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AGLIPAY Vs.

RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent
the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order
the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing
ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. constitutional
HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people
Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when
he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The
Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal
Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per
general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a
municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic
is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the
Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila
Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS
refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive

codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a
living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when
it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of
economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national
patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist
from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching
bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary
agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Taada vs. Tuvera


136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts: Invoking the Peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, trough the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioners
are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuance is a question. Said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being aggrieved
parties within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is required for the effectivity of laws
and statute.
Held: The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of the laws as a prerequisite for their effecitivty. Neither the publication of laws in the Official gazette as a
pre-requisite for their effectivity. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication on the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided This pre-requisite does not apply to a law with a fixed
provision as to when will it take effect, The intention of this provision is to give the
general public enough awareness of the laws that will regulate their actions.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not support the proposition that for the effectivity of
laws, it must be published in the Official Gazette. The said act only provides the uniform
publication and distribution of the Official Gazette, only important legislative acts and
those of public in nature are required to be published in the Official Gazette.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one, it is unjust if a person will be punished with a law
he had no notice, thats why laws which is public in nature shall be published in the
Official gazette to protect the constitutional right of the people, to be informed on matter
of public concern. For no person should be bound by law without notice. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.

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