VF Etude Juin 2012

Development Planning Division
Working Paper Series No. 32
Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction:

Present state, ongoing projects and
prospects for reinvestment
Ward Anseeuw, Tinashe Kapuya and Davies Saruchera
2012

Preface
This study was commissioned in support of an initiative coordinated by the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement
and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The objective of the study is to identify the development needs
of Zimbabwes economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular. The associated economic and
agricultural policies, their coordination and functioning are also discussed as a basis for national dialogue on
investment in the countrys agricultural sector.
A grounded understanding of such elements of Zimbabwes economy will assist in encouraging the design of
investment interventions conducive to national development. These should take cognisance of both
the constraints facing agricultural producers, particularly smallholder and associated actors, and government
objectives for food security and wider economic development.
This report includes inputs of a consultation workshop that was held in Harare on 21 October 2011 for
validation of the report before its finalisation and inclusion in a review process.
Acknowledgements
The compilation of this report would not have been possible without of the important contribution of various
stakeholders that participated in a survey in the information-gathering phase. Their participation in the study
and their inputs are much appreciated.
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Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction: Present state, ongoing projects and prospects for reinvestment
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Contents
Acronyms and abbreviations
Executive summary
(i) Zimbabwes agricultural sector

(ii) What has (not) been done until now?
(iii) Some thoughts on investment priorities for Zimbabwes
agricultural reconstruction
8
10
Chapter 1: Introduction
15
1.1
The context of the study
11
15
1.2 Significance, objectives and scope of the study
16
1.3 The methodology used in the study
17
1.4 Study limitations
18
1.5 Structure of the report
18
Chapter 2: The state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe
19
2.1 Introduction
19
2.2 The Evolution of policies and governance since 1980

2.2.1 Land policy and resettlement
2.2.2 Agricultural policy
2.2.3 Food security policy
19
20
23
26
2.3 The agricultural sector within the broader economy
27
2.4 Production trends of the main agricultural commodities

2.4.1 Cereal crops
2.4.2 Export/cash crops
2.4.3 Oilseed crops
2.4.4 Livestock
32
33
40
44
46
2.5 The State Of Food Security In Zimbabwe

2.5.1 Food security at the national level
2.5.2 Food security at infra-national and household levels
50
51
55
2.6 Agriculture in the reconstruction of Zimbabwes broader economy:

Its role, future and challenges
58
Chapter 3: T
he political economy of the agricultural sector
and post-crisis reconstruction
61
3.1 Context
3.1.1 Lack of statistical information
3.1.2 Fragile political stability
64
64
65
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3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
Lack of democratic government and governance

Biased political will
Low state and national stakeholder capacities
Conclusion on the context
67
69
70
71
3.2 Policy framework and reforms

3.2.1 Macroeconomic reforms and structural transformation
3.2.2 Country-owned strategy in development
3.2.3 Industrial and trade policies
3.2.4 Integrated agricultural policy
3.2.5 Social safety nets
3.2.6 Conclusion on policy framework
71
71
73
75
75
77
78
3.3 Assistance
3.3.1 Zimbabwes short-term, year-on-year approach
3.3.2 A country and target-specific approach
3.3.3 The lack of donor-recipient consensus
3.3.4 Multiple donors, partially aligned
3.3.5 Funding certainly not matched by recipient
3.3.6 Concluding remarks on foreign assistance
78
78
79
79
80
82
82
3.4 Current principles of action to meet development needs

3.4.1 Humanitarian aid prevails, lack of development approach
3.4.2 Technical assistance
3.4.3 Lack of private sector engagement in Zimbabwe
3.4.4 No debt relief, no budget support, but tied aid instead
3.4.6 Concluding remarks on principles of action
83
83
84
85
86
87
3.5 The need for a well-defined, holistic approach, including government

and donors
88
Chapter 4: Actors and projects: Coordination and alignment
89
4.1 Institutional description of actors

4.1.1 Government of Zimbabwe and the public sector in transition
4.1.2 Donors and development agencies coordinated but not aligned
4.1.3 Organised and well-structured but weak civil society
and private sector
4.1.4 Other agricultural actors regional and pan-African organisations
4.1.5 Agricultural research institutions
89
89
93
96
101
101
4.2 Implemented projects

4.2.1 Government
4.2.2 Food and Agriculture Organization
102
103
106
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4.2.3 World Food Programme and other United Nations agencies
107
4.2.4 Protracted Relief Programme
112
4.2.5 Bilateral projects and assistance
112
4.3
rom emergency to integrated development:

F
The need for broad, multi-sectoral structural reforms
Chapter 5: Investment

priorities for agricultural sector development
and zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction
113
115
5.1 The need for a broad restructuring and post-crisis reconstruction

5.1.1 The need for governance restructuring
5.1.2 The necessary development of Zimbabwes integrated agricultural and
broader economic policy framework
5.1.3 Rethinking assistance to Zimbabwes agricultural sector
and reconstruction
5.1.4 Establishment of a stimulating economic environment
115
117
5.2 Investment priorities for agricultural and broader development

5.2.1 Public economic infrastructure
5.2.2 Telecommunications
5.2.3 Irrigation rehabilitation and development
5.2.4 Research and extension support services
5.2.5 Post-harvest and market-based infrastructure,
linked to value chain redevelopment
5.2.6 Institutional and market-based instrument support
5.2.7 Social infrastructure and capacity building
5.2.8 Agro-manufacturing and processing capacity development
5.2.9 Credit and financial services
120
120
126
128
130
5.3 The need for a threefold development approach for reconstruction
140
5.4 Public consultation and prioritisation
143
References
146
Annexure 1
153
List of interviewed institutions
153
Annexure 2
154
Agricultural and related legislation
154
Annexure 3
161
List of agribusiness and agro-industrial companies in Zimbabwe.
161
Annexure 4
164
Public consultation workshop list of participants
164
117
118
118
132
134
136
137
139
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Acronyms and abbreviations

A1/A2 Properties allocated to black farmers under the Fast Track
Land Reform Programme
AFD Agence Franaise de Dveloppement
AfDB African Development Bank
Afrexim African Export-Import Bank
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
Agritex Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services
AIAS African Institute of Agrarian Studies
AM3A Support to the Rural Actors in Southern Africa
AN ammonium nitrate
ASPEF Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility
AURP Support to Disfavoured Rural Populations
BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAN calcium ammonium nitrate
CFSAM Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CFU Commercial Farmers Union
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Cottco
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe
CSC Cold Storage Company
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization
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FANRPAN Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network

FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GAA Welthungerhilfe Zimbabwe
GDP gross domestic product
GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System
GMB Grain Marketing Board
GNU Government of National Unity
HELP Health, Education, Literacy Programme
HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ICRAF World Agroforestry Centre
ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
ICT information and communications technology
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
JCRR Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoAMID Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development
NEPAD New Partnership for Africas Development
NGO
non-governmental organisation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
POTRAZ Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe
PRP Protracted Relief Programme
RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
Page 7

Executive summary
The overall objective of this report is to identify priorities for public and private sector
investment in Zimbabwe, for national and international partners, which target agricultural
recovery and food security. In order to create a framework for the development of a
strategic plan for investment in Zimbabwe, the specific objectives of the assignment are to:
(i) Describe in detail the state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe;
(ii) Detail Zimbabwes political economy and elements of the countrys post-conflict
or post-crisis period to create a better understanding of its opportunities for
and constraints to reconstruction;
(iii) Identify, describe and critically review all programmes and projects currently
implemented in Zimbabwe; and
(iv) Based on a critical review comparing the specific post-crisis reconstruction needs
with the projects and programmes currently being implemented, identify
investment priorities for agriculture and food security contextualised within
a broader economic setting.
(i) Zimbabwes agricultural sector

Zimbabwes agricultural sector has emerged from a prolonged period of structural change,
in the context of shifts in the social, political and economic environments. Of particular
note are the shifts in the scale of operations and the composition of the farming sector
since 2000. This occurred concomitantly with major financial upheaval, which involved
protracted periods of hyperinflation, followed by the liberalisation of markets and the
eventual shift to the use of foreign exchange in late 2008.
Zimbabwes agricultural sector has long been key to its economic stability and growth.
Not only does it form the basis of the direct and indirect livelihoods of almost 70% of the
population, but economic growth is also directly linked to the performance of this sector.
The growth and development of agriculture are expected to support the improvement
and growth of the other sectors of the economy, namely industry and services. Although
the agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to decrease slightly (to 12%),
it will remain significant for Zimbabwes transitional economy (Robertson, 2011),
contributing 30% of formal employment (Kapuya et al., 2010) and representing the largest
single source of export earnings. This contribution is all the more important in view of
the Millennium Development Goals, which make it necessary to consider the different
roles of agriculture in Zimbabwes new economic, political and social setting.
Despite various arguments about specific approaches to re-establishing Zimbabwes
agriculture and economy, a number of characteristics and challenges will have to be
considered:
Page 8

Productivity is low, which is related to a low level of capital endowment, leading to a

restricted uptake of productive farm technologies and, subsequently, to low yield and
output (ZimVAC, 2009). A first objective for Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction
will be to increase productivity levels again (perhaps not to the levels seen before 2000,
as the sectors structure has changed, but at least to levels similar to or higher than
what communal and small-scale farmers were reaching before fast track land reform).
With the production bases in place, the result of a well-structured sector before 2000,
revitalisation of the sector will often not take much. This makes the Zimbabwean
case different from that of many failed states. A good example of revitalisation is
the significant growth in the tobacco and cotton sectors. Although Zimbabwes
reconstruction should be broad-based, including a wide range of agricultural and
non-agricultural subsectors, it makes sense in the framework of this project
to focus first on basic food crops that require minor investments, such as maize
and extensive livestock production. Reaching past production and productivity levels
in these sectors would enable Zimbabwe to reach food autonomy. Other crops, such
as small grains (irrigation-sensitive) and poultry (capital-intensive), will follow rapidly
once the basic conditions have been established.
The rural market economy collapsed because of the economic crisis, as well as constant
interventions by the state and donors. This led to the collapse of input and output
markets and efficient price-setting mechanisms, among other things (Esterhuizen, 2010).
It is vital for Zimbabwe to re-engage with development. Both government and donors
have to shift from an assistance-aid approach to a developmental one. This will require
a rethink of current measures and policies.
Several issues are hampering this shift and the subsequent re-initiation of a solid,
positive growth path for both agriculture and the overall economy:

The lack of a relevant and well-defined policy and institutional framework, leading
to an ill-defined overall development strategy and unstructured institutional entities
(parastatals, for example) and arrangements (including contractual arrangements)
(Kapuya et al., 2010);

Deteriorating infrastructure for the marketing and movement of produce, such as
roads and telecommunications, as well as overall production capacity (including a
lack of fuel, electricity and input manufacturing industries) leading to high costs
or scarcity of production factors (Kapuya et al., 2010; Moyoetal.,2009);

A lack of efficient and effective support to agriculture, such as research and
agricultural extension, leading to a limited transfer of technology from research,
restricted dissemination of productive farm technologies, and a lack of commercial
farming skills;

Limited access to working capital and difficulties in accessing agricultural finance,
which stem from a lack of credit, financial services that are poorly adapted to the new
tenurial situation, and unfavourable borrowing conditions (Kapuya et al., 2010); and
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Inadequate training in production and crop management, stemming from poor
extension services, and, therefore, a limited transfer of technology from research.
(ii) What has (not) been done until now?

The presentation of Zimbabwes institutional framework for agriculture (Chapter 3) and
of the projects implemented since its Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Chapter 4)
leads to two major observations: i) the different processes of project implementation; and
ii) the need for a transition towards integrated development approaches.
First, the donors approaches to and channels for assistance are not exclusive. However,
there are four major channels: the government, the United Nations group (coordinated by
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for agriculture), the Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF), and bilateral initiatives (the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) is atypical although
it started as a bilateral programme of the Department for International Development
(DFID), it now involves several donors). With each sphere being well coordinated (except
for the government, where project implementation was mainly ad hoc), there is little
coordination between these different entities. Inter-entity coordination efforts are being
made, as specific projects and donors focus on different targets:

Geographical area: None of the donor-funded projects focused on the newly
resettled areas but instead targeted the previously resettled areas and communal
lands; the government focuses on the newly resettled areas.

Recipients and types of projects: Lately, food aid has been reoriented towards
the poorest and more marginalised, whereas vouchers and inputs are directed
towards potential farmers.
The main reasons for the lack of coordination are the different approaches to assistance,
different political stances towards Zimbabwe, and donor visibility. On the ground, separate
implementation might lead to less coordinated and limited (scattered funding) initiatives.
Second, most of the projects remain emergency-oriented. The government and donors or
development partners have been responding to the needs of temporarily and chronically
hungry people on a large scale in recent years, through various schemes based on
the targeted transfer of food and agricultural inputs. Increasingly, humanitarian relief
programmes have sought to focus on consolidating the livelihoods of the recipients in an
attempt to generate supplementary household incomes and thereby reduce the need for
future welfare transfers. In the last two years, in order to respond to these issues, new
approaches have been developed to revive household production and the rural economy,
while providing humanitarian assistance:
(i) Donors, mainly coordinated through the FAO, have started providing monetary
vouchers for aid to provide food and agricultural inputs, trying to revitalise rural
market linkages.
Page 10

(ii) Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the GRM consortium,

have implemented new approaches, focusing on market development and the
reconstruction of value chains; and
(iii) Market studies and investment studies, focusing on the areas that are prioritised
under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
process (by the government of Zimbabwe), the Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector
Assessment (ZASA) (by the World Bank and the MDTF), and the strategic investment
planning documents of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
Although these renewed approaches are essential and a welcome transition from the
previous food aid projects, they are only the initial and necessary stepping-stones towards
broader structural changes. When compared to the post-crisis reconstruction framework
detailed in Chapter 2, two points should be highlighted. On the one hand, in addition
to being mainly emergency-oriented, the initiatives are all project-based. All of them
have a specific objective (even though a certain evolution towards development-oriented
strategies has occurred), are time and area-bound, and are thus very limited in scope.
On the other hand, the projects currently being implemented focus narrowly on food and
agricultural production. A few started targeting broader value chains; none (except the
USAID credit facility scheme) are oriented towards broader integration of the agricultural
sector (agribusiness development, manufacturing and industrial development, financial
sector development, etc.), and wider macroeconomic and governance restructuring.
Zimbabwe needs a structural paradigm shift and a transformation towards sustainable
agricultural production, based on in-depth structural and broad policy changes. This will
liberate the country from aid dependency. Investments in policy reflection and in the
broad-based resuscitation of the economy (particularly the private sector) are still lacking.
(iii) Some thoughts on investment priorities for Zimbabwes

agricultural reconstruction
Recent political and economic developments in Zimbabwe offer the twin prospects
of a renewed restructuring of economy, including agriculture, and rapid, sustainable
growth following the nadir reached at the end of 2008. An effective sectoral recovery
strategy will require the mobilisation and investment of financial resources from both
public and private sources. However, investments alone will not lead to sustainability.
Agriculture, and the broader economy, needs the requisite factors of production and
exchange. As such, based on the Post-Crisis Reconstruction Model, the report details
broad restructuring prerequisites for a sustainable post-crisis reconstruction in Zimbabwe.
Without underestimating the complexity and gravity of current challenges, these
prerequisites need to acknowledge the concomitant necessity of a social contract that is
Page 11

generally recognised and supported, and effectively engages all stakeholders in a broad
framework of reforms. According to the Post-Crisis Reconstruction Model, there is a need
for governance restructuring; an engagement in agricultural, and overall, policy reform;
a rethink of assistance strategies; and the establishment of a stimulating economic
environment. These conditions are not exclusive, but are rather complementary and
strongly related.
The need for governance restructuring: Although democracy is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for a successful recovery, there is a need for effective governance.
This implies the effective implementation of efficient, sustainable and accepted
programmes. The ability of a central government to implement inclusive policies
successfully forms a solid foundation on which recovery can be attained. Two major
aspects related to governance are, therefore, stressed: effectiveness and inclusivity.
The necessary development of Zimbabwes integrated agricultural and broader economic
policy framework: First, there is an absolute need for the country to engage in strategic
policy definition. Second, this should be done on a sectoral basis, particularly in
agriculture, but should be integrated with complementary development strategies for
industrial development, manufacturing, and the like. Third, in alignment with the Paris
Declaration, these policies should reflect a country-owned strategy.
Rethinking assistance to Zimbabwes agricultural sector and reconstruction:
The agricultural sector has to move away from a reactive food aid and emergency
relief approach towards a more proactive production and development approach.
Establishment of a stimulating economic environment: A major condition for this is
the revitalisation of the private sector, directly in agriculture, but also in downstream
and upstream sectors. As such revitalisation is to be supported by substantial domestic
and foreign investment in the agricultural sector, private sector engagement should
be promoted through a stimulating environment. Although the private sector will play
an important role, so too must the government and the donor community, in order to
improve the level and distribution of returns on agricultural investments.
The mobilisation and investment of financial resources in agriculture need the requisite
factors of production and exchange. The necessary conditions for any effective sectoral
recovery strategy (as with any other economic activity) would include: the rapid
reorientation of all farming efforts to respond to available markets; a gradual increase
in efficiency in production at all scales of operation; the availability and adequate
quality of inputs and services; affordable financial arrangements for working capital and
seasonal operations, as well as investment in productive assets; and positive expectations
among farmers, entrepreneurs and all others operating in value chains. Attaining these
fundamental groundwork goals will require a concerted investment of government
resources in the agricultural sector. Proposed potential areas of investment are shown in
the figure below.
Page 12

Category
Public
Nature of investment
Policy reform
Agricultural and land policy
Interlinkages with broader economic policies
Notes
Long-term
investments
Institutional and administrative reforms

Restructuring the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation
Development (MoAMID)
Restructuring parastatals

Cooperative development
Legal reform

Property rights
Research and extension

Public agricultural research

Pro-poor extension services
Public economic infrastructure

Electricity and energy (coal mining and hydroelectricity)

Transport and communications (roads, railways and
telecommunications)

Irrigation rehabilitation and development
Post-harvest and market-based infrastructure, linked to value chain
development

Information technology

Information dissemination

Storage grain, warehouse infrastructure, abattoirs

Retail development (agri-dealers)

Output market development
Economic institutional infrastructure and market-based instrument
support

Stop orders

Vouchers

Contract farming and contractual arrangements
Social infrastructure and capacity building

Agricultural union capacity building

Decentralised management capacity building (irrigation schemes,
for example)
Manufacturing and agro-processing capacity development

Revitalisation and modernisation of machinery in input and
processing industry

Adaptation for small-scale initiatives
Private
sector
Credit and financial services

Loan guaranty arrangements for agribusinesses, as well as farmer
microcredit facilities

Private sector credit facilities

Support for credit to farmers by agribusiness

Insurance
Immediate
investments
Page 13

In conclusion, Zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction might necessitate a threefold

development approach, combining macro, policy and governance reforms with sectoral or
value chain initiatives, as well as with a territorial development approach. The combination
of more sectoral or value chain approaches with territorial development strategies
endeavours to foster balanced development of a specific territory as a whole, of sectors
that are booming, and of areas in difficulty. Such an approach to rural development will
be able to respond to the changes that have taken place in rural Zimbabwe through the
following:
(i) Not focusing only on agricultural activities, but recognising the importance
of non-farm rural activities and other income-generating strategies in a country
in transition;
(ii) Taking account of the potential effects of the strengthening of rural-urban linkages
on transforming agricultural production patterns and on the living and working
conditions of the population, particularly the poor;
(iii) Avoiding using project resources to compensate for market failures, only to see
them reappear once such interventions have concluded;
(iv) Not only focusing narrowly on smallholder farming, but also considering that
alliances with non-poor, non-rural agents (i.e. contract farming) can be more
efficient routes out of poverty;
(v) Taking into consideration socio-political constraints and macroeconomic
restrictions;
(vi) Taking into account the heterogeneity of rural areas, since centrally designed
programmes are often one size fits all; and
(vii) Distinguishing between social and economic objectives that limit the development
of entrepreneurial capabilities.
Concretely, for Zimbabwes reconstruction, the territorial entities could offer specific aid
to the most disadvantaged rural and urban territories, supporting smallholder agriculture,
encouraging the setting up of businesses, and supporting tourist activities and land use
management. They could also enable the major urban centres and other economic sectors
to develop further, through urban development contracts and major urban development
projects; broader economic development, including industry and services; and setting up
community public services. One example would be the establishment of a network of rural
centres, providing major services and opportunities for broader economic development.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The context of the study
The economic performance of Zimbabwe rests mainly on agriculture, mining and the
manufacturing industry, with agriculture contributing about 20% of gross domestic
product (GDP). Even though approximately 7.6million people (just under 75% of the total
population of 11 million) live in rural areas and depend mainly on agriculture, Zimbabwe
distinguished itself from the traditionally agriculture-based countries and is characterised
as a transitional economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s.1
However, Zimbabwes economy has struggled, agriculture more so than most other sectors,
to cope with the combined effects of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP),
hyperinflation, capital constraints and government controls on markets. Zimbabwes real
GDP declined by more than 71% between 2000 and 2008 (Robertson, 2011) with overall
agricultural production declining by 30% over the same period (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
The governments land reform programme and the subsequent collapse of the agricultural
sector, which once provided 400 000 jobs and was the countrys main source of export
revenues and foreign exchange, are seen as the prime cause of the prolonged economic
crisis (Richardson, 2004). The deterioration of commercial agriculture and the sector in
general, which led to the country becoming a net importer of food by 2002, has resulted
in a substantial fall in formal employment opportunities, output, exports and secondary
demand generated by the modern or capitalised sector (World Bank & Government of
Zimbabwe, 2010). Once known as the breadbasket of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) region, Zimbabwe is now characterised by chronic food insecurity
and is entirely dependent on international aid, particularly food aid (Makumbe, 2009).
After 2000, there have been several emergency-related programmes, from food relief
to input support schemes, funded by the government or bilateral or multilateral donors,
to improve food security and (mainly subsistence) agricultural output.
From 2009, Zimbabwe has achieved a relatively peaceful transition, which led to the
formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU is a transitional arrangement
that brought the main political groupings together in government, with the objective of
spearheading the implementation of political, economic and constitutional reforms. Since
the formation of the GNU, Zimbabwes economy and agricultural sector have shown
resilience in the face of difficult market conditions. The combination of crises led to the
liberalisation of the agricultural market and the eventual adoption of foreign exchange as
part of a series of emergency policy measures to facilitate production and mitigate short1
Personal communication: Interviewed during research project, 2 February 2010.
Page 15

term emergencies. Trade in international currencies has brought the rapid revitalisation of
both input and product markets. In 2009, Zimbabwes economy grew by 4.3%, the first
positive growth rate in a decade. Agriculture grew by an estimated 10% between 2008 and
2009 (RBZ, 2010). The prospects for continued rapid growth are now highly favourable.
Given the potential for political stability, the revitalisation of agriculture one of Zimbabwes
main sectors is necessary in order to shift from aid dependency towards a productionbased economy. Zimbabwe has an enviable resource endowment for agricultural
development, in terms of land and water resources, sunk investments, expertise, demand
for exports and even a conducive climate, notwithstanding the unpredictability of rainfall
patterns within seasons and between years (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe,
2010). However, the agricultural sector is now characterised by an entirely new structure.
It is mainly composed of small-scale and newly resettled farmers, practicing their activities
on non-titled land. In contrast, a decade ago, the sector was composed of well-established,
large-scale commercial enterprises on private land. This raises new questions and requires
new instruments.
It is in this context that the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Agence
Franaise de Dveloppement (AFD), the French development agency, commissioned an
assessment of investment needs and priorities for supporting growth prospects and recovery
strategies for the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe. This agricultural sector assessment study
outlines opportunities for investment that will enable the country to achieve sustained
growth in production and trade, while improving food security. It discusses Zimbabwes
agricultural sector in a broader context of agricultural policies, overall politics and multisectoral linkages. The study is not exhaustive, but rather offers an overview of a number
of strategic investment opportunities. It generates pertinent summary information for
use by the main stakeholders, including international development partners, in guiding
the requisite levels of investment for the revival of agricultural and rural economic
activity. Investments at the appropriate points and levels will assist the recovery process.
Appropriate, incremental development investments may accelerate economic growth
and, therefore, enable the transition away from relief programmes by the government
and donors.
1.2 Significance, objectives and scope of the study

The overall objective of this assignment is to identify priorities for public and private
sector investment that targets agricultural recovery and food security. This information will
highlight the relevant areas for investment by national and international partners, whether
public or private. In order to develop a framework for a strategic plan for investment in
Zimbabwe, this study outlines the state of the agricultural sector, national and household
food security, the existing projects of different stakeholders, and policy processes and their
determinants within the broader political economy context of the agricultural sector.
Page 16

The specific objectives of the assignment are as follows:

(i) Describe in detail the state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe. This includes
an analysis of the evolution and structural changes of these two sectors, as well
as an overview of their current challenges, government policies and governance
structures.
(ii) Detail Zimbabwes political economy and elements of the countrys post-crisis
period to create a better understanding of its opportunities and constraints for
reconstruction. This is done according to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model,
drawn from international experiences in post-conflict economic recovery. The model
assumes the need for specific elements in the recovery process of fragile, failed
and/or post-conflict states.
(iii) Identify, critically review and detail all programmes and projects currently
implemented in Zimbabwe. Alongside an institutional description of Zimbabwes
agricultural sector, these include initiatives by the government, national and
international development partners, and the private sector.
(iv) Based on a critical review comparing the specific needs for post-crisis reconstruction
with the projects and programmes currently being implemented, identify investment
priorities in agriculture and food security, contextualised within its broader economic
setting.
The analysis provides practical advice for the development of agricultural investments
within the context of specific policy reforms in Zimbabwe.
1.3 The methodology used in the study

The studys methodology is developed around three axes:
First, an extensive review of available literature and data on the agricultural and
food security sectors is presented. The study uses existing secondary data from
the Central Statistical Offices and the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and
Irrigation Development (MoAMID), but more particularly from international donors
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have provided and disseminated
information as government services faded (this is discussed in more detail later in
this report).
Second, the study team conducted wide-ranging discussions with important
stakeholders in government and the public sector, in cooperation initiatives and in
the private sphere in order to gather additional data. This related mainly to current
projects, the politics and political economy elements of agriculture and food security,
and the major needs of and obstacles facing the country (see list in Annexure 1).
Third, in order to complement these views and discuss preliminary results, a follow-up
stakeholder workshop was held in November 2011. This involved a large panel of
Page 17

stakeholders from Zimbabwes agricultural sector, including the donor and

international community. The stakeholder workshop enabled the team to discuss,
complement and, in particular, prioritise the different investment needs identified.
1.4 Study limitations

Although there is a significant effort to produce and disseminate the most precise
information and data possible (particularly by multilateral cooperation initiatives, within
the framework of the organisation and coordination of emergency initiatives), this area
still calls for caution.
Some aspects of the agricultural sector have operated in an environment of information
asymmetry, in which policy-relevant information has been gained from what is known by
one party but not by another. This atmosphere persists today with only a slight concession
to clarity, as increasing numbers of institutions and functions attempt to gather data
on which to base policy or commercial decisions. Nonetheless, secrecy and reluctance
to divulge information are prominent features of the sector, which, despite attempts to
triangulate data, necessitate some assumptions to deal with gaps in the information.
1.5 Structure of the report

After this introductory chapter on the objectives and the rationale of the study, Chapter
2 details Zimbabwes past policies and discusses the evolution and present state of the
agricultural sector and food (in)security, as well as the necessity of revitalising these in a
country such as Zimbabwe. Chapter 3 analyses Zimbabwes political economy and presents
elements of the countrys post-crisis agricultural reconstruction. Chapter 4, divided into
two sections, presents Zimbabwes institutional framework by describing the different
stakeholders (public, private and donor), as well as the programmes and projects currently
implemented by these actors. Finally, Chapter 5 outlines investment priorities.
Page 18

Chapter 2
The state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe
2.1 Introduction
To create a better understanding of the situation in Zimbabwe and contextualise the
investment needs in its agricultural sector, this chapter gives a detailed description of the
evolution and current state of agriculture and food security in the country. The first section
presents a broad overview of Zimbabwes past agricultural policies, the transformation
of the countrys land structure, and the role of agriculture within the broader economic
development path. The concluding section details the challenges and the necessity of
revitalising the sector to shift from aid dependency towards a production-based economy.
2.2 The Evolution of policies and governance since 1980

In order to understand the shifts in production patterns, it is important to detail the
evolution of Zimbabwes farm structure and policies (see Table 2.1). The historical structure
of the countrys agricultural production base was described as dualistic: on one side,
the commercial subsector (comprising large-scale farms) produced cash crops such as
tobacco, horticultural produce and grain. On the other, small-scale producers (comprising
smallholder and communal farmers) grew mainly food crops, particularly maize, and
were the major livestock keepers. The commercial sector consisted of 1.3 million people
(including farm owners and farmworker households) who lived on 4660 large commercial
farms, covering 15 million ha. The small-scale sector consisted of over a million households
(5.6 million people) subsisting on 16 million ha. This production base produced sufficient
food for the country, and in certain years represented an important source of exports and
foreign exchange (Kapuya et al.,2010).
There were three phases in post-independence policies. The period from 1980 to the
early 1990s was characterised by a continuation of previous policies and relative stability.
The 1990s brought structural adjustment programmes, which were followed by the FTLRP.
Currently, a new era of liberalisation has been announced, but implementation is still at
a very early stage.
Page 19

Table 2.1: Summary of land, agricultural and food security policies, 19802010
Period
1980
1990
1991
1998
2000
2008
2009+
Sector
Policy
Description
Land
Willing buyer, willing

seller resettlement
programme
Government bound by the Lancaster House Agreement.

Distributed 2.46 million ha in first five years to model
12-acre schemes, which became successful.
Agriculture
High regulation and

control policies
Land
Compulsory land
acquisition
Legislation to acquire land compulsorily passed. Was meant

to receive donor support but the support was not
forthcoming. Resettlement programme was, hence,
very slow and far off target.
Agriculture
Liberalised policies
Trade liberalisation begins, founded in the macroeconomic

reforms proposed market-based economy. Cancellation of
controls and subsidies, although the grain sector remains
partially controlled. The start of efforts to write national
agricultural policies.
Food
security
No official policy
Government prioritises food security by controlling trade

in grains and funding relief aid (with help of NGOs) in years
of drought.
Land
FTLRP
Politically motivated land invasions see 7.3 million ha taken

by blacks in two years alone. The programme attracts
negative media attention the world over for its criminal
elements.
Agriculture
Return of
regularisation
Production nosedives after the FTLRP. All efforts to craft

national policy fail and the government becomes highly
involved in trade regulation again. The central bank
bankrolls national agricultural projects, and marketing
of most produce, especially grain, is tightly controlled.
Food
security
No official policy
Severely reduced agricultural production and lack of funds

dampen national food security programmes. Government
relies on the World Food Programme (WFP) and CSAFE for
household food security.
Agriculture
Mixed approach
Unity government partly liberalises agricultural trade again.

Grain trade uncontrolled for the first time. Government
and NGOs fund input projects to communal and resettled
farmers.
Maintaining the dual agricultural system. Continuation of

the pre-independence government controls, with a heavy
bias towards black small-scale and communal farmers,
who receive subsidised inputs and protected marketing.
National food security is a priority.
Sources: Rukuni (2006); Moyo (2009).
2.2.1 Land policy and resettlement

Before 1980, a racially skewed land ownership pattern prevailed in Zimbabwe, facilitated
by the colonial government (see Table 2.1). After independence, a land reform policy
was meant to address the underlying inequity and increase access to land by indigenous
Page 20

people. A clause in the Lancaster House Agreement, however, prevented the government
from taking white farmers land in the first ten years of democratic rule, as it enforced a
willing buyer, willing seller policy.
In what can be seen as the first phase, land reforms from 1980 to 1992 redistributed
3.5 million ha of white-owned commercial farmland to 71000 indigenous families, mostly
from communal areas (see Table 2.2). This policy managed to establish a successful
resettlement programme as a double-barrelled strategy to boost food security and
equitable economic growth, while simultaneously reducing land pressure in overcrowded
communal lands (Rukuni, 2006).
Table 2.2: Land ownership pattern in Zimbabwe at independence in 1980
Number of
farmers
Million ha
Large-scale commercial
5 600
15.5
39.1
Small-scale commercial
1.4
3.5
Communal
16.4
41.4
National parks and urban
6.0
15.2
State land
0.3
0.8
39.6
100.0
Sector
Total
% of total
Source: Rukuni (2006).
After the ten-year moratorium expired, the willing buyer, willing seller principle (and the
payment of market prices for land) was dropped. A second phase of land reform began
in 1992, with the improved 1992 Land Acquisition Act allowing for the compulsory
acquisition of land. Compensation was based on a complex set of 15 principles to derive
a fair price for land. As such, 5 million ha of commercial farmland were to be acquired in
order to resettle a further 110 000 families. However, the pace of resettlement remained
below 2500 households per year between 1990 and 1993 (Mhishi, 1995). Despite the
passing of the new Land Act (to speed up the resettlement process) and constitutional
amendments (to prevent farmers from challenging fair compensation in the courts), the
new land acquisition drive acquired only 0.17 million ha for 4697 families (UNDP, 2002).
Phase 3 began in 2000. Following the rejection of the governments draft Constitution in
a referendum in February 2000 the ruling partys first popular defeat since coming to
power in 1980 action was taken to shore up support before the parliamentary elections
scheduled for June of the same year. Central to the strategy was a new, radicalised approach
to land reform to secure the rural vote ahead of the elections. In a process marked by
considerable coercion, violence and illegal activity, thousands of party-sponsored settlers
and veterans of the Liberation War invaded commercial farms, in what was to become the
Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). Between 2000 and 2002 alone, the process
led by the war veterans had taken over 3074 farms, designating 7.3 million ha of land
Page 21

for 114 830 households (Chaumba et al., 2003). The occupation of commercial farms was
later legitimised through amendments to the Constitution and legislation passed quickly
through Parliament by what had become an autocratic, dominant ruling party.
The FTLRP established two models of resettlement:
Model A1, in which each household would be allocated at least 3 ha (maximum 5 ha)
of arable land, but with shared grazing; and
Model A2 schemes based on small, medium and large-scale commercial farms with
99-year leases (Moyo, 2006).
Table 2.3: The new ownership structure
Farms/households
Farm class
Land tenure
Numbers
% of
total
1 100 000
16.400
15
72 000
3.700
51
141 656
5.700
40
1 313 656
98.0
25.800
75.6
20
8 000
1.400
175
Small A2
14 072
1.000
71
Subtotal
22 072
1.6
2.400
7.0
109
Mediumlarge A2
1 500
0.900
600
Black large-scale
commercial farms
1 440
0.900
625
White large-scale
commercial farms
1 377
1.200
871
Subtotal
4 317
0.3
3.000
9.0
695
657
1.000
1 522
64
0.041
641
Parastatal
153
0.600
3 922
Subtotal
874
0.1
1.641
4.8
1 878
1.300
3.8
1 340 919
34 141
100
Communal
Old resettlement
Smallholder
A1
Subtotal
Small to mediumscale commercial
Large-scale
commercial
Old small-scale
commercial farms
Company
Corporate
estates
Area
Church
Transitional
Unallocated
Total
Hectares
(million)
% of
total
Farm size
(ha)
Source: Moyo and Yeros (2009).
Following the implementation of the FTLRP in June 2000, the agricultural industry now
comprises four major farming sectors, namely corporate (and transnational) estates, largescale commercial farms, small to medium-scale commercial farms, and the smallholder
sector (see Table 2.3). The smallholder sector consists of 1.1 million communal farmers and
Page 22

72 000 farmers in the old resettlement areas, as well as 141 000 A1 farmers, for a total of
1.3 million farmers. The small to medium-scale commercial farm category, which before
the reforms consisted of the pre-independence black leasehold lands commonly referred to
as small-scale commercial farming areas, has been expanded from 8000 to 22 000 with the
introduction of small to medium-scale A2 farmers under leasehold tenure (Moyo, 2006).
While the old system was geared towards large-scale production, the transition to
smallholder production is yet to yield the anticipated results. Findings by Mujeyi (2010)
reveal that the land redistribution exercises have brought about significant shifts in
agricultural production and the functioning of commodity markets and, hence, changes
in Zimbabwes agrarian structure. A new era of modified markets and marketing channels
for agricultural services, inputs and outputs emerged out of the marketing and pricing
policies for agricultural commodities during the FTLRP era, leading to the proliferation of
new market regimes and market relationships.
2.2.2 Agricultural policy

In the early 1980s, the government sought mainly to sustain the dual agriculture system
it inherited, but with more efforts to assist black small-scale and communal farmers.
Government actions promoted the development of the smallholder sector through
subsidised inputs, the promotion of conservation farming techniques, and a drive towards
the development of irrigation capacity, animal disease control and private sector marketing
within a controlled pricing system. This included controlled inputs production and trade
to keep inputs affordable to farmers. Every season, an allocated foreign exchange budget
was provided to trade associations to help with the importation of inputs. Input producers
were registered and monitored to restrict competition, while parastatal fertiliser prices were
fixed. The overall policy objective was to promote national self-sufficiency in food and raw
materials. As a result, the government was heavily involved and favoured the production of
certain crops, such as wheat, even when this was not Zimbabwes comparative advantage.
The 1991 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) led the government to abandon
these controls, as it adopted a liberal, market-oriented macroeconomic policy. The ESAP,
sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promoted trade liberalisation,
specifically lifting government controls and removing subsidies. In agriculture, this meant
reducing intervention, eliminating food subsidies and liberalising trade.
The government had to devise a new and relevant policy in line with the ESAP. It made
several attempts, the first being the Zimbabwe Agricultural Policy Framework and Strategy,
19952020. In broad terms, it promoted:
Land reform that ensured the productive use of the land;
Institutional development that focused on efficient, more private service
delivery to small-scale farmers;
Page 23

A focus on increased food production to ensure household food security;

The development of a public-private sector investment programme to
support agriculture development; and
The restructuring of the agricultural finance system towards more private
engagement (see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1: Agricultural finance in Zimbabwe
Agricultural financing in Zimbabwe was the mandated responsibility of the Agricultural
Finance Corporation and later the Agribank. The Agricultural Finance Corporation,
a parastatal under the direction of Zimbabwes Reserve Bank (RBZ), was established
in the early 1980s. It focused on communal and resettled farmers, who farmed fulltime, had access to land and had a marketing card (enabling them to market their
produce). In 1985/86, it provided 100 000 communal, small-scale farmers with funds
(Jansen & Rukovo, 1992), resulting in 45% of marketed maize being produced by
these farmers. The Agribank, a government-owned commercial bank specifically
created for agricultural finance, was formed from the dissolution of the Agricultural
Finance Corporation in 1996. However, it only began operating in 2000, at the time
the government was increasingly cash-strapped. As a result, the Agribank has never
been able to meet its mandate fully, as it mainly assisted in the distribution of central
bank project funds.
Farmers thus had no alternative but to approach commercial banks (17 commercial
banks with a combined asset base of US$516 million) for finance. However, the
formal banking sector has been reluctant to service the agricultural sector, owing to
a number of factors, particularly land insecurity. The commercial banks held that the
nationalisation of land under the land redistribution programme has rendered land
a dead asset, which cannot be used as collateral for agricultural loan applications.
In its November 2005 report to Parliament, the Portfolio Committee on Lands, Land
Reform, Resettlement and Agriculture said that it was concerned to note that the
current financing facilities are tailor-made for large-scale commercial farmers at the
expense of smallholders. So officially, there is a policy on agriculture finance, but it is
not being implemented.
Provisions in this framework were overtaken by events before implementation. It was later
abandoned for the National Agricultural Strategy Framework, 20052035, and augmented
by the Agricultural Mission Statement Strategy Framework and Action Plan, 20072011.
These programmes promoted the objectives of the original framework with revised
timescales and budgets.
Page 24

However, these documents were never adopted. The main shortcomings of these efforts
include limited stakeholder consultation, as the documents were never published.
Furthermore, the government appeared to be preoccupied with land reform and
resettlement programmes. Until these priority programmes reached completion, none of
the agricultural policies were implemented. In addition, although not a major factor, the
frequent portfolio changes of agricultural components into different ministries prevented
a comprehensive policy implementation effort.
In contrast, after 2000, economic and, in particular, political pressure saw the government
re-engaging directly with the agricultural sector. Shunned by donors after the controversial
land reform programme, the government began financing its own agricultural production.
The RBZ provided finance for sourcing inputs and mechanisation equipment through
various programmes. On the marketing side, Zimbabwes policy on grains shifted to
state-controlled markets, which were argued to achieve and ensure food self-sufficiency
while keeping prices low for consumers. The interventionist policies between 2000
and 2008 were defined by the reconstitution of the Grain Marketing Act through the
Grain Marketing (Controlled Products) Notice, which made private grain trade illegal,
leading to the suspension of the operations of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity
Exchange. The Grain Marketing Notice Statutory Instrument (No. 235A of 16 July 2001)
represented a paradigm shift from the complete market liberalisation policy proposed in the
1990s market control dispensation. Similar controls were extended to the beef industry.
With respect to horticultural produce, beef and tobacco, exports may only be undertaken
with an export permit.
In 2007, with technical assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
the then Ministry of Agriculture engaged in another attempt to write a policy document.
Land reform was nearing its end. After extensive work and consultation, the project was
completed in 2009, when the final draft the Nyanga Document was produced. It mainly
promoted:
(i) Agricultural growth and productivity, to ensure food security through
the generation of income and employment;
(ii) Improved provision, through public-private entities, of financial, marketing,
research and extension services; and
(iii) Strengthening of agricultural institutions to deliver advice and services
to farmers sustainably.
But again, mainly due to diverging political stances within the Ministry and the change of
Ministers, the policy was never adopted. As a result, Zimbabwe currently has no formal
Page 25

agricultural policy. Policies seem to be developed on an ad hoc basis. In the absence of

an official agricultural policy, initiatives have been based on political reactions to ongoing
socio-economic and political developments, evident mostly in the post-2000 period.
Finally, in 2009, with the establishment of the inclusive government, the suspension of
the local currency, and the introduction of the multi-currency system,2 the sector began
a process of deregulation. Controls and direct government interventions are being
abandoned, although slowly. The government is allowing private players to participate
in the grains, cotton and beef industry, although the tobacco sector remains largely
unchanged.
2.2.3 Food security policy

Although Zimbabwe has never had a clearly articulated policy on food security, it has
always incorporated measures to ensure food security. For example, a national drought
policy was mooted in 1982. Among its recommendations were the efficient use of water,
increased agricultural productivity, improved management of land use and natural
resources, and the provision of food relief to vulnerable households. This relief has been
extended to a developmental stage by integrating a public works component, called
Food for Work, since 1984. In 1984/85, a drought levy was planned that would feed a
drought insurance fund, but this has failed to take off. The only attempt to develop an
articulated framework has been the Zimbabwe Food Security Strategy presented at the
FAO World Food Summit in 2002.
Zimbabwes past food security policy was mainly aimed at ensuring food self-sufficiency,
while keeping prices low for consumers. The target commodities for this policy were maize
and wheat, and their milled products. An important instrument to attain the desired level
of national self-sufficiency is the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). Until 2009, maize and
wheat and, to some extent, other commodities were officially only traded through GMB.
No movement of these grains was allowed, with the exception of farmer-to-farmer sales of
small quantities (for example 150kg). GMB was originally designed to maintain a strategic
grain reserve, and still has the mandate to maintain strategic reserves up to a maximum
of 500000 tons of maize and wheat. Actual implementation of the policies has varied.
One reason was the decline in the production and productivity of grain crops during the
1990s, attributable to low producer incentives in view of unviable controlled prices, input
shortages, and the limited farming experience of the recently resettled farmers. Another
important reason was the lack of foreign currency, which precluded access to the import
market to replenish reserves (MoAMID, 2009).
2
The use of the United States dollar is official, but other currencies in particular South African rand are also in use.
Page 26

Restrictions to grain trading were reinforced through the gazetting of Statutory Instrument
387 in December 2001, which compelled farmers to deliver maize stock to the GMB
within 14 days of harvest. To complement this measure intended to promote food security,
the government suspended the standard grading system of grain that was set according
to the prescriptions of the GMB, and grains were bought at uniform prices regardless
of quality.
As recently as 2009, grain marketing was liberalised. In this new environment, the role
of the GMB was expected to change from one of monopoly purchasing, importing and
selling of maize and several other grains to that of buyer of last resort to help maintain
floor prices for maize and protect domestic producers. However, implementation has been
lagging so far (Kapuya et al., 2010).
2.3 The agricultural sector within the broader economy

Compared to a large number of African countries, particularly the other landlocked ones,
Zimbabwes economy shows a transitional structure (see Table 2.4 below): between 1998
and 2010, agricultures contribution to GDP varied between 17.9% and 13.7% respectively,
industry/manufacturing between 28.3% and 20.7%, and the service sector between 54.0%
and 65.6%. Two major differences during the past decade can, however, be identified:
1) the increasing weight of the agricultural sector, at least between 1993 and 2003; and,
2) more importantly, the collapse of the countrys economy, particularly between 2000
and 2008 (see Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3).
Between 2000 and 2008, Zimbabwes economy saw a 71% decrease in its GDP, from
US$7.117 million to US$3.784 million, affecting all sectors. Agriculture was one of the
most affected sectors its contribution to the economy fell from 17% in 1997 to 13.1% in
2009. The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP ranged between 15.8% and 17%
in the pre-crisis era, before increasing to average 20.4% from 2000 to 2003. From 2004
to 2008, during the economys sharpest decline (on average by more than 8% per year),
agriculture collapsed (up to 32% in 2005 alone). The decline in agriculture was attributed
to the severe negative effects of recurrent droughts, fuel problems, high input costs,
shortages of foreign currency and agricultural inputs, and the subsequent land acquisition
exercise, which destabilised farm production. It was matched by a decline in the industrial/
manufacturing sector from 21.5% of GDP in 1997 (pre-crisis level) to a mere 10.7% in 2008,
when the economy itself had shrunk by 71%. The decline in the manufacturing sector may,
in part, have been induced by the collapse of the farm production sector, which supplies
the industry raw materials.
Page 27
Page 28
7.9
2.8
Finance and insurance
Real estate
6.6
1.9
1.7
4.6
2.1
Education
Health
Domestic services
Other services
Less: Imputed bank service

charges
2.0
4.4
1.6
2.1
6.6
4.8
8.2
17.9
2.9
8.3
2.3
2.3
20.7
4.7
15.1
1995
2.0
4.3
1.5
1.8
6.6
4.1
9.0
17.4
2.7
7.9
2.4
2.1
21.7
4.1
16.5
1996
3.2
4.7
1.6
1.4
7.1
3.9
9.1
17.7
2.8
7.5
2.8
2.1
21.5
4.1
17.0
1997
4.9
4.9
1.6
1.4
7.6
3.8
8.6
18.0
3.0
8.0
3.0
2.0
20.8
4.5
17.9
1998
5.3
5.4
1.5
1.4
7.2
3.7
8.7
18.1
3.3
7.9
2.7
2.2
20.5
4.4
18.4
1999
5.8
5.5
1.5
1.7
7.8
3.6
7.8
17.8
3.6
8.4
2.4
2.3
19.0
4.2
20.1
2000
7.3
5.6
1.7
2.1
8.7
4.0
7.7
17.6
3.9
8.6
1.6
2.6
18.9
3.8
20.4
2001
7.5
6.1
1.8
2.3
10.0
4.4
8.5
18.0
4.3
11.2
0.9
3.1
14.3
4.1
18.6
2002
7.8
4.1
1.6
1.0
6.8
5.2
9.2
20.7
2.1
10.5
1.3
2.8
17.0
5.2
20.3
2003
8.5
4.2
1.6
1.0
6.9
5.3
9.5
21.5
2.1
10.6
1.3
3.0
16.4
5.6
19.3
2004
5.5
4.1
1.6
0.9
6.7
5.3
9.6
21.2
2.9
10.8
2.1
4.1
14.9
5.8
15.6
2005
8.3
4.7
1.7
0.9
6.4
6.0
7.8
23.2
2.9
13.2
1.9
4.2
11.6
7.9
15.8
2006
8.2
4.7
1.7
0.9
6.4
6.0
8.8
24.3
2.7
13.1
1.9
4.2
11.5
7.6
14.6
2007
7.4
4.8
1.6
1.0
6.3
5.6
9.9
25.7
2.6
12.8
1.9
4.2
10.7
7.4
12.8
2008
7.0
4.6
1.6
1.0
6.1
5.2
9.8
29.0
2.7
10.4
1.8
4.2
10.7
6.9
13.1
2009
7.7
4.3
1.5
1.1
5.8
5.5
9.1
28.9
2.7
10.5
1.7
3.9
12.0
7.0
13.7
2010
Source: Robertson (2011).
7 426 7 560 7 499 7 117 6 519 6 234 5 588 5 356 5 008 4 752 4 182 3 785 3 790 4 000
Note: Colouring of columns is according to Zimbabwes macroeconomic period, orange being characterised as the FTLRP period.
GDP in US$ (million)
2.5
4.6
1.7
2.2
6.4
4.8
6.7
16.9
2.7
8.1
3.1
2.3
22.3
4.5
16.3
1994
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5.8
Public administration
GDP at factor cost
6.4
Transport and communication
16.5
3.2
Construction
Distribution, hotels and

restaurants
2.2
22.7
Electricity and water
Manufacturing
4.1
15.8
Agriculture, hunting, fishing

and forestry
Mining and quarrying
1993
Sector
Table 2.4: Contribution to GDP by major sectors

GDP (US$ million)

8 000
Agriculture
7 000
Industry/manufacturing
6 000
Services
Total GDP
5 000
4 000
3 000
2 000
1 000
19
9
19 7
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
0
20 4
0
20 5
0
20 6
0
20 7
0
20 8
0
20 9
10
Figure 2.1: The evolution of GDP in Zimbabwe, 19972010
GDP (US$ million)
Source: Robertson, 2011.
8 000
Agriculture
7 000
6 000
Services
Total GDP
5 000
4 000
3 000
2 000
1 000
19
9
19 7
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
0
20 4
0
20 5
0
20 6
0
20 7
0
20 8
0
20 9
10
Figure 2.2: Sectoral contribution to Zimbabwes GDP, 19932010

20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
)
10
)
-
20
98
(1
9
To
ta
l
Total GDP
00
(2
0
Services
To
ta
l
Agriculture
20
08
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
99
19
19
98
-120
Figure 2.3: The evolution of sectoral GDP growth rates, 19982010

Page 29

During the recovery period of 2009 and 2010, the economy recorded overall growth
from US$3.8 billion to US$4 billion, representing zero growth in 2009 but 5% growth in
2010. Agriculture grew by 2% and 9% respectively, and its contribution to GDP increased
marginally from 13.1% to 13.7% (see Figure 2.4).
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
19
8
19 0
8
19 1
8
19 2
8
19 3
8
19 4
8
19 5
8
19 6
8
19 7
8
19 8
8
19 9
9
19 0
9
19 1
9
19 2
9
19 3
9
19 4
9
19 5
9
19 6
9
19 7
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
0
20 4
0
20 5
0
20 6
0
20 7
0
20 8
0
20 9
10
-60
Agriculture GDP (% of total)

Agriculture GDP Growth Rate (%)
Figure 2.4: Yearly agricultural GDP growth, 19802010

Source: Adapted from African Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS) data.
Despite the modest contribution of agriculture to the GDP, the importance of the sector
should not be underestimated, all the more so since the post-2000 collapse of the economy.
First, agriculture forms the basis of the direct and indirect livelihoods of almost 70%
of Zimbabwes population. With the economic crisis, formal sector employment started
to decline. From a peak of 1241500 in 1998 (i.e. a 68% unemployment rate), it fell
to 1012900 in 2002 (i.e. 80% unemployment) and to an estimated 400000 presently.
The formal employment rate is estimated at between 5% and 10%.3 This represents
a compound annual growth rate of 5.0%. A large element of this was the loss of the
formal agricultural employment: estimated at 345 100 in 1998, it fell to below 100000
after the countrys controversial land reform programme (Luebker, 2008). Non-agricultural
employment also fell from 896 400 in 1998 to 300 000 (which includes about 245 000
public servants). With agriculture continuously contributing between 25% and 30% of
3
See: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html
Page 30

the economys overall formal employment (Kapuya et al., 2010), an estimated 66% of
Zimbabwes labour force depends on the sector, compared with 10% on industry and
manufacturing, and 24% on services.
Second, given the multiple functions of agriculture, the sectors strategic role within the
broader economy has been critical in maintaining economy-wide stability and growth.
In value terms, the agricultural sector forms the largest single source of export earnings,
contributing 40% of total exports since the late 1980s (Mudimu, 2003). Although
Zimbabwes agricultural exports fell by 54% and 74% in 2000 and 2007, largely due to
low production and productivity affecting the main commodities, in 2010, agricultural
exports contributed US$487.4million to the US$1253.4million total national export
proceeds. This represented a contribution of 38.9%, as against 22.9% for the fuels and
mining sectors and 33.7% for manufacturing. The main agricultural exports include
tobacco, sugar, beef, horticultural produce, coffee, tea and cotton lint, with tobacco and
cotton accounting for 83% in 2009 (see Table 2.5) (RBZ, 2009).
Table 2.5: Contribution of various commodities to agricultural export earnings (%)
Year
Tobacco
Sugar
Horticulture
Cotton lint
Others
Total
agricultural
exports
2000
54
12
15
100
2001
65
13
100
2002
62
18
100
2003
55
20
12
100
2004
45
11
17
24
100
2005
47
10
18
22
100
2006
43
17
11
23
100
2007
46
16
12
22
100
2008
50
11
26
100
2009
61
11
22
100
Source: RBZ (2009).
Kapuya et al. (2010) point out that the contribution of agriculture, in terms of food and
exports, has been the pillar of Zimbabwes economic stability, with years of drought
coinciding with negative economic growth. The importance of the agricultural sector is
Page 31

reflected in the strong and direct positive correlation between agricultural performance
and overall economic growth. As shown in Figure 2.5, annual GDP declined during bad
agricultural years (the droughts of 1983, 1987, 1992 and 1995) and increased during years
of good agricultural performance (including 1996 and 2009). This explains the overall
negative growth rates during the FTLRP.
15
Droughts
Year-on-year growth
10
-5
-10
Land reform
19
8
19 0
8
19 1
82
19
8
19 3
84
19
8
19 5
8
19 6
87
19
8
19 8
8
19 9
9
19 0
9
19 1
92
19
9
19 3
94
19
9
19 5
9
19 6
9
19 7
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
04
20
*2 05
00
20 6
*2 07
00
20 8
*2 09
01
0
-15
Figure 2.5: Links between annual GDP growth rates and natural and socio-political
events in Zimbabwe, 19802010
Source: Adapted from Robertson (2009).
* Estimates based on Robertsons (2009) forecasts.
2.4 Production trends of the main agricultural commodities

A combination of political and economic instability, exacerbated by poor domestic policies,
contributed to the sustained underperformance of the agricultural sector. The period between
2000 and 2008 saw a steady decline in the production volumes of staple commodities and
increasing reliance on food aid and imports from neighbouring countries.
Given the objective of this study and the structure of the agricultural sector, four major
commodity categories are discussed. The first is food grain crops, which are Zimbabwes
major food security crops; these include maize, wheat and small grains (sorghum and
millets). The second involves an oilseed crop, namely soybean, while the third includes the
main export crops tobacco and cotton. The last category comprises livestock commodities,
namely beef cattle and poultry (see Table 2.6).
Page 32

Table 2.6: Commodity contribution to agricultural GDP in Zimbabwe

Commodity
Contribution to
agricultural GDP,
2008 (%)
Total,
2008
(000mt)
Total,
2009
(000mt)
Change,
2009
(%)
Contribution to
agricultural GDP
growth rate, 2009
Tobacco
25.5
45
56.5
26
2.69
Maize
14.0
575
1 240
116
6.69
Cotton
12.5
242
210
13
0.68
Beef
10.2
90
93
0.14
Sugar
6.8
298
286
0.11
Horticulture
6.5
60
50
17
0.45
Poultry
4.8
41
42
0.05
Groundnuts
3.2
131
216
65
0.86
Wheat
3.6
31
12
61
0.91
Dairy
2.9
46.4
36
22
0.27
Coffee
2.1
2.3
2.6
13
0.11
Soybeans
1.9
48
115
140
1.10
Tea
1.9
19
18
0.04
Paprika
1.1
40
0.18
Pork
0.8
14
0.05
Wildlife
0.6
53
56
0.01
Sorghum
0.6
75
181
141
0.35
Barley
0.4
34
35
Sheep
0.3
0.4
0.5
25
0.03
Sunflowers
0.2
39
680
0.56
Ostriches
0.1
15
15
Agricultural GDP growth (2009)
10.00
Source: World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe (2010).
2.4.1 Cereal crops

Maize
The production and marketing of maize have been subject to a significant historical
policy bias that taxed the sector (Masters, 2007). Maize is the fundamental staple crop
and, therefore, the most important grain crop in Zimbabwe (Kapuya et al., 2010).
With the average per capita food consumption of maize and maize products being
120 kg/year between 2004 and 2008 (Kapuya et al., 2010), maize and maize products
account for between 43% and 70% respectively of the total dietary energy supply.
Humans consume more than half of the maize produced, with about 10% being utilised
by the animal feed industry, while the remainder is used for seed and other industrial
purposes (FAO,2004).
Page 33

The period between 2000 and 2008 saw a steady decline in the production volumes of
staple commodities and increasing reliance on food aid and imports from neighbouring
countries. For instance, in 2008/09, maize production fell to a little less than half a
million tons, down from its ten-year average of 1.6 million tons in the previous decade.4
During the past decade, national maize production has averaged around 1.1million tons,
with production peaking in only two seasons: 2001/02 (at 1.5million tons) and 2004/05
(at 1.7 million tons). Extreme levels of less than a million tons were experienced in the
2002 and 2005 droughts, but the worst year of the decade was 2008/09, when the country
produced only 0.57million tons (see Figure 2.6) (AIAS, 2010).
2.5
2500.0
2.0
2000.0
1.5
1500.0
1.0
Yield (tons/ha)
Production ('000 tons) and area ('000 ha)
3000.0
1000.0
0.5
500.0
0.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
0.0
Production (000 tons)

Area (000 ha)
Yield (tons/ha)
Figure 2.6: Maize production, 19802010

Source: AIAS database (2010); FAO/WFP (2010).
*20082010 sectoral classification data unavailable; 2010 production data forecast from the Crop
and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM).
Maize was traditionally grown by smallholders and on commercial farms (see Table 2.7).
The drop in the national production of maize is mainly linked to: 1) the drastic decrease
of the area under maize in the commercial sector (from 160 000 ha to 55 000 ha); and
2) the drastic reduction in productivity (from 4.2 tons/ha to 1.5 tons/ha). The reduction
in productivity has mainly been attributed to the controlled pricing of maize, which has
not kept pace with rising input costs and hyperinflation. The smallholder communal sector,
however, remained stable, with an increase of the area under production, but with a low,
stagnating (700800 kg/ha) productivity (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
4 This is below the 1980s average of 1.8 million tons per year. National maize production peaked at about 2.8 million tons in
1985, with average crop yields peaking at about 2.2 tons per ha that same year. Maize yields in the smallholder sector peaked
at 1.4 tons per ha.
Page 34

Table 2.7: Maize production disaggregated by farm type

Harvest
year
Communal
Production
(mt)
Area
(ha)
1980
600 000
900 000
1981
1 000 000
1982
Commercial
Yield
(kg/ha)
Yield
Production
(mt)
Area
(ha)
(kg/ha)
667
910 700
277 700
3 279
1 000 000
1 000
1 833 400
363 400
5 045
595 000
1 100 000
541
1 213 400
316 400
3 835
1983
285 000
1 050 000
271
624 800
283 900
2 201
1984
670 000
1 136 000
590
678 500
224 600
3 021
1985
1 558 000
1 018 000
1 530
1 153 000
238 000
4 845
1986
1 348 000
1 074 000
1 255
1 064 000
240 000
4 433
1987
1 064 000
627 700
1 695
466 000
147 100
3 168
1988
1 609 300
1 149 500
1 400
643 800
150 000
4 292
1989
1 188 200
1 030 000
1 154
743 000
168 300
4 415
1990
1 262 300
971 000
1 300
731 500
178 800
4 091
1991
1 019 300
926 200
1 101
566 500
175 000
3 237
1992
115 200
728 000
158
245 800
153 000
1 607
1993
1 133 600
1 040 000
1 090
878 250
198 000
4 436
1994
1 313 600
1 169 200
1 124
1 012 400
232 000
4 364
1995
399 400
1 209 200
330
440 200
188 700
2 333
1996
1 687 000
1 330 000
1 268
922 000
205 000
4 498
1997
1 453 000
1 483 000
980
738 370
157 100
4 700
1998
727 550
1 057 000
688
690 480
166 800
4 140
1999
845 300
1 262 000
670
674 260
184 400
3 657
2000
938 709
1 212 540
774
680 942
160 577
4 241
2001
993 940
1 084 100
917
532 388
155 888
3 415
2002
310 638
1 199 021
259
294 120
128 833
2 283
2003
817 446
1 225 791
667
241 340
126 577
1 907
2004
1 505 970
1 400 800
1 075
180 181
93 010
1 937
2005
837 304
1 659 424
505
78 062
70 443
1 108
2006
1 385 957
1 650 158
840
98 882
62 841
1 574
2007
1 080 624
1 390 132
777
80 986
55 683
1 454
Source: MoAMID (2007).

Notes:
1. Resettlement areas are included in communal area totals from 1980/81 onwards.
2. Small-scale commercial totals are included in commercial area totals from 1999/2000.
3. From 2008 to date, statistics have been aggregated and the sectoral production levels were not available.
Page 35

In 2009, the national production of maize (mainly by smallholders) was 130% higher
than in 2007/08. The increase in production is related to the significant extension of
the area under production, from 1.2 million ha to 1.6 million ha. This was combined
with a favourable rainfall pattern and a relaxation of market controls on input prices (see
Box 2.2). Combined with input supply from donors and the government (see Chapter 3),5
this ensured a moderate availability of seed, fertiliser, fuel and draught power. The average
yield was 800kg/ha, which compares unfavourably with the 1990s ten-year average of
1.25tons/ha. In 2010, national maize production is estimated at 1.3 million tons, with
an average yield that should remain unchanged (FAO/WFP,2010). Although production
recovered, the country is expected to import at least 400 000 tons (inclusive of food aid)
to meet food and industrial needs (see Table 2.8).
Box 2.2: Organisation of Zimbabwes grain sector
In the 2000s, Zimbabwes policy on grains shifted back to state-controlled markets,
which were held to achieve and ensure food self-sufficiency, while keeping prices low
for consumers. The target commodities for state controls were maize and wheat, and
their milled products. The main market-related instruments for achieving the policy
objective consisted of the following (Kapuya et al., 2010):
Statutory instruments required all maize and wheat produced to be sold through
the parastatal GMB. Since 2001, all producers of maize and wheat have been
required by law to deliver their produce to GMB within 14 days of harvest.
All handlers of grain and products were to be registered and submit quarterly
returns to GMB regarding stocks.
The government set a predetermined producer price for maize and wheat,6
the selling price from GMB to the grain processors, and the wholesale and
retail prices of milled products.
State controls included exclusive rights for the GMB to trade in the main grains.
The GMB was the custodian of the strategic grain reserve of up to 936 000 tons
of maize and 500 000 tons of wheat.
Small grains, such as finger millets, pearl millets and sorghum, could be sold
on private open markets, with the GMB maintaining a minimum floor price.
Implementation of the policies has varied. For instance, low production in the past
few years has made it difficult to maintain strategic reserves, while a lack of foreign
currency has precluded the use of import markets to replenish reserves (Sukume &
Guveya, 2009). In emergencies, the GMB has given permission for processors of noncritical foods and stockfeed to import maize and wheat. The government has also
allowed agro-processors to contract farmers to produce grains in exchange for the
provision of inputs.
The effect of the relaxation of market controls on donor programmes has, however, not been established.
Prices were to be set at the South African Futures Exchange f.o.b. prices plus 25%.
Page 36

Table 2.8: Trends in maize availability in Zimbabwe

Year
National
production
(000 tons)
1980
1 511
1981
Maize
availability
(000 tons)
Change
in stock
(000 tons)
Exports
(000 tons)
Imports
(000 tons)
1 487
100
69
145
2 833
1 590
1 000
305
1982
1 808
1 557
100
492
1983
910
1 415
1 000
2 526
1984
1 349
1 401
269
1985
2 711
1 836
800
285
1986
2 412
1 771
320
495
1987
1 530
1 438
750
393
1988
2 253
1 606
340
314
1989
1 931
1 562
250
174
1990
1 994
1 532
310
414
1991
1 586
1 559
500
230
83
1992
361
1 729
100
1 845
1993
2 012
1 791
500
396
205
1994
2 326
1 772
400
597
1995
840
1 770
44
133
1996
2 609
329
101
1997
2 191
310
1998
1 418
299
189
1999
1 520
385
2000
1 620
2001
1 526
89
2002
605
764
2003
1 059
340
2004
1 686
589
2005
915
271
2006
1 485
822
2007
953
408
2008
471
670
2009
1 240
772
2010
1 300
411
Sources: Rugube (1995); MoAMID (2007); Kapuya et al. (2010).
Page 37

The main objective in the maize sector is to increase productivity to offset the need for
grain imports and reduce input costs to the food and feed industry. The steady expansion
of the area under maize from 2000 to 2010 needs to be combined with a concomitant
increase in average yields back to the levels previously achieved. This would allow the
country to double its maize production.
Wheat production
Wheat is the second most important grain crop after maize. A staple crop, wheat
contains 20% bran, which is sold to bakers as wheat bran or to millers as an ingredient
for stockfeed. All commercial wheat produced in Zimbabwe is grown under full irrigation
during winter. Due to its resource-intensive nature, it has traditionally been grown by
large-scale commercial farmers (Kapuya et al., 2010).
300.0
250.0
200.0
150.0
100.0
50.0
0.0
Yield (tons/ha)
350.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Consequently, over the past ten years, there has been a significant decline in the level
of wheat output, following the disruptions in winter wheat production caused by the
ongoing land reforms. During the FTLRP decade, wheat production steadily decreased
from a peak of over 250 000 tons in 1999/2000, reaching 150 000 tons in 2007 and
virtually collapsing to 31 000 tons after 2008 (see Figure 2.7). In 2010, production
remained low at 30 000 tons. Because wheat is resource-intensive and its production is
highly technical, much of the precipitous drop in wheat output has been attributed to
the lack of resources to meet the crops high resource demands and the lack of technical
knowledge among beneficiaries under the land reform programme.

Area (000 ha)
Yield (tons/ha)
Figure 2.7: Wheat production, 19802010

Source: AIAS database (2010); Crop Forecasting Committee.
Page 38

Efforts over the past decade to capacitate the land beneficiaries and push for increased
wheat production have not been successful. The destruction of irrigation equipment during
land invasions, high input costs, electricity shortages (which have become more severe),
and high costs of borrowing have hindered an expansion and stabilisation of the wheat
production base. As a result, yields have fallen from 5.4 tons/ha in 2001 to only 2 tons/ha in
2009, while the area under cultivation has decreased (see Figure 2.7). The limited impact of
government programmes was also due to the controlled markets (against hyperinflation),
which has, in the past, led to unsustainable net farm incomes. This has limited farmers
capacity to access adequate resources to produce wheat (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
Small grains
Small grains comprise sorghum, pearl millet (mhunga) and finger millet (rapoko). After
a period of stagnation during the 1990s, aggregate small grains production has seen a
steady increase during the 2000s (see Table 2.9). Mainly grown by small-scale farmers, the
area and output of sorghum, pearl millet and finger millets have increased since 2002.
Small grains production grew from an average of about 50 000 tons during the 1990s to
as much as 270 000 tons in 2009 (AIAS, 2010). The main attraction of small grains has
been the absence of government price and movement controls, such as those affecting
maize (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe, 2010). In addition, small grains ensure
reasonable yields without fertiliser, a particularly attractive trait given the shortages of
these inputs in the 2000s. With these distinct advantages, it, however, remains unclear
how the substitution effect of small grains for maize has affected food security. Table 2.9
shows the production of small grains.
Table 2.9: Small grains production, 20002010
Year
Yield
(tons/ha)
Output
(000 tons)
Area harvested
(000 ha)
2000
0.13
50.0
377.4
2001
0.42
90.7
215.8
2002
0.46
99.6
215.8
2003
0.18
35.8
202.8
2004
0.25
131.2
518.3
2005
0.59
196.1
333.9
2006
0.26
128.6
498.2
2007
0.38
138.6
368.8
2008
0.2
93.2
472.5
2009
0.39
270.2
644.1
2010*
0.31
194.0
630.0
Source: AIAS (2010).

* CFSAM forecast for 2010.
Page 39

2.4.2 Export/cash crops

Tobacco
Tobacco is Zimbabwes most valuable agricultural commodity, accounting for about 26%
of agricultural GDP and 61% of agricultural exports. Once the worlds second largest fluecured tobacco exporter (after Brazil) in 2000, Zimbabwe is now the worlds sixth-largest
exporter, ranking behind Brazil, India, the United States, Argentina and Tanzania, according
to the worlds biggest tobacco-leaf merchant, Universal Corporation (Marawanyika, 2011).
Historically, this production was almost entirely derived from the large-scale commercial
farm sector. In 2000, these farmers sold a peak level of 227 million kg, worth over
US$1 billion. Over the next eight years, the volume and value of production fell by
80%because of the combined effects of the FTLRP, capital constraints, foreign exchange
constraints and uncertainties about pricing (see Box 2.3).
Box 2.3: Organisation of Zimbabwes tobacco sector
Approximately 98% of tobacco produced in Zimbabwe is exported, to over 80 countries.
The remaining 2% is processed locally by four cigarette-manufacturing plants, of
which three produce for export. In recent years, processing companies had to resort to
importing tobacco, given serious shortages of raw material, particularly cut-rag (semiprocessed tobacco), as a direct result of declining crop size (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
Traditionally, tobacco has been marketed through an auction marketing system
overseen by the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board. Three Harare-based auction
floors have been the platform of exchange, with buyers on the auction floors being
approved by the Board. A prerequisite for buyers is proof of offshore funds, since all
price bids and payments are made in United States dollar. In 2003, an important policy
decision was made to transform the tobacco marketing system from auction sales to
a dual system that involves the adjacent operation of contract growing/marketing and
auctions. This initiative was meant to augment production through input provision
and the extension of technical advice by contractors. Not only has this led to the
timely availability of inputs, but it has also seen contract growing accounting for 61%
of tobacco sales in 2007 (Sukume & Guveya, 2009). The contractors options are either
to export directly to foreign markets or to trade the tobacco on the auction markets.
The main attraction for the contracting firms has been the ability to retain a portion of
export proceeds for their own import needs (Muir-Leresche & Muchopa, 2006; Sukume
& Guveya, 2009).
A number of challenges have confronted tobacco marketing in recent years. A longstanding problem was the overvaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, which reduced the
effective price farmers obtained from tobacco growing and, hence, adversely affected
grower viability. The suspension of the Zimbabwean dollar as a medium of exchange
and the subsequent adoption of a multi-currency system in 2009 have addressed
this critical problem. Having a grower base of over 40 000 farmers spread across the
Page 40

countrys geographic space has necessitated the decentralisation of tobacco marketing

to reduce farmers costs of getting product to the centralised Harare auction floors.
The Board has been geared to regulating auction marketing and does not have
the legislative and regulatory instruments to manage contract growing and buying
(Muir-Leresche & Muchopa, 2006; Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
Since then, tobacco production has shifted in favour of the smallholder sector, which
now accounts for 60% of crop area and 30% of production. The number of tobacco
farmers grew consistently from 8537 in 2000 to 31 761 in 2005 and almost 40 000 in
2010 (Sukume & Guveya, 2009). Meanwhile, the national area under tobacco fluctuated
between 47 300 ha and 84 700 ha between 2000 and 2010 (see Figure 2.8). Production,
however, declined to 63 600 tons in 2009, mainly owing to the fall in yields from
2.33 tons/ha to 1.33 tons/ha. Zimbabwes tobacco production may climb 38% to
170 million kg in the 2010/11 season, according to the Tobacco Industry and Marketing
Board. This is due mainly to the good rainy season and the integration of the producers
in contract farming arrangements (Banya, 2011).
3.0
2.5
2000.0
2.0
1500.0
1.5
1000.0
Yield (tons/ha)
2500.0
1.0
500.0
0.5
0.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
0.0

Area (000 ha)
Yield (tons/ha)
Figure 2.8: Tobacco production, 19802010

Source: AIAS and MoAMID (2007).
* CFSAM 2010 projection.
The liberalisation of markets and the stabilisation of the economy since 2009 have
improved the prospects for tobacco. Although production levels are only half of what
was produced in 2000/01, uptake among smallholders (including a sizeable proportion
of resettled farmers) was significant, potentially supplying more than 50% of the national
Page 41

crop. There is substantial scope for the expansion of contract farming linked with the
supply of agricultural inputs and private extension support, addressing the weakness of
capital markets in funding agricultural inputs and the revitalisation of irrigation systems
(Banya, 2011). The growth of tobacco production among smaller-scale farmers depends on
the speed of the adoption of higher inputs and more sustainable farming practices.
Cotton
Cotton is Zimbabwes third most important agricultural commodity (after maize and
tobacco), contributing 12.5% of agricultural GDP and 22% of the value of agricultural
exports in 2008. Most cotton lint is exported, but cottonseed is an essential input for the
domestic vegetable oil and stockfeed industries.
2.0
450.0
1.8
400.0
1.6
350.0
1.4
300.0
1.2
250.0
1.0
200.0
0.8
150.0
0.6
100.0
0.4
50.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
Yield (tons/ha)
500.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Zimbabwes cotton production peaked at 311 000 tons in 20007 before declining to 246 000
tons in 2009 (see Figure 2.9). Compared to other crops, cotton production did not decrease
significantly, as the cotton sector has long been a smallholder-dominated sector, with on
average 91% of the crop grown by smallholders. As such, it remained largely unaffected
by the FTLRP. Instead, the trends in cotton production over the last decade can largely
be explained by firms engaging or disengaging from outgrower relationships. Cotton has
seen several firms involved in outgrower schemes, which have helped to maintain growth.
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco) cotton scheme was temporarily disrupted
by the entry of many competitors in the market, which led to an increase in defaults
due to side-marketing by contracted farmers, especially in the 2002 season (Sukume &
Guveya, 2009).

Area (000 ha)
Yield (tons/ha)
Figure 2.9: Cotton production, 19802010

Source: AIAS (2010) and MoAMID (2007).
*CFSAM 2010 projection
Note that 20082010 sectoral classification data is unavailable.
7
However, FAOSTAT data suggests that production peaked at 364 000 tons in 2004.
Page 42

The main constraint affecting cotton production is low yields, averaging less than
1 ton/ha, which stem mainly from low investment in agro-chemicals and a decline in the
quality of management practices. This may explain a large part of the year-on-year
variations in output, as well as the productivity differences between small-scale and
commercial farms. Farmers are frustrated by what they perceive as low product prices,
caused by depressed international market prices. Investments in credit and input supply on
the part of ginners are undermined, as farmers renege on the agro-processors outgrower
contracts (see Box 2.4).
Box 2.4: Organisation of Zimbabwes cotton sector
The cotton industry used to be characterised by limited price controls and price-related
regulations, with markets being relatively free of government intervention. Much of
the production was organised through contractual arrangements. Cottco, formerly a
parastatal called the Cotton Marketing Board, has received preferential treatment in
terms of market access since the structural adjustments that deregulated the market
and reduced government ownership of the company. The government stake in
Cottco declined to 10% in 2001/02, but its reduced ownership did not eliminate the
governments bias towards the company.
Several adverse developments affected the cotton sector after market liberalisation.
These include the following:
The worsening macroeconomic situation, beginning in the 2001/02 season,
led to higher defaults in the input credit scheme. This was the direct result
of Cottcos failure to pass on to producers the massive real devaluation of
the Zimbabwean dollar early in 2002.
Subsequently, there was a rapid entry of ginning and buying companies that
offered better prices than Cottco. These new entrants captured the input-credittied cotton (technically called side-marketing), which eventually led to defaults.
The entry of new firms continued such that by 2003, Cottcos market share had
dropped from 70% to 58%. This jeopardised the sectors input credit scheme
(dominated by Cottco), which had been fundamental to its growth.
The intense competition that came because of new entrants (often small, most
of which do not grade cotton) led to a collapse of the quality control system, with
farmers being paid fixed prices for seed cotton irrespective of quality. The inevitably
damaging effects on the quality of Zimbabwean cotton on international markets
have led to poor exports. Side-marketing has also negatively affected the grower
contract arrangements that ensured input finance.
Source: Sukume and Guveya (2009); Muir-Leresche and Muchopa (2006).
Page 43

In 2009, a new industry regulation (Statutory Instrument 142/2009) was instituted to

monitor the sectors constraints, including preventing farmers from defaulting and
reneging on their production contracts (side-marketing). This is to be done through the
establishment of a common fund for the supply of agricultural inputs. The government
may play a role as a facilitator in price negotiations between processors and farmers,
in setting price floors that may prevent farmers from getting less than the cost of production.
In addition, loans guaranteed by the government might be provided to bolster the
expansion of input supply, further improving productivity.
2.4.3 Oilseed crops

Soybean
Soybean is a relatively minor commercial crop, accounting for only 2% of agricultural GDP,
but it offers substantial opportunities for both value addition and import substitution.
2.0
450.0
1.8
400.0
1.6
350.0
1.4
300.0
1.2
250.0
1.0
200.0
0.8
150.0
0.6
100.0
0.4
50.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
Yield (tons/ha)
500.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Zimbabwe produces roughly a third of its soybean requirement. From about 140 000 tons
in 2000/01, production decreased to between 40 000 and 60 000 tons in 20032005,
and was revitalised to 120 000 tons in 2009 (AIAS, 2010) (see Figure 2.9). As with maize,
the collapse of the commercial sector affected national production.

Area (000 ha)
Yield (tons/ha)
Figure 2.10: Soybean production, 19802010

Source: AIAS and MoAMID (2007).
* CFSAM 2010 projection.
National average yields have been stagnant over the past eight years, with the only
significant decrease, in 2007, due to drought. The yield of the communal sector is up to
1.562 ton/ha just under commercial sector yields. With the smallholder sector increasing
Page 44

its soybean area significantly (it almost tripled between 2003 and 2009), national
production is seemingly catching up, although it remains unstable, with major fluctuations.
(Banya, 2011).
Two main problems limit the expansion of production. First, markets are thin, given
significant price volatility and high transaction costs. Market risks discourage both
producers and buyers. Second, the high cost of borrowing and the scarcity and cost of
inputs prevent the sector from expanding the production base to meet the demand for
150000 tons by the local oil manufacturing sector. Interventions to increase soybean
production by the RBZ, the Soybean Task Force, and the WK Kellogg Foundation-funded
programmes under the Agricultural Research Council (since 2004) have not brought about
the desired results (Kapuya et al., 2010) (see Box 2.5).
With the country not meeting national requirements, deficits are resolved partly through
direct but unconfirmed soybean imports and partly through imports of products dependent
on soybean inputs, such as meat, milk, margarine and cooking oil. In 2009, Zimbabwe
imported over US$130 million in these products (Kapuya et al., 2010).
Box 2.5: Organisation of Zimbabwes soybean sector
Soybean (as well as oilseed crops, such as groundnuts, sunflower seeds and cottonseed)
operate in markets in which pricing is largely free of government controls. However,
during food emergencies, soybean exports were banned. The marketing of oilseeds is
done through the GMB, stockfeed producers and oil expressers.
The most important and perhaps dominant user of oilseed crops is the oil expression
sector, which uses the seed as a primary raw material in the manufacture of cooking
oil and by-products such as stockfeed and industrial oils. There are five key players
in Zimbabwes oil expression sector: Surface Investments (53% market share), Olivine
Industries (24%), National Foods (12%), United Refineries (3%) and Grafarx Consortium
(4%). Other players include on-farm processing and cottage industries, which account
for 4% of overall oilseeds (Kapuya et al., 2010).
Soybean producers are represented within the two main farmer associations, the
Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). Under
the arm of the CFU, soybean growers are represented by a commodity association, the
Commercial Oilseed Producers Association. The Association represents the interests of
commercial oilseed growers in all aspects of the production and marketing of oilseed
crops, which include soybeans. It promotes and supports research, extension and the
utilisation of technology to ensure the development and expansion of the industry.
Soybean producers, through their farmers association, have been engaged with the
Agricultural Research Council and the Soybean Task Force in several research initiatives
meant to capacitate farmers and improve production (Kapuya et al., 2010).
Page 45

2.4.4 Livestock8
Cattle
Before the land reform programme, the structure of the livestock subsector was dualistic,
with the large-scale commercial sector dominating in the production of formally marketed
livestock and livestock products, such as beef, milk, chicken and eggs. Due to the land
reform programme, from 2001 onwards, cattle on large-scale farms have declined
significantly, from about a quarter of the national herd to between 9% and 13% (see
Table 2.10).
Table 2.10: Trends in the national cattle herd, 19802005
Year
Commercial
(000)
Communal
(000)
1980
2 410
2 869
1981
2 391
1982
2 400
1983
Resettlement
(000)
A1
(000)
A2
(000)
Total
(000)
5 279
2 895
5 286
3 240
52
5 692
2 358
3 105
83
5 546
1984
2 231
3 087
147
5 465
1985
2 090
3 231
178
5 499
1986
2 126
3 453
204
5 783
1987
2 013
3 609
296
5 918
1988
1 990
3 501
314
5 805
1989
1 994
3 555
301
5 850
1990
2 046
3 777
395
6 218
1991
2 138
3 803
433
6 374
1992
1 948
3 620
346
5 914
1993
1 748
2 964
308
5 020
1994
1 670
3 138
332
5 140
1995
1 617
3 070
305
4 992
1996
1 642
3 104
332
5 078
1997
1 625
3 427
323
5 375
1998
1 560
3 495
395
5 450
1999
1 680
3 690
468
5 837
2000
1 550
3 793
612
5 955
2001
1 291
4 398
505
6 195
2002
329
4 055
471
169
24
5 048
2003
360
3 944
548
169
93
5 116
2004
377
3 755
535
307
52
5 027
2005
3 604
520
324
319
4 768
20062008*
Source: MoAMID (2007).

*No data available between 2006 and 2008.
Chinogaramombe, N, CEO CSC, Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Lands, Land Reform and Agriculture, 16 October 2007.
Page 46

On the one hand, in the period after the land reform, production is still marginal on the
A2 resettlement farms (which replaced the large-scale commercial farms), with most of the
newly settled farmers trying to grow their livestock holdings (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
On the other hand, since 1998, the number of cattle in the small-scale sector has been
increasing (see Table 2.10).
Although export earnings from beef exports declined from US$48 million in 1998 to less
than US$1 million in 2005 (Sukume & Guveya, 2009), the shortage of beef from the largescale sector has increased the demand for smallholder cattle. This is demonstrated by the
increase in slaughtering from that sector since 2001, leading to higher prices being offered
for smallholder cattle (see Box 2.6).
Box 2.6: Organisation of Zimbabwes livestock sector
Cattle producers sell products or animals by private treaty, on contract or at auctions
to other farmers locally or, in some cases, outside the country. Large-scale beef
producers use all three methods, which are highly institutionalised, for selling weaners
or pen-fed or breeding animals. Though open to small-scale beef producers, the
accessibility of the marketing channels is rather limited, with farmers having to travel
long distances to auction pens and marketing information being poorly distributed.
As a result, most smallholder beef is traded informally, without the benefit of more
competitive auction markets.
The beef sector is served by a large number of well-equipped abattoirs, the largest
being the parastatal Cold Storage Commission (CSC). CSC has the only slaughter
facilities approved for exports to the European Union. Until the disruptions in beef
production from the land reforms, it used to process all meat exported to the
European Union under the 9100 ton quota provided for under the Lom Convention
Preferential Trade Agreement. CSC also has the only approved facilities to collect and
process blood meal for the stockfeed industry. The current shortage in blood meal
is largely due to the low throughput in CSC abattoirs, which, in turn, is due to low
government-controlled prices offered to beef farmers for meat destined for local
production (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
An extreme example of price controls occurred in July 2007, when the government
announced a price freeze on various commodities, including beef. As part of the price
freeze, the government fixed the producer price of cattle. The result was a drastic
reduction in cattle offered for slaughter, from around 20 000 per month before the
price controls to between 1700 and 2000 in the months the freeze was in effect
(Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
The beef and livestock industry in general suffered a number of constraints over the years.
These included low offtake of cattle; price controls on beef, which led to poor viability of
Page 47

these enterprises; a lack of information on temporal and spatial livestock prices, auction
dates and other market-relevant information; and rising levies and value added taxes
(Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
Poultry
Poultry accounts for almost 5% of agricultural GDP, but holds substantial growth prospects
as consumer incomes rise (Mudzonga, 2009b). In contrast to other commodities,
the production of chicken meat grew rapidly from the late 1980s to the late 2000s,
peaking at 56 683 tons in 2007 (see Figure 2.10). The reason for this growth is the high
demand for cheaper sources of protein, as consumers gradually shifted from beef to
chicken (Mudzonga, 2009b). Per capita consumption of chicken protein increased from
0.67 g/person/day in 2000 to 1.55 g/person/day in 2007, while per capita supply increased
from 1.96 kg/person/year in 2000 to 4.55 kg/person/year (FAO, 2010).
5.0
60.0
4.5
50.0
3.5
40.0
3.0
2.5
30.0
2.0
Yield (tons/ha)
Per capita supply (kg/capita/yr)
4.0
20.0
1.5
1.0
10.0
0.5
0.0
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
0.0
Poultry per capita supply (kg/capita/yr)

Per capita protein supply (g/vapita/day)
Poultry supply quantity (tons)
Figure 2.11: Chicken meat supply, 19802007

Source: FAOSTAT (2010).
There are three categories of chicken producers in Zimbabwe:

The formal, large-scale commercial producers, which use day-old chicks of improved
breeds, raised on high plane diets under biosecure housing for slaughter at registered
abattoirs;
Small-scale commercial producers, which produce improved breeds under high plane
but less structured feeding regimes, slaughter at home, and market meat informally; and
Traditional free-range chicken production, mostly for home consumption.
Page 48

The first two categories produce the bulk of Zimbabwes chickens, but information
on production levels becomes scarcer moving from the large-scale to more traditional
producers.
Only in 2001/02 did production decline significantly, owing to feed and electricity
constraints. In addition, since 2008, following the lifting of the import ban on chicken
meat and the importation of cheap chicken meat from South Africa, Brazil, Argentina
and Uruguay, production has fallen to an estimated 27 600 tons, an almost 50% decline
(Mudzonga, 2009b).9 Imports grew from zero in November 2008 to 1200 tons/month
in March 2009 (Mudzonga, 2009b). During this period, prices fell from an average of
US$10/kg to US$3.30/kg. With inefficient and low local production capacity, Zimbabwe
changed from being a regular exporter of meat, eggs and day-old chicks to becoming
a regular importer (see Box 2.7). As cheaper chicken imports threatened the viability of
the domestic industry, local chicken producers lobbied government for the reinstatement
of tight import restrictions. Monthly import quotas were put in place to control import
quantities and, in April 2010, a three-month protectionist policy was implemented to bar
imported chickens. In May 2010, markets reciprocated through an increase in the price
of chicken to between US$4/kg and US$5/kg (Nhambura, 2010).
Box 2.7: Organisation of Zimbabwes poultry sector
Zimbabwes poultry sector is one of the most organised, with the top large-scale
poultry producers contracting farmers as outgrowers. Under such schemes, selected
farmers are provided with day-old chicks, veterinary services, medicines and feeds.
The industry is represented by its main umbrella body, the Zimbabwe Poultry
Association, and is organised and regulated through the Poultry Industry Board.
Zimbabwes poultry industry has been relatively free from market control and was
cushioned before 2007 by a protectionist ban on chicken imports. The import ban
was in line with Zimbabwes longstanding policy against genetically modified food
on the grounds of human safety and the potential threat of contamination.
For the same reason, the industry is strictly regulated by the Poultry Industry Board, in
conjunction with the Agriculture Research Councils Biosafety Board and the Veterinary
Department in the MoAMID, to enforce the strict sanitary and phyto-sanitary
requirements under the Statutory Instrument 20/2000 Biosafety Regulations.
The difference between domestic and international prices has been attributed to several
reasons. First, Zimbabwe faces higher costs of procuring day-old chicks (between
US$0.80 and $1.05, compared to between US$0.30 and US$0.50 in other international
9 Brazilian and South African chicken imports land in Harare at US$1.90/kg and US$2.15/kg respectively. These prices are below
Zimbabwean producers local costs of production, estimated at between US$2.50 and US$2.85 for medium to large-scale farming
production (Mudzonga, 2009b).
Page 49

markets). Second, low maize production causes higher production costs, because
maize obtained for chicken feed is traded at import parity prices averaging
US$350/ton, compared to international costs of US$170/ton. Maize constitutes 70%
of chicken feed, and poultry production is a major market for stockfeed, accounting
for about 40% of total feed sales (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe, 2010).
Third, imported chicken is brined at levels of up to 35%, while brine inclusion in
Zimbabwe is limited to less than 15%. This underlines the concerns of the Zimbabwe
Poultry Producers Association that the weights of imported chickens are increased
through excessive brining during processing, and the higher brining levels give foreign
producers the ability to reduce their price per kg. In addition, Zimbabwe employs
more costly traditional organic production systems, in which chickens take six to
eight weeks to reach maturity (The Herald, 1 April 2009). In contrast, sophisticated
global technological advancements have seen chicken production cycles reduced
to an average of only three weeks. While it is clear that domestic producers face a
production technology constraint, the contraction of the chicken sector could also
be explained by exogenous factors, such as unviable administered prices in 2007 and
2008. A combination of these factors left the industry with a low capacity utilisation,
estimated at 20% in October 2009 (Mudzonga, 2009b).
The recovery of the poultry sector requires three major investments. First, greater stability
in the electricity supply will facilitate expanded production and reduce the cost of day-old
chicks. Second, the industry remains concerned about the risks of Newcastle disease and
avian flu. Investments are needed in disease surveillance and vaccination. Finally, the
competitiveness of the industry depends on the availability of low-cost feed. This requires
investments in improving the productivity of both maize and soybean. The growth of the
industry will also require tariff and quota protection from government in order to control
imports (Mudzonga, 2009b).
2.5 The State Of Food Security In Zimbabwe

Analysing Zimbabwes food security in the context of the crisis is complex. The dimensions
of the food security problem10 and the status of Zimbabwes food insecurity vary
spatially (per region), by level (at national and household level), temporally (inter- and
intra-seasonally) and socially (urban and rural households, income-related). It is all the
more difficult to assess because Zimbabwe has been affected by food insecurity since
independence. Indeed, in the 1980s, the country experienced a food security paradox in
10 F ood security refers to access by all people at all times to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for a healthy and active life. There are three
components to food security: availability (sufficient quantities of appropriate food are available from domestic production), accessibility
(adequate income or other resources to access appropriate food through home production, buying, barter, gifts, borrowing or food
aid) and utilisation (food is appropriately used through appropriate food processing and storage practices, adequate knowledge and
application of nutrition and healthcare, and adequate health and sanitation services) (FAO, 2010).
Page 50

which there was household food insecurity in the midst of a national production surplus.
At that time, 30% of Zimbabwes children under five were chronically malnourished and,
despite food availability through domestic production (and storage in some years), up
to 8.5% of the population still required food aid (Rukuni, 1994). This was because of a
combination of the effects of the countrys pan-territorial pricing policy and the controlled
grain markets that restricted grain movement such that it could not easily be transferred
from surplus to deficit areas (Kapuya et al., 2010). However, the dimension of the food
security problem changed after 2000, when Zimbabwe had national grain shortages amid
a modest level of household food insecurity, thereby moving from hunger amid plenty to
hunger amid shortages. Thus, the food security landscape shifted from an accessibility
problem in the 1980s and the 1990s to what can be viewed as both an accessibility and
an availability problem after 2000 (Kapuya et al., 2010).
Although, at national level, food security is directly related to production trends, these
temporal, geographical and social nuances make it difficult to discern precise trends at
household level.
2.5.1 Food security at the national level

Depending on the estimations (i.e. depending on the methodology used, on the staple
foods that are considered, and the like), the national requirement for human and
commercial use is estimated at 1.825 million tons of maize and 350 thousand tons of
wheat (FAO, 2010).
However, between 2000 and 2010, Zimbabwe produced an average of 1.137 million
tons of maize and 133000 tons of wheat; hence, output levels fall far short of national
requirements. As a result, Zimbabwe has become a deficit grain producer and has relied
on imports to fulfil domestic grain needs (see Tables 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12). Maize imports
peaked in 2003, 2006 and 2008, reaching 763 000 tons, 685 000 tons and 600 000 tons
respectively. Wheat imports reached 175 000 tons in 2008 and peaked at 251 000 tons in
2010 (FAO/WFP, 2010).
In the past decade, this deficit and thus imports (commercial and aid) has fluctuated
between 400 000 tons and 1.2 million tons, representing a self-sufficiency rate that varied
from 37% to 77%. Meanwhile, food aid (maize and wheat) was above the 1990s average
in six of the ten years between 2001 and 2010. Aid is now maintaining levels of between
22% and 26% of imports, as can be seen between 2006/07 and 2009/10. Compared to the
total domestic requirements for food cereal, aid contributed between 10% and 14% over
the past three years (see Table 2.11).
Page 51

Table 2.11: Total cereals requirement vs cereal imports
Year
Total cereal
required
(000 t)
Food imports (000 t)

Total
imports
Commercial
As food aid
imports
% selfsufficiency
Aid as % of
import
% aid
compared
to total
required
2001/02
1 940
448
434
14
77
3.13
0.72
2002/03
1 940
1 216
855
361
37
29.69
18.61
2003/04
1 940
830
433
397
57
47.83
20.46
2004/05
1 940
835
686
149
57
17.84
7.68
2005/06
1 940
848
755
93
56
10.97
4.79
2006/07
1 928
441
342
99
77
22.45
5.13
2007/08
1 928
789
502
287
59
36.38
14.89
2008/09
1 875
986
728
258
47
26.17
13.76
2009/10*
1 738
680
500
180
61
26.47
10.36
Source: World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe (2010) and composed of different CFSAM reports,
Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) (2005/06),
FAO/Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Crop Assessment reports
(ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai469e/ai469e00.pdf)
Notes:
1. 2009/10 figures are estimates in FAO/WFP 2009.
2. One note of caution: in the past, GMB imported cereals and occasionally distributed these in the form of aid assistance.
These imports are included under commercial imports and not under aid. The FAO/WFP 2009 estimated that GMB would
not have the financial means to purchase much food, and suggested that it would import only 10 000tons of maize and
10 000tons of wheat. It is not clear whether this has indeed been purchased. The cereal requirement has been declining
because of the marginal reduction in the overall population.
Page 52
1 395.74
1 195.67
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons/
year
kg/person/
year
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
Production: Total
Opening stock
Total supply
Ending stock
Consumption
Per capita
consumption
Exports
Imports
Net trade
Observed demand
Unexplained stock
Total demand
3 318.83
313.03
3 005.79
414.38
0.00
414.38
117.75
3 318.83
1 325.06
1 993.77
1.30
t/ha
4.09
1 149.80
Communal yield
000 ha
Total area
harvested
971.00
t/ha
000 ha
Communal area
178.80
1990
Commercial yield
000 ha
Commercial area
Unit
2 981.96
783.34
2 198.62
230.22
0.00
230.22
117.77
1 229.40
739.00
2 981.96
1 395.74
1 586.22
1.10
3.24
1 101.20
926.20
175.00
1991
1 099.90
602.79
1 702.68
82.17
83.17
1.00
116.77
1 252.86
532.00
1 099.90
739.00
360.90
0.16
1.61
881.00
728.00
153.00
1992
Table 2.12: Maize balance sheet trends, 19902000
3 293.63
1 199.69
2 093.94
392.03
204.97
597.00
120.51
1 340.91
361.00
3 293.63
967.00
2 326.63
1.12
4.36
1 401.20
1 169.20
232.00
1994
Source: Kapuya (2011).
2 543.93
1 682.71
861.22
1 448.88
1 845.00
396.12
122.13
1 343.10
967.00
2 543.93
532.00
2 011.93
1.09
4.44
1 238.00
1 040.00
198.00
1993
1 200.27
587.58
1 787.85
44.10
0.00
44.10
120.42
1 352.75
391.00
1 200.27
361.00
839.27
0.33
2.33
1 397.90
1 209.20
188.70
1995
2 999.53
1 302.77
1 696.76
196.18
133.00
329.18
122.73
1 403.58
97.00
2 999.53
391.00
2 608.53
1.27
4.50
1 535.00
1 330.00
205.00
1996
2 288.71
359.36
1 929.36
209.09
101.24
310.33
120.27
1 400.27
320.00
2 288.71
97.00
2 191.71
0.98
4.70
1 640.10
1 483.00
157.10
1997
1 737.77
530.00
2 267.77
299.30
0.00
299.30
118.54
1 403.47
565.00
1 737.77
320.00
1 417.77
0.69
4.14
1 223.80
1 057.00
166.80
1998
2 084.89
240.80
2 325.69
137.72
189.13
326.85
120.24
1 445.50
742.46
2 084.89
565.00
1 519.89
0.67
3.66
1 446.40
1 262.00
184.40
1999
2 361.98
263.67
2 625.65
21.77
384.60
406.36
118.23
1 440.79
1 163.10
2 361.98
742.46
1 619.51
0.77
4.24
1 373.12
1 212.54
160.58
2000

Page 53
Page 54
000 tons
000 tons
000 tons
Observed demand
Residual stock
Total demand
kg/person/year
Per capita consumption
000 tons
000 tons/year
Consumption
Net trade
000 tons
Ending stock
000 tons
000 tons
Total supply
Imports
000 tons
Opening stock
000 tons
000 tons
Production: Total
Exports
t/ha
000 ha
Total area harvested
Communal yield
000 ha
Area harvested: Communal
t/ha
000 ha
Area harvested: Commercial
Commercial yield
Unit
684.67
180.73
865.41
1 216
1 216
92.00
1 509.00
120.00
684.67
80.00
604.67
0.26
2.28
1 327.85
1 199.02
128.83
2002
1 756.02
303.81
1 452.21
835
835
99.00
1 517.11
120.00
1 756.02
70.00
1 686.02
1.08
1.94
1 493.81
1 400.80
93.01
2004
Source: Kapuya (2011)
1 178.98
134.85
1 313.83
830
830
95.00
1 584.00
70.00
1 178.98
120.00
1 058.98
0.67
1.91
1 352.37
1 225.79
126.58
2003
1 036.06
60.94
975.12
848
848
95.33
1 541.11
120.00
1 036.06
120.00
916.06
0.51
1.11
1 729.87
1 659.42
70.44
2005
120.00
1 485.04
0.84
1.57
1 713.00
1 650.16
62.84
2006
1 605.04
170.61
1 434.44
441
441
96.44
1 565.10
120.00
1 605.04
* Ending stocks are derived from supply and demand stock differences.
2 689.57
1 271.51
1 418.07
448
448
110.00
1 418.72
88.00
2 689.57
1 163.10
1 526.48
0.92
3.42
1 239.99
1 084.10
155.89
2001
Table 2.13: Maize balance sheet trends, 20012009
1 281.10
42.35
1 323.45
789
789
96.93
1 589.09
120.00
1 281.10
120.00
1 161.10
0.78
1.45
1 445.82
1 390.13
55.68
2007
2 258
680
680
1 578
512
2 770
19
1 243
1 508
2008*
2 319.00
331.00
448.00
448.00
1 540.00
874.50
3 193.50
35.50
1 354.00
1 804.00
2009*


In the 2010/11 season, characterised by a significant increase in production, the difference

between domestic availability and consumption remained at 428 000 tons, of which
317 000 tons would be covered by commercial imports and 111 000 tons by aid (see
Table 2.14).
Table 2.14: Z
imbabwe cereal supply and demand balance sheet,
April 2010 to March 2011 (000 tons)
Maize
Milletsorghum
Wheat
Rice
All
cereals
1 401
194
67
1 661
47
37
84
Total production
1 354
194
30
1 577
Utilisation
1 651
194
221
23
2 089
Food use
1 360
147
181
23
1 712
Feed use
150
150
Seed use
54
2.7
63
Losses
68
10
79
Closing stocks
50
35
85
251
196
55
154
99
55
23
23
428
317
111
Domestic availability
Opening stocks
Total import requirements

Anticipated commercial imports
Of which: Food aid on hand/in pipeline
Source: FAO/WFP (2010).
In conclusion, it is important to highlight two trends. First, during this last decade,
Zimbabwe has evolved from a food-autonomous country to one dependent on food
assistance. Production has been on the rise since 2009, with 2010/11 possibly close
to breakeven level. Second, however, production shows a much more irregular pattern,
with years of quasi-sufficiency (20042006) and others characterised by a huge deficiency
(2005). Probably related to the increased sensitivity of production to natural elements
(rain and drought) because of collapsed infrastructure and services, it questions the solidity
of the recent increases and their implications at household level.
2.5.2 Food security at infra-national and household levels

Although it is difficult to discern precise food security trends at household level, Zimbabwes
fluctuating food insecurity conditions have remained dire over the past decade. Issues of
food insecurity are strongly related to decreasing food production trends (both overall and
by households) and lower access to food by a population affected by the soaring inflation
in previous years, which eroded incomes. Against the context of a 95% unemployment
rate (as of 2009) and an overall national poverty rate of 68%,11 the broader microeconomic
factors served to aggravate the food insecurity situation.
11 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html
Page 55

Since 2000, besides the food deficit at national level, there has been an ongoing food
security predicament at household level. Already very high at the beginning of the crisis
(between 40% and 55.2% of the total population), the number of the insecure has
varied between 1.5 million and 4.1 million since 2005 (respectively 12.7% and 37%)
(see Table 2.15). Of the 2.3million food insecure people in 2009/10, the large majority
resides in rural Zimbabwe. An estimated 40% of the inhabitants of communal areas are
food insecure (7% chronically and 33% transitory). In urban areas, about 15% of the
population is food insecure (7% chronically and 8% transitory) (FAO/WFP, 2010).
Table 2.15: Evolution of food insecurity in Zimbabwe
Year
Number of food insecure people
% food insecure people
2001/02
6 074 000
55.2
2002/03
4 400 000
40.0
2003/04
5 423 000
49.3
2004/05
2 300 000
20.9
2005/06
1 500 000
13.6
2006/07
1 400 000
12.7
2007/08
4 100 000
37.3
2008/09
1 571 799
14.3
2009/10
2 300 000
20.9
Source: World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe (2010) and composed of different FAO/WFP reports,
SARPN and FEWS NET (2005/06), FAO/GIEWS Crop Assessment Reports
(ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai469e/ai469e00.pdf).
According to FAO/WFP (2010),12 provisional pre-harvest predictions made in 2009, 2.8million

people of whom 2.28million (80%) live in rural areas would be food insecure during
the 2009/10 marketing year and would require food assistance amounting to some
228 000tons (including 190 000tons of cereals).13
Food insecurity varies strongly spatially or seasonally. At provincial level, food insecurity
levels were expected to be 18% on average (ZimVAC, 2009). However, Matabeleland and
Masvingo, for example, experience more severe food insecurity, with rates at around 22%.
12 The WFP and the CSAFE consortium composed of Catholic Relief Services, World Vision and CARE, are responsible for distributing the
emergency food assistance in Zimbabwe. These organisations have to be able to respond quickly to an emerging food crisis and are
thus not in a position to await the facts collected specifically for this purpose).
13 These figures vary significantly, often due to different methodologies and estimation criteria. The FAO/WFP CFSAM calculates the number
of people who are likely to be food insecure in the coming year by comparing an estimate of the domestic production plus expected
imports with the total food requirements of the total population. The cereal consumption requirement per person is currently set at
158kg per year, distributed across cereals as: maize120 kg, wheat23 kg, millet and sorghum 13kg, and rice 2kg. At 158kg of cereals
per capita/year, about 69% of the minimum calorie needs of a person (at 2100kcal/day) would be met, on average. The remainder is
expected to come from other foods such as beans, groundnuts, root crops, meat, poultry, fish, vegetables and wild foods.
The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) surveys study households in more detail and also assess their coping
mechanisms when facing food insecurity, caused, for instance, by a failed harvest or depleted stocks. The ZimVAC report of October 2009
estimated that about 1.4million rural people are likely to have inadequate food entitlements during the peak hunger period. Their total
cereal entitlement gap was estimated at 107 000tonnes. The ZimVAC figures appear to differ considerably from the CFSAM figures.
Reasons for the lower ZimVAC numbers are, among other factors, the fact that the ZimVAC study also considers the coping mechanisms
of households and that the study is based on the perspective of the household and not on national, aggregated data on production
and imports.
Page 56

In addition, with standard deviations being high, certain wards within these provinces
might be affected more severely (see Table 2.16). The Zambezi valley (Matabeleland North)
remains an area of exceptionally high food insecurity, with between 45% and 48% of the
population being food insecure (see Figure 2.12), particularly from January to March, when
stocks are low.
Table 2.16: Food insecure population by province, 2009
Number of food insecure people
Rural
population
Aug 2009
July to
September
October to
December
January to
March
Manicaland
1 460 402
110 596
179 656
260 251
18
Mashonaland Central
1 098 501
75 605
139 121
190 557
17
Mashonaland East
1 135 089
58 730
117 315
174 620
15
Mashonaland West
1 037 848
64 293
112 612
161 300
16
Masvingo
1 377 912
94 489
141 271
205 425
15
Matabeleland North
706 836
93 507
133 300
157 750
22
Matabeleland South
698 502
62 739
113 475
153 048
22
Midlands
1 291 056
116 236
200 280
268 849
21
Total
8 806 147
676 195
1 137 030
1 571 799
18
Province
% food
insecure
Source: ZimVAC (2009).
Mashonaland West
Mbire
Hurungwe
Centenary
Kariba Urban
Guruve
Makonde
Gokwe North
Harare
Kadoma
Seke
24 - 27
Mutasa
Hwange
Nkayi
Lupane
Chikomba
Kwekwe
Matabeleland North
Chirumhanzu
Bubi
Tsholotsho
Gweru
Umguza
Chimanimani
Shurugwi
Bulawayo Urban
Bulilima
42 - 45
Bulawayo
Umzingwane
Bikita
Lake Kariba
Conservation Area
Urban Area
Masvingo
Chivi
Insiza
Plumtree
Mangwe
45 - 48
Buhera
Mutare
Gutu
Zvishavane
39 - 42
Mutare Urban
Midlands Province
33 - 36
36 - 39
Makoni
Hwedza
27 - 30
30 - 33
Nyanga
Marondera
Hwange Urban
21 - 24
Mutoko
Goromonzi
Murehwa
Chegutu
Gokwe South
15 - 18
18 - 21
Bindura
Harare Urban
Binga
Victoria Falls
Mudzi
Zvimba
9 - 12
12 - 15
Mashonaland East
Mashonaland Central
Mazowe
6-9
UMP
Shamva
Kariba
3-6
Rushinga
Mt Darwin
Karoi Urban
Mberengwa
Chiredzi
Matobo
Gwanda
Manicaland
Chipinge
Zaka
Mwenezi
Masvingo Province
Matabeleland South
Beitbridge
International Boundary
Province Boundary
Beitbridge Urban
District Boundary
Figure 2.12: Food insecure population, January to March 2011

Source: FAO/WFP (2010).
Page 57

2.6 Agriculture in the reconstruction of Zimbabwes broader

economy: Its role, future and challenges
The agricultural sector of Zimbabwe has come through a prolonged period of structural
changes against the backdrop of shifts in the social, political and economic environments.
Of particular note is the dramatic shift in the scale of operations and the composition of the
farming sector since 2000, which occurred concomitantly with major financial upheavals.
These included protracted periods of hyperinflation, followed by the liberalisation of
markets and the eventual shift to the use of foreign exchange in late 2008.
Zimbabwes agricultural sector has long been key to its economic stability and growth.
Not only does it form the basis of the direct and indirect livelihoods of almost 70% of the
population, but economic growth is also directly linked to the performance of this sector.
The growth and development of agriculture are expected to support the improvement
and growth of the other sectors of the economy, namely industry and services. Although
the agricultural GDP is expected to decrease slightly (to 12%), it will remain significant
for Zimbabwes transitional economy (Robertson, 2011; see Table 2.17), contributing 30%
of formal employment (Kapuya et al., 2010) and representing the largest single source
of export earnings. This contribution is all the more important in view of the Millennium
Development Goals, which make it necessary to consider the different roles of agriculture
in Zimbabwes new economic, political and social setting.
Table 2.17: Projections of percentage contributions by major sectors, 20112015
Sector
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
12.9
12.5
12.2
11.9
12.0
7.9
8.9
10.0
11.0
12.1
12.3
12.1
12.1
12.5
13.1
Electricity and water
3.9
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.6
Construction
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
10.3
9.9
9.6
9.3
9.2
Agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry

Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Finance and insurance

Real estate
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.8
27.0
26.2
25.5
24.5
23.5
Transport and communication
9.2
9.2
9.3
9.6
9.7
Public administration
5.5
5.4
5.3
5.3
5.2
Education
5.9
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.5
Health
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
Domestic services
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
Other services
4.3
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.1
7.0
5.2
5.0
5.2
5.8
GDP at factor cost
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
GDP in US$ million
4 300
4 672
5 110
5 640
6 291
Distribution, hotels and restaurants
Less: Imputed bank service charges
Source: Robertson (2011).
Page 58

However, the role of agriculture in the broader economy needs to be recontextualised.

First, the decline of agriculture has inevitably resulted in a substantial fall in formal
employment opportunities, output, exports and secondary demand. However, following
the liberalisation of markets and the stabilisation of the economy since 2009, the prospects
for the agricultural sector are positive. Although production increased substantially
during the 2009 and 2010 seasons, Zimbabwe faces the challenge of returning to the
production levels of 2000, and growth remains very fragile. Considering the state of
the agricultural sector from a micro and macro-perspective, the sudden and substantial
growth, mainly in maize and tobacco, might not be repeated. Important aspects of
the agricultural sector (and broader economy) will have to be rebuilt, with the sectors
sustainability requiring not only resource endowments in terms of land and water
resources, but also coherent development policies, sunk investments, relevant support
systems, appropriate capacities, and the like.
Second, these policies and systems have to be tailored to a sector that has been entirely
restructured, with smallholders (including a significant proportion of resettled farmers)
currently producing more than 50% of the national total. As such, in view of the
changes in the agricultural sector over the last decade, the approach to reviving the
sector should give due consideration to adapted policy measures that take into account
several new key issues. These include the fragmentation of land holding, the absence
of tenurial arrangements and title deeds, the prominence of small-scale agriculture,
the collapse of the economy and the agricultural support system, and distrust in the
overall public environment all aspects that differ strongly from the well-developed
agricultural sector that existed before 2000. Since the old commercial agricultural
system was supported by considerable subsidies (Moyo et al., 2008), how can the
new system and structure of production be supported sustainably? The approach to
addressing these issues surely differs from that of the World Bank, whose approach
to the future role of Zimbabwes agriculture is premised on revitalising a pre-2000
agricultural system and reinstating large-scale commercial production, deemed in this
case as an economically viable approach from a farm-level perspective (World Bank,
cited in Moyo et al., 2009).
Despite various arguments regarding specific approaches to re-establishing Zimbabwes
agriculture and economy, it remains crucial to identify and determine the basic conditions
for its revival in a post-crisis scenario. A number of characteristics and challenges
forthcoming from this chapter and relevant literature will have to be considered:
Productivity is low, which is related to a low level of capital endowment, leading to a
restricted uptake of productive farm technologies and, subsequently, to low yield and
output (ZimVAC, 2009). A first objective for Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction will
be to increase productivity levels again (perhaps not to the levels seen before 2000, as
the sectors structure has changed, but at least to levels similar to or higher than what
communal and small-scale farmers were reaching before 2000). With the production
bases in place, the result of a well-structured sector before 2000, revitalisation of the
Page 59

sector will often not take much. This makes the Zimbabwean case different from
that of many failed states. A good example of revitalisation is the significant growth
in the tobacco and cotton sectors. Although Zimbabwes reconstruction should be
broad-based, including a wide range of agricultural and non-agricultural subsectors,
it makes sense in the framework of this project to focus first on basic food crops
that require minor investments, such as maize and extensive livestock production.
Reaching past production and productivity levels in these sectors would enable
Zimbabwe to reach food autonomy. Other crops, such as small grains (irrigationsensitive) and poultry (capital-intensive), will follow rapidly once the basic conditions
have been established.
The rural market economy collapsed because of the economic crisis, as well as constant
interventions by the state and donors. This led to the collapse of input and output
markets and efficient price-setting mechanisms, among other things (Esterhuizen,
2010). It is vital for Zimbabwe to re-engage with development. Both government and
donors have to shift from an assistance-aid approach to a developmental one. This will
require a rethink of current measures and policies.
As the following chapters argue, several issues are hampering this shift and the
subsequent initiation of a solid, positive growth path for both agriculture and
the overall economy:

The lack of a relevant and well-defined policy and institutional framework, leading
to an ill-defined overall development strategy and unstructured institutional entities
(parastatals, for example) and arrangements (including contractual arrangements)
(Kapuya et al., 2010);
Deteriorating infrastructure for the marketing and movement of produce, such as

roads and telecommunications, as well as overall production capacity (including a
lack of fuel, electricity and input manufacturing industries), leading to high costs
or scarcity of production factors (Kapuya et al., 2010; Moyoetal.,2009);
A lack of efficient and effective support to agriculture, such as research and

agricultural extension, leading to a limited transfer of technology from research,
restricted dissemination of productive farm technologies, and a lack of commercial
farming skills;
Limited access to working capital and difficulties in accessing agricultural finance,

which stem from a lack of credit, financial services that are poorly adapted to
the new tenurial situation, and unfavourable borrowing conditions (Kapuya et
al., 2010); and
Inadequate training in production and crop management, stemming from poor

extension services, and, therefore, a limited transfer of technology from research.
Given such challenges, it becomes important to identify how the government has used its
political resources in an attempt to address constraints in the agricultural sector. Against
this backdrop, the political economy can be examined to assess the policy framework that
led to and presently has to address the constraints in the sector.
Page 60

Chapter 3
The political economy of the agricultural sector
and post-crisis reconstruction
Agricultural reconstruction and development are seen as key factors for economic recovery
in many post-conflict and post-crisis countries, including developing countries such as
Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, recent interventions in the agricultural sector have been of only
limited effectiveness, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. Two success stories of agricultural
recovery that could be identified were Europe and Taiwan in the post-World War II era,
and were used as input to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model (see Box 3.1) (Giordano,
2011). Some intervention principles implemented in these case studies may need to be
rediscovered in the Zimbabwean context in order to achieve the same level of success.
Box 3.1: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model is a recently developed framework drawn
from international experiences in post-conflict economic recovery. Broadly, the model
proposes to rethink the state-building approach and assumes the need for specific
elements to address the recovery process of fragile and/or post-conflict states.
The critical thinking provoked by the model is how to design practical measures
i) to overcome the weaknesses and inability of the state; and ii) to carry out the task set
by the international community to make foreign assistance more effective under a set
of aid instruments (i.e. humanitarian aid and budgetary support), without overtaking
the state in fulfilling state prerogatives (Giordano, 2011).
The model highlights the determinants of two historical success stories in Europe
and Taiwan after World War II. It compares them to the global principles applied by
development partners when intervening in such situations. This approach allows the
identification of gaps in development partners strategies, which need to be bridged for
agricultural development to play its full role in post-conflict economic recovery. These
gaps match some but not all of the shortcomings identified by the recent literature on
agricultural support in post-conflict countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
According to Giordano (2011), the OECD Principles for Good Engagement can be applied
in fragile states with reference to the post-World War II Marshall Plan for Western Europe
and Japan and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) plan for Taiwan,
to analyse a countrys post-conflict and post-crisis development process. The Marshall
Plan, on the one hand, owed its success to a number of favourable conditions, which
included the fact that relief aid and development measures were being implemented at
the same time, backed by financial support that was matched dollar-for-dollar with local
contributions. The post-war governments in Europe were strong enough to drive their own
economies. They owned utilities and had sound industrial policies. In addition, the Plan
had a regional rather than a country-specific approach. The JCRR plan, on the other hand,
Page 61

succeeded because prerequisites for programme effectiveness existed, like well-developed

transport systems and social services. An autonomous body that was independent
from political and government interference implemented the programme. The assistance
from the United States lasted several years and was planned with consistent long-term
goals. The programme was backed by strong political commitment from government and
competent capacity to undertake the reform process.
However, Zimbabwes socio-economic conditions, political setting and governance
structures are markedly different from the situation under which the recovery in
Western Europe and Taiwan occurred. It is important to state from the outset that
Zimbabwe fits the definitions of both a fragile and a failed state, whether by Giordano
(2011), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the
World Bank (see Box 2.2).
Box 3.2: Defining fragile and failed states
There is still no universally accepted definition of a fragile state. A variety of causes can
be identified, sometimes seemingly contradictory, which can reduce a country to the
unclear category of fragile state. These difficulties of defining the causes have led donors
to use different wordings over time, with occasional ambiguities.
The OECD defines fragile states as countries in which state structures lack political
will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction,
development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations
(OECD-DAC, 2007). This definition has the virtue of underscoring the real political nature
of state fragility. Several donors, like the Department for International Development
(DFID), have acknowledged this dimension (DFID, 2009:69). Others, like the World Bank,
have not, defining fragile states [as a] term used for countries facing particularly severe
development challenges such as weak institutional capacity, weak governance, political
instability, and frequently on-going violence or the legacy effects of past severe conflict.
Although its intention is defining fragile states, the World Bank definition identifies
weak or failed states instead, because it does not motivate sound political economy
analysis of the sources of fragility and failure (Rocha-Menocal & Fritz, 2008).
In practice, donors have looked at fragility, weaknesses and failures in terms of their own
interests, and defined these terms according to the difficulties they face in engaging
with these countries and proceeding with their usual practices. The conceptual definition
of these terms is embedded in the attributes that are closely related to governance.
As such, they have several attributes whose common indicators include: a state whose
central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over
much of its territory, the non-provision of public services, widespread corruption and
criminality, refugees and involuntary movement of populations, and a sharp economic
decline (ODI, 2005 in Giordano, 2011).
Page 62

In Zimbabwe, basic sectors such as nutrition, health and capacity building are heavily
complemented by donor aid and international assistance. Nonetheless, the still relatively
well-developed structures that remain, the stabilisation of the domestic economy since
the introduction of the United States dollar, and the stable political situation after 2009
present opportunities for a possible recovery that is underpinned by a strengthening of
the state, renewed investment, and a potential initiation of a sustainable development
path. Table 3.1 outlines and compares the characteristics of the Zimbabwean situation to
the foundation principles that established successful agricultural and economic recovery
in Europe and Taiwan, the OECD Principles of Good Engagement in Fragile Situations,
and the situation in Zimbabwe. The chapter then develops each of the retained principles
in the framework of Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction.
Policy framework
Context
Table 3.1: F
eatures of World War II states: Scope for Zimbabwes agricultural
recovery interventions
OECD Principles of
Good Engagement
in Fragile Situations
Zimbabwe postconflict state

intervention
Information
Take context as a
starting point
Poor statistical
systems
Politically stable
Politically stable
Politically unstable
Democratic
government and
governance
Strong democratic
government
Strong
undemocratic
government
Focus on state
building as the
central objective
Political will/social
contract
Political will/social
contract
Political will
Biased political will
Human and
institutional
capacities
Strong capacities
Low capacities
No safety nets/high
poverty rates
Macroeconomic
reforms and
structural
transformation
Macroeconomic
reforms and
structural
transformation
Macroeconomic
reforms, but
awaited structural
transformation
Lack of
macroeconomic
reforms and
awaited structural
transformation
Country-owned
strategy
Country-owned
strategy
Country-owned
strategy
Macroeconomic
reforms and
partial structural
transformation
Industrial and trade

policies
Industrial policies
Four-year plans
(19531968)
Poor development
strategy/no
industrial policies
Integrated
agricultural policies
Integrated
Integrated
No integrated
agricultural policy
Social safety nets
Massive social safety

nets
Subsidies acting as
safety nets
Low political will/no

social contract
General features
The Marshall Plan
The JCRR
Information
Information
Political stability
Lack of democratic
government and
governance
Page 63
Principles of action
Assistance

OECD Principles of
Good Engagement
in Fragile Situations
Zimbabwe postconflict state

intervention
Multi-year
approach
Multi-year approach
Year-on-year
approach
Regional approach
Mainly countrybased approach
Stay engaged long

enough to give
success a chance
Country-based
approach
Donor/recipient
consensus
Donor/recipient
consensus
Felt needs
approach
Recognise the
links between
political security
and development
objectives
No donor/recipient
consensus
Funding matched by
recipient
Funding matched by
recipient
Funding matched
by implementers
Align with local

priorities in different
ways in different
contexts
Funding not
matched by
recipient
Donor
One donor
One donor
Agree on practical
coordination
mechanisms between
international actors
Multiplicity of
donors coordinated
mainly around
emergency aid
Humanitarian aid
and development
Humanitarian aid
combined with
development
Humanitarian aid:
Felt needs, joint
evaluation
Humanitarian aid
little development
Technical assistance
Technical assistance
Technical
assistance
Little technical
assistance
Private sector
Projects/private
sector support
included in
development plan
Projects/private
sector support
included in
development plan
Budget support with

conditions, tied aid
Budget support with

conditions, tied aid
Budget support
with conditions,
tied aid
Jointness Principle
Limited Jointness
Principle
Jointness Principle
NATO*
United States
protection (mutual
security)
General features
The Marshall Plan
The JCRR
Multi-year approach
Multi-year approach
Regional approach
Security and safety
Prioritise
interventions/avoid
pockets of exclusion
(aid orphans)/
promote nondiscrimination as a
basis for inclusive and
stable societies
Lack of private
sector engagement
No debt relief, no
budget support,
tied aid
Parallel processes,
no alignment
Weak SADC
protection but
strong local defence
force capacity
Source: Adapted by authors from Giordano (2011).

*NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
3.1 Context
3.1.1 Lack of statistical information
Within the context of post-conflict reconstruction, both the Marshall Plan and the JCCR
were built on solid and reliable statistical information that allowed for proper planning,
policy design and follow-up.
Page 64

With respect to Zimbabwe, one important difficulty facing researchers carrying out
analytical work and policy-makers making policy decisions centres on the availability and
quality of datasets. There has been a significant deterioration in the national statistics
system in recent years, with brain drain over the last decade adversely affecting national
capacity in this area, while the shrunken fiscal revenue base has failed to cover even
the recurrent costs required to support data collection efforts (UNDP, 2008). Although
ZimVAC, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and WFP/FAO/GIEWS
Crop Forecasting Committee assessments have rendered assistance in the agricultural
sector, much data is quite simply no longer being collected. Where it is being collected, it
is of limited quality, is not analysed, and increasingly over recent years, on the grounds
of national security is no longer being made available or is used (and manipulated) to
suit government purposes (UNDP, 2008).14 An important concern, for example, has been
the failure of government to carry out a comprehensive land audit (ZimOnline Investigation
Team, 2010).
It has become clear that a significant effort is required to update national databases.
Reliable baselines are a prerequisite for planning for national and sectoral recovery, and
form the basis upon which targets can be set and progress towards these targets monitored
and evaluated. Seen in this light, it would be in the interest of the government as well
as of the private sector and (national or international) development partners to address
this constraint as quickly and as comprehensively as possible. The current framework of
operation between the government and non-state actors leads to donor initiatives (save for
perhaps the WFP/FAO/GIEWS crop assessments) being planned and implemented outside
government.15 This explains the difference between government estimates and FEWS NET
projections of food security needs.
3.1.2 Fragile political stability

Major success stories emphasise political stability as an important element. Although
promising since the establishment of the GNU, the political situation in Zimbabwe remains
latent.
With hindsight, several political developments have, over time, shaped the political
trajectory of the country. In December 1987, a Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was
signed to bring together the two ethnic groups, Shona and Ndebele, which had been
engaged in an armed conflict since independence, and to form a unified government.
Although this signalled an end to ethnic tensions, political tensions re-emerged between
the government and a renewed opposition force in the form of the Movement for
14 T
here has been tension between state and non-state (international donors and partners) actors about information credibility and access.
Non-state actors have viewed data from the state with suspicion, while the state has viewed data from non-state actors with equal
suspicion. The state points out that international partners (United Nations agencies in particular) are circulating negative information
about the countrys food security status. The Integrated Regional Information Network quoted the Minister of Agriculture, Mechanisation
and Irrigation Development, Dr Joseph Made, as saying that crop and food assessments had become, as a result, a matter of national
security that should be treated with utmost caution and exclusivity.
15 Personal communication: Interviewed during research project, 4 February 2011.
Page 65

Democratic Change (MDC) 15 years later (GNU Watch Zimbabwe, 2011). Between 2000
and 2008, political strife between the MDC and the government of the Zimbabwe African
National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) led to worsening political and socio-economic
conditions (Mapuva, 2010) (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Timeline of Zimbabwes political processes16
Date
Notes
Outcomes
18 April 1980
1980 marked the dawn of a new era in Zimbabwes

political history, with the ushering in of a black majority
government.
Zimbabwes independence was

based on the Lancaster House
Agreement of 1979.
19821985
In 1982, government security officials discovered large

caches of arms and ammunition on properties owned by
ZAPU, accusing Joshua Nkomo and his followers of plotting
to overthrow the government. Mugabe fired Nkomo and
his closest aides from the Cabinet.
There was political instability

in Matabeleland.
December
1987
A Unity Accord was signed to merge the ZANU government

with PF-ZAPU to form ZANU PF, after a lengthy and
protracted unrest in Matabeleland.
The Unity Accord created

ZANU PF.
September
1999
The MDC was founded as an opposition party by trade

unionist Morgan Tsvangirai.
Opposition politics in Zimbabwe

were strengthened.
February 2000
In a referendum, Zimbabwean voters rejected a new

Constitution, which includes provisions that called for
the redistribution of white-owned farmland to blacks.
June 2000
The Mugabe government embarked on the FTLRP, in which

white-owned farms were compulsorily acquired without
compensation.
A precipitous drop in agricultural

production led to a fall in export
revenue, widespread food
insecurity, and the weakening
of the Zimbabwean dollar.
March 2001
The United States imposed economic sanctions on

Zimbabwe based on the countrys human rights record,
political intolerance and absence of the rule of law.
The sanctions came through an Act called the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA).16
This resulted in restrictions in

trading and investment between
Zimbabwe and the United States,
declining aid assistance, and
tension in bilateral ties between
Zimbabwe and the United States.
2002
The European Union imposed travel restrictions on senior

members of government and their associates (targeted
sanctions).
This brought restrictions in

trading and investment between
Zimbabwe and the European
Union, as well as declining
investment and donor assistance.
15 September
2008
The leaders of the 14-member SADC witnessed the

signing of the power-sharing agreement, brokered
by South African leader Thabo Mbeki.
The Global Political Agreement

ended the political crisis.
January 2009
Morgan Tsvangirai announces that he would do as the

leaders across Africa had insisted and join a coalition
government, the GNU, as Prime Minister with President
Robert Mugabe.
The GNU brought economic

recovery.
Source: Compiled by authors.
16 Through the enactment of ZIDERA, Zimbabwes access to finance and credit facilities was effectively destroyed. ZIDERA empowers
the United States to use its voting rights and influence multilateral lending agencies, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the
African Development Bank, to veto any applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling and international
debt cancellation.
Page 66

Since 2009, Zimbabwe has achieved a relatively peaceful and stable political transition
through a political settlement called the Global Political Agreement. This subsequently led
to the formation of the GNU, which consists of ZANU PF and the opposition MDC.17 Against
the backdrop of Zimbabwes poor human rights record, with restrictions on property
rights, press freedom, economic freedom and political freedom, the GNU is a transitional
arrangement with the objective of spearheading the implementation of political, economic
and constitutional reforms that address these issues. However, the GNU has made limited
progress in changing the countrys fundamentals, owing to protracted negotiations on
political and economic policy reforms. There are still visible weaknesses in accountability
systems and repressive legislation that limits democratic opposition, free media and civil
societys ability to express the voice of the public. Zimbabwes political leadership has failed
to address pertinent issues that caused the vicious cycle that links corruption to poverty
(Transparency International, 2009).
Tensions exist within the GNU between ZANU PF and the MDC, with entrenched ideological
differences causing the slow implementation of policies. The GNU clearly lacks a common
vision, including on options for an economic recovery path, and the policy differences
between political parties have compromised the spirit of political stability (Mapuva,
2010). Currently, ZANU PF is advocating for early elections, citing the failure of the GNU
to yield cohesive governance, while the MDC is arguing that elections should follow the
implementation of a new Constitution that would ensure free and fair polls.
3.1.3 Lack of democratic government and governance

In relation to governance, the Marshall Plan and the JCCR reflect on the fundamental
importance of a strong government. While examples drawn from this context show that
democracy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a successful recovery,
they emphasise the need for effective governance, implying effective implementation of
efficient, sustainable and accepted programmes. The ability of a central government to
implement policies successfully forms a solid foundation on which recovery can be attained,
as shown in both the European and Taiwanese success stories.
Zimbabwe is classified as undemocratic, in view of its failure to transition towards free
and fair, transparent electoral processes, with human rights abuses by the government
widely reported in the media (Makumbe, 2009). While democracy might not be a necessary
condition for post-conflict and post-crisis recovery (as shown by the Taiwan case),
Zimbabwe is currently ranked as the fourth failed state in the world after Somalia, Chad
and Sudan,18 reflecting its poor and weak governance. If this includes the lack of rule of
law and the failure to respect property rights (Richardson, 2004, 2006, 2007; Makumbe,
17 www.sokwanele.com/system/files/GNU%20Watch%20April%202010.pdf and idasa.org.za/media/uploads/outputs/files/gnu_watch_
january_20111.pdf.
18 See the Failed States Index Score: www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=452&Itemid=900
Page 67

2010),19 it is also supported by the fact that the country has been unable to implement
formulated policies effectively.
Besides the agricultural policy processes and implementation (which will be detailed later
in this chapter), the land and land resettlement policy processes are particular examples
of these governance problems. Due to the complexity and scope of land redistribution,
a number of committees within Cabinet, the Politburo and the office of the Vice-President
have handled the land resettlement programme:
(i) In the Politburo, although it is based in Cabinet, there is a secretary for land issues.
(ii) There is a Ministry for Lands, Land Reform and Rural Resettlement, which includes
a National Allocation and Redistribution Committee that deals directly with land
occupation and resettlement at district level.
(iii) In the Vice-Presidents office, there is a Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and
Rural Development and a National Land Acquisition Committee.
Ofce of the President
Ofce of the Vice-President
Vice-President
Cabinet
Politburo
Foreign Minister
Secretary for Land
Cabinet committee on
Resettlement and
Rural Development
National Land
Acquisition Committee
Foreign Farms Committee
Conrmation
Working Party of
Permanent
Secretaries
Minister of State:
Land Reform and
Rural Resettlement
Minister of Lands, Land

Reform and Rural
Resettlement
National Land Allocation

and Redistribution
Committee
Director Ofce
of the
Vice-President
Inter-ministeral Committee
on Resettlement and
Rural Development
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Local
Government
Offer letter
issued for
land
Approval
Provincial Governor and

resident Minister
Land Task Force

of Ministers
National Command
Centre Committee
Provincial Administrator
Provincial Land
Identication
Committee
Technical
subcommittee
evaluation
Agricultural Land
Settlement Board
Recommendation
Land applicant
District Administrator
Short list
Submission
District Land
Identication Committee
Figure 3.1: Land policy formulation process

Source: UNDP (2008).
19 T
his point is often made in reference to Zimbabwes fast track land reform, in which white commercial farmers where forcibly evicted
from their farm land.
Page 68

The Cabinet Committee has been in place since at least 1985. Its role, however, remains
unclear when the various committees, working parties, task forces and command centres
are added to the organisational structure for land identification, acquisition and settlement
(see Figure 3.1). This complexity created difficulties in defining responsibilities for land
policy and implementation, making it hard to decipher the actual policy decision-making
process. As a result, most decisions are taken outside the confines of formal government
institutional processes (UNDP, 2008).
Against this backdrop of institutional vagueness, over-centralisation and a lack of
coordination of the programme appeared (Rukuni, 1994). In February 1993, and especially
after 2000, the Comptroller and Auditor-General reported that programme implementation
had suffered, owing to interference by politicians, the overtaking of its implementation
by independent formations/individuals, and the lack of government capacity to coordinate
implementation (UNDP, 2008).
3.1.4 Biased political will

Perhaps the most important precondition for any recovery programme is the concerted
political will of government, which essentially creates a conducive operational environment
for both state and non-state actors. In the context of the Marshall Plan and the JCCR,
political will established not only a conducive environment, but also the commitment to
implementing reforms effectively. The Taiwanese governments effectiveness under the JCCR
plan was reflected in its willingness to act, as after the defeat against the Communists and
their exile to Taiwan, government officials and civil servants were determined to prove their
political ideas right. The speed with which the land reform was designed and conducted
explicitly illustrates this attitude (Wu Huang, 1993 in Giordano, 2011).
According to Moyo (2009),20 the government has failed not because there are no
alternative policies that can be adopted, but because there is no visionary leadership. Such
leadership, within which an established, well-disposed political will can both existentially
and ideologically make the pursuit of alternative national policies possible, should be
capable of kick-starting Zimbabwes recovery.
The political commitment to creating the necessary environment for investment and
economic growth in Zimbabwe has been questionable and uninspiring (Zimbabwe
Telegraph, 2010). Due to polarised ideological views within the GNU, the adoption of
macroeconomic policy reforms has been sluggish (Mapuva, 2010). This has significantly
weakened the policy development process and led to the adoption of limited policy
reforms. Without a strong political will, current interventions in Zimbabwe are not likely
to see any positive policy development, owing to a lack of state-building initiatives, the
absence of a common vision, infighting and power struggles, and polarised division
within government on development policies.7 Importantly, policy reform efforts relating
20 www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/jonathanmoyo6.14651.html
Page 69

to governance are not free from political interference. Because policy reforms are approved,
monitored and directed by politicians according to their own interest (as opposed to the
public interest), the weakness and, therefore, failure of the policy framework is mainly
attributed to the intrusion of political interests (Mapuva, 2010).
A clear shift in ideology and political will may be the first step towards a sustainable
recovery process for Zimbabwe. This could be modelled along the structure of the JCRR,
which eliminated unnecessary political interference and preserved the autonomy and
flexibility of the technocrats that oversaw the development and implementation of policies
(Giordano, 2011).
3.1.5 Low state and national stakeholder capacities

Previous successes in recovery were built on the foundation of strong capacity, a pool
of skilled manpower, technology and the financial wherewithal to support the policies
and initiatives to sustain reconstruction. Success stories have shown that the capacity to
accomplish reconstruction is related to the ability to drive the economy, with government
officials and civil servants being experienced and capacitated. As such, the role of the
state and its involvement in the economy is recognised, while its collaboration with
well-organised non-state actors, such as civil society and the private sector, is emphasised
(Chinn, 1979 in Giordano, 2011; Liang & Hou Liang, 1988).
In the case of Zimbabwe, however, a significant brain drain of skilled manpower occurred
over the last decade as the economy declined, weakening the states capacity (UNDP, 2008).
An estimated 67% of government expenditure is channelled towards civil service salaries,
leaving little room for government to sustain basic functioning and support mechanisms,
such as infrastructure development, policy development, social services, and the like
(New Ziana, 2010). These services are heavily supported by donor aid and international
assistance. In order to address the issue, the IMF advised the restructuring of the
government personnel base, including the elimination of ghost workers, while attaching
greater priority to social and infrastructure development programmes (IMF,2010).
Concomitant with the limited capacity of the government has been the limited
capacity of various stakeholders involved in the agricultural sector, including farmers
organisations, civil society and the private sector. Currently, several farmers groups
exist, but indications are that they do not have a strong influence, if any, on policy
outcomes.21 Regarding farmers organisations, the CFU, which had been very influential
in the past, has been debilitated by the collapse of commercial agriculture following the
land redistribution process. The ZCFU may yet emerge as the farming voice in future;
however, as its membership is linked to the dominant faction in government, it has had
limited autonomous influence in policy direction (see Chapter 2 for more details). NGOs,
although well developed and well organised, have seen their involvement constrained by
Page 70

the restrictive political environment.22 Most NGOs are only undertaking humanitarian aid,
mainly channelled outside government structures. Lastly, the private sector once the
strength of Zimbabwes economy has been weakened by the economic collapse and
direct political intervention into the private sphere.23
3.1.6 Conclusion on the context

The different criteria used to assess the context in which Zimbabwes reconstruction
has to be organised present a dire reality and highlight many challenges to an efficient
reconstruction.
First, the lack of information results in decision-making under a higher level of uncertainty.
It also requires particular endeavours to fill this knowledge gap, or at least create a
minimum level of common understanding. Indeed, while the provision of information is
a useful tool to make donors converge towards long-term development, its dearth implies
that another means of coordination between donors is required simply to agree on a
common diagnostic. Information has to be gathered outside of the official channels, shared
between the different stakeholders that are intervening in the country (donors, NGOs and
government), and cross-checked to ensure a common understanding of the situation.
Second, political instability and governance concerns make it difficult for the different
actors to rely directly on the government as a channel for their interventions. This creates
a major challenge for the efficiency of development aid and the long-term evolution of
foreign assistance, especially in the transition from emergency interventions to longterm development support. Addressing this situation is a prerequisite for Zimbabwes
reconstruction. Otherwise, institutional innovations have to be developed that can both
overcome the drawbacks related to political instability and allow the development of a
long-term intervention strategy by engaging the relevant stakeholders. The latter will,
however, only be an intermediate solution, which could be contradictory to the necessary
policy reforms and alignment conditions detailed hereafter in this chapter.
3.2 Policy framework and reforms

3.2.1 Macroeconomic reforms and structural transformation
According to Mudzonga (2009a), Zimbabwes macroeconomic reforms with respect to
trade, industrial and investment policies can conceptually be viewed as an evolution of
four distinct phases, which essentially saw a shift in the role of the state and how it shaped
industry, trade and investment. These include the following:
(i) The first phase pre-independence to 1980 was strongly state-led, with
government pursuing import substitution through heavy protection for
local industry.
Page 71

(ii) The second phase, 19801989, was the first decade after the country attained
its political independence and the economy was still strongly state-led.
(iii)
The third phase, 19902000, ushered in reforms through a structural adjustment
programme as well as through trade regimes, for example under the World Trade
Organization.
(iv)
The last phase, 20002008, was a period of weak and ad hoc state intervention.
The economy was highly open regionally, as it also implemented the gradual tariff
reductions under the SADC Free Trade Area. As the country was then in a political
and economic crisis, the government intervened through price and foreign exchange
controls, among other protectionist measures. Table 3.3 provides a short history of
Zimbabwes industrial and trade policies in these periods.
Table 3.3: Zimbabwes economic policy framework over time
Pre-independence
19801989
19902000
20002008
20092011
Policies
Strong state-led
Strong state-led
Import

Infant industry
substitution
industry
Protection
White enclave
protection
IMF/World
Bank-led
ESAP

Tight controls

Export

Foreign

Trade
through tariffs
exchange
allocation

Growth with
equity
promotion
liberalisation

Financial
deregulation

Export
retention
schemes

Cost recovery
World Trade
Organization
agreements
Weakened state
attempting to
regain control
Highly open but
mixed economy
Ad hoc state
intervention
Tight foreign
exchange control
regulations
(initially)
Price controls
Import
liberalisation
Economic
Partnership
Agreements
(initialised)
Weak state
attempting to
liberalise markets
Ad hoc
intervention
Dollarisation of the
economy
Liberalisation of
almost all sectors
(goods and
services)
Collapsing
Slow recovery

Free market
ideology
Liberalisation
of almost all
goods and
services
State of the economy

Strong/vibrant
Strong/vibrant
Gradual
disintegration,
deindustrialisation
and deagriculturalisation
Source: Adapted from Mudzonga (2009a) and compiled by authors.
Page 72

However, in the current policy phase (20092011), under economic pressure from the
countrys disastrous situation and foreign concerns, the economy has progressively been
restructured and liberalised. This follows autonomous, bilateral and multilateral efforts
to liberalise the economy and integrate Zimbabwe into the world economy (Mudzonga,
2009a). Major changes include the following:
The official adoption of the United States dollar in March 2009 reduced annual
inflation to 3% in 2010, enabling the restoration of economic stability (Government
of Zimbabwe, 2011);
The economy opened up both locally and regionally with continuing, albeit gradual,
tariff reductions under the SADC Free Trade Area.
RBZs quasi-fiscal activities were curtailed, and the central bank was restricted to its
core monetary policy functions on the advice of the IMF.
However, beyond the political crisis, the state is still very weak and measures are being
implemented only in part, owing to the lack of financial and human capacities but also
to the absence of genuine motivation for transformation among dominant stakeholders
(Mudzonga, 2009a). Interventions remain ad hoc in nature. In addition, the growth in the
overall economy was projected to slow to 2% from the initial government projection of
7.7%.24 The modest economic growth has not resolved the ever-increasing unemployment
problem, the deepening poverty and the lack of delivery of social services (Makumbe, 2009).
3.2.2 Country-owned strategy in development

After a decade of economic recession in which GDP was reduced by 50%, the issue of
appropriate short-term economic stabilisation measures could not be ignored. Shortterm stabilisation imperatives would be addressed through the Three-Year Budget MacroEconomic Policy Framework (20102012), alternatively known as STERP II. This policy
framework is a follow-up recovery programme to the Short-Term Emergency Recovery
Programme (STERP) announced at the inception of the GNU in February 2009 and initially
designed to last 18 months. The broad-based and inclusive strategic vision of both
programmes focuses in particular on resuscitating and creating a functional and viable
economy. In this regard, both programmes prioritise economic strategies that guarantee
economic growth, as well as social imperatives (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009a, 2009b).
In short, STERP is a capacity-based rehabilitation programme, based on a three-pronged
strategy:
(i) Political and governance issues: The Constitution and constitution-making processes,
the media and media reforms, and legislative reforms (intended for strengthening
governance and accountability, promoting good governance and the rule of law,
and promoting equality and fairness, including gender equality);
24 www.afriqueavenir.org/en/2010/04/25/imf-slashes-zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-economic-growth-prospects-for-2010/
Page 73

(ii) Social protection: Food and humanitarian assistance, and strategically targeting
vulnerable sectors such as education and health; and
(iii) Stabilisation: Implementing a growth-oriented recovery programme that fosters free,
deregulated markets and restructured parastatals; increasing capacity utilisation in all
sectors of the economy; creating jobs; and ensuring adequate availability of essential
commodities such as food, fuel and electricity. A key area in the STERP has been
rehabilitating the collapsed social, health and education sectors and addressing the
adequacy of the water supply.
Within this policy framework, Zimbabwes economy experienced 5% growth in 2009
and is expected to continue its recovery in the short to medium term. The 2010 GDP
growth rate, initially projected to reach 7%, was only about 2.2%, given the reluctance
of the international community to extend financial and budgetary assistance to
Zimbabwe (Development News, 2010). Western powers, particularly the United States
and the European Union, were cautious because of the slow implementation of political
and economic reforms, including the restructuring of parastatals and the RBZ, the
implementation of a new democratic Constitution, and the abolition of draconian
legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the
Public Order and Security Act, which curtail media freedom25 and the freedom of speech
and expression, respectively.
In Zimbabwes post-crisis scenario, given the emphasis on national ownership and the high
degree of dependence on aid flows, Zimbabwe must take the initiative with the assistance
of donors to define its own priorities, design its own development programmes, and
build an institutional structure to improve the effectiveness of aid significantly. As such,
Zimbabwes responsibilities would be to exercise effective leadership over its development
policies and strategies, and to coordinate development actions in terms of time and
capacity in a participatory and inclusive manner. More specifically, according to UNDP
(2008) recommendations, the government would have to:
(i) Create national development plans, such as an agricultural and food security policy
and a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, with clear strategic and budgeted priorities.
(ii) Develop a performance assessment framework jointly with donors and agree on a
single set of conditions derived from these two policies.
(iii) Translate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper into a Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework, with annual and multi-year budgets to facilitate aid predictability.
(iv) Strengthen Zimbabwes institutional structures, systems and procedures to facilitate
the alignment and harmonisation of donor support, so that they can synchronise
their pledges and disbursement cycles with national planning and budgeting cycles.
25 Others include the Broadcasting Services Act and the Censorship and Entertainment Act.
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(v) Strengthen parliamentary oversight and reinforce participatory approaches by

involving non-state actors the private sector, labour and civil society in the
process of developing an agricultural and food security policy.
3.2.3 Industrial and trade policies

Although agriculture is considered a major building block for reconstruction, particularly
in countries such as Zimbabwe, industrial and trade policies are (also) prioritised in
reconstruction situations. The latter was certainly the case during the Marshall Plan and
the JCRR, and should not be neglected in a transitional country such as Zimbabwe
(Giordano, 2011).
Hurungo (2007) argues that the country lacks a properly constructed trade policy or
framework for a specific period in which trade objectives, targets, policies and linkages
with other macroeconomic growth and development targets are clearly set out. There are
elements of industrial and trade policies in various policy documents (e.g. annual budgets,
industrial policy, Ministers pronouncements and the National Export Strategy Document)
(Mudzonga, 2009a). At one stage, the countrys trade strategy provisions were summarised
and incorporated in the draft (but not formally adopted) Industrial Policy (19962006),
which mainly recommended the use of appropriate fiscal measures and other incubation
arrangements to encourage the informal sector and small and medium enterprises,
and help informal enterprises to be integrated into the formal market (Mudzonga,
2009a). Another example is related to the STERP, which included the foundation for the
development of a more comprehensive industrial policy. However, it has been hampered
by the absence of comprehensive sectoral policies, and once again, as detailed above
its effectiveness has been further restricted by the lack of effective implementation.
Industry (and trade) policy provisions are very limited. The government is currently
developing the National Export Strategy document, which may form the foundation of
a formal trade policy document. Included in this document is the implementation of the
Look East Strategy, whose ideas have not yet translated into significant formal measures.
A diversification strategy of the countrys New Export Strategy, Look East is a deliberate
effort to diversify Zimbabwes exports to non-traditional markets, such as South Asia and
the Far East. Among other elements in the National Export Strategy are toll manufacturing;
development of a country product matrix; concessionary funding; posting of trade
promotion officers; trade and investment missions; trade facilitation; promotion of exports
by the media; quality certification; and promotion and implementation of programmes
that support exports by micro-, small and medium enterprises.
3.2.4 Integrated agricultural policy

Related to the previous subsection, to be effective, agriculture should be integrated with
other sectors and macroeconomic growth and development targets.
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Zimbabwe currently faces two major problems. First, it does not have an agricultural and
food security policy; and second, the country has not integrated its policy reflections within
a broader overall economic development framework. This largely explains why the country
has resorted to the adoption of ad hoc measures.
Zimbabwe has been attempting to create an agricultural policy since 1995. To date, there
have been four attempts at a national agriculture policy framework, but none has been
adopted or implemented so far. These attempts include:
(i) Zimbabwe Agricultural Policy Framework and Strategy, 19952020;
(ii) National Agricultural Strategy Framework, 20052035;
(iii) Agricultural Mission Statement Strategy Framework and Action Plan, 20072011; and
(iv) Zimbabwe Regional Agricultural Policy draft (also known as the Nyanga Document).26
Although the objectives of the attempted policies remained the same, shifts in international
relations, political priorities, the economic environment and land ownership have made
adoption difficult. The first three draft attempts were seen as not comprehensive, and the
processes of policy formulation and implementation faced several critical problems. First,
there has been widespread political interference, which has remained a major problem
as policymakers-cum-politicians drew political benefits from the policy implementation
process. Food aid and agricultural input programmes were implemented on a political basis
(Makumbe, 2009). Another important problem is that government has since adopted a
top-down approach, in which stakeholders have been marginalised in the development of
policies and strategies to address economic and political problems (Mano, 2001). Ministers
appear to have heavily influenced the policy process. The Agricultural Minister remains the
de facto policymaker, enabling him to disregard consultative processes. The latest Nyanga
Document, developed with national and international expertise (including from the FAO)
and based on a participatory process, seems to be neglected. Thus, the current processes
appear not only to lack inclusivity, but also to disregard technical information and advice
from experts. They also apparently fail to capitalise on local and international technical and
financial support.
Commitments to long-term policy priorities for production were overridden by short-term
consumption needs. In the absence of an agricultural and food security policy, Zimbabwe is
in short-term survival mode, with emergency strategies of subsidies, food aid imports and
relief efforts, at the expense of a long-term development strategy. The 2000 Government
Input Scheme, the 2004 Productive Sector Facility introduced through the RBZ, and the
Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (introduced in 2005 through the RBZ)
were designed as short-term stopgap measures financed from the mass printing of the
local currency (Hanke, 2008).
26 This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
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Given that Zimbabwe has neither an agricultural and food security policy nor an industrial
and trade policy, the country inevitably lacks an appropriately integrated agricultural
strategy. Although no fixed rule exists, particularly with participatory processes,
international experience suggests that the average time to develop an agricultural policy
is 20 months (UNDP, 2008). However, given that the FAO and relevant stakeholders have
already developed a comprehensive policy draft on agricultural policy related to the SADCs
Regional Agricultural Policy, this exercise may well take less time.
3.2.5 Social safety nets

Well-developed social safety nets have been a basis for sustainable development, mainly
through the establishment of an equitable and stable demand structure within a stable
society (ILO, 2010).
In the Zimbabwean case, there is no well-developed social security net. The government
established the National Social Security Authority in 1989, with two schemes, the National
Pension Scheme and the Workers Compensation Insurance Scheme. However, because
of the collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar, the latter became almost insignificant. Now fixed
at US$10, few families benefit from it.
The significant need for expanded social safety nets stems from two critical concerns,
namely high unemployment levels and the growing proportion of the population
living under US$1.25 per day. In the most recent updates, Zimbabwes unemployment
rate remained at 95% in 2009 and poverty rates were estimated at 68% in 2008.27
Updated information from the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) suggests
that 78% of the population was absolutely poor, while 55% was living under the food
poverty line (Schubert, 2010). Education and health were in a state of virtual collapse at
the height of the crisis, with government-run schools and hospitals closing down owing
to a lack of funds (OECD-DAC, 2008). With the implementation of STERP and STERP II,
which has stabilised the economy, macroeconomic reforms have been coupled with some
consideration of the necessary social safety nets to deal with the inevitable deflationary
impacts of the recovery adjustment processes. Social protection under STERP and STERP
II has emphasised the need for food and humanitarian assistance in the short term and
for strategically targeting vulnerable sectors, such as education and health (see the next
subsections). However, implementation and service delivery have remained poor, and the
requirements for recovery in areas such as social service delivery systems have not been
addressed.
Government and the donor community have, however, implemented short-term, ad hoc
emergency relief and subsidised input safety nets, in the form of food aid, free input
deliveries or input subsidies. These short-term interventions have so far, unlike in the
Malawian case, not yielded positive results. Instead, the combined effect of these
27 See: www.theodora.com.wfbcurrent/zimbabwe/zimbabwe_economy.html
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subsidised input interventions has arguably been to create dependency and significantly
distort markets. Concerns have been raised about their design, as evidenced by their lack
of production impact at national level (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe, 2010).
Suggestions have been raised about diversifying targeted and well-designed subsidies to
more economically regenerating activities, involving active private sector participation.
3.2.6 Conclusion on policy framework

Probably the most difficult hurdle to overcome is the total absence of a development
strategy. Successful post-conflict recovery is generally based on thorough development
strategies and policies, including agricultural and industrial policy; this is not the case in
Zimbabwe. Although primarily a sovereign issue, the development community and donors
could support policy development processes. This could include capacity building for the
different stakeholders of the agricultural sector (including government and non-state
actors) and developing discussion platforms to facilitate public debate. The issues detailed
in the section on the context are, however, a limiting factor.
In addition, it is necessary to focus on the articulation of agriculture and the wider economy,
particularly the industrial and manufacturing sectors. The key element is not solely to
enable production, but also to facilitate interaction between the different sectors. Lastly,
the role of safety nets, either social safety nets via public transfers or disguised safety nets
via more protectionist measures, cannot be ignored. The main challenge is to transform
emergency relief into safety nets and to ensure concomitant support to agriculture and the
other economic sectors.
3.3 Assistance
3.3.1 Zimbabwes short-term, year-on-year approach
In the context of the Marshall Plan and the JCCR, a multiple-year, long-term approach
to development assistance was followed. Development assistance lasted for several
years through diverse mechanisms. Even when the countries gradually took on their
own assistance, they continued to benefit from funds generated by past aid with the
establishment of specific economic and social development funds, supplied by both the
country and the donor(s). Where economic assistance lasted only a certain number of
years, these funds provided the necessary resources to continue. The funds were, however,
implemented in a way that neither created dependency nor constrained local/national
economic development (Kao, 1967).
In the Zimbabwean case, however, assistance was not only relatively low, it was also only
implemented on a short-term, year-on-year basis. These issues are related and associated
with the countrys international isolation. Zimbabwes aid decreased to US$150 billion in
2001 and US$190 billion in 2004, before rising again to pre-2000 heights of US$592 billion
in 2008 (Woods, 2005; OECD-DAC, 2010). This is relatively low compared to Senegals aid
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budget of between US$400 billion and US$800 billion for the last 20 years. The donors aim
to meet the production gap in order to alleviate food shortages, as assessed on a yearly
or seasonal basis. These are only emergency initiatives. As is the case with governments
agricultural measures, the current ad hoc approach of the donors to food aid and relief
efforts suggests that the donor sector also lacks an effective and sustainable long-term
development strategy. Assistance is being criticized for a lack of effort and ideas about
evolving from the current short-term emergency aid approach towards long-term
development strategies (Sukume & Guveya, 2009).
3.3.2 A country and target-specific approach

Experience of post-conflict reconstruction shows that country-specific plans based on
regional support strategies are better placed to rebuild states. The Marshall Plan extended
over the entire Western Europe, while the JCCR addressed the needs of Japan and Taiwan.
International and regional support to Zimbabwe has adopted a country-based or even a
target-specific approach, with subsidies and agricultural support initiatives being tailormade to suit socio-economic constraints and to reach the farmers most in need (Kapuya
et al., 2010). For example, SADCs provision of seed and fertiliser through the SADC
Agricultural Inputs Support Initiative (2008) primarily targeted Zimbabwes heterogeneous
smallholder sector in communal, old resettlement and small-scale commercial areas.
Over the years, the engagement of multiple (mainly Western) donors has been driven by
emergencies. This has seen food aid and fertiliser support to particular target regions,
generally focusing on the poorest households (mainly communal farmers the newly
resettled farmers were excluded). This is strongly related to the political atmosphere
in which the agricultural crisis is embedded and assistance is being rolled out (causing
international donors to avoid budgetary support). Assistance is thus far from being
regional, but is rather country and target-based.
Perhaps the only attempt at a regional plan has been the drawing up of the SADC Regional
Agricultural Policy, based on country submissions. Zimbabwe has not yet submitted
a draft for this policy. At continental level, projects needs have been drawn from the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) process (Government
of Zimbabwe, 2010).
3.3.3 The lack of donor-recipient consensus

In the main post-crisis reconstruction cases, there is donor-recipient consensus, whether
on the approach to take (the Marshall Plan) or the needs to be addressed (the JCRR).
This leads to coherent activities, supported by the different stakeholders.
The Zimbabwean case is very different, mainly because of the political and ideological
stances of both government and donors. On the one hand, the anti-occidental position
of the Presidency causes the government to oppose most proposals and initiatives of the
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donors. On the other hand, although to different degrees, the anti-government stance
taken by Western governments against Zimbabwes regime, mainly due to alleged human
rights abuses and political persecution, has created a political impasse that has affected
the manner of and approach to delivering aid. Decisions within these two different spheres
are made separately, and the implementation of the activities is disjointed.
As a result, international aid is channelled outside government structures and delivered
directly to communities. Aid activities are also implemented separately and have different
targets. Donors focus only on the traditionally communal lands and previously resettled A1
farms, whereas the government mainly targets the newly resettled A2 farms.28 This results
in a parallel system, with government and donors purposely acting separately.
The government views international aid organisations as representing anti-government
interests, mainly because of the political interests they represent.29 The government
therefore introduced the NGO Bill in 2004, which, though meant to create an enabling
environment for NGOs, was widely condemned as an institutional barrier curtailing civil
society. 30 Although NGOs have formed a self-regulatory, coordinated framework of
engagement in agricultural and food security fora, a clear lack of consensus is apparent.
This is especially reflected by the marginal participation of government in NGOimplemented projects and agricultural fora.
It can indeed be noted that the government and donors or the assistance community
do not interact or communicate with each other. The FAO-coordinated Agriculture
Coordination Working Group could, for example, have promoted joint interaction.
Although the government participates in this working group (and others), it sees it mainly
as an information-gathering tool, and does not engage effectively.31 The European Union,
in the framework of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), is looking into setting up a multistakeholder strategic reflection group, including the government as an effective participant.
This is yet to be implemented.32
3.3.4 Multiple donors, partially aligned

A major observation regarding the Marshall Plan and the JCRR success stories is the
presence of only one major donor in the reconstruction. This has led to a facilitated
donor-recipient consensus and common strategies for reconstruction (Giordano, 2011).
Alignment has two crucial elements. The first is that donors should align their support
around their partner countrys national development strategy documents, such as a Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper and agricultural and food security policies. They should also link
29 See: Presentation on civil societys impression of decentralisation in Zimbabwe. www.nango.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=43&Itemid=81.
30 See: Human rights protection under diminished funding.www.ngoconsultancyafrica.org/files/Human%20Rights%20Protection%20
Under%20Diminished%20Funding_0.pdf
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their funding to a single framework of conditions and performance indicators. In particular,

this means untying aid and synchronising pledging and disbursement cycles with national
planning and budgeting cycles. The second is that donors should align themselves to their
partner countrys institutional structures, systems and procedures, by strengthening them
and working through them (UNDP, 2008).
Regarding the first element, alignment with government strategies and policies seems
difficult at present. As noted, the lack of a donor-recipient consensus, combined with the
absence of well-defined and coherent policy frameworks in Zimbabwe, makes it impossible
to align these initiatives.
Regarding the second element, in contrast to Europe and Taiwan during their reconstruction
phases, numerous donors are engaged in Zimbabwe (see Chapter 4) for more detail on
the different actors, projects and effective coordination). There are three different groups
or coordination mechanisms. The United Nations cluster, and more particularly the FAO
for agriculture (through the Agricultural Coordination Working Group) and the WFP for
food aid (through the Food Assistance Working Group), coordinates food and agricultural
aid. It coordinates different projects, channels funds from several major donors, and
coordinates a significant international and national NGO network for the coherent
implementation of the projects (see Chapter 4). In addition, in order to develop an overall
coordination tool, it also tries to keep track of all other projects implemented outside
of this framework (for example, several bilateral projects).
A second group of donors is organised around the MDTF, headed by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. Established to channel
funds towards more strategic and agriculture-oriented approaches, it groups donors
with different generally firmer political stances towards Zimbabwe. If at first sight
these two entities seem complementary, it appears that very little collaboration takes place.
The MDTF is developing a matrix that groups all assistance projects, while the FAO has
been implementing a similar initiative (but which excludes many of the bilateral projects
of the MDTF-related donors).
A third group, which is often forgotten, is a less formally coordinated one; this type of
cooperation is mainly organised on a bilateral basis with Zimbabwes government or directly
with specific stakeholders (NGOs, civil society, farmers organisations, etc.). Coordination is
often weak and alignment with other donors rare. Several partners of the United Nations
and MDTF groups have additional bilateral projects/strategies a well-known one is DFIDs
Protracted Relief Programme (PRP). Other countries, such as France and Norway, also
engage on a bilateral basis. Countries that are not participating in these groups include
pan-African and emerging country donors. Very little information was available regarding
these donors, but it suggests that these should not be underestimated.33 South Africa
offered a bilateral loan of US$56.1 million, while China provided a loan of US$700 million
33 www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=74529
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to be used mainly in agriculture, mining, energy and tourism. A grant of US$950 million
is also being discussed with China.34 Other donors are SADC, Botswana and South Korea;
some are part of the governments Look East Strategy.
These groups are not exclusive, as several donors contribute to different groups. The European
Union, for example, contributes to the United Nations cluster and the MDTF. Many,
as detailed in Chapter 4 contribute to a group but still implement their own projects
bilaterally.
3.3.5 Funding certainly not matched by recipient

The post-crisis reconstruction cases are adamant on participation by the recipient countries:
assistance funding has to be matched by the recipient in order to sustain its engagement
and commitment. Europe and Taiwan progressively took over from the United States as the
main funder, even for emergency assistance (Kao, 1976).
The collapse of the economy, the inflationary effects of its measures, and their lack of
sustainability and production impact resulted in the government lacking both the strategy and
the financial resources to meet aid, relief efforts and subsidies. With inadequate resources,
funding from the Zimbabwean government has been poor (UNDP, 2008). In agriculture,
donors are currently providing 60% of the sectors resources, while government can only
afford 40% (FAO, 2010).
Zimbabwe has not been able to provide global funding for overall development, neither
was it in a position to fund many of the projects decided on. Since 1995, Zimbabwe has
spent between 2% and 7.5% of its annual budget on agriculture. This falls short of the
CAADP recommendations that African countries should allocate at least 10% of their
national budgets to agriculture in order to enhance food security and rural development.
The failure to provide adequate budget support has led to an underfunding of agricultural
support services and infrastructural development, as well as the governments priority projects
(Anseeuw & Wambo, 2008). Regarding Zimbabwes short-term projects, in particular,
the strategic grain reserve/food security measures have not been effectively implemented
due to inadequate GMB financing (Sukume & Guveya, 2009). Also, in 2009, the government
failed to import grain to meet a critical food deficit and relied on donors and commercial
imports to stabilise grain supply.
3.3.6 Concluding remarks on foreign assistance

Alignment difficulties between the Zimbabwean government and development partners
complicate the coordination of donor assistance. These difficulties are related to the donors
relationships with the recipient country and the lack of strategic orientation. Significant
34 www.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/Chinese-Government-Signs-US700-Million-Loan-to-Support-Zimbabwes-Agriculture-and-HealthSectors-118382889.html
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progress could be made if donors and the government engaged in long-term planning,
ensuring a shift from relief to development, and implemented a genuine demand-driven
approach. This could include, for example, a country contribution to guarantee a high level
of ownership, and follow a process that supports the development path of the region.
Efforts are needed to address the institutional barriers to such a situation. First, related
to the previous two sections on Context and Policy, there is a need for the government
to engage in strategic reflection and broad restructuring. Second, renewed engagement
between development partners and the government is required. Although the trust fund
model and a multi-stakeholder strategic reflection group, which includes the government
as an effective participant, represent progress, they lack a long-term perspective, have a
limited strategic orientation, and may not have proof of buy-in by the government and
other local stakeholders.
3.4 Current principles of action to meet development needs

3.4.1 Humanitarian aid prevails, lack of development approach
In successful post-crisis reconstruction cases, emergency and humanitarian activities went
hand in hand with development (Giordano, 2011).
In Zimbabwe, the government and donors/development partners have been responding to
the needs of temporarily and chronically hungry people on a large scale in recent years,
through various schemes based on the targeted transfer of food and, lately, agricultural
inputs (see Chapter 4). Increasingly, the humanitarian relief programmes have sought
to focus on consolidating the livelihoods of the recipients in an attempt to generate
supplementary household incomes and thereby reduce the need for future welfare
transfers. Nonetheless, reports from civic groups have not only cited the politicisation
of aid by government as a constraint to the scope and scale of effective aid assistance
to vulnerable communities, they have also pointed to the prevailing, and sometimes
counterproductive, humanitarian approach (Makumbe, 2009).
While the cumulative benefit of the relief transfers has been substantial, the channelling
of resources for consumption under humanitarian assistance (and, de facto, under some
livelihood/maize input schemes) at the expense of a long-term strategy for productivity
growth have led to households remaining in non-viable enterprises and descending into
dependency on handouts (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe, 2010). It also led,
through the distribution of subsidised inputs, to dysfunctional markets and value chains,
destabilising the local rural economies. As such, the World Bank and the Government of
Zimbabwe (2010) report that in the context of the gradual shift of agriculture from less
to more efficient processes, humanitarian food transfers have perverse economic side
effects in assessing the risks and potential returns of farm enterprises, off-farm incomegenerating alternatives, or physical relocation to more productive areas or towns. The relief
and development assistance, therefore, advances the cause of economic reform only to a
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limited extent. The current operational framework of aid and humanitarian support seems
to acknowledge these links with development insufficiently.
In response to these issues, new approaches have been developed over the past two years
in order to, on top of the humanitarian assistance, revive household production and the
rural economy:
Donors, mainly coordinated through the FAO, have started delivering aid for food
and, mainly, agricultural inputs as monetary vouchers, trying to revitalise rural market
linkages.
Several NGOs, including the GRM consortium (see Chapter 4), have implemented
renewed approaches focusing on market development and value chain reconstruction.
Market studies and investment studies, which focus on the areas that are prioritised
under the CAADP process (by the government of Zimbabwe), the Zimbabwe Agricultural
Sector Assistance (ZASA) programme (by the World Bank and MDTF), and the USAID
strategic investment planning documents.
Although some donors have continued to provide input aid, they now focus more on
the poorest and most vulnerable elements of society, with the provision of vaccines,
prophylactics, antiretroviral drugs to fight HIV/AIDS and, crucially, food. Limited funds
have also been channelled towards specific and well-identified local community-based
recovery initiatives, as well as in support of work in the areas of governance, democracy
and human rights.
In addition to these renewed approaches, Zimbabwe needs a paradigm shift and a
transformation towards sustainable agricultural production that frees the country from
aid dependency. On the one hand, although the United Nations cluster, particularly the
FAO, engages in such reflections regarding agriculture, its activities have been mainly
oriented towards the organisation and coordination of emergency assistance. On the other,
the MDTF group, promoting a more strategic and long-term approach to development,
has been criticised for limiting its activities to conducting preliminary studies, without
directly engaging in development.35 This being said, although donors have to engage in
such approaches, it is also necessary for the government, inclusively, to develop its own
long-term strategies and policies. The European Union is implementing a multi-stakeholder
strategic reflection group in the framework of the MDTF, which includes the government
as effective participant; this is a welcome initiative (a Programmatic MDTF is being created,
linked to the African Development Bank (AfDB)).
3.4.2 Technical assistance

Technical assistance is an important part of post-crisis reconstruction, and is certainly
needed in the case of Zimbabwe, which is seriously affected by brain drain and financial
constraints.
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Technical assistance from international partners mainly involves capacity and programme
support. For instance, an IMF mission visited Harare in June 2010 to review recent economic
developments and assist the government in the preparation of the 2010 mid-year budget
statement. Another example is the FAO technical support to the agricultural draft policy,
which has not been adopted. In addition, international technical assistance in various
sectors has improved the timeliness and quality of data reporting and is contributing to
progress on economic policies.
However, such technical support remains very limited, in view of three factors. First, there
are political and ideological differences between the government and donors, which
limit direct engagement. Second, Zimbabwe remains in a humanitarian rather than a
developmental, and more technical, mode. Third, there is a lack of long-term, well-defined
strategies and policies, particularly on agricultural and economic development.
3.4.3 Lack of private sector engagement in Zimbabwe

The Marshall Plan and JCRR show that, although there certainly is a role for the state,
development has to be carried by the private sector (Giordano, 2011). However, this is
almost non-existent in Zimbabwe, mainly because of past policies.
The mixed results of the ESAP in the 1990s led to indifferent private sector participation
in agricultural markets during the market control era of 2000 to 2008 (UNDP, 2008).
A combination of government-instituted price controls, poorly developed subsidy
programmes, and a prohibitive hyperinflationary and macroeconomic environment has
contributed to the stifling and crowding out of private sector investment in agriculture
(UNDP, 2008). While some private partners (and also private-public partnerships) remain
in the agricultural sector (such as Cottco, Quton and British American Tobacco), and
international seed companies such as Pannar continue to operate in Zimbabwe, a negative
business environment hampers the development of the private sector.36 Three major aspects
can be put forward:
The absence of property rights, particularly in the context of nationalised land:
The resulting lack of collateral has discouraged the engagement of financial institutions.37
The lack of financial services, linked to the previous point, but also due to the overall
collapse of the economy: Only two major, but financially constrained, commercial
banks remain.38
The extremely high risk of doing business, without well-developed insurance
mechanisms: These risks are related to the political environment, as well as the
overall infrastructural constraints (roads, electricity, etc.) and economic fluctuations.39
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3.4.4 No debt relief, no budget support, but tied aid instead

Between 1999 and 2009, Zimbabwe accumulated a US$6.7 billion combined external debt
to the IMF, the World Bank and the AfDB. It lost its credit rating in 2001 when it defaulted
on IMF loans. The country relied almost exclusively on borrowing, while suffering limited
foreign direct investment and a sharp economic decline. This, in turn, worsened its debt
repayment prospects (Manyuchi, 2010). One alternative source of finance was concessional
loans from China, but these have been irregular and linked to specific conditions.
In his 2010 Budget Statement, the Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, noted that cooperating
partners had promised to channel resources to projects prioritised by the government.
It estimated that US$1.4 billion of the US$2.2 billion budget would be funded through
internal resources, while a vote of credit for US$810 million was expected to come from
external sources.40 However, the government only managed to secure US$35 million in
external budget support, US$30 million of which came from neighbouring South Africa
and the remainder from China (New Ziana, 2010).
Traditional donors from the international community have remained reluctant to release
international funding support, owing to unsatisfactory progress within the GNU towards
the implementation of political and economic reforms. These include a new Constitution,
a cessation of political violence and human rights abuses, the adoption of media reforms
to promote freedom of speech and expression, the repeal of repressive legislation, and
general good governance (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2006). Prospects for debt
relief depend on the countrys political and governance practices, as detailed in Article 96
of the Cotonou Agreement on Zimbabwe-European Union relations or as recommended
by the IMF economic restructuring policies in various sectors of the economy, including
agriculture (IMF, 2010).
Due to the political impasse between Zimbabwe and Western governments since 2000, tied
and untied aid from the United States and the European Union has declined significantly.
As a counterstrategy, Zimbabwe adopted its Look East Strategy, strengthening bilateral
ties with non-Western governments, such as Iran, China and Russia, as it looked for
non-Western sources of international support. It also looked for regional assistance and
received tied aid from South Africa and Botswana. In 2009, Zimbabwe received a bilateral
loan of US$56.1 million from South Africa, US$70 million from Botswana and a grant of
US$950 million from China, when it started rebuilding its economy after the inception
of the GNU.41 It also secured additional credit lines of US$250 million from the African
Export-Import Bank (Afrexim) and US$400 million credit to revive its manufacturing sector
from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).42
40 The 2010 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review, presented by the Minister of Finance, Hon. T Biti, MP, 14 July 2010.
41 www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=74529
42 www.zimbabwemetro.com/finance/afrexim-extends-us250m-credit-for-economic-reconstruction/
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3.4.5 Mutual regional security

Political security in Zimbabwe has been a major concern within SADC, and the political
and socio-economic instability has been handled at various levels within SADCs regional
institutions (Matlosa & Lotshwao, 2010). Specifically, the Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security Cooperation of SADC has been handling the protracted political negotiations
around setting up the GNU.43 Nonetheless, SADC political protection has been weak, owing
to its inability to deal effectively with the political crisis in Zimbabwe. This was related
to the confusing stances of its members towards Zimbabwe: although its reforms and
measures were publicly criticised, many supported the country either bilaterally or through
silent diplomacy (Alden & Anseeuw, 2009). Amid regional security concerns, Zimbabwes
own national defence security has been strong. The country has not seen any serious threat
to its national independence in the form of civil wars, with the exception of pockets of
politically motivated post-election violence, since the ethnic strife in the 1980s. It currently
remains relatively stable, despite lengthy political negotiations within the GNU.
The SADC tribunal, an organ that deals with regional legal issues, ruled in November
2008 that the governments post-2000 land resettlement programme, which compulsorily
acquired white-owned commercial farms, was illegal on the grounds of racial
discrimination, infringement of private property rights, and human rights abuse. Under the
2005 constitutional amendment that allowed the seizure of white-owned farms without
compensation, the government was deemed to have violated international law. However,
the Zimbabwean government did not recognise the SADC order protecting the property
rights of white commercial farms that resisted government eviction (Human Rights
Annual Report, 2007). Although the farmers made a formal request to the SADC tribunal
that the Zimbabwean government be held in contempt for ignoring the 2008 ruling, the
government of Zimbabwe has not responded to calls by the regional body to desist from
the continued eviction of white farmers (Matyszak, 2010). The Tribunals soft stance against
Zimbabwe in this regard has revealed that SADC, as a regional body dealing with member
states, is a very weak organisation whose engagement is loose and whose decisions are
non-binding and, therefore, ineffective.
3.4.6 Concluding remarks on principles of action

The importance of humanitarian aid cannot be denied. It should be emphasised, however,
that this has to be combined with a developmental approach, requiring technical assistance
and an unconstrained private sector. Therefore, economic conditions, stability and
trust have to be restored and capacity should be available. Zimbabwes debt should not
represent a constraint for the countrys reconstruction. Debt relief should be considered
once governance and policy issues have been resolved. At the same time, development
43 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation is led by a troika of Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola. Swazilands King
Mswati III is the current chairperson, and the Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, is the deputy chair.
Page 87

strategies should focus on revitalising the private sector. Thereby avoiding (partly) the
governance/government issues, it will facilitate the shift from assistance to development.
In order to enable this shift, development cooperation could assist by providing technical
assistance to the government as well as NGOs, civil society and private sector organisations.
Once again, this can only happen if the prerequisites detailed in the previous sections
are met.
3.5 T
he need for a well-defined, holistic approach, including
government and donors
Using the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Model, four major conclusions can be drawn about
the reconstruction of Zimbabwe:
(i) The first is contextual, relating to the need for political stability and a democratic
government and governance system, backed up by political will and human and
institutional capacity.
(ii) The second is related to the policy framework, emphasising the significance of
well-established, country-owned macro and sectoral policies. It also stresses a
broad approach, highlighting the integration of agricultural and industrial policies.
(iii) The third underlines the importance of aid that is well-organised, long-term and
matched by and aligned with the recipients strategies.
(iv) Although the importance of humanitarian aid is not denied, it has to be combined
with a developmental approach, requiring technical assistance and an unconstrained
private sector.
Although significant progress is being made, particularly since the establishment of the
GNU, many of the abovementioned conditions are not being met in Zimbabwe. First, this
draws attention to the rather fragile situation evolving in Zimbabwe. The growth expected
in agriculture during the 2010/11 season might thus be a one-off, and its impact on the
evolution of Zimbabwes socio-economic situation might be limited. The fundamentals
for a solid, longer-term reconstruction are yet to be reinforced. Second, as detailed
in this chapter, these different elements (categorised in the four groups) are not only
essential to Zimbabwes reconstruction, but they are also highly interconnected. Indeed,
many of the issues detailed, including those affecting or caused by donors, are related
to the broader governance, socio-economic and political situation. In order to engage
effectively in post-crisis reconstruction, these prerequisites will have to be addressed. Third,
it stresses the many initiatives still to be implemented for Zimbabwe to follow a longterm, sustainable development trajectory. In order to build on the progress made, a more
detailed identification and description of the projects and initiatives being implemented
are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Actors and projects: Coordination and alignment
To complement Chapter 3 on the post-crisis reconstruction of Zimbabwes agricultural
sector, Chapter 4 provides an in-depth description of the institutional environment and
the different programmes and projects implemented in Zimbabwes agriculture and
food security sectors, outlining the current structure of the sectors. In the first section,
the chapter elaborates on all the stakeholders, how they function, and how they are
coordinated in order to respond to the countrys agriculture and food security issues.
A second section details the different projects being implemented.
4.1 Institutional description of actors

In contrast to public opinion (particularly outside Zimbabwe, influenced by superficial
media reporting), as shown in Chapter 2, Zimbabwes agricultural and rural sectors are
still active and relatively well organised. This stems partly from the well-structured
agricultural sector characterising Zimbabwe before 2000.
The major difference is the prominent role of the donor and development community,
characterised by a significant set of actors ranging from international humanitarian
agencies to local NGOs (see Figure 4.1) These institutions complement the implementation
of basic functions (Government of Zimbabwe and UNDP, 2006).
4.1.1 Government of Zimbabwe and the public sector in transition

The arm of government responsible for agriculture and food security is the Ministry of
Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (MoAMID), which has a number
of service departments and parastatals under its jurisdiction (see Box 4.1). These parastatals,
established in the colonial era (except the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority),
were initially created to assist farmers in financing and marketing their produce. However,
by carrying out the MoAMIDs policies and regulations, they became its implementing
arm in an increasingly controlled economy, particularly after 2000. Interventions included
controlling the prices of inputs, regulating grain imports, and prescribing the marketing of
agricultural produce, especially grains.
As such, parastatals have been playing a very political role in the economy. In the last
decade, they have been used as an executive arm of the government and as conduits
for government projects, such as distributing often at own cost subsidised inputs to
communal and resettled farmers (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2003). To further compound
this centralisation of power, there was a blurring of the distinction between, previously,
state and party and, today, government and party. This led to the Minister, and even the
President, together with his and the partys supreme decision-making bodies, such as
the Politburo, to engage directly with the parastatals and with agricultural/economic
decision-making (Mano, 2001). Note that in the framework of the GNU, agriculture remains
under the former ruling party, with significant executive powers vested in the Minister.
Page 89

Government of Zimbabwe
ZANU PF
OCHA
WFP
Politburo
FAO
UNICEF
RBZ
UNHCR
UNDP
MoAMID
Agritex
Research
and
Specialist
Services
Irrigation
Services
Veterinary
services
Mechanisation
Donors
Education
and
training
Services
MDTF
Economics
and
Marketing
Parastatals
Tobacco
Industry
Marketing
Board
Cold
Storage
Company
Tobacco
Research
Board
Grain
Marketing
Board
Agricultural
and Rural
Development
Authority
Agricultural
Marketing
Authority
Working
groups
Agri
Bank
Pig
Industry
Board
Regional
organisations
Private
Companies
Research
institutions
Farmers Unions
ZCFU
Local NGOs
ZFU
NGOs
CFU
International
NGOs
Figure 4.1: Institutional description of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe

Source: Compiled by authors.
Page 90

Many of the public and government projects were decided in the Presidency and
implemented often at own cost by the parastatals and local government departments.
As a result, the parastatals accrued large debts. The increasingly cash-strapped government
then relied on the RBZ to fund state programmes directly, mainly through the printing
of currency. The RBZ, therefore, became the de facto economic manager of the country
in every ministry, and the implementing agency of agricultural policy.44 RBZ projects in
the agricultural sector included the provision of food, subsidised inputs, free fuel and
mechanisation equipment (see later in this chapter for detailed lists).
Box 4.1: Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development
MoAMID has seven departments. Economics and Marketing is concerned with resource
use, pricing policies, the marketing of agricultural production, and development and
trade. The Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex) is
responsible for crop and livestock assessment. Research and Specialist Services
carries out agricultural research. Veterinary Services is for livestock and disease
control. Irrigation Development is a new department, mandated to design and
implement irrigation to support especially the new farmers. Mechanisation, another
new department, is tasked with sourcing agricultural mechanisation equipment
and providing technical services. Education and Training provides relevant technical
and professional training and information in the science and practice of agriculture.
Besides the six departments, MoAMID runs seven parastatals:

Tobacco Industry Marketing Board: The Board is responsible for marketing tobacco
through the dual marketing system, that is, the contract and auction systems.
It approves buyers and controls the auctioning.
Tobacco Research Board: The Board is a statutory body mandated to direct, control
and conduct research on tobacco. It undertakes both long-term research and shortterm advisory and support services on request from growers and merchants.
Cold Storage Commission (CSC): The CSC has the only slaughter facilities approved
for exports to the European Union. Until the disruptions in beef production due
to the land reforms, it used to process all meat exported to the European Union.
There are no European Union exports anymore, and the depletion of the national
herd has significantly reduced CSC operations.
Grain Marketing Board (GMB): The GMB is the central marketer of grain and
a state food security reserve. It is sometimes used as a distribution channel for
state subsidies. It plays a central role in the governments market interventions,
especially in producer prices.

Agribank: The government-owned agriculture finance house is currently
financially strained.
44 Personal communication: Interviewed during research project, 2 June 2010.
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Agricultural and Rural Development Authority: The Authority runs farming projects
that use agriculture as a tool for rural development. It long relied on donor
funding, but this has since dried up for political reasons. Facing viability problems,
the Authority has reduced its operations and retrenched a large staff complement.

Agricultural Marketing Authority: The Authority has recently been reintroduced
after being disbanded in 1993. It is to regulate and supervise the marketing of
agricultural produce to ensure fairness in the sector. It is still acquiring offices
and equipment.

Pig Industry Board: The Boards mandate is to develop the countrys pig industry
from breeding to marketing, and its major responsibility is to support smallholder
farmers adequately.
Source: Authors.
Since 2009, with the enactment of the GNU and the forced liberalisation of the economy
(see Chapter 2), these institutions have been in a process of restructuring. Institutionally,
besides the official adoption of the United States dollar in March 2009 (which reduced
inflation) and opening up the economy both locally and regionally, major restructurings
include:

The amendment of the RBZ Act to outlaw the quasi-fiscal activities, namely the
funding of projects related to the dominant party and other expenditures through
public funds and in the name of government (Ploch, 2010); and

The restructuring of parastatals, including the GMB, to focus on their viable core
business (IMF, 2009).
However, beyond the political crisis, the state is still very weak and measures are
being implemented only partially, owing to a lack of financial and human capacity and
the absence of genuine motivation for transformation among dominant stakeholders
(Mano, 2001). For example, the government still does not have an agricultural policy
(see Chapter 3). In addition, some state interventions continue: the GMB, ordered by the
President, acquired maize at much more than the market price (at US$275/mt), destabilising
the markets and putting itself under financial constraints, as it was impossible to retail
the maize at a profit.
These incomplete reforms, at least according to the international community (ZimOnline,
2010), have major consequences. The first is an extension of the international sanctions
against Zimbabwe. With the economy and the government, including the MoAMID, being
resource-strained and not receiving any budgetary support, the private sector is not reviving
and very few public programmes are being rolled out. The agricultural and food security
sectors still have to rely on donor funds. The second is a poor working relationship between
the government and donors or the development community. ZANU PF is very hostile
Page 92

towards the donors; not only are projects not implemented together, but the government
also sometimes limits donor activities. In 2008, the then ZANU PF-led government banned
Western-sponsored NGOs (Otto, 2009). Earlier in 2011, the MoAMID prohibited donorsupported information services from carrying out harvest estimates (only the governments
estimates are allowed and only these estimates will be used).45 Because of this strained
relationship, donors have been reluctant to channel aid through government departments.
Instead, they work directly with NGOs and farmers unions to implement their projects,
logically questioning the relevance of cooperation and alignment as driving principles in
such a situation.
4.1.2 Donors and development agencies coordinated but not aligned

Donors have been providing critical funding for projects in the country, especially post2000. Although they used to contribute funds to government programmes through
budgetary support, this has ceased and funds are disbursed through several other channels.
Until recently, these funds have mainly been for emergency support. Before the end of
each cropping season, FEWS NET forecasts the harvest and the national food requirements.
If any shortfalls between the forecast and government-planned initiatives are expected, the
international community is warned through what is called a Consolidated Appeal Process.
This quantifies the food needs and launches the process of identifying vulnerable groups.
This process is coordinated by the ZimVAC, which comprises the government, United
Nations agencies (the WFP and the FAO) and NGOs. Once the assessments have been done,
relief aid from the Consolidated Appeal Process (once received) comes through the WFP.
Lately, the PRP has also been providing food aid. The WFP and the PRP do not implement
the projects on the ground; this is the responsibility of subcontracted international and
local NGOs (FAO, 2010).
In 2007, in order to deal with the significant amount of aid flowing into Zimbabwe, the
United Nations agencies decided to form different clusters according to their field of
expertise. Eight clusters were formed, with each United Nations agency leading a cluster.
These are the FAO (agriculture), the UNDP (livelihoods), UNICEF (education and nutrition),
the WFP (emergency food aid), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) (coordination of humanitarian assistance), the World Health Organization (WHO)
(health), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (protection). These clusters are established to
coordinate emergency responses in the different sectors. In addition, around the same
time, working groups were created to coordinate the implementing NGOs on the ground.
These included the major stakeholders directly engaged at local or ward level, such as
government, donors and NGOs (see Box 4.2).
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Box 4.2: Seven working groups46

Agriculture Coordination Working Group: Chaired and funded by the FAO, this
Working Group brings together NGOs, donors and government representatives.
It meets monthly and coordinates agricultural and food security projects. NGOs
provide information on what they are doing in which districts. The government
also gives updates on its projects and areas of need. At this platform, the
Agricultural and Food Security Monitoring System, consisting of the FAO,
Agritex and FEWS NET, shares its latest findings. FEWS NET is an organisation
that forecasts crop harvests.

Market Linkage Working Group:46 This working group links small farmers with the
market, specifically organising them into groups to work with private companies.
It also maintains a database to link smallholder farmers with markets. It provides
market intelligence information for dissemination, especially to remote smallholder
farmers. This is the only working group to include the private sector. It also works
with donors, farmers unions, the government and a financial institution (Standard
Chartered Bank). It is funded by the Dutch agency SNV.

Livestock Working Group: This working group works with the veterinary
department in government. The forum brings together the main players in
the livestock sector to discuss topical livestock issues. Representatives of the
government, farmers unions, NGOs, United Nations agencies, donors and other
stakeholders constitute the meetings. The group produces technical guidelines
and project models, and promotes ideas for uptake. It is co-chaired by the FAO
and the government. This is the only working group where the government has
an active role, because of its Extension Departments comprehensive rural network.

Food Assistance Working Group: Chaired by the WFP, this group provides food
security updates, as well as the monitoring and distribution of aid. It also offers
logistical support to other United Nations agencies. The group comprises donors,
NGOs and government.

Conservation Agriculture Working Group: Conservation agriculture is being
promoted and practiced in Zimbabwe as a sustainable agricultural technology
that increases crop productivity, while preserving and conserving the environment.
The FAO chairs a taskforce comprising representatives from donor agencies,
local and international NGOs, United Nations agencies, important ministries
such as MoAMID and Local Government, academics, researchers and interested
individuals.The taskforce meets bimonthly to share experiences and sound
practices emanating from the implementation of conservation agriculture.
This group seems to be the most open, as it allows any interested party to
participate.
46 www.mlwg.co.zw
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Gardens Working Group: Formed in 2004, this group is chaired by the FAO.
Its purpose is to provide a forum that promotes dialogueon current and
emerging issues in rural and urban gardens and to facilitate the exchange
ofimprovedpractice and strategic information and experiences, so as to
ensure closer collaboration and networking between partners in the area
of household gardens. Gardens are sources of nutritional diversity and food
security. The group comprises representatives from donor agencies, local
and international NGOs, United Nations agencies, government (MoAMID and
Local Government), academics, researchers and interested individuals.It meets
once a month to share experiences and sound practices.

Cash Working Group: More donors are now using vouchers and cash transfers
instead of giving free inputs. NGOs involved in the cash projects meet to share
lessons and coordinate. This group comprises only NGOs.
Source: Authors
Although the United Nations framework significantly enhances the structuring and
coordination of emergency help, several issues do appear. First, it coordinates only part
of the assistance. Several donors with different political/ideological stances and assistance
practices have decided not to channel their assistance through the United Nations
framework. Second, it only coordinates and is mainly oriented to emergency assistance.
There is a lack of joint programming between donors. Also needed is a constructive
reflection on more strategic, long-term engagements that would allow a shift towards
more development-oriented approaches. Third, although the government takes part in the
different working groups, it does not contribute effectively, making the working groups
a gathering of donors, bilateral and multilateral donors, and NGOs.
In 2008/09, led by the World Bank, development partners and multilateral agencies in
Zimbabwe agreed on an approach to strategic analysis that anticipated re-engagement
and renewed cooperation with the government (World Bank, 2008a). This contributed to
analytical work on important development challenges facing Zimbabwe. Broader in scope,
the aim is to support the transition of the country from an aid dependent humanitarian
situation to a developmental state of recovery by supporting several themes, including
agrarian issues, social protection, infrastructure rehabilitation, economic analysis and
private sector output (World Bank, 2008a). Officially, although the government is still
excluded from the implementation of donor funds, with support from the European Union,
the MDTF should create a platform for government, donors, civil society and the private
sector to regroup and re-engage.
Chaired by USAID, the Agrarian Sector Technical Review Group, one of the five MDTF pillars,
has engaged in several studies focusing on agricultural assessments and policy issues.
Page 95

Although criticised for not having implemented effective development projects,47 it has
funded PRPs, even though they are humanitarian projects. While its stated objectives seem
complementary to those of the FAO cluster, they operate separately. Except for donors such
as the European Union, those that contribute to one48 do not contribute to the other.
Besides these two coordination entities, several donors also contribute bilaterally,
directly to implementing NGOs. There are three major reasons for donors to cooperate
bilaterally: 1) their home governments diverse stances regarding their engagement with
Zimbabwe; 2) the visibility of their work and cooperation; and 3) the implementation
of renewed approaches to reconstruction. Most bilateral assistance focuses on renewed
approaches to support development: they mainly fund market-oriented approaches, value
chain programmes, agri-dealer establishment, contract farming development, and the
like. Examples of such bilateral agreements include the SNV, which sponsors agro-dealer
promotions in communal areas. Germany, through the Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is funding conservation farming, while the Danish
and Finnish Red Cross Societies provided farming inputs for the 2010/11 season (see
detailed list in the second part of this chapter).
While certainly relevant, their individual implementation might lead to uncoordinated
activities and duplication on the ground.
4.1.3 Organised and well-structured but weak civil society

and private sector
NGOs
Within the context of sanctions, the NGOs are in charge of the implementation of the
projects from donor groups and multilateral and bilateral institutions. They work with
donors but not with government. Until the 2009/10 season, their projects were mainly
related to food aid, coordinated by the WFP. Afterwards, their efforts began to move
towards agricultural inputs, coordinated by the FAO. Now these projects have taken a more
sustainable approach, with inputs distribution, conservation farming, livestock production
and irrigation development as the major projects.
Although the government and donors work separately in planning projects, it is different
at the level of implementation. There is much coordination, first among the implementing
NGOs, and then between the NGOs and other stakeholders. This is mainly achieved
through the FAOs established mechanism that coordinates the implementation of NGO
work. Besides establishing several working groups through which NGOs, government,
donors and other stakeholders meet (detailed above), a database of each NGOs activities
and geographical engagement is kept, allowing the structuring and coordination of the
NGO sector. To this end, it was decided that only one NGO should be active per ward.
48 T
he Agrarian Sector Technical Review Group has 12 donors, including USAID, DFID, the European Union, GTZ, Swiss Cooperation,
AusAID, Dutch Cooperation, the World Bank, Finnida, South Africa, Norway and Japan.
Page 96

Box 4.3: NGOs engaged in Zimbabwes agricultural sector

There are 70 NGOs operating in the Zimbabwean agrarian sector. Fewer than half of
these are international. They include World Vision International; GOAL; Concern; CARE
International; Zimbabwe Catholic Relief Services; Oxfam GB; the Southern African Aids
Trust (SAT); the Red Cross; the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development; International
Relief and Development; Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom); Plan International;
Christian Aid; Action Contre la Faim; ActionAid; Adventist Development and Relief
Agency; German Agro-Action; Health, Education, Literacy Programme (HELP); COSV;
TDHA; AAID; Cordaid; Concern; Mercy Corps and many others. International NGOs
have a coalition, the International Non-Governmental Organisations.
Local NGOs vary in size and operations. While some are national and other provincial,
many more are operating at district or ward level. There are estimated to be up to
a 1000 national NGOs, including those dealing with non-agricultural issues (Otto,
2009). The bigger, better-known ones include the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society,
Lead Trust, Africare, Khula Sizwe Trust, Practical Action, RUDO, Tsuro dzeChimanimani,
Hope Tariro Troicare, Zimbabwe Community Development Trust, Farm Community
Trust of Zimbabwe, Cluster Agricultural Development Services, CTC, E Africa, Africa
2000, River of Life, HIV/AIDS Zimbabwe, the Lower Guruve Development Association
and others. The National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations represents
all NGOs, local and international. This body coordinates NGO activity at national
level, negotiates operational guidelines with the government, and assists member
organisations in acquiring donor funds. However, it remains very discreet.
The NGO sector remains rather fragile and donor-dependent. Considering their relationship
with international donors, NGOs have a difficult relationship with the government, which
does not allow them to engage constructively in Zimbabwes reconstruction (through
policy reflection, lobbying, and the like). In addition, their position as implementers
of donor projects (mainly of emergency assistance) distances them from more strategic
engagement around structural reconstruction of the agricultural sector, while also making
them dependent on external and probably temporary funding sources.
Farmers unions
Zimbabwe has three main farmers groups, as discussed in Box 3.3. Again, although well
organised, they are characterised by a dwindling capacity to influence.
The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), grouping the previous large-scale commercial
farmers, has lost its influence in the sector. Disposed of land through the FTLRP, the CFU
Page 97

lost most of its members. Currently advocating for compensation for farms taken by
government, it has tabled proposals to government regarding the revival of commercial
farming. While mainly providing legal support for farm compensations, it is reorienting
itself towards the implementation of projects in collaboration with NGOs. In order to
access funds, some propose that the CFU should become an NGO looking after the welfare
of displaced white farmers.49
The Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU) groups mainly newly resettled farm
owners. Close to government, it is likely to become the commercial farming voice in
the near future, if it can organise itself well enough to be financially and institutionally
sustainable. With most of its members being influential in civil service, the army, the police,
the judiciary, politics and business, ZCFU occupies a powerful position, particularly as an
indigenous union with patriotic (black) members. It has a more politically acceptable image
than the CFU and appeals to pan-African ideals, but it is questionable whether the ZCFU
will position itself to lobby government. Newly reformed, it is struggling to operate and
its functions have not been fully established because of limited funding. Also, the union is
torn apart by internal conflicts.
The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) is Zimbabwes largest agricultural union, representing
communal and previously resettled small-scale farmers. Financially very limited owing to
its base of poorer farmers, it is largely dependent on government support. Currently, given
governments financial limitations, ZFUs main support is from the European Union, related
to conservation farming, input assistance and capacity building projects. With very little
organisational, financial and leadership capacity (it has had the same president for the
last 20 years), it has always been pro-government, usually lacking an independent voice.
Box 4.4: Zimbabwes farmers unions

Commercial Farmers Union (CFU): The CFU was formed in 1905 as the Rhodesia
Agriculture Union, consisting of white, large-scale commercial farmers who were
owner-managers on private land. Until 2000, CFU had about 4000 members.
The colonial government assisted by underwriting commercial agriculture, a
preserve for white farmers, with financial assistance for research, advice, credit
and transport. During this colonial period, white farmers had a strong voice,
since the CFU had political influence through parliamentary representation (some
of their members were in Parliament). This influence continued for a while after
independence, especially from 1980 to 1985, as the then Minister of Agriculture
was a former CFU president. Severely affected by the 2000 land reform programme
(which forcibly dispossessed white farmers of their land without compensation),
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fewer than 400 CFU members still own land. Although the SADC regional court
ruled in their favour (see Chapter 3), the government of Zimbabwe refuses to
accept the court ruling. The lack of government support, depleted membership,
and reduced financial contributions have severely weakened the operations of the
CFU. Some of their more radical members have formed a pressure group Justice for
Agriculture to confront government on the issue of compensation, but they have
largely been ignored.

Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU): The ZCFU was formed in 1945 as
the African Farmers Union, later named the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union.
Membership was from the then African Purchase Land owners, with about 9500
members. These farms were small-scale commercial enterprises, on land not
demanded by white farmers. Farms measured 80200 ha, on freehold tenure.
This group had no influence under the colonial government, but started receiving
government attention after independence. In 1991, the organisation was registered
as an association, before being established as a union in 1996. Beneficiaries of the
government-sponsored post-1999 land reform, which had previously formed their
own Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union, have since dissolved their group and
joined this one. The group now has immense political influence, as it has liberation
war heroes, politicians and pro-ruling party businessmen among its members.

Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU): Initially called the National Farmers Association
of Zimbabwe, the group has registered, since 1980, all rural, small, scattered
peasant and voluntary farmers associations around the country, representing
farmers in communal areas. Now having a membership of over a million, it is the
largest farmers group, consisting of communal and resettled farmers (resettled
on the village-based, small-scale plots in the 19801985 government land reform
programme). Its financial base comes from member contributions, government
and donor support, especially from the European Union.
Source: Authors
A related organisation is the General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe,

under the leadership of Gertrude Hambira. Representing the only independent union in
the face of government-fuelled splinter unions, their members have become the targets
for harassment and abuse since the start of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe.
Their human rights have been violated and their labour rights are often disregarded.
A significant conflict of interest has emerged as policymakers and government officials
have become employers.
Private sector
The private sector encompasses seed processors, fertiliser manufacturers, agro-chemical
companies, agro-dealers, mechanisation and irrigation equipment manufacturers, and traders.
In the last ten years, industrial production has been below 40% (Makumbe, 2009).
Page 99

The decrease is related to the overall collapse of the economy, poor infrastructure, power
shortages and an unfavourable financial environment. A combination of the governments
contra-market interventions and reduced industrial capacity has negatively affected the
potential for recovery, especially for seed and fertiliser manufacture. For example, the
production of fertiliser fell from 365 000 mt in 2001 to 70 000 mt in 2008, while
the contribution of imports to national supplies has increased from less than 10% before 2004
to as much as 42% in 2008. The Zimbabwe fertiliser industry used to have the capacity to
produce some 560 000 mt of fertiliser (which would cover the countrys needs based on
historical usage levels) (Mhazo et al., 2006).
Zimbabwes agri-business sector was thriving before 2000, comprising several international
brand names. Since then, the sector has become increasingly dualistic. Some surviving
major entities have acquired an oligopolistic position in their subsectors (such as National
Foods in the processing subsector and AgriSeeds in the seed subsector). Most small and
medium agri-businesses closed down (or relocated), significantly reduced operations,
or were taken over by the oligopolistic ones. Recently, small, indigenous entities have
emerged to fill this gap. Table 5.5 lists private agriculture-oriented companies operating
in Zimbabwe.
The collapse of the private sector is particularly severe in the rural areas, with agri-dealers
and rural centres having shut down. The decline in the agricultural and overall economy,
combined with the proliferation of aid and assistance programmes since 2000, has
hampered private development in the rural areas (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe,
2010). The initial free handouts of food and later of agricultural inputs, centrally organised
and implemented through NGOs, left the rural private sector with little functionality.
Renewed market-oriented approaches were implemented with the aim of revitalising
the rural private sector. Initially based on food and input vouchers (to be used as payment
at a local shop or dealer), it now also entails value chain programmes, agri-dealer support,
and the like (see the detailed list in the second part of this chapter).
Private sector recovery will strongly depend on the liberalisation of the sector through
government policy and the availability of credit. According to several private actors
interviewed,50 neither of these conditions is being met. The enactment of the Indigenous
Ownership Act at the end of 2010, making it compulsory for international companies to
reserve a 51% ownership for black Zimbabweans, has caused mistrust, as it is strongly
related to the governments previous property rights expropriations (New Zimbabwe,
2010). In addition, local private sector players are hamstrung by a lack of credit and the
absence of a comprehensive policy framework.
50 Personal communication: Interviewed during research project, 3 and 4 February 2011.
Page 100

4.1.4 O
ther agricultural actors regional and
pan-African organisations
Although Zimbabwe has been privately (but very rarely publicly) criticised by fellow African
states, its membership of regional and pan-African entities has never been questioned
(Alden & Anseeuw, 2009). Unlike donor organisations, regional organisations derive
their authority from member states and, therefore, can only work through governments.
Their work is limited to policy issues and investment priorities.
Two initiatives are noteworthy regarding agriculture: the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership for Africas Development
(NEPAD) and SADCs Regional Agricultural Policy.
Through the African Union, the NEPAD programme is promoting the CAADP framework.
Within this framework, member states have ratified the Maputo Agreement, which prioritises
agriculture as an identified development vehicle and allocates at least 10% of the national
budget each year to the sector. At national level, Zimbabwe has also engaged in the
preparation of the CAADP Compact, identifying priority investments. Although this process
has been halted (probably because of a lack of resources), it could be revived through the
USAID-supported CAADP process.
Also, SADC is in the process of establishing a Regional Agricultural Policy, with assistance
from the FAO. This is, however, in a very early phase (SADC, 2010).
4.1.5 Agricultural research institutions

Research is ongoing in Zimbabwe, albeit at a very slow pace in view of financial constraints
and the ad hoc emergency implementation approach.
Although education and research were some of Zimbabwes strengths, public research
has been severely affected during the past ten years. In agriculture, the MoAMIDs
own research wing, the Agricultural Research Council, and the different universities
(which mainly operate on grant money or funded projects) have seen the majority of
their academic personnel leave. The University of Zimbabwe, for example, once a major
hub for research on agricultural economics, has few agricultural economists left.51
Subsequently, several independent consultancies some of excellent quality have emerged
(see Box 4.5).
Since the approach evolved from emergency aid to development, donors have increasingly
worked with research organisations, and are funding both national and international
organisations. For example, the Mandi Rukuni Seminar engaged in the development of
the Regional Agricultural Policy. The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
(CIMMYT) is working with the Seed and Markets Project from the international development
Page 101

management company, GRM International, on seed crop breeding. The Seed and Markets
Project is also funding the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
(FANRPAN) to compile a policy and regulatory framework for seed markets.
Box 4.5: Agricultural research institutions in Zimbabwe
Agricultural research institutions include both local and international organisations,
consisting of academic institutions, consulting firms and organisations linked to the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
Local institutions form two categories:
Public research institutions: University of Zimbabwe, SIRDC and the Agricultural
Research Council.
Private research institutions: African Institute for Agrarian Studies (food security
and land policy), Centre for Rural Development (rural development), Mandi Rukuni
Seminar (food security), etc.
International institutions include CIMMYT (maize and wheat), the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) (small grains promotion), the World
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) (agro-forestry) and FANRPAN (livelihoods and natural
resources).
4.2 Implemented projects

Since 2004, Zimbabwe has implemented and received substantial humanitarian support
and aid, by both government and donors. Three major phases of aid can be identified:
1. Food emergency relief projects were either implemented by the government
or fell under the WFP and CSAFE, then the PRP.
2. Since 2008/09, households have been receiving emergency agricultural support
inputs, fertiliser and training. Although a renewed approach, it was mainly free
emergency assistance, largely coordinated through the FAO.
3. This approach is now solidifying into long-term, sustainable projects, targeting
market and rural development capacity building, conservation farming, livestock
and livelihood programmes, agri-dealer and market support, and contract farming
development. The FAO, the PRP and donor agencies are coordinating these projects
separately. Food aid and emergency agricultural support programmes do, however,
continue,52 although on a more targeted basis (focusing on the more marginalised),
mainly coordinated by the WFP in terms of logistics.
The projects are in different phases; some have just been completed, others are still in
implementation, while yet others have been decided on but are still to be implemented.
52 It is also expected that some parts of the country will need food this year.
Page 102

4.2.1 Government
Since independence, the government has been involved in subsidy schemes for smallholder
farmers. After the FTLRP, however, it could not continue these, as it became increasingly
isolated and cash-strapped. As a result, the implementation of government projects was
mainly through the central bank, which became a major player in the economy, particularly
in agriculture (RBZ, 2008). Relying on artificial funding by the RBZ, which printed money
to fund the projects, these operations were implemented within a hyperinflationary
environment. Very few of these projects were agreed upon through formal processes;
few had established budgets or a target number of beneficiaries.53 From 2004 to 2009, the
RBZ provided subsidised inputs, free fuel and mechanisation equipment. It also controlled
input imports by holding all foreign currency reserves in the country.
However, this ended with the GNU in 2009, which amended the RBZ Act to outlaw
quasi-fiscal activities. In 2009, with the help of NGOs, the government endeavoured
to implement a public works programme for food aid, the so-called Food for Work
programme. This has since failed to take off because of strained relationships between the
government and NGOs. In the 2010/11 season, the government implemented a subsidised
inputs programme, where private companies were contracted to provide seed and fertiliser.
Farmers received two bags of fertiliser and a 10 kg maize seed pocket (and, in some cases,
sorghum) for US$35. The programme was implemented through the GMB at a cost of
US$30 million. It distributed 3523 tons of seed maize, 98 tons of seed sorghum, 3903 tons
of ammonium nitrate (AN) fertiliser and 12 705 tons of Compound D, reaching 400 000
households. Lastly, a land audit has been negotiated with several donors for two years, but
it has not been implemented yet. Table 4.1 summarises the government projects.
Government programmes seem to follow an ad hoc approach, responding to very diverse
objectives, some being political rather than focusing on peoples needs.54 The short-term
nature of these interventions, the lack of transparency in their functioning, the inability
to identify beneficiaries, and the dearth of records and evaluation lead to questions
about their efficiency. However, some have apparently delivered results. A first result was
the involvement and engagement of the private sector, through the Subsidised Inputs
Programme of 2010, at a time when public services were in a dire state. A second one
was the Food for Work programme, showing how collaboration between government and
donors can ensure at least a minimum level of convergence. This should lead donors to
investigate their action plans and evaluate the possibilities of closer collaboration between
private and public entities.
Page 103
Page 104
Productive Sector
Facility
Agriculture
Sector
Productivity and
Enhancement
Facility
Operation
Maguta
National Cassava
Programme
Farm
Mechanisation
Programme
Public Sector
Investment
Programme
Inputs Assistance
Programme
2004
20052009
2007
20072008
2008
Food for Work
Land Audit
2010
2010
European
Union pledged
some funds
WFP
Government
Government
RBZ
RBZ
Government/
FAO
RBZ
RBZ
RBZ
Funder
Not known yet
45 million
335 000
Budget (US$)
Subsidised Inputs
Programme
2010
20102011
20072008
Programme
Period
Description
Had been planned for ten phases but only two completed because of lack of
funds. Tractors, combine-harvesters and other equipment given to farmers on
credit, to start paying back in two years. It became very controversial for its biased
allocations.56
In principle, the system allocated resources for implementation based on projected
revenue inflows and priorities in all sectors, including agriculture. However, due to
budgetary limitations, some projects failed to receive funding.
Providing inputs to farmers on credit, with a 210-day payment period.
To be provided by private companies with the government guaranteeing credit.
This was discontinued after the first phase because private companies pulled out,
citing irregularities on the part of the government.
A modified version of the scheme above. This time, the government set aside
US$45 million to buy inputs from private companies and tasked the companies
with the distribution to rural centres.
A resuscitation of the 1989 strategy of the Food for Work programme where rural
people get food aid in compensation for working to improve local infrastructure
like roads, dip tanks, waterways, and the like (similar to the felt needs approach).
NGOs bring the food for distribution and the Ministry of Local Government
identifies work arrears and controls the process. This improves local infrastructure
while households avert starvation. The programme was quickly aborted because
of disagreements between government and NGOs.
The government was supposed to implement a land audit in 2009, funded by the
European Union, but this has not happened yet. There is reluctance on the part
of those senior government officials who are suspected to have corruptly gained
from the chaotic FTLRP.
A continuation of the Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF),

but done as a quick, short-term project just before the 2008 elections. Distribution
of low-cost farming implements, done through the army for logistical efficiency.
Under the office of the Vice-President. Cassava imported from Brazil to promote
its production as an alternative food crop. Was later shelved, but FAO resuscitated
it for the 20092011 period.
Meant to cater for the increased need for agricultural financing. Under this
facility, the RBZ provided agricultural financing at a 25% interest rate for food
crop production at a time when interest rates on loans in the commercial banking
sector were between 300% and 400%.55 The facility had repayment periods of six
months for seasonal loans and 18 months for capital expenditure loans.
Funding low-cost inputs for farmers, mainly the resettled ones. Funded by the RBZ.
Source: Authors.
Government
(but still to be
implemented)
Government
Government
Government
RBZ
RBZ
Government
National Task
Force
National
Army
Government
through the
GMB
RBZ
Implementer
Table 4.1: Zimbabwean governments agricultural and food security projects

Horticulture
Support
Conservation
Agriculture for
Food Security
HIV/AIDS
Mainstreaming
Farm
Management
Conservation
Agriculture
Inputs Assistance
Programme
Inputs
Emergency Aid
Small Grains
Promotion
Inputs and
Market Linkages
Livelihoods
Livestock Health
Livelihoods
Livelihoods
Livelihoods
Agri-Information
Conservation
Agriculture
20072011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20092010
20092011
20082011
20082009
20082010
20082010
Policy Building
Programme
20052010
Period
4 073 879
1 781 148
908 626
732 601
1 300 000
843 880
475 000
2 097 902
399 000
70 000 000
23 947 626
4 073 879
140 984
450 000
3 244 434
45 000
1 101 827
Budget (US$)
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
Farmers unions
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
NGOs
Government
Implementer
Improved impact of livelihoods interventions on vulnerable households in Zimbabwe through

coordination, monitoring and evaluation of agricultural interventions and mainstreaming of
HIV/AIDS.
Improved coordination through generation of agricultural information and crop production
support.
Promotion of conservation agriculture and coordination of agricultural activities in Zimbabwe.
Improving rural livelihoods through an integrated farming approach.
Conservation Agriculture/Farmers Unions Project: Enhancing and stabilising agricultural

productivity for communal farmers through advanced land use and management practices.
Agricultural input assistance to vulnerable smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe and the coordination
and monitoring of agricultural emergency interventions.
With the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD) and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), aimed at reducing the food
aid dependency of farming households by providing subsidised inputs to kick-start production.
Distributed fertiliser and seed maize to 738 000 households. The results were tangible, as the
area of maize grown increased by 20% from the previous year and production rose by 7%.
Promoting production, processing and marketing of small grains (sorghum, pearl millet
and finger millet) in the marginal areas in Zimbabwe.
Improvement of food security and livelihoods of smallholder farmers through the provision of
extension, inputs and market linkages. The FAO is practically funding the now undercapacitated
Agriculture Extension Department.
Securing farming systems and livelihoods in communal lands adjacent to Protected Areas through
human and wildlife conflict management.
Provision of dipping chemicals, dip tank management, and improved community dipping service
in communal areas of Zimbabwe.
Improved livelihoods through sustainable agricultural development.
Updating of Farm Management Handbook.
Strengthen institutional capacity in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS concerns in the agricultural sector.
Improving Policy Environment and Related Capacity for Sustainable Food and Agriculture
Development in the SADC Region Phase I: Zimbabwe received technical assistance to draw
up an agriculture policy.
Development and piloting of horticulture outgrower schemes for export markets in eastern
and southern Africa.
Upscaling Conservation Agriculture for Improved Food Security using the CAADP Framework:
Conservation farming was taught to communal households in Zimbabwe.
Description
Table 4.2: F
AO-funded long-term projects covering input assistance, farm management, livelihoods, conservation farming
and livestock projects since 2005

Page 105

4.2.2 Food and Agriculture Organization

The FAO plays two major roles. First, it sources funding for projects and implements them
through NGOs, sometimes in partnership with government. Secondly, it has a coordinating
role for a significant part of the assistance projects (those channelled through the FAO)
and for NGO activities on the ground. Projects implemented through the FAO concern
conservation farming, promoting small grains, securing livelihoods, livestock, inputs
assistance, institutional strengthening and HIV mainstreaming.
The FAO was the major provider of farm inputs in the 2009/10 and 2010/11 seasons. In the
2009/10 season, farm input programmes were successfully coordinated in a partnership
with the WFP. In order to create sustainability in household food security, aid agencies
decided to provide farming inputs support to the small-scale, transitory food-insecure
farmers as part of the emergency aid. As shown in Table 3.2, seed and fertiliser totalling
over 55 tons were distributed. In 2010/11, their input assistance programme reached
549 000 households, in addition to their conservation farming, implemented through
25 NGOs, through which they reached 260 000 households. A target of 500 000 has been
set (see Table 4.2 for the long-term projects covering input assistance, farm management,
livelihoods, conservation farming and livestock projects funded through the FAO from 2005
and Table 4.3 for the input projects funded by FAO for the 2010/11 farming season).
The FAO is also planning long-term, more development-oriented projects. From 2011, the
organisation will capacitate colleges with conservation farming, introducing it into the
curriculum. It will work with the University of Zimbabwe, CYMMIT and ICRISAT. It also
intends to improve alignment and cooperation with government by setting up a working
group at the Permanent Secretary level. Although not confirmed yet, the FAO might
also consider a national irrigation rehabilitation project. As the voucher aid system spreads
(it is estimated at US$1 million a month), the FAO is preparing a strategy to launch a
project that will switch this system to an electronic one.
Table 4.3: FAO farm inputs projects, 2010/11
Period
Implementer
Number of
beneficiaries
(Households)
2010/11
Farmers unions
3 000
2010/11
ZFU
12 000
Distribution of fertiliser (calcium ammonium nitrate CAN)
2010/11
SAT
31 000
Inputs maize seed, cowpeas, fertiliser (AN). Conservation farming

and training.
2010/11
SAT
750
2010/11
SAT Concern
4 500
Description
Conservation farming. Inputs seed for maize, cowpeas, sorghum
and sugar beans.
Inputs distribution maize seed, sorghum, AN fertiliser,

limes and herbicides. Conservation farming.
Inputs fertiliser: AN, Compound D, gypsum, herbicides.
Conservation farming.
* Budgets for these projects were unavailable.
Page 106

The FAO started with a policy initiative to create a framework into which assistance could
be incorporated. However, projects moved to short-term initiatives, probably because the
policy framework was not developed. The FAO is not working with the private sector in
implementing programmes, leading to concerns about the sustainability of its projects. It is
worth considering expanding the focus beyond NGOs (depending on humanitarian needs)
and looking at farmers unions and the private sector. The FAO is working with farmers
unions on only a few projects.
4.2.3 World Food Programme and other United Nations agencies

The WFP provided emergency food aid in Zimbabwe between 2002 and 2009. Since
Zimbabwe moved out of its emergency relief situation after the 2009/10 season, the WFP
has reduced its food aid operations. It now focuses on more targeted assistance for foodinsecure, vulnerable groups (see the WFPs PRP operations (WFP, 2010)). Between August
2009 and March 2010, the WFP disbursed 112 550 mt of food aid to 3 388 024 people.
It has also budgeted $261 million to source 223 235 mt to feed 1 550 000 people between
January 2011 and December 2012 in the PRP (WFP, 2010).
Besides food aid, several other programmes were implemented. Apart from emergency
assistance for the transitory food insecure, which is temporary, more permanent programmes
are also in place, such as:

Supplementary feeding for schoolchildren and for the chronically food insecure:
The WFP collaborated with UNICEF to combat reduced nutrition levels in schools,
which led to school dropouts in rural Zimbabwe. The WFPs supplementary feeding
schemes reached over 1.3 million children a year between 2004 and 2009
(see Table 4.4).
F
arming inputs: For the 2009/10 season, the WFP partnered with the FAO, IFAD
and AGRA to supply farming inputs to vulnerable rural households (see Table 4.3).
Two more United Nations agencies also provided relief support for agricultural inputs.
The UNHCR provided farming inputs to 800 households in the 2010/11 farming season,
and OCHA, through the Emergency Relief Fund, assisted 5000 households in the same
period. It is not clear why the two became involved in what is clearly a FAO cluster, but it
may point to overlapping functions despite existing coordination.
Other United Nations agencies have shown an interest in Zimbabwe, but have either not
implemented any projects yet or these do not concern agriculture. For instance, the United
Nations Development Group/World Bank Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional
Results Framework have been prepared, but have not yet been implemented in Zimbabwe.
The projects before 2010 focused on humanitarian assistance; post-2010 projects shifted
towards the revitalisation of agriculture through inputs supply. The Protracted Relief And
Recovery Programme, however, seems to be at odds with this trend as it is still providing
aid. Also, the presence of both protection (the IOM and the UNHCR) and development
agencies (the FAO and the UNDP) at the same time gives a conflicting picture of the
priorities the country is pursuing.
Page 107
Page 108
Supplementary
Feeding
Schemes
School Feeding
Schemes
Inputs
Emergency Aid
Farming Inputs
Farming Inputs
Protracted
Relief and
Recovery
Yearly from
2002 to 2009
20092010
20102011
20102011
20112012
Programme
Yearly from
2002 to 2009
Period
WFP
OCHA
Emergency
Relief Fund
UNHCR
WFP
WFP
WFP
Funder
261 299 547
Not available
Not available
70 000 000
Changed
yearly
Changed
yearly
Budget (US$)
Table 4.4: WFP, UNHCR and OCHA projects
National and
international
NGOs
Africa 2000
Christian Care
International
NGOs
International
NGOs
International
NGOs
Implementer
1 550 000 people
5 000 households
800 households
Not available
Information not
available
Over 1.3 million

people a year
Number of
beneficiaries
Budgeted to source 223 235 mt to feed people

between January 2011 and December 2012 in
the Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme
(US$79 million in food and US$22 million in cash
vouchers)
Sorghum, cowpeas.
Inputs maize seed, cowpeas, groundnuts and

fertiliser.
See FAO, Table 4.3.
With UNICEF. Feeding primary school children to

combat hunger, which reduced nutrition levels
and led to school dropouts in rural Zimbabwe.
Still going on but now focused mainly in the
Matabeleland, Manicaland and Midlands
Provinces.
This has been going on every year since 2001,

in almost every district. Operations are reduced
or expanded yearly depending on needs.
Basic foodstuffs are distributed to vulnerable
households in rural households maize, cooking
oil, beans, etc.
Description

Programme
Protracted
Relief
Programme
Zimbabwe
Emergency
Agricultural
Inputs
Project
Period
2009
2011
2009
2011
World Bank
DFID
and SNV,
European
Union,
Norway,
AusAID,
UKAid and
World Bank
Funder
Not available
DFID: 30 million
(19 million in
grant funds).
Further donor
support:
16.3 million
in 2009
Budget
International
and local NGOs
32 international
and local NGOs
Implementer
Table 4.5: Protracted Relief Programme GRP project
300 000 smallholder

farmers in targeted foodinsecure communal lands

2009/10: 381 000
farmers one or more
inputs

2008/09: 80 000
households
field crop seeds;
200 000 households
topdressing fertiliser

10 000 people/
month awareness
campaigns and
training sessions
Number of beneficiaries
(Households)
The operation is financing the distribution of

improved maize seeds to 300 000 households
in 10 kg packs to strengthen their capacity
to produce more grain necessary to meet
consumption requirements.
The Protracted Relief Programme is targeting

the poorest and most vulnerable households
in both rural and urban settings with the aim
of reaching more than two million people
by improving agricultural and livestock
productivity. Components include, but are
not limited to, improved food production
through conservation farming, improved
farmer extension methodologies, the provision
of small stock through livestock fairs, greater
access to potable water and sanitation and
hygiene, and the promotion of improved
nutrition through small vegetable gardens
in rural and urban settings.
Description

Page 109
Funder
BMZ
Danish Red
Cross
European
Commission
Finnish
Red Cross
IFAD
Irish Aid
OFDA
Plan
International
AusAID
Tearfund
USAID
SDC
USAID
USAID
USAID
SDC
Programme
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Farming
Inputs
Information
Network
Loan
Guarantees
Studies
Irrigation
Rehabilitation
Period
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
20102011
Yearly
2011
2011
TBA
Table 4.6: Bilateral projects
Page 110
Not appointed yet
Not appointed yet
US$200 000 to
US$300 000
US$10 million
Standard Chartered Bank
FEWS NET
SAT
CARE, Lower Guruve Development

Association, Africare, Condaid
River of Life
Plan International
Plan International
GOAL, CARE, Africare, Plan

International
Trocaine
Africare
Zimbabwe Catholic Relief Services
CARE, World Vision, Oxfam GB, SAT,

Christian Aid, FACHIG, HELP, COSV
Zimbabwe Catholic Relief Services
SAT, GTZ, HELP, Welthungerhilfe

Zimbabwe (GAA)
Implementer
US$20 million
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Budget
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
7 343
18 302
12 843
2 700
1 256
13 200
750
800
17 016
126 723
9 870
38 622
Number of
beneficiaries
(Households)
Funds earmarked for a national

irrigation rehabilitation project.
Two studies to be implemented:

1) Livelihoods and institutional support;
and 2) Supply chain analysis
Loan guarantees for commercial

producers.
Funding the operations of FEWS NET.
Inputs maize, cowpeas.
Vouchers. Inputs distribution seeds,

fertiliser.
Conservation farming training only.
Vouchers (US$60)
Vouchers (US$60)
Conservation farming, inputs

distribution fertiliser, vegetable seed,
open-pollinated varieties.
Inputs
Inputs seed: sorghum, sunflower,

sweet potato. Fertiliser.
Inputs
Vouchers, conservation farming
Inputs distribution, seed vegetable,

maize, small grain
Input distribution. Seed sorghum,

millet, cowpeas, ambara and fertiliser.
Conservation farming
Description

AfDB
Capacity
Building/
Studies
Drought Relief
Sector Grant
Loan
Ongoing
2009
2009
2008
2011
China
SADC
AfDB
Netherlands
Capacity
Building
US$342 million
ZAR300 million
US$1 million
US$6 million
Not available
Not available
France Action
Contre la Faim
Ongoing
Not available
Infrastructure
Studies
2010 to date
(ongoing)
SNV
US$3.3 million
(for Zimbabwe,
Lesotho and
Swaziland)
Budget
Not available
Agri-Dealers
20102011
SDC
Funder
MDTF
Seed Markets
Programme
20102012
Period
Government
Government
Government
Government
Various NGOs
Various NGOs
MDTF
Local NGOs
GRM International
Implementer
Not available
China gave a US$700 million loan

facility to Zimbabwe in March 2011,
of which US$342 million is for
agricultural equipment and machinery.
A grant to secure farming inputs for

the season.
Emergency relief for drought-affected

households.
30 000
households
Not available
From the Fragile States Facility Fund,

to help build capacity in government
ministries.
Presiding over the MDTFs Technical

Review working group.
Funding contract farming in chosen
districts.
Funding of NGO projects.

In 2010, two Priority Solidarity Funds
were closed:
T
he AURP (Support to Disfavoured
Rural Populations), which funded
36 infrastructural and inputs microprojects, mainly focusing on food
security; and
T
he AM3A (Support to the Rural
Actors in Southern Africa), linked
to the FAO regional office in Harare.
Four studies:
1) Achieving household and national
food security.
2) Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector
Assessment (first draft produced).
3) Baseline study for the agrarian
sector.
4) Study on land reform.
Promoting agri-dealers.
Seed breeding to make communal

farmers self-reliant producing own
seeds being piloted in Zaka District.
Description
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Number of
beneficiaries
(Households)

Page 111

4.2.4 Protracted Relief Programme

The PRP consortium was established in 2004 to respond to the protracted need for
emergency food aid in Zimbabwe. It operates outside the United Nations agencies (the
WFP and the FAO), in giving both food aid and emergency agriculture support. Initially
funded solely by DFID, it is now a pooled project fund, receiving funds from several donors,
notably the SNV, the European Union, Norway, Australia, United Kingdom Aid of the
Department of International Development (UKAid) and the World Bank.55 The PRP contracts
NGOs to implement its projects, and it is working with 32 international and local NGOs in
54 rural districts and eight urban centres.
The PRP has three spheres or project focus areas social protection, food security and
livelihoods promotion encompassing projects like water and sanitation, climate change
and community-based care. Regarding food security projects, it provides assistance for
inputs, livestock, farming, extension and training. The PRP is now in Phase 2 (20082013),
with a $130 million budget that targets two million people.
Unlike FAO projects, the PRP is managed by a private company, GRM International. In the
2010/11 season, it provided farming inputs and closed vouchers for the purchase of inputs
to a total of 239 000 households, working with NGOs World Vision, Zimbabwe Catholic
Relief Services, Save the Children (United Kingdom), Concern, the Catholic Agency for
Overseas Development, CARE, the Zimbabwe Community Development Trust and Oxfam
GB. The managing company, GRM, is also implementing a separate donor-funded project
on seed breeding, detailed in section 4.2.5 under bilateral arrangements (see Table 4.5 on
page 109).
4.2.5 Bilateral projects and assistance

Donor agencies and foreign missions are involved in bilateral agreements with
implementing NGOs or farmers unions. Bilateral engagements are not exclusive of other
assistance (through the FAO, the PRP or the MDTF).
There are two major approaches. Some projects are strongly oriented towards revitalising
the agricultural economy, such as conservation agriculture, inputs distribution and inputs
vouchers. Others provide soft support, such as credit facilities or studies by donors,
development institutions and other countries.
Table 4.6 lists such bilateral projects, covering several portfolios inputs distribution,
conservation farming, food aid and livelihoods. Note that several projects are similar in
operation (but implemented through different forms of cooperation), and some donors are
sponsoring projects that they are also funding through pooled funds. These observations
question the coordination and alignment of these donors and their initiatives.
55 The World Bank contributed US$7 million in 2009/10 for inputs from its MDTF agrarian sector funds.
Page 112

4.3 From emergency to integrated development:

The need for broad, multi-sectoral structural reforms
The presentation of Zimbabwes agricultural institutional framework and the projects
implemented since its FTLRP leads to two major conclusions: 1) the existence of diverse
and often divergent processes of policy and project implementation; and 2) the need for a
transition towards integrated development approaches.
First, although none of the abovementioned approaches to and channels for donors
assistance is exclusive, four major channels appear: government, United Nations groups
(coordinated by the FAO for agriculture), the MDTF, and bilateral cooperation (the PRP
is atypical although it started as a bilateral DFID programme, it now involves several
donors). With each sphere being well coordinated (except for government, where project
implementation was mainly ad hoc), there is little coordination between these different
entities. Inter-entity coordination efforts are being made, as specific projects and donors
focus on different targets:
G
eographical area: None of the donor-funded projects focused on the newly resettled
area; they targeted the old resettled areas and communal lands. The government,
however, focused on the newly resettled area.
R
ecipients and types of projects: Lately, food aid has been reoriented towards the
poorest and more marginalised, whereas vouchers and inputs are directed towards
potential farmers.
The main reasons for this are the different approaches to assistance, diverse political
stances towards Zimbabwe, and donor visibility. On the ground, separate implementation
might, however, lead to less coordinated and limited (scattered funding) initiatives.
Second, most of the projects remain emergency-oriented. As shown by the numerous
projects identified in this chapter, the government and donors or development partners
have been responding to the needs of temporarily and chronically hungry people on a
large scale in recent years, through various schemes based on the targeted transfer of food
and agricultural inputs. Increasingly, humanitarian relief programmes have sought to focus
on consolidating the livelihoods of the recipients, in an attempt to generate supplementary
household incomes and thereby reduce the need for future welfare transfers. In the last two
years, in order to respond to these issues, new approaches have been developed to revive
household production and the rural economy, while providing humanitarian assistance:
(i) Donors, mainly coordinated through the FAO, have started providing monetary
vouchers to provide food and agricultural inputs, trying to revitalise rural market
linkages.
(ii) S
everal NGOs, including the GRM consortium, have implemented renewed approaches
focusing on market development and value chain reconstruction; and
Page 113

(iii) M
arket studies and investment studies, of which the future implementation may be
based on the areas that are prioritised under the CAADP process (by the government
of Zimbabwe), the ZASA (by the World Bank and the MDTF), and the strategic
investment planning documents of USAID.
Although these renewed approaches are essential and a welcome transition from the
previous food aid projects, they are only the initial and necessary stepping-stones towards
broader structural changes. When compared to the post-crisis reconstruction framework
detailed in Chapter 2, two points should be highlighted. On the one hand, in addition
to being mainly emergency-oriented, the initiatives are all project-based. All of them
have a specific objective (even though a certain evolution towards development-oriented
strategies has occurred), are time and area-bound, and are thus very limited in scope.
On the other hand, the projects currently being implemented focus narrowly on food and
agricultural production. A few started targeting broader value chains; none (except the
USAID credit facility scheme) are oriented towards broader integration of the agricultural
sector (agribusiness development, manufacturing and industrial development, financial
sector development, etc.), and wider macroeconomic and governance restructuring.
Zimbabwe needs a structural paradigm shift and a transformation towards sustainable
agricultural production, based on in-depth structural and broad policy changes. This will
liberate the country from aid dependency. Investments in policy reflection and in the
general resuscitation of the economy (particularly the private sector) are still lacking.
Page 114

Chapter 5
Investment priorities for agricultural sector development
and zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction
Recent political and economic developments in Zimbabwe offer the twin prospects of a
renewed restructuring of economy, including agriculture, and rapid, sustainable growth
following the nadir reached at the end of 2008. The introduction of international
currencies in 2009 removed the main constraint hyperinflation and liberalisation should
progressively eliminate the many market dysfunctions introduced since 2000 (Gilpin, 2008).
An effective sectoral recovery strategy will require the mobilisation and investment of
financial resources from both public and private sources. However, investments alone
will not lead to sustainability. Agriculture, and the economy overall, needs the requisite
factors of production and exchange. As such, based on the Post-Crisis Reconstruction
Model, this concluding chapter starts by detailing broad restructuring prerequisites for a
sustainable post-crisis reconstruction in Zimbabwe. The second part highlights effective
investment priorities for the development of the agricultural sector and Zimbabwes postcrisis reconstruction. Lastly, as concluding comments, it suggests an overall strategy for
Zimbabwe, combining policy, sectoral or value chain, and territorial development reforms.
5.1 The need for a broad restructuring and post-crisis

reconstruction
Given the potential for political stability, the revitalisation of agriculture one of
Zimbabwes main sectors is necessary in order to shift from aid dependency towards a
production-based economy. Zimbabwe has an enviable resource endowment for agricultural
development, in terms of land and water resources, sunk investments, expertise, demand
for exports and even a conducive climate, notwithstanding the unpredictability of rainfall
patterns within seasons and between years (World Bank & Government of Zimbabwe, 2010).
However, the agricultural sector is now characterised by an entirely new structure. It is
mainly composed of small-scale and newly resettled farmers, practicing their activities on
non-titled land. In contrast, a decade ago, the sector was composed of well-established,
large-scale commercial enterprises on private land. As described in Chapter 2, smallholders
now supply more than 50% of the national production, including cash crops. Against the
backdrop of structural transformation, economic recovery equates to the achievement of
sufficient sustainable growth in business activity and household incomes for most of the
population to support their standard of living; it does not necessarily mean a return to
an earlier state of affairs or the restoration of a previous set of economic relationships
between stakeholders. Re-establishing a growth trajectory in Zimbabwes agricultural
Page 115

sector will thus not simply require revitalising the sector, but rather developing an entirely
new sector, based on renewed structures that necessitate renewed instruments.
As described in the second chapter, this highlights the importance of broader, fundamental
strategies for Zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction, beyond project-based and agricultureoriented initiatives. Moyo et al. (2009) emphasise the need for a fundamental rethink of
strategic interventions and policies to enhance the role and contribution of agriculture in
future. These include:
(i) The design of rural financial services and credit facilities that essentially move
beyond the requirement for freehold title as collateral to new forms of credit
guarantee supported by the state (and/or non-state actors);
(ii) Consideration of a range of land tenure options for securing land rights and
encouraging investment, including permits, leases and other mechanisms;
(iii) A redesign of infrastructural and technological support, again moving beyond
the assumption that certain types of scale-specific infrastructural investments
(in irrigation facilities, production/processing equipment, tobacco barns, etc.)
are appropriate to the present context;
(iv) An adaptation of market systems and supply chains, not exclusive to, but also
inclusive of high-value, high-risk European and North American export markets;
(v) Support for the dynamic entrepreneurialism of new farmers particularly on
the A1 farms without undermining this with inappropriate or heavy-handed
stabilisation measures; and
(vi) Active intervention by the state not through the distorting practices of command
agriculture or price fixing, but through coordinating, facilitating and providing
focused subsidies and start-up finance to rejuvenate agricultural production.
But, in addition, the post-crisis reconstruction also calls for the broader restructuring
and reconstruction of the economy, governance and policy. The very clear message from
the government states that reconstruction with equitable growth and stability should
be characterised as a pro-poor, broad based and inclusive development framework
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2009a). The governments equitable growth strategy
emphasises rapid economic and trade growth through major investments (cf. the CAADP
programme in agriculture) as the key to success. Without underestimating the complexity
and gravity of current challenges, this needs to acknowledge the concomitant necessity
of a social contract that is generally recognised and supported, and effectively engages all
stakeholders in a broad framework of reforms. According to the Post-Crisis Reconstruction
Model, this emphasises the need for governance restructuring; an engagement in
agricultural, and overall, policy reform; a rethink of assistance strategies; and the
establishment of a stimulating economic environment. These conditions are not exclusive,
but are rather complementary and strongly related.
Page 116

5.1.1 The need for governance restructuring

Although democracy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a successful
recovery, scholars such as Makumbe (2009) emphasise the need for effective governance,
implying effective implementation of efficient, sustainable and accepted programmes.
Two major aspects related to governance must be stressed: effectiveness and inclusivity.
First, there a need to restructure Zimbabwes institutions, including the RBZ, ministries
and agriculture-related parastatals, as well as property rights, to be more efficient, secure
and reliable. These institutions should be safeguarded against direct political engagement,
and focus on their core functions of effective policy implementation. Second, in order
to identify the status, role and functions of these institutions, preliminary inclusive and
participatory governance structures should be established. These should represent all the
major stakeholders, including government, major political parties, professional associations,
donors, the private sector and civil society.
It is only with these two interrelated aspects in place that a more democratic government
and governance structures will be established, which could eventually lead to political and
socio-economic stability. Such restructuring will take time and is embedded in complex
policy processes, which will need human and institutional capacity (this might require
support mechanisms for stakeholder capacity building and broad-based social safety nets).
5.1.2 The necessary development of Zimbabwes integrated

agricultural and broader economic policy framework
At this stage, Zimbabwe has no well-defined and implemented policy frameworks.
Three points should be emphasised.
First, there is an absolute need for the country to engage in strategic policy definition.
There is neither a policy framework for the majority of the sectors, such as agriculture for
example, nor an overall framework. Also, where a policy framework does exist, it is not
properly implemented, as in the case of STERP (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009a). In order
to avoid the ad hoc, uncoordinated, project-based approach (both public or donor-based),
the definition of policy frameworks should be prioritised.
Second, policy definition should be done on a sectoral basis, particularly agriculture in this
case, but should be integrated. Agricultural development policies should be integrated
with complementary development strategies for industrial development, manufacturing,
and the like. They should also be part of overall macroeconomic reforms and structural
transformation (institutional liberalisation, trade strategies, etc.).
Page 117

Third, in line with the Paris Declaration, these policies should reflect a country-owned
strategy. This implies that Zimbabwe should develop its own strategies that represent the
countrys guiding framework (guiding every Zimbabwean actor and forming a framework to
which others should align themselves, avoiding ad hoc or parallel processes). These policies
should also have countrywide representation (once again, including all stakeholders).
In the absence of the required overarching policy framework, each external intervention
beyond relief should be interrogated about how it will contribute to the long-term
development of the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole. Its design should be
informed by an assessment of the complementary actions needed to ensure the required
outcome. This might be the only way to design a coherent investment strategy (seeing aid
as an investment), which could kick-start and sustain economic growth.
5.1.3 Rethinking assistance to Zimbabwes agricultural sector

and reconstruction
The agricultural sector has to move away from a reactive food aid and emergency relief
approach towards a more proactive production and development approach. In addition to
the collapse of Zimbabwes economic and institutional framework, the nature of assistance
in Zimbabwe, based mainly on free food and agricultural input provision, has contributed
to the disintegration of the agricultural sector. To overcome this, assistance to Zimbabwe
should be changed to focus on autonomous development support, the revitalisation of
value chains, and the like.
This is, however, constrained by Zimbabwes governance problems and the absence of
integrated policies, as detailed in the previous two subsections. The former keeps donors
from constructively engaging with the countrys reconstruction. The latter is a prerequisite
for rethinking assistance in a well-defined framework for reconstruction and development.
This would also enable alignment between the government and donors, and between
donors themselves.
5.1.4 Establishment of a stimulating economic environment

As noted in the previous subsection, the transition from an assistance-based economy
to a development-oriented one will only be possible through broad-based investments in
the sector and broader economy.
A major condition for this is the revitalisation of the private sector, directly in agriculture
but also in downstream and upstream sectors. Such a revitalisation should be supported
by substantial domestic and foreign investment in the agricultural sector, while private
sector engagement should be promoted through a stimulating environment. Zimbabwean
farmers should be able to produce in stable markets on the basis of price, access to output
markets, and consistency of supply markets. These aspects may be necessary but not
Page 118

Category
Public
Nature of investment
Policy reform*
A
gricultural and land policy
I
nterlinkages with broader economic policies
Notes
Long-term
investments
Institutional and administrative reforms*

R
estructuring the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation
and Irrigation Development (MoAMID)
R
estructuring parastatals
C
ooperative development
Legal reform*
Property rights
Research and extension
P
ublic agricultural research
P
ro-poor extension services
Public economic infrastructure
E
lectricity and energy (coal mining, hydroelectricity)
T

ransport and communications (roads, railways and
telecommunications)
I
rrigation rehabilitation and development
Post-harvest and market-based infrastructure, linked to value
chain development
I
nformation technology
I
nformation dissemination
S
torage grain, warehouse infrastructure, abattoirs
R
etail development (agri-dealers)
O
utput market development
Economic institutional infrastructure and market-based
instrument support
S
top orders
V
ouchers
C
ontract farming and contractual arrangements
Social infrastructure and capacity building
A
gricultural union capacity building
D
ecentralised management capacity building (irrigation schemes,
for example)
Manufacturing and agro-processing capacity development
R
evitalisation and modernisation of machinery in input and
processing industry
A
daptation for small-scale initiatives
Private
sector
Credit and financial services

L
oan guaranty arrangements for agribusinesses, as well as
farmer microcredit facilities
P
rivate sector credit facilities
S
upport for credit to farmers by agribusiness
I
nsurance
Immediate
investments
Figure 5.1: Proposed potential areas of investment

Source: Adapted from stakeholder consultation by authors.
4 Prerequisite conditions were discussed in the first part of this chapter.
Page 119

sufficient for addressing growth and development fundamentals. Growth also depends on
the sustained adoption of improved technologies, continuing efforts to reduce marketing
costs, and attention to the evolving nature of agricultural markets.
Although the private sector will play an important role in this process, there is a significant
role for the government and the donor community to improve the level and distribution
of returns on agricultural investments. Government needs to operate as a facilitator of
investment through, for example, the provision of public support for agricultural research
and extension; the provision of public goods, such as better road and rail systems, which
reduce marketing costs; and improved market information, which resolves market failures.
Again, these will include stronger partnerships between government, the donor community
and private investors based on solid, inclusive governance and policy frameworks. This will
also facilitate debt relief and budget support, easing the constraints on Zimbabwes
development trajectory.
5.2 Investment priorities for agricultural

and broader development
The mobilisation and investment of financial resources in agriculture need the requisite
factors of production and exchange. The necessary conditions for any effective sectoral
recovery strategy, as with any other economic activity, would include: the rapid
reorientation of all farming effort to respond to available markets; a gradual increase of
production efficiency at all scales of operation; the availability and adequate quality of
inputs and services; affordable financial arrangements for working capital and seasonal
operations, as well as investments in productive assets; and positive expectations
among farmers, entrepreneurs and all others operating in value chains. Attaining these
fundamental groundwork goals would require the concerted investment of government
resources in the agricultural sector.
5.2.1 Public economic infrastructure

Zimbabwes public economic infrastructure has been neglected during the past decade.
The collapse of the economy and the related lack of public funds have led to a drastic
decrease in public spending (in absolute terms), with economic infrastructure most affected
(see Table 5.1).56
The agriculture-related sectors directly affected by a fall in infrastructure spending are
electricity, transport, communications and irrigation.
56 T
he STERP document points out that the government requires US$1.15 billion to support the economy in terms of capacity utilisation,
transport and communications requirements, and general public infrastructure, in addition to US$2 billion to repair electricity generation
plants and build new ones.
Page 120

Table 5.1: Z
imbabwes proposed development expenditure on the infrastructure
programme (in US$ million at constant 2009 prices)
Category
2010
2011
2015
2020
Total
(20112020)
Public development expenditure

Water resources management
22.0
102.5
98.7
822.9
68.6
215.1
137.9
134.0
1 920.3
443.5
150.1
154.6
2 252.9
165.8
223.7
386.2
3 626.6
41.7
98.0
75.5
887.5
30.9
0.3
72.4
207.6
352.6
461.9
4 586.5
3.5
5.4
39.0
276.2
1 036.7
857.8
9 621.6
Water resources management
60.0
30.0
1 375.0
Water supply and sanitation
10.0
20.0
100.0
Power
453.2
2 076.0
Railways
165.0
25.0
740.0
Civil aviation
86.0
226.0
Communications
6.1
43.4
Total
780.3
75.0
4 560.4
276.2
1 036.7
1 638.1
947.0
14 182.0
Water supply and sanitation

Power
Transport
Roads
Railways
Civil aviation
Subtotal
Communication
Total
Associated private investment
Grand total
Source: AfDB (2010).
5.2.1.1 Electricity for agriculture, agro-industries and the overall economy

Zimbabwes electricity is provided by the countrys monopoly parastatal body, the
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). Zimbabwe has two major sources of power
(Kariba South Power Station and Hwange Power Station) and three smaller thermal
power stations (see Table 5.2).
Page 121

Table 5.2: Generation plant capacity

Plant
type
Year
installed
Installed
capacity
(MW)
Theoretical
send-out
capacity (MW)
Actual average
maximum sendout capacity (MW)
Kariba
Hydro
195960
666
666
750
Uprated in
1990s
Hwange
Coal
198186
920
876
698
Overdue
overhauls
Harare
Coal
1940s58
135
128
43
Munyati
Coal
1950s
120
114
42
Bulawayo
Coal
1950s
120
114
60
1 961
1 898
1 593
Station
All
Remarks
Ongoing,
although due
to be retired in
20042005
Source: World Bank (2008b).
The economic collapse, mismanagement, corruption and the lack of funding for repair
and maintenance costs have undermined ZESAs ability to meet the countrys electricity
requirements. Currently, about 80% of the urban population and 35% of the rural
population has access to the distribution network (the connection rate has declined by
50%, with waiting lists that have increased fourfold). There has been no major investment
in power generation infrastructure in Zimbabwe since 1986. The actual average maximum
send-out capacity of the power stations of just under 1600 MW falls far short of the
minimum 2300 MW capacity necessary to meet demand and reserve requirements (see
Table 5.3). The estimated energy supplies are only about 40% of installed capacity and
provide less than half of peak demand, even with reduced levels of economic activity.57
The energy deficit is estimated at 2.691 billion kWh (CIA, 2011). Between 1996 and 2006,
the country depended on imports for 35% of its energy requirements and 23% of its
power requirements, but foreign currency shortages and a lack of firm power contracts
forced ZESA to resort to load shedding. In addition, the countrys grid equipment has been
damaged, due to the frequent breakdown of equipment because of poor funding, leading
to a worsening of power distribution.
Without being exhaustive, major problems related to the electricity sector and to
agriculture broadly are linked to the reduction in production capacity and productivity, and
the cost of alternative energy sources. This is particularly the case for irrigation-dependent
crops (since grid electricity is the major source of power for irrigated crops), sanitarysensitive production (for example, poultry) and agri-enterprises that are directly electricitydependent. Examples include the following:
(i) Wheat has been especially affected: yield levels declined to the current estimated
2 t/ha from the peak of 5 t/ha in 2002 (see Chapter 2) and production decreased
to 30 000 tons from 350 000 tons.
57 There has been a decline in consumption in the agricultural, mining and industrial sectors, but an increase in domestic demand.
Page 122

(ii) Chicken production has been negatively affected by continued power shortages that
reduced production capacity (Mudzonga, 2009). In 2001/02, the lack of electricity
caused a production decline of almost 20%, mainly due to sanitary problems.
Farmers have resorted to installing generators, leading to excessive costs (90 litres
of fuel per hour for a medium poultry production) (Mudzonga, 2009). The lifting
of the import ban on chicken meat resulted in a 50% decline in production, with
Brazilian and South African chicken meat being 20%30% cheaper (Mudzonga, 2009).
(iii) Agro-industries are reportedly operating at between 10% and 40% of capacity
one of the main reasons, besides the lack of markets in general, is the shortage
of power (Dawes et al., 2009).
Table 5.3: Actual capacity sent out (MW) and energy sent out (GWh)
Year
Kariba
MW
Hwange
GWh
MW
GWh
Harare
MW
Munyati
GWh
MW
Bulawayo
GWh
MW
GWh
1997
2 122.3
736
4 781.3
161.4
160
72.6
1998
1 925.9
726
4 407.7
121.5
127.6
1999
2 949.3
678
3 866.0
110.0
121.1
44.3
2000
601
3 260.4
640
3 317.3
74
186.0
70
110.7
63
121.4
2001
621
2 997.7
782
4 808.9
47
27.5
59
44.2
87
47.5
2002
631
3 823.9
732
4 580.7
47
66.7
53
19.1
74
47.5
2003
754
5 359.2
606
3 388.2
41
32.7
32
7.1
42
11.6
2004
753
5 521.2
744
3 907.5
46
106.5
57
58.6
63
124.5
2005
748
5 418.3
698
3 902.6
25
17.3
20
4.9
58
47.6
2006
729
5 310.3
642
2 430.0
24
1.7
30
36.1
Average
691
3 868.8
698
3 939.0
43
83.1
42
65.3
60
55.3
Investment in the expansion of the generation, transmission and distribution capacity of

electricity to ensure an adequate and reliable supply is a priority. Investments should be
made mainly in the rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing national supply capacity of
electricity. Examples of investments include the following:
(i) Rehabilitation of generation infrastructure at Kariba South Power Station;
(ii) Rehabilitation of generation infrastructure at Hwange Power Station;
(iii) Resuscitation of thermal power stations;
(iv) Rehabilitation of transmission and distribution infrastructure countrywide;
(v) Private investment in new generation capacity; and
(vi) Private investment in alternative electricity generation capacity (solar power, etc.)
Page 123

Note that ZESA is currently facing a US$900 million debt.58 This includes US$140 million
owed to southern African regional powerutilities, adding to ZESAs requirements of an
estimated US$540 million to upgradeits infrastructure. However, ZESA was only allocated
US$55 million inthe 2011 national budget.
With sustained underinvestment in electricity generation, agriculture (among other
economic sectors) is likely to experience restricted growth, owing to the limited capacity
of non-gravitation-reliant irrigation projects, wheat production (which relies entirely on
irrigation), fresh produce storage and transformation, chicken production projects, and
the processing sector. The opportunities in agriculture are substantially reduced in the face
of critical power shortages. Investing in power generation, therefore, remains a necessary
condition for any meaningful recovery of Zimbabwes agricultural and agro-industrial
sectors. Given the shortage of electricity, investments will take time to be realised and
re-established. Before then, there may be a need for a careful assessment of the feasibility
of some agro-processing and irrigation projects, since the sustainability of agricultural
growth might be compromised by the unreliable provision of energy.
Box 5.1: Estimated investment costs for power generation
Various estimates have been proposed in view of varied assessments of Zimbabwes
generation capacity. The World Bank (2008b) estimates total investment costs of
approximately US$1.26 billion for the refurbishment of generation infrastructure and
the rehabilitation of transmission and distribution infrastructure. The AfDB (2010)
estimates a total investment cost of US$4.3 billion, including US$2.1 billion of private
investment in new generation capacity.
5.2.1.2 Transport: Roads and railway

Roads: The countrys road network comprises 90 000 km of roads, of which 14 000 km are
surfaced, 56 000 km are gravel all-weather roads and the remaining 30 000 km are earth
roads. Insufficient financial resources for maintenance and the shortage of technically
skilled human resources have left the countrys road network severely run down. Although
the annual combined budget allocations for all the road authorities and the Road Fund
(including maintenance) is estimated at US$160 million, actual revenues amounted
to only US$6 million in 2006, while the state budget for the Department of Roads for
routine maintenance declined to US$400 000 (World Bank, 2008b). The withdrawal of
donor money in 2000 and the lack of a budgetary contribution from government resulted
in new road developments being suspended. Meanwhile, re-gravelling demands continue to
grow the design life of a gravel road is 15 years, and roads need re-gravelling every five
to six years. The lack of funds meant that, by 2000, some 12 000 km of the developed
58 S
ee: www.voanews.com, 2011. Zimbabwe state-owned power utility staggering under US$900 million debt, 7 March.
www.cfuzim.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1370:zimbabwe-state-owned-power-utility-staggeringunder-us-900-million-debt&catid=95:zesa&Itemid=92
Page 124

roads were already in need of re-gravelling. By 2005, only 24% of the entire road network
was estimated to be in good condition (World Bank, 2008b).
Railway: Zimbabwe has an estimated 3077 km of railway lines across the country,
313 km of which is electrified (GweruHarare section) (CIA, 2011). The National Railways
of Zimbabwe has also suffered during the general decline of the economy, which was
exacerbated by mismanagement59 and skills flight in search of better working conditions.
Given a general neglect of maintenance, a lack of spare parts, and overdue replacement of
equipment, only part of the railroad network is in good condition and equipment problems
have led to reduced service. Steam locomotives have been reintroduced since 2004, as coal
is in relatively good supply, while diesel must be imported and electricity shortages are
common. In addition, the company is seriously indebted, making it impossible to solve this
situation without external help.60 Goods transport declined from 18 million tons in 1998
to 2 million tons in 2010, and about half of the 213 locomotives and 10 500 wagons are
presently sidelined.61
The main problems related to the railways include the following:
(i) Market (input and output) access problems: Transportation of produce and inputs
to and from markets remains one of the most critical challenges facing many
small-scale rural farmers, particularly in remote areas, as well as major industries
and economic actors. This results in a lack of commodities for basic consumption
and economic activities. The impacts can be far-reaching, with several trickling-down
effects. For example, tobacco farmers who utilise coal for curing flue-cured tobacco
have had limited access to coal from the Hwange colliery mine, owing to the poor
state of the rail system.
(ii) Increased costs: The poor road and rail system is a major hindrance to input
distribution in agriculture and the industrial sectors, leading to higher costs and
longer waiting periods. Poor transport also often results in a deterioration of the
quality of farm produce.
(iii) Loss of negotiation power for small-scale and remote farmers: Smallholders very
often find themselves limited to local markets and at the risk of being exploited
by unscrupulous intermediaries, which take full advantage of farmers need for
immediate cash and disposal of their produce.
There is, therefore, a need to invest in rehabilitation, particularly of the railway and the
rural (and urban) road network, including in poorer and remote areas as well as in highly
59 See: allafrica.com/stories/201007020866.html
60 www.africanews.com/site/Zimbabwean_trains_held_in_China_over_debt/list_messages/36451
61 www.railwaysafrica.com/blog/2011/02/nrz-freight-stats-plummet%e2%80%a8/#
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productive areas with marketable surplus. Investments should be oriented to the

rehabilitation of existing facilities as well as the construction of new ones. Priorities include:
(i) Detailed assessment of the feeder road and rail network in the country;
(ii) Rehabilitation of existing roads and rails in highly productive areas with
marketable surplus;
(iii) Rehabilitation and/or construction of 1) feeder roads in food-insecure regions;
and 2) main roads and rails in every region in Zimbabwe;
(iv) Capacity building of local private contractors in the preparation, execution
and supervision of feeder road works and rails; and
(v) Project implementation support to the Ministry of Transport and the National
Railways of Zimbabwe.
In the absence of such investments, Zimbabwes logistics and marketing system will
remain underdeveloped, increasing the costs of transferring produce from production
points to markets or inputs to the production points. Kapuya et al. (2010) reported that
the dilapidated state of roads has rendered some farmland inaccessible, leading to missing
and/or segmented markets.
Box 5.2: Estimated investment costs for road and railways rehabilitation
According to the World Bank (2008b), the investments related to roads infrastructure
are estimated at US$160 million per year, while those for railway infrastructure
are estimated at US$72 million per year. The AfDB (2010) estimates the current
replacement cost of transport infrastructure and facilities to be in the range of
US$12 billion. Of this amount, an estimated US$4 billion (at constant 2009 prices)
is needed for rehabilitating the assets of the transport sector. Once fully rehabilitated,
a well-managed programme of periodic maintenance of these transport assets would
require capital outlays of about US$550 million per year.
5.2.2 Telecommunications62
Although teledensity rates have improved in the past ten years, the sector has been
unable to meet consumer demand. Problems include poor reliability, frequent disruptions
of operation, and long waiting lists for service registration, leading to poor coverage,
especially in the rural areas. TelOne has about 332 000 fixed lines in service, giving a fixed62 B
efore liberalisation in 2001, the government-owned Posts and Telecommunications Corporation held a monopoly on all telecom
services in the country, except cellular services. The Posts and Telecommunications Act came into effect in September 2000.
Its purpose was to establish the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ), which started operating in 2001.
POTRAZ is mandated by law to issue licences in the postal and telecommunications sector, to set the terms and conditions of the
licence agreements, and to regulate tariffs. The telecoms licensees contribute to a Universal Service Fund, which is managed by
the POTRAZ Board. The Fund is intended to support the expansion of communication services to underserviced areas.
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line teledensity of 2.7% (see Table 5.4). Mobile subscribers number about 1.1 million, giving
a mobile penetration rate of 9% (as against an estimated demand of 2 million). There are
four licenced data communications providers and three licenced Internet access providers;63
however, there are only about 1.2 million Internet users, owing to limited expansion
(services are only provided in urban centres). TelOne is burdened by foreign currency debts
reported at US$350 million in 2005, with its operating equipment having outlived its
useful life. In addition, the expansion of the networks and service levels is hampered by
the shortage of foreign currency and the lack of private sector engagement.
Table 5.4: Telecommunications in Zimbabwe
Items
Statistics
Fixed lines in service
332 000
Fixed line teledensity
2.7%
Number of Internet service providers
26
Mobile subscribers
1 100 000
Annual growth of mobile services
25%
9%
Mobile penetration
Internet host computers
6 600
Internet users
1 200 000
Internet penetration
10%
Besides the normal issues linked to a lack of telecommunications, other concerns are:
(i) Rural areas in Zimbabwe are, for the most part, disconnected from any (market)
information, leading to dysfunctional markets.
(ii) Currently, the lack of adequate resources in information and communications
technology (ICT) is undermining the traditional roles and effectiveness of a range of
public institutions, including the national agricultural research and extension service,
veterinary services, agricultural education, mechanisation and irrigation support.
Accordingly, investments should have a strong governance orientation, and include the
following:
(i) Governance:
1) T
he government should initiate a thorough audit of the assets and liabilities
of TelOne to inform a restructuring of the corporation and a future privatisation
strategy.
2) It should strengthen the independence and capacity of POTRAZ to encourage
investment in the sector.
63 The national Internet backbone was upgraded to 2 Mb/s in 1998 and expanded to 11 Mb/s by 2003.
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3) It
should consider Zimbabwes participation in the Regional Communications
Infrastructure project of the World Bank or a similar initiative to enhance
international connectivity of all services to and from Zimbabwe.
4) POTRAZ

should review Clause 3.23 public data network service licences with
the aim of amending the clause to allow licensees to offer Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) services.
5) The

government should ensure the appointment of the Board of POTRAZ
in accordance with the law.
6) POTRAZ

should enter into a twinning arrangement with private sector
players for the exchange of staff and the transfer of skills (World Bank,
2008b; AfDB, 2010).
(ii) Major ICT infrastructure investment in rural areas: TeleAccess originally aimed to
invest up to US$540 million in setting up infrastructure throughout the country,
targeting the corporate market but also offering telecommunication services
(World Bank, 2008b).
(iii) Development of ICT services: With the support of government and the private sector,
this will assist farmers and agribusinesses with agricultural and market information.
Investments in telecommunication are a critical intervention in agriculture, as ICT becomes
a crucial mode of transferring market information. An efficient market information hub,
underpinned by well-developed ICT, is likely to increase market efficiency, owing to easier
and more efficient methods of farm-level extension and agricultural market development.
5.2.3 Irrigation rehabilitation and development

Most of the water used is surface water, of which 45% is stored in government dams and
the remaining 55% in some 5700 dams in former large-scale commercial farming areas, on
mines and on plantation estates. Underground water, representing about 10% of the total
water use in Zimbabwe, is tapped mainly through boreholes; records show that there are
over 16 000 boreholes scattered across the country (Gumbo, 2006).
Close to 550 000 ha of land in Zimbabwe is irrigable, but only 33.6% (200 000 ha) has been
developed. The amount of land under irrigation includes functional and non-functional
irrigation systems, as well as informal irrigation schemes. The failure to irrigate the other
350 000 ha is largely due a mismatch between the location of irrigable land and water.
While the mismatches are noted, there is considerable unutilised water in government
dams, because of aged and outmoded equipment, limited working capacity, poor
management, and the collapse of social institutions.
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With Zimbabwe being an atypical subtropical country64 with one rainy season (November
to March 657 mm/year), the lack of irrigation development leads to:
(i) High crop failures in natural regions III, IV and V, characterised by low and unreliable
rainfall patterns that are coupled with high summer temperatures; and
(ii) Unreliable production of several strategic crops, such as soybeans, maize,
groundnuts and cotton, which receive supplementary irrigation in summer to
guard against mid-season drought and prolong the ploughing season. (Virtually
all wheat and sugarcane grown in Zimbabwe is under irrigation, while 70% of
coffee and 55% of tea are under irrigation.)
Access to water through irrigation is vital to Zimbabwes agricultural sector. This could
both increase national agricultural productivity65 and stabilise yields (Makadho et al.,
2006). The Department of Irrigation estimated in 2003 that more than 15 600 ha could
be irrigated immediately should water in 23 government dams be utilised (Department
of Irrigation, 2003). In communal areas, the total potential from internal water resources
is more than 90 000 ha. Year-round cropping would be possible if water could be made
available continuously.
Accordingly, investments should comprise the following components:
(i) Based on existing water resources, the identification and development of irrigation
projects and/or the development of old projects needing rehabilitation;
(ii) Institutional capacity building for dams and local irrigation schemes, to be managed
in a decentralised manner, by setting up local water management boards, reinforcing
watershed management measures to regulate water use, and the like;
(iii) Technical capacity building of producers to plan, produce crops, and operate
and manage the irrigation schemes, and of stakeholders, in particular technical
specialists, to provide the necessary inputs/support for irrigation development;
(iv) Project implementation support to MoAMID, and setting up a permanent system
at national and catchment level for observing and monitoring parameters that
enable the monitoring and assessment of water resources; and
(v) Mobilisation of non-conventional water supplies to reduce the gap between
demand and supply, particularly in unserved areas (through rain catchment,
reuse of return flows and use of wastewater): increasingly, techniques and
expertise are available for tapping non-conventional water supply sources in
a sustainable manner (Gumbo, 2006).
64 In Zimbabwe, dryland cropping in natural regions III, IV and V has generally proven hazardous due to the very low and unreliable
rainfall patterns, coupled with high summer temperatures. Rain-fed crop production frequently fails because of the regions aridity,
and families in these areas rely more on aid from either the government or food aid NGOs. In other parts of the country, such as
regions IIa and IIb, the risk of crop failure has been increased by prolonged mid-seasonal dry spells, where annual rainfall is reduced
by a mid-season drought.
65 This is because irrigated land produces more than double the yield of rain-fed land.
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The institutional and financial viability of such projects is important. In-depth reflection
is necessary on how these dams and schemes will be managed. In a commercial context,
irrigation developments can be implemented with the bulk water capture and supply
function retained in the public sector. Agricultural water can be supplied at cost or
subsidised to users, with producers managing the schemes. The schemes can also be
managed entirely at a decentralised level, being either financially autonomous or having
budgetary support.
Box 5.3: Investment costs for irrigation rehabilitation
The CAADP initiative points out that the cost of rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure
is estimated at US$157 million, while the provision of irrigation facilities to exploit
underutilised water in existing major dams is estimated to cost US$1.05 billion
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2009c).
5.2.4 Research and extension support services

According to the UNDP (2008), land reform was deficient at five levels: policy formulation,
coordination and management of implementation processes, provision of specialist
technical services, field supervision and extension, and monitoring and evaluation.
Although Zimbabwe was characterised by well-developed public (agricultural) research and
extension sectors, they have been severely affected by the countrys crisis. They are badly
constrained by poor funding support; poor organisational arrangements; low technical
and scientific capacity; and inadequate networking, monitoring, lesson learning and
dissemination (Rukuni, 2006).
Research
Although Zimbabwe had an extensive network of diverse institutions engaging in
agricultural-related research,66 very little research is currently conducted, mainly because of
a lack of funds.
(i) Although the Department of Agriculture hosts 12 research stations around the
country, research activities at these stations have declined, owing to a lack of
government funding and high staff turnover (FANR Directorate and SADC
Secretariat, 2008).67
(ii) Public research centres have been significantly affected by brain drain (the University
of Zimbabwe once a leading African institution in the sector has only a few
agricultural economists left), but several smaller, private research and consultancy
agencies have emerged.
66 This includes three ministries in Zimbabwe that host national agricultural research organisations and specialised departments (including
Agritex); nine state and three private universities, with each of them presenting several agriculture-related faculties, departments or
modules; and research parastatals (the Tobacco Research Board, the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre, the
Forestry Commission, and the Pig Industry Board).
67 www.sadc.int/fanr/agricresearch/icart/inforesources/situationanalysis/ZimbabweSitAnalysisFinalReport.pdf
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(iii) Research equipment and facilities are not maintained and are often dysfunctional,
making meaningful research difficult.
Extension:
Besides the significant decrease in agricultural research, the lack of resources is also
hampering efforts to provide critical services to farmers in remote areas.
(i) In agricultural extension, the farmer-to-extension worker ratio in the 1990s was
estimated at 800:1 (Rukuni, 2006). Although the number of extension workers
remained the same (approximately 1600), this ratio inevitably worsened after 2000,
given the increase in the number of new farmers. Currently, most extension workers
have low levels of experience and competency (due to skills flight among the more
experienced extension workers), are isolated, and have limited access to information
on market developments as basis for giving up-to-date agribusiness advice to farmers.
(ii) They lack basic equipment such as levels for pegging conservation works, rain gauges
to advise on planting times, and reference materials or manuals to consult when
confronted with specific crop or livestock problems. They also lack transport (bicycles,
motorcycles or travel allowances) for meeting farmer groups or undertaking farmer
training.
(iii) This results in the collapse of public extension, seen in the crippling lack of effective
veterinary services, such as dipping and the control of animal diseases, the lack of
technical advice on crops, and so forth.
The previously well-developed research and extension services represent an advantage for
the country. Although some restructuring might be necessary, a first stepping-stone will be
to build on what exists. Accordingly, investments should comprise the following activities:
(i) Upgrade existing agricultural research centres by funding provision through the
development, for example, of an agricultural research fund for 1) effective research
implementation; and 2) human resources (in number and quality). Enhance
agricultural technology generation, dissemination and adoption at the MoAMID,
the Department of Research and Specialist Services, and Agritex. Attention should be
given to Zimbabwes renewed agricultural sector, which necessitates a reorientation
of services to be developed and, thus, of research needs.
(ii) Promote better integration of more effective research in commodity value chains
through 1) cooperation with the private sector and other organisations; and
2) widening of the resource mobilisation base to meet the needs of the restructured
agricultural sector, in particular smallholder farmers. The public and private sectors
should look for collaborative engagements in research and extension service delivery.
(iii) Capacitate public extension services if this could be achieved through budgetary
support to MoAMID, investments in renewed collaboration with private sector could
be prioritised. National private sector capacities that are available for some of these
services are underutilised.
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Box 5.4: Zimbabwe CAADP investment priorities in agricultural research

and technology adoption
Specific area of research and extension
Cost
(US$ million)
Multiple technology transfer platforms/research and services targeting
3.40
Human resource capacity
1.17
Establishment of new and rehabilitation of post-harvest and value chain systems
0.71
Biotechnology, molecular biology and in vitro culture facilities
0.38
Research-extension interface
0.33
Rehabilitation of the laboratories at the Chemistry and Soil Research Institute,

the Horticulture Research Centre and the Plant Protection Research Institute
0.76
Optimising biodiversity: Integrating wildlife, aquaculture and livestock
0.48
Mass dissemination of agricultural information to the farming sector
0.80
Information and communications technology
0.60
Rehabilitating and equipping the biosecurity level 3 laboratory for the local production
of vaccines for anthrax, blackleg, brucellosis, lumpy skin disease and Newcastle disease
1.30
Delivering good crop, plant and livestock genetic resources
2.12
Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia surveillance
0.32
Use of biotechnology applications in indigenous breed conservation, breeding, health

and production in communal and small-scale cattle farming areas
0.50
Total
12.87
Source: Government of Zimbabwe (2009c).
5.2.5 Post-harvest and market-based infrastructure,

linked to value chain redevelopment
Zimbabwe was characterised by well-developed post-production and marketing infrastructure.
It was, for example, endowed with a good commercial grain handling and storage system,
a world-class auction system for tobacco, well-developed market linkages (agri-dealers, etc.),
and the like. Many of these establishments have deteriorated or entirely collapsed. The causes
are threefold. Essential public sector post-production and marketing infrastructure across
the country has been deteriorating because of a lack of public investment (and thus of
overall maintenance) and government regulations (leading to dysfunctional auctions
and markets). In addition, the collapse of the rural economy made it unviable for these
services to be performed by private sector stakeholders. Another factor was the nature of
the assistance that Zimbabwes farmers received from the government or through food or
development aid, which deregulated the rural economy. The Infrastructure Projects Division
of the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe was formed in July 2006 to develop
and rehabilitate infrastructure in Zimbabwe; however, its activities remain marginal owing
to financial constraints.68
68 This might change, with the IMF promising US$100 million, under certain conditions (see: www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/topstories/325-us100m-availed-for-infrastructure-refurbishment.html).
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There are several consequences:

(i) The collapse of agricultural value chains and market linkages has led to the
disintegration of input and output markets, untimely input distribution, and
a lack of access to markets.
(ii) Inadequate storage facilities in rural areas, coupled with poor handling and
poor post-harvest technologies, have caused exceptionally high post-harvest
losses, particularly for many resource-poor rural farmers. Currently, the nations
total storage capacity is estimated at 5 million tons (ten main bulk grain depots
for 733500 tons and bagged grain storage of up to 4266500 tons). Most of
this infrastructure is, however, underutilised. In particular, storage in marginalised
areas has been deemed unprofitable and commercially unviable, and remains
defunct. Similar situations can be found in the livestock sector, with defunct and
disused abattoirs, particularly in remote areas.
(iii) Industry players cite the lack of local information on market developments and
prices as a key constraint (Kapuya et al., 2010). The formation of the Commodity
Market Exchange in 2011 will be a major step in addressing this challenge.
Stakeholder opinions obtained during the interviews proposed investments in the following
components:
(i) Rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of post-harvest infrastructure, such
as market structures (including handling, processing and storage facilities),
are essential to increase production and productivity and enhance (input and
output) market access. As production increases, the need for improved postharvest storage and processing facilities (abattoirs, transformation plants, etc.)
and other post-harvest (on-farm) technologies is becoming more evident.
(ii) There is a need to support rural traders and to develop and catalyse local supply
chains, creating effective demand for the produce of smallholder farmers.
(iii) The establishment of rural centres and agri-dealers is essential, including input
and output markets, all production services, transporters, and the like.
(iv) Information dissemination systems (for market trends and improved technologies)
and communications networks must be developed.
(v) There is a need to assess public sector market infrastructure, train agro-dealers,
develop linkages with input suppliers, and provide project implementation support,
including capacity building.
(vi) Firms that provide intermediary services to small farmers must be supported to
provide better access for smallholder farmers to input and output markets and to
transfer knowledge (extension) and information. Support to business for innovative
and commercial ideas that combine profitability with developmental and social
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impact includes the following: 1) capitalisation for grants/loans to enterprises with

qualifying investment project ideas; and 2) management and project implementation
support. Such interventions can directly benefit large numbers of the poor as
producers, as well as employees of rural farmers and agribusinesses.69
The idea of these investments is to recreate various value chains and linkages to revitalise
the different sectors. If the revitalisation of agriculture should be facilitated through public
support, it will need the engagement of the private and local civil sector. A market-based
approach can help frame approaches to poverty reduction more in terms of enabling
opportunities and less in terms of aid. For the government, it can help to focus attention
on reforms needed in the business environment to allow a larger role for the private sector
(within the context of the indigenisation policy). The engagement of the private sector
will, however, only be achieved through securing its environment (in terms of the legal
aspects detailed earlier) and by facilitating its engagement. Strategic options for private
sector participation should, therefore, be examined, as well as the condition of services and
infrastructure, commercial viability, the legal and institutional framework, environmental
and safety considerations, and the impact on the local economy.
5.2.6 Institutional and market-based instrument support

In addition to the lack of respect for property rights, many of the previously well-established
formal economic institutions have collapsed. These include contractual arrangements,
stop orders and recognised vouchers. These institutions had the significant advantage of
lowering transaction costs, through securing the transaction itself.
The lack of respect for property rights during the last decade has led to:
O
nly informal contracting models remaining, which resulted in less integration of
the sector, leading to lost (credit, input, market, etc.) opportunities for farmers and
less secure and irregular procurement for agribusinesses (see Table 5.5);
S
pot markets as the only possible route for transactions (as all other types of
transactions could not be safeguarded), resulting in increased transaction costs
as well as reduced market opportunities;
S
ide-selling as a common practice, as enforcement mechanisms faded, leading to
the collapse of contractual arrangements and a loss of trust within the sector
(Tawuya, 2009); and
I
ncreased transaction costs for farmers and intermediaries, as they could not guarantee
either the production or the transaction.
69 The government of Zimbabwe points out that the cost of rehabilitating cattle infrastructure is estimated at US$100.86 million.
The dissemination of agricultural information to farmers and related stakeholders is estimated to cost US$1.398 million per year
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2009c).
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Table 5.5: Current classification of companies into contracting models70

Product
Cotton
Company name
Current model
Cargill
Informal/centralised
Cottco
Seed Quton
GMB
Informal
Olivine
Informal
Legume crops
Reapers
Informal
Ostriches and chickens
Ostrindo
Multipartite
Cairns Spices
Informal/centralised (Multipartite)
Capsicum
Informal
CTE
Informal
Hy-veld
Informal
AgriSeeds
Informal
ARDA Seeds
Informal
Seed crops
SeedCo
Informal
Sorghum
Delta
Informal
Sugarcane
Mkwasine
Nucleus estate
Northern Tobacco
Tribac
Multipartite
Tobacco
ZLT
Vegetables and/or fruit
Cairns Foods
Informal/centralised (Multipartite)
Favco
Informal
Honeywood
Wholesale Fruiterers
Informal
Selby Enterprises
TZI
Centralised
Paprika
Source: Dawes et al. (2009).
Making the agricultural sector interesting to the private sector implies making it secure
and viable for the private sector to invest. Revitalising the institutional infrastructure and
market-based instruments is vital. Besides legal frameworks, an environment of trust
has to be created between the different actors, including government, agribusinesses
and farmers. In order to facilitate this, the government has established the Agricultural
Marketing Authority. Its previous role was to finance and coordinate the activities of the
marketing boards, but in a deregulated market environment, its modified role is now to
facilitate and promote access to agricultural markets, particularly for smallholders.
70 T
he centralised model is used when a processing company gives farmers production quotas and requires high quality standards.
This model uses directed contract farming. The nucleus estate model is a variation of the centralised model and is used when
the company is an estate that contracts satellite outgrowers. The multipartite model refers to contracts where more than one
organisation is mandated to fulfil a certain function. The informal model describes companies that make minimal investments
in the farmers, do not require quotas, and have minimal quality standards.
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Additional investments are needed to support this process:

D
evelopment of institutional instruments to support market transactions (contractual
agreements, contract farming, vouchers and stop orders);
C
apacity building of different stakeholders regarding such instruments and negotiating
capacities; and
D
evelopment of adapted monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to follow up the
implementation of these instruments.
Box 5.5: Investment costs for rehabilitating market-based infrastructure
The Government of Zimbabwe (2009c) points out that the cost of rehabilitating cattle
infrastructure is estimated at US$100.86 million. The dissemination of agricultural
information to farmers and related stakeholders is estimated to cost US$1.398 million
per year.
5.2.7 Social infrastructure and capacity building

Although Zimbabwes post-independence administration has always been relatively centralised,
local structures were well established. A lack of resources at local level; mismanagement of
resources, particularly during the FTLRP; and political interference at local level have led to
the collapse of many of the local institutions. Although several NGOs have been established
since the implementation of aid, and are well coordinated (particularly through the United
Nations system), they remain dependent on donor assistance and are thus situation-specific
and temporary.
The collapse of local institutions has resulted in the following:
(i) A lack of management at local level, whether by statutory bodies (municipal boards,
etc.) or local management entities (e.g., irrigation scheme boards);
(ii) A lack of representation at local level, which is particularly constraining in the
potential framework of more decentralised governance: Local organisations are not
well organised, neither are professional associations. This leads to a lack of political
representation at local level, which cascades to a lack of representation of the local
level at national and other levels; and
(iii) Limited development of social institutions of collective action (saving clubs,
cooperative initiatives, etc.).
The country needs to redevelop its social infrastructure and institutions as tools for
more autonomy at local level, more effective representation, and poverty alleviation in a
decentralised governance system. Therefore, investments are needed to:
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(i) Enable and support decentralisation, strengthen the capacity of local governments/
municipalities to deliver services, and ensure development at local level as a vehicle
for improving the quality of life, particularly in rural areas.
(ii) Build the capacity of local representations and their associations. Capacity building
of community, local organisation or union leadership should cover basic elements
of democratic attitudes, leadership, representation, negotiation, procedures and
structures related to the external environment, and programming, for example.
To improve the capacity of organisations or unions to organise themselves and
raise their profile and visibility, it will be necessary to develop the skills and
knowledge of representing agents to ensure effective member representation
and improved communication between the leadership and the grassroots.
Efforts should also be made to ensure the participation of women.
(iii) Promote local partnerships, decentralised cooperation and joint action, such as
cooperative initiatives. Complement and support regional initiatives relevant to
local government.
(iv) Promote alternative development approaches to problems and issues that affect
local organisations by emphasising ownership and the direct participation of
key stakeholders.
(v) Provide a platform for analysing, debating and promoting policy leading to more
democratic and responsive governing structures at local level. Invest in catalysts
for improving communication and generating consensus among African institutions,
NGOs and international development agencies.
(vi) Make provision for equipment and operating capital.
5.2.8 Agro-manufacturing and processing capacity development

The agro-manufacturing and processing subsector plays an important role in the
agricultural downstream and upstream subsectors, providing the necessary inputs and
adding value to the countrys production. However, as have many of the other sectors,
the agro-processing subsector has for the past seven years been operating (and continues
to operate) at low levels of capacity, ranging from as low as 10% to about 40%. Dawes
et al. (2009) report that by 2008, agro-processing and manufacturing industries were
operating at less than 20% of their capacity. Reasons are: 1) difficulties in accessing foreign
currency and limited access to working capital; 2) low economic activity and reduced
demand for equipment, as most clients fail to mobilise resources to acquire equipment;
3) limited transfer of technology from research; 4) lack of raw materials and high duty
and tax on imports; and 5) poor quality products, especially from the informal sector, as
the enforcement of standards has not been effective (Mhazo et al., 2006). In addition,
those who are still operating have old equipment, some of which needs replacement or
refurbishment.
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Among other outcomes, this has resulted in:

(i) A lack of input and output markets for Zimbabwean farmers, resulting in lower
capacity utilisation, lower production efficiency, higher production losses and an
increased cost of production;
(ii) Extensive reliance on imported inputs (leading to high production costs) and export
markets for processing (resulting in lower incomes), with a loss of local market share
and potential export markets; and
(iii) A lack of income diversification for small-scale farmers, who often can no longer
support their livelihoods from agriculture alone.
Agro-processing companies in Zimbabwe have a potential competitive advantage over
imported products if the constraints facing the industry can be addressed. This will also
facilitate the revitalisation of the agricultural sector, while creating (direct and indirect)
income diversification opportunities in rural Zimbabwe. On the one hand, the factory
structures of most companies are relatively intact, though old, and should be refurbished.
On the other, as the structure of Zimbabwes agricultural sector has changed, it will be
important to establish small-scale, appropriate and sustainable processing plants and
businesses that are flexible, require little capital investment, and can be carried out at
home or through small-scale enterprises, without the need for sophisticated or expensive
equipment.
(i) There is a need for recapitalisation to refurbish plant and equipment and provide
operating capital requirements, while also supporting indigenous small and medium
agro-industries, particularly in rural areas. In the interviews, various stakeholders
identified the following major subsectors as having potential: medium-scale grain
milling enterprises, manufacturing of livestock feeds at local level, processing and
marketing of peanut butter, processing and marketing of processed fruits and
vegetable products, and vegetable oil.71
(ii) With the smaller farm sizes and the increase in the number of farmers, there is a
need to develop small and medium-scale agri-based manufacturers and processing
plants that cater to the full spectrum of agricultural inputs and commodities.
The focus will be on small processor development (home/farm use), enhanced
performance of both manufacturers and processors, and the promotion of small
and medium service providers, particularly those based in rural areas.
(iii) The provision of support services is vital. Equipment cost is beyond the reach
of individuals; hence, technology access through service provision rather than
ownership of the hardware is more favourable. Emphasis should then shift from
small-scale farmers aspiring to own the processing technology to improving access
to the technology, such as through collective equipment.
71 Literature on small and medium-scale agro-processing often omits meat, mopani worm, fish and non-food products such as
hides and skins, timber and medicinal plants. However, it may be argued that the last two are more related to natural resources
(Mhazo et al., 2006).
Page 138

(iv) There is a need to support research to make technologies and services accessible
to small-scale farmers, such as exposure to available technologies and the range
of products that can be manufactured to encourage uptake of this new business,
the need to enforce food safety and hygiene standards, and research on how
costs of production can be reduced, for example.
5.2.9 Credit and financial services

After the introduction of the multi-currency system, the major constraint for farmers,
agribusinesses and the agro-processing industry has been the availability of financial
resources and services from the banking and financial sector. The financial sector faces
the challenge of a limited domestic deposit base, which reduces the capacity of banks
to provide credit to the private sector, particularly the small-scale sector, on appropriate
repayment terms. The credit risk of the country is perceived to be high, limiting its credit
access. Due to the unfavourable environment for doing business, insurance is weakly
developed, particularly in the broader agricultural sector. In addition, although there has
been some increase in bank lending during the course of 2010, most loans remain shortterm (90 days or less), with longer-term loans accounting for less than 3% of the overall
deposits (Government of Zimbabwe, 2010). The cost of credit is high, remaining above
30%. Lastly, very few financial services are adapted to the new situation of nationalised
land tenure, leaving many farmers without collateral.
The constraints on the financial system have major implications:
(i) The limited availability of a full range of short, medium and long-term loan finance
for the broader agricultural sector, constraining the recovery of the sector and posing
serious challenges to its operational efficiency; and
(ii) The lack of insurance mechanisms, contributing to the already risky farm
environment (accentuated by the deterioration of its infrastructural basis).
Past government policy focused on providing credits to farmers (as discussed in Chapters 2
and 3), albeit limited, in a bid to achieve growth-led recovery. Financial services need to be
developed in order to support growth in and beyond the agricultural sector. This includes
the design of rural financial services and credit facilities that essentially move beyond the
requirement for freehold title as collateral to new forms of credit guarantee supported
by the state, non-state actors and/or the private sector. It is indeed necessary for both
businesses and the government to think more creatively about new financial products and
services that can meet the needs of rural farmers and households, and about opportunities
for market-based solutions to achieve this. Perhaps the international donor community
could play a leading role in loan and credit assistance interventions to support government
efforts to augment financial resources.
Page 139

There is a need for investments at different levels, engaging different actors:

(i) Credit guarantee arrangements for financial institutions, in which the credit
to agricultural actors is secured through public, donor or private funds72 (this will
mitigate risks for financial institutions and should thus increase lending rates);
(ii) Development and support of innovative credit facilities by financial institutions:
1) to farmers (adapted to the new land tenure regime, flexible and decentralised);
and 2) to the manufacturing and agro-processing industry, with a special window
for rural processors;
(iii) Provision of incentives to the private sector for active and innovative support for
small-scale farmers through tailor-made credit facilities, alongside support for
proposals from business for innovative commercial ideas that combine profitability
with developmental and social impact (fund capitalisation for grants/loans to
enterprises with qualifying investment ideas, including management and project
implementation support costs). For example, the experience of private companies
linking with large numbers of smallholder outgrowers or contract farmers to
attain the scale of operations necessary for commercial enterprises has shown that
operational private sector credit models can produce results, particularly in the
tobacco and cotton sectors; and
(iv) Support for the development and adaptation of insurance schemes for farmers
(including smallholders) and broader agricultural operators (natural disaster
insurance, etc.).
5.3 The need for a threefold development approach

for reconstruction
In conclusion, it is important to note that Zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction will
necessitate a threefold development approach, combining macro, policy and governance
reforms with sectoral and value chain initiatives, as well as with a territorial development
approach.
One of the characteristics of inequality and poverty is the prevalence of intra-country
differences. This is also the case in Zimbabwe. The natural features and institutional
architecture in specific territories largely explain why some have been or will be able to
achieve local economic growth and social inclusion, while others have not. Applying only
macro and sectoral reforms or initiatives might, therefore, be a source of unequal, and
thus unsustainable, development.
72 This concept was adopted in Zimbabwe as the Loan Guarantee Facility Scheme, in which USAID covers 50% of the credit,
while Standard Chartered Bank covers the remaining 50%.
Page 140

Policy/governance
reforms
Sectoral/value chain
measures
Territorial
development
Figure 5.2: The need for a threefold development approach

for Zimbabwes reconstruction
Regarding territorial development, it is used to define the set of social, cultural and
economic processes that promote economic dynamism and a better quality of life for the
population of a specific territory. The aim of territorial development is to develop and
support the implementation of sustainable territorial development policies according to
participatory democratic approaches.
The purpose of this approach is to define a process in which local territorial issues,
based on the viewpoints of different actors, contribute to a coherent understanding of
the territorial system. It is thus based on an open process of diagnosis to support the
definition of a collective territorial project. Such a project provides a new perspective on
the management and prevention of problems arising from local competition for resources
and/or unequal development stemming from national policies and external dynamics.
This methodology allows for a negotiated aggregation of local demands, and provides
inputs for an adaptation or redefinition of national and local policies in order to meet
such demands. The main purpose of the process is to strengthen dialogue and mutual
trust among the various actors (in one level) and between the actors and the institutions
(of different levels). Decentralised institutions represent the main entry point in a
collaborative attempt to influence social, cultural and political change and to improve
the design of and coordination between the interventions at the different decision
Page 141

levels (from civil society and organisations related to the state and its decentralised bodies)
(FAO, 2005).
The combination of more sectoral and value chain approaches with territorial development
strategies endeavours to foster balanced development of a specific territory as a whole,
including sectors that are booming and areas in difficulty. The more sectoral approaches to
rural development will be unable to respond to the changes that have taken place in rural
Zimbabwe and that will need adapted responses, for the following reasons:
(i) They are centred on agricultural activities, despite the importance of non-farm rural
activities and other income-generating strategies in a country in transition. As shown
through the Post-Crisis Reconstruction Model, agricultural integration and other
sectoral development are as important.
(ii) They do not take account of the potential effects of the strengthening of rural-urban
linkages on transforming agricultural production patterns, as well as on the living
and working conditions of the population, particularly the poor.
(iii) They use project resources to compensate for market failures, only to see these
failures reappear once such interventions have concluded. This, as indicated on
several occasions in this report, is a major issue linked to Zimbabwes (government
and donor) assistance framework.
(iv) Actions are narrowly focused on smallholder farming, not considering that alliances
with non-poor, non-rural agents (i.e. contract farming) can be more efficient routes
out of poverty
(v) They do not take into consideration socio-political constraints or macroeconomic
restrictions, for example on the amount of resources employed, thus limiting the
development of their initiatives.
(vi) The design does not take into account the heterogeneity of the rural areas, since
centrally designed programmes are often one size fits all.
(vii) Confusion between social and economic objectives limits the development of
entrepreneurial capabilities.
Combining these approaches will enable these aspects to be taken into consideration.
It will also facilitate the development of proximity answers to the difficulties of these areas,
adapted to the spatial features and based on local dynamics. Concretely, in Zimbabwes
reconstruction, the territorial entities could offer specific aid to the most disadvantaged
rural and urban territories, supporting smallholder agriculture, encouraging the setting up
of businesses, and supporting tourist activities and land use management. They could also
enable the major urban centres and other economic sectors to develop further, through
urban development contracts and major urban development projects; broader economic
development, including industry and services; and setting up community public services.
One example would be the establishment of a network of rural centres, providing major
services and broader economic development opportunities (see Box 5.6).
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Box 5.6: Rural centres for Zimbabwes revitalisation

A good example of combined macro, sectoral and territorial development, which
potentially could be adapted to Zimbabwes situation, would be the establishment
of rural centres. Such centres, established in a rural town or village, would include
(initially) all major services: shops with basic commodities, a local rural cooperative, an
agri-dealer, and the like. It would provide all agricultural inputs and would represent
an output market (including storage facilities, decentralised market, etc.). In addition,
it could also be the basis for service delivery to the wider rural area (extension services,
road servicing, common tractor provision/rental, etc.).
Such a centre would probably be based on public-private partnerships, that is, public
or donor budget assistance, managed privately or on a cooperative basis. Most of
the infrastructure (storage, etc.) and several of the services are already available, but
should be revitalised.
In order for such a process to succeed, however, institutional, social and human capacity
has to be present. Not only will such a process need decentralised institutions (cooperatives,
markets and stop orders) and administration (municipal services), but it will also be based
on local representation (unions, professional associations, etc.) by capacitated individuals
enabled to engage in the (formal and informal) public political and economic sphere.
Particularly in Zimbabwe, because of the interference of economic and political spheres,
elites and coalitions (and the links with supra-local levels) determine what the rules are and
how they have an impact locally.
5.4 Public consultation and prioritisation

In order to discuss the results presented in this report, a follow-up stakeholder workshop
was held in November 2011. The workshop included a large panel of stakeholders
representing Zimbabwes agricultural sector, including the donor and international
community. The stakeholder workshop enabled the team not only to discuss and
complement the report (comments were integrated into this final version), but also to
prioritise the different investment priorities and define strategies and roles for the different
stakeholders.
1) Reassessing priorities for agricultural development and food security promotion
A first consultation group reflected on the prioritisation of the identified investments.
Two main fields of reform were emphasised:
P
olicy reform: Policy reforms should bring policy coherence; the current policy
incoherence is an obstacle to development. There are many examples of such
incoherence. For instance, one policy paradox is that local farmers cannot export
their produce, while the country allows imports. The country imports genetically
Page 143

modified maize, yet local farmers are not allowed to grow it. This reduces the
competitiveness of local farmers in a global market. Critical areas where policy
reform is needed include:

Land titling for collateral purposes (unlocking the market value of land),
land should be transferable and bankable;

Agriculture policy framework;

Legal reforms, including the issue of land and water rights;

Liberalisation policy; and

Capacity building

Individual and institutional capacity building is needed in the areas of research,
extension and training; the development of commercial farming skills; enhancing access
to appropriate technology (conservation agriculture, genetically modified products,
new processing technology for agribusiness, etc.); and enhancing access to information
and markets (storage to reduce post-harvest losses, access to export markets, and the
adoption of ICT in government departments).
2) Supporting agriculture and food security by investing in the non-agricultural sector
A second group reflected on the broader services, infrastructure and institutions that
enable the agricultural sector to develop. Many interventions in the agriculture and food
security sectors have focused only on the production side, and the approach was not
comprehensive. Several priorities were identified:

Infrastructure development: This should be done through capacitating local
authorities for social service provision, including health, water and sanitation, and
the development of good road, telecommunications and power/energy facilities.

Support services: This applies to whole value chains and should include research
and extension, education and the introduction of service centres in, for instance,
rural growth points.

Market development: This involves supporting the development of agro-dealers
and embracing the influence of the donor community.

Enabling policies: These include the use of genetically modified crops, a tenure
system, the mandate and operations of parastatals, and general legislation.
Availability of appropriate finance: This should cover long-term loans for
capitalisation, medium-term loans for rehabilitation, and short-term loans
for seasonal provision.
Creation of databases: Examples include land use and irrigation.
3) Interventions of different actors engaged in Zimbabwes agricultural sector

The discussion group explored several pertinent issues, such as how the activities
of local institutions, donors and development finance institutions can be redirected
and their effectiveness improved, or what the targets should be for interventions by
Page 144

both state and private actors to support agricultural development and food security.
The major players involved in agriculture development and food security were
categorised into government, donors and development finance institutions, each with
a specific role to play.
G
overnment:

Government must create an enabling environment, including law and order
and individual property rights, in which all actors can perform.

Farming is a business, and the land issue needs to be resolved, moving from
mere land allocation to land ownership.
D
onors:

Develop models that eliminate handouts or subsidies to farmers.

Promote farming as a business (commercialisation).

Strengthen coordination of donor activities.

Capacitate institutions, including farmers unions and associations,
financial institutions, and research and teaching institutions.

Promote bottom-up approaches to development.

Be inclusive of all farmer categories, in recognition of the diversity
and heterogeneity of farmers in the country.

Promote appropriate technology.
D
evelopment finance institutions:

Provide tailor-made financing models for different categories of farmers.

Support infrastructure development.
Page 145

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Page 152

Annexure 1
List of interviewed institutions
This table shows all the institutions interviewed. More than one person could have
been interviewed in each institution or category. For confidentiality reasons, names are not
disclosed.
Organisations visited
Classification
Government
1
Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (MoAMID)
Government department
Treasury/Ministry of Finance
Government department
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)
Central bank
Agricultural Marketing Authority
Parastatal
Grain Marketing Board (GMB)
Parastatal
Agribank
Parastatal
Farmers unions
7
Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU)
Farmers union
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)
Farmers union
Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)
Farmers union
Private sector
10
Paperhole Investments
Private company
11
AgriSeeds
Private company
12
Surface Investments
Private company
Multilateral organisations
13
World Bank
Bretton Woods institute
14
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
United Nations agency
15
World Food Programme (WFP)
United Nations agency
Bilateral Organisations
16
USAID
Aid agency
17
French Embassy
Foreign mission
18
European Union
Foreign mission
NGOs
19
Concern Worldwide
International NGO
20
GRM International (PRP)
International NGO
21
Care International
International NGO
22
Red Cross Zimbabwe
Local NGO
Research Institutions
23
Agricultural Research Council
Public research institution
24
University of Zimbabwe Centre for Applied Social Sciences
Public academic institution
25
University of Zimbabwe Department of Agricultural Economics
Public academic institution
26
African Institute of Agrarian Studies
Private research institute
27
Mandi Rukuni Seminar
Private research institute
Independent
28
Independents
Economic consultants
Page 153

Annexure 2
Agricultural and related legislation
Year
Act
Sector
Description
Pest control, animal health and standards

1982
Locust Control Act

[Chapter 19:06]
Pest control
This Act introduces a series of measures to control the spread of the African
migratory locust, the brown locust, the desert locust and the red locust
in Zimbabwe. Section 3 requires owners or occupiers of land to notify
specified authorities about the occurrence of swarms of locusts on their
land. The Minister of Agriculture may provide an occupier or owner of land
with material to fight locusts free of charge (section 4). The owner shall use
the material provided appropriately and following the directions given by
the Minister. The Minister may give orders to occupiers or owners pursuant
to section 5. Sections 8 to 10 prescribe offences and penalties and section
11 specifies the regulation-making powers of the Minister.
1988
Plant Pests and Diseases

(Importation)
Regulations, 1976
Pest control
These Regulations make provision for the control of the importation of

plants, plant products, seeds, growing mediums, soil, invertebrates and
injurious organisms that may carry harmful pests and diseases. Regulations
1 and 4 define the categories of plants or plant products to which these
Regulations apply. Items listed in Regulation 4 shall only be imported with
an import permit or the approval of the Chief Plant Protection Officer,
being an officer appointed under Regulation 3. Other regulations concern
inspection and treatment of imported items.
1989
Plant Pests and Diseases Act

[Chapter 19:08]
Pest control
This Act makes provision for the control of pests and diseases affecting
plants in Zimbabwe. The Act consists of 30 sections divided into five parts:
Preliminary (I); Eradication and prevention of spread of pests (II); Control
of importation of growing media, injurious organisms, invertebrates and
plants (III); Special provisions relating to cured tobacco (IV); and General
(V). For the purposes of this Act, the Minister may, by regulation, order
or notice: (a) declare an injurious organism to be a pest either generally
or in respect of a particular type of plant, and either with a view to its
complete eradication or its control or the prevention of its spread or for
some other purpose; and (b) declare a plant to be an alternate host of a pest
(section 2) and may provide for the eradication of pests or the prevention or
control of attacks by or the spread of a pest in accordance with section 4.
Section 6 defines the duty of the landowner to eradicate pests. Provisions of
Part II specify the regulation-making powers of the Minister and the
inspection powers of inspectors in relation to the importation of growing
media and other specified material. Provisions of Part IV concern the
handling, storing and removal of cured tobacco (defined in section 2) and
the licencing of premises of certain growers. Provisions of Part V concern the
appointment of inspectors and some miscellaneous matters, and prescribe
offences.
1989
Animal Health (Import)

(Amendment) Regulations
(S.I. No. 146 of 1989)
Pest control
Regulation-making powers of the competent minister, being the Minister

of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlements, for purposes of eradication
and prevention of animal pests and diseases are outlined in section 5 of the
Animal Health Act. These Regulations declare things specified in Schedule
2 as infectious things for purposes of these Regulations and list animals to
which these Regulations apply in Schedule 1. They regulate the importation
into Zimbabwe of animals and imported things, such as embryos, carcasses,
specified animal products and drugs. The Regulations also apply to fish and
crustaceans. Permits for the importation of animals and things to which
these Regulations apply shall be issued by the Director of Veterinary Services
in the form set out in Schedule 3. Comma 2 of Regulation 6 specifies
exemptions from the requirement to import only with a valid permit.
(Ten regulations completed by five schedules)
Amended again in 1994,

1997 and 1999
Page 154

Year
Act
Sector
Description
1990
Food and Food Standards

(Poultry, Poultry Meat
and Poultry Products)
Regulations, 1990
(S.I. 103 of 1990)
Standards
These Regulations prescribe standards for any poultry, i.e. any bird that is
commonly used for food and poultry products. They apply to all poultry,
poultry meat and poultry products that are sold or manufactured for sale
in Zimbabwe. No person shall sell, import for sale or manufacture for
sale any poultry, poultry meat or poultry products other than in terms of
these Regulations (Regulation 2). The standards prescribe ingredients and
use of additives and preservatives, treatment of food, intrinsic qualities
and labelling. Regulation 4 prohibits the use of exogenous oestrogenic
substances and the sale of products containing exogenous oestrogenic
substances. The same regulation defines adulterated poultry meat, poultry
meat products or preparations thereof. (Six regulations)
1990

(Peanut and Peanut
Products) Regulations, 1990
(S.I. No. 99 of 1990)
Standards
These Regulations prescribe standards for peanut and peanut products that
are sold or manufactured for sale in Zimbabwe. No person shall sell, import
for sale or manufacture for sale peanut or peanut products other than in
terms of these Regulations (Regulation 2). They mainly prescribe standards
for the ingredients of peanut butter and a maximum limit for mycotoxins.
1990

(Fish and Fish Products)
Regulations, 1990
(S.I. No. 104 of 1990)
Standards
These Regulations prescribe standards for fish and fish products, i.e. fish
parts used for human consumption, with or without salt or seasoning, and
flesh of crustaceans, molluscs, other marine invertebrates, marine mammals
and marine reptiles, with or without salt or seasoning. Regulation 2 provides
that these Regulations shall apply to all fish and fish products that are sold
or manufactured for sale in Zimbabwe and that no person shall sell, import
for sale or manufacture for sale any fish or fish products other than in terms
of these Regulations. Fish and fish products may be placed on the market
with food additives and preservatives as permitted by the Food and Food
Standards (Preservatives, Additives and Prohibited Substances) Regulations
of 1972, but shall be labelled accordingly.
1991

(Pasta Products) Regulations,
1991 (S.I. 149 of 1991)
Standards
These Regulations prescribe standards for labelling, shape, size and

ingredients of a class of food prepared by drying units of dough prepared
from flour and water with or without one or more of the optional ingredients
referred to in Article 5. Regulation 2 prescribes that these Regulations
shall apply to all pasta products that are sold or manufactured for sale in
Zimbabwe, and that no person shall sell, import or manufacture for sale any
of such products otherwise than in terms of these Regulations.
2001

Act [Chapter 15:04]
Standards
The Act consists of 27 sections divided into six Parts: Preliminary (I);
Adulterated and falsely described food (II); Administration (III); Legal
proceedings (IV); Food Standard Advisory Board (V); and General (VI).
Section 2 outlines the application of the Act. Section 4 gives a definition of
adulterated food. Section 5 prohibits the sale, importation and manufacture
for sale of food that is adulterated or falsely described. Section 7 provides
for the control of blended foods. Part III regulates the inspection, sampling,
seizure and disposal of food and detention of food at entry ports.
The Minister may issue an order under section 15 for purposes of obtaining
information about food from importers, manufacturers, and the like. A Food
Standards Advisory Board is established under section 18. The last Part
provides for the appointment of inspectors and analysts and the delegation
of powers by the Minister to local authorities, and prescribes offences.
Section 27 outlines the regulation-making powers of the Minister.
2001
Animal Health Act

(Chapter 19:01)
Pest control
The Minister of Agriculture shall indicate, in accordance with section 3,

animals, diseases and pests subject to the provisions of the present Act.
Regulation-making powers of the Minister for purposes of the eradication
and prevention of animal pests and diseases are outlined in section 5.
Sections 6 to 8 provide for the prevention of the spread of diseases by
regulating the importation and exportation of goods and animals. Section 9
concerns stray animals. Sections 12 to 14 provide for the construction and
use of veterinary fixtures, being structures for the cleansing and treatment
of animals, persons, vehicles, and the like. Section 15 provides for the
Minister ordering the destruction of animals living in the wild. Section 29
specifies powers of the officer-in-charge at the Department of Veterinary
Services of the Ministry. Remaining provisions deal with the issue of permits,
fencing and the use of land for destruction and disposal of animals, and
prescribe offences.
Page 155

Year
Act
Sector
Description
Land policy Legislation and regulations

1985
Land Acquisition Act
Land
Though drawn up in the spirit of the 1979 Lancaster House willing

seller, willing buyer clause (which could not be changed for ten years),
the Act gave the government the first right to purchase excess land for
redistribution to the landless. However, the Act had a limited impact, largely
because the government did not have the money to compensate landowners.
In addition, white farmers mounted a vigorous opposition to the Act,
and because of the willing seller, willing buyer clause, the government
was powerless in the face of resistance. As a result, between 1980 and
1990, the government acquired only 40% of the targeted 8 million ha
(19.77 million acres) of land, and 71 000 families out of a target of 162 000
were resettled.
2002
Communal Land Act of

1983, amended in 2002
Land
The Act states that all communal land vests in the President, who holds it
in trust for the people. It shifted authority over these lands from traditional
rulers to local authorities and changed the designation from Tribal Trust Lands
into Communal Areas. Communal land consists of land that, immediately
before 1 February 1983, was Tribal Trust Land in terms of the Tribal Trust Act
of 1979. All those with vested rights are entitled to continue to exercise their
rights on customary land. No person shall occupy communal land unless he
acquired the right to do so before 1 February 1983, has obtained a permit
to do so, or is related to a person who occupies or uses communal land.
Those without vested rights may apply to the relevant Rural District Council
to acquire occupation and user rights. However, in granting the permit to use
this land, the Council must refer to customary law, which excludes women
from acquiring land.
2002
Rural Land Act of 1963,

amended in 2002
Land
The Act provides for the acquisition of land by the state and for the alienation
of state land. Land may be leased or alienated to a single individual or to
a single corporate body but not to two or more persons jointly without
the consent of the appropriate Minister. Private land shall not be leased
for cultivation if not properly demarcated. The owner of land to which this
Act applies shall permit no cultivation based on sharecropping, unless an
agreement in writing and approved by the Minister is in place.
1992
Land Acquisition Act
Land
The government introduced this Act to speed up the resettlement process

and to address the problem of inequitable access to land by resettling
landless people after the expiration of the conditions entrenched by the
Lancaster House Constitution in 1990. However, land redistribution did not
proceed rapidly and, as a result, land occupations increased.
1998
Land Reform and

Resettlement Programme
Phase II
Land
The Programme envisaged the compulsory purchase over five years of

50 000 km2 of the 112 000 km2 owned by white commercial farmers, public
corporations, churches, NGOs and multinational companies. The 50 000 km2
meant that every year between 1998 and 2003, the government intended to
purchase 10 000 km2 for redistribution. In September 1998, the government
called a donors conference in Harare on the programme to inform the donor
community and involve them in it. Forty-eight countries and international
organisations attended and unanimously endorsed the land programme,
saying it was essential for poverty reduction, political stability and economic
growth. They agreed that the inception phase, covering the first 24 months,
should start immediately, particularly appreciating the political imperative
and urgency of the proposal.
2005
Administrative Court [Land

Acquisition] Rules of 1998,
amended in 2005
Land
The Rules set out forms and defined procedures for specific proceedings
and applications with the Administrative Court in relation to the acquisition
of land under the Land Acquisition Act.
1996
Deeds Registries Act of

Land
The Act provides for the establishment of deeds registries, the appointment
of registrars of deeds, and the registration of deeds and conventional
hypothecations and matters incidental to the foregoing. The Act also
provides for the making and registration of deeds regarding land and
other real rights, rights in land such as lease and servitude, and the transfer
of land.
Page 156

Year
Act
Sector
Description
2001
Traditional Leaders Act of

Land
The Act provides for the appointment of chiefs, headmen and village
heads. These local officers shall have a wide range of powers in the local
administration regarding, among other things, grazing, allocation of
communal land and communal land use, irrigation and the use of natural
resources.
2001
Agricultural and Rural

Development Authority Act
of 1971, amended in 2001
Land
The Act establishes the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority.

The operations of the Authority shall be controlled by a Board constituted
under section 5. For the better exercise of its functions and powers, the
Board may establish one or more committees. The functions and duties
of the Authority shall be: i) to plan, coordinate, implement, promote and
assist agricultural development in the country; ii) to prepare and, with the
agreement of the Minister, to implement schemes for the betterment of
agriculture in any part of the country; and iii) to plan, promote, coordinate
and carry out schemes for the development, exploitation, utilisation,
settlement or disposition of state land.
2002
Rural District Councils Act of

Land
The Act provides for the declaration of districts, the classification of lands
in districts by the Minister, and the establishment of Rural District Councils.
Councils shall have functions and powers related to natural resources
management, matters concerning land in a district, water, fisheries, forestry,
sewerage and protection of the environment. A District Council may, among
other things, compulsorily acquire land under this Act, establish cooperatives
and make bylaws.
2000
Fast Track Land Reform

Programme of 2000 (FTLRP)
Land
The war veterans organised like-minded people (not necessarily other war
veterans, as many of them were too young to have fought in the Liberation
War) to march on white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song
and dance. The programme was officially announced as the Fast Track
Resettlement Programme. The (usually white) owners were forced off the
land, frequently together with their farm workers, who were often of foreign
descent. This generally happened violently and without compensation.
In the first wave of farm invasions, 110 000 km2 of land was seized.
Much of the land was claimed through corrupt means by officials from
ZANU PF, army officers, high-ranking police officers, and the like. Several
hundred thousand farm workers were excluded from the redistribution.
Many of them lost their jobs and their homes. Officially, the land was
divided into smallholder production, so called A1 schemes, and commercial
farms, called A2 schemes. There is, however, much overlap between the
two categories.
2005
National Land Policy
Land
The Policy was established to address unequal land distribution, insecurity

of tenure and unsustainable and suboptimal land use. Within the unequal
land distribution, it recognises womens weak position regarding land
rights in customary land tenure regimes, and calls for the modernisation of
customary law to provide for equality between men and women. Particularly,
the amendment of section 23 of the Constitution was requested in order to
create synergy and consistency between the Constitution and other laws
to protect womens rights. Parliament, dominated by ZANU PF, passed the
constitutional amendment, signed into law on 12 September 2005, which
nationalised farmland acquired through the Fast Track process and deprived
original landowners of the right to challenge in court the governments
decision to expropriate their land.
Comment:
In 2006, the Agriculture Minister was considering legislation that would compel commercial banks to finance black peasants who had
been allocated formerly white-owned farmland in the land reforms. The newly resettled peasants had largely failed to secure loans from
commercial banks because they did not have title over the land on which they were resettled, and thus could not use it as collateral. With no
security of tenure on the farms, banks have been reluctant to extend loans to the new farmers, many of whom do not have much experience
in commercial farming or assets to provide alternative collateral for any borrowed money (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reform_in_Zimbabwe
-cite_note-12). This situation still prevails. The Finance Minister has asked Cabinet to give new farmers secure tenure in order for them to
access agri-finance, but this has not happened yet.
Page 157

Year
Act
Sector
Description
Agricultural production, financing and inputs policies Legislation and regulations

1991
Dairy Produce Marketing

and Levy Act [Chapter 18:09]
Dairy
This Act establishes the Dairy Marketing Board and provides rules for the
marketing of dairy produce. It consists of 47 sections divided into seven
Parts: Preliminary (I); Establishment of Dairy Marketing Board (II); Financial
provisions relating to Board (III); Functions of Board (IV); Imposition of
levies on dairy produce (V); Marketing of dairy produce (VI); and General
(VII). The Dairy Marketing Board is established as a body corporate.
The functions of the Board shall, subject to this Act and any direction given
to the Board by the Minister, be to: (a) buy at the appropriate prescribed
prices any butterfat, cream or milk that is delivered by a registered producerwholesaler of butterfat, cream or milk, as the case may be, to any depot
appointed by the Board for the purpose; (b) manufacture and prepare milk
products; and (c) market, within and outside Zimbabwe, milk and milk
products (section 28). Other provisions of this Act concern the imposition of
levies on dairy products, the registration of dairy producer-wholesalers and
producer-retailers, the disposal of dairy produce rejected by Dairy Marketing
Board, procedural matters of the Board, inspections, offences, and the like.
1991
Cold Storage Commission Act

[Chapter 18:06]
Beef
This Act establishes the CSC. It consists of 51 sections divided into five
Parts: Preliminary (I); Establishment of the Commission (II); Financial
provisions relating to the Commission (III); Functions, powers and duties
of the Commission (IV); Special provisions relating to livestock finance
schemes (V); and General (VI). The CSC is established as a body corporate.
Its functions and powers are set out in Part IV. They include: (a) purchase
at the appropriate prescribed prices all livestock delivered by any person to
the works of the CSC; and (b) operate abattoirs and refrigerating works for
the purpose of chilling, freezing and storing beef, mutton, pork, poultry,
fish and other perishable foodstuffs of whatsoever nature, and canning
factories and livestock animals processing plants (section 31). Section
36 concerns the ownership, possession and keeping of grazers, i.e. any
livestock: (a) of the CSC in the possession of a grazier; (b) purchased by a
grazier out of an advance made by the CSC; or (c) given in security to the
CSC by a grazier for an advance made by the CSC or for a debt due to the
CSC. Grazier means any person who is in possession of grazers and who,
in terms of a contract with the CSC, has agreed to deliver them to or hold
them on behalf of the CSC. Section 46 of Part VI provides that the Minister
may, by statutory instrument, prescribe areas in Zimbabwe within which,
from and after a date specified in the statutory instrument, the carcasses of
all livestock slaughtered for sale or export in any form whatsoever shall be
graded immediately after slaughter in accordance with this Act.
2001
Sericulture Act
[Chapter 18:18]
Sericulture
This Act provides for the registration of breeders, buyers, breeders, reelers
or twisters of silkworms with the registration officer to be appointed by
the Minister. Section 5 requires all sale or otherwise disposal of cocoons
of silkworms or raw silk to be done by registered persons. The Minister
may give written authority to a person: (a) to rear a prohibited variety of
silkworm in any area; or (b) to import a prohibited variety of silkworm
into any area; and, in granting such authority, the Minister may impose
such terms and conditions as he or she deems fit. Sections 7 to 9 concern
the control of diseases. The Minister may declare any disease or symptom
affecting silkworms to be a disease for the purposes of this Act; declare
any area in which any disease exists to be a disease area; prohibit, either
absolutely or subject to conditions, the sending or bringing of silkworms
or cocoons into any disease area, or the sending or removal from a disease
area of silkworms or cocoons; and require breeders within a disease area
to register in the prescribed manner and form. Section 9 provides for the
notification of diseases by breeders. Other provisions concern inspection
and regulation- making powers of the Minister. (Twelve sections divided into
four Parts)
Page 158

Year
Act
Sector
Description
2001
Sugar Production Control

Act [Chapter 18:19]
Sugarcane
This Act makes provision for the control of production of sugarcane

and sugar. It consists of 22 sections divided into four Parts: Preliminary (I);
Control of sugar manufacture (II); Control of sugarcane production (III); and
General (IV). Millers shall obtain a licence under section 3. The Minister may
fix the quantity of sugar to be produced under section 5. Millers may not
sell sugar in excess of the quota assigned to them. Section 10 concerns the
determination of prices for sugarcane delivered by private owners. Section
11 provides for the licensing of growers of sugarcane. The Minister may, by
order, fix the quantity of sugarcane delivered by a grower to a miller (section
13). Section 18 sets out the regulation-making powers of the Minister.
2001
Fruit Marketing Act [Chapter

18:03]
Marketing
This Act concerns the quality of fruit produced in Zimbabwe. Fruit means
any fruit declared in terms of section 3 by the Minister of Agriculture or
another Minister to whom the President has assigned the administration
of this Act, to be fruit for the purposes of this Act. No person shall use
the national mark prescribed for a specified fruit or a mark similar to the
national mark, unless such use is permitted under this Act (section 4).
The national mark may be used by registered growers of fruit that complies
with requisite standards of quality and packing of the fruit concerned.
An application to register as a grower shall be made under section 5 to
the Secretary of the responsible ministry. No fruit shall be exported unless
it complies with the requisite standard, and containers in which the fruit is
exported comply with prescribed requirements and bear the national mark
(section 7). The Minister may appoint inspectors for purposes of this Act
under section 8. Section 12 sets out the regulatory powers of the Minister.
(Twelve sections)
2001
Dairy Act [Chapter 18:08]
Dairy
This Act provides rules for dairy produce. It is divided into eight Parts:
Preliminary (I); Cream depots, creameries and factories (II); Sale of dairy
produce (II); Registration of dairies, ice cream factories and milk depots
(IV); Regulations (V); Administration (VI); Offences and penalties (VII);
and General (VIII). Section 3 provides for the compulsory registration of
premises and the issue of registration certificates. Sections 9 and following
provide for quality control of dairy produce, e.g. certificates of proficiency
in butter or cheese making, grading and testing of cream and milk and
issue of corresponding certificates, grading of cheese, and regrading of
creamery or imported butter in certain cases. Part III contains rules relating
to packing and labelling of dairy products destined for sale. The Minister
of Agriculture may appoint a Chief Dairy Officer and Dairy Officers under
section 32. Section 37 provides for cooperation between local and national
authorities. The Schedule specifies the matters that may be regulated by the
Minister under section 29.
2001
Fertilizers, Farm Feeds and

Remedies Act [Chapter
18:12]
Inputs
Farm feeds, sterilising plant and remedy are defined in section 3. One or
more registering officers may be appointed for the purposes of this Act
under section 3. No person shall sell any fertiliser, farm feed or remedy
unless registered under section 4 of this Act, it is packed in the prescribed
manner, the container in which it is sold complies with labelling and packing
requirements, and it is of the composition, efficacy, and so forth as specified
in the application for registration (section 8). An appeal may be lodged
with the Minister of Agriculture against the decision of the registering
officer (section 7). No person shall use a plant for the sterilising of bones
unless such plant is registered under this Act (section 9). Section 10 places
restrictions on the importation of farm feed or fertiliser made of bones or
other substance of animal origin. Section 14 sets out powers of inspectors
appointed by the Minister, whereas section 15 provides for the detention
and sampling of imported farm feed, remedy and fertiliser. Section 21
specifies the regulation-making powers of the Minister.
1995
Zimbabwe Agriculture Policy

Framework, 19952020
Sector-wide
This represents an attempt by the Ministry of Agriculture to draw up a

national policy document on agriculture. It never received formal approval,
although it remained a working document in use inside the ministry.
Its proposals became obsolete as they were overtaken by time and events.
Page 159

Year
Act
Sector
Description
2005
National Agricultural
Strategy Framework,
20052035
Sector-wide
This was an improvement on the Zimbabwe Agriculture Policy Framework,

but it was neither circulated nor entered the public domain. In 2007,
a Mission Strategy Policy Framework (20072011) was mooted to reorient
the focus of agriculture after the FTLRP. Again, this died inside the Ministry
for political reasons. The two documents did not even go for stakeholder
consultations.
2007
Zimbabwe Agriculture Policy
Sector-wide
With technical assistance from FAO, the government sought to write a

comprehensive policy framework over two years. After two years and
three drafts, the document also died, as the Minister failed to endorse it,
apparently for political reasons. Instead, the Minister edited the document,
coming up with something very different. But that has not been adopted
either, so the Ministry currently functions without a policy document.
It seems the Ministers directives are used as policy.
1996
Agribank
Finance
The Agriculture Finance Corporation, founded by an Act of Parliament in

1971, was transformed into a commercial banking entity, Agribank, wholly
owned by the government (50% by the Agriculture Ministry and 50%
by the Finance Ministry) and given a commercial bank licence in 1999.
Its main business is the provision of agricultural finance, retail banking,
treasury and corporate banking services. Credit is to be given to communal,
commercial and resettled farmers. This bank, however, is facing viability
problems and is practically insolvent.
Page 160

Annexure 3
List of agribusiness and agro-industrial companies in Zimbabwe.
List of private actors
Address
Description
Seed producers
Seed Co
1st Floor Standards Association

of Zimbabwe Building
Northend Close, Northridge Park
Borrowdale, Harare
Develops and markets certified crop seeds,

including hybrid maize seed, cotton seed, wheat,
soybean, barley, sorghum and groundnut seed
Pioneer
Mutual Gardens
100 The Chase West
Emerald Hill, Harare
Distributes Pioneer brand maize hybrids
National Tested Seeds
750 Lorraine Drive

Bluff Hill, Harare
Producers, importers and exporters of seeds
Quton
1 Simon Mazorodze Road

Workington, Harare
Produces the countrys entire cotton planting

seed requirements
Pannar
PO Box 99
Ruwa
Breeds seeds for beans, soybean, maize, sorghum,

sunflower and forage crops
Progene
1A Kent Road
Chisipite, Harare
Breeds seed for maize, sugar beans, cowpeas,

sorghum, wheat, barley, sunflower, potatoes,
millet and groundnuts
ZFC
35 Coventry Rd
Workington, Harare
Manufactures fertilisers and crop chemicals
Windmill
Bryanston House
George Silundika Avenue, Harare
Manufactures compound fertilisers
Zimphos
93 Park Lane, Harare
Fertiliser producer
Omnia
OmniaHouse, Epsom Downs

Business Park
13 Sloane Street,
Bryanston, South Africa
Fertiliser manufacturing
62 Birmingham Road
Harare
Agro-chemical manufacturing and supplying
Hastt
6 Nuffield Road
Workington, Harare
Manufacturer of agricultural implements, haulage

equipment and plough and harrow discs
Farmec
36 Birmingham Road
Harare
Tractor and farm machinery distributors
Rarefields
98 Kelvin Rd
South Granitside, Harare
Sells tractors, spraying equipment, farming

implements and other allied equipment
Bain New Holland
35 Douglas Road
Workington, Harare
Manufacturer and distributor of agricultural

implements
Zimplow
39 Steelworks Rd
Heavy Industrial Estate, Bulawayo
Manufactures animal-drawn agricultural

implements
Fertiliser producers
Agro-chemical producers
Agricura
Mechanisation enterprises
TSA Africa
Page 161

Address
Description
Farmers World
Distributes tractors and various other farming

implements
Florimash
A small company involved in supplying farm

equipment and agriculture products
Irrigation
Irrig 8
Supplies irrigation equipment
Water Flo
Designs, installs and maintains irrigation and

water engineering systems
WG Kinsey and Co
Construction: Civil engineering, construction

and irrigation works
Proplastics
Irrigation pipe suppliers
Exposales
161 Eltham Rd,

Tobacco Sales Floor
Willowvale, Harare
Suppliers of irrigation equipment
National Foods
13 Foundry Road
Aspindale, Harare
Milling, oil processing
United Refineries
Kelvin North Industrial Area, PO

Box 873, Bulawayo
Oil processing
Olivine Industries
Birmingham, PO Box 797, Harare
Oil processing
Surface Investments
20647 Masanga Road

Chitungwiza Industrial Area
Soybean oil processing
Savanna
424 Gleneagles Road

Willowvale
Cigarette manufacturing
BAT Zimbabwe
1 Manchester Rd
Southerton, Harare
Production, sale and marketing of tobacco

and cigarettes
Cairns Holdings
1 Upton Rd
Ardbennie, Harare
Food manufacturing, winemaking and canning
Agri-Foods
33 Remembrance Drive
Kopje, Harare
Production of animal feeds
Premier Milling Company
1 Brodie Street, Harare
Packaging and distributing foods
Victoria Foods
83 Wollwich Rd
Willowvale, Harare
Milling and food processing
Colcom Holdings
3 Coventry Rd, Workington
Pork meat processing and marketing
Tanganda Tea Company
6th Floor, 99 Jason Moyo Avenue,

Harare
Tea production and processing
Dairiboard
ZB Life Towers, 77 Jason Moyo

Avenue, Harare
Milk processing
Irvines Day Old Chicks
Box 815, Harare
Eggs and day-old chicks
Transformation
Donnington
Crest Breeders
Poultry production
PO Box W99
Waterfalls, Harare
Poultry breeding
Page 162

Address
Description
Cottco
1 Lytton Road
Workington, Harare
Cotton processing and marketing
Cargill Zimbabwe
Block B, Virginia Office Park

Borrowdale
Cotton processing
Grafax Cotton
4th Floor, G&B House, 83 Sam

Nujoma Street, Harare
Cotton processing
Triangle Sugar Corporation
SE Lowveld
Growing sugarcane, sugar refining
Rainbow Foods
15 Ironbridge Donnington,
Bulawayo
Milling
Basic Foods
78 Silver Crescent
Kelving West, Bulawayo
Milling
Ilanga Foods
18 Market Road
Kelvin North, Bulawayo
Milling and packaging
Blue Ribbon Foods
4 George Drive
Msasa, Harare
Food processing
Maize for Africa
167 Chihombe Rd
Ruwa, Harare
Milling
Makonde Industries
Cnr Gyroen Rd/Martin Drive

Msasa, Harare
Milling
Simboti Millers
Lot1 Off The Glen, Domboshava

Rd, Harare
Milling
Multifoods Milling Company
Farm 19
Holland, Bulawayo
Milling
Gwai Millers
6084 Western Triangle,

Highfields
Milling
Zimbabwe Sugar Refineries
Southerton,
Harare
Sugar refining
Page 163

Annexure 4
Public consultation workshop list of participants
By alphabetic order of institution
First name
Last name
Company
Job title
City
Marty
Daniel
AFD
Deputy Regional Coordinator
Johannesburg
Jean-Michel
Debrat
AFD
Director
Johannesburg
Roger
Luhalwe
AFD
Investment Officer
Johannesburg
Assia
Sidibe
AFD
Investment Officer
Johannesburg
Michael
Ndimba
Africare
Project Coordinator
Chitungwiza
Francis
Macheka
Agribank
Director: Agricultural Development

and Banking Operations
Harare
Clemence
Mapika
Agriculture
Research Council
Projects Administrator
Harare
Marcus
Hakutangwi
Beat
Consultant
Harare
Jean
Goncalves
Belgian Consulate
Consultant
Harare
Samuel
Kodani
Chemistry and Soil

Research Institute
Head of Laboratory/Research Officer
Harare
Steve
Rothfuchs
CIDA
Policy Analyst
Harare
Ward
Anseeuw
CIRAD-UP
Academic
Pretoria
Eric
Etter
CIRAD
Researcher
Harare
Michel
Garine-Wichatitsky
CIRAD
Researcher
Harare
Marc
Carrie-Wilson
Commercial
Farmers Union
(CFU)
Legal Affairs
Harare
Ben
Gilpin
Commercial
Farmers Union
(CFU)
Manager: Agricultural Recovery

and Compensation
Harare
Pete
Steyl
Commercial
Farmers Union
(CFU)
Vice-President
Harare
Mark
Harper
Concern
Director
Harare
Thierry
Giordano
DBSA
Senior Researcher
Johannesburg
Samson
Muradzikwa
DBSA
Chief Economist
Johannesburg
Michele
Ruiters
DBSA
Regional Specialist
Johannesburg
Monica
Chogumaira
District
Development
Fund
Principal Planning Officer
Harare
Joseph
Bakkeren
European Union
Delegation
Attach
Harare
Severin
Mellac
European Union
Delegation
Food Security Task Manager
Harare
David
Magunda
FAO
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
Harare
David
Mfote
FAO
Assistant FAO Representative
Harare
Agnes
Chaonwa
FETA Consultancy
Researcher
Harare
David
Germain-Robin
French Embassy
Cooperation Attach
Harare
Page 164

First name
Last name
Company
Job title
City
Dietmar
Petrausch
French Embassy
First Counsellor
Harare
Francois
Ponge
French Embassy
Ambassador
Harare
Charlotte
Stergou
French Embassy
Programme Officer
Harare
Bettina
Schoop
GIZ German
Development
Cooperation
Coordinator for Rural Economic

Development
Harare
Albert
Mapanga
IDBZ
Agribusiness Manager
Harare
Verencia
Mutiro
IFAD
Country Representative
Harare
Themios
Ntasis
IRD
Country Director
Harare
Douglas
Ncube
Mandi Rukuni
Seminar
Programme Coordinator
Harare
Pardon
Njerere
MoAMID
Economics and Marketing
Harare
Lynette
Tshabangu
Oxfam
Economic Justice Coordinator
Harare
Andrew
Shoniwa
Pig Industry Board
Director
Harare
John
Robertson
Robert EconomicsConsultancy
Managing Director
Harare
Prosper
Matondi
Ruzivo Trust
Director
Harare
Doug
Taylor-Freeme
SACAU
President
Chinhoyi
Philippe
Dardel
SADC
Advisor: Agriculture Policy
Walter
Chivasa
Seed Co
Group Pea Manager
Harare
Paul
Rupende
Seed Co
Chief Maize Breeder
Harare
Theresa
Buluzi
Stanbic Bank
Relationship Manager
Harare
Israel
Muchuchu
Triple C Pigs
General Manager
Norton
Tinashe
Kapuya
University of
Pretoria
Research Assistant
Pretoria
Jacqueline
Mutambara
University of
Zimbabwe
Lecturer
Harare
Ephraim
Chabayanzara
USAID
Programme Management Specialist
Harare
James
Lafleur
USAID
Economist
Harare
Blessing
Butaumocho
USAID FEWS NET
Country Representative
Harare
John
Laurie
Valcon
Harare
James
Hochschwender
Weidmann
Associates
Senior Managing Associate
Gospel
Matondi
Womens
University
Lecturer/Development Consultant
Harare
Omar
Lyasse
World Bank
Senior Agricultural Economist
Harare
Kudzai
Gumunyu
ZB Bank
Head (Agribusiness)
Harare
Jacob
Nyagweta
ZFC
Business Development Manager
Harare
Rumbidzai
Sithole
Zim Acp
Policy Analyst
Harare
Stan
Goredema
Zimbabwe
National Farmers
Union (ZNFU)
Vice-President
Harare
Charles
Mataya
Zimbabwe
Commercial
Farmers Union
(ZCFU)
Economist
Harare
Page 165

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Development Planning Division

Working Paper Series No. 32

Zimbabwes agricultural reconstruction:

Ward Anseeuw, Tinashe Kapuya and Davies Saruchera

Development Planning Division

Intellectual Property and Copyright

Development Planning Division

Acronyms and abbreviations 

(i) Zimbabwes agricultural sector 

The context of the study 

1.2 Significance, objectives and scope of the study 

1.3 The methodology used in the study 

1.4 Study limitations 

1.5 Structure of the report 

Chapter 2: The state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe 

2.2 The Evolution of policies and governance since 1980 

2.3 The agricultural sector within the broader economy 

2.4 Production trends of the main agricultural commodities 

2.5 The State Of Food Security In Zimbabwe 

2.6 Agriculture in the reconstruction of Zimbabwes broader economy:

Development Planning Division

Lack of democratic government and governance 

3.2 Policy framework and reforms 

3.4 Current principles of action to meet development needs 

3.5 The need for a well-defined, holistic approach, including government

Chapter 4: Actors and projects: Coordination and alignment 

4.1 Institutional description of actors 

4.2 Implemented projects 

Development Planning Division

4.2.3 World Food Programme and other United Nations agencies 

4.2.4 Protracted Relief Programme 

4.2.5 Bilateral projects and assistance 

 rom emergency to integrated development:

5.1 The need for a broad restructuring and post-crisis reconstruction 

5.2 Investment priorities for agricultural and broader development 

5.3 The need for a threefold development approach for reconstruction 

5.4 Public consultation and prioritisation 

List of interviewed institutions 

Agricultural and related legislation 

List of agribusiness and agro-industrial companies in Zimbabwe. 

Public consultation workshop list of participants 

Development Planning Division

Acronyms and abbreviations

Development Planning Division

FANRPAN Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network

Development Planning Division

(i) Zimbabwes agricultural sector

Development Planning Division

Productivity is low, which is related to a low level of capital endowment, leading to a

Development Planning Division

(ii) What has (not) been done until now?

Development Planning Division

(ii) Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the GRM consortium,

(iii) Some thoughts on investment priorities for Zimbabwes

Development Planning Division

Development Planning Division

Institutional and administrative reforms

Credit and financial services

Development Planning Division

In conclusion, Zimbabwes post-crisis reconstruction might necessitate a threefold

Development Planning Division

Personal communication: Interviewed during research project, 2 February 2010.

Development Planning Division

Ward Anseeuw, Tinashe Kapuya and Davies Saruchera

Acronyms and abbreviations

(i) Zimbabwes agricultural sector

The context of the study

1.2 Significance, objectives and scope of the study

1.3 The methodology used in the study

1.4 Study limitations

1.5 Structure of the report

Chapter 2: The state of agriculture and food security in Zimbabwe

2.2 The Evolution of policies and governance since 1980

2.3 The agricultural sector within the broader economy

2.4 Production trends of the main agricultural commodities

2.5 The State Of Food Security In Zimbabwe

2.6 Agriculture in the reconstruction of Zimbabwes broader economy:

Lack of democratic government and governance

3.2 Policy framework and reforms

3.4 Current principles of action to meet development needs

3.5 The need for a well-defined, holistic approach, including government

Chapter 4: Actors and projects: Coordination and alignment

4.1 Institutional description of actors

4.2 Implemented projects

4.2.3 World Food Programme and other United Nations agencies

4.2.4 Protracted Relief Programme

4.2.5 Bilateral projects and assistance

rom emergency to integrated development:

5.1 The need for a broad restructuring and post-crisis reconstruction

5.2 Investment priorities for agricultural and broader development

5.3 The need for a threefold development approach for reconstruction

5.4 Public consultation and prioritisation

List of interviewed institutions

Agricultural and related legislation

List of agribusiness and agro-industrial companies in Zimbabwe.

Public consultation workshop list of participants

Productivity is low, which is related to a low level of capital endowment, leading to a

(ii) Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the GRM consortium,

(iii) Some thoughts on investment priorities for Zimbabwes

A focus on increased food production to ensure household food security;