contends that by virtue of the forego. ing the Philippine
Refining Co., Inc., is under obligation to include the, employees' Christmas
bonus and other fringe benefits in the computation of their overtime
compensation which, as agreed, is "regular base pay plus 50% thereof".
The legal provisions pertinent to the subject of overtime compensation are
found in Secs. 3 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended, which
read as follows:
HELD: NO
Ratio Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that contemplated in the
employment contract; additional pay given for any other purpose cannot be
NATURE
Absent a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for the computation of
overtime pay are 2 computations, namely:
FACTS
1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or service rendered
PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the
proper computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living
nor temporary as a given only to remedy a situation which can change any
included in the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went
time.
employees basic salary or wage plus cost of living allowance and longevity
the very simple reason that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA,
received during the work week, including differentiated payments for working
444 [or the 8-hour Labor Law, now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify
at undesirable times, such as at night and the board and lodging customarily
furnished the employee. This prompted PNB to appeal, hence this case.
overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be paid at the
same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional. The
ISSUE : WON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be
law did not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law
regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to
what is commensurate with his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed
from the NAWASA case. CIR relies on the part of the NAWASA decision
spends additional time to his work, the effect upon him is multi- faceted; he
variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation considers work in
his family to enjoy the comforts thereof; he might have no time for relaxation,
etc. It is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse
purposes of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the
effects just mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that justify and
are the real reasons for the extra compensation that is called overtime pay.
each and every employee. It would require reference to and continued use
employment covered by the 8 hour Labor Law [C.A. 444, now Art. 87 Labor
the overtime hourly rate by the number of hours worked in excess of eight.
to compute overtime pay and this may again cause delays in payments,
which in turn could lead to serious disputes. To apply this mode of
computation would retard and stifle the growth of unions themselves as
Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying, new and additional
fringe benefits, if not those already existing, for fear of bloating their
overhead expenses through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed,
becomes instead a veritable source of irritant in labor relations.
QUITCLAIM
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39387 June 29, 1982
PAMPANGA
SUGAR
DEVELOPMENT
CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SUGAR WORKERS
ASSOCIATION, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. seeks the reversal
of the order dated June 6, 1974 of respondent Court of Industrial Relations
awarding to respondent Sugar Workers Association's (Union) counsel
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the judgment in CIR Case No. 4264ULP and ordering the lower court's Examining Division to compute the wage
and fringe benefits differentials due the 28 individual workers who did not
execute quitclaims as well as attorney's fees corresponding to 20% of the
benefits due to 53 workers who entered into agreements waiving their rights
and benefits under the decision dated December 4, 1972 in the aforecited
case; also, the setting aside of the CIR resolution of September 3, 1974
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the questioned order (pp.
15 & 57, rec.).
For a better appreciation of this case, certain prefatory facts must be
recalled. Sometime in February, 1956, the workers' affiliates of respondent
Union staged a strike against petitioner company. This labor dispute was
certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations which was
docketed as Case No. 13-IPA. After six years, the said Court issued an order
on November 8, 1962 directing petitioner company to reinstate the members
of respondent union. On March 12, 1963 some 88 union members were thus
reinstated by petitioner. However, petitioner discriminated against the
reemployed workers with respect to wage rates, off-season pay, cost of living
allowance, milling bonus and Christmas bonus by depriving them of
aforesaid benefits or by granting to some members benefits lesser than
those given to members of the Pasudeco Workers Union, another labor
group in the service of petitioner. By reason of such denial and/or grant of
lower benefits to respondent's members because of their union affiliation and
union activities, respondent filed with the CIR a complaint dated September
10, 1964 for unfair labor practice against petitioner which case was docketed
as Case No. 4264-ULP.
On December 4, 1972, the CIR handed down a decision adjudging herein
petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice acts as charged and finding the same
to have been committed, and thereby directing petitioner to cease and desist
from further committing the said unfair labor practice acts and directing
petitioner to pay wage differentials to certain workers and fringe benefits as
would be found due and payable to them and to readmitted seasonal and
casual members of respondent union totalling 88 with the exception of 7
workers.
In a resolution dated May 28, 1973, the CIR denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of aforesaid decision filed on December 14, 1972. Petitioner
appealed the above decision and resolution to this Court on June 15, 1973
praying in its petition for the nullification of said decision and motion for
being contrary to law, and for the rendition of a new judgment dismissing CIR
Case No. 4264-ULP.
This Court, in its resolution of July 31, 1973, denied the said petition for
review (docketed as G.R. No. L-36994) for lack of merit. Petitioner then
moved for reconsideration of aforesaid denial which was denied on October
4, 1973 for lack of merit. Said resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thus became final and executory on October 12, 1973.
With the finality of the December 4, 1972 decision having been settled,
respondent Union filed with the CIR a motion for computation of final
judgment and a petition for attorney's lien both dated October 17, 1973 (pp.
47 & 50, rec.).
a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that issues not raised in the trial
court may not be raised on appeal. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigations thus defeating the ends of justice.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the allegations to be devoid of merit.
Petitioner's contention that there is no basis for respondent's petition for
attorney's lien filed with the trial court containing allegations relative to
attorney's fees as agreed upon between him and his client, the complainant
Sugar Workers' Association, is untenable. The written conformity of the
President of said Sugar Workers Association on behalf thereof confirms the
existence of such an agreement on attorney's fees and constitutes an
irrefutable evidence of such agreement. The trial court, therefore, had
sufficient evidence upon which it based its decision. The petitioner did not
contest the allegations contained in the respondent's petition for attorney's
lien before the trial court. This constitutes an implied admission thereof.
Moreover, it is evident from the tenor of the trial court's order issued on June
6, 1974 that the said court carefully evaluated the respondent's petition for
attorney's lien and even reduced the percentage from 25 IC to 20 %.
On the first assignment of error, paragraph (b), this Court likewise finds the
same to be without merit. This issue has already been resolved by this Court
when the petitioner filed its first petition for certiorari (G.R. No. L- 36994)
seeking nullification of the trial court's judgment on the same issue.
Petitioner's allegations were rejected by this Court in said case. It may not
now be repeated and raised on appeal before this Court, the same being res
judicata.
Be that as it may, the allegations of petitioner to the effect that by reason of
the quitclaims there is nothing upon which the attorney's lien attaches, is not
valid. This Court finds the quitclaims not valid. Firstly, said quitclaims were
secured on December 27, 1972 by petitioner after it lost its case in the lower
court when the latter promulgated its decision on the case on December 4,
1972. Obviously in its desire to deny what is due the sugar workers
concerned and frustrate the decision of the lower court awarding benefits to
them, it used its moral ascendancy as employer over said workers to secure
said quitclaims. Predicated on said quitclaims, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court but the same was denied by the Court on July 31,
1973 and October 4, 1973. Petitioner now has the audacity to return before
this Court still invoking said quitclaims, which We again reject.
Secondly, while rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law (Art. 6, New Civil Code). The quitclaim
agreements contain the following provisions in paragraph I 1, No. 3, thereof:
3. Nothing herein stipulated shall be construed as an
admission and/or recognition by the Party of The Second
Part of its failure refusal and/or omission as employer, to
faithfully comply with the pertinent laws, rules and
regulations and/or agreements, nor its liability therefor and
thereunder.
Needless to state, the foregoing provisions are contrary to law, It exempts
the petitioner from any legal liability. The above- quoted provision renders
the quitclaim agreements void ab initio in their entirety since they obligated
the workers concerned to forego their benefits, while at the same time,
exempted the petitioner from any liability that it may choose to reject. This
runs counter to Article 22 of the New Civil Code which provides that no one
shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
Thirdly, the alleged quitclaim agreements are contrary to public policy. Once
a civil action is filed in court, the cause of action may not be the subject of
compromise unless the same is by leave of the court concerned. Otherwise,
this will render the entire judicial system irrelevant to the prejudice of the
national interest. Parties to litigations cannot be allowed to trifle with the
judicial system by coming to court and later on agreeing to a compromise
without the knowledge and approval of the court. This converts the judiciary
into a mere tool of party-litigants who act according to their whims and
caprices. This is more so when the court has already rendered its decision
on the issues submitted.
In the case at bar, the lower court has already rendered a decision on the
issues presented before the alleged quitclaims agreements were made. The
quitclaim agreements were secured by petitioner while it filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court for a review of the lower court's decision. The
quiclaim agreements taken together with the petitioner's petition for certiorari
of the trial court's decision clearly and unmistakably shows the bad faith of
the petitioner and its outright refusal to comply with its legal obligations. And
now it has the temerity to attempt to use this Court as its instrument for the
purpose.
This Court rejects the contention of petitioner to the effect that the lien of an
attorney on the judgment or decree for the payment of money and the
preference thereof which he has secured in favor of his client takes legal
effect only from and after, but not before notice of said lien has been entered
in the record and served on the adverse party, citing the cases of Menzi and
Co. vs. Bastida (63 Phil. 16) and Macondray & Co. vs. Jose (66 Phil. 590) in
support thereof.
This Court finds the petitioner's contentions and citations applicable only
when the case has already been decided with finality. In the case at bar, the
original case was decided with finality only after this Court denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this Court's denial of its petition for
certiorari on the lower court's decision.
This Court is appalled by the attempt of petitioner to mislead it by alleging
that the lower court recognized the validity and effectivity of the 53 individual
agreements when it declared allegedly that "rights may be waived. " The
records show that the lower court qualified its statement to the effect that the
waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law citing
Article 6 of the New Civil Code. This attempt by petitioner casts a serious
doubt on the integrity and good faith not only of the petitioner but also of its
counsel.
This Court rejects the allegation of petitioner to the effect that the 53
agreements gave substance to the policy of the Industrial Peace Act of
encouraging the parties to make all reasonable efforts to settle their
differences by mutual agreement, citing the case of Filomena Dionela, et al.
vs. CIR, et al. (L-18334, August 31, 1963).
Petitioner's contention and the case cited in support thereof apply only
where there is good faith on the part of the party litigants. In the case at bar,
petitioner acted with evident bad faith and malice. Petitioner secured the 53
quitclaim agreements individually with the 53 sugar workers without the
intervention of respondent's lawyer who was representing them before the
lower court. This subterfuge is tantamount to a sabotage of the interest of
respondent association. Needless to say, the means employed by petitioner
in dealing with the workers individually, instead of collectively through
respondent and its counsel, violates good morals as they undermine the
unity of respondent union and fuels industrial disputes, contrary to the
declared policy in the Industrial Peace Act.
the same worthless. The Meralco case does not apply in this case for the
reason that the facts and circusmtances are entirely different.
On the Second Assignment of Error, this Court finds petitioner's allegation to
the effect that the lower court erred in ordering the computation of judgment
on the ground that by reason of the quitclaim agreements the computation of
judgment has become academic, to be without merit and grossly inane.
The allegations of petitioner are premised on its previous allegations
regarding the quitclaims. This Court has earlier stated that the quitclaim
agreements are void ab initio. The lower court was correct in directing the
computation of judgment, there being a basis therefor.
On the Third Assignment of Error, this Court likewise finds petitioner's
allegations which are based on its allegations in support of the first and
second assignments of errors, without merit, as heretofore discussed.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED AND
RESPONDENT CIR (NOW THE NLRC) IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO
IMPLEMENT ITS ORDER DATED JUNE 6,1974.
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), J., concur in the result. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on
leave.
ART 87-88
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari, petitioner contending as not in accord with law, the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 19-IPA(4), dated
February 25, 1970, (a) directing the payment of basic time compensation for
services rendered by Simeon Chongco, in excess of the official time of five
(5) hours but within eight (8) hours, during the summer months, (b) holding
that Republic Act No. 1993, which bars claims for overtime services
rendered beyond three (3) years prior to the demand, is not applicable, and
(c) ruling that any service rendered exceeding thirty (30) minutes beyond the
official working hours as evidenced in time records, is overtime service for
which the employee should be paid. Petitioner also assails the order of
February 25, 1970 for its purported failure to express "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based," as required by Section 12, Article
VIII, of the former Charter, now Section 9, Article X, of the new Constitution.
On October 23, 1967, Simeon Chongco filed with respondent Court of
Industrial Relations a "Motion to Extend Benefits" docketed as Case No. 19IPA(4), alleging that he was employed as Administrative Assistant of the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter referred to as the
NWSA), and at the time of filing of his motion, Chief of the Recreation
Section, with a salary of P4,860.00 per annum, with free quarters; that from
January, 1955 to June, 1965, he rendered overtime, night time, Sunday,
legal holiday and basic time services, but he was not paid in full for the said
services despite the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-18938,
entitled "National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
The objections of the NWSA to the report were as follows: (a) The alleged
overtime and night time services covered in the report were not duly
authorized in writing by the NWSA General Manager, and any service
rendered in excess of eight (8) hours a day or at night time was voluntary
and did not redound to the NWSA's benefit. (b) The movant is not entitled to
additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays.
(c) The Examining Division arrogated unto itself judicial powers when it
included in the report additional compensation for services rendered within
eight (8) hours a day, which was not an award in the main case.
official time during summer months, but within eight (8) hours; and (d) the
records of the case showing that Chongco's claim for basic time differential
had previously been clarified by the Examining Division of the court, and that
the same consists of the 8th hour on ordinary days prior to July 1, 1957 and
the 6th, 7th and 8th hours on summer days prior to and after July 1, 1957.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs. Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar and Esguerra , JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., took no part.
ART 91-93
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26844
petitioners.
CASTRO, J.:
Review on certiorari of the resolution dated October 14, 1966 of the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) dismissing the petitioners' complaint in case 38-V.
Sunday and holiday, would only apply if it is shown that the monthly
or yearly salaries stipulated are intended to cover work on ordinary
working days only or where the nature or conditions of employment
do not require work on Sundays and holidays. But where, in
agreeing to the monthly or yearly stipend, the parties knew, or had
reason to know, that the work would be continuous, without
interruption on Sundays and holidays, then the wage earner would
only be entitled to the 25% supplement (or extra pay) provided by
section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor law, as the regular monthly or
yearly wage already covered the work done on Sundays and
holidays.
The import of the law and the decision in Manalo is that for work on Sundays
and legal holidays, the employer must pay the employee: (1) his regular
remuneration, or 100%; and (2) an additional sum of at least 25% of the
regular remuneration, which is called the "premium pay." In other words, the
pay for Sundays and legal holidays is 125% of the pay for ordinary days, but
only the excess of 25% is premium pay. With respect to employees paid on a
monthly basis, the first 100% (of the 125%), corresponding to the regular
remuneration, may or may not be included in the monthly salary. If it is, then
the employee is entitled to collect only the premium of 25%. If it is not, then
the employee has a right to receive the entire 125%.
The question that thus emerges is whether the petitioners' monthly salaries
already cover the 100% regular remuneration for Sundays and legal
holidays. 1
From the allegations in paragraph 3 of the petitioners' complaint it can be
clearly inferred that such regular remuneration of 100% is already
encompassed in the petitioners' monthly salaries. We hereunder quote the
itemization of the claim (which is essentially the same in respect to the other
petitioners) of the petitioner Felipe de Leon:
Period of employment for which claim is based
January 1, 1946 to October 31, 1957
Salary per month from January
1, 1946 to December 31, 1950 P95.00
Number
of
Sundays
and 300
P3.95
Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Barredo,
JJ.,
Fernando,
concur.