Crim 1 : Self-defense

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled
and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the
said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered
woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered
woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by
the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the
records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman
syndrome as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation,
she
is
defined
as
a
battered
woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy
the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however,
not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule
that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and
the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense
must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life
or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression
of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from
his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were,
however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over
a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.

Crim 1 : Self-defense
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life
and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted.
Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts
to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

Crim 1 : Self-defense
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of

David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and
Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found
fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his
house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher
with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land
settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property.
At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending
and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly
didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting
was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person
and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to
pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is

applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these
requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should
have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and
putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not
be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here,
there was no provocation at all since he was asleep.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable
to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity.
RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs
of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that
RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be
given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of
the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However,
this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to
property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code
recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and

extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto
mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the
article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was
still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the
victim was the original aggressor.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he

acted in defence of his rights.

Crim 1 : Self-defense
People vs Boholst-Caballero

Facts:
(According to Boholst)

The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst
and her daughter was left to the support of her parents.

One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her,
manhandled her. There were an exchange of words and later on, Caballero
was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face until her nose
bled.

Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she
held on to his waist. As she did so, she grasped the knife tucked by the left
side of his body.

She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her
saying that he will kill her. Because she had no other recourse, she pulled
out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the left side of his
body near the belt line.

When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the
knife.

In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and
blood-stained dress she wore that night. The police officer accompanied
her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer be found, she was
advised to just give any knife and she did (now marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness, Caballeros friend)

On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and
when he approached her, she suddenly stabbed Francisco her with the
knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.

His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by
the police officer confirming that his wife stabbed him. But because he
needs blood transfusion, he needs to be transferred to another hospital. He
died on the way.
Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?
Held: Yes.
Ratio decidendi:

The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and convincing:

Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during

the trial

No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician

That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is
incredible

Contradictory statements

Has motive: husbands abandonment

The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb
the findings of the trial court on facts testified by the witnesses

The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could
confirm the narration of the appellant: location of the wound inflicted
on the victim.

As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no
other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her
husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion just below the

waist, as also described by the attending physician as the left lumbar

region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was
drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her testimony, for as she lay on
the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right
hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the mans belt and
thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the
prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the wound should have been
directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at his back.
The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which
confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband
and for several months prior to the incident, she appeared resigned to her
fate.
She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as
stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the
victims large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. >.<
All the elements of self-defense are present:

unlawful aggression as pointed out above

reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and

chocked by a furious aggressor, rendered almost unconcious by
the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital is the imminent
peril to Boholsts life. The knife afforded appellant the only
reasonable means with which she could free and save herself.
Necessity knows no law.

Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero.

She gave a valid excuse that she went carolling to earn money for
their child.

Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of conviction set
aside. Acquitted.

Crim 1 : Self-defense
People vs Alconga
Facts:
On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing
black jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the
game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave signs to
De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he
expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as ahome guard.
While the said accused was seated on a benchin the guardhouse, Barion came
along and said Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a swing of his pingahan,
a bamboostick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench
with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. Asecond blow was given by
Barion but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to
go out of theguardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to
deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver,causing him to stagger
and hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a
blow to the accused whowas able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to
handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and havingsustained
several wounds ran away. He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after
200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one
which slasehde the cranium. The deceased fellface downward besides many other
blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but
after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and
several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased
absolutely/Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure.
He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he is stillnot safe. In
the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the superior fighter and his
safety was already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more reason for
him to further chase Barion. The second fight will be treated differently and
independently.
Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the case in
the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of
Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no
mitigatingcircumstance (MC) of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. It should be proportionate to theact committed and adequate to
stir one to its commission

Crim 1 : Self-defense

People vs Sumicad
FACTS:

ISSUE:
1
2

Setting: Feb 23, 1931, 5:30pm, Plaridel, Occidental Misamis

Accused Julian Sumicad was resting from hauling logs for the construction
of a chapel. Segundo Cubol passed by where he was resting.
Sumicad had rendered five and a half days of service to Cubol. He asked
Cubol for the money (payment) that Cubol owed him.
Cubol answered with, What debt!, insulted Sumicad and struck him with
his fist.
Sumicad got up and moved backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued
him. Sumicad found himself cornered by a pile of logs. As Cubol pressed
upon him, Sumicad drew his bolo and delivered a blow to the right
shoulder. Cubol lunged at Sumicad, trying to wrestle the bolo from him.
Sumicad struck two other blows. One blow broke through the cranium, the
other made a cut extending from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper
lip.
Cubol gave down and crawled away, sat on a nearby log.
Witness Francisco Villegas asked Cubol if he had struck Sumicad with his
fists, he said yes. Villegas told Sumicad to surrender himself to the
authorities, which he did.
Cubol died in about an hour. A knife was found in his pocket. Sumicad
testified that when he inflicted the blow, Cubol was trying to draw the knife
from his pocket.
Did Sumicad inflict blows in self-defense?
Is Sumicad criminally liable?

RULING: REVERSED
1
Yes

Element #1: Deceased was aggressor Cubol admitted that he hit

Sumicad with his fists

Element #2: There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused quarrel which resulted to Cubols death was of his own
doing; accused was not materially to blame in bringing about trouble

When the aggression begun, the accused retreated until he was

cornered in the angle of a pile of logs.

Accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder (labo nito, kanina sabi
right tapos ngayon left). Sanitary officer reported that this could not
have resulted in death. Instead of desisting assault, deceased pressed
forward and tried to get the bolo. Given this, accused was justified in
using the bolo as a weapon, for it would have been an act of suicide to
permit that weapon to pass into the hands of his assailant.

The reputation of the deceased for violence is pertinent, for it shows

that when the fatal blows were struck, the accused had reasonable
grounds for believing that he was in grave peril to life or limb.
Deceased was known to his neighbors to be a dangerous man.

Under the circumstances, Sumicad had the right to resist the

aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow,
it must be considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense.

No
All elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-defense are present in
the case.

DISSENTING OPINION: C.J. Avancea

Incomplete self-defense: defendants use of bolo was not a reasonably

necessary means of defending himself against the others attack, which
was but a matter of fisticuffs

having received the first blow on the arm, the deceased was justified in
acting as he did, in the reasonable belief that defendant would continue
the attack with that weapon.

Crim 1 : Self-defense
People vs De La Cruz
Facts: Accused was found guilty of homicide for stabbing and killing Rivera.
Prosecution claimed that Dela Cruz and Rivera had a relationship and that the
accused was madly in love with the deceased and was extremely jealous of another
woman with whom Rivera also had a relationship. Dela Cruz claimed, on the other
hand, that on her way home one evening, Rivera followed her, embraced and kissed
her and touched her private parts. She didnt know that it was Rivera and that she
was unable to resist the strength of Rivera so she got a knife from her pocket and
stabbed him in defense of her honor.

Held: She is justified in using the pocketknife in repelling what she believed to be an
attack upon her honor. It was a dark night and she could not have identified Rivera.
There being no other means of self- defense.