TAADA vs TUVERA

Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents,
through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition, absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances
in question said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties." Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. Respondents further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issues:
Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring the instant petition? Whether publication is needed
to make the law effective?
Held:
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than
the fundamental law of the land. Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Considered in the light
of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department
Order No.16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The
DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong
Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular
No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the
grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of

their

rule-making

authority

in

issuing

said

circulars;that t h e a s s a i l e d D O L E a n d P O E A c i r c u l a r s a r e c o n t r
a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e unreasonable, unfair

and oppressive; and

that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess in issuing circulars.
HELD:

The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants
the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
activities. I t r e a d s : T h e S e c r e t a r y o f L a b o r s h a l l h a v e t h e p o w e r
t o r e s t r i c t a n d r e g u l a t e t h e r e c r u i t m e n t a n d p la c e m e n t ac t i v i t i e s of
a l l a g e n c i e s w i t h i n t h e c o v e r a ge o f t h i s t it l e [Regulation of Recruitment
and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory
authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 to
take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the
National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for a m o n g

the

f u n c t i on s

i n h e r i t e d b y t h e P O E A f r o m t h e d e f u n c t B u r ea u o f E m p l o y m e n t
Services was the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or
licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and
placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from the defunct
Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and
place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government
to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and
from the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and
supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the
hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986)
FACTS:
Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from Central Bank in 1962
and1963, all covered by promissory notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank

released a circular; Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This
circular all informed all rural banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty interest

would be assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965. This was enforced beginning July
1965.In 1969, the outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural filed a case in CFI

Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to 1968, amounting to about 16k, and to restrain
Central bank from further imposing the penalty. Central Bank filed a counterclaim for

the outstanding balance includingthe10% penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under
the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on

1958, under RA 720.Tayugs defense was that the counterclaim should be dismissed
since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to Central Banks flexible and double
standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug Rural and its subsequent arbitrary and

illegal imposition of the 10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty starting
from 1965 was included in the promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was
rendered by CFI Manila in favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank

to pay10% penalty in the amount of around 19k pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to pay
nothing for the next remaining loans. Tayugs claim in the case was however successful, and so
Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k, with interest to the Central Bank for the overdue accounts
with respect to the promissory notes. Central Bank appealed to the CA, but also lost on the

ground that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings. The case was then raised to

the SC, with each party arguing in the following manner: CFI rules that the circulars retroactive
effect on past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts and deprives Tayug Rural of property
without

due

process

of

law.C e n t r a l B a n k r e a s o n s t h a t T a y u g R u r a l , de s p i t e t h e l o a n s , sh o u l d
h a v e k n o w n t h a t r u l e s a n d regulationsauthorize the Central Bank to impose additional
reasonable penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via Memorandum
Circular No. DLC-8
HELD:
NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that

nowhere therein is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to
the rural banks on past due accounts with the Central Bank. As said by the CFI, while the

Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition
of administrative

penalties

character. Administrative

cannot

rules

be

have

taken

the

as

force

measure

and effect

of

SUPERVISORY
law.

in

There are,

however, limitations in the rulemaking power of administrative agencies. All that is required
of administrative rules and regulations is to implement given legislation by not contradicting it and
conform to the standards prescribed by law. Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the
basic

law.

Since

compliance

therewith

can

be

enforced

by

ap e n a l s a n c t i o n , a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e nc y ca n n o t i m p l e m e nt a p e n a lt

y no t p r o v i d e d i n t h e l a w authorizing it, much less one that is applied retroactively.

The new clause imposing an additional penalty was not part of the

promissory notes when Tayug Rural took out its loans. The law cannot be given
retroactive effect. More to the point, the Monetary Board revoked the additional penalty later in
1970, which clearly shows an admission that it had no power to impose the same. The Central
bank hoped to rectify the defect by revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural must

pay the additional 10% in case of suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in
attorneys fees and costs of suit and collection.
Judgment AFFIRMED with modification.

Firestone Tire Company vs. Lariosa and NLRC

GR No. 70479
February 27, 1987

FACTS:
Carlos Lariosa work in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about to leave the company
premises, he was frisked by security guard because while his personal bag was
inspected, there were16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the company. As a result, he was
terminated by firestone on the ground of stealing company property and loss of trust. The
company also files criminal complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, on other hand,
filed a case for illegal dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dism issal just
bust the
NLRC reversed
the decisionFirestone contends that NLRC
erred in not dismissing Lariosas appeal for being late.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa and NLRC was filed late.

HELD:
Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days from the notice of
the decision of the labor arbiter. Under the Labor Code, the reglementary period
for which an appeal from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC is within a
period of ten days. The ten-day period has to be interpreted to mean as ten calendar days
and not ten working days.

Gonzaga vs de David
GR No. L-14858
December 29, 1960
FACTS: Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the
vehicles
and
pays
the first installment for registration
fees due
on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted to the
provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under
postal money orders. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the
remittance bears the
date
August 31, 1957.
The registrar of the
Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second
installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of August. The
last working day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And consequently, the
remittance of Gonzaga which bears cancellation mark dated August 31,1957was made
beyond time fixed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees was made
beyond the time fixed by law.
RULING:
The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31, 1957.However,it
was immaterial the
last working
day contemplated in the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of
Motor Vehicle Office. The fact that August31, 1957 was declared a special public
holiday did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day
for paying registration fees without penalty. Moreover, under the said law,
for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the
envelope containing the remittance is considered the date of application.

Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA

GR no. L-32116 April 21, 1981
FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan
to apply for industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage
on Castors house, after that, the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia
obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castros signature
as co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then sent a notice
announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the
obligation. Upon request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10,
1961was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was subsequently
declared a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public auction on April
11, 1961 which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday.
Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that there was fraud on the
part of Valencia who induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory
note since she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write and it was only
when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that the encumbrance on
her property was P6000 and not for P3000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring the
date already set by law.
RULING:
The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135 which
states that that a notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less
than 20 days in at least 3public places and if the property is worth more
than P400 such notice shall also be published for in a newspaper
of general circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3 consecutive

weeks. The pretermission of a holiday applies only where the day, or the last day for
doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a
given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an
office or officer of the government for an act to be done. Since April 10, 1961
was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fi xed
by deputy sheriff , the sale cannot be legally made on the next
succeeding business day without the notice of the sale in accordance with Act no.
3135.

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PAZ M. DEL
ROSARIO,Defendant-Appellee.
Facts:
On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City
charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on the 28th day of
May, 1953. The accused thereupon presented a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court
sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Against the order of dismissal appeal
is made directly to this Court under the provisions of section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 as only questions of law are involved in the
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ISSUE:

Whether or not the term "month" in the Revised Penal Code should be understood to
be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil calendar or calendar
month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
HELD:
Yes. The term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the
sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in the year 1887 (S.
de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, it had
declared that when the law spoke of months, it meant the natural month or the solar
month, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary. But after the
promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule
for the interpretation of the laws, and with particular respect to months, that a month
shall be understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the two months period
for the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month
being a 30-day month. (S. de 6 de abril de 1895, 3 Viada, p. 45).
Similarly, we hold that in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil
Code the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be
understood

to

mean

the

30-day

month

and

not

the

solar

or

civil

month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days,
said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and
we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet

been

prescribed

because

July

27

is

the

sixtieth

day

from

May

29.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case ordered
reinstated. Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Re: Filart 40 Phil 205

FACTS: These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven
residents of Asingan, Pangasinan, who filed a complaint against attorney
Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in substance:
1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them the
sum of P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum in connection with
Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to
the Supreme Court, he having practically abandoned the case.
ISSUE: Whether the facts presented are sufficient to support the allegation
of fraud and negligence on part of the respondent.
HELD: The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been
dismissed because of the lack of diligence of counsel, cannot let the
occurrence pass without expressing a strong disapproval of such criminal
carelessness. While we would not wish to assume a harsh and
uncompromising attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them
to know that by indulging in such unprofessional tactics they become
unworthy of the trust which the law reposes in them. The lack of due care is
a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a
disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. We bring to the notice of
clients whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of
an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings necessary in the proper conduct

of a cause, and in taking such steps as may be required in the progress of

the case, that the client who has suffered damages as the result of his
attorney's negligence or misconduct may recover therefor.
Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of
Attorney Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it does
become our solemn duty to reprimand him for carelessness and misconduct
in attending to the cause of poor clients. Let a copy of this order be
furnished to the respondent for his information with a warning that a more
severe punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar
acts and omissions; and let a copy hereof be filed with his personal papers
in this court. So ordered.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. L-52306
12 October 1981
Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, Petitioner Corporation was engaged in
the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. For which
petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film
rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued
General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully
withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the
company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA
5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35%
and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income.

In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for

deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for
reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V334, may be retroactively applied.
Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive
application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the
prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is
beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that
petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and
demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three
years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer
in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already
remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular
was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not
fall under any of them.

Lorenzo vs. Posadas

64 Phil 353
Facts: On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and
considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanleys will provides the
following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real
estate owned by him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years
after Thomas Hanleys death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took
oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was
appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed
inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes penalty and
surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will be
ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted
Posadas motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after

10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter
counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on
the tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed
this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for refund against Posadas. Hence,
both appealed.
Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore
liable for the P1, 191.27 that Posadas is asking for?
Held: Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to
each beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10,
1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.Although
the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court
considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui que trust, the beneficiary
within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).Even though there was no express mention of the
word trust in the will, the court of first instance was correct in appointing a trustee
because no particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69
C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise
a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that
Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his
properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated purpose.

Ferrazzini v Gsell | 1916 |

o
o
o

Facts:
Carlos Gsell is engaged in the manufacture of umbrellas, matches and hats;
Anselmo Ferrazzini was employed by Gsell as foreman in the umbrella factory;
At some point, he was discharged by Gsell so he filed this case to recover damages for an alleged wrongful
discharge;
Gsell, for his part admitted he discharged Ferrazzini without written advice of six months in advance as
provided in the contract;
But, he says the discharge was lawful on account of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders;
He also sought a counterclaim for further alleged breach by Ferrazzini after his discharge (that he cannot enter
into employment of any enterprise in the Philippines, during his employment and within 5 years after

termination except when given written permission; if he does, he will pay Gsell P10k; Gsell was employed in
cement industry);
Trial court favoured Ferrazzini and declined to consider the counterclaim, so Gsell appealed.
Issues:
-

Was the discharge lawful? Yes.

Is the stipulation preventing Ferrazzinito enter into the employment of any enterprise in the
Philippine Islands, whatever, save and except after obtaining special written permission therefore valid? No,
against publicpolicy.
Ratio:

Th e d i s c h a rge w a s l a w f u l .
Court looked into whether Gsell had just cause to discharge Ferrazzini; Gsell has to prove
justification for his act because it was in contravention of the six-month clause in the contract; if it was without
just cause, it was in violation of the contract and Ferrazzini is entitled to recover;

BOCOBO V ESTANISLAO
L-30458, Aug. 31, 1976
FACTS:
A radio broadcaster was accused of libel before the municipal court of Balanga,
Bataan, the municipality being one of the places where the broadcast was heard. It
was contended that while RA 1289 vested exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases in
courts of first in-stance, still under a later law, RA 3828, municipal courts in provincial
capitals were given concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes (up to a certain penalty).
ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD:
The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bataan has jurisdiction.
Repeal of the special enactment (RA 1289) by a general but later enactment (RA 3828)
is NOT FAVORED, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so, even if the
provisions of the general but later law are sufficiently comprehensive to include matters
apparently set forth in the special law. Incidentally, the reason why suit must be filed
with the RTC of the province is to prevent undue harassment of the accused, in case,
for instance, the suit is brought in a very remote municipality, simply because the
broadcast was heard there. The contention that the alleged libel, having arisen from a
radio broadcast, is triable only by a municipal court, because Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code talks only of defamation in writing and does not say by similar means is
not tenable, since the contention ignores the basic purpose of the law, namely,
to prevent inconvenience or harassment. A radio broadcast may be spread far and
wide, much more so than in the case of newspapers, and it is not difficult to imagine
the deplorable effect (of the harassment) on the accused even if he has a valid
defense.
[NOTE: An act passed later but going into effect earlier will prevail over a statute
passed earlier and going into effect later. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor
Union, 72 Phil. 7). This is because the later enactment expresses the later intent.].

LICHAUCO & COMPANY., petitioner, Vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of

Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
respondents
Facts: Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against
Silverio Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from

Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau
of Agriculture contending that said cattle shall have been immunized from the
rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.
The petitioner asseted that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the
Administrative Code (amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has an absolute and
unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum from phom-pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippin Islands and
that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said
restrictions.
Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of
the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6
Issue:
Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to
draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?
Held: Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular
contingency and not inconsistent with Section 1762. Petition does not show sufficient
ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction.
Dispo: We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the
reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section
1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section

1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section

1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of
section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section
1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to
bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the
cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon
compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference
between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in
the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the
amendatory Act (3052).
That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not
dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions.
Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing
of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on
the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a
dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the
provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770
is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the
special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the
administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry
of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.
U.S. vs Palacio 33 Phil 208

FACTS: The undersigned charges Mateo P. Palacio with having violated

section 87 of Act No. 82, in the following manner, to wit: Said accused, on or
about the 26th day of September, 1914, in the municipality of Tacloban,
Province of Leyte, P.I., he being then and there a deputy to the provincial
assessor of Leyte, charged with the duty of assessing real property, did
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally upon revising the assessment and in
reassessing the property of Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Diit, municipality of Tacloban, omit from the tax list certain real properties and
improvements belonging to said Francisco Madlonito, knowing that the
properties omitted were lawfully taxable; in violation of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act committed by the defendant constitute an
infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as
the Municipal Code.
HELD: Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of
the municipality shall be valued and assessed for taxation by a board, to
consist of the president, the municipal treasurer, and a specially authorized
deputy of the provincial treasurer, which board shall be known as the
municipal board of assessors. On February 11, 1913, Act No. 2238 was
passed, section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for
each province containing municipalities organized under the provisions of
the Municipal Code. As may be seen, the purpose of Act No. 2238, in
creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such number of
deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the
approval of the Executive Secretary, was the same as that of Act No. 82, in
creating, in section 49 thereof, the municipal board of assessors.
Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly said by
defendants counsel in his brief, is that when there are two laws on the
same subject enacted on different dates, and it appears evidently by the
form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the legislator
to cover therein the whole of the subject, and that it is a complete and
perfect system, or is in itself a provision, the latest law should be considered
as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in
force and that all that is not shall rejected and repealed. By reason of the
foregoing, and the judgment appealed from being in accordance with the
merits of the case and the law, we hereby affirm the same, with the costs
against appellant. So ordered.

Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation

GR 30642; April 30, 1985

FACTS: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex

Mining Corporation, who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in
that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved
to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before
the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the
regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that
they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same
time sue.

HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then
they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win

in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to
them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they
would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may
be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him.

ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed
Industries Inc. A Pacifi c BankingCorporation Check was paid and
drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later
dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source of
check
and
laterd i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e b e l o n g e d t o o n e E u g
e n i o B a l t a o . A l b e n s o n m a d e a n extrajudical demand upon
Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the
signature was his. Company fi led a complaint against Baltao for
violation
of
BP
22.
It
was
later discovered that
private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the
business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform

Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages
against Albenson.
ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RULING: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have
the intent to cause damageto the respondent or enrich themselves but just
to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of
Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed
that it was private respondent who issued check based on the following
inquiries: SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene
Baltao. Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and
the III.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson. A p e r s o n
who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will
n a t u r a l l y s e e k w a y s t o compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal
for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CA

445 SCRA 500
FACTS: Private respondent Emerald Resort Hotel Corporation (ERHC) obtained a loan from
petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). To secure the loan, ERHC mortgaged
its personal and real properties to DBP. On 5 June 1986, alleging that ERHC failed to pay its
loan, DBP filed with the Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, an Application
for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages. Sheriffs issued the required
notices of public auction sale of the personal and real properties. However, they failed to

execute the corresponding certificates of posting of the notices. The Office of the Sheriff
scheduled on 12 August 1986 the public auction sale of the real properties. The first scheduled
public auction was publish. However, the Office of the Sheriff postponed the auction sale on 12
August 1986 to 11 September 1986 at the request of ERHC. DBP did not republish the notice of
the rescheduled auction sale because DBP and ERHC signed an agreement to postpone the 12
August 1986 auction sale.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial foreclosre of real and chattel mortgage are valid.
RULING: Valid as to chattel mortgage. Void as to real estate mortgage.
There is no question that DBP published the notice of auction sale scheduled on 12 August
1986. However, no auction sale took place on 12 August 1986 because DBP, at the instance of
ERHC, agreed to postpone the same to 11 September 1986.
Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity such
that those interested might attend the public sale. To allow the parties to waive this
jurisdictional requirement would result in converting into a private sale what ought to be a
public auction.
DBP, however, complied with the mandatory posting of the notices of the auction sale of the
personal properties. Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, the only requirement is posting of the
notice of auction sale. There was no postponement of the auction sale of the personal properties
and the foreclosure took place as scheduled. Thus, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage in the instant case suffers from no procedural infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 38569 and
38604 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage is valid whereas the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage is void. The
award of moral damages is deleted for lack of basis. No costs.

DELIMA VS LAGUNA TAYABAS

160 SCRA70
FACTS: Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision seeking its modification so
that the legal interest awarded by the Appellate, Court will start to run from the date of the
decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963 instead of January 31, 1972, the date of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Potenciano Requijo as heir of the deceased Petra de
la Cruz further sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00. The
Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since the plaintiffs did not
appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award interest on the damages and that the court on

its own discretion awarded such interest in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity
of the interest should not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo was rendered.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeal; erred in granting legal interest on damages to start only
from the date of its decision instead of from the date of the trial court's decision;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not increasing the indemnity for the death of
Petra de La Cruz (in Civil Case No. SP-240) from P3,000 to P12,000.00.
RULING: Under the first issue, petitioners contend that the ruling of the Appellate Court
departs from the consistent rulings of this court that the award of the legal rate of interest should
be computed from the promulgation of the decision of the tonal court. Respondents counter that
petitioners having failed to appeal from the lower court's decision they are now precluded from
questioning the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party
cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may
make counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds
but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for in such case he must appeal.A party who
does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court
other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on
appeal. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case where the heirs of the victim in the
traffic accident chose not to appeal in the hope that the transportation company will pay the
damages awarded by the lower court but unfortunately said company still appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which step was obviously dilatory and oppressive of the rights of the said claimants:
that the case had been pending in court for about 30 years from the date of the accident in 1958
so that as an exception to the general rule afore stated, the said heirs who did not appeal the
judgment, should be afforded equitable relief by the courts as it must be vigilant for their
protection. The claim for legal interest and increase in the indemnity should be entertained in
spite of the failure of the claimants to appeal the judgment. We hold that the legal interest of six
percent (6) on the amounts adjudged in favor of petitioners should start from the time of the
rendition of the trial court's decision on December 27, 1963 instead of January 31, 1972, the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, the subject decision is modified in that the legal interest on the damages awarded
to petitioners commences from the date of the decision of the court a quo until actual payment
while the civil indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz is increased to P 30,000.00.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ
481 SCRA 384 (2006)
FACTS: Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante hired the services of Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. to send a telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog asking her
to send money for their mother Editha Verchez who at that time was confined in a hospital in
Sorsogon. But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to Zenaida. When Editha
died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida
and their respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial

Court of Sorsogon. They alleged that the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the
early death of Editha. RCPI argues that there is no privity of contract between other respondents
except with Grace, also the delay in the delivery is caused by force majeure, maintaining further
that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees; hence they must be released from
any liability. The RTC rendered judgement against RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there was no
direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts
RULING: RCPIs stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual
or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-hereinco-respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It
took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the
alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception
of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address
of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of
such a loss. Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering
the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the nontransmission and the non-delivery s that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But
it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

160 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of the West Visayas College.
She extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. As a result,
the school president (petitioner) denied her the right to graduate MAGNA CUM LAUDE

despite the order of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools that she be conferred such
honor.

ISSUE:
Is the school president liable for damages?

RULING:
It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's
decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He
could have done so considering that he received the decision XXX and even though he sent it
back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only
3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr. Delmo, the girl's
father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner failed to do,
and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC

GR NO. 174689

FACTS:
The petitioner, Rommel Jacinto Silverio filed a petition to change his first name from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his gender from male to female in his birth certificate so that he can
marry as a woman to a man.

The petition is based on the ground that he has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand a year before the petition was filed. The petition was granted by the said
court yet on August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed by the appellate court.
The latter ruled that the decision of the former lacked legal basis. Wherefore with the decision
rendered the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Should the court allow the change of name and gender based of the ground that petitioner is
now physically a woman?
RULING:
No. The court denies the petition.
The Supreme Court denies the motion on the ground that there is no law recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex is at the time of birth, if it is not by error then it
cannot be changed.
Thus, the court explained that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences, for it will greatly affect the rules of
marriage and family relations and affect public policy considering laws governing women.

VAN DORN VS RONILLO 139 SCRA 139

Van Dorn v. Ronillo, Jr., et al
FACTS: Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an
American citizen. The two were married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence
in the Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alicia Reyes re-married
in Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes
Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business (Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal
property of the parties and asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE: W/N the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private
respondent even after their divorce obtained in USA.

RULING: No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his
county, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him.
He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the
petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private
respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA (1989)

GR No. 80116
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was
married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding
against the petitioner in Germany and promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed for two complains of
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent,
petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.
The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. The Secretary of Justice directed the respondent city fiscal to

defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not yet been arraigned and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. On October 21, 1987 this Court issued a
TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Petitioner argues that
the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the criminal
complaint.
ISSUE: W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of
the filing of the criminal action.
RULING: Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence an adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed the suit. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.

HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14628

FACTS:
Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she,
used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised petitioner that she
was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE:
W/N moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

RULING:

When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover
moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical
and hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees.
Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love
for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a
woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of
the new Civil Code.

WASSMER VS VELEZ
12 SCRA 652

FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their promise to love, decided to get married.
Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be
postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her
nothing changed rest assured returning soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz
sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

RULING:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless
for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded
under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.

Ty vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and
church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon
City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private respondent
wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in
Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their
marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got
married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submitted the
marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC
and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of
the respondent.
RULING:
There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Supreme
Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from
her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents.
Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.

EUGENIO VS J VELEZ GR 85140

GR 85140 17 May 1990

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas cohabited with Tomas Eugenio. Unfortunately, Vargas died due to heart failure
while giving birth. The brothers and sisters of the former filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
27 September 1988. They stated that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence and had
resided her in the palacial residence in Misamis.
RTC issued the writ of Habeas Corpus but Eugenio refused to surrender the corpse to the sheriff
due to the reason that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus. The court consequently
ordered that the corpse of Vitaliana Vargas be delivered to the funeral parlor for autopsy but
Eugenio stated that the court does not have jurisdiction. Eugenio insisted that he has a right on
Vargas corpse because he is her common law husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio can claim custody for the deceaseds body

RULING:
No, Eugenio cannot claim custody for the deceaseds body. The court ordered for the dead body
of Vargas be awarded to her brothers and sisters. As stated in the Revised Administrative code,
the duty of burial of an unmarried person should be left to any kin.
Even if the deceased and the petitioner cohabited, they are still not considered husband and wife
as the Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman can cohabit
for years even without marriage; however, their legal status remains that of an unmarried
person.
The petitioner has an existing marriage with another woman which serves as an impediment
from marrying Vitaliana when she was still living. Therefore in this case, the custody of
Vargass dead body is with her relatives.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (1996)

GR No. 961088
FACTS: Dapa, Surigao del Norte Mayor Navarro filed a complaint against respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency
in office and ignorance of the law. As for the first act complained, it was alleged that Judge
Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the lack of
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of Ida Pearanda, Tagadans first
wife.
Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by Tagadan stating the fact that he and his
first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years is sufficient proof of Pearandas
presumptive death, and therefore, he could rightfully solemnize the marriage. Second, it was
alleged that Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and
Gemma del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction. The judge holds his office and therefore has
jurisdiction in Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent judge acted with gross misconduct and in gross ignorance of the
law.
RULING: Yes. As in the first issue, the respondent judge solemnized the wedding despite the
declaration in the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga
stating that Tagadans civil status is separated. Furthermore, he also maintained that the joint
affidavit stating that the first wife, Ida Penaranda, has not returned nor been heard of for almost
seven years thereby giving rise to her presumptive death, is enough reason to proceed with the
marriage.

These of course are in disagreement with Art. 41 of the Family Code which provides that for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse, and therefore, by reason that no such summary
proceeding was made by Tagadan, made their marriage void. As for the second issue, it is
covered by Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus Art. 7 could not justify the judges action for
the reason that his jurisdiction covers only the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, thus
he is without authority to administer the wedding in Dapa, Surigao Del Norte. Furthermore, the
judge could not cite Art. 8 to validate his actions as this would only demonstrate his lack of
understanding of the basic principles of the civil law since the parties did not fall under any of
the exceptions aforementioned in the provision.

Pugeda vs Trias
GR No. L-16925
4 SCRA 49

FACTS: The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same
were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted
marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934. The defendants Rafael, Miguel,
Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff
alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764
of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273,
82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76%
in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the aid interest in the lots abovementioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became coowners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof.
Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the
plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share
therein of plaintiff.
ISSUE: The defendants questioned the marriage of the plaintiff, when they produced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite or the month
of January 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.
HELD: Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented it

to proof marriage.
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.

People vs Borromeo
133 SCRA 106
FACTS: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told
Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her.
Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and
together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying
infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accusedappellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be
liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage
contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that
the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
ISSUE: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
HELD: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are
presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society.
Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of
the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage
does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as
long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a

copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000.

Mariategui vs C.A.
GR No. 57062
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages
during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4
children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had
a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco
and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupos descendants by his
first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated
themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage,
no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting

themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

Tenebro vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 150158
FACTS:
Tenebro was married to Ancajas before a judge in a trial court in Lapu-lapu city.
Thismarriage took place in 1990. Eventually Tenebro showed Ancajas a marriage
certificateinvolving him and a Villareyes, a marriage consummated in 1986. Tenebro left their
home andsaid that he will cohabit with Villareyes. However, in 1993, he married another
woman namedVillegas. After discovering this, Ancajas corresponded with Villareyes asking her
if their marriage did take place and Villareyes answered in the affirmative. With this, Ancajas
filed acase for bigamy. Tenebro claimed that he only had children with Villareyes but there was
noexisting valid marriage between them because there was no ceremony that took place and
alsothere is no record of their marriage in the civil registrar. The lower court found him guilty
of bigamy and said decision was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner
contestedthis by invoking psychological incapacity in the second marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebros marriage to Villareyes was valid and whether he may
invoke psychological incapacity in the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on liability for
bigamy?
HELD:

With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in the affirmative and ruled in the
negativeon the latter. For the first issue, Villareyes was able to present a valid marriage
certificate and her handwritten statement. These were sufficient documentary evidence that can
prove that amarriage was solemnized since that is what is stated in the document and signed by
the parties.When a court declares a marriage null and void by reason of psychological
incapacity itdoes not declare the marriage non-existent from the very beginning. This means
that a marriageis still considered to have taken place. With this, the court ruled that a subsequent
marriage wasconsidered contracted while another marriage subsists thus constituting bigamy

Republic vs Dayot
GR No. 175581
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July
1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to

a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.

Cario vs Cario
GR No. 132529
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom
he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993,
Yee filed for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer,
Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the
previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same
has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may

be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled
to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void.

Republic vs CA and Castro

GR No. 103047
FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only
4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother
with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to
follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that
there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the
certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office
did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of
Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of
the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of
the proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.

Ninal vs Bayadog
GR No. 133778
328 SCRA 122
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to
Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February
19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the RTC.Petitioner is a
citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the USA.They were married in
Hongkong and established residence in the Philippines and produced twochildren. They
divorced in Nevada and it is also where petitioner remarried Theodore Van Dorn.Private
respondent filed a case against petitioner with regard to a business in Ermita, whichrespondent
claims as Conjugal property and he asks to be declared with right to manage.Petitioner claims
that said act is barred by his confirmation in their Nevada divorce that they hadno community
property. The court denied dismissal because said property is in the Philippinesand so the
divorce has no bearing in the case. Hence, the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the Nevada divorce is to be given merit in the Philippines?
HELD:
The private respondent contends that the divorce cannot be held valid in the Philippines because
it is against our laws. However, the Philippines recognizes divorce by an alien in
another country. The divorce that took place between private respondent and petitioner received
nocontention from private respondent. In fact he sent his lawyers on his behalf, stating that

theywish to get a divorce by reason of incompatibility and that there is no community property
to beadjudicated. With this, the court cannot rule in favor of private respondent because being
acitizen of the United States it was his own laws that made the divorce valid.DOCTRINE
Article 15 of the Civil Code talks about laws on family rights binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad.
However, private respondent is a citizen of the USA and pursuant to his national law, he is no
longer the husband of petitioner, and it being a valid divorce, is recognized here in the
Philippines.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
GR No. 8011
174 SCRA 653
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983.
The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January
15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair
with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued?
HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.

Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Republic vs Obrecido
GR No. 154380
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court.Cipriano
Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in Ozamis City in the year 1941.This relationship
gave birth two a son and daughter. Said son was with Lady when she left for the States in 1986.
Cipriano knew eventually that his wife has become a naturalized citizen of theStates and
learned that she has married another man after acquiring a divorce decree. Ciprianoasked the
declaration of the court permitting him to remarry.
The Solicitor General asrepresentative for the State contends that he cannot be granted
permission to remarry becauseLady was not a foreign citizen specifically when he married her
and the law only recognizesdivorce acquired by the alien spouse. Petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Code permits Cipriano to remarry after a divorce was acquired?
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative, however, it denied Cipriano permission to remarry.The court
in answering in the affirmative on the issue based their decision on paragraph 2of Section 26 of
the Family Code which provides for the recognition of a divorce decree validlyacquired by the
alien spouse in another country. This is to permit the Filipino spouse to remarryas a matter of
fairness because the foreign spouse ceased to be attached to the Filipino. What is relevant here

is that Lady was no longer a citizen of the Philippines when she acquired thedivorce bringing
her within the purview of Section 26. She is considered an alien who obtained adivorce decree.
This then capacitates Cipriano to remarry.
Unfortunately, for his petition to begranted, he has to prove to the court that a divorce decree
has been validly acquired by his wife.However, he failed to do so, hence, the court cannot
permit him to remarry.

Llorente vs C.A. and Llorente

GR No. 124371
345 SCRA 592
FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal
home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he
went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was
having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo
married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his
last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a
petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On
appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they
have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce
abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that
divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of

foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

Republic vs Iyoy
GR No. 152577
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.Crasus Iyoy was
married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to fivechildren. Fely Iyoy eventually
left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus
documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasuseventually found out that
Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship hasconceived of a child. Crasus
eventually questioned the validity of Felys subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in
deciding this case sided with Fely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid
and recognized in the Philippines?
HELD:
The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Courts decision.
Basingfrom the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984,
marryingMicklus a year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in
such away that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and

thereforeshe does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as
subsisting.
The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status
are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen
then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.

Republic vs CA and Castro

GR No. 103047
236 SCRA 257
FACTS: Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage
license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status
before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued
to
them
prior
to
the
solemnization
of
their
marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the
trial court was reversed.
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD: At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one
of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void
ab
initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a
city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents
of the former.

Lacson Vs Lacson
Facts:
Feb 14, 1953 when they got married. Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in
Bacolod to go to ManilaMarch 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as
well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it pushed through
though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and
the youngest would stay with Carmen. This was affirmed by the CFI. May 7, 1963, respondent
filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only
entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given
custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.CA: ruled that compromise
agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.
ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife
HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure." Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been
declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise. However the children
are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with
(sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968. Court may also
award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.
However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with
respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together
as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the
intention of livingseparate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with himas a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and
cross-complaint that she had been compelled toleave because of the cruel treatment of her
husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation bedeclared and the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.The trial judge, upon
consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husbandwas more to
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justificationfor her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other?
HELD:
NO.It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses tocohabit
with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclinedto sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compelthe restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium . At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel

the cohabitation of marriedpeople shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.We are
therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditionaland absolute order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitorypart of the complaint; though
he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife haspresented herself without sufficient cause
and that it is her duty to return.Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original
complaint and thecross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital homewithout sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolvedfrom the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda Case Digest

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252
Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were
legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had
contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got
irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff
appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action.
Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage
is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given

by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the
defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at
P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court
in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that
no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married

man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.

Barnuevo v. Fuster
FACTS:
On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain, got married in a
Catholic ceremony in Malaga, Spain. On 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and
acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of 1896, Contanza came to Manila and
lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. On April 4, 1899, they made an
agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to
Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases". Fuster undertook in the same
document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid
from June 1899, but he only complied until August 1899. Contanza Barnuevo returned to
Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against her husband on the ground of adultery committed by
Fuster. Fuster denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued
that they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain and he alleged that both of them were natives
and subjects of Spain. Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the possession of real
and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their
qualification as being all conjugal property. The Court of First Instance of Manila decreed the
suspension of life-in-common between Barnuevo and Fuster and directed the communal
property to be divided between the parties.
ISSUE(S):
(a) W/N the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by Barnuevo against Fuster
who are citizens of Spain and W/N the the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the partition

of properties of a Spanish couple who were married in Spain obtained their divorce in the
Philippines
HELD/RATIO:
(a) Yes. The CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish
Catholic subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their domicile herein. The defendant
had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than which he manifestly had in the
Philippines during the 17 years preceding the date of the complaint. He had kept open house
and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object of
conjugal society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife resided in Manila
from middle of 1896 until April 1899.
(b) Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country,
where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein,
shall be required in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish
before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of
Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may
have."
MARCELO vs ESTACIO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant Daniel V. Estacio from the orders of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal of November 18 and 28 respectively, the first of which denied his motion to
reconsider the order of August 23, 1938 directing his arrest, and the second of which denied his
motion of November 7, 1938, for the same purpose. It appears from the record that the
plaintiff-appellee, Felisa S. Marcelo, married the defendant-appellant, Daniel V. Estacio, on
April 24, 1921, but she separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17, 1937, when
she learned that the defendant had been named justice of the peace of the municipalities of
Moncada and San Manuel, Province of Tarlac, said plaintiff-appellee brought suit for support.
In its judgment of October 25, 1937, the court ordered the said defendant-appellant to pay to the
plaintiff-appellee a monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. On November 18, 1937, the
defendant-appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court in its order of
December 7, 1937. On January 8, 1938, the said defendant-appellant announced his exception
and intention to appeal. On February 5, 1938, the said defendant-appellant filed his bill of
exceptions. On February 8th of the same year, the attorney for the plaintiff-appellee filed in the
Court of First Instance of origin a motion asking that the said defendant-appellant be ordered to
pay her the allowance awarded to her in the decision, or to post a bond of P2,000
notwithstanding the appeal taken by him to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not affording the defendant an opportunity to
prove his poverty and his inability to pay his wife, the plaintiff-appellee, the allowance for
support to which he was sentenced.

HELD:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in ordering the execution of the judgment, rendered by it against the
defendant-appellant Daniel V. Estacio, sentencing him to pay an allowance to his wife, and the
issuance of an order of arrest in case of non-compliance with said judgment, after the approval
of the bill of exceptions, acted without jurisdiction, wherefore, said order of execution of the
judgment is illegal and void. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed insofar as it orders
the defendant Daniel V. Estacio to pay an allowance for support to his wife, Felisa S. Marcelo,
and the arrest of the defendant for non-compliance therewith, issued after the approval of the
bill of exceptions and the elevation thereof to the appellate court, is reversed, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.

Canonizado vs. Almeda-Lopez

109 Phil 1177
FACTS
Petitioner and her husband, Cesar Canonizado lived together until February 18, 1956. The latter
left the conjugal home for reason of insufferable conduct of the herin wife/petitioner. He left
with him his child named Chrisitina Beatriz who is now 13 years old and since then, remained
under the custody and care of wife/petitioner. In order to assert support for her and daughter,
petitioner filed a petition to ask for support from Cesar Canonizado. In resolving the case, the
respondent judge rendered decision denying the petition of support pendente lite by reason that
herein petitioner is engaged in gainful occupation.
ISSUE
W/N the court erred in its ruling denying the petition for support pendent lite for the by reason
that herein petitioner is engaged in gainful occupation.
HELD

Yes, court erred in its ruling when it denied the petition for support. The law expressly provides
for the properties to be exempt from attachment and executions; courts cannot provide for the
other exemptions. Cost against respondent

Jocson vs. Empire Insurance Co. 103 Phil 580

Facts:
Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor
children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co.
for surety and managed his childrens properties that included war damage payments, which
formed part of their inheritance from their mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses
for education and clothing of the children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed
guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of
Agustins accounts, claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the guardianship funds
for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority, Enrique and Jesus adopted the
petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursementswhich Empire Insurance Co.
and Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these should have come instead
from the support, which they were entitled to receive from their father.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners-appellants contention their fathers disbursements from their guardianship
funds are illegal are valid
Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be
demanded and established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners
mere relationship with their father. The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed
and especially must this be true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means
of their own. Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were even sanctioned by
the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done in a separate action, not
in guardianship proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is a paupers
appeal.

Samson vs. Yatco

1 SCRA 1145
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court to set aside an order
entered on 1958 by the CFI of Rizal, Quezon city that dismissed with prejudiced a petition for
support (Civil Case no. Q-2620). That among the facts of the case are as follows: Sybil Samson,
a minor is legitimate child of Consuelo Enriquez (petitioner/plaintiff) and Arsenio Samson
(respondent) whom after years of living in the maternal house of the latter, Consuelo Enriquez, ,
decided to leave the house of her mother-in-law bringing with her their child Sybil Samson for
the reason that she had been maltreated in the said house. Subsequently said spouse filed a
petition for support for her and her child. In one of the hearings, petitioners failed to appear
before the court and reasoned-out that said minor child is sick. Upon verification by the court,
said child was found to be only experiencing a slight fever and that said minor can still walk.
That the following circumstances led to the dismissal of the petition for support upon failure to
appear in court on the part of the petitioner/plaintiff.
ISSUE.

Whether or not said CFI erred in dismissing said petition for mere reason of failure to appear in
court on the part of the petitioner/plaintiff.
HELD:
Yes. The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The petitoners right to support from the
respondent, under article 301 of Civil Code cannot be renounced, and they should not be
deprived of their right to present and future support. With cost against the respondent.

Leouel Santos and Rosario Bedia Santos v CA 242 SCRA 407

FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a
nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget
only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time
the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia
agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents,
the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the
hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because
petitioner could not afford to do so. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos,
left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is
not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United
States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. On
September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents

contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the
boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
ISSUE: who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr.
HELD: Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the
appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the
Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. The Court of Appeals held that
although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is
"depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered,
as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have
custody of the minor. The respondent appeal to court. His being a soldier is
likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of
the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to
deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children
merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and
assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November
13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor
Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel
Santos, Sr. SO ORDERED.

Flores Vs. Esteban

97 Phil 439
Facts

Eduardo Flores (petitioner) is married to Adoracion Esteban and that they had a son named
Reynaldo Cenon E. Flores born on Dec 22, 1946. That her wife died on Dec 27, 1953 and since
then, their son lived with her mother in law named Maria De leon Vda. De Esteban, herein
referred as respondent. That said respondent alleged that said child was under her custody since
he was twenty days old up until now that said child is already aged eight years old, and that she
is paying for all the expenses of said minor and never restrains the minor of his liberty but the
latter refuses to go with his father whom he hardly knows due to the fact that herein petitioner
has been away from this country, and since then the respondent has been supporting the child
and is sending him in a primary school in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The petitioner prayed that
custody of the child be granted to him being the biological of said child.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the custody of the child be granted to the father being the
biological father.
Held:
For the sake of the welfare of the child, we are of the opinion that the respondent grandmother
should have the legal custody over him, without prejudice to the obligation of the father to
contribute to his maintenance. In view of the foregoing, it is decreed that the respondent Maria
de Leon Vda. de Esteban have custody of the child. The petition is dismissed.

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie C. Cervantes

GR 79555
Jan. 27, 1989
Facts

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed with this court over the persons of minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes. Among the facts of the case are as follow: said minor was born on 14 february 1987
to respondents Conrado Fajardo and gina Carreon who are common-law husband and wife. Said
respondents offered the child for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes
(petitoners). Said adoption wasgranted by the RTC of Rizal in favor of the respondents with all
the vested rights inherent to the adoption of the child, hence, the child was known as Angelie
Anne Cervantes. Sometime March or April of 1987, said petioners received a demand letter
from herein respondents asking for P150, 000 otherwise they would get back their child.
Petioneers refused to yield on the demand which prompted said respondent to took the child
from her yaya under the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Despite
demand for the respondent to return the child, same proved futile as the herein respondent
reasoned-out that she has no plan of returning the child, and that the consent of adoption she
had executed was not fully explained to her. That she will only return if she were paid the
amount she had earlier demanded. That said respondent is now cohabiting with other man other
than the natural father of the minor.
Issue
Whether or not the custody of the child rightfully belongs to the respondents or the otherwise,
to the adopting parents.
Held.
The custody of the child rightfully belongs to the petitioners. It was held time and again by this
court that in cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters
welfare is paramount. The provision that no child under five years of age shall be separated
from her mother cannot be applied in this case where the court finds compelling reason to rule
otherwise.

Quintana vs Lerma 24 Phil 285

Facts: In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from

the judgment of the lower court granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee

Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on a contract they
made for support. As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901
and entered, in February 1905, into a written agreement of separation,
renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal
property between them and the defendant undertaking the duty to provide
plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and maintenance to be given within
the first three days of each month. In his original answer to the action,
Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right to support by committing
adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the
ground that under Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized
ground upon which obligation to support ceases. The lower court refused to
recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it in his amended
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the written agreement made by parties is void and
whether or not adultery may be permitted as a special defense against
action for support
HELD: Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code
provides that in default of express declarations in the marriage contract,
the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only
take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by
article 50. However, the wife has a right of action against defendant under
the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the
defendant may also set up adultery as a special defense, which if properly
proved and sustain will defeat the wifes action.
Judgment reversed.

CORNELIA

MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971

FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix
died. Thereafter ,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue
of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when
Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between
the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As
stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor
of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack
of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant
having
exclusive
right
to the
disputed
property. As
a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other
half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower ,the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.

De Leon vs RFC
GR No. L-24571
December 18, 1970

FACTS:
On August 14, 1945, herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano, father of third-party
plaintiffs Teofila Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano, obtained a loan for
P10,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Manila, mortgaging a parcel of land in the name of
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, as security for the loan. Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), Manila, his loan application for an industrial loan, for putting up a
sawmill. The application was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was executed on October 8,
1951 by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife Carmelina Russel, and Francisco Soriano.
At the time that Francisco Soriano signed the mortgage deed, his spouse Tomasa Rodriguez was already
dead leaving as her heirs, her children namely, Rosalina, Teofila and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano, none of whom
signed the said mortgage deed or the promissory note. The Sheriff sold the land covered by original certificate
of Title No. 8094 in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, on June 15, 1954 and the
deed of sale, dated April 19, 1955 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser thereof, the RFC,
including all the other properties sold.
The Sorianos contend that the lot covered by original certificate of title No. 8094 in the name of
Francisco Soriano belonged to the conjugal partnership of the latter and his wife, Tomasa Rodriguez, now
deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said property, registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez, is presumed belonging to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Francisco Soriano.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the property was registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez," and that based upon this fact alone without any proof establishing satisfactorily that the property
had been acquired during coverture the lower court presumed that it belongs to the conjugal partnership of
said spouses. We agree with the RFC that the lower court has erred in applying said presumption.

Needless to say, had the property been acquired by them during coverture, it would have been registered,
in the name not of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," but of the spouses "Francisco Soriano
and Tomasa Rodriguez."
It is thus clear that the lower court erred in annulling the RFC mortgage on the Paraaque property and
its sale to the RFC as regards one-half of said property, and that the decision appealed from should, accordingly,
be modified.

Jocson v Jocson Vasquez 170 SCRA

Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the
only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while
respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her
husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972. The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents
executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale,
to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his
one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents
and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. In his Second
Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the evidence
documents for being null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R
rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of
their parents.
Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing.It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which

explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no
such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio
Jocson.

Sideco v Aznar
Facts: This is an action for partition and for the recovery of plaintiff and appellants share in the
produce of the land sought to be partitioned. The defendant and appellee is the judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased Crispulo Sideco, who died on the 26th of May,
1942. She is the decedents widow by his third marriage, which took place on January 26, 1912.
The plaintiffs and appellants are his (Crispulo Sidecos) children and grandchildren by his wife
Matilde Jimenez, who died on March 14, 1906. The subject of the action is a parcel of riceland
134.6671 hectares in area, situated in the Sitio of Pulong Pandan, Barrio Sangitan, Municipality
of Cabanatuan, surveyed on May 21, 1908, and registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco,
widower, on March 12, 1909, under certificate of title No. 77 (Exhibit 6). The land was declared
for the land tax in the year 1906 in Crispulo Sidecos name (Exhibit 5). The land was mortgaged
to the Philippines National Bank on May 10, 1912, for P8,000, on July 30, 1917, for P6,400,
and on September 28, 1922, for P5,800. In June, 1923, the loan with the Philippine National
Bank was paid, but the land was sold with pacto de retro to Margarita David for P16,000
redeemable in two years, this period extendible for one year. In 1928 Margarita David resold the
property to Crispulo Sideco, but the same was again mortgaged to her for P6,000 (Exhibit 6). In
1933 certificate of title No. 77 was cancelled, and No. 7631 issued in lieu thereof in the name of
Margarita David (Exhibit D). The land, however, was reconveyed to the estate of Crispulo
Sideco on August 31, 1946 (Ibid). The land is now covered by transfer certificate of title No. T303 in the name of his estate (Exhibit 21-A).
Issue: Whether or not the finding of the trial court that the land is not conjugal property of the
spouses Crispulo Sideco and Matilde Jimenez, but the exclusive property of Crispulo Sideco.
Held: It is well-settled that land already decreed and registered in an ordinary land registration
proceeding can not again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent cadastral
proceeding. (Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 588; Addison

vs. Payotas, 60 Phil. 673). This does not mean, however that in proper cases and upon proper
application or the consent of the registered owners, or of the person in whose name the decree is
issued, the court may not order a change in the names of the owners by inclusion or exclusion
of some, or in the rights or participation of each in the land registered.

Onas v. Javillo 59 Phil 733

Facts: Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927, in the municipality of Sigma,
Province of Capiz, Philippine Islands. On the 25th day of July, 1927, a petition was filed in the
Court of First Instance of that province praying that an administrator of this estate be appointed,
and after hearing Santiago Andrada was named administrator. He submitted two projects of
partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court and from that order some of the heirs
appealed to this court which appeal was dismissed. 1The second project of partition dated
September 9, 1931, is the one now on appeal in this case. Crispulo Javillo contracted two
marriages. The first, with Ramona Levis. To this marriage five children were born, to wit,
Consolacion, Mercedes, Caridad, Soledad and Jose Javillo, the appellees in this case. After the
death of Ramona Levis, Crispulo Javillo married Rosario Oas. To this marriage four children
were born, to wit, Joaquin, Ana, Bernardo and Porillana. Rosario Oas the appellant in this
case.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court committed errors in deciding the case:
Held: The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the above-mentioned
absurd claim and furthermore is not in conformity to law. One-half of all the conjugal property
of both marriages corresponds to the deceased Crispulo Javillo and must be divided share and
share alike among all the children of both marriages. One-half of the conjugal property
pertaining to the first marriage should be divided share and share alike among the five children
of that marriage. One-half of the conjugal property of the second marriage must be adjudicated
to the widow Rosario Oas and furthermore she has a right of usufruct over the property of her
deceased husband equal to one-ninth of the two thirds of that property which constitutes the
legitime of the children of both marriages which is two-twenty-sevenths of the property
corresponding to her husband. The property of the second marriage consists of parcels 12 to 31,
inclusive, and the remainder of the carabaos and large cattle mentioned in the agreement copied
above.If it is true as alleged by the appellant that there are houses on any of these parcels of
land, it is to be presumed that they were included in the valuation made by the committee on

claims and appraisal and therefore they would belong to the person to whom the land, upon
which they are built, is adjudicated. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and this case is
remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this decision without pronouncements as
to costs.

De Ocampo v Delizo 69 SCRA 216

Facts:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20,
1891 until Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and the second,
with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or from October,
1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years. The
action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first
marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo,
another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea,
Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their
mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea
de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino,
Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed
Delizo.
Issue:
Whether or not the aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties
described in the complaint were those of the second marriage.
Held:
Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although
such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage
should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof
adjudicated to the children of the first marriage.

PNB vs QUINTOS
FACTS: The appellants pray for the dismissal of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff,
alleging that the judgment appealed from is erroneous: (1) Because it holds that the document
Exhibit A does not contain anything that makes the plaintiff agent of the defendants; (2) because
it finds without any ground that the defendant were husband and wife when they executed said
document; (3) because upon this finding, it considers unnecessary to discuss whether or not the
obligation evidence by said document is solidary between the defendants (4) because to
maintain such opinion amounts to compelling the defendants to comply with said obligation in a
manner distinct from that stipulated in the contract; and (5) because it sanctions an arbitrary,
unjust and illegal procedure.
ISSUE: whether or not appellants executed the aforesaid document Exhibit A as husband and
wife was decided by the trial court in the sense that the defendant appellant Mr. Ansaldo is the
husband of the other defendant Doa Margarita Q. e Iparraugirre
HELD: We agree with the appellants that, according to the contract of pledge Exhibit A,
attached to the complaint, the defendants authorized the plaintiff to act as their agent with full
power and authority to dispose of the effects pledged in the manner stipulated in said contract;
but it appears that the plaintiff had also an option, not an obligation precisely, to enforce the
securities given. For the reason above given we cannot alter this finding of the trial court and
consequently if the defendants are husband and wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was
contracted by one or the other, for in either case as the debt was contracted during the marriage
of the defendants it must be paid for the account of the conjugal partnership in accordance with
article 1408 of the Civil Code. 1awph!l.net
After a thorough study of the judgment appealed from, we do not find therein any
substantial error that justifies the reversal thereof and therefore the same must be, as is hereby,
affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

De Ansaldo V. Sheriff of Manila 64 Phil 156

Abad Santos,
FACTS: Upon the express guaranty of the appellant Fidelity & Surety Company of the
Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Romarico Agcaoilia credit in current
account not to exceed at any one time P20,000. Appellee Angel Ansaldo, in turn, agreed to
indemnify the surety company for any and all losses and damages that it might sustain by
reason
of
having
guaranteed Agcaoili's obligations. Agcaoili defaulted, and the surety company, as hisguarantor,
paid the Philippine Trust Company. Thereafter, the surety company brought an action against
the appellee Angel Ansaldo for recovery of sum of money, and after obtaining a judgment on its
favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy on the joint savings account of
Spouses Angel and Margarita Ansaldo. Appellees instituted an action against the appellants
in the CFI to have theexecution levied by the sheriff declared null and void. The court
below granted the relief prayed for and sentenced the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay
the appellees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of Angel Agcaoli may be enforced by the Sheriff against
the joint savings account of the spouses.
RULING:NO. Since there is a failure to prove that the obligation of the husband was produced
benefit to the family, it cannot be charged against the conjugal partnership.T he sum in
controversy was derived from the paraphernal property of the appellee, Margarita hence it
forms
part
of
the
conjugal
partnership
under Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. Construing the two relevant provisionstogether,
it
seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the assets
of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to

the family. No attempt has been made to prove that the obligations contracted by the appellee,
Angel, were productive of some benefit to his family. It is, however, claimed that, as the sum of
P636.80 has become the property of the conjugal partnership, at least one-half thereof
was property levied on execution, as the share of the appellee Angel Ansaldo. This contention is
without merit. Theright of the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership
does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is also
dissolved. (Civil Code, arts. 1392 and 1426.)

Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways4 SCRA 397

Facts: P l a i n t i ff Z u l u e t a , h i s w i f e a n d d a u g h t e r w e r e p a s s e n g e r s a b o a r d defenda
nts plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were
advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the
toilet at the terminal building but finding it f u l l w a l k e d 2 0 0 y a r d s a w a y.
U p o n r e t u r ni n g h e t o l d a n e m p l oy e e o f t h e defendant that they almost made him
miss the flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a discussion with
either the plan captain or the t e r mi n a l m a n a g e r. H e w a s t o l d
that
they would open his
bags which her e f u s e d a n d h e w a r n e d t h e m o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s . J u s t t h
e s a m e t h e y opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go
out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and h e
w a s a b l e t o l e a v e Wak e I s l a n d a n d r e t ur n t o M a n i l a t h r u H o n o l u l u a n d Tokyo
after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not moral damages may be recovered.
Held: The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received a t t h e h a n d s o f S i t t o n o r
Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the r a m p ( W h a t i n t h e h e l l d o
y o u t h i n k y o u a r e ? G e t o n t h a t p l a n e ) ; t h e menacing attitude of Zentner or
Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your
bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, I dont give a damn); will you pull
these three monkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind
remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if
they were criminals, M r s . Z u l u e t a s h a v i n g s u ffe r e d a n e r v o u s breakdown for
which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to

which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta
having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her
parents at the airport allt h e s e j u s t i f y a n a w a r d f o r m o r a l d a ma g e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m
m e n t a l a n g u i s h , serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliationthereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00
andmoral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00attorneys
fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.

JOVELLANOS vs. CA 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)

Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement
over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom
he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married
private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st
marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos,
Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter
donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon.
In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that
the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still
subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners
contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first
marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2,
1955.
Issue: Whether or not the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held: In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the
property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of
the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a
pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The
failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force. Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it
was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his

favor. Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the
deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Upon the execution of said deed
of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. NB: But since it pertained to
the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners
who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family
Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

Santos vs Bartolome 44 Phil 76

FACTS: Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon were united in marriage many
years ago and lived together as man and wife in the Province of Pampanga
until in the year 1914, when Estanislao Santos died. The widow, Da.
Marcela Tizon, survived until December, 1917, when she also died. No
children appear to have been born to the pair, and the persons now
interested in their properties are the collateral heirs of the two spouses
respectively. After the death of Estanislao Santos the community property
pertaining to the two spouses came into the possession and under the
control of his administrator, Eliseo Santos, with corresponding duty to
collect assets, pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate according to law.
In connection with the discharge of these duties, said administrator also
came into the possession of certain property pertaining to the widow in her
own right, which he managed to the same extent as the community
property itself.
ISSUE: The liquidation of the community estate pertaining to the spouses
Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon, both of whom are now deceased, and
whose respective estates are now represented before the court by Eliseo
Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo Bartolome, as
administrator of Marcela Tizon
HELD: Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there
can be no doubt that the amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of
the property should be deducted from the community assets in liquidation,
thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against the portion pertaining to

Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which reference is

here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular
property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so
also must the property belong to her after redemption. From an observation
contained in the appealed decision we infer that the action of the trial judge
in rejecting the various claims to which reference has been made was based
in part on the idea that said claims should have been submitted to the
committed appointed to appraise the property and allow claims against the
estate of Marcela Tizon in administration, in conformity with the
requirements of section 695, and related provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed
from must be reversed, and the clause will be remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered, without express
pronouncement as to costs.

Lorenzo vs Nicolas 91 Phil 686

FACTS: Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the
deceased Gregorio Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the
deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that time a widower. On January
16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage.
Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January
31, 1934. During their coverture, the two had no children. In his first
marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo left, as heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and
Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who had been
succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and
Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in her first
marriage, left as heirs, the deceased Gerardo Nicholas, father of the
defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa, all
surnamed Nicolas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two parcels of land are part of the Friar Lands as
provided in Act No. 1120.
HELD: From the provisions of sections 11, 12 and 16 of Act No. 1120 it is
apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell the friar lands
acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same.
In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to
sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to
be sold by the Government. Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the
deceased holder of a certificate if no widow survives him. The fact that all
receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband
Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that
the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her name in
spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two
parcels of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente. The petitioners, the heirs
of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two parcels of
land. But the installments paid during covertures are deemed conjugal,
there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging
exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente. Upon these grounds and
reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is affirmed,
without cost.

PEOPLES BANK & TRUST CO. v

REGISTER OF DEEDS 60 Phil 167
FACTS:

Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled Agreement and
Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in
Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was to redeem mortgage
constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan of
P10,000.00 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said
property
while
remained
unsold.
ISSUES:
WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property which therefore belongs to
CPG, WON management belongs to husband and WON contract is null and void since husband
did not give consent.
HELD:
Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the
fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to
expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise
do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus
rendering such contract merely voidable or void.

PEREZ v PEREZ 109 Phil 64

FACTS:
Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant Angela
Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under
guardianship
based
on
the
following
allegations:
she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix, she was spending the
conjugal partnership of gain and defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children
with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband. CFI dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.
HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction.
Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and wife) and not
patrimonial or financial.

RODRIGUEZ v DE LA CRUZ 8 Phil 665

FACTS:
Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez (married to Hilarion de la Cruz) both their second marriages filed in CFI Albay a complaint for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands from the
defendants (children of Hilarion dela Cruz). Plaintiff alleges that she had acquired said lands
during her first marriage from deceased father and that she had permission from Hilarion to
commence this action in her own name against Hilarions children. She claims that Hilarion had
been administering the said lands during the entire period of his marriage to her. However, CFI
Albay dismissed the case in favour Hilarions children through his first marriage and found as a
fact, from evidence during trials, that the lands described in the complaint were acquired by
Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one Andrea de Leon. And thus, granted the land in
question to the children of Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
WON Hilarion was the owner of said lands since he had been administering the land in question
during the entire period of his marriage to Matea and did the CFI Albay err in finding that
Hilarion acquired the land in question during his marriage to Andrea de Leon.
HELD:
No. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the
property of his wife, as her representative, and certainly it cannot be concluded that the property
which he administers for his wife is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same
for a long time.the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to administer her property
does not mean that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the property
of her husband.SC examined the evidence adduced during the lower court trials second
marriages - filed in CFI Albay a complaint for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands
and found that the lands in question were acquired by Matea from her deceased father through
inheritance.

MOORE and SONS MERCANTILE CO v WAGNER 50 Phil 128

FACTS:
Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the settlement proceedings petitioned the court
to require the administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter Avelina Allen an
allowance of P80. The special administrator appointed in the case objected to the allowance of
the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and
approved by the committee on appraisal and claims. Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several
creditors also entered his opposition to said order. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of
the estate, the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support
article 1430 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow and daughter valid?
HELD:
NO. Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving spouse and his or her children
shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of
the inventoried estate, and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted
from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or
income. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May 28,
1896, wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased
spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant
the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the
estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her property. In
any case, the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it
does not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just
because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more
or less uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality.In this case, it appears from the
record that the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his
widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property to the marriage. Wherefore, it
is unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance

payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no property to
be partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.

IN RE: JOSE BERNAS & PILAR BERNAS 14 SCRA 327

FACTS:
In May 1962, petitioner-sps Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bernas executed an Agreement
for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership & Sep of Property. It states that during their marriage,
they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 buildings. The purpose of this Agreement is to prevent
friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, particulary because
petitioner Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, another by his present. The
petition was filed stating the above mentioned facts and that this voluntary dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Art 191 of CC, subject to
judicial approval. Moreover, the sps have no outstanding debts/obligations and the sep
of properties would not prejudice any creditor or 3rd
However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under CC Art 192, a
conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered and
exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment . And
upon approval of the petition for dissolution, the court shall take such measures
as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
ISSUE:
WON conjugal partnership may be dissolved w/o notification of children of the
parties previous marriages.
HELD:
No, in a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191CC, it is essential
that children of previous marriages shall be personally notified of said proceeding. In this
case, the names and addresses of children by previous marriage of Jose Bernas, Sr.
have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified personally of the filing of
the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the danger of substantial injury to their
rights would seem to be remote. At any rate, the rights of the children by the first marriage are still

affected in the event that when there is doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
between different conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective sps. Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to lower
court for further proceedings

PARTOSA-JO v CA GR 82606 18 December 1992

FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The
latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of
the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.The
complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground
that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested
that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during
the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her.
ISSUE:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.
HELD:
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead
of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of
marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo
did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence,
the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property. Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the
petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between
them, share and share alike.

TUMULOS v FERNANDEZ GR 137650 12 April 2000

FACTS: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumulos,
Toto Tumulos, and Gina Tumulos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the
defendants to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any
rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, they will pay rental but which agreement
was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the
defendants vacate the premises. Guillerma Tumulos was the only one who filed an
answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of
action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract
to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question
together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Upon
appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the
said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until
she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property In litis.
RULING: Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Her claim of having administered the property
during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her
claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e pr o p e r t y a m o u n t s
t o a c o n t r i b u t i o n i n i t s acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co
ownership. T h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n b e l o n g s t o t h e

c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p o f respondents.

VALDEZ v RTC 260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids. On
June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of
the FC. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with
their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Art.147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51and 52 of the FC.
Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not have
provisions for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. The court
explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family home acquired
during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the property
would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be
governed by the regime of co-ownership. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply
since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Antonio moved
for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.
ISSUES:
WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar and
WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the
cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 1482. In the case at bar,
Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were
capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.

AGAPAY v PALANG 276 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at
Pangasinan. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. He left to work in
Hawaii and when he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child and
also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. Miguel then c o n t r a c t e d h i s s e c o n d marriage
with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. Both jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land and a house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed
of Donation and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to
their only child. Two years later, Miguel
died
and
thereafter,
C a r l i n a f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t o f concubinage on the previous party. Respondents
sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner
contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that
the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in
favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.
ISSUE:
W h e t h e r o r n o t p e t i t i o n er m a y o w n t h e t w o p a r c e l s o f l a n d acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale
but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

CARIO v CARIO 351 SCRA 127

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969 without a license and without
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage - he married Susan Yee on
November 10, 1992. Cario died due to diabetes on November 23, 1992 under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both spouses of Cario claimed and
collected monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies as death
benefits. Susan Yee filed a case to collect one half of the sum of the death benefits received by
Susan Nicdao. At the time she married Cario, Susan Yee claimed that she had no knowledge
of Carios marriage with Susan Nicdao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first marriage contracted by Cario is void ab initio.
RULING:
YES. The first marriage contracted by Cario is void ab initio. The marriage of Cario and
Susan Nicdao is void since it was solemnized without the required marriage license. Under the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.

ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA GR 177703, 28 January 2008

FACTS:
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed a Special Civil Action with the RTC against Vilma
G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for the judicial
partition of the properties
left by the deceased
Fidel Arriola.
Respondent
is
the son of Fidel with his
f i r s t w i f e Vic t o r i a C .
C a l a b i a , w h i l e p e t i t i o n e r A n t h o ny Ronald is the son of Fidel with his second wife, petitioner
Vilma. The RTC ordered the partition and public auction of the subject land covered by TCT No.
383714.
The
public
auction
was
scheduled
on
May
31,2 0 0 3 b u t w a s r e s c h e d u l e d w h e n t h e p e t i t i o n er s r e f u s e d
t o i n c l u d e t h e s u b j e c t house standing on the land. This prompted the respondent to file
with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that
petitioners be declared in contempt but was denied. Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari where the decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside, and the sheriff is
ordered to proceed with the public a u c t i o n s a l e o f t h e s u b j e c t l a n d a n d ,
constructed
thereon. P e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a M o t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b u t
t h e C A d e n i e d t h e s a m e resolution. The petitioners filed Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the subject house is part of the judgment of co- ownership and partition.

RULING:
T h e s u b j e c t h o u s e i s d e e me d p a r t o f t h e j u d g m e n t o f p a r t i t i o n f o r t w o
compelling reasons: first, under the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 440, 445,a n d 4 4 6 .
F o l l o w i n g t h e Principle of Accession, improvements including the house even not included
in the alleged complaint of partition are deemed included in the lot in which they
stand. Second, the subject house was part of the estate of the deceased, as such it is owned by
the heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of Civil Code, may, at any
time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, the respondents recourse to
the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered.

JOSE E. HONRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO

Facts:
On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC
of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business
under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. For failure of Honrado, as well as his
counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. It turned out that the
Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the
judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name under Transfer
Certificate of Title T-143175 located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family
house.
On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution
under Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines. It was alleged therein that the property
is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before
he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other
real property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution It further averred
that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was
no showing that its present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157
of the Family Code
Issue:
Whether or not finding and concluding that failure to assert his claim for exemption of
his family home from execution at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time is fatal to his
claim.

Ruling:
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The family home continues to
be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by Law. It is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must
remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. Such provision finds no application in this case.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164740
July 31, 2006

Facts:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Eduardo and Elsa Versola, seeks to nullify and set aside the 28 April 2004 Decision and 28 July
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Orders dated 6 January 2003 and
14 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case No.
Q-93-16003. This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent
Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted
a P1,000,000.00 loan to the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private
respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a
deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The
execution of the deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent. With the dishonor of
the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private
respondent came away empty-handed as she did not receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan
she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is
exempt from execution.
Ruling:

Under Article 153 of the Family Code provides:The family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Under the cited provision, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there
is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, for lack of merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC

[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property,
located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the
salient portion of which provides: c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their
collectibles will be collected.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground
that the property covered was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling on
Modequillo v. Breva which held that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under
the provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and
applicable jurisprudence. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should
take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,

FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF
FERNANDO PLATA G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled
"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. The said judgment having become
final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the
said judgmenton the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur
registered in the name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao
del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Oblation Malalag is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the family
Code except for the liabilities mentioned in Article 155 therof, and that the judgment debt
sought to sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not of those enumerated
under Article 155 of the family code. The opposition was filed by the plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way
of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
who owns the home. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extra judicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.

Antonio Valdes
VS.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the
petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children
chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to
start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family
Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.

MANUEL G. ALMELOS vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

GR 179620 August 26, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor and respondent Leonida Trinidad were married on January
29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their union bore three children.
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. At home, Leonida described Manuel as
a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel
kissed another man on the lips.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court as regards the order
declaring the marriage as null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community
or conjugal property and both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime jointly. The RTC decreed dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida
and forfeited Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the property regime is
unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain
Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former
marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman
before their marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married
to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of
introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are
regarded void under the law.

Odayat vs Amante 77 SCRA 338

FACTS: Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court,

Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression,
immorality and falsification of a public document.
Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent
grabbed a portion of complainant's land, and, when this latter resented, the
former arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court;
(2) that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he
begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive;
and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as
single in the information sheet be submitted in connection with his
appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance

with law and the evidence in record.
HELD: The charges were investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of
said Court. The accusations of Odayat against Atty. Amante regarding
oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document was not
proved and supported by proper evidence. The Investigator found that the
complainant failed to prove this charge. In the course of formal
investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge Zosa, complainant
acquiesced to the dropping of this charge of oppression against respondent,
inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary dispute
between the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more
properly a cause for a civil action. 6 Hence, the scope of the investigation by
Judge Zosa is limited to the other two charges. Contrary to the allegation of
the complainant the document in question, shows that the respondent
actually placed in "Civil Status" therein the word "Married". In view of the
foregoing, we find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in
accordance with law and the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the
charges filed against him by complainant.

Agueda Benedicto vs Esteban De La Rama 3 Phil 341

FACTS: This is an action for divorce. The complaint, which was filed on
October 29, 1901, alleged, as the grounds therefor, abandonment and
adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery
imputed to the defendant, and asked for a divorce. Judgment was rendered
on July 5, 1902, in favor of the plaintiff, granting her divorce and 81,042.76
pesos as her share of the conjugal property. The defendant excepted to the

judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the facts were not
justified by the evidence. This motion was denied, and the defendant
excepted. The record before us contains all the evidence received at the
trial.
ISSUE: Whether the parties are entitled for a divorce.
HELD: Neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result makes it
unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment which relates to the
settlement of the conjugal partnership. Section 497 1 authorizes us in cases
of this kind "to make such findings upon the facts and render such final
judgment as justice and equity require.
The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the
following facts:
(1) The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as
to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein
stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria
Bermejo.
(2) The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of
Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the
civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is
entitled to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered
that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his cross
demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this
court or the Court of First Instance.
Judgment will be entered accordingly forty days from the filing of this
decision, and the case remanded to the court below for execution. So
ordered.

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City and they got married on September 20,
1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latters parents.
The
e c s t a s y,
however, did
not last long. It was
bound
t o h a p p e n , L e o u e l a v e r r e d becauseof thefrequent interference byJulias parentsint
o theyoungs p o u s e s f a m i l y a f f a i r s . O c c a s i o n a l l y, t h e
c o u p l e w o u l d a l s o s t a r t a quarrel over a number of things like when and where the
couple
should
start
living independently
from Julias parents or whenever
Julia would express resentment on Leouels spending a few days with his own parents. On
May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his
husbands pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called
Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S he desperately tried
to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for
more
than
five
years
clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter intomarried life.
Issue: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article36 of the
Famliy Code.
Ruling:
The use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in
our
law
on
marriage.
Thus,
correlated
p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c a p a c i t y s h o u l d r e f e r t o n o l e s s t h a n a m e n t a l incapacity that
causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy
making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred
during their first night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on
the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A
case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted
that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him every time he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts
she always removed his hands.
ISSUE:

Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with

petitioner a psychological incapacity

HELD:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently,
one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the

spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple
got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that
would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely
showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of

the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which
is not considered as psychological incapacity.

LEONILO ANTONIO VS. MARIE IVONNE REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months
later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an
illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good
in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his
own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents
fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be
difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between

spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

MARCOS V MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that
Wilson Marcos has Psychological Incapacity. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage
null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for determining of Psychological Incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case determines Psychological
Incapacity.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of the evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition since qua non
for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of a state of Psychological Incapacity. There is
absolutely no evidence that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behaviour of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and even left the
family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Significantly, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
Psychological Incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and
for her failure to observe the guidelines presented in the Molina Case.

LEONILO ANTONIO V MARIE YVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to
annul the marriage due to Maries Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She claims that she is a psychologist but in reality she is not. She claims
to be a singer for the Blackgold Company and its number one money maker, apparently she is
not. She also spends lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. Leo presented an expert that
proved Maries Psychological Incapacity. Marie denied all Leos allegations and also presented
an expert to prove her case. The Regional Trial Court ruled against Marie and annulled the
marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed
by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Psychological Incapacity is attendant to the case.

HELD:

Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case
is properly established in the case at bar. The Supreme Court also emphasized what fraud means
as contemplated in Art 45 (3) and Art 46 of the Family Code. In Psychological Incapacity, the
misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations,
kindred to Psychological Incapacity.

In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar
because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such
misrepresentations constitute her odd behaviour which further constitutes Psychological
Incapacity. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leos consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fantasy from reality and
falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

Imelda Marbella-Bobis (petitioner), vs. Isagani D. Bobis (respondent)

Facts:
Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25, 1996. Unknown to the
petitioner, her other half has contracted his first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on
October 21, 1985 and has not been nullified. The respondent once again entered into marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. A case of bigamy was filed against the respondent on the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a license.
Respondent has filed a motion to suspend the trial and has been granted. Petitioner filed for a
motion for reconsideration but has been denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes

a question to a criminal case for bigamy
RULING:
No, respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
question to a criminal case for bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second
marriage, he was considered already considered as a married man even if it was a marriage
without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been
promulgateSd on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still
no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the
parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court.
The respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in
order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal case.

Landicho v. Hon. Relova

Facts:
Elvira Makatangay was married to Rolando Landicho (Petitioner). Petitioner then
contracted a 2nd marriage to Fe Pasia w/o dissolving his 1st marriage. Landicho was charged
w/ Bigamy by his 1st wife Elvira. Fe then sought to declare her marriage to Petitioner void due
to alleged threats & force. Petitioner then sought to declare his 1st marriage void on the ground
that he contracted it under duress. Petitioner moved to suspend his criminal case for bigamy
pending the result on the validity of his marriage on the grounds that the validity of his marriage
was
a
prejudicial
question
Issue:

W/N
a

the

validity of
suspension

his

marriage
of

is a prejudicial question
Petitioner's
Bigamy

to

warrant
charge

Ruling:
The
may

validity

of
not

the

marriage
suspend

is

NOT
the

prejudicial
bigamy

Parties
to
a
marriage
cannot
determine
its
courts
may
decide
on
the
validity
of
a
declaration
of
nullity
by
a
court,
a
party
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

question and
case.

thus

nullity.
Only
competent
marriage.
Prior
to
a
who
contracts
a
2nd

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only
4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother
with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is
not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo
had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous
marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home
from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the

declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said
person is freed from being charged with bigamy.When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law
states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them.

Republic vs. Nolasco

220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After
that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January
1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter
from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco
went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing

another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first
met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death
of Janet.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to
show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of
seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another
contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities
to find his wife.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
Facts:
Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that
her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to
go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to
her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her
children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives.

In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC
under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an
order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. In November 7,
2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final and executors
under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the
Philippines
filed
a
notice
of
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under
Art
41
of
the
Family
Code
were
duly
established.
Held:
Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family
Law,
sets
the
tenor
for
cases
scoured
by
these
rules,
to
wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be
decided
in
an
expeditions
manner
with
out
regards
technical
rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.

Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva
null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
VICTORIANO JOANINO, defendant and appellant.
From the evidence it appears that on or about the 22d day of May, 1890, the defendant was
joined in the bonds of holy matrimony to one Hipolita Rosario; that he continued to live with
the said Rosario as her husband until the year 1896, or 1897, when he was deported by the
Spanish Government from the Philippine Islands to the island of Guam; that he remained in the

island of Guam until the year 1901 or 1902, when he returned to the Philippine Islands; that
while he remained in the island of Guam he acted as a clerk in the court of first instance in said
island; that when he returned to the Philippine Islands he found that his wife, Hipolita Rosario,
had been living and cohabiting with one Gregorio Malinit, and that as a result of such illicit
cohabitation the said Hipolita Rosario had given birth to two children during the absence of the
defendant; that within a short period after the return of the defendant from the island of Guam,
he, being informed of the illicit relations of his wife with the said Gregorio Malinit, commenced
proceedings to be divorced from his wife, Hipolita Rosario, in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Pangasinan; that after the trial of the said divorce proceedings, the court found that
the facts justified the petition of the plaintiff (the defendant, Victoriano Joanino) and granted the
divorce prayed for; that thereafter, on the 9th day of May, 1908, he was joined in wedlock with
one Maria Roque; that at the time of the second marriage the said Hipolita Rosario was still
living.
During the trial of the cause the defendant admitted all of the foregoing facts. He attempted,
however to justify his second marriage upon the ground that he believed that when a divorce
had been granted him he had a right to remarry. He alleged that while he was in the island of
Guam he had known some cases in which a divorce had been granted and the where the parties
had remarried. He admitted, however, that at the time he was granted a divorce from his wife,
Hipolita Rosario, he had been informed by the court that the divorce which he had been granted
him did not permit him to remarry. In this court the defendant, through his attorney, has filed
every interesting brief, in which he attempts to justify his second marriage upon the ground of
his belief of the fact that when a divorce had been granted to parties under the laws of the
Philippine Islands they were permitted to remarry during the life of the former spouse.
Under the laws in force of the Philippine Islands, the granting of a divorce does in no way annul
the marriage. The divorce does not destroy the marriage vinculum. (Law 3, Title 2, Partida 4.)

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria
on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.
Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses
Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated
from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance
of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and
Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

Hatima C. Yasin v. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986 (February 23, 1995)
Facts: The summary case filed by the petitioner, a divorcee, to resume the use of her maiden
name was denied by the Sharia Court, holding that said petition needed to go through a judicial
process under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name.

ISSUE: Under Article 16 (1)(g) of the CEDAW, as a wife, a woman has the right to choose a
family name, and the right to enjoy the same personal rights as the husband. In this instance, the
Court ruled that a women need not undergo a special proceeding to change her name back to her
maiden name after a divorce.
Held: Rule 103 of the Rules of Court should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right
of a divorcee woman to reuse her maiden name and surname.
A woman marrying a man is not required to seek judicial authority to use her husbands name.
In the same way, when the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as
authorized in the Muslim Code, the widow/divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to reuse her maiden name.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husbands surname during the marriage (Art. 370),
after annulment of the marriage (Art 371), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373), is
permissive and not obligatory, except in the case of legal separation (Art. 372).
* Concurring Opinion, Justice Flerida Ruth Romero
Sec. 14. The state recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage.

Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

The case is about a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President dated May
27, 2005 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President and in turn affirmed the decision of
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying the petitioners request to revert to the use of her
maiden name in the issuance of a renewed passport.
Statement of Facts ; The petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipina whose
passport was expiring on October 27, 2000. The following entries appear in her passport:
Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name and Remo as her middle
name. Petitioner who at that time her marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her
passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.
On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to
revert the use of her maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the
conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of
annulment, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these
conditions. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a
letter dated 13 October 2000. The Office of the President also dismissed the appeal on July 27,
2004.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Answer: Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she should not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Holding: The court denied the petition due to unjustified changes in ones name and identity in
a passport.

Llorente vs CA
345 scra 592
Nationality Principle
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the
conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the
Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was
pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and
filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and
begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos
estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified
declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this
petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law.
The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of
the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Espiritu vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS:Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was
sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post.
They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the
Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a
second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded
for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left
them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain
custody of the children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall
be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered
to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the
mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7
years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be
considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit
well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and
care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already
caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS;

Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Paraaque City,
Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005]
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom Joycelyn
allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided
to abandon Crisanto. One Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic
testified that he was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn
and came up with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations. The findings of
Renato Santos were corroborated by a house helper of the spouses who stated that
the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on
one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody
of the child to the father, violated Art. 213 of the Family Code, which mandates that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Ruling:
It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision
mandating that a child below seven years should not be separated from the mother. It
has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct
may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But sexual preference or
moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact
that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her
unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband
must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare
of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental
care.

Hontiveros vs. RTC

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999
Facts:
The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to
uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private
respondents answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they
had denied petitioners claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only
be resolved after trial.
The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an assessment of the diverging views
and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is inappropriate not only for the
fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages
against them, but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove
the amount thereof, however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer
to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The court dismissed
the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath
that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof.
Ruling:
Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to
the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship
by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private
respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA

P. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of
his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan.
Issue: Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate
child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child.
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate
child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority
over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in
such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU VS CA and TERESITA MASAUDING

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was
sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post.
They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the
Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a
second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded
for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left
them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain
custody of the children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall
be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered
to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the
mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7
years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be
considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit
well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and
care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already
caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

V IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, (ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD)

GR NO. 148311
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie
had been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of
the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The
lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as
his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.

Lahom vs. Sibulo

G.R. No. 153989 July 14, 2003
Facts:
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption in which
she averred, that, despite the proddings and pleadings of the petitioner and her
husband, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before
his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was
prevented by petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner
to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.
Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
Ruling:
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,
had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and
the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into
force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right
in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a
right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the states
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.