To what extent were Soviet policies responsible for worsening relations among
the wartime allies in the period up to 1950?
The Cold War has been characterised as both a collapse of the wartime alliance between the USA and Great Britain and the USSR, resulting in a period of heated tension, as well as the clash of the incompatible ideologies of Communism and Capitalism. The war was cold as there was no direct conflict between the two powers, but was fought mainly through proxy wars. The scope examined will be from 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution, to 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO. Soviet policies refer to expansionist Soviet attempts to wrest control over the Eastern bloc in order to create a buffer zone around itself. It was the conflict between Soviet policies and US national interests, exacerbated by the personalities of Truman and Stalin, as opposed to secondary factors such as ideology, that eventually led to the breakdown of relations between the US and the USSR as concretised in the formation of NATO which clearly delineated two separate camps. Soviet policies and Russian expansionism contributed to the collapse of its wartime alliance with the US. Russia, having suffered great losses during the second world war, both saw the need for the creation of a buffer zone as a security measure and larger reparations from Germany, commensurate to the extent of its loss. For example, by June 1944, there were 228 Axis divisions on the Eastern front where there were only 61 in Western Europe. Furthermore, it wanted to reclaim territories lost during World War 2 and those it gained from the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact, such as Poland and Romania. As a result, in order to gain control over the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union engaged in salami tactics to orchestrate the rise of Communist governments in countries like Poland and Bulgaria. For example, the Polish coalition government was taken over by the USSR through rigged elections, expulsion of non-Communist members and coordination of Communist takeovers. The USSR also supported the illiberal Czechoslovakia coup in 1948 where Communist overthrew the government. In addition, peoples democracies were supported throughout Eastern Europe in order to lead countries closer to socialism, and subversive tactics such as controlling the police forces ensured that Communism always won, as historian Robert Tucker notes. As a result, the Communist won improbable majorities in countries like Poland, where they won 80% of the vote. Moreover, as the USSR felt that it had a moral and categorical claim to many territories. These claims were codified mainly in the Percentages Agreement of 1944, where it was concluded that the USSR had a claim to Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, with the UK retaining influence in Greece. The USSR had also made claims for other concessions, but most were denied by the US and the UK, and in response, the US stationed a Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to provide aid to Greece in the event of insurgent and renascent Communism. Due to these denied concessions, the USSR activated around 200,000 troops along the Bulgarian border, twelve divisions on the Eastern frontier of Turkey and pillaged Manchuria, and pro-Soviet forces declared a new government in Azerbaijan. As such, the US and Great Britain were alarmed by these responses, and Churchill made his Iron Curtain speech, effectively dividing the world into two clear camps.
Additionally, the national interests of the US conflicted with Soviet
policies and aims, furthering tensions between the powers and leading to the collapse of their wartime alliance. Historians such as William Appleman Williams blame the US and its Open Door policy as projecting economic power outward, thus forcing the USSR to adopt conservative defencism. Thus the US, also in fear of Communism, pursued a policy of containment as recommended by Kennans Long Telegram and Ethridges report. This is because the growth of Communist would prevent the export of American goods in Europe, thereby limiting economic growth. Therefore, $2.7 billion was given to France via debt cancellation to support resistance against the French Communist Party. Furthermore, it embarked on the Marshall Aid programme in 1947, to support countries following the winter, in order to prevent impoverished citizens from turning to Communism, and it was the Czechoslovakia coup that finally convinced congress to approve of the programme. Moreover, US Secretary of State James Byrnes offered loans to the USSR in exchange for the economic rebuilding of and free trade in Eastern Europe. In response, Stalin viewed this as US dollar imperialism and ordered all states in the Eastern European bloc to reject Marshall Aid. Furthermore, in 1947, Zhdanov condemned Marshall Aid and openly bifurcated Europe with his Two Camps speech. However, as per the traditionalist view, some historians such as William McNeill have singularly blamed Soviet expansionism for the collapse of the wartime alliance. Also, as per the revisionist view, historians like William Appleman Williams blames the US for exerting undue pressure on the USSR despite having a greater range of available options in foreign policy. Despite the arguments for both these views, it is noted that the traditionalist view disregards any notion of dual culpability in determining the outbreak of the Cold War. Hence, historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that the conflict between the USSR and the US created a security dilemma where both powers sought to protect their own security interests, heightening tensions. Conversely, the revisionist view ignores Soviet behaviour as a factor, and overemphasises the self-serving characterisation of the US, where some argue that the US had a sincere belief in the universal good of a liberal trading system. Additionally, the respective personalities of Truman and Stalin also exacerbate the conflicts created by Soviet policies and US national interests. On one hand, Truman was seen to be a hardline anti-Communist, who fully believed the Riga Axiomists and Kennan when he claimed in his Long Telegram that he USSR was impervious to the logic of reason but highly sensitive to the logic of force. Furthermore, Gaddis posits that Truman was heavily influenced by his advisors such as W. Averell Harriman who had been trying to advise Roosevelt to adopt a harsher stance towards the USSR. As such, he promoted the Truman Doctrine in 1947, where he would exaggerate the threat of Communism so as to prevent the Domino Effect, according to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, where one country falling to Communism would lead to surrounding countries doing the same. Furthermore, political scientist Lynn E. Davis characterised Truman as an idealist who provoked the Soviets by asserting that the USSR was suppressing freedom and democracy.
In contrast, Stalin was seen to be paranoid and calculating, leading to
him becoming overcome by fear and paranoia. As such, he was deeply distrustful of the Anglo-American Alliance, as the delayed opening up a Second Front, which he construed, along the policy of appeasement, the Americans and the British wanting a weakened Soviet Union. This was worsened by the exclusion of the USSR in the postwar settlement of fascist Italy, and the request for a $6 billion loan allegedly being lost. Furthermore, historian Gal Alperovitz argues that Stalin was also greatly fearful of the atomic bomb, which the US fittingly used as a negotiating tool. As such, Stalin would quickly call for work on the Soviet atomic bomb to be accelerated. Thus, the personalities of the two leaders both led to inflammation of existing tensions. Lastly, historians such as William McNeill argue that the the incompatible ideologies of the USA and the USSR, of Communism and capitalism, doomed the Cold War to occur. On one hand, the USSR pushed for the abolition of capitalism and a Communist world revolution as in the orthodox MarxismLeninism, embodied by Comintern, which was established in 1919. On the other hand, the US espoused values such as liberalism, free market capitalism and democracy, as shown in the Atlantic Charter and Woodrow Wilsons 14 Points. As a result of the fundamental universality present in both these ideologies, they would indubitably come into conflict, as both claimed to be the best form of government. This resulted in a conflicting diametric of beliefs, manifest in documents such as NSC-68. Thus, ideology contributed to early antagonism by the US towards the USSR, as in its intervention with the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War for example. In addition, the US belief in self-determination was opposed to Russian control over Communist governments in Bulgaria and Hungary. Thus, historian Howard Roffman stated that the Cold War was predetermined from the moment the Bolsheviks triumphed in Russia, and historian Isaac Deutscher called it the Great Contest between capitalism and Communism. However, ideological could not have been the central factor, as historians such as Gaddis argue that Stalin especially was very willing to forgo ideology in the name of national interest, as per the concept of realpolitik. For example, he was willing to sign the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, often adopted the stance of socialism in one country despite its inherent universality, and supported democratic coalition governments in France until the Marshall Aid programme. Additionally, the US was willing to support Francos fascist regime during the Spanish Civil War despite being opposed to its own ideologies. Thus, ideology alone cannot be a strong enough factor. In conclusion, a clash between Soviet policies and US national interests was required to start the basis of conflict, exacerbated by the respective personalities of Stalin and Truman, all with the backdrop of the larger ideological conflict, resulted in the collapse of the wartime alliance.