Is it fair to say that Russian agriculture at the end of the nineteenth

century was in a state of crisis?

The period between the Emancipation Act in 1861 and the First World War was a
period of great change and difficulty for the agricultural system in Russia. The
Emancipation Act had freed the peasants from serfdom, this was to take the land
away from the gentry and give the peasants the land they deserved in order to
keep peace with the peasants, but by 1905 there was a revolution. The cause of
this is often put down to an agrarian crisis and since agriculture accounted for
85 percent of the Russian population at the turn of the century 1 it stands to
sense that this was the case. This essay will look for evidence of a crisis by
examining land prices, debts and repayments, agricultural output and the living
standards of the peasants.
The tax burden is a good indicator of a crisis; optimists think the peasants were
simply not willing to pay their taxes, pessimists argue that the peasants did not
have the funds to pay such high taxes. According to Brzheskiis data, peasant
indebtedness on the payments of direct taxation rose from a sum equal to 22
percent of tax assessment in 1871-1875 to just under 100 percent in 18901895.2 This rise in taxes meant that peasants were forced to sell their goods as
soon as possible rather than waiting for prices to increase; they were fighting to
stay above subsistence. Since the peasants were under such pressure to pay
taxes, they had no long term goal, this meant that they did not use their land
effectively and the soil was quickly becoming exhausted. Simms argues against
this; 80 percent of tax revenue came from indirect taxes, 3 this is not convincing
as it means that the peasants were no only struggling with high direct taxes, but
indirect taxes were harming their purchasing power, effectively making them
worse off. Level of defaults in direct tax payment rose sharply (threefold) in

1 Gregory, Paul R. Before Command (Princeton University Press, 1994) p.42

2 Wheatcroft, Stephen G. Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late Imperial
Russia, in: Esther Kingston-Mann & Timothy Mixter (eds.), Peasant Economy, Culture,
and Politics of European Russia 1800-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1991) p.167

3 Simms, James Jr, The Crisis in Russian Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth
Century: A Different View, Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep 1977) p.379

1904, especially in the NCR,4 pessimists argue that this is a clear standard of
the duress of the peasants, because there were terrible consequences for
defaulting including whipping and imprisonment, optimists argue that the level of
defaults was so high because the peasants were simply not willing to pay such
high taxes. Even the pessimists argument is a sign of crisis because efficient
economies usually pay taxes readily without military force.

After emancipation, the peasants thought that they would get the land for free,
this was not the case, they had to pay redemption payments in order to earn the
land, these payments were in effect a very expensive mortgage that put added
stress on the peasants, the total redemption payments averaged 134 redemption
value as a percentage of market prices 1863-1972 5, this showed that peasants
were paying off a mortgage on land that wasnt even producing enough crops in
terms of value to be worth it.
The high redemption payments were worsened by rising land prices and the
authorities took advantage of the peasants, as seen from the smallest plots of
land, and in some areas the least fertile, being of the highest value. In Central
Russia, peasants who had 1.503 desiatinas of their own allotted land paid 11.21
rubles per desiatina of leased land and those possessing over 5 desiatinas only
5.77 rubles. In the Orel district, rents were higher in sections with poor soil and
lower where the soils were more productive. 6 However, Wheatcroft has done a
lot of regional research; it has become clear through this that it cannot be
assumed that all of Russia had high land values just because this was the case in
the Central Region. Between 1887-1888 and 1901 there was a fall in land prices
in the Northern Consumer Region by almost 50 percent while prices rose by 34
percent in the Southern Producer Region, 7 this point shows how the price of land
varied across states and although this shows evidence that not all land prices
4 Wheatcroft (1991) p.171
5 Stagg, K. Lecture Notes (2012)
6 Volin, Lazar. A Century of Russian Agriculture. From Alexander II to
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) p.74
7 Wheatcroft (1991) p.153

were high, a change of 50 percent over a 13 year period is surely cause for
concern.
Output is an indicator that agriculture was developing and becoming more
efficient towards the end of the nineteenth century and domestic products were
even able to support the growing population, From 1883 to 1901 agricultural
output grew at 2.55 percent per annum- a rate double the 1.3 population growth
rate.8 This increase in output is quite impressive however, it must be noted that
much of the increase of output was because of virgin land that was owned by the
gentry and thus was of no benefit to the peasants. There was development of the
market gardens in the Moscow region, where smaller farms were intensifying,
modernising and doing well.
Wages of the peasants should be a clear indicator of their wealth and standard of
living, but data for wages is not very consistent, and it is possible the data has
been manipulated by the Russian government. This is evident by the arguments
of Gregory and Wheatcroft, Gregory argues that Strumlin finds that the average
daily real wage of hired workers rose by 14 percent between 1885-87 and 190305,9 this is of great contrast to the data put forward by Wheatcroft; the real
wages of rural labour in rye equivalent fell by more than 50 percent from 18871888 to 1891-1892.10 Wages are therefore a difficult indicator, so examining the
standard of living for the peasants will now be examined by savings and livestock
holdings.
The savings of the peasants are a sign of how close to subsistence they were
living, Gregory argues that the peasants were retaining more of their crops and
therefore their standard of living was higher, he also argues that consumption of
luxury goods such as sugar matches and tea were increasing. Gregory calculates
that retained wheat on farms grew from 154 (prices in millions of rubles) to 344
from 1885-89 to 1897-1901.11 This leads us to think that savings were
increasing in terms of grain, this argument is deepened by Simms who calculates
8 Gregory (1994) p.44
9 Gregory (1994) p.41
10 Wheatcroft (1991) p.151
11 Gregory (1994) p.45, table 3.5

that the value of monetary savings was also increasing; in 1886 the number
of savings accounts stood at 306,000, and grew steadily to 3,551,000 by
1900.12 However, livestock holdings are also an indicator of the level of savings,
sheep decreased from 45.9 to 40.5 in the short period of 1887 to 1894, 13 this
shows evidence of crisis because the people would only slaughter their animals if
they are in dire need; either they cannot get the fodder for the animals, or they
need the food themselves to avoid starvation. The fall in livestock was not just
restricted to sheep, horses were of great importance for harvest and in 1887,
30.6 percent were without horses and, in 1901, 38.2 percent. 14 This shows that
agriculture is going backwards rather than developing. It must however be
remembered that this fall in livestock could be because of exogenous factors
such as epidemics.
The commune was very important in the lives of the peasants, legally it meant
that peasants could not leave, and that they were responsible for the debts of
others in the commune, this caused the growth of agriculture to be very
restricted. To begin with, breaking up the large estates after 1961 actually made
things worse since it meant land was broken up and sold off, which prevented
economies to scale. The commune meant that there was no long term goal of
increasing the productivity of the land since it could be seized at any time.
Furthermore movement from the commune was very heavily restricted so the
peasants couldnt leave to find better wages; Gregory has argued that the
commune didnt have a strong hold and that the peasants could still move to
areas of higher productivity and be rational agents. This is an interesting
argument because it must be remembered that many of the peasants were
illiterate so it is hard to believe that they would become rational agents and
leave the commune with the threat of the whip looming. The role of the
commune was not negative in all of Russia, there were vast regional differences
in the standard of living of the peasants; in the Moscow province, the Zemstvo
assisted the peasants along these lines with credit for seed and machinery, as a

12 Simms (1977) p.389

13 Wheatcroft. (1991) p.144, table 4.5
14 Volin, L. (1970) p.59

result, between 1892 and 1904, nearly a thousand villages introduced the crop
rotation system and grain yields doubled or trebled. 15
From the Emancipation Act to the start of World War I, Russia had suffered three
famines, received aid from the Red Cross, experienced revolution and illiteracy
had reached 15- 24 percent16; these are not things that stable economies
experience in such a short time. From examining the evidence, it is fair to say
that Russia was in crisis. The optimists did put forward a good argument; output
did increase, and in certain regions, savings did rise, however, it is worth noting
that Gregory began by stating that data for livestock was not reliable, then
continues to use data for livestock in order to fit his argument. A large part of the
problem was bad policy, an efficient agricultural sector was never set up,
peasants were uneducated because authorities were afraid they would gain too
much knowledge and industrialisation was squeezing agriculture. Eastern Europe
was not advanced, and showed no promise of industrialisation, by forcing high
taxes and output, the government forced the peasants into crisis.

15 Volin, L. (1970) p.67

16 Volin, L. (1970) p.64

Bibliography

Allen, Robert C. Farm to Factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial

Revolution (Princeton Economic History of the Western World, 2003)

Gerschenkron, Alexander. Agrarian Policies and Industrialization: Russia 18611917, in: H.J. Habbakuk & M. Postan (eds). The Cambridge Economic History of
Europe, Vol. 6 (Cambridge: CUP, 1966)
Gregory, Paul R. Before Command (Princeton University Press, 1994)
Moon, David. The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia (Longman 2000)
Simms, James Jr, The Crisis in Russian Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth
Century: A Different View, Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep 1977)
Stagg, Kevin. Lecture notes (2013)
Volin, Lazar. A Century of Russian Agriculture. From Alexander II to
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970)
Wheatcroft, Stephen G. Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late
Imperial Russia, in: Esther Kingston-Mann & Timothy Mixter (eds.), Peasant
Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia 1800-1921 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991)