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HELD:
RA 4790 declared as Null and Void
Note: ( Detailed )
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is
the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became
RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in
the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is
there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers
two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5.
Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of
the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition.
4.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title
limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a
night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a
regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
2.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise
in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A
refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open,
would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative
will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close
their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to
no more than a temporary termination of their business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Tobias vs Abalos
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the
enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on
the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one
subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in
the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in
the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution
stating that within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section
Issue:
WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including
Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
Note:
Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a
Demetria vs Alba
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan
Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from
disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph
1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for
the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the
privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render
the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one
item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
Guingona vs Caraque
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with
P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,
otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by
PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative
of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution?
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
Held:
unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations
that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation
was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation JLN standing for Janet Lim Napoles had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013,
the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation covering the use of legislators PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that [a]t least
P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy
subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the
Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of
the pork barrel system under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on
insofar
as
they
constitute undue
delegations
of
judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only
vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes
it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to
the coffers of the National Treasury. As taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing Pork
Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified
as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. The CoA
Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves not [merely] a systems failure but a complete
breakdown of controls amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved.
Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits
in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This
required
identity
is
not
attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the
1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at
bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel
System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and
decided
by
a
competent court. Absent
any
powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases
call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire Pork Barrel System as well as (b) the intra-relation of postenactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also
to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues
and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since
the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report),
it
must partially
abandon
its
previous
ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was
merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence,
has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects
post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded postenactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
Provision
4,
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highlyurbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some
years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be
treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase for such other purposes may be limited; second, the said phrase
also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under
the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it
is limited only to energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government.
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
[second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes
which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. Verily, the
law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure
development projects and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects must be stricken down
as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of PD 910 it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Facts:
House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these
Purposes)
Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different
from that of the House Bill
Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the
Bill on the same day
Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become
enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.
Procedural Issue:
WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance
with sec 24, art 6 of Consti
WoN the Senate bill violated the three readings on separate days
requirement of the Consti
WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.
NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were
exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included.
PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal
of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made after the
meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of
RA 7166
Held:
YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House
of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the House
of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they are
elected in the district level meaning they are expected to be more sensitive
to the needs of the locality.
Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes
while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other
than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the
House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential
certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading
the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres.
certification
(1)
(3)
No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to
expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power
of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public
utility when the common good so requires.
One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members
and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not
know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they
might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its
existence.
Additional read:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weightof legislative practice.
2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax
exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building
constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of
the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA
7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung
center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real
properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose.
Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are
exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not
exempt from such taxes.
respondents
exceeded
their
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the
amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general
professional partnership.