Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Held/Ratio: Yes
As to the issue of due process, Atty. Asoy's side has been fully heard in
the pleadings he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not
needed. The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. What
due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
The facts disclosed require no further evidentiary hearing, and speak
for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur. The Orders of the Trial Court
dismissing the Civil Case are of record and Atty. Asoy's excuse that he
can no longer recall them is feeble.
Atty. Asoy is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He received from
Richards, his client, compensation to handle his case in the Trial Court,
but the same was dismissed for lack of interest and failure to
prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract
ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. That
Atty. Asoy also ignored the processes of the Court and it was only after
he was suspended from the practice of law that he surfaced, is highly
indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the Court.
Mendoza v. NHA 111 SCRA 837
Santiago Mendoza, Carmen Urbano, Manuela Urbano, Renato De
Guzman, Raquel De Guzman, Rosette De Guzman, And Romeo De
Guzman (Mendoza et.al.), petitioners, are occupants of certain portions
of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They all claim ownership of their
occupied lands:
Santiago Mendoza: acquired from the DEUDORS, as evidenced by an
AGREEMENT
Carmen Urbano and Manuela Urbano : by virtue of a contract and
denominated DEED OF TRANSFER OF RIGHTS TO, INTERESTS IN AND
POSSESSION OF A RESIDENTIAL LOT
Renato, Raquel, Rosette, and Romeo, all surnamed de Guzman:
inherited from their father Serafin de Guzman
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, took effect - authorized "the
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly owned by the J.M. Tuason and
Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio
Deudor, et al.," for subdivision into small lots and its resale al cost to
the bona fide occupants thereof
Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was directed to institute the
proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate
Before the complaint for eminent domain could be filed, the J.M. Tuason
and Company, Inc., claiming to be the owner of the Tatalon Estate
which was sought to be condemned, filed an action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the LTA, praying that Republic Act No.
2616 be declared unconstitutional: DENIED.
On September 15, 1978, the trial court recognized the Compromise
Agreement made by the Republic of the Philippines, now represented
by the National Housing Authority, and the J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
On June 11, 1978, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 1472, authorizing the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
summarily eject any and all squatters from government resettlement
projects without the necessity of a judicial order.
Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President of the Philippines declared
the entire Metropolitan Manila Area as an Urban Land Reform Zone,
issued Proclamation No. 1967, proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan
Manila, including the Tatalon Estate, described as "Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
On January 27, 1981, NHA wrote Manuela Urbano, informing her that
her request for inclusion in the list of Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could
not be favorably considered, for being an absentee structure owner,
and demanding that she demolish her structure built on the Tatalon
Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise, NHA would summarily demolish her structure after the
expiration of the period without further notice.
In a letter, dated June 5, 1981, NHA also informed Romeo de Guzman
and Renato de Guzman that they cannot be granted a lot in the Tatalon
Estate after development because they were absentee structure
owners, as well. NHA, however, offered to buy their at a price to be
determined by it in order to avoid economic waste, but that if the
owner was not willing to sell the structure, he should demolish the
same within 10 days from notice, otherwise NHA would summarily
demolish the same without further notice.
In a letter dated August 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority also
ordered the petitioner Santiago Mendoza, "to demolish the illegal
extension of (his) structure located at the Tatalon Estate which
encroaches to the adjacent lot boundaries and pose obstruction/delay
in the allocation process", within 10 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise the NHA would summarily demolish the illegal construction
after the expiration of the period without further notice.
Due to the threat of demolition, Mendoza et.al. filed a petition for
prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order, to restrain the NHA from the
threatened demolition of the petitioners' houses situated in Barangay
Tatalon, Quezon City; and to declare Presidential Decree No. 1472
unconstitutional.
Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional due
process clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the
squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by personal service or by
posting the same in the lot or door of the apartment as the case may
be at least 10 days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises,
which has been amply complied with in the case of the petitioners.
Here, notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it
had been determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries"
and, consequently, squatters on the land occupied by them.
QUESTION:
Why are the petitioners not entitled to lot allocations?
ANSWER:
They falsely claim ownership over parcels of the Tatalon Estate. The
subject land is a property of the state after the expropriation
proceedings. They even admitted the States title when they applied
for inclusion as beneficiaries.
The petitioners, having actual knowledge of the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate,should have vindicated their claim of ownership to the
land claimed by them in the expropriation proceedings, as intimated by
the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration.
QUESTION:
What are the remedies against public nuisance?
ANSWER:
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero
Facts: On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately
25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong
and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and
3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated
were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the
market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with
presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion
for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the
amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing
the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to
CSC vs Lucas
Facts: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the
Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for
brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavitcomplaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the
same agency, for misconduct. Raquel felt Mr. Lucas hand touching her
thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and
suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she
will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. Lucas.
Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at huwag na
huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan A verbal exchange then
ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved
her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands protected
her face from smashing upon the door.Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA,
issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint, not
to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June
17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano,
assistant head, BOPI, denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did
not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what transpired was
that he accidentally brushed Linatoks leg when he reached for his
shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend
nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatoks leg.
Issue:
(a) Whether respondent was denied Due process when CSC found him
guilty of Grave Misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct
(b) whether the act complained constitute grave mis conduct
Ruling:
CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.offenses
fall under different categories. This is clear from a perusal of
memorandum circular No. 49-89 (also known as the guidelines in the
application of penalties in administrative cases) itself which classifies
administrative offenses into three: grave, less grave and light offenses.
The charge of grave misconduct falls under the classification of grave
offenses while simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense.
The former is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable
either by suspension (one month and one day to six months), if it is the
first offense; or by dismissal, if it is the second. Thus, they should be
treated as separate and distinct offenses. Grave misconduct as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest,which is obviously lacking in respondents case.
The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and
their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury
and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that
what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports[2] bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information[3] and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest,[4] demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs
task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on
the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by
the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he
has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the
subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case
No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the
Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said
Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the
President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General
Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their
undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an
inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995
Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan
dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses attorney-in-fact.
DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in
interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There
is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced
to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat
admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said
Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat
them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race
and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law
sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites
of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough
that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish
them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on
real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is
not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does
not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable
race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion
of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their
inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true
equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their
culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their
progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
Antero Sison Jr. vs Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben Ancheta et
al
Equal Protection
Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that thered
be a higher tax impost against income derived from professional
income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional
businessman, and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would
be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of
tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis
impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income.
There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt
the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while
continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional
and business income.
Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection
Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has
already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the
eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions
of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length
of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of
action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from
Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all
the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is
only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of
the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled
to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two
appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal
protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided
for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction
over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption.
The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special
court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public
service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court
ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the
present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public
official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the
standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the
Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices
a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully
reached than other trial courts.
Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)
Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not
belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies
are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the
CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds
are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public
officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only
allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact
that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate
any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of
justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one
judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence,
industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate
tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the
accused and to the people.
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded
and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual,
given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it
does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines
237 SCRA 538 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights
Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave
Felonies
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was
charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted
murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section
47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case
is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807
of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be
limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of
General points our that the issue regarding Section 67 had already
been passed upon by the Court in the case of Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
Indeed, we have dealt squarely with the issue of the validity of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. Section 67
was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional
pronouncement that public service is a public trust. Section 67 is not
violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of
office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of
Section 67 is covered by the term voluntary renunciation. Our
foregoing ruling in Dimaporo is still applicable in this case.
2. REMEDIAL LAW, SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PROHIBITION; DOES NOT
LIE TO RESTRAIN ACTS ALREADY A FAIT ACCOMPLI.- It must be pointed
out that this present petition is one for prohibition which is a
preventive remedy. The act sought to be enjoined had already been
accomplished with the holding of the 1998 elections. Prohibition, as a
rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
TELEBAP vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the
ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is
in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate
the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves,
the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means
through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and
programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of
time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time
unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of
their right to know. Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides that the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that the use of property bears a
social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive
justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being
overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high
positions in government or not. Second, the provision is directed to the
activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan
or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal
or barangay level.
Quinto Vs COMELEC 22 Feb. 2010
This is a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in Quinto vs. COMELEC, 1 December 2009.
ISSUES:
1.
Do the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause?
2.
Do the assailed provisions suffer from overbreadth?
HELD:
1.
No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our
Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that
under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material
and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of
the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents
for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded
from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for
the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference
is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
2.
No. The view that the assailed provisions are overly broad
because they apply indiscriminately to all appointive civil servants
regardless of position obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally
plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of
a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the
scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its
incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."
[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which
could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the
reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction
as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree
of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes
of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be
noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the
restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of
appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections.
Central Bank Employees Association vs BSP GR 148208 15
December 2004
Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and
created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank
Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State
has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
primarily, must be struck down.
2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies in the National
Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be
maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep
in mind the provisions of RA 4729: thecontraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the due process clause
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health
service provider. The private health care institution cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.
Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al
Equal Protection
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to
the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the
United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred
to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on
the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax
applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the
tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not
be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality,
or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax
upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage,
use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is
violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being
liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if
Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec
2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and
merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is
still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it
taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
identically worded informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91101732 to 101739, one of which reads as follows:
That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates inclusive, the above-named
accused, in conspiracy with her late husband, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, while both residing in Malacaang Palace in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously open and
maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad, particularly in Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) in Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of Maler
Establishment, later transformed into Maler Foundation, which was
organized by their dummies, nominees, fronts, agents or duly
appointed administrators among them Jean Louis Sunier who received
instructions from the accused and her husband who signed with their
alias JOHN LEWIS in order to maintain two accounts, one of which is
Account No. 98929 NY under Maler II with a balance of SF
16,195,258.00, without prior permission from the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such act of maintaining foreign account abroad was
not permitted under Central Bank regulations.
- (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No.35719, pp. 45-46)
The wordings of the other seven (7) informations differed only in the
dates of commission of the offense charged, the name/s of the
dummy/dummies, the balance of the foreign exchange accounts
maintained abroad and the name/s of the foreign bank/s where such
accounts were maintained.
Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or to register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated by
Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were
similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation of Section 10, CB
Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act in five
(5) informations filed with the RTC of Manila which were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 91-101883. On the same date, nine (9)
more informations essentially charging the same offense were filed
with the RTC of Manila, but this time only against Marcos and
Benedicto, which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101884 to
91-101892. One of the informations reads:
That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26, 1985, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime thereafter, all accused, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, all residing and/or doing business in Manila, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and assisted by their
foreign agent or attorney-in-fact Stephen G. Cattaui, did then and there
issues and arguments for the quashal of the charges against her, with
the result that the same have been deep-frozen since 1991. Inevitably,
the three-tiered adjudicature to which they have been subjected has
merely resulted in reiterations by the parties of their set issues,
congealed arguments and invariable conclusions.
It is time then to thaw those cases from the frigidity of their present
status so that petitioner may have the opportunity to prove her
defenses on the merits, instead of having those cases indefinitely
sidelined by legal strategy contingent on expectancies. For, in the
present posture thereof, it does not appear that respondent Court of
Appeals has committed any abuse of discretion, much less of a grave
or arbitrary nature, as would call for the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. We accordingly uphold the denial of petitioners motion to
quash so that the interlocutory proceedings may now move on to trial
wherein she can present such evidence as may possibly place her
protestations in another light as she claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the challenged
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Nolasco v COMELEC
FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayorelect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds
for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of
what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their
position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc.
Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that
should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned
over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc
denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws.
He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that
should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning
candidates proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is
already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the
candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There
cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received
the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a
voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won
the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate
is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Ponente: Kapunan
Facts
PCGG field a case against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for the recovery of illgotten wealth. Among the defendants were the ACCRA Law Firm and
Raul Roco, also a part of ACCRA. Case alleged that Cojuangco and
defendants conspired in setting up through the use of coco levy funds
numerous banks; that ACCRA acted as dummies.
ACCRA performed legal services for clients, with the incidental services
where its members acted as stockholders. In the process, members of
ACCRA acquired information relative to assets of clients and their
personal and business circumstances.
PCGG excluded Raul Roco from the complaint as party-defendant
because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principals for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder in the companies
involved.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the exclusion of
ACCRA members in the complaint as party-defendants. MR denied.
PETs contend: that the exclusion of Roco as party-defendant grants him
a favourable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to
divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over ACCRA
members; that lawyers are prohibited from revealing the identity of
their principal.
Issue
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere
requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients
which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to
reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private
respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at
ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for
the alleged questioned transactions.[61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the
filing of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore, the
PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based on real
differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of
the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of
protection against uneven application of statutes and regulations. In
the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.[62] Those who
fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.[63]
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG
of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG
Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The
condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated
litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the
others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related
to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorneyclient privilege but also of the constitutional right against selfincrimination.Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the
proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are
not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the
very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be
compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against selfincrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be
allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should
not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorneyclient relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients.To allow the case to continue with respect to
them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early
opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should
not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a
proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be
allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover illgotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal
protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
Olivarez vs Sandiganbayan GR 118533 04 October 1995
Facts: Paranaque Sanguaniang Bayan Resolution 744, approved by
Mayor Olivarez 6 Oct 1922, authorized Baclaran Credit Cooperative Inc
(BCCI) to set up a manfacturers night (Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair
sa Baclaran) during the Christmas fiesta celebration, at Baclaran for 60
days, (11 Nov 92 to 15 Feb 93) for which they will use a portion of the
service road of Roxas Boulevard.
Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary
permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the permit unless BCCI
gives money to the latter.
court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be
imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in
a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.