Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sun Yat-sen Journal of Humanities
Number 16_ Summer 2003
ASEAN Female Writers/Dramatists
/
Mohammad A. QUAYUM
01
Mohammad A. QUAYUM
15
FENG Pin-chia
33
49
Catherine DIAMOND
47
__________________________________
Mihhail LOTMAN
61
Peirce,
Saussure
and
the
Foundations
of
Semiotics
61
__________________________________
BOOK REVIEW
CHIANG Shu-chen
73
The present paper has two aims. On the one hand, I would like to treat some
problems concerning the theoretical foundations of semiotics. On the other hand, it is
an attempt to avoid the regular semiotic discourse, the usual way of semiotic
conceptualization. Therefore, this paper has, in a way, a provocative purpose. I
would like to turn to some circumstances which are most certainly well known and
treat them, so to say, from the profane angle. We have a habit to use certain
metalanguages and formulations which form a firm and, seemingly, self-evident
system. But sometimes it is efficient to break this pattern, since there is a danger that
these formulations not only help to solve these problems, but also hide, even
substitute them.
Let me start with something which seems to be irrelevant not only to our theme,
but which concerns semiotics only accidentally. Once I had a rather tense discussion
with a philosopher. He started in a quite offensive manner: I dont like semiotics.
Because, he added, I dont know what it is. I tried to turn it into a joke and said
that this is indeed a good reason for disliking. But it soon turned out that his not
knowing was purely rhetorical and he knew, for example, Peirce better than me.
The reason for his dislike lay elsewhere: according to him, semiotics invades the field
of philosophy and usurps the very subject of philosophical investigation: everything
concerning the production of signs belongs to the sphere of analytical philosophy, the
usage of signs to the sphere of hermeneutics. Nice try, I said. Searching for ones
object is a problem of philosophy rather than that of semiotics. Philosophy, which
has pried into all the possible fields of knowledge during its whole history and has
been kicked out of everywhere (at first it was kicked out of physics and other
sciences, but in the twentieth century also from the humanities 1 ), is now trying to
annex the field of signs.
*
First version of this paper presented as a lecture at the International Summer School of
Semiotics in Imatra (Finland) on June 12, 2002.
1 . At the same time, we can observe a reverse process as well: the philosophization of
humanities which, in turn, does not evoke enthusiasm in philosophers, since it leaves them
again without their subject.
In this respect, semiotics seems to have quite strong positions, both in theory
and in practice. Unlike philosophy, semiotics has a firm empirical basis and semiotic
theory is strongly connected with this basis. Something like that I said then to the
philosopher. But later, when I thought it over, I was not so sure any more in the
firmness of my position. The expression semiotics deals with signs is almost a
tautological truism. The question is, what is a sign? Semioticians refer with an
incomprehensible pride to more than eighty definitions of sign by Peirce. 2 We can
add to them a couple of dozens definitions by other scholars. As I will demonstrate
below, the fact that Peirce had so many different definitions of sign and that during
his whole life he constantly returned to redefining it, shows that he was not satisfied
with any of those. And even nowadays we can successfully manipulate signs,
classify them, etc, but the problem of the essence of signs has as little clarity as it had
in Peirces lifetime. What has been said is not confusing. To a certain extent it
paralyzes the development of semiotics. Most semiotical studies are, so to say,
handicapped (I mean, more in a sportive than in a medical sense): we can successfully
manipulate signs, but only if the sphere of signs is predetermined, both
synchronically and diachronically. We can deal with given signs, but we dont know
their origin; in discussing how signs became signs, we have to exit semiotics and
appeal to other fields of knowledge, such as history and biology.
We can indeed speak of the progress of semiotics in the description of
empirically given semiotic systems, but there is no progress in exploring the essence
of semiosis. Here we are as far as Peirce; however, without his optimism. Therefore,
we have nothing to be proud of in front of the philosophers. Like philosophy,
semiotics is cursed to return constantly, searching for its foundations and sources.
Below I will not attempt to solve any problems of foundations of semiotics,
rather I will try in Peircean spirit to cleanse the ground and make a few steps that
seem to be useful.
Cf. Robert Marty, 76 definitions du signe relevees dans les ecrits de C. S. Peirce and Alfred
Lang, 12 Further Definitions.
Mihhail Lotman_Peirce, Saussure and the Foundations of Semiotics_78
not been explicitly pointed out. For Peirce, a sign is a concrete object, a substitute
which replaces another concrete object (I would rather not get into an argument now
whether such a sign as abstract is concrete or not; it is enough to point out that, in
my opinion, we are dealing in such cases both with concrete objects and concrete
signs), while for Saussure, a sign is an abstract object which is realized in a concrete
substance, and, what is most interesting, this realization in a way compromises its
semiotic nature: the sign realized in speech is not trully a sign any more.
As it is known, Saussure divides the sphere of language (langage) into
language itself (langue) and speech (parole). In such distinction two circumstances
seem to be most important. First, language is an abstract system which is primary
with regard to speech. Language is represented in speech, whereby what is
linguistically relevant in the latter is only how and to what extent it realizes the
structure of language. 3 Secondly, only language (and not speech) constitutes a sign
system. The latter seems to be especially paradoxical: the speech signals (not only
the single sounds, but full sentences as well) which are said and sensed are not signs
by themselves, they only represent signs of language. This can be expressed with the
following scheme:
langue
arole
signified
thought
signifier
acoustic (graphic)
matter
For Saussure, there is no direct connection between the conceptual sphere and
the voiced speech, between thought and acoustic matter, they are only related to each
other indirectly, due to the fact that they both realize signs of language. The central
part in this scheme belongs to the relationship which connects the signifier and the
signified of a sign (later Louis Hjelmslev calls this relationship the sign function).
Although usually there is no treatment of semiosis in the Saussurean tradition and this
term is not in use, we could still say that namely the sign function is the basis for the
formation of sign (i.e., semiosis). Hence, differently from that of Peirce, Saussures
sign is, first, abstract and, secondly, complex. The central problem of Saussures
semiotics is the relationship between the signifier and the signified.
3. Saussure emphasizes it categorically: As for all the other elements of speech activity, then
linguistics could completely do without them (Saussure 1982: 31).
Mihhail Lotman_Peirce, Saussure and the Foundations of Semiotics_80
signified
signifier
Saussure emphasizes two things: first, the symmetry of the signifier and the
signified and that one cannot exist without another, and secondly, the arbitrarity of
their relationship. It seems that here we are dealing with an obvious contradiction.
On the one hand, the sign of language is something certain, being determined by the
system of language; on the other hand, the relationship between the components of
sign is fully optional, arbitrary. To solve this dilemma, Saussure distinguishes
meaning and value (valeur). Arbitrarity characterizes the meaning of the sign, and
the absolute determination characterizes the value of it. Meaning arises from the
relationship between the signifier and signified, value characterizes the position of an
element in a system, that is, value is the complex of all the internal connections of the
given element in the given sign system. To illustrate this statement, Saussure offers
the following schema:
signified
.
signified
signified
signifier
signifier
signifier
At the same time, Saussure emphasizes that the relations which connect
different signs differ, in principle, from those which create the correspondence
between the signifier and the signified: the relations which connect signs have
determinative nature. The most problematical is here the linear alignment of signs.
Probably we should not pay too much attention to it, since, obviously, we are dealing
with the inertia of the linearity of speech.
Hence, unlike Peirce, for Saussure the proceeding-point is language and its
structure which, to his mind, are fully clear and fixed, while the single elements of
language, including the question of the sign of language, are problematical. While
we called the Peircean approach to semiotics atomistic, then the Saussurean approach
81_Sun Yat-sen Journal of Humanities
should be called holistic. The subsequent studies in the sphere of the semiotics of
language showed that the Saussurean approach, regardless of its above-discussed
paradoxicality, appears to be far more powerful and productive. One of the examples
is the problem of meaning of grammatical categories. It is especially remarkable that
the contemporary formulation to this problem was given by an outstanding American
linguist Edward Sapir (1921), who, as it is known, was not a direct follower of
Saussure. Nevertheless, his conception of grammatical categories which is not a bulk
of occasional indicators, but a certain system characteristic to every given language
has been developed in the Saussurean, that is, in the holistic spirit. The complex of
grammatical categories is one of the most important parameters of the description of
language. It is individual for every language and what functions as a grammatical
category in one language does not have to do so in another language. For instance, in
comparison with Indo-European languages the Estonian language lacks the
categories of grammatical gender or future tense. This lacking cannot be explained
in Peircean terms through the relationship between the object and interpreter of sign,
it is a parameter which characerizes the Estonian language as a whole. This lacking
can be discovered only if we compare the Estonian language as a whole with some
other language.
At the same time, Sapir shows the semiotic nature of grammatical categories.
These are not only the schemes of conjugation or declination, but the conceptual
network with which language creates its own world-view. It is a very important fact:
at least part of the signs of language are not given in advance, but at the same time
they are not an open amount, as, for example, words in a lexicon; grammatical
categories are the signs which clearly represent the Saussurean valeur.
Proceeding from his idea of sign, Peirce creates a rather complicated typology
of sign, of which the most important part constitutes what he himself calls the second
trichotomy of sign: the iconic, indexical and symbolic signs. The basis of this
classification is the nature of connections between signs and objects signified by them.
When we approach this problem in the Saussurean spirit, we must mention that what
is discussed by Peirce characterizes not language but speech; the signs of language, in
Saussures opinion, are of the same type. As was pointed out by Jerzy Pelc (1986) in
a paper exclusively devoted to this problem, when we speak of iconic signs, it would
be more correct to speak of the iconical usage of a sign, that is,, iconicity evolves
only in speech, not in language. Proceeding from the analysis of language by Charles
Bally and especially by Emile Benveniste, we could most certainly assert that the
same applies to the indexical signs as well: there is no indexicality in language. It
evolves in speech, in every certain speech act. But it would be inconsiderate to
conclude, as does, for example, Roman Jakobson, that only symbolic signs can be
found in language, since symbolic signs can not exist without icons and indexes.
What I intend to say, is that all the Peircean types of signs characterize only speech,
while the signs of language are based on a principally different logic, which is
grounded on the values of sign, not on its connections with objects.
Saussures followershere I mean above all the Prague Linguistic Circle, but
also Emile Benveniste, Roman Jakobson and Claude Lvi-Strauss, as well as the
representatives of the Tartu-Moscow semiotic schoolso-to-say rehabilitate speech.
First, it turned out, that speech has also a semiotic nature, andwhat is especially
important for us, this nature is not an automatic consequence of realization of the
Mihhail Lotman_Peirce, Saussure and the Foundations of Semiotics_82
system of language. Emile Benveniste emphasizes that speech has its own semiotic
qualities that are not derived from language. Secondly, speech can also be a closed
and stable system. Such system was to be called text. Lvi-Strauss analyzed the
ritual and mythological text in the way Nikolai Trubetzkoy analyses the phonological
system of language. In the case of artistic text, Tartu-Moscow semiotic school has
achieved analogical results. Hence, text is an immanent system, the elements of text
form a structure and every element of text has its own certain value.
Cf, for example, the beginnings of Morris and Sebeoks books with a number of examples:
this is a sign, these are signs, these, these, these are signs.
along with language, lies are created by signs. As Rousseau resolutely claimed and
Aesopus before him, language is created for lying. During the centuries the fight
against untruth always became the fight against language, its semiotic nature. But
this fight is hopeless, because we can only fight signs with signs.
However, the history of thinking knows different attempts and many traditions
that make a try to avoid signs and the law of identity. It may sound rather
paradoxical, since signs seem to violate this law, but we must admit that these things
are closely connected and the fight against identity is always the fight against signs.
Moreover, these attempts are related to the traditions of Eastern thinking, but we can
find also in the West several attempts to undermine these principles. Maybe one of
the best known is that of Heraclitus: You could not step twice into the same river
(Plato Cratylus 402a). It is, however, remarkable; how dubious all these attempts are.
The saying by Heraclitus denies only the self-identity of an object, but not that of a
subject. You cannot step twice into the same river, because the river has changed, not
the one who steps (of cource, there can be a directly opposite conclusion based on the
thesis of the constant mutability of a subject in immutable world: one generation
passes and another comes, but the world forever stays Ecclesiastes 1:4). Secondly,
not the self-identity of the object is denied completely, but only in different segments
of time. In every single moment of time the self-identity of the object is not
endangered by anything, otherwise it would be impossible to step into river not only
twice, but even once.
What is the basis for self-identity in case of river or any other object? It is the
sign which denotes this object. What bothers Heraclitus is that constant changes in
world are not reflected in signs. There is already a different water in the river, but the
river is still the same.
Thus, without sign, any kind of knowledge is impossible, and the precondition
of knowledge is the identity of object to itself (A = A), but the content of which are
the substitution of something else (A = B), which is principally different from it (A z
B), and manipulation of this substitute (B) in order to achieve results which through
reversed substitution are trans-shipped to object (A). What are these A-s and B-s?
We can interpret them in many different ways, for example, A is an object and B is a
model, or A is an object and B is its sign. In any case, the way of knowledge is the
way of signs.
WORKS CITED
Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.
Lang, Alfred. 12 Further Definitions. http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lsh/marty/
langdef.htm.
Lotman, Mihhail. Atomistic Versus Holistic Semiotics. Sign Systems Studies 30.2.
Ed. P. Torop, M. Lotman, and K. Kull. Tartu: Tartu likooli kirjastus, 2002.
513-27.
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is twofold: to treat certain aspects of the theoretical foundations
of semiotics, thereby avoiding the usual way of semiotical conceptualization, and to
break the pattern of regular semiotical discourse. To understand better the difficulties
of contemporary semiotics, a re-examination of its sources, Peirce and Saussure,
seems to be reasonable. While the Saussurean approach treats sign as a single
phenomenon (this approach can be called atomistic), for Peirce a sign does not exist
as a single phenomenon; it comes into being only in the relationship with other signs
in the same sign system (such approach will be named holistic).
The basis of (European) knowledge is the self-identity of investigated object
(A=A). As it was shown already by Gottlob Frege, the equal sign (=) does not link
the objects, but their signs. In this sense, the sign is different from the object: its
identification is not connected with self-identity. The identity of a sign lies not in
itself, but in entirely different object called the meaning of this sign. A sign is neither
identical to itself nor to the object denoted by it. A sign is identified through its
meaning, but it is not identical with its meaning either; they are principally different
phenomena. Thus, in the world of signs the law of identity is not valid. In the basis of
semiotics lies an internal paradoxicality: A z A.
Key words: Charles Sanders Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure, sign,
foundations of semiotics, knowledge
(A=A)
(=)
AA