CLASS AGAINST CLASS

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN

IN THE THIRD PERIOD, 1927-1932.

By Matthew Worley, BA.

Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, August 1998.

TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE

Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have beenpossiblewithout the guidance,

encouragementand advice of my supervisorChris Wrigley. Professor
Wrigley's encyclopaedicknowledge and ever expandinglibrary madethis
project a joy to complete.Closer to home, the loving support and patient
encouragementof Louise Aikman kept me focusedand inspired whenever
the pressuresof study appearedtoo much to bear. Thanks are also due to
Chris, Peteand Simon (for a lifetime's friendship), Scott King (for
welcome distractions),Dominic and Andrea (for help and camaraderie),
Peteand Kath (for holidays), John (for Manchester),my family (for
everything) and Toby Wolfe.

ii

Contents

Abstract

iv

Abbreviations

Introduction: The Communist Party of Great Britain

in the Third Period

Chapter One: A Party in Transition

15

Chapter Two: Towards the Third Period

45

Chapter Three: The New Line

82

Chapter Four: The Party in Crisis

113

Chapter Five: Isolation and Reappraisal

165

Chapter Six: A Communist Culture

206

Chapter Seven: Crisis and Reorganisation

236

Conclusion: The Third Period Reassessed

277

Bibliography

281

iii

Abstract

This thesisprovides an analysisof communismin Britain between 1927

and 1932.In theseyears,the CommunistParty of Great Britain (CPGB)
embarkedupon a'new period' of political struggle around the conceptof
classagainstclass.The increasingly draconianmeasuresof the Labour
Party and trade union bureaucracybetween 1924and 1927significantly
restricted the scopeof communist influence within the mainstreamlabour
movement.As such,the CPGB - in accordancewith the Communist
International attemptedto establishan 'independentleadership'of the
working class.

The decline in CommunistParty membershipthat accompaniedthe'New

Line'has led historians to associatean apparentcollapse in CPGB
influence with the political perspectiveof class
againstclass.Similarly, the
CPGB's initial resistanceto the line has beeninterpreted
as evidenceof the
Party's willing subservienceto Moscow. In this thesis, such a portrayal of
communist motive and experiencewill be challenged.Instead,a more
multifaceted approachwill endeavourto show that: i) the 'left turn' of
1927- 28 complementedattitudesevident in Britain since at least 1926; ii)
the simultaneouscollapsein CPGB influence related primarily to the
structural changesafflicting Britain (and the British labour movement)
betweenthe wars; iii) the period was a difficult but
not completely
disastroustime for the Party. Rather,the years should be
seenas a
transitional period, in which the focus of communist activity moved out of
the workplace and onto the streets.Thus, the Party's successful
mobilisation of the unemployed,and the developmentof an idiosyncratic
communistculture, were 'positive' factors. And finally; iv) that the
political line pursuedby the CPGB was more flexible and changeablethan
IV

has hitherto beenrecognised.The Party continually modified its political

strategyand objectivesthroughout the Third Period. Moreover, the
'sectarianexcesses'that characterisedclassagainstclasswere due in part
to the will of the Party rank and file. Many in the Party embracedthe
exclusivity of the New Line, and were responsiblefor interpreting the
policy'on the ground.'

Abbreviations

AEU

AmalgamatedEngineeringUnion

BL

British Library

BUA

Bristol UnemployedAssociation

BWSF

British Workers' SportsFederation

cc

Central Committee

CI

Communist International

CLC

Central Labour College

Comintern

Communist International

CPGB

Communist Party of Great Britain

CPSU

CommunistParty of the Soviet Union

CPUSA

CommunistParty of the United Statesof America

DMA

Durham Miners' Association

DMM

Dockers' Minority Movement

DPC

District Party Committee

ECCI

Executive Committee of the Communist

International

FKCMA

Fife, Kinross and ClackmannanMiners' Association

FOSR

Friends of Soviet Russia

ICWPA

International ClassWar Prisoners'Aid

IFTU

International Federationof Trade Unions

ILP

IndependentLabour Party

Inprecorr

International PressCorrespondence

IRA

Irish RepublicanArmy

JAC

Joint Advisory Committee

KPD

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands

LAI

LeagueAgainst Imperialism

LPC

Local Party Committee

vi

MFGB

Miners' Federationof Great Britain

MM

Minority Movement

MMM

Miners'Minority Movement

MRM

Members'Rights Movement

NAC

National Administration Council

Narkomindel

People'sCommissariatof Foreign Affairs

NCLC

National Council of Labour Colleges

NLWM

National Left Wing Movement

NUGMW

National Union of GeneralAnd Municipal Workers

N-LJR

National Union of Railwaymen

NUS

National Union of Seamen

NUT&GW

National Union of Tailors'and GarmentWorkers

NUWCM

National Unemployed Workers' Committee

Movement

NUWM

National Unemployed Workers' Movement

PAC

Public AssistanceCommittee

PB

Political Bureau

PCF

Parti CommunisteFrancais

PCI

Partito Communista,Italiano

Profintern

Red International of Labour Unions

RAPP

RussianAssociation of Proletarian Writers

RGO

RevolutiondreGerwerkschaftsOpposition

RILU

Red International of Labour Unions

RVM

Railwaymen'sVigilance Movement

SPD

SozialdemokratischePartei Deutschlands

SWMF

South Wales Miners' Federation

TGWU

Transport and GeneralWorkers'Union

TMM

Textile Minority Movement

TUC

TradesUnion Congress
Vil

UCWU

United Clothing Workers'Union

UMS

United Mineworkers'of Scotland

USSR

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

WCML

Working ClassMuseum Library

WEB

West EuropeanBureau

WFS

Workers'Film Society

WTM

Workers'Theatre Movement

YCI

Young Communist International

YCL

Young Communist League

viii

Introduction
The Communist Party of Great Britain
in the Third Period

In an essaydevotedto the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and

the recently openedcommunist archive, Kevin Morgan suggestedthat "if
it
because
it
is
is
history
Party's
often
British
the
worth writing at all,
its
to
influence
out of all proportion
exerciseda political and cultural
Morgan's
"'
This
however,
the
thesis
of
essence
size.
while endorsing
assertion,is an attempt to understandthe CPGB in a period generally
Between
history.
in
Party's
be
the
the
to
regarded
most calamitous
amongst
1927 and 1932,Communist Party membershipdwindled, its leadership
fractured, and many of the links the CPGB had tirelessly establishedwith
the wider labour movementwere curtailed. Non-Party allies, such as the
denounced
Cook,
leader
A.
J.
were
as social fascists;joint
miners'
initiatives establishedwith the trade unions and the Labour left were
discontinued;and the CPGB found itself increasingly estrangedfrom both
the work environment, and the working classthat the Party endeavouredto
represent.

And yet, although many of the channels through which the Party had
carved out a political influence were obstructed during these years, the
CPGB remained a significant presence in other important spheres. The
Party had become the undisputed leader of the unemployed by the early
1930s, leading national Hunger Marches and helping thousands of workers
negotiate the trauma of unemployment at a local level. Also 'on the
football
CPGB
the
as
such
organised
political
events
social
and
ground',

IK. Morgan, 'The CPGB and the Comintern Archives.'In Socialist HistoEyAutumn 1993,
P19.

leagues,campaignsfor free school meals,local news sheetsand aid for

striking workers. Similarly, the CP developeda rich educationaland
cultural environment.Party schoolswere established;workers' theatreand
film groups developedacrossthe country; and numeroussocial events
initiatives.
for
As such,
to
were organised raise money
various communist
this thesis will examinethe nature of CommunistParty influence and
support between 1927and 1932,basedupon the premisethat: i)
'understandingthe lulls in Party influence are as important to the study of
communism in Britain as the various peaks;and ii) that the late 1920sand
early 30s were a difficult but not wholly disastroustime for the CPGB-

The prevailing view of communist activity in this period is an

overwhelmingly negativeone. Historians both sympatheticand hostile to
the Party generally agreethat the CPGB suffered during theseyears;and
both locate the blame for the Party's apparentdecline in the classagainst
classpolicy pursuedby the CP from 1928.Such a policy - which sought
to reveal the 'treacherous'role of social democracywhile simultaneously
establishingan 'independent'communist leadershipof the working classis seento be inapplicable to the 'objective conditions' prevalent in Britain
in the 1920-30s. Furthermore,the policy's proximity to Stalin's
consolidation of power within the Soviet Union has further tainted the
period as one of growing 'Stalinisation' and communist uniformity.
Commentatorshave therefore,either dismissedthe period as an anomaly
in the CPGB's developmentand ignored the wider implications of the New
Line (asthe policy was alternatively called); or stressedthe prominent role
played by the Comintern in the implementationof the policy so as to
highlight the CPGB'ssubservienceto Moscow/Stalin. The British
CommunistParty was brow beateninto submission,the argumentgoes,
and suffered as a consequence.

Henry Pelling's accountof the Third Period, written in the midst of the
Cold War, encapsulatessuch a 'traditional' view. "By 1928" writes Pelling,
the CPGB's "slavish submissionto Moscow" led to the "barren class
British
forced
Party.
being
the
compliant
upon
againstclass policy"
'Alienation' from 'any general influence whatsoever'followed as a
from
2
damning
Similarly
the
emerge
period
accountsof
consequence.
Trotskyist writers. Robert Black's outlandish Stalinism in Britain for
example,relentlessly attributes every move of the CPGB to Stalinist
manoeuvring.Hugo Dewar meanwhile, focuseson Party explanationsand
'excuses'for the New Line. Class againstclasshe concludes,was a
'misreading' of the "entire political situation in the most blockheaded
mannerpossible."3 A more balancedTrotskyist critique comesfrom Brian
Pearce,but here too marginalisedpolitical point scoring overrides
objective analysiS.4

Both Pelling and the various Trotskyist historians fail to place the
experienceof the CPGB beyond the parametersof the Party's relationship
to Moscow and the Communist International. Inconsistenciesin CPGB
policy are highlighted with an apparentdisregardto wider considerations.
Such accountsfail to acknowledgethe indigenous factors that facilitated a
'left turn' in communist thinking. In particular, they fail to place the
experienceof the CPGB within the context of the wider British labour
movement.As such,the 'traditional' argumentis overwhelmingly
determinist and one sided; Stalin moulded communist policy, the CPGB

2H. Pelling, The British Communist Paqy- A Historical Profile (London, 1959),
ppS4-72.
For a more recent, but similarly prejudiced account,seeF. Beckett, The Enemy Within:
The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Pa!V (London, 1995), pp36-37 and pp44-47.
Beckett describesthe "fatility" of the New Line with barely disguisedglee.
3R. Black, Stalinism in Britain (London, 1970). H. Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain:
The CPGB from its Origins to the SecondWorld War (London, 1976), pp88-102.
4M. Woodhouseand B. Pearce,Essgyson the HistoEyof Communism in Britain (London,
1975).

did as it was told, and the Party becamealienatedfrom the British working
class.This thesiswill contestsuch a viewpoint in an attempt to place the
experiencesof the CPGB within a broaderparadigm.The Party's fortunes
will be discussedin relation to the social, political and economic climate
of the time, wherein the changingeconomicstructureof the UK, and
developmentswithin the British labour movement,were fundamentalto
the Party's evolution.

Those historians more sympatheticto the activities of the CPGB are also
generally dismissive of the class againstclassyears.The Third Period is
reducedto a homogenousblock, and although the Party's adoption of the
New Line is rightly consideredto have a rationale beyond Stalinist power
politics, the argumentremainsessentially focusedon the implementation
(or failure) of the Party line. "The New Line" saysNoreen Bransonin the
third volume of the CommunistParty's history, "was a disaster." Emphasis
is thus placed on the Party's falling membershipand the divisions inside
the CP leadership.5 Similarly, Willie Thompson'saccount of the Third
Period is one of "total and bitter isolation." After concedingthat the
relationship betweenthe CPGB and the Labour Party and trade unions
further deterioratedfollowing the GeneralStrike, Thompsonmaintainsthat
the line ran "wholly againstthe grain of British realities." As such,the line
of the CPGB again becomesthepredominant causeof the Party's loss of
influence, and while Thompsonalso refers to the Party's

successful

mobilisation of the unemployed,no attempt is madeto reconcile thesetwo

seemingly contradictory trends.6

5N. Branson,History of the Communist PaM of Great Britain (London, 1985),pp 17-51.
6W. Thompson,The Good Old Cause:British Communism 1920-1991 (London, 1992),
pp44-50.

Thompsonfurther suggeststhat the adoption of the New Line led the

CPGB "to abandona position from which it could never subsequently
recover."7 Yet such a view neglectsthe evolutionary nature of history, and
ignoresthe continually changingnature of communist - labour-socialist
relations and socio-economicdevelopment.Moreover, it presupposesthat
a fixed 'position' was altered through communist realignment. As will be
demonstratedthroughout this thesis,the policies of the Third Period were
actually under constantreview, and the sectarianismthat undoubtedly did
characterisecommunist activity between 1928and 1931was regularly
attackedby the Comintern and British Party leaders.By treating the New
Line as a constantand solid entity, the various attemptsmadeby the
CPGB to adaptthe line to the 'objective situation' in UK are overlooked.

In their 1975 essay Trade Unions and Revolution: The Industrial Politics
of the Early British Communist-PaLty, James Hinton and Richard Hyman
have gone some way towards locating the fortunes
and experiences of the
CPGB within a fluid historical context. While noting that the
revolutionary
zeal of the New Line was incongruous, Hinton and Hyman place the
(mis)fortunes of the Party within the "profoundly unfavourable conditions"
of the depression years, outlining the changing nature of the Labour Party
and the trade unions, and the immobilising effect of economic depression
and unemployment on a revolutionary proletarian movement. 8 Even so, the
essay's focus on political practice negates a detailed analysis of the Third
Period, and concentrates primarily on the theoretical 'correctness'
of Party
policy. 9

71bid.
8SeeD. Geary, EuropeanLabour Politics from 1900to the Depression(London, 1991),
pp6l-66.
9J.Hinton and R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution: The Industrial Politics of thg
Early British CommunistPagy (London, 1975).

More detailed studiesof the CPGB and the Minority Movement (MM), by
L. J. Macfarlane and Roderick Martin respectively,clearly demonstrate
various nuancesin the British Party'sapproachto the New Line. However,
both fall short of an adequateanalysis.10Macfarlane endshis accountin
1929,thus arbitrarily discardingthe New Line's continual evolution and
the CPGB'snumerouspolitical and theoretical realignments.We are left
hanging,with the CPGB in mid-crisis. And while Macfarlane details
possibleBritish motives for a political 'left turn' (the expulsion of
communistsfrom the Labour Party and the trade unions, communistanger
and analysis in the wake of the General Strike, declining Anglo-Soviet
relations) he fails to apply them to either the perspectiveof the CPGB, or
the 'space'in which the Party attemptedto function. II Martin meanwhile,
outlines the failings of the New Line in relation to communisttrade union
activity. Again, the decline in communist influence is attributed almost
solely to the line of the CPGB, and subsequentlylittle or no attention is
placed upon the generaldecline in trade union activity between 1927and
1930;structural changesin the British economy;and divergent communist
labour-socialist
introduction
to
the
relationsprior
of class againstclass
in 1928.

Such an exclusive focus on the Party line (and the dismissal of a six to
sevenyear period as either'good', 'bad', a 'success'or 'disastee)is clearly
inadequate,and historians in the 1980sand 90s have sought to offer a
more complex appraisalof Communist Party history. As Eric Hobsbawm
and Perry Anderson have both suggested,a satisfactory appraisalof any

10L.J. Macfarlane,The British Communist Pa[jy: Its Origin and Developmentuntil 1929
(London, 1966). R. Martin, Communismand the British Trade Unions, 1924-1933
(Oxford, 1969).
1IMacfarlane also ignores the cultural side of CPGB activity, and 'traditionally' remains
fixed on the 'line' of the Party. He concludes:'... the adoption of the New Line was the
main factor which acceleratedthe rate of decline after 1928.' ibid, p286.

Communist Party necessitatesa multifarious approach.12The Party's

be
Comintern
to
the
reconciled againstthe particular
must
relationship
basis
CP
The
Party
the
of
support and
operated.
environmentwithin which
'success'
CP
Finally,
the
the
be
Party
of
the
explained.
the nature of
must
industrial
just
than
be
and
policy.
electoral
must measuredagainstmore
The communist experiencewas a total one, and its ideology cut across
13
bounds.
social, political and cultural

More recently, historians have tendedto concentrateupon certain areasof

the
to
figures
(or
key
the
opposed
as
movement)
within
communist activity
diversity
line.
Subsequently,
Party
the
of communist
the
specific nature of
is
1930s
late
1920s
in
the
revealed,and assumptions
early
and
experience
inherent in the 'traditional' view of the classagainstclass years are
for
in
Britain
Marxist
Maclntyre's
tradition
the
Stuart
study of
undermined.
divisions
between
demonstrates
the
that
communistsand
example,clearly
labour-socialistsexplicit during the Third Period, were evident well before
the Party's adoption of the New Line. 14MacIntyre, along with Alan
Campbell and Hywel Francis, has also presentedvaluable researchinto the
diverseexperiencesof the British communist movement.By looking at
historians
Scotland)
in
Wales
these
(mainly
and
specific communities
CPGB
import
influence
the
was closely connectedto
that
the
of
and
show
indigenousfactors - local traditions or economic environment.15
12E.Hobsbawm,'Problems Communist History.' In Revolutionaries (London, 1973),
of
pp3-10. P. Anderson, 'Communist Party History! In R. Samuel,People'sHistojy and
Socialist Theoly (London, 1981), pp 145-156.
DSeeK. Morgan, Against Fascismand War: Rupturesand Continuities in British
Communist Politics 1935-41 Manchester1989. Morgan offers this work as a contribution
to Anderson'ssisypheantask.
14S.Macintyre, A Proletarian Science:Marxism in Britain. 1917-1933 (Cambridge,
1980).
15S.Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communismand Working Class Militangy in Inter War
aritain (London, 1980). H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed: A HistojY of the South Wales
Miners in the Twentieth Centuly (London, 1980). H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism
London, 1984).'The Communist Party in the ScotsCoal Fields in the Inter-War Period.
'In Andrews, Fishman,Morgan (Eds.) Opening the Books: EssUs on the Cultural Histoly

RaphaelSamuel's,StephenJones'and Alun Howkin's varied studiesof

CommunistParty culture have also given a new significance to CP activity
in the late 1920s,early 30s. Workers'theatre groups, football, netball,
Esperanto
film
circles,
even
and
societies
rambling and cycling clubs,
beyond
benefit
in
developed
to
the
by
Party
these
of
many
the
years
were
the CPGB itself. 16Similarly, Richard Croucher'shistory of the National
UnemployedWorkers' CommitteeMovement (NUWCM), has
demonstratedclearly what previous commentatorshave noted but never
really explored; the Party's successfulmobilisation of a national
unemployedmovement.17Finally, the work of Kevin Morgan, Nina
Fishman,John Callaghanand SueBruley - though concentratingon
broadertopics - has also revealedthe various adjustmentsin communist
and CPGB perspectivethat occurredthroughout the Third Period. Bruley's
researchinto the Party's attitude towards women, Fishman'saccountof the
Party's industrial policy, and Morgan and Callaghan'sdefinitive
biographiesof Harry Pollitt and Rajani PalmeDutt, all demonstratehow
the Party attemptedto adaptitself within the framework of the New Line.
Focuseschanged,initiatives were born, and general failures were mixed
with limited success.18
of the British Communist PpIly (London, 1995).Also'The Social History of Political
Conflict in the ScotsCoal Fields 1910-1939.'In A. Campbell, N. Fishman,D. Howell,
Miners. Unions and Politics, 1910-47 (Aldershot, 1996).
16R.Samuel,E. MacColl, S. Cosgrave,Theatres the Left: Workers'Theatre Movement
of
in Britain and America 1880-1935 (London, 1984). R. Samuel,'The Lost World of
British Communism.,In New Left Review November/December1985,March-April
1986,September-October1987.S.G. Jones,Workers at Play: A Social and Economic
HistoKyof Leisure (London, 1986). 'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement: The
British Workers'Sports Federation,1923-35.'In British Journal of Sports Histojy Vol.. 2
No. 2 1985.A. Howkins, "ClassAgainst Class:The Political Culture of the Communist
Party of Great Britain, 1930-35.'In F. Goldsmith (Ed.), ClassCulture and Social Change
(Sussex,1980),pp208-239.
17R. Croucher,

We Refuse to Starve in Silence: A Histojy of the National Unemployed

(London, 1987).
Workers'Movement
18The attention paid to women's issues in the early 1930s was a clear example of the
Party acting upon a1esson leamt'during
the Third Period. S. Bruley, Leninism, Stalimsm
'Women
(New
York,
1986).
1920-1939
in
Movement
Britain
Women's
and
the
and
.

Understandablyhowever,the generalopinion of the New Line period

for
has
"but
Soviet
Morgan
Kevin
incredulous.
that
argued
remains
"
have
While
Nina
[the
CPGB]
collapsed.
virtually
would
subventions,
Fishmanhas suggestedthat it took the political guile of Party leaderssuch
drift
CPGB's
towards
halt
Campbell
the
Harry
Pollitt
Johnny
to
as
and
Welsh
his
in
the
Francis
Hywel
mining
too,
of
study
ultra-7leftobscurity.
19
Only
Mike
"
has
described
"industrial
the
suicide.
communities,
policy as
Squiresand Alun Howkins have attemptedto portray the Third Period in a
from
light.
Squires
increase
in
Party
to
the
positive
membership
refers
1931, while Howkins points to the burgeoning Party culture of the early
1930s.Both argumentsare instructive, but somewhatmisleading. Squires'
concentrationon membershipfigures ignores any possible disparity
betweennumbersand influence, and Howkin's study (situated within a
collection of essayson classculture) is not broad enough to constitute a
comprehensive'line' on the Third Period.20

Within this thesistherefore,a fresh analysis of the CPGB in the Third

Period will be offered. This will consider the fortunes and experiencesof
the British communistmovementbeyond the parametersof the Party line.
While the disputesover policy and the Party's relationship with the
Communist International are imperative to an understandingof communist
activity (and will be discussedin detail within this thesis), the wealth of

Communism:A CaseStudy of the LancashireWeavers in the Depression.' In Andrews,

Fishman,Morgan (Ed.), Opening the Books op. cit. K. Morgan, 'The CPGB'op. cit. Also
Hagy Pollitt (Manchester,1993).N. Fishman,The British Communist Pam and the
Trade Unions, 1933-45 (Aldershot, 1995). J. Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in
British Stalinism (London, 1993).
19K.Morgan, 'The CPGB'op. cit. p 19. N. Fishman,The British Communist Party op. cit.
pp3l-43. H. Francis,Miners Against Fascismop. cit. p47.
20M. Squires,Saklatvala:A Political BioUaphy (London, 1990). pp208-223. 'CPGB
MembershipDuring the ClassAgainst ClassYears.' In Socialist History Winter 1993.A.
Howkins, "ClassAgainst Class' op. cit.

evidenceunveiled by the communistarchive, and the spacesopenedup by

recent research,necessitatea broader,more multifaceted analysis.The
yearsbetween 1927and 1932were ones in which the focus and
composition of the CPGB changeddramatically. The antagonismsthat had
long divided communistsand labour-socialists(or social democrats)
becameentrenchedin the mid-late 1920s,while the federal, liberal nature
of British socialism was replacedby the hegemonicdominanceof the
Labour Party and TUC. The changing economicstructureof the UK
shatteredthe traditional basesof radical socialist (later communist)
support. The miners, engineers,and shipbuilders,who formed the
backboneof British militancy, were displacedthrough economic
depressionand unemployment.Communistswere expelled from the
Labour Party and, following the General Strike, silencedin the unions. As
such, the focus of the Party's struggle moved from the workshop to the
streetand the dole queue.

Such an approachwill not endeavourto turn history

on its head.The
difficulties and traumasexperiencedby the CPGB, and detailed in
previous studies,were very real ones.The memoirs and testimoniesof
communistsinvolved with the Party during the Third Period are full of
frustration and disappointment.Harry Pollitt, for example,who became
GeneralSecretaryof the CPGB in 1929,and its de facto leader in 1930,
would later recall the period of his promotion thus:
Wehad3,500duespayingmembers,
no dailypaper,anddisagreements
on policythat
requiredtwo Partycongresses
to sort out ... I think the Partycongress
in Leedsin
November
1929wasthemostdifficultcongress
I haveeverattended.
I madea political
21
in stoneysilence.
reportthatwasreceived

1H. Pollitt, Twen!y Years Fight for Socialism (CPGB pamphlet, 1949).p2.
10

Party members such as Ernie Benson and William Paynter describe 'dark
days' of unemployment and poverty, 22CP election candidates recall
humiliating defeats and returned deposits,23and veterans of numerous
industrial struggles remember fighting for an 'independent leadership' in a
tone of anger and futility. 24ldris Cox, a champion of the New Line who
belatedly
Period,
during
Third
Party
the
through
the
apparatus
rose
imagination
heat,
"amazing
[amount
time,
the
expanded
and
ofl
regretted
...
on secondary tactical issues."25 And even Rajani Palme Dutt, who
remained uncompromisingly loyal to the CP throughout his life, later
"
'class
"potentially
that
slogan,
conceded
misleading
against class' was a
and that the period's formulation of 'social fascism' led to "harmftil"
repercussions.26

Consequently,this study will endeavourto place the Third Period in

perspective;to suggestthat the policy pursuedby the CPGB in the wake of
the General Strike was in many ways a palpable responseto contemporary
eventsand attitudes.This was certainly true within broader Comintern
circles, where dissatisfactionwith the more moderatepolicies of 1924-26
was widespread.27With regard to the CPGB, the attitudes expressed
during the classagainstclassyearswere neither 'alien' to the Party, nor
were they uniformly imposed from 'outside'.Moreover, in line with the

22E. Benson, To Struggle is to Live: A Working Class Autobiography

(Newcastle, 1980),
ppl7-19. W. Paynter, My Generation (London, 1972), pp82-108.
23H. Pollitt, Serving My Time (London, 1940),
pp 265-283. J. T. Murphy, New Horizons
(London, 194 1), pp291-294. H. Crawftird, Autobiographical
Transcrip
(undated).
Communist Archive.
24M. McCarthy,

Generation

in Revolt (London,

1953), pp 151-153. A. Homer,

Rebel (London, 1960), pp 103-111.

Incorrigible
251. Cox, Personal and Political Recollections (undated). Communist
26R. P. Dutt, The Internationale
(London, 1964), pp209-10.
27This was abundantly
(Princeton, 1997).

clear in Germany.

See E. D. Weitz, Creating

II

Archive.
German Communism

late
Eddie Frow, the period was a mixture of positive
the
of
perspective
and negative results.28

In chapterone, the foundationsof British Communist Party support are

examinedin relation to the structural changesaffecting Britain in the interinfluence
During
the
and the
communist
war period.
yearsunder review,
focus of communist agitation were forced out of the workshop and onto
the street, as changesin the British (and world) economyaffectedboth
industry and society. This is explored further in chaptertwo, where the
ramifications of the GeneralStrike will be discussedin conjunction with
the emergenceof a more 'leftist' communist perspective.From late 1926
through 1927,the theoretical basisof Communist International policy (as
outlined by Nikolai Bukharin) hardened,while Communist Party criticism
of the trade union and Labour Party bureaucracyintensified in responseto
the perceivedbetrayal of May 1926.Concurrently, both the Labour Party
and the trade unions extendedmeasuresrestricting communist influence
within the broaderlabour movement,compounding variancesinherent in
the communist- labour-socialistdialectic. Essentially, the retreat of the
British labour movementevident since 1920-21 was accentuatedin the
years following the GeneralStrike as the militant wing of the movement
succumbedto the more moderate,conciliatory majority.

The implementationand principal effects of the New Line are outlined in

chaptersthree and four. Although the decision to radically alter the
political direction of the CPGB emergedwithin the Executive Committee
of the Communist International (ECCI), the New Line introduced in
February 1928was relatively limited. It is arguedthat the New Line must

28K. Morgan, 'EngineeringStruggles:Eddie Frow.'In M. Herbert and E. Taplin, Born

with a Book in his Hand: A Tribute to Eddie Frow 1906-1997 Manchester 1998.p 12.

12

be seenas evolutionary. That is, its scopewidened and contractedin

accordancewith national and international events,and as a consequenceof
Crucially,
the
the leftist
movement.
communist
within
power struggles
perspectivethat characterisedCPGB politics throughout 1929was
it
from
both
left
Comintern,
took
the
the
to
the
and
pressure
persistently
of
ECCI and sectionsof the British leadershipto realign the CPGB with the
International line.

Also within chapterfour, as well as in chaptersfive and seven,the

practical application of the New Line is detailed. The achievementsand
work of the CPGB are equatedwith the material conditions in which the
Party operated.In such instancesas the Yorkshire and Lancashiretextile
disputes,communistsattemptedto rally support in areaswhere the CP had
little local support. Conversely,in areaswhere the Party did have deeprooted support, industrial action was limited by unemployment and union
recalcitrance.Moreover, as the trade unions sought to limit communist
influence, the capability of Party membersto influence eventswas
similarly restricted.This was compoundednot only by the CPGB's
unrealistic attemptsto establishan independentcommunist leadership,but
also by Party members'unemploymentand subsequentseparationfrom the
workplace. As such,the organisationalrigour many communistshad
applied to industrial politics, was now applied to the struggles of the
unemployed.Thus, when and where conditions favoured communist
agitation - during the heightenedpolitical atmosphereof late 1931 for
example- the Party was able to act effectively (through the NUWM) and
gain support.

The period between 1927and 1932should be seenas transitional one for

the CPGB, during which the Party was forced to adapt itself to the

13

changingnature of inter-war Britain, to widen the scopeof its activity, and

to createa political totality distinct from that of the mainstreamlabour
movement.The genesisof such a developmentis discussedin chapters
five and seven,wherein the Party'svarious attemptsto realign itself with
the British working classare examined.

Correspondingly,the emergenceof a distinctly communist culture, is

explored in chaptersix. The Party's decision to act independentlyof the
organisedlabour movementinstigated a number of cultural initiatives. An
idiosyncratic Party social life subsequently
emerged,and was chronicled
in the pagesof the Daily Worker. Moreover, through numerousstudy
groups and Party schools,the CPGB expandedupon a tradition of
proletarian educationindicative of the early British labour movement.

The history of the CPGB and the New Line is complex

and varied, and this
thesis is an attempt to chronicle the multiple experiencesof the Party in the
Third Period. So far as is possible,the historical framework
outlined by
Anderson and Hobsbawmhas beenadheredto, although to fulfil
such an
extensivecriteria would needa considerably larger body of work. As Nina
Fishmannoted in 1995,"British historians have failed to revise their
standardaccounts[of the New Line] to take accountof recent research
which showsthe Comintern'sflexible interpretation of its own line. Not
only have they ignored evidenceof the Comintern'spragmatism,they have
also not consideredthe published accountsof the CPGB's own particular
It is hoped that this work will go someway towards
political trajectory.1129
correcting such an incongruity.30

29N. Fishman, The British Communist PgM

op. cit. p36.
30This thesis is primarily focused
on the CPGB's activity within Britain itself.
Subsequently, the Party's work in relation to the British colonies is neglected in the
interest of time and space.

14

Chapter One
A Party in Transition

1926-1932

Traditional portrayals of the CPGB in the Third Period have concentrated

primarily on the collapsein CommunistParty membershipand the
in
CP
the
the
influence
that
afflicted
simultaneouswithering of communist
late twenties.I But while the Party did diminish in both number and
influence during the years of classagainstclass,to attribute such a
'disaster'to the political line of the CPGB is to ignore the economic,social,
late
in
the
labour
British
that
the
and political realities
ensnared
movement
1920s-30s.It is the purposeof this chapter,to approachthe experienceof
the CPGB from a broaderperspective.

Foremost,the traditional correlation betweenCommunist Party influence

and Party membershipis highly problematic. Kevin Morgan has correctly
raisedthis concernin relation to Mike Squires'attempt to give a more
positive reading to the New Line years,but such an observation should
also be applied to the overtly negative interpretationsof the period.2 The
origins of the growing divide betweenthe CPGB and the reformist labour
movementbeganprior to the introduction of the New Line. The hostile
I Seeintroduction for the
views of various historians.
2K. Morgan, 'The CPGB'
op. cit. pp 19-20.M. Squires,Saklatvalaop. cit. pp208-223.
Also M. Squires,'The CPGB and ClassAgainst Class.'In Socialist Histojy Winter 1993.
pp4-13. Squiresrightly points out that the Party was firmly aligned to the policy of class
againstclasswhen CP membershipbeganto increasein 1931. However, he neglectsthe
fact that the Party remainedsufficiently concernedabout its 'isolation from the masses'to
overhaul the Party apparatusin 1932;to restrain the more extreme conceptsof the New
Line from 1930through to 1932;and to recognisethe severelack of communist influence
in the factories and trade unions. It was not until the CPGB overhauledthe Party
apparatusin 1932that the Party was able to consolidateits membershipand broadenits
influence. From that time, the Party managedto balancethe notion of an independentlead
focused
'grass
based
front
broadly
the
that
on
roots' concernsof the
united
policy
with a
became
the
the
more conducive to
mid-30s
of
social-economic
conditions
workers, while
working classagitation.

15

TUC,
Labour
Party
the
the
coupled with the massexodusof
and
of
policy
Party membersrecruited during and immediately following the General
Strike, significantly influenced the CPGB's(and the Comintern's) change
figures
by
As
those
generally
used
membership
of approach. such,
historians to demonstrateCommunistParty decline have beenapplied in
high
(2,555)
1930
low
November
the
Both
the
and
an arbitrary manner.
of
of late 1926(10,730)3were statistical extremes.4

Indeedthe extent to which the rank and file membershipof the Communist
Party were influenced by the specifics of the Party line must be
questioned.While the 'hardcore'of the CPGB were dedicatedmilitants
with at least a basic understandingof Marxist ideas,those who joined the
Party in the midst of an industrial struggle, or in the sway of a dazzling
oratory display by Tom Mann or Shapurji Saklatvala,did so for quite
different reasons.And although the Party's emphasison political training
was undoubtedly an attemptto facilitate a revolutionary class
consciousness,the majority of thosewho passedquickly through the ranks
of the CPGB, did so on the basisof the Party's relationship to their own
circumstances.Hence,the miners of the 1926lock-out and the
unemployedof the 1930smeanstest demonstrations.

It is clear therefore, that any history of the CPGB must encompass more

thanjust the political line of the Party at any given time. Of equal, if not
more importanceto the developmentand fortunes of the Communist Party,

3Themembershipactually reached11,127in December 1926 (Pgly CensusJanuaryFebruary, 1927.Klugmann Papers),but historians usually refer to the figure of 10,730
given at the 1926Party Congress.
417orthe questionof why the CPGB generally failed to appealto the massof the British
peopleseeD. Geary EuropeanLabour Protest 1848-1939 (London, 1981),and European
Labour Politics from 1900to the Depressionop. cit. Seealso R. McKibbon, The Ideolog
of Class(Oxford, 1990).

16

was the social, economicand political climate in which it functioned.

Between 1926and 1932,the British economywas in the midst of
substantialstructural problems.The old export reliant industries of coal,
textiles, steel,and shipbuilding were in decline, unemploymentwas
increasing,and those communitiescentredaroundBritain's staple
industrieswere falling deepinto depression.Significantly, it was in just
those communitiesthat the CPGB had a basisof support,and the
disintegration of those localities greatly affected the Party'straditional
sphereof influence.

Furthermore, the structural problems confronting sections of the economy

in the twenties and thirties affected other working class organisations.
Trade union membership (and therefore influence) also declined, and the
growing homogeneity of the Labour Party as a parliamentary force
overshadowed the numerous guilds, co-operatives, and associations that
had once characterised British socialism. Militant
workers (both
communist and non-communist) subsequently became marginalised in the
wake of May 1926. Hounded from trade union and Labour Party branches,
victimised by their employers, militant workers were forced through
circumstance to focus their activity away from the shopfloor and onto the
plight of the unemployed. 5

It is within such a climate of social and economic dislocation therefore,

that the difficulties experiencedby the CPGB in Third Period must be
assessed.

SThiswas clearly evident in South Waleswhere militant miners were blacklisted and
condemnedto unemployment.SeeW. Paynter,My Generatio op. cit. pp82-108, for a
personalaccount.Seealso H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp98-107.

17

The Communist Party of Great Britain: Foundations of Support

In February 1927,the CPGB registereda membershipof 7,909 spread
6
The
branches.
local
Party
219
membershipwas predominantly
across
male (there were 1,122female members),and predominantly working
class,with the majority of the Party consisting of mine workers recruited
in the wake of the GeneralStrike and miners' lock-out of 1926.7Of these,
5,823 communistswere also membersof a trade union, the majority of
whom (3,753) were in the MFGB. The communistpresencein other
in
AEU
less
the
little
unions was
substantial,with relatively
representation
(219), the NUR (168) and the TGWU (152). Even so, the Party was able to
exert an influence that belied its small number through the National
Minority Movement, which claimed to represent956,000 workers in 1926,
and through the acquisition of official positions within the various union
branchesand tradescouncils.8As well as Arthur Homer and Harry Pollitt's
annualappearanceat the TUC,9numerouslesserknown Party members
held official positions within the union apparatus.10The CPGB also had
1,455membersin the Labour Party and 690 tradescouncil delegatesin
February 1927,and the dedicatedmilitancy of CP membersagain enabled
communiststo hold prominent positions within the Labour Party branches.

6Unlessotherwise stated,the figures given in this chaptercome from various

organisationalreports included amongthe JamesKlugmann Papersin the Communist
Party archive, Manchester.
71nthe wake of the GeneralStrike
and miners lock-out of 1926,the ranks of the CPGB
swelled considerably,rising from 4,398 in June 1925to a peak of 11,127in December
1926.
8TheMM had an actual
membershipof 3,460 in December 1926, although the 228
organisations/groupsaffiliated to the movementclaimed to representsome219,000
workers. 910 memberswere miners, 950 were transport workers, 640 were metalworkers,
and 210 were in the building trade. SeeHarry Pollitt's Report of Minorijy Movement 31
December 1926.Klugmann Papers.At the MM conferenceof August 1926,802
delegatesattendedand claimed to represent956,000workers.
9Horner was on the MFGB Executive Committeein 1926-28
IOTwosuch exampleswere ThomasCavanaghand Seth Segar.Cavanaghwas President
Salford
Manchester
delegate
Salford
2nd
5th
AEU,
the
Pendleton
to
and
and
and
of
tradescouncil. Segarwas a member of the Nelson Weavers'Executive Committee.

18

ldris Cox for example,was the vice chairmanof the MaestagLabour Party
at this time.II

Although a minority in the Party, women such as Rose Smith, Kay

Beauchamp,Lily Webb, Isabel Brown, BessieDickinson, Beth Turner,
Kath Duncan, and Helen Crawfurd, emergedas leading figures within the
CPGB. The Party was committed, in theory, to sexualequality and female
emancipation,with a functioning Women'sDepartmentheadedby Rose
Smith, and a periodical entitled The Working Woman.12A Women's
Conferencein February 1928,organisedby the Party in preparationfor
International Women'sDay, was attendedby 152 delegatesfrom numerous
working classorganisations.13The subsequentdemonstration,on 6 March,
was a great success.Three hundredwomen travelled from Wales,
Lancashire,Durham and Yorkshire to join their London comrades.
Communist slogansdecoratedthe procession,and Beth Turner, Majorie
Pollitt, Kath Duncan,A. J. Cook and J.R. Campbell addressedthe
contingent in Trafalgar Squareto cries of 'Make Way For The Women!'
and demandsfor equal pay.14

However, the CP was not the progressive organisation such a synopsis

suggests.The'woman question'was seenas largely peripheral to the

broader classstruggle, and severallocal Parties failed to establisha

I 11.Cox, Personaland Political RecollectionsUnpublished Autobiography. Communist

Archive.
12S.Bruley, Leninism Stalinism op. cit. p 134.The Working Woman was initially called
The Woman Worker in 1926.The former existed from 1927until March 1929.
Circulation dropped in relation to Party membershipand its disappearancein 1929was
due to financial reasons.
13Women'sDelegateConference4 February 1928.Johnson-Pollard Collection. The
Party first becameinvolved with International Women'sDay in 1926.
14TheMarch of the Women (London, 1928).

19

functioning women'ssectionin the 1920s.15Moreover, where sectionshad

developed,they were often ill-supported by the male comrades,while the
load
job,
family,
to
the
substantial
of
already
work
more
addition of yet
16
limited.
Florence
Mahon,
Party
were
efforts
meant
and
responsibilities,
in a letter of December1927for example,regretedthat her hospital work
Similarly,
Committee.
Women's
her
local
from
the
necessitated resignation
Edith Brandwood reportedthat her position as a'live-in' domesticworker
severelyrestricted her activity in the Tooting Women'sgroup. Brandwood
also complainedof her male comrades'lack of support,while suggesting
that many women in the Party were only membersbecausetheir husbands
were. "The women who could be active won't; and the women who would
be active can't," she concluded.17

The role of female Party members varied from locality to locality. In areas
such as South Wales and Scotland, the exclusively male world of mining
and political debate cast a long shadow over the pit villages. Women
appeared to function primarily in a militant but supportive role, not
participating in political decision making, but figuring prominently in the
struggles undertaken by their men-folk. In the textile towns of Yorkshire
and Lancashire however, where women made up the majority of the
workforce, the respective sexual roles were more even. 18Women not only
15SeeWomen'sDepartmentMaterial. Johnson-Pollard Collection. In November 1927,
the Women'sDepartmentissueda memorandumto all London Local Party Committees
(LPQ requestinginformation concerning'work amongstwomen'. SeveralLPCs had no
Women'ssectionshowever, while those Locals that had establishedsuch a department
generally reporteddifficulties and inactivity.
161bid.Kay Beauchampwas
madeill by her heavy workload in 1927.However,
Beauchampdid successfullyco-ordinatea North London Committee of Communist
Women through which paperssuch as the St PancrasWomen's Worker and the Islington
Women'sWorker developed.
17171orence
Mahon to ComradeWilliams 3 December 1927.Edith Brandwood to the
Secreta!3of the Women'sDepartment2 September1927.Both in the Johnson-Pollard
Collection.
18SeeS. Bruley, Leninism, Stalinism op. cit. for an excellent overview of women and the
CPGB.

20

but
lead
in
forefront
took
the
the
the
also
of
struggle,
a
participated at
McCarthy
Burnley
the
Margaret
the
instances.
was
secretary
of
number of
NUWM by 1930for instance,while Isabel Brown headedthe Shipley
Central Strike Committee in the sameyear.19In London too, Kay
Beauchamp,Phyllis Neal and Ethel Maddox were all notable CP
organisersin the late 1920s.

The role of the female proletariat and the growing prominenceof women
in industry were characteristicsof the Third Period to which the CPGB
and the Comintern were slow to adapt.Clara Zetkin had criticised
.
Bukharin's failure to acknowledgethe revolutionary potential of women in
the workplace in an article for The Communist International in August
1928,and Beth Turner, in The Communist Review, had earlier detailed the
effects of rationalisation on the female workforce.20Although the
Women'sDepartmentencouragedwomen's study circles and even issued
speakersnotes on the plight of the female textile workers, it was not until
1930- following the adventof numerousfemale-dominatedstrikes - that
the CPGB attemptedto effectively adapt itself to such a crucial feature of
the period.21

Support for the CPGB in the 1920swas mainly concentratedin those areas
affected by Britain's industrial decline, and was most deeply rooted in the
mining towns and villages of South Wales, and the mill towns, shipyards
and coal fields of Scotland.However, this should not necessarilysuggesta
link betweenthe economicdownturn of the time and communist support.
As is well documented,the Party lost support in the years of 'the
19M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. p IS I20The Communist International August 1928. Beth Turner, Communist Review
November 1927.
21Women's Department Materials. Johnson-Pollard Collection.

21

depression'.Those areasin Wales and Scotlandwhere the CPGB claimed

back
had
that
influence,
tradition
to
of
militancy
stretched
a
generally
an
before the First World War. As such,communist influence was most able
to manifest itself in comparativelynew communitiesof two to three
distinct,
locally
be
These
to
tended
with
quite
generations.
communities
controlled institutions (co-ops,guilds, unions, workmen's clubs), and a
leisure
Work,
industry.
based
and
workforce
upon a single or concentrated
home life were tightly connected,and an often non-conformist tradition
was complementedby a studiousliteracy that fuelled an indigenousclass
consciousness.Labour Collegeswere prevalent in both South Wales and
Scotland,and the bookish habits of theseworking classmilitants was one
inherited by the fledgling CPGB.22

The South Wales District Party numbered 1,500in September1926and

although the official membershipfigure of 2,300 given the following year
was exaggerated,the Party was neverthelessable to mobilise significant
supportthroughout the Welsh mining region. As Stuart Macintyre and
Hywel Francis have demonstrated,the CPGB was a dominant political
force in Welsh villages such as Mardy, where the Party becamea
congenitalpart of suchvillages' local identity.23Theseclose-knit pit
villages threw up a number of renown militants (not all of them
communist) such as Arthur Homer, Noah Ablett and S.O. Davies, while

22S. MacIntyre,

A Proletarian

Science op. cit. Little Moscow's op. cit. Both offer an

overview of such areas. MacIntyre's analysis offers a paradigm within which militancy,
not necessarily of a communist nature, was able to develop.
231bid. Also H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. Idris Cox has pointed out that

Moscow' tag. See 1.

several localities in the Welsh coal fields were worthy of the'Little
Marxism Todgy June 1970. Hywel
Cox, 'Communist Strongholds in Inter War Britainin
Francis has also warned against focusing too much on Mardy. The workforce was'mobile
from
Ferndale, Blaenilechau
Mardy
the
came
workforce
and much of
and variegated',
160.
)
Fed
The
Smith,
D.
(H.
Francis
Tylorstown.
op.
cit.
p
and
and

22

industry
Welsh
flavour
international
the
mining
allowed radical
the
of
24
British
traditionally
ideas
to
reformiSM.
more
with
coalesce
syndicalist

Similarly in Scotland, the militant reputation of localities such as the Vale

'Little
Moscow's'
being
led
Lumphirmans
their
Levan
to
christened
of
and
in the 1920s. The CPGB had significant support throughout the industrial
belt of Scotland, and even when the Scottish district membership fell from
1,792 in December 1926 to just 346 in November 1930, communists such
Hugh
Gallacher
Harry
McShane,
Willie
Abe
Alex
Moffat,
and
as
and
McIntyre, were able to mobilise considerable support for the NUWM, the
UMS, and local and national election campaigns.

In both Wales and Scotland,communistsemergedwithin, and were an

acceptedpart of, an already militant locality. Communistswere measured
by their work rather than their particular ideology, and were supportedfor
so long as the Party remainedwithin the framework of the indigenous
social labour movement.However, a senseof oppressednationhood also
facilitated political militancy in theseregions, not only from Scottish and
Welsh nationals, but also from the large Irish contingent that had settled in
theseindustrial centres.As Alan Campbell has demonstrated,Scottish
politics were often bitter and fragmented,and religious sectarianism
hamperedcommunist influence.25In Lanarkshire,certain villages were
known by their religious denomination,and local militancy was even
expressedin the procurementof explosivesfor the IRA. 26It is significant
241talian,Spanish,and West Indian workers were all prevalent in the Welsh coal fields.
After initial hostility, the relationship betweenthe Spanishand Welsh workers was later
fought
in
Spanish
Civil
by
Welsh
War.
International
Brigades
the
the
who
symbolised
SeeH. FrancisMiners Against Fascismop. cit.
25A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the ScotsCoal Fields.' op. cit.
Bob Stewart, in his memoirs, Breaking the Fetters(London, 1967), p 102, also refers to
the political individualism of many Scottishmilitants.
26A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the ScotsCoal Fields.'op. cit.

23

therefore,that in Fife, where suchreligious disputeswere less prevalent,

the CPGB found more consistentsupport.

Such religious sectarianismwas also an obstacleto Communist Party

districts.
Liverpool
In
Manchester
in
both
Liverpool
the
and
and
progress
certain Lancashiretextile towns such as Accrington, the predominanceof
Protestant-Catholicdivisions eclipsedthose classantagonismsthat the
CPGB sought to focus on. (Significantly, the Labour Party also found
progressdifficult in theseareas.)27The Liverpool CP was subsequently
amongthe weakestof the Party's various district sections,with a
had
in
1930,
385
February
1927.
By
December
this
membershipofjust
fallen to 58, and although dedicatedlocal communistssuch as Leo
McGree worked tirelessly to develop the District Party, Liverpool
remainedparticularly unresponsiveto communist agitation.

The ManchesterDistrict, which included the cotton towns of Lancashire,

was also relatively weak. The working class communities of Lancashire
in
different
Wales and Scotland, with the relatively
those
to
were very
paternal liberalism of the mill owners and the fragmentednature of textile
labour organisationsobstructingpotential communist influence. The
textile industry was characterisedby a number of small associations
detachedfrom, and evenhostile to, broaderunion organisation.Moreover,
the CPGB'sprogrammewas generally inapplicable to the predominantly
female labour force, whosedomestic'responsibilities' further restricted
political activity. Although such a picture may well have beenundermined
somewhatby 1930,as the industry fell into serious decline and the Party

27ForLiverpool seeP.J. Waller, Democracyand Sectarianism:A Political and Social

History of Liverpool 1868-1939 (Liverpool, 1981).For an insight into Lancashiresee
Margaret McCarthy's autobiographyGenerationin Revolt op. cit. ppl2-18.

24

increasingly focusedattention on the revolutionary role of women in

industry, such engraineddifferentials madecommunist influence difficult
to attain.

In Manchesteritself, the Party nurtured a number of eminent working class

activists - Eddie FroW,28Hymie Lee, Jimmy Miller and Ernie Woolley
amongthem - and through the NUWM the Party was able to mobilise
thousandsof unemployedworkers in the early thirties.29Even so, the
District membershiphad numberedonly 756 at the peak of the CPGB's
popularity in December 1926,and despitethe Party's steadygrowth from
1930,those pockets of communist support scatteredacrossLancashire
remainedisolated,as the Party secretariatcomplained in 1932.30

While the CPGB often remainedon the periphery of the political struggle
in the North West, the Party and the Minority Movement were able
sporadically to mobilise support among the miners of the North East.
During the lock out of 1926,mine workers flocked into the CPGB. The
District Party was temporarily the largest section of the British CP in
December 1926with 2,600 members,while the militant programmeof the
MM was endorsedby over 30 lodges of the Durham Miners' Association
in 1927.31However, support for communist initiative was often transient,
and the North Eastwas a classic exampleof working class acceptanceof

28EddieFrow moved to Man6hesterin 1929after working with Leo McGree in the

Liverpool CP.
2917or
an overview of communismin Manchesterin the early 1920sseeR. and E. Frow,
The CommunistPaM in Manchester1920-26 (Manchester, 1979).
30TheManchesterDistrict membershipstood at just 218 in May 1930,but through the
efforts of comradessuch as thoselisted above,and the intensified political climate
engenderedby the unemployedand textile strugglesof 1929-33, the Party membership
Political
in
Minutes
689
1932.
Bureau of the Communist
For
the
of
see
criticism,
reached
Pgqy of Great Britain 25 June 1932.CommunistArchive.
3IR. Martin, Communismand the British Trade Unions op. cit. p5S. Seealso W.R.
Garside,The Durham Miners 1919-1960 (London, 1971), pp240-242.

25

communists,but rejection of communism.The huge gains of 1926were

Party
(the
District
had
lost
for
fallen
to just
membership
example
quickly
109by mid 1930),and while the MM was still able to rally support around
in
1929,
Dawdon
disputes
the CPGB
the
that
colliery
at
specific
such as
had little effect on the solid Labour Party supportin the area.32Even the
'Little Moscow' of Chopwell was more militant than communist.Despite
its Marx Terrace and the prominent role local communistsplayed in the
GeneralStrike, the Chopwell Party branch numberedjust four in 1933.33

The two District Party organisationsestablishedin Yorkshire were also

characterisedby a fluctuating membership.The Sheffield District, which
by 1927included the mining areasof the Midlands, had 554 membersin
Februaryof that year, and was comprisedprimarily of miners and
engineersfrom Sheffield, Mansfield, Nottingham and Rotherham.The
militant shop stewardsmovementof the First World War had given the
CPGB a certain basis of support in the region, but the less radical tradition
of the Midland miners meant communist influence was relatively diffuse.
After an increasein membershipduring the General Strike (the District CP
grew from 247 in June 1925to 1,200in September1926) the Party
suffered severelossesthroughout 1927.34Even so, there remained a
communist presencein the local trade councils, on which Party members
such as Dan Mahoney and Billy Lees were able to gain limited political
victories.35

320nly 2.4 per cent of the electoratein Seaham,Durham voted for Harry Pollitt in his
GeneralElection battle with RamsayMacDonald in 1929. Seealso K. Newton, The
Sociology of British Communism(London, 1969).
33S.MacIntyre, 'Red StrongholdsBetween the Wars.'In Marxism Today March 1979.
34SheffieldStatementon Membership 1926-1930. WCML.
35SeeR. Stevens,TradesCouncils in the East Midlands, 1929-1951: Politics and Trade
Unionism in a7raditionally ModerateArea. Ph.D thesis,Nottingham University, 1995.

26

The other Yorkshire District Party, basedin Bradford, was briefly

amalgamatedinto the surroundingDistricts in 1927,but the advent of the
Yorkshire woollen disputenecessitatedthe re-establishmentof the District
Party Committee in 1929.Despite the bitter struggle conductedby the
woollen workers however,the Party membershipnever grew to more than
300. As in Lancashire,the organisationalstructureof the woollen unions
and the predominantly unorganisedfemale labour force, were unconducive
to CommunistParty advancement.With no establishedroots in either the
industry or the district, the CPGB remainedon the periphery of the
indigenouspolitical culture.

The samewas true in Birmingham, where the lack of a homogenous

working classcommunity hamperedthe developmentof a collective
political consciousness.Local industry was relatively varied, and
Birmingham was dominatedby new industries that

were not so affectedby

Britain's economic decline. Even in the midst of the General Strike the
local Party amountedto only 326 members,and throughout the Third
Period Birmingham remainedamongthe smallestand least effective of
CPGB sections.

Finally, the CPGB had solid basesof support in London, with a

membershipof 1,105in February 1927.In the East End the Party boasted
sizeablesupport amongstthe Jewish community centredaround the textile
industry. The Party's internationalism,and the CPGB's active

approachto

politics appealedto those marginalisedby wider British society, and the

distinct location of the textile industry and its workers enabledan acute

27

36
As
Sharon
Gewirtz
develop.
has
identity
to
noted,
of
class
sense
"communismprovided an answerto both kinds of oppression,classand
divide
the
to
If
tool
the
class
employed
ruling
of
a
was
ethnic ... racism
disappearance
defeat
the
the
then
would
mean
of
capitalism
working class,
1137
slavery.
wage
of anti-Semitismalong with

Communist Party support in London was focusedless on specific

industriesthan in Wales or Scotlandhowever. The CPGB did dominatethe
London TradesCouncil in the mid 1920s,but the basis of communistwork
in the capital was often concentratedaround local political or community
issues.As such,the Party's composition was relatively disparatewith
railwaymen, engineers,clerics, teachersand transport workers all included
among its varied membership.Communistseven enjoyed limited electoral
successin areassuch as Bethnal Green,Batterseaand Hackney, with
Shapurji Saklatvala'selection as the MY for North Batterseain 1924being
the most obvious example.38Even so, communist influence developed
primarily in those London communitieswhere a radical local tradition had
already beenestablished.This is clearly demonstratedby Mike Squires
with regard to Battersea,where communistswere incorporatedinto a
radical tradition that stemmedfrom the 1880s.In addition, while local
communistsaccumulatedconsiderablepower within the borough, the
actual number of CPGB membersremainedsmall. Here again, communists
but
local
such support did not necessarily
embraced
were
as
militants,
transform itself into an acceptanceof Marxism-LeniniSM.39
36Foran insightful accountof communismand Jewish life in the East End, seeJ. Jacobs,
Out of the Ghetto. My Youth in the East End: Communismand Fascism 1913-1939
(London, 1978).
37S.Gewirtz, 'Anti-Fascist Activity in Manchester'sJewish Community in the 30s.'In
ManchesterRegion HistoEyRevie Spring/Summer1990.p20.
38ForSaklatvalaseeM. Squires,Saklatvalaop. cit. Also S. Saklatvala,The Fifth
Commandment:Biography of Shgpuji Saklatyal (Salford, 1991).
39M. Squires,Saklatvalaop. cit. pp65-72.

28

Throughout Britain therefore, the CPGB's ability to develop a significant

influence among the working class varied markedly. In areas where a
distinct working class identity had developed, communists who emerged
within the existing social and political structures of the local community
were able to mobilise significant support. Where the Party, or Party
members, appeared as anisolated political sect with strange links with
Russia'- as Margaret McCarthy remembered the fledgling CPGB in
Lancashire

40
Subsequently,
influence
communist
was generally minimal.
-

for a locality to
embrace communist, as distinct from militant, activity, the
ability of individual Communist Party members to interact and relate with
the indigenous working class community was imperative. Support for the
CPG13was linked to the
wider traditions of the British labour movement;
to its federal nature that allowed trade union, ILP, Labour Party and
Communist Party
members to coalesce as representatives of the working
class. This explains the loyalty felt for Arthur Homer within Mardy in
South Wales. Homer's

commitment to the pit and village arguably

legitimised the CPGB in the

minds of his contemporaries to a greater
extent than his specific political ideology.

In the following sectiontherefore,the decline in CPGB supportwill be

examinedwithin the broad framework of the British socio-political climate
of the time.

A Party in Decline
As the 1920sturned into the 1930s,the British CommunistParty found
itself in disarray. A report on the Party's position in October 1930, drafted

40M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt

op. cit. p7l.

29

by Robin PageArnot, acutely outlined the CPGB'splight. "In areaafter

area," he noted, "the Party is isolated from the masses,is miserably weak
and cannotbe said to have won the leadership[of the working class]."
There were areaswhere propagandawas never heard,PageArnot
complained,where Party work was conductedonly amongstsmall circles
of workers, and where united front initiatives amountedto little more than
a seriesof "paper campaigns." In Tyneside for instance,he found no MM,
no YCL, no Friends of Soviet Russia,no Meerut Prisonerscampaign,no
Workers' Film Society or book shop, and no worker correspondentsfor the
Daily Worker.41

Other Party memberscompiled similarly distressingreports. The ultraleftist interpretation of the New Line most acutely expressedin
Tyneside,Birmingham and parts of Scotland appearedto have reduced
those sectionsof the Party to minuscule sectarianrumps. In Newcastle,
there were reportedly only five active Party membersby 1931, and the
subsequentfailure to develop a 'united front' policy beyond the ranks of
the CPGB itself (the Workers' Charter Committee in Newcastle included
just one non-communistmember)had isolated the District Party to the
brink of extinction.42The inter Party purge of the 'right danger'further
diminished the CPGB. Details referring to expulsionsand suspected
deviations pepperedthe organisationalreports of severalDPCs, leading to

41R.PageArnot, Position the Pq!jy October 1930.Dutt SuitcaseWCML. Such

of
a
synopsiswas verified by William Spence,who visited the District in 1931. Spence
describedTyneside as "the worst district in the whole country." The leadership
was
preoccupiedwith rooting out the 'right danger',and its sectarianapproachwas reported to
have led to "disintegration and apatheticindifference throughout the membership."
Report of the TynesideDistrict Congress15 March 1931. GeneralReport of the Party
Organisationin the TynesideDistrict 22 January 1931. Klugmann Papers.
42GencralReport of the Pgjy Organisationin the lyneside District 22 January 1931.
Klugmann Papers.Seealso David Springliall's report to the CC. Minutes of the Central
Committeeof the CommunistPaqy of Great Britain 16-17 January 1932.Communist
Archive.

30

43
Party
displacement
experienced
cadreS.
of
many
the
or censure
Subsequently,both Margaret McCarthy and Harry McShanewrote later of
in
DPC
Scottish
the early
the
the ramshacklecharacterof

1930S. 44

What such disarray amounted to in terms of actual membership varied

from region to region. Nationally, the Party membership fell to 5,556 in
April 1928,3,200 in December 1929,2,800 in May 1930 and 2,555 in
November 1930.45 Locally, those areas that had traditionally formed the
backbone of the Party's support declined dramatically in the late 1920s.
The South Wales membership had fallen from 1,147 in February 1927 to
just 264 by November 1930. In the same period, the Scottish Party
148,
from
1,969
to
fell
from
Party
356,
1,306
Tyneside
to
the
membership
CPGB
did
in
from
Only
London
Manchester
Party
766
244.
the
to
the
and
916
in
1,105
1927
to
remain slightly more stable, with
compared
members
in 1930.46

More important than the drop in membershipfigures however, was the

dwindling influence of the Party amongthe working class.The number of
43For examples, see Report on the Scottish District PaIty 18 July 1930. WCML. Report
of the Sheffield District PaM Committee 3 January 193 1. Report on the Tyneside District
13 August 193 1. Klugmann Papers.
44H. McShane, No Mean Fighter (London, 1978). pp 166-67. McShane recalls the
to Marx's Communist Manifesto as an
abridged edition of the text. While working in the Party book shop, Campbell
subsequently recommended customers Ryzanoffs commentary instead! M. McCarthy,
Generation in Revolt op. cit. ppl59-160.
McCarthy described the Party as 'disorganised
in the Scottish Party, see
and chaotic. ' For an official report of the "disenchantment"
Report of the Scottish District Pagy Committee July 1930. WCML and Klugmann
Scottish organiser

Davie Campbell

referring

Papers.
45The various figures are taken from numerous Party census and organisational
reports.
For 1928, see Materials for Organisational Report April 1928. Klugmann Papers. For
1929 and 1930 see Report on PLM Organisation November 1930. Klugmann Papers.
These include reports on the various districts. Similar reports can also be seen at the
WCML.
461bid. Other District Party membership losses in the same period were: Sheffield, 554 to
245 to 78. The Bradford District was dissolved
205; Liverpool, 385 to 126; Birmingham,
in late 1926, but its membership numbered 250 in September 1926 and had fallen to 155
by November 1930.

31

factory groupsestablishedby Party membershad fallen from 149 in

February 1927to just 39 by November 1930,while the percentageof Party
Where
declined
in
the
the
sharply.
vast
majority
of
work
actually
members
Party had beenemployed in 1926,only 39 per cent of the Communist
Party membershipwere in the workshops,pits and mills by 1932.47Such a
transformation of the Party's structural basis also affected the CP's
had
Not
the expulsion of a
labour
only
standingwithin other
organisations.
number of communistsfrom both the Labour Party and tradescouncils
severeda crucial link betweenthe CPGB and the working clasS,48but the
percentageof communisttrade union membersfell from 90 per cent of
those eligible in October 1926,to just 65 per cent in November 1931.49
Moreover, the once influential Minority Movement had all but
disintegratedby 1930-31 as membersbroke their ties with the movement
to avoid expulsion from their union, or were forced into unemployment
through recessionor victimisation. By the early 1930s,the CPGB's
OrganisationBureau diagnosedthat a "lack of political confidence due
...
to pessimism"had descendedover the Party, and the vanguard of the
working classhad becomelargely a Party of the unemployed.50

The traditional explanations for such an apparent decline in Communist

Party support have focusedprimarily on the class against classpolicy then

47Reportof the Twelfth Congressof the Communist Pa!jy of Great Britain. Klugmann
Papers.The report was given by Idris Cox, who headed the OrganisationalBureau at the
time.
48TheLondon DPC reportedthat thosememberswho had chosento remain in the Labour
Party rather than leave for the CPGB had "ceasedto maintain contact with the Party."
Recruitmentand Loss in London 9 July 1930.WCML.
49
19 October 1926.Report on Par!y OrganisationNovember
1931. Both Klugmann Papers.
50CoveringLetter to the Report on Organisation4 July 1930. Klugmarm Papers.William
Spencereportedthat 70 to 80 per cent of the Tyneside District Party membershipwere
Report
13
August
193
1.
Klugmarm
1
(Tyneside
District
Papers).In
by
193
unemployed
Wales, Enoch Collins found himself to be the only employedmember of the South Wales
DPC in the early 1930s.(H. Francis,Miners Against Fascismop. cit. p60.)

32

endorsedby the CPGB. The Party'sattempt to develop an independent

leadershipof the working classisolatedthe Party, it is argued,and it is true
that the sectarianismengenderedby the New Line contributed to the
Party'sproblems.In areaswith a "strong tradition of working within the
trade unions,"51such as South Wales, many workers desertedthe Party
once the questionof 'new unions,' and the 'social-fascism' of their union
52
Similarly,
became
feature
the
comrades,
a
of communistpropaganda.
ferocious, all encompassingattacksthe Party madeon the Labour Party
undoubtedly alienateda number of workers and potential allies. However,
the circumstancesleading to the CPGB's loss of influence cannotbe
reducedto the political line of the Party; a closer examinationof the
underlying causesreveal far more diversereasons.

Significantly, the CPGB'sdrop in membershipand influence coincided

with similar developmentsin the broader labour movement. Trade union
membershiphad been falling since the early 1920s,dropping from
8,434,000in 1920to 4,392,000in 1933.Moreover, the number of actual
trade unions had fallen to 1,081in 1932,comparedto 1,176 in 1925.53As
Chris Wrigley has demonstrated,the drop in overall membershipwas
further compoundedby a reduction in union density after 1926,as the
number of organisedworkers in traditionally unionised industries
decreased.The percentageof Yorkshire miners belonging to a union for
example,fell from 82.5 per cent in 1925to just 63 per cent in 1927.54This

51Harry Pollitt, Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist PaM of Great
Britain 15-16 April 1930.Klugmann Papers.
52SeveralWelsh Party membersalso left following the transfer of Arthur Homer to the
RILU in early 1930.Homer was regardedas (and indeedwas) a grudging and critical
adherentto the New Line.
53C.j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions Betweenthe Wars.'In C. J. Wrigley (Ed.), A Histo
of British Industrial RelationsVolume 11.1914-1939(Brighton, 1987).p72. K. Laybourn,
A History of British Trade Unionism (London, 1992).
54C.j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions' op. cit. pp72-111.

33

labour
in
CPGB,
the
the
of
sections
as
movement
affected
undoubtedly
degree
been
influence
had
to
exert
able
a
of
previously
which communists
beganto contract. Thus the SWMF lost nearly half of its membership
between 1927and 1929,falling from 136,250to 74,446.55

The consequenceof such a developmentwas a decreasein both trade

declined
lost
days
to
influence.
The
stoppages
number of
union power and
Strike,
General
followed
the
in
that
rapidly, particularly the three years
defensive
disputes
did
those
that
a
occur were almost uniformly of
and
nature.56Union leaderssought only to limit, rather than oppose,the effects
of rationalisation. In addition, a 'new spirit' of union-employer relations
was encapsulatedin the Mond-Turner talks of 1928.Many workers,
demoralisedby the GeneralStrike, fearful of unemployment,and
increasingly aware of the impotent position of the unions, turned away
from extra-parliamentaryaction, and looked to the Labour Party for a way
out of their economic and social impasse.

For a Party that prosperedin times of heightenedpolitical and/or industrial

tension, the decline in industrial action, and the disheartenedcharacterof
the labour movement,significantly restricted the Party's potential sphereof
influence. Workers in the 1920stendedto join the Party in the midst of 'the
during
On
the General Strike
this
was evident
struggle'.
a national scale,
late
193
1,
the
amidst which thousands
political-economic crisis of
and

55H.Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p97. By 1928the Federation'smembership
had fallen to 59,858.
56In 1927and 1928,the days lost through industrial action amountedto 1,174,000and
1,388,000 respectively.In the yearsprior to the General Strike 7,925,000(1925),
8,424,000(1924) and 10,675,000(1923) days were lost. The increasein 1929,to
8,287,000was due primarily to the outbreak of the Lancashiretextile dispute in the latter
half of the year. Ministly of Labour GazetteDecember 1929.Seealso, K. Laybourn, A
Histojy of British Trade Unionism op. cit. p142.

34

flocked into the CPGB.57The localised, defensive,and sporadicnature of

industrial action between 1927and 1931therefore, tendedto obstruct the
CPGB's attemptseither to influence those disputesthat did occur, or to
develop a massParty in their wake.

The changingeconomicconditions that Britain experiencedin the interdiminishing

labour
the
authority.
to
movements'
war period were central
Technological modernisationand the subsequentrationalisation of
industry; the emergenceof new industriesbasedupon domesticretail,
declining
Britain's
electrical engineeringand chemical production; and
shareof the export market, were all fundamentalto this. Subsequently,
those areasreliant on the old staple industries becameincreasing
dilapidated. Unemploymentrose as employersmodified or shut down less
efficient units of production, the psychological effects ofjob loss and/or
insecurity sappedthe spirit from previously resolute communities,and the
searchfor work led to the literal dislocation of numerousworking class
localities.58Meanwhile, union representationamongstthe new industries
developedonly slowly. The union tradition was not inherent in such
industries,and the workforce was geographically diffuse, less skilled, and
included a number of women andjuveniles; factors unconducive to union
organisation.59As a result, the traditional basis on which the labour
57Evenduring the barrenyearsof 1929-30, when the Party was able to exert only a
limited influence on the workers' defensivestrugglesagainstrationalisation, local Party
membershipgenerally increasedduring a relevant dispute (though not to the extent the
Party would have wished). During the Dawdon colliery strike in 1929 for example,a
Dawdon CP branch was establishedand the District membershiprose briefly from 130 to
220. SeeW. Gallacher'sReport of the TynesideDistrict Party Congressin Minutes of the
Central Committeeof the CommunistPany of Great Britain 26-27 October 1929.
Klugmann Papers.Even in Bradford, where the Party lacked a basis of support within the
woollen industry, the Party membershiprose from just 58 in December 1929, to 300 in
May 1930as a consequenceof Party activity in the woollen dispute of March-June 1930.
58Theunemployedwere not in a position to take strike action. And with unemployment
rising, thosein work were in a weaker bargaining position.
59SeeD. Geary, EuropeanLabour Protest 1848-1939 op. cit. Also S. Maclntyre, A
ProletarianScienceop. cit. p14.

35

had
CPGB)
(and
typically gained support, fell into
the
movement
disrepair.

The South Wales coal fields for example,were decimatedby the industrial
decline of the inter-war period. Between 1921and 1936,241 mines closed
down and a workforce that had numbered271,161 in 1920fell to 126,233
in the sameperiod.60Similarly in Scotland,the mines of the West-Central
region employedjust 38,585workers by 1932,comparedto 66,986 in
1925.61In the textile regions of Lancashire,Yorkshire and Scotland,a
declining export market combinedwith rationalisation, mechanical
innovation and more intensive working practices(the'more looms
system'),forced thousandsinto unemployment.Between 1912 and 1938
the amount of cloth producedin Britain fell from 8,000 million square
yards to just 3,000 million, and the number of cotton workers dropped
from 621,000to 288,000.62

For the CPGB, such fundamentalshifts in Britain's structural composition

were inherently linked to the Party's loss of influence between 1927 and
1931. Migration, unemployment,or victimisation becamethe expectedlot
of the dedicatedcommuniSt.63Ann Kane hasrecalled how her father, Jock,
a Scottishminer, was both laid off and evicted in responseto his activities
during the GeneralStrike. The whole family'walked down to England' in

60H.Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp32-35.

61A. Campbell, 'The Social History of Political Conflict in the ScotsCoal Fields 19101939.'In A. Campbell,N. Fishman,D. Howell, Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910-47 op.
cit.
62E.Hobsbawm,IndustKyand EmpireLondon 1968.p207.
6317or
by
dictated
the pit owners following the lock-out of
list
terms
the
enforced
of
a
1926,seeH. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp505-507. In Ogmore and Gilfach,
Party
for
Communist
the
was
re-employed
example.
of
member
no

36

find
Even
their
that
them.
to
those
reputation
preceded
only
of
work
search
Kanes
64
threatened
to
the
the
were
with
sack.
who offered accommodation

Whole towns fell to ruin in the wake of such economic decline. Most
famously, Jarrow becameknown as 'the town that was murdered'
following the collapseof its shipyard industry. Similarly, Welsh mining
to
"from
Rhymney
Rhondda
the
the
to
succumbed
valleys"
villages
crippling unemploymentand poverty.65As one contemporaryobserved,
"[the] South Wales coal field was ravagedby pit closures pits at the
...
field
the
throughout
the
the
coal
northern endsof
valley and
shallow pits
be
later
to
the
that
were closed,with
result
mining villages and areas,
designated'distressedareas',becamederelict."66Miners, including
communistssuch as Dai Lloyd Davis, were forced to transport themselves
to London or the coal fields of South Yorkshire and the Midlands to find
employment.Communist support was thus dispersedand diluted acrossthe
country. By 1927,the effects of unemploymentand victimisation were
such that Arthur Homer's Mardy Lodge -a traditional bastion of
communist support- comprisedjust 377 employed and 1,366unemployed
members.By 1929,the Lodge had virtually disintegratedwith only 25
working miners and 325 membersattempting to procure work. 67

Even in areas less affected by the rigours of Britain's economic

dislocation, communistsfound little respite. The Sheffield DPC for

example,reportedthat severalof the local Party's 'best comrades'had been

641nP. Cohen,Children of the Revolution. Communist Childhood in Cold War Britain

(London, 1997),p 141.
65SceE. Wilkinson, The Town That Was Murdered (London, 1939). For Wales, seeH.
Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit., and A. Hutt, The Condition of the Working Class
in Britain (London, 1933).
66W.Paynter,My Generationop. cit. pp42-43.
67H.Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p 164.

37

"starved out of their homes," and had either'left town,'and even the
68Thosemilitants who decidedto stay in their
county, as a consequence.
particular localities, generally choseeither unemploymentor a period of
political inactivity. The Sheffield Party again reportedhow certain
comradeshad decidedto "lie low" in order to gain employment,69while
the Scottish DPC similarly noted "wholesalevictimisation and emigration"
as the primary causeof the District Party's shrinking membership.70

The CPGB's decline in the late 1920s must also be placed within the
context of the British labour movement's continual transformation. In
particular, the homogenisation of the Labour Party negated the pluralist
traditions of the movement, and the entwining party, union, and
association memberships of the late 19th, early 20th century had became
ever more tenuous by the mid 1920s. Following the First World War, the
Labour Party developed a political programme
and constitution
increasingly distinct from the party's broader, federal
roots. Subsequently,
the ties that had bound the Labour Party and the trade unions loosened
throughout the inter-war period, and the disparities that existed between
the party and the ILP, and between the constitutional and the radical,
similarly widened as the twenties drew on. 71

As for the CPGB, the Party's revolutionary objectives, its theoretical

orthodoxy, its internationalism, and its deference to the Soviet Union, all
stood apart from the gradualist, ethical socialism of the Labour Party.
While the broader labour movement of trade unions, co-operatives, Fabian
68ForWales, seeH. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op cit. pp74-107. For Sheffield, see
Sheffield Statementon Membership 1926-1930 23 July 1930.WCML.
69ibid.
70Reportof the SgottishDistrict PAM July 1930.WCML. The Party estimatedthat 90
membershad left becauseof victimisation.
71SeeR. McKibbon, The Evolution of the Labour Pagy 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974).

38

liberal
fin-nly
framework
had
Clubs
the
Clarion
that
within
remained
and
both spawnedand shapedtheir development,the 'Bolshevisation' of the
CPGB soon severedwhat incipient ties the Party had with such a
tradition.72In many ways, the antagonismsof the class againstclassyears
hampered
had
differences
that
the
communist
were merely an extensionof
birth.
Party's
Communist
labour-socialist
the
relations since
-

As such,divisions were evident long before the CPGB's adoption of the

New Line. At a national level, the refusal of Communist Party affiliation,
and the denial of individual membershipto communists,revealedthe
Labour Party National Executive'sperception of Labour as a party
ftindamentally at oddswith the CPGB. Conversely,the CPGB'srejection
of reformism, and the Party's intention to manipulateparliamentary
democracyin an effort to mobilise anti parliamentary activity, was
obviously antithetical to the constitutional Labour Party. Indeed, the
CPGB's fundamentalopposition to the Labour Party was an inherent part
of the Party'spolitical perspective.The debateover whether the CPGB
should utilise parliament through Labour affiliation had preoccupiedthe
Party'sunity conferencesof 1920,and it took the intervention of Lenin to
stop the fledgling CPGB from dismissingparliamentary action
altogether.73

In those areaswhere communistswere an acceptedpart of the indigenous

political make-up,differencesbetweenmoderateLabour Party members
72S.Maclntyre's A Proletarian Scienceop. cit., remainsthe definitive accountof the
divergenceof British Marxism and labour socialism.
73Forvarying interpretationsof the Party'sinitial debateover parliament seeW. Kendall,
The Revolutiongy Movement in Britain 1900-21 (London, 1969). J. Hinton's review and
Sociejy
for
in
Bulletin
Study
is
the
the
Kendall
the
of
to
of Labour
published
reply
Histo Spring 1929.pp42-49.J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist PaLtyof Gre
Britain, Volume One (London, 1968). L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa!jy op.
cit.

39

1928.
to
also
class
activists
were
apparent
working
prior
militant
and more
The RhonddaUrban District Council for example,was characterisedby
"continual wrangling betweenthe cautiousmajority and left-wingerS."74
Stuart Maclntyre has thus concludedthat "the consequentpolarisation of
Labour ranks in Mardy clarified a division within industrial and political
"75
1920s.
the
been
had
throughout
apparent
opinion which

Across the myriad sectionsof the labour movement,disparitieswith the

CPGB were manifest in the early 1920s.In 1922,the CPGB broke with the
Plebs Leagueover the question of Marxist teaching,while the Party's
relationship with the Central Labour College becameincreasingly strained.
The Party's revolutionary, monotheistic version of Marxism (-Leninism)
createdevident friction, and Party criticism of college practice and method
led eventually to the expulsion of communist studentsbetween 1926and
1928.76The Party similarly secededfrom the Socialist SundaySchoolsin
1922-24, and the ability of CommunistParty membersto attain prominent
positions on the executive committeesof various organisationsled to
further ruptures in the British Workers' SportsFederation(BWSF) and the
LeagueAgainst ImperialiSM.77

74S.MacIntyre, Little Moscow's

op. cit. p34751bid.p35.
76S.MacIntyre, A Proletarian Scienceop. cit. pp80-85. Those trade unions that sponsored
the Labour College also severedtheir links in the late 1920s.The reasonwas asmuch
financial as political, although the College'sreputation for schooling militant critics of
trade union reformism must have madethe decision of the NUR and SWMF more
palatable.
77Minutesof the National Committeeof the British Workers' Sports Federation 16
October 1927.Conferenceof the National Committee of the British Workers' Sports
Federation8 January 1928.CommunistArchive. The First Annual Conferenceof the
BWSF, held on 28-29 April 1928,debatedthe Labour Party and the TUC's decision to
Power:
The
'Staying
Lost
World
British
Samuel,
R.
See
BWSF.
of
the
also,
veto
Communism,Part Two.'In New Left Review March-April 1986.pp63-113

40

Even in the world of working classtheatre,RaphaelSamuelhas

demonstratedhow the "rise and extensionof the Workers' Theatre
Movement was closely associatedwith, and anticipated,the'leffturn" of
in
direction
WTM
the
the
78
CPGB.
Debate
the
of
the
content and
over
divergence
from
Party's
Strike
General
the
growing
the
reflected
wake of
the theatregroupsthat had precededit. And although the various working
broader
had
WTM
of
theatre
to
the
out
emerged
class
groups affiliated
labour movementinitiatives, the CP'shegemonyover the ideological
direction and physical make-up of the movementsoon severedany links
the ILP, Labour Party or the Central Labour College wished to have with
the WTM.

Finally, while trade union strengthwas compromisedby the politicoeconomicclimate of the 1920s,the period did seethe emergenceof a more
powerful trade union apparatus.79The growth in union membership
between 1910 and 1920,the amalgamationsthat forged the TGWU and
NUGWU, and the extendedneed for collective bargaining on a national
scale,all prompted a more centralisedunion administration. As a result,
the characterof the TUC changeddramatically in the wake of the First
World War. The formation of a GeneralCouncil in 1921,the appointment
of a full time Secretaryin 1923,and the adoption of a mediatory role
betweenunion and government,all servedto consummatethe primacy of
the central bureaucracy.

Ironically it was the militants who had led the appealfor a more
TUC
The
suffered
as
a
consequence.
and
centralisedunion movementwho

78R.Samuel,'Theatreand Socialism in Britain 1880-1935.'In R. Samuel,E. MacColl

Left
the
Theatres
Cosgrove,
op. cit.
S.
of
and
79j. Hinton and R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution op, cit. pp 18-22.

41

the various trade union leadershipshad consolidatedtheir position within a

clearly defined remit. While a central administrationcould potentially
offer a militant leadershipto a labour movementon the offensive, in the
adverseconditions of the 1920s,the oppositeproved to be the case.The
abject failure of the GeneralStrike tipped the balanceof power decisively
in favour of the moderatewing of the tradeunion movement,and the
increasinglypowerful administrationwas utilised to marginaliseits more
militant sections,and to expel the revolutionaries.

As the CPGB'slinks to the

wider British labour movementwere severed

and the industrial-geographicalfoundationsof its supportdisintegrated,

the Party inevitably suffered.The CommunistParty was caughtin a time
of transition, and any history of the Party in the Third Period must
necessarilycorrelatethis structural crisis with the Party'sability to
confront the changesthat surroundedit.

Conclusions
The structural changesthat

inter-war
during
Britain
the
years,as
affected

'new' industriesbegan
industries
'old'
displace
to
the
export reliant
slowly
of coal, textiles and shipbuilding, alteredfundamentallythe traditional
basisof the British labour movement.Rationalisationand unemployment
cameto characterisethe old industrial heartlandsof Britain, and areas
where the labour movementhad traditionally amassedsupport fell into
dramatic decline.80The depressionof 1929-33 merely exacerbatedthe
alreadyevident structural decay,and for both the CPGB and the wider
labour movement,the effect of suchdislocation was immense.

8OForthe effects of such a decline see A. Hutt, The Condition of the Working Class in
Britain op. cit.

42

The apparentisolation of the CPGB between 1927and 1932must be

both
in
developments
to
the labour movement
within
understood relation
framework
the
of Britain in the 1920and
social, political, and economic
30s. While the non-revolutionary climate of the period marginaliseda
Party calling for revolutionary change,and the policy undertakenby the
Party did initially accentuateproblems already confronting the CPGB, the
New Line in itself did not incite the Party's discernible decline.81Nor too
did it prevent the Party from expandingits membershipbasewithin the
same(Third) period.

As such,traditional interpretationsof the Third Period ignore the

achievementsof the CPGB between 1927and 1932.First, the Party's
divorce frorn'the wider labour movementenabledthe CPGB to develop a
rich Party culture distinct from the liberal traditions of British labour (see
chaptersix). Similarly, the depiction of a Party'isolated' from the working
classunderminesthe considerablesuccessof the NUWCM. From the
aboveanalysis,it is apparentthat those areasin which the Party.had
traditionally obtainedsignificant supportwere the sameareasmost
affected by the dislocation of British industry in the 1920s.Second,such
areas(in particular South Wales and Scotland)saw the emergenceof
powerful and active unemployedmovements.As Hywel Francis has
recognised,"erstwhile ... militants redirectedtheir energiesinto the
National Unemployed Workers' Movement, which becamethe archetypal
extra-parliamentarymovementin the South Wales valleys."82Indeed,the
81SeeJ. Hinton And R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution op. cit. for
an analysis of
CommunistParty strategy.Hinton and Hyman persuasivelyarguethat a CPGB policy
attemptingto develop a massParty was fundamentally flawed. The Party programme
should, it is argued,have centredaround consolidating the basesof support the Party had
already established.
82H,Francis, Miners Against Fascismop. cit. pp5l-52. For a contemporaryaccountsthat
correspondto such a statementseeW. Paymer,My Generationop. cit. pp82-108. And M.
McCarthy, Generationin Revolt op. cit. pp 150-153.

43

Party's involvement with the unemployedarguably widened the scopefor

CPGB-worker contact,as evidencedby the increasingly large local and
between
held
1929and 1933, and the thriving
demonstrations
national
turn-over of Party membershipin the early thirties. Third, the impact of
the CPGB often disguisedits relatively small number. As well as the
NUWM, the formation of the UMS occurredas the Scottish membership
plummeted,while in London some 113 communistsheld official trade
union positions in November 1931.83Conversely,the increasein Party
membershipthat coincided with the economic crisis of 1931did little to
enhancethe Party's ability to influence events.

The years between 1927and 1932therefore, saw the CPGB passthrough a

period wherein the foundationsof the Party's support disintegratedand the
focus of communist agitation passedout of the workshops and into the
dole queue.The period necessitatedthat the Party adapt itself to structural
changesevident in British industry, and (despitethe revolutionary rhetoric
of the Comintem) to the defensivenature of the working class struggle. In
doing so, the Party would reap genuine successesin the early 1930s,and
the Party's work amongstwomen, the unemployed,and againstthe fascist
threat, all facilitated a broaderbasis of potential CPGB support. Amidst
the turmoil of 1927-1930 however,the prospectsof such a revival seemed
to hang precariously in the balance.

830rganisational
Klugmann

Report of the London District Parjy Committee December 193 1.

Papers. 603 members of the London CP were also members of a trade union.

44

Chapter Two
Towards the Third Period
May 1926 - October 1927

For the Communist Party of Great Britain, the General Strike of May 1926
was both an inspirational and enragingexperience.The Party had entered
the strike in defiant mood, calling for trade union solidarity, the formation
front
Councils
Action,
Workers'
Defence
Corps,
of
of
of
and a united
every "political, industrial, co-operativeand unemployedorganisation.",
Although too small to play a decisive role in the nationwide dispute,in
areaswhere the CPGB had a basis of support- mining villages in South
Wales and the North East, industrial centresin Scotland the Party was
able to exert an influence that belied its relatively small membership.2 In
the South Wales village of Mardy for example,the CP dominated miners
lodge effectively becamethe'executive power of the

village. '3 The

subsequentcollapse of the strike was a profound disappointmentto the

CPGB, and it is the intention of this chapterto outline a noticeable
radicalisation in the Communist Party's perspectivefrom mid-l 926.

The manner of the General Strike's defeat confirmed the Party's generally
low opinion of the existing ('reformist') leadershipof the TUC and Labour
Party. Although communist expectations had been raised by the relatively
lQuoted in J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist PaM of Great Britain Volume Two:
The General Strike 1925-1926 (London, 1969).p 115.
2 The CPGB membership stood at 6,000 immediately prior to the General Strike.
Additionally, at the'Special Conference'of the Minority Movement held in March 1926,
883 delegates attended from 636 trade unions and trades councils, claiming to represent
956,000 workers. Harry Pollitt, 'Report of the Minorijy Movement. Klugmann Papers.
3H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. ppl63-64. This was also the case in some
Scottish villages. See A. Campbell, ' The Social History of the Political Conflict in the
Scots Coal Fields 1910-39. ' In A. Campbell, N. Fishman, D. Howell, Miners, Unions and
Politics. 1910-47 op. cit. Similarly in the North East, the Party had a forcible influence
during the strike. See A. Mason, The General Strike in the North East (Hull, 1970), and
R. Page Amot, The Miners Years of Struggle (London, 1953).

45

'left! agendaof the ScarboroughTUC in 1925,4the GeneralCouncil's

in'to
Government
to'give
pressureappearedto underline the
willingness
futility of Party attemptsto revolutionise the British labour movement
through the existing apparatus.Indeedthe Party sloganof 'All Power To
The GeneralCouncil'rang particularly hollow in such circumstances.
Moreover, the enthusiasmand solidarity shown by the workers suggested
to many in the Party that the working class,in contrastto their leaders,
were 'turning to the left'; towards the CPGB.

Concurrently however, the accusationsand condemnationslevelled by

communistsagainstthe official labour leadershipwere reciprocated.
Indeed,it can be arguedthat the increasingly autonomousposition
undertakenby the CommunistParty in the late 1920swas provoked as
much through necessityas design.Those links adjoining the CPGB to the
wider the labour movementwere systematicallybroken by the various
trade union bureaucracies,the TUC GeneralCouncil and the Labour Party
Executive throughout the 1920s.Although hostility towards communist
agitation was hardly a new development,in the months following the
GeneralStrike, it took on an increasingly official and effective quality.
This chapterwill detail the CPGB'sresponseto such an offensive.

In accordancewith the British Party'smore militant perspective,the

theoretical basisof international communistpolicy similarly hardenedin
late 1926.At the SeventhPlenum of the ECCI in November of that year,
Nikolai Bukharin (who headedthe CI from 1926to 1929)outlined the

4This was due to the seeminglyleft bias of the GeneralCouncil, which included such
men as A. A. Purcell and A. J. Cook. Additionally, the militant characterof AJ. Swales'
opening speech;the endorsementof resolutionsmoved by the Minority Movement; and
the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Committee,all appearedto justify the Party policy
of'united front from above.'

46

A'First
Period'of revolutionary
struggle.
period'of
emergenceof a'new
crisis was seento have emergedin the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917,and continuedup until the failed KPD putsch of 1923.This was
followed by a'Second Period' of 'relative capitalist stabilisation' from
1924,while a 'Third Period' of 'capitalist crisis' was officially sanctionedat
the Sixth World Congressof the Communist International in 1928.
However, it would be erroneousand historically naive to acceptsuch
distinct cut-off dates.Comintern policy was continually 'fine tuned', and
while historical continuity seemedto compliment the teleological
approachof the ECCI, it was evident that the 'new periods' of struggle
unfolded, rather than appeared(as it were) overnight. As such,November
1926saw the beginning of a revision of Comintern policy, a revision that
would gain momentumand substancethroughout 1927 in responseto
eventsacrossthe world. This chapterwill outline this development,while
demonstratingthe differencesand similarities betweenthe 'left turn' in the
CPGB and the'left turn' in the Communist International.

Finally, in order to analyseclearly the Communist Party's responseto the

eventsof 1926,it is necessaryto bear in mind the importance the
Comintern and the Soviet Government(and indeedthe CPGB) placed on
the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee. The Committee,
establishedin 1925,promised "co-operation betweenthe British TUC
GeneralCouncil and the All RussianTrade Union Council in every way
that may be consideredfrom time to time advisablefor the purposesof
Soviets,
"5
For
international
the
the agreementbrought the
promoting
unity.
Russiantrade unions closer to the IFTU (International Federation of Trade
Unions), while for the Comintern, it provided an important point of contact
5SeeJ. Klugmann, Histojy of the Communist PaM of Great Britain op. cit., pp 16-21 for
details of the committee.

47

betweenSoviet and British workers. Such manoeuvringswere very much

Period'to
links
during
O's
theSecond
the
establish
with
attempts
part of
the wider international labour movement.By working in harmony with the
'reformist' trade unions, the Comintern.hopedto disseminatecommunist
influence amongstthe workers, while simultaneously'revolutionising'the
lay
'inevitably'
for
that
the
ahead.
struggles
unions

The Need for Change?

i) Lessonsof the General Strike
On the 15 May 1926,the foremosttheoretician in the CPGB, Rajani Palme
Dutt, describedthe GeneralStrike as a "prelude to a new era." The "old
conditions can no longer continue" he wrote, "and the British working
into
have
a new era, the era of massstruggle, which can only
class
entered
"
had
For
Dutt,
in
the
acutely
struggle.
strike
culminate openrevolutionary
"the
leadership
labour
'reformist'
the
the
and
of
movement,
undermined
trappings of parliament, democracy,trade union legalism and economism
[had] beentom aside." Within two days of the strike's collapse,Dutt was
"direct
for
to
to
political
situation,
a new approach a new
calling
6
Communist
party.
the
the
auspicesof
revolutionary" struggleunder

Dutt was writing from Brussels(where he resided,ostensibly, on the

leadership
in
Britain,
ill-health),
7
but
back
the
acting
of the
groundsof
CPGB headedby Bob Stewart,took a similar line.8The calling off of the
61bid.
7Dutt did have health problems,but his residencein Brusselsalso enabledhim to have
Comintern.
Bureau
the
West
European
the
of
contact
with
closer
8The'acting leadership'was due to the imprisonmentof twelve leading communists
immediately prior to the Strike. Albert Inkpin (Secretary),William Gallacher, Harry
Pollitt, Wal Harmington and William Rust had all beensentencedto twelve months in
November 1925under the Incitement to Mutiny Act. Arthur MacManus, Tom Bell, Jack
Murphy, Johnny Campbell, Robin PageArnot, Tom Wintringham.and Ernie Cant, each
receivedsix months.This political trial was motivated, in part, by the mounting tension
of the pre strike days.

48

General Strike was condemnedby the Party as "the greatestcrime that has
but
been
the
only
against
miners,
not
againstthe working
committed,
ever
"
Like
Dutt,
Great
Britain
the
the Party laid the
world.
whole
and
class of
blame squarely at the feet of the GeneralCouncil, and also like Dutt, the
Party included the "so-called left wing" of A. A. Purcell and GeorgeHicks
in its criticism. 9PeterKerrigan, a member of the Party Executive in 1927,
recalled later that many communistsfelt a "tremendoussenseof betrayal,
not only by the TUC leadershipbut also by the lefts on the General
Council," at the end of the strike. "The effect on myself and on otherswas
to turn againstthem, and this made it easierfor the tendencyto be against
the whole 'official movement'... it helped make stronger sectarian
tendenciesamong communists."10

For those such as Dutt whom Harry Pollitt would later call "sectarian
through and through" II- the untrustworthiness of the 'so-called left' was a
central lesson of the General Strike. 12As Bolsheviks, the Party knew its
support of the General Council and the Labour Party was equivalent to the
'rope supporting the hanging man', and the excuse to come out openly
against those who uttered'Ieft phraseswhile maintaining a commitment to
reformist politics was embraced by many throughout the communist
movement. Internationally, this was evident in the'Theses on the General
Strike' adopted by the ECCI, which declared "the exposure of the left wing
9Stand by the Miners! An Appeal by the Communist PaM Of Great Britain 13 March,
1926. Printed in full in J. Klugmann, Histoly of the Communist Pa!jy of Great Britain
op. cit. pp210-212.
I OQuoted from an interview with Peter Kerrigan in R. A. Leeson, Strike: A Live Histoly
1887-1971 (London, 1973). pp 114-116.
1)Quoted in K. Morgan, Har! y Pollitt op. cit. p76.
12Dutt felt that the General Strike was the furthest the 'Reformist leadership' could
go
without "breaking through those shackles and entering on the direct revolutionary
path. "
'The British Election and the New Labour Government'. Sent to the CI 26 June 1929
Sent to the Cl 6 July
(Dutt Papers, BL). See also, 'Problems of the New poliev in Britailf.
1928 (Dutt Papers, BL). For a similar opinion, see G. Hardy, Those Stormy Years.
Memoirs ofthe Fight for Freedom on Five Continents (London, 1956). p 188.

49

as people who capitulated," to be a primary task of the CPGB. It was the

'left', insistedthe ECCI, who were "mainly responsiblefor the defeat." 13

Although the CP briefly 'toned down' its rhetoric in an attemptto realign

the collapseof the strike with the Party's continuedencouragementof
Anglo-Russian relations,14the more instinctive 'mood' within the CPGB
prevailed, and it did so for a number of reasons.First, the experienceof the
strike itself, with its disappointing climax and the continuedsufferanceof
the miners, facilitated communisthostility. As the miners continuedtheir
struggle, the Party'sangertowards those who claimed to representthe
working classyet appearedindifferent to the suffering of the mine workers
and their families undoubtedly intensified. Moreover, the CPGB's call for
an embargoagainstcoal imports was rejected repeatedlyby the official
leadersof the labour movement.Even the ILP, within which there was
rank and file support forjoint action with the CP, excluded any possibility
of such a campaign.Understandablytherefore, communistsperceived
themselvesto be fighting alone in support of the miners.15

Second,the Party'sattitude towards the GeneralCouncil was compounded

by the criticism many in the TUC aimed at the CPGB, and the cries of
'never again'that resonatedthroughout the labour movement.C.T. Cramp
of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) for example,blamednot the
GeneralCouncil for the eventsin May, but "our people who for years
made it impossiblefor the GeneralCouncil to resist the GeneralStrike." 16

13Communist

Review July 1926.

14See Workers'Weekly

4 June 1926. 'Why the Strike Failed'; a statement by the Central

Committee of the CPGB, 29-31 May 1926. Such an attitude was clearly evident at the
Third Conference of the Minority Movement in August.
15For a lucid account of such a response to the lock-out,
see M. McCarthy, Generation in
Revolt op. cit. pp80-84.
16Quoted in N. Fishman, The British Communist Party
and the Trade Unions op. cit. p30.

50

Furthermore,many union leadersand memberswho had once been

tolerant of the CPGB and communist led Minority Movement, turned
Conley,
Andrew
former
Tailor
the
the
their
secretary
of
allies.
and
against
GarmentsWorkers' Union, who prior to the General Strike had
intentions
his
the
the
movement,
admitted
of
and
aims
sympathisedwith
fear that unlesstradescouncils were forbidden from affiliating to the MM,
the 'Minority' could becomethe'Majority'. 17By 1927he was of the
opinion that:
It may be that the Minority Movement served a useful purpose in the early days,but with
my reading of the papers from week to week I am convinced that the vilification of our
movement that we see there is doing our movement a lot of harm, and if Pollitt and his
friends want to play the part of team men they should get back into the movement and
work againstthe common enemyinsteadof splitting our forces.18

Subsequently,at the 1926TradesUnion Congress,the General Council

informed its membersthat, "affiliation to the National Minority
Movement, in the opinion of the Council, was not consistentwith the
policy of the Congressand the GeneralCouncil, and that the Council could
not, therefore, approveof affiliation with the National Minority
Movement."19

Third, the solid support shown by the workers during the General Strike,
in
dogged
the
the
and
miners the months that followed,
commitmentof
appearedto contrastsignificantly with the General Council's apparent
hasteto end the dispute.Fundamentalto the attitude of the CPGB (and the
Cl) was the belief that while the labour leaderswere retreating to the right,
the workers had beenradicalisedby the General Strike; their morale

17N.Branson,Histo!y of the Communist PaLtyof Great Britain op. cit. p12.

18R.Martin, CommunismAnd The British Trade Unions op. cit. p79. Quoted from the
TUC Report of 1927.
19J.Klugmann, History of the CommunistPagy of Great Britain op. cit. p273.

51

boosted and their resolve enhanced.20Even when it became clear that the
had
led
Strike
General
to
generally
the
more
experience of
"disillusionment with both the TUC leadership and with direct action, "21
intensified
the
Party
workers'
of
remained convinced
sections of the
fell
from
7,
lost
days
to
Although
the
stoppages
number of
militancy.
950,000 in 1925 to 1,170,000 in 1927 (excluding the extraordinary 1926
figure of 162,230,000),22the apparent dichotomy between perceived
working class radicalisation and the decline in industrial action was
explained by Dutt as being due to 'the initiative laying with the
bourgeoisie. ' The workers' subjection to defeat and victimisation served
only to augment class differences, argued Dutt. 23

Fourth, the instinctive reaction of the CPGB was encouragedby both the
ECCI and the Soviet Government.Although the CI was not, in mid 1926,
committed to an overhaul of International policy, the attitude of the
Comintern following the GeneralStrike becameincreasingly critical.
Similarly, the RussianAll Union Central Council of Trade Unions
condemnedunreservedlythe'surrendee of the GeneralCouncil, as
24Although this did not
Tomsky's telegramto the 1926TUC demonstrated.
lead to a Soviet withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian Committee, the
Soviet attitude towards the British trade unions noticeably hardened.

20Foran example,seeJ.T. Murphy, The Political Meaning of the General Strike (London,
1926).ppl34-36. "The working classhas emergedfrom the General Strike with its
its
leaders.
"
bitterly
the
though
collapse
of
resenting
undamaged,
morale
21C.j. Wrigley, 'Trade Unionism Betweenthe Wars' op. cit. p99. My emphasis.
22SeeMinisjjy of Labour Gazettefor the relevant years.In 1928the number of days lost
fell to 1,390,000.
23Referenceto'Problems of the New Policy in Britain', an article sent to the Cl in July
1928(Dutt Papers,BL); although Dutt wrote severalarticles making this point. For
anotherexampleseeInpreco I March 1928.
24SeeL. J. Macfarlane,The British Communist Party op. cit. p168.

52

In his autobiographyNew Horizons, Jack Murphy gives an entertaining, if

important,
slightly self
account of Moscow's position. Murphy, the British
representativeon the ECCI, met with a Russiandelegation that included
Stalin and Bukharin to discussthe situation. He suggestedthat too harsh a
tone of criticism was "calculated to rupture the Anglo-Russian Trade
Union Unity Committee, thereby strengtheningthe position of the [British]
Governmentwhich was aiming to break off relations with Russia." Stalin,
who according to Murphy admitted the committee'scollapsewas probable,
"quietly proceededto analyseour points of criticism and give the reasons
for the Russiandecision to deal so sharply with the British trade union
leaders." Stalin felt the CPGB approachedthe question with "too formal a
viewpoint" and suggestedthat "sometimesit was necessaryto break with
formalities, especially when they had ceasedto have any real value to the
Such a responsewas consistentwith the view outlined by
working class.1125
Bukharin at the Fifteenth Conferenceof the Soviet Communist Party. The
existenceof formal relations betweenthe British and Soviet unions
insisted Bukharin, was less important than the relationship betweenthe
workers; which Bukharin believed to be tightening. Even so, like Stalin,
Bukharin favoured the maintenanceof the Anglo-Russian committee.26

Such factors demonstratethe importancethe Communist Party plated on

the eventsof May 1926.Not only had the General Strike revealedthe'true
face' of the reformist labour leadership,but the working class had shown it
could be effectively mobilised. At the Eighth Congressof the CPGB, held
in Batterseaon 16-17 August 1926,the Party declaredthat the "General
Strike and the mining lock-out have awakenedthe class consciousnessof

25J.T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. pp226-230.

261OLecorr 4 November 1926. See also L. T. Lah, O. V. Naumov, 0. V. Khlevniuk,
Stalin's Letters to Molotov (New Haven, 1995). pp 106-107.

53

the rank and file workers who are moving to the left. " The 'classcooperation'of the GeneralCouncil and the'left wing phrasemongers'was
condemned,and although the Party maintainedits belief that the trade
union apparatuscould still be 'won over', it neverthelessaffirmed "that the
classstruggle in Britain has enteredinto a new phasein which the efforts
of the working classto defend itself must bring the working class
forcing
it
into
to
the
class,
ever sharperconflict with
capitalist
movement
realise that the only way to completevictory is the destructionof the
capitalist stateand its replacementby a workers' statebasedon the mass
organisationsof the workers.1127

ii) The International

While the CPGB instinctively 'turned leffin the wake of the General
Strike, the Communist International begana more theoretical realignment
in late 1926.At the SeventhPlenum of the ECCI, Bukharin outlined three
phasesof post-war development,the third of which was one of ever
sharperclass struggle stemmingfrom the "internal contradictions of the
processof... [capitalist] stabilisation ... coming out in ever sharperform."
Significantly, a principal characteristicof such a developmentwas the
radicalisation of the working class.28

The basis for such an observationwas detailed at the Fifteenth Conference

of the Soviet CommunistParty in October 1926,where Bukharin noted
that while certain capitalist countrieswere expanding,others like Britain,
were in obvious decline. He reasonedthis with a "differentiated" analysis,
'types'
into
divided
the
world
six
wherein the 'revolutionary
was
whereby

27The Eig-hth Congess of the Communist

Resolutions (London, 1926).
281npreco 20 December 1926.

Pagy of Great Britain:

54

_Reports

Theses and

in
differed
This
acknowledgeda perceived swing to the left
each.
situation'
by workers in certain countries,while recognising also the (temporary)
in
Such
'capitalist
others.
an equilibrium was
stabilisation'
continuation of
however, Bukharin suggesteddialectically, characterisedby 'internal
contradictions'that actually intensified classantagonismsand thus
"We
for
Communist
Parties
to
may
exploit.
engenderedconditions ripe
is
"that
Bukharin
to
the
now
capitalism
conclusion"
reasoned,
come
approachingthe conclusion of its period of reconstruction.1129

The determinantsfor Bukharin's theory came from a number of sources.

As N.N. Kozlov and E.D. Weitz have demonstrated,the developmentof
capitalism in Germanywas central to Bukharin's perspective.30Although
Germanywas advancingtechnologically, economic relations in the
Weimar Republic were deteriorating by the mid-twenties. Subsequently,
sectionsof the KPD began,in the words of L Peterson,"to demanda more
aggressivestrike strategyagainstemployers ... and the repressivereaction
of the labour union leadersto the growth in support for the communist
opposition convincedmany KPD leadersthat it should adopt a policy of
leading grassrootseconomicmovements even if this meant
...
confiontation with the labour unions."31

Weitz has also demonstratedthat divisions in the German labour

"The
SPID's
leading
Weimar
intensified
the
throughout
period.
movement

291nprecorr 4 November 1926.

30N. N. Kozlov and E. D. Weitz, ' Reflections on the Origins of the'Third
Period':
Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany. 'In Journal of
Contemporary HistoKy July 1989.
31L. Peterson, 'From Social Democracy to Communism:
Recent Contributions
to the
1914-1945. 'In International
Labour and
History of the German Workers' Movement,
Working Class Histojy No. 20 198 1. Also quoted in K. McDermott
and J. Agnew, The
Comintern: A Histojy of the International Communism
from Lenin to Stalin (London,
1996). p72.

55

role in the Weimar system... meantthat the police forces with which the
communistscameinto conflict were often under the commandof social
democrats,making coalitions even with other labour parties almost
hostility
intense
The
toward social democracyhad
unthinkable.
communist
its origins therefore

in the hard experienceof physical conflict in

...

politicised spaces."32The influence of the KPD within the Comintern was

substantialand Bukharin's analysis of the 'international situation' was
effectively a theoretical balancing act that acknowledgedsuch pressure,
whilst maintaining his own belief that the period of capitalist stabilisation
was not universally resolved.

Events in Britain similarly influenced Bukharin's perspective.The General

Strike motivated the ECCI dialectician to declarethat:
Our international policy, in view of the specific international situation, which has
enrichedus with the experiencesof the English strike and the great transformationsin the
English proletariat, must now passon to the next stageof progress
[The English
...
working class] can no longer be retardedin its revolutionary developmentnow that the
chief basisbetweenthe English bourgeoisieand the working class has disappeared.
English capitalism, more than any other capitalism, is confronted with its imminent
collapse.33

It was in Britain for instance, that Bukharin saw "more than in any other
country in Europe ... a direct revolutionary situation developing. "34The
British workers, once "the most conservative force in the European labour
movement, " were now the "vanguard of the European working class."35In
such a situation the CPGB was called upon to expose 'ruthlessly' the
reformism of the trade union and Labour Party leadership, while
intensifying its agitation inside the trade unions. The emphasis of the

32E. D Weitz, Creating German Communism

331npreco 4 November 1926.
341npreco 3 December 1926.
351bid.

op. cit. p 187.

56

CPGB's 'united front! work was thus switched from 'above' to 'below'; a
strategythat was evident also with regard to the Anglo-Russian Trade
Union Unity Committee.

As noted above,the Committee remainedan integral part of both Soviet

and Comintern policy. However, the GeneralStrike revealedthe
limitations of "mutual aid betweenthe two countries." Not only was the
Soviet offer of monetary aid refusedby the GeneralCouncil during the
miners lock-out, but the severecriticism of the TUC leadershipunleashed
by Mikhail Tomsky (Presidentof the Soviet Trade Unions) and members
of the CPGB following the strike's demise,souredthe relationship
permanently.Thus, the Soviet position shifted so as to "remain in the
Anglo-Soviet [sic] Committee,for the sake of contact with the massesof
the British workers, without restricting in any way our right to criticise any
action by the GeneralCouncil."36

Due to British imperial interests, the CPGB was also closely connected to
the revolutionary possibilities emerging in the East during the 1920S.37
Events in China had forced the ECCI to reassessits political strategy, as
the communist alliance with the Kuomingtang became increasingly
CI
he
While
Chiang
Shek
Kai
support,
welcomed
entangled.
simultaneously ensured that communist influence within China was
severely limited. 38Consequently, while the Comintern remained
committed to the united front, there was (non-Trotskyist) pressure from

36CodedTelegram from Molotov to Stalin I June 1926.In L. T Lih, ON. Naumov,

and
ON. Khlevniuk, Stalin's Letters to Molotov op. cit. pp 106-7. Stalin agreed.(p 109.)
37TheParty mounted a dedicated'Handsoff China! campaignin the following
months
and much of its associatedliterature tackled the issueof imperialism.
381nMay 1926,Chiang orderedthe expulsion of communistsfrom all
senior positions.

57

sectionsof both the ChineseCP, and Voitinsky within the ECCI, for a
looseningof the alliance with Chiang.39

Finally, the gradualist nature of Soviet policy in the USSR, most obviously
the NEP, was coming in for criticism by 1926,and Bukharin accordingly
outlined a turn in policy towards increasedproduction, new enterprise,and
technological advancement.Although Bukharin's policy was in no way as
extremeas that advocatedby Russianleft wingers such as Preobrazensky
(or indeedTrotsky), the move towards a more centrally planned,proindustrial economydid mark a subtle 'left turn' in Bukharin's outlook, and
can in part be attributed to the pressurefor a more radical policy gaining
eminencewithin the Soviet Union.40

Thus, within the CPGB and wider sectionsof the international communist
movement,the strategicand theoretical basisof communist policy was
coming into question.While this did not lead inevitably to an overhaul of
Comintern practice, the sharpercondemnationof labour-socialistsand
social democrats;the increasingly tenuousnature of the 'united front from
above'; and the innate desirewithin a revolutionary movementfor
revolutionary policy (most obviously expressedwithin the KPD), all
servedto push the Comintern to the left. The eventsof the following year
could only augmentsuch a development.

The Left Turn Consolidated

39M. Weiner, 'Comintern in EastAsia, 1919-39.' In K. McDennott

and J. Agnew, The
Comintern op. cit. ppl58-190. Seealso R. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chines
Communist Pqr!y 1928-1931 (Washington, 1969).
40Forfurther details, seeE.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, Foundations
of a Planned
Economy, 1926-1929 2 vols. (Great Britain, 1969).Also, R.W. Davies, The Socialis
Offensive 1929-1930: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture (London, 1980).
pp440.

58

Although, as Keith Laybourn has argued,the General Strike should not be

seenas a'watershed'in industrial relations,41the aftermath of May 1926
certainly exacerbateddifferencesalready existent within the British labour
movement.This sectionwill examinehow the more radical perspectiveof
the CPGB and Cl was affirmed by British and international events
throughout 1927.

For the CPGB, the harder line adoptedat the Eight Party Congresswas
justified by a perceivedpolarisation in the British labour movement.On
the one hand, the Party claimed to discern a notable radicalisation of the
working class,including the 'left rank and file' inside the Labour Party and
trade union movement.On the other, however, the Party detailed an
offensive againstthe workers, carried out under the auspicesof the
capitalist state in conjunction with the Labour Party and TUC bureaucracy.
The Party portrayedthe militancy of the working class in a number ways;
the solid supportgiven to the GeneralStrike, the emergenceof an
organisedLeft Wing Movement inside the Labour Party, the expansionof
the Minority Movement, and the numerical growth of the CP itself. Linked
to this was the Party'sexpectationthat the events of May 1926and the
revelation of the 'true character'of the reformist leaders,would allow the
workers to recognisethe Communist Party as the only true representative
of the working class.

There was some credence to the Party's outlook. Party membership had
grown to 11,127 by December 1926,42with substantial increases in South
Wales, Scotland, Sheffield and Tyneside. Furthermore, the 'treachery' of
the labour leaders had pushed several thousand workers, particularly
41K. Laybourn, A Histo!y of British Trade Unionism
op. cit. pp 139-143.
42PagyMembershipFigures June 1925-September1927. Klugmarm Papers.

59

miners, into the CPGB. Margaret McCarthy, Will Paynter,FredaUtley,

Reg Groves, and Tom Thomashave all detailed how the General Strike
and miners' lock-out convinced them to join the CPGB.43Thomas,writing
in 1977,recalled how he "left [the Labour Party] becauseof the way the
GeneralStrike had beenbetrayed.I could not continue under the
MacDonald leadership so I joined the... CommunistParty, and
...
remainedin it for severalyears."44While the majority of new recruits
proved to be more transient membersthan Thomas (who developedthe
Workers'Theatre Movement), the increasein membershipundoubtedly
enthusedand encouragedthe CPGB.

The extensionof left wing activity inside the Labour Party also bolstered
communist expectations.Left Wing groups had been forming within the
Labour Party since 1924,primarily in responseto the perceivedright wing
policy of the leadership,but also in opposition to action taken against
communist Labour members.The Labour Executive had taken various
measuresto restrict communist activity within the party, ranging from the
rejection of CommunistParty affiliation and a block on communist
membersacting as national or local representativesof the Labour Party, to
the denial of individual membership.The GeneralStrike encouragedthe
continued organisationof the Left Wing, and in September1926the first
conferenceof the National Left Wing Movement (NLWM) was held in
London.

43W. Paynterin My Generation

op. cit. pp33-34. M. McCarthy in Generationin Revolt
op. cit. pp66-69. F. Utley, Lost Illusion (London, 1949). pp I 1-12. R. Groves, The
Balham Group (London, 1974).pp 15-16.
44T.Thomas, 'A PropertylessTheatrefor PropertylessClass' In HistoEyWorkshop
a
Journal No. 4 1977.Reprinted in R. Samuel,E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove,BLeatresof the
Left op. cit. p79.

60

The very existenceof the NLWM seemedto bear out the CPs vision of a
filling
NLWM
labour
the
with
communists
and
movement,
polarised
leadershipand a CP sponsorednewspaperacting as its mouthpiece
(SundU Worker),45the Party was intrinsically linked to its development.
The SecondAnnual Conferencein September1927was attendedby 54
local Labour Partiesrepresenting150,000members,46and with 90 Left
Wing groups acrossthe country, R.W. Robsoncould justifiably inform the
Party leadershipthat "the active rank and file in the Labour Party are more
47
As
Wing
Left
activity.
closely connectedwith communists" as a result of
The Communist boastedin 1927; "from being a movementmainly
confined to London, the Left Wing, has ... developedinto a powerful
national force, which is causingthe right wing Labour bureaucracymore
and more anxiety and alarm."48

As for the National Minority Movement, the number of workers the

from
200,000
in
in
1924
956,000
to
to
rose
represent
movementclaimed
1926,although individual membershipamountedto just 3,460.49The
Fourth Minority Movement Conferencein 1927saw a further increasein
the number of delegatesfrom the metal and transport industries, and the
1926MM's
throughout
TUC
to
the
the
existence
gave
mounting concern
29 was a compliment to the relatively tiny CPGB. Moreover, as Roderick
Martin has demonstrated,the antagonismthat existed betweenthe MM
in
the
trade
mainstream
and
union movementwidened the months

45The headquarters

of the NLWM was Gray's Inn Road, London, home of the CP

initiated Sunday Worker.
4613etween the Fifth and Sixth Congress 1924-1928 CPGB 1928.
47Minutes of the Central Committee
of the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 14-15 May
1927. Klugmann Papers.
48The Communist August 1927. Cited in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essays
op. cit.
pl8l.
49Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist P=
of Great Britain 31 December
1926. Klugmann Papers.

61

following the GeneralStrike, with the MM exuding "new vigour" in its

work, concertedlyorganising factional activity and mobilising the militant
opposition at the annual TUC. 50

This 'new vigour'was first evidencedat the Third Annual Conferenceof

the MM in August 1926.Although condemnationof the TUC General
Council was deliberately restrainedat the conferenceso as not to threaten
the Anglo-Russian Committee, the organisationalstructureof the MM
was overhauled,and more radical political objectives were unveiled in
accordancewith the increasingly militant perspectiveemanatingfrom CP
headquartersin King Street.GeorgeHardy of the MM Executive
Committee declaredthat "the Minority Movement is entering a new phase
in its work. " Where previously the MM had organiseditself as an
ideologically broad militant movementthat campaignedfor a radical trade
union policy within the official trade union organisation,the August
conferencetransformedthe movementinto a more co-ordinatedpressure
group, aiming to gain political control of the trade union apparatus.A new
leadershipwas elected,with Harry Pollitt as Secretary.The movement's
structurewas further centralised.And the conferenceresolved to form MM
factions in every possibleareaof the trade union structurewith the
intention of gaining "control of the existing unions, to transform them into
real classwar organisations."51

Such developmentswere due, in part, to the on-going processof

'Bolshevisation' then underway throughout the Comintern, and the
reorganisation of the MM augmented the CPGB's growing separation from

SOR.
Martin,CommunismandtheBritish TradeUnionsop. cit. p82-83.

51Report of the Third Annual Conferenceof the National Minorily Movement August
1926.

62

the mainstreamlabour movement.In the context of the General Strike

however, the 'new phase'of the MM also necessitatedmore radical
objectives.No longer would the MM merely advocatea militant trade
union policy, it would systematicallyendeavourto apply such a policy by
securingactual control of the leadership.Essentially, the MM had become
an organisationwithin an organisation.Furthermore,the 'conciliatory'
attitude shown towards the trade union leadershipby the MM in the wake
the GeneralStrike was soon rectified. In November 1926,The Worker
renouncedthe MM's concernthat criticism of the trade union leadership
would damagethe miners' struggle. Instead, "merciless criticism and
exposureof the manoeuvresof the new consolidatedtrade union
bureaucracy"was to become"one of the foremost tasks in the struggle for
revolutionising the British trade union movement.1152

From such a perspective,the CPGB was able to detect a protracted

militancy within the labour movementthrough which an "organised
revolutionary opposition movement,centredaround the political
leadershipof the Communist Party" could develop.53The masseswere
seento be moving, in Andrew Rothstein'swords, from "political passivity
to political activity. "54Even the communist led National Unemployed
Workers' Committee Movement (NUWCM), which had been in decline
since the successfulcampaignsof the early twenties, appearedto be
regrouping.55

52TheWorker 19 November 1926.

53LabourMonthly February 1927.This commentwas in particular relation to the
NLWM.
54Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 14-15 May
1927.Klugmann Papers
55SeeR. Croucher, We Refuseto Starve in Silence
op. cit. p87.

63

The plight of the miners and the appearanceof the BlanesburghReport

in
1927.
A
NUWCM
focus
definite
the
to
widespread
point of
gave a
hated
'not
included
(which
the
genuinely
the
report
campaignagainst
And
face
TUC
in
launched
the
opposition.
a
of
seekingwork! clause)was
N_LJWCMsponsoredmarch from South Wales to London, in recognition of
the out of work miners, was supportedby thousandsof unemployed
in
Trafalgar
demonstration
huge
in
latter
The
culminated a
workers.
Squareon 20 November 1927,and small but hard-fought concessionswere
the
56
Labour
Party
However,
trade
of
acceptance
union
and
secured.
BlanesburghReport (and the subsequentUnemployment Bill), onceagain
labour
CPGB
breach
between
the
the
the
wider
and
revealed growing
movement.The contrastingattitudes (and response)to the report merely
in
labour
leadership
'treachery'
the
the
the
of
official
apparent
underlined
57
it
indicative
and
was
of such mounting
minds of communist supporters,
tension that the Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) of the TUC and the
NUWCM was dissolved in mid 1927.

While the CPGB perceivedthe workers and sectionsof the militant left to
have radicalised in the wake the GeneralStrike, the representativesof the
be
to
the
to
labour
moving
seen
movementwere simultaneously
official
"the
to
leadership
The'reformist!
crushing
was committed
right.
labour
the
Marxist
that
movement
within
existed
nucleus"
revolutionary
Dutt later wrote, echoing R.W. Robson'sreport to the PB in May 1927.59

56W. Hannington, Unemployed Struggles 1919-1936 (London, 1977,reprint). pp 154168.

57SeeHannington'spamphlet,The Meaning of the BlanesburghRepo (London, 1927).
And, Workers' Life 6 May 1927.
58LabourMonthly September1928.Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Great Britain 14-15 May 1927.Klugmarm Papers.Robson outlined a
poMsation within the Labour Movement where a'sharpening class struggle'was evident
betweenthe workers and the bureaucracy.Robsonalso noted the latter's 'offensive'
againstthe CP.

64

But the basis for such reasoningrelated to far more than the 'betrayal' of
May 1926,and was supportedby a seriesof measuresundertakento limit
or indeed 'crush' communist influence within the labour movement.

Following the TUC's denunciationof militant action in 1926,numerous

measureswere taken by the various trade union bureaucraciesto restrict
the influence of communistsinside the union apparatus.The NUGMW
declaredmembershipof the MM or CPGB to be 'inconsistent'with 'loyal
attachment'to the union, and a number of its memberswho had attended
an MM meeting againstthe orders of the union executivewere later
disqualified. By 1927,the union insisted that no communist or memberof
the Minority Movement could hold an official position within the
NUGMW, and C.J. Moody (a communist memberof the union leadership)
was suspendedalong with severalother militant trade unionists.

The AEU meanwhile, blocked the payment of affiliation fees to the

Minority Movement, and warned local branchesagainstsending delegates
to MM conferences.Similarly, the Boilermakers' Union voted to deny
communiststhe right to act as union delegates.Elsewhere,the NUR and
the TGWU sought to block correspondencebetweenthe MM and local
union branches;the Painters' Union ruled affiliation to the MM out of
bounds; and both the Printers and the ShopAssistants' union deniedCP or
MM membersthe right to standfor official union positions. Even the
MFGB, arguably the most militant trade union, condemnedthe activities
of the communistsand the MM at its Annual Conferencein 1928.

Where the MM continued to wield an influence, as in the National Union

of Boot and Shoe Operatives, extraordinary measures were granted to the
union executive to arrest communist infiltration. Minority Movement

65

holding
debarred
from
official positions within the union,
memberswere
local brancheswere forced to sign a declarationdenying affiliation to
communist organisations,and the leaderof the Leather Workers MM,
G.W. Chandler,was expelled.59

Communist influence within the tradescouncils was also targeted.In

February 1927,the TUC withdrew recognition of those tradescouncils
affiliated to (or associatedwith) the MM. This struck a major blow against
for
Council
influence.
Trades
The
London
a significant areaof communist
example,had included five membersof the MM on its Executive of twelve
in 1926.60

Such measureshave beenlisted in a number of studiesof the CPGB, yet

their relevanceto the Party's adoption of a more militant perspectivehas
61
The
CPGB
been
acknowledged.
regardedthe manoeuvres
adequately
not
be
bureaucracies
to
the
symptomatic of the growing'class
union
various
of
formed
fundamental
basis
'offensive'
the
the
a
of the
scopeof
struggle', and
new Party line in 1928.With the Party's accessto the various unions and
tradescouncils severelyrestricted,the CP was forced to assumea more
independentposition prior to the adoption of the New Line.

59EdwardPountneyof the National AmalgamatedUnion of Shop Assistants,

Warehousemenand Clerks suffered a similar fate. SeeE. Pountney,Autobiographical
Transcript. Communist Archive, and E. Pountney,Unpublished Minority Movement
Pamphlet.Communist Archive. Also, Verbatim Report of an Interview BetweenMr. S.
Purkis and the Executive Committee of the RCA (Railway Clerks Association 3 March
1929.Pollard-JohnsonCollection.
60j. Vaughan,R. Pountney,F. Smith, T. Quelch and W. Hannington. The CP had also
beenresponsiblefor the establishmentof a National Federationof TradesCouncils in
1923.
61SeeR. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op. cit. pp93-101. N.
Branson,Histoly of the CommunistPa!V of Great Britain op. cit. pp I l- 15. L. J.
Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa op. cit. pp243-46.

66

In effect, the trade union leadership sought to exclude all communist and
associated groupings from the official labour movement. And when the
measures undertaken by the General Council are considered next to the
TUC's withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian Committee in September
1927, the offensive against the MM/CP (and communism generally) can
be regarded as an efficacious one. Add to this the advent of 'industrial
peace' and the Mond-Turner talks held by TUC and employers
representatives in January 1928, and it becomes clear that the 'new spirit'62
within the hierarchy of the labour movement fermented the 'intensifying
class struggle' determined by the CPGB.

This was similarly reflected at the 1926Labour Party Conference,which

exudedan overall tone of conciliation and moderation.63Not only was the
GeneralStrike dismissedas an unrealistic industrial weapon, but the
disaffiliation of local Labour Partiesand tradescouncils linked to the
CPGB - outlined a year earlier in Liverpool - was re-emphasised.
Although thesemeasureswere criticised by communistsand left wingers
defeated
Frank
Jackson,
Southall
their
Joseph
challenge
was
and
such as
disaffiliated
from
had
been
branches
local
by
the
1929,27
easily, and
Labour Party. Meanwhile, thoseLabour locals that wished to avoid
disaffiliation were forced to severtheir ties with both the NLWM and the
CPGB. Communistswho were individual membersof the Labour Party
were also targeted,and although the CP maintaineda presenceat the
Labour Party Conferencein 1928,the measurestaken in Birmingham that
year -a loyalty clausethat outlawed the election of communist trade union
delegates,and the debarring of Labour membersfrom sharing a platform

62K. Laybourn, A Histoly of Trade Unionism op. cit. p 143.

63See J. Klugmann, Histoly
of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain
details of Robert Williams' presidential address.

67

op. cit. p279, for

last
inNLWM
the
CP
the
off
communist
sealed
with
and
- effectively
roads into the Labour Party.64

It was not just within the labour movementthat the CPGB perceivedthere
to be an offensive againstthe working classhowever. The Party could also
'intensifying
its
justify
Government
class
to
an
to
of
claims
action
point
disdain,
CPGB
had
'
The
the
and
traditionally
with
regarded
state
struggle.
the GeneralStrike servedonly to reinforce such an attitude. As Richard
Thurlow has recently suggested,the British state'sview of communism
little
in
law
terms
or no
with
order,
of
and
was approachedvery much
the
the
which
within
understandingof
political, social, economic context
Party operated.65Subsequently,the General Strike was perceivedas a
for
in
the
to
quo,
status
resulting
mounting
pressure
militant challenge
direct action againstthe left in all its guises.In relation to the CPGB,
for
been
had
the
links
Moscow
to
a
constant
source
of
consternation
whose
Comintern
Joynson-Hicks
the
William
Sir
saw
strike
as
a
secretservices,
Council,
General
TUC
the
with the unemployedemerging
to
plot capture
imagination
leaps
the
Although
Army.
fledgling
Red
of
amazing
such
as a
disruption
the
the
caused
throughout
apparatus,
state
were not consistent
by the General Strike meantthe Governmentset out immediately to ensure
that such a situation could never occur again.66

In June,the Lord Chancellor laid out various restrictive measuresdesigned

to limit the power of the labour movement,including the compulsory
1906
Trades
the
the
trade
of
amendment
auditing of
union accounts,

64Fora comprehensiveoverview, seeN. Branson,Histoly of the Communist Pam of

Great Britain op. cit. pp4-11.
65R.Thurlow, The SecretState.British Internal Securijy in the Twentieth Centu!y (Great
Britain, 1995).p 145.
661bid.

68

Disputes Act, and the requestfor legal notice to be given before strikes
followed,
Bill
Mines
the
Coal
The
suspending
soon
were undertaken.
Act
Union
Trade
in
April
1927,
day.
And
the
outlawed the
seven-hour
included
that
The
Act
General
Strike.
provisions
numerous
policy of
infringed trade union practice. Theseincluded limiting the rights of
TUC,
from
to
the
debarring
and
affiliating
civil serviceunions
picketing,
transforming the payment of the trade union levy by substituting
'contacting in' for'contracting out'. For Palme Dutt, the Bill was the second
'signpost to the new era' (the other being the GeneralStrike), and in
it
the
'industrial
TUC's
the
talk
constituted
of
peace'
conjunction with
"most smashingattack" on the working class, "eclipsing the General
...
Strike

into
in
henceforth
Britain
transforming
the
social situation
and

...
increasingly open conflict betweenthe capitalist dictatorship and working
classrevolution.1167

Such a 'smashingattack' had beenprecededby more 'grassroots' action.

Prior to the GeneralStrike, the CP leadershiphad been arrestedand
1926
May
the
throughout
succeedingmonths, communists
and
and
gaoled,
branches
Party
Local
for
were
targets
victimisation.
were conspicuous
has
thousand
historian
that
communists
a
over
estimated
raided, and one
in
General
Strike,
the
in
the
often
period of
were arrested and around
distributing
or
of
producing
the
charge
connectionwith
seemingly minor
in
68
bulletins.
As
chapterone, communistsand
noted
militant strike
lost
in
the
workplace,
as
employers
militant workers were also victimised
known
"To
become
in
time
themselves
as
workers.
ridding
of'difficulf
no
67LabourMonthly May 1927.The languageusedby Dutt was particularly interesting
fascism.
he
'
beginning
that
the
that
the
preached'social
of
period
was
writing
at
given
"The leadersof international fascism fare] striking from the seatof power of decaying
British capitalism," he wrote.
68A. J. Davies, To Build a New Jerusalem.The British Labour Pg!!Y from Keir Hardie to
Tony Blai (London, 1996).p157.

69

'Red' on the averagejob" recalled Douglas Hyde in his autobiography,

"meant that, at the first opportunity, you would be dismissed."69And
historical
impossible
to
memoirs
and
various
gather,
although numbersare
inflicted
illustrate
the
againstmilitant
arbitrary measures
studies
acutely
70
Strike.
General
in
the
the
the
wake of
membersof
working class

On an international scale,the communist perspectivewas augmentedby

the deteriorationof Anglo-Soviet relations. On 12 May 1927,the British
Governmentraided the offices of ARCOS, the Russiantrade delegationin
London; and the subsequentespionagechargesmadeby the Baldwin
administration led to the severing of diplomatic relations.71
Simultaneously,the Soviet embassyin Peking was raided, while British
troops were dispatchedto Shanghai- on the pretenceof protecting British
property - in order to halt the advancingNationalist offensive. For the
Soviet Union, suchmeasureswere the prelude to war, and throughout the
Third Period the threat of 'imperialist aggression'featuredprominently in
the pronouncementsof the CPGB and the Comintern.72

The Trade Union Act, the 'social democratic'discipline of the Labour

Party, the TUC offensive againstcommunistsand the Minority Movement,
the rationalisation of industry, and the collapse of Anglo-Soviet relations,
69D.Hyde, I Believed (London, 1950).p2470Forexamplessee,A. Campbell, 'The Communist Party in the ScotsCoal Fields in the
Inter-War Period' op. cit. Campbell quotesDavid Proudfoot, a leading Communist in
Fife, as saying in 1927that, "others were failing to put in an appearanceat the Party
meetingsbecauseof the bright and handy idea that membershipof the Party is the reason
for them not being employed." Seealso C.J. Wrigley, '1926, Social Costs of the Mining
Dispute', in Histoly Today November 1984. pp5-10.
71Duttreferred to the raid as "lawless bandit outrage" and linked it to the perceived
offensive againstthe working class in Britain. Labour Monthly June 1927.
72SeeWorkers'Life 3 June 1929. Labour Monthly and The Communist June 1927.Also
articles such as T. Bell, 'The Communist Partiesand the War Danger' in The Communist
July 1927.C. Dutt, 'War Preparationsand the TUC' in Labour Monthly September1927.
W. Gallacher,'Facing the War Makers' in Labour Monthly August 1929.And A.
Rothstein's'PreparingWar on Soviet Russiain Labour Monthly September1929.

70

were all regarded by the CPGB as evidence of sharpening class struggle.

The questionthat soondivided the British CommunistPartyhowever,was

how should the CPGB respond?

A New Policy?
The severance of British-Sovict

debacle
tile
worsening
ever
and
relations

in China, where Chiang Kai Slick's continued repression of the CU

have
in
in
1927,
April
Shanghai
the
culminated
massacre of communists
traditionally

been presented as tile cause of the left tuni within the

Comintern. 73 In reality however, such events augmented a move to tile left

already apparent from late 1926, and in many ways justified the rationale
behind it. The transition from theory to practice engendered by Bukharin's
speech to the ECCI Plenum in November 1926 was however, a anornalous
one. Contrasting interpretations as to the extent and meaning of the
encroaching Third Period clearly obstructed the development of a cogent
Comintern policy, and the practical modifications

that initially

innovations
Bukharin's
were confused and
theoretical
complimented
uncertain.

In Germany, where enthusiasm for a stronger line towards social

democracy was perhaps most intense, the KPD immediately complimented
the ECCI's hardened rhetoric. At the Eleventh Congress of the German
Communist Party in January 1927, Ernst Thtilmann announced that the left
development
leflward
SPD
had
become
"obstacle
the
to
the
of
within
an
the social democratic workers, " and went on to stress the "necessity of

73ForexampleseeE.11.Carr and R.W. Davies,Foundationsof P lllinncd Economyop.

(revisededition) op. cit. pp383-406and It. Martin,
cit. pp56-57.Also 1. Dcutschcr,
_Stalin
Communismand the British TradeUnion op. cit. pp102-105.

71

fighting the 'left' leadersas the main enemy within the SPD."74Although
the final congressresolution differentiated between the left SPD members
and tile party leadership, tile majority of the KPD supported Thalmann's
hard-line position. 75And yet, the KPD was not certain enough of the ECCI
position to initiate a distinct break from the existent Party policy.

In France too, Jules Humbert Droz, a close comrade of Bukharin and tile
ECCI's representativeon tile French Communist Party, took steps to adapt
PCF policy to Comintem ideology. Both Zinoviev and Bukharin had
castigated the PCF for its 'right tendencies' at the Sixth Plenum of tile
Communist International in early 1926,76and Humbert Droz consequently
encouraged the French CP to sever its electoral alliance with the'Bloc des
Gouche.' In premonition of the divisive conflict that later tormented the
CPGB, the policy - named'class against class'- was tile centre of a
PCF.
Although
debate
heated
the majority of the
the
within
protracted and
French Party leadership resisted Humbert Droz's initiative, the new line
in
included
March
Bukharin
by
ECCI
that
commission
was endorsed an
1927.77While convinced of the need to overhaul tile policy of the PCF
however, the fact that the debate endured through to November suggests
its
'new
line.
'
ECCI
the
of
to
extent
that the
remained uncertain as

The debate surrounding the PCF revealed that controversies over the

developmentof communistpolicy wereevidentearly in 1927.Moreover,

it is apparentthat discussionswithin the higher echelonsof the

74B. Fov%-kcs,
Communism in Gumany under the Wcimar Rqpublic (London, 1984).
p142.
75K. Mcdermott and J. Agnew. 'l-be Comijit
op. cit., pp7l-72.
76T. Draper. 'Me Strange Case the Comintcm-' In Survey Surnincr 1972. pp9l-137.
of
Bukharin said, "the central danger in France is the right danger."
771bid.Also, E. Mortimcr, -nic Rise of the French Conlullnist Party 1920-1947 (London,
1984). pp 131-138.

72

Internationalhad also stretchedbeyondelectoraltactics and political

theory. In a letter to the Italian leaderTogliatti, Humbert Droz revealed
that pressurefor a more radical 'left turn' was mounting. In particular
Losovsky, who headedthe Red Internationalof Labour Unions (RILU),
was reputedly battling with the ECCI over the possibility of establishing
communist led 'Red' tradeunions.78

The Eighth Plenumof the ECCI, held betweenthe 13 and 30 May 1927,
offered a glimpse of future political realignments.Again however,there
was scantevidenceof any forthcomingpractical amendmentsto existing
Comintern policy. Certainly the primary focus of the Plenumwas centred
upon the non-Party left, and the "exposure"of such "lackeys of the
reactionarybureaucracy"(who the Comintern labelled "our greatest
enemy") was listed as a'most urgent'task of the Communist
International.79In addition, conceptsthat would becomecentral to the
Third Period, such as the 'sharpeningclassstruggle,' the 'rapprochement'of
social democracyand the capitalist class,and the 'fascist methods'of
capitalist rule, were all inclusive in the Plenumresolutions.80However, a
distinct 'new line' with which to approachthe 'new period' was noticeably
absent.Subsequently,the CPGB continuedto apply a policy that mingled
militant rhetoric with a limited practical agenda,thus revealing a number
of differing opinions within the CPGB, aswell as disparitiesbetweenthe
Party and the Cl.

78T. Draper, 'The Strange Case

131.
Comintern'
cit.
p
the
op.
of
791npreco 23 June 1927. 'Resolution
'
The
CPGB.
Tasks
the
the
reference noted
of
on
18 August 1927.
above related to the ILP. Inpreco
80'Resolution of the Eighth Plenum
in
Great Britain. ' In The
Situation
ECCI
the
the
on
of
Ninth Congress of the Communist PA!jy of Great Britain (London, 1927).

73

The first open disagreement occurred in October 1926, in the form of

an
article written for the Communist International by Robin Page Amot and
Jack Murphy. 81The article, pointedly endorsed by the ECCI, brought
attention to Nacillations to the right in the ranks of the British Communist
Party or rather in its leadership." These included the failure to criticise
adequately the role of the 'sham left' during and after the General Strike;
undue concern over the severity of Tomsky's criticism of the TUC General
Council; 82the failure to expose the'right errors'of A. J Cook; and the
portrayal of the Bournemouth TUC as a'step backwards'. "The British
Communist Party has spoken a language much less clear than the Russian
trade unions" wrote Murphy and Page Arnot, "in particular [the CPGB]
adopted a mild attitude towards the "lefts" of the Purcell type, although
these "left" leaders had moved to the right, to an alliance with Thomas."
The MM conference was held up as an example of these 'right
vacillations', and Murphy and Page Arnot insisted that the Bournemouth
TUC represented a "step forward" in terms of the militancy shown by the
working class rank and file. 83

The sharpertone that emergedfrom Murphy, PageAmot and the ECCI

echoedthat of PalmeDutt, who in the 1920Swas the most acute
'Cominternreader'in the CPGB. Dutt was married to the Finnish
Otto
Salme
Murrik
with
particularly
revolutionary
whosecontacts,
Kuusinen, led her to the heartof the ECCI's 'inner sanctum.' As Kevin
81Murphy was the British secretariat'srepresentativeon the ECCI, and PageArnot was a
memberof the Cl's Agit Prop section in Moscow.
82TheComintern'sinfluence can be seenheredue to the fact that Murphy had beenone
of thoseopposedto such criticisms - as evidencedby his conversationwith Stalin
describedabove.
83TheCommunistInternational 15 October 1926.The CPGB'sreply was publishedin
The CommunistInternational30 October 1926.The Executive deniedit had neglected
criticism of Cook, and soughtto compromisebetweenthe varying interpretationsof the
TUC. The matter of the Russiantrade unions was acceptedhowever, althoughthe CC
pointed out that Murphy sharedin this 'error.'

74

Morgan has shown, Salmeplayed a hiddenbut significant role in the

CPGB,84and althoughDutt's influenceon the 'average'CP membershould
not be exaggerated,his unique location and his contactwith the'inner
sanctum'of the ECCI, enabledhim to offer a reliable guide to the varying
currentsof the Comintern.85

Dutt had struck a typically militant tone immediately following the

GeneralStrike, even going so far as to "question whetherthe apparatus
...
of the [trade union] movementis fitted for such a generalstruggle.t'86
Although his analysiswas temperedby the line of the EM,

Dutt

consistentlyadopteda position that pre-emptedCPGB'sanalysisof the

emergentThird Period throughout 1927.In both the Labour Monthly
(which he edited) and The CommunistInternational, Dutt relentlessly
outlined the 'treachery'of the TUC, the militancy of the working class,and
the ever closer correlation of the labour bureaucracy,the employersand
the state.87In January 1927,Dutt insistedthat the trade union leadership
88while
could only be transformedfrom "outside" the existing apparatus,
his Socialism and the Living Wage,publishedin mid 1927,stated;"a
basis,
longer
leadership
has
and can only
any
reformist
no
and party
decoy
the
itself
for
by
as
openly
more
maintain
acting more and
a while
agentof the capitalist classin the tasksof repressionand stabilisationon
the backsof the workers."89Suchreasoning,while generally accepted
within the CP, did not lead necessarilyto a political consensushowever.

84K.Morgan, Hagy Pollitt op. cit. pp 33-38.

85Seealso, J. Callaghan,Raiani PalmeDutt op. cit.
86R.P. Dutt in The.Communist InternationalJune 1926.
87Fora typical exampleseeLabour Monthly May 1927.
88LabourMontbly January 1927.
89R.P. Dutt, Socialism and the Living Wag London 1927.

75

In 1927,the Party Executivewas concernedprimarily with its responseto

the repressivemeasurestaken againstthe CPGB by the Labour Party and
TUC. Without a clear lead from the ECCI however,the Party often found
itself at oddswith the logic of Dutt and the Comintern.In responseto the
TUC's threat to withdraw its recognitionof tradescouncils affiliated or
associatedwith the MM for example,the majority of the British P13voted
to accept"underprotest" the TUC decision,andto insteadconcentrateon
trade union branchesand individual membership.90To resistthe decision,
the CPGB argued,would further "isolate" thosetradescouncils linked to
the Party.91

The ensuingdebatehowever,revealedboth the ambiguity of the ECCI's

position in 1927,and the leftward trajectory of Cominternpolicy. Harry
Pollitt had beenthe only British leaderto opposethe line recommendedby
the British Political Bureau(PB), but in doing so he receivedsupportfrom
the ECCI and its British representative,JackMurphy. Murphy was
leadership,
Party
into
"[wiring]
the
to
and althougha
provoked
a protest"92
subsequentECCI Presidiumfailed to constructa clear alternativeto the
CPGB line, it resolvedthat the Party should "conductwith greaterenergy"
General
the
disgraceful
"expose
of
the
ultimatum
a campaignto
Council."93Thus, the ECCI insistedthat the CPGB opposethe General
Council's ultimatum, and campaignagainst the TUC, but was unableto
formulate a cohesivepolitical strategy.The fact that Pertrovsky,the ECCI

90Minutes of the Political Bureau

22 March
Great
Britain
Pa!
Communist
jy
of
the
of
1927. Letter from Inkpin to Bukharin 30 March 1927. Klugmann Papers. Letter to all
Trades Councils 31 March 1927. Tanner Papers.
91Minutes of the Central Committee
Great
Britain
2-3
April
Pa!
Communist
ly
of
the
of
1927. Klugmann Papers.
92j.T. Murphy, New Horizons op.
by
Gallacher.
See
Pollitt
supported
was
also
cit. p233.
Letter from H. Pollitt to J. T. Mu! phy 31 March 1927. Klugmann Papers.
931npreco 14 June 1927.

76

in
favour
in
Britain,
of the CPGB's initial decision,
argued
representative
can only have exacerbatedthe confusion.

The Labour Party's intention to expel those local parties associatedwith

the NLWM raised similar questionsfor the CPGB. Again, the central issue
from a communist perspective,was whether an offensive policy would
"isolate" those Labour Parties linked to the CPGB. As such,the Party
disaffiliated
the
that
maintained a variable policy of not recommending
branchesreturn to Labour, while simultaneouslystruggling against
disaffiliation where it was threatenedbut had not yet occurred; a decision
that reflected the importancethe Party placed on the Left Wing groups in
1927.The main critic of the Party's policy was William Gallacher,who
felt such a strategycontradictedthe line taken towards the disaffiliated
tradescouncils. "How far can we carry on a defensive struggle againstthe
trade union bureaucracy," he asked,"whilst ... endeavouringto maintain an
offensive action againstthe Labour Party leadership?"94

Gallacher feared that the CPGB's strategy would lead to a split with the
Labour Party, and he communicated this concern to Bukharin in February
1927.95Even so, it was Gallacher who suggested that the "success" of the
Labour Party's disaffiliation campaign necessitated a "modification of our
fell
CPGB
line
"96
the
the
somewhat short of the
of
and although
poliCy,
decision
Party's
in
PCF,
discussion
the
to support
the
then
under
policy
Left Wing candidates against official Labour representatives marked a
noticeable 'left turn' in the Party's strategy. Moreover, the disagreements
94Minutesof the Central Committeeof the CommunistPaM of Great Britain 2-3 April
1927.Gallacher later chargedthe leadershipof "wobbling" between ultra-leftism and
ultra-rightism. Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist Party of Great
Britain 14-15 May 1927.Klugmann Papers.
95Letterfrom Gallacher to Bukharin 19 February 1927.Klugmarm Papers.
961,etter from Gallacher to the Political BureauApril 1927.Klugmann Papers.

77

that would characterisethe introduction of the New Line in 1928,

in
'mood'
the
the
to
masses,
were
also
emerging
of
particularly with regard
1927.

This was clearly evident in the leadershipdiscussionon the Trade Union

Bill. The debatecentredaround the proposedsloganin favour of a General
Strike adoptedby just five votes to four at a meeting of the Political
Bureau in March.97Although it was acceptedthat the working classwere
believed
left,
P13
the workers were not yet
the
to
the
on
a minority
moving
leadership
Party
For
the
the
to
of
majority
ready embracesuch a slogan.
however, the workers, betrayedby the eventsof May 1926,were indeed
98
Bill.
the
to
ready, and such a sloganwas expected rally support against
The debatewas a heatedone, so much so that the Party secretaryAlbert
Inkpin, complainedto Bukharin that "the atmospherein the PB during the
last two weekshas beenvery tense"and Gallacher,who once again found
himself in the minority, was so unhappythat he went'back to Glasgow.'99
In the Executive meetingcalled to concludethe matter, the sloganwas
adoptedby fourteen votes to six.

Ultimately, the CPGB'scall for a secondGeneralStrike found little

Scottish
TUC
(although
the
the
Party
rejected
circles
outside
of
support
for
decision
to
However,
the
by
just
agitate
such a
policy
nineteenvotes).
in
Party
the
policy clearly revealedthe militancy of a significant section of
97Minutesof the Political Bureau of the CommunistPaM of Great Britain 6 April 1927.
Klugmann Papers.Rothstein,Campbell, Brown, Rust and Inkpin were in favour of the
Campbell,
Interestingly,
Gallacher,
Stewart,
Robson
Bell
against.
were
slogan.
and
Rothstein,Brown and Inkpin were to be amongstthe chief targetsin the hunt for the
'right danger'in 1928-29, and yet all three show a greaterbelief in the radicalisation of
the working classin 1927.
"Such a belief was exemplified by Pollitt a week later when he said the rank and file
would be able to force the TUC into calling a GeneralStrike. Minutes of the Central
Committeeof the Communist PaM of GreatBritain 12 April 1927. Klugmann Papers.
"Letter from Inkpin to Bukharin 29 April 1927.Kluginann Papers.

78

1927.100
But how intensedid the CPGB believe the "sharpeningclass
"growing
Comintern's
be?
the
While
the
to
of
estimation
struggle"
by
CP,
it
10
1
left"
the
to
the
the
accepted
was not
was
masses
momentumof
As
W.
Robson
in
R.
Britain.
'evenly'
be
outlined at the
to
occurring
seen
SpecialExecutive meeting in May 1927,the "drift to the left" in a British
Conservative
from
"swinging"
by
the
context, was characterised workers
itself,
Party
Labour
Labour;
Party
Liberal
the
a
to
while within
and
bureaucracy
between
the
and
simultaneousclassstruggle was emerging
the rank and file. 102Such a synopsisled the Party to struggle actively to
maintain its links with the Labour Party, while also seekingto consolidate
communist influence within the disaffiliated Labour locals. The workers
were perceivedto be getting closer to communism, the classstrugglewas
becoming more acute,and the Party had sharpenedits line towards the
labour movementleadershipaccordingly; but the CPGB still remained
it
Labour
Party
And
the
to
existing
within
apparatus.
committed working
in
ECCI
October
1927.
to
the
that
sou
ght
challenge
an
approach
was such

Conclusions
Although the CPGB perceivedthe General Strike to be apotentially
in
final
1926
May
the
were,
reality,
a
of
events
revolutionary opportunity,
flurry of militancy from a labour movement forced onto the defensive.
Subsequently,the dramatic fall in the instancesof industrial protest that
little
CPGB
lock
the
the
opportunity to
allowed
out
proceeded miners'
either witness, or work amongst,the'radicalised working masses.'

10()Reportof the Ninth Congress of the CPGB op. cit. Also in L. J. Macfarlane, The
British Communist PaE!y op. cit. p 182. It should be noted that even those on the Party
Executive who voted against the slogan did so because it was inappropriate at that time,
rather than because it was inappropriate per se.
1011nprcco 14 June 1927.
102Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Parly of Great Britain 14-15
May 1927. Klugmann Papers.

79

Although the Party'svehementsupport of the miners earnedit the respect

of the heroic men and women who carried their struggle on into November
1926,the CPGB's main concernthroughout 1927was the 'offensive'
launchedagainstParty membersby the Labour Party and trade union
bureaucracy;a changeof emphasisindicative of the Party'sgrowing
separationfrom the 'official' labour movement.

The CP did make some gains within the industrial sphere however. In
Scotland, the militant tradition among the Scottish mineworkers
engendered notable communist success. Support for the Party and the
Minority Movement in Fife had developed as a consequence of communist
involvement in the Miners Reform Union, set up in 1923 in opposition to
the conservative Fife, Kinross and Clackmannan Miners' Association
(FKCMA). When the two unions merged in early 1927, the extent of
communist support (further enhanced by the CP's work during the miners'
lock out) was revealed. Communist candidates dominated the elections of
the amalgamated Fife Union, and David Proudfoot and John McArthur
were both elected onto the Executive of the National Union of Scottish
Mineworkers (NUSM). The Yorkshire woollen dispute in late 1927
similarly bolstered communist expectations. The MM's campaign in favour
of industrial action rallied considerable support, and the employers'
temporary retraction of proposed wage cuts was interpreted as a victory by
the CP. 103

On wider issues,and in areaswhere the Communist Party lacked a firm or

even incipient basisof support,the Party proved less successful.Its call for
a GeneralStrike in responseto the Trade Union Bill was given little
103Workers'Life 2 and 9 December1927.See
also L.J. Macfarlane, The British
Communist PLM op. cit. pp 188.

80

indeed
labour
by
by
those workers still
the
or
movement,
wider
credence
recovering from the struggle of the previous year. Subsequently,
campaignsbasedaround such slogansas 'Hands Off China' failed to
left,
CP
ILP
despite
beyond
the
the
the
the
and
of
circles
mobilise support
file.
Party
the
and
efforts
of
concerted
rank

While the CPGB claimed to discern evidenceof working class

in
1927
industrial
in
decline
therefore,
the
action
radicalisation
substantial
and the mood of conciliation and anti-militancy that dominatedthe TUC,
placed the Party in a difficult position. The CP was being simultaneously
squeezedout of the labour movementat a time when class antagonisms
were deemedto be 'sharpening,' and Party influence was seento be
spreading.The experienceof the General Strike had reinforced the Party's
belief in the revolutionary potential of the British working class;but
leadership
labour
the
was moving closer to the
conversely,
official
From
the
state.
such a perspective,the
capitalist
employers and
'independentleadership'that the CPGB attemptedto forge in the Third
Period can be regardedas a cogent responseto events asperceived by the
CommunistParty. And while it is possible to criticise the Party's
estimation of the 'existing situation,' it is essentialto recognisethat much
based
'left
Party's
logic
lay
behind
turn'
the
the
that
was
on events
of
unfolding within Britain itself.

81

Chapter Three
The New Line
October 1927- September 1928

On I October 1927,the Political Secretariatof the Executive Committee

of the Communist International madea decision that radically affected the
CPGB. In conjunction with the ConservativeGovernment,the ECCI
declared,the Labour Party and trade union leadershipwere "concentrating
[their] fire" on the British Communist Party. This was due to the
realisation that the CPGB was "the only Party" willing and able to defend
"the interestsof the British workers and the oppressedcolonial and
...
semi-colonial peoples." Simultaneously(or dialectically), the CPG13had
forged a "growing influence amongthe workers," and would subsequently
"headthe forthcoming strugglesnot only againstthe ruling classes,but
also againsttheir lackeys." As such, it was necessaryfor the CPGB to
"struggle againstthe bourgeoisleadershipof the Labour Party, against
in
its
forms,
all
and ... take the necessary
parliamentarycretinism
preparationsfor participating in the next general election as an
independentParty with its own platform and candidates against
...
candidatesof the LP."I

This chapterwill endeavourto outline the Party's responseto the ECCI

decision, and to place the 'left turn' of October 1927within the theoretical
context of the New Line adoptedat the Sixth World Congressof the
Communist International in August 1928.As has been discussedin the
precedingchapters,the CPGB's separationfrom the mainstreamlabour
movementhad beenaccentuatedin the wake of the General Strike, and the
I Wire to the Ninth Congressfor the Political Secretariat the CPGB, Decided
of
on I
October 1927.Copy translatedby JamesKlugmann. Klugmann Papers.

82

decision to standopenly againstthe Labour Party was arguably a logical

developmentof this widening breach.And yet, the ECCI memorandum
bitterly split the British Party leadership.The changein policy, which was
led
both
in
1928,
February
ECCI
Plenum
Ninth
to
the
a change
enforcedat
in Party policy and authority. Party stalwarts such as Johnny Campbell,
Tom Bell, Albert Inkpin and Andrew Rothstein,suddenly found
themselvesin opposition to the line of the International, while Harry
Pollitt, PalmeDutt and (eventually) William Rust becamethe erstwhile
fixed
Comintern
line.
Such
the
ambassadorsof
an alignment was never
Pollitt would soon find himself opposedto the New Line approachto trade
unionism - but the emergenceof right, left and centre blocs (however
amorphousor intangible) seriously affected the CPGB.

The emanationof the New Line has beencomprehensivelydiscussedby

little
but
historians,
attention to the nuancesof policy and
with
numerous
in
February 1928 differed
Crucially,
the
adopted
policy
perspective.
in
by
Party
1929,or 1930,or 1932.
from
line
the
the
greatly
pursued
Initially, the'left turn'appearedto relate only to electoral policy and
theoretical formulations. However, by approachingthe New Line in the
knowledge of the excessesthat later emerged,the traditional explanation
Moscow
dictate,
Third
Stalinist
Period
the
or
overly
manoeuvre
of
as a
both
CPGB
the
intentions
the
of
and the
predetermine
and objectives
Comintern. Central to this thesistherefore, is the evolutionary natureof
communist policy in the Third Period, and this chapterwill subsequently
concentrateon the disparities of the initial 'left turn', and the varied
interpretationsof that policy within the CPGB.

83

Emergence and Implementation

Quite clearly, the decision to revise the political objectives of the CPGB
Communist
International.
In
higher
the
initiated
the
of
echelons
within
was
September-October1927,Bukharin issueda seriesoVinformation letters'
to the various Comintern sectionsin which he emphasisedthe primary
needto 'uninaslethe "treacherousand malicious role of social
democracy."2 The memorandumto the CPGB sent on I October further
in
Communist
Party
to
candidates stand
recommendedthe adoption of
3
Finally,
Labour
Party
the
to
the
opposition
at
proximate generalelection.
letter
further
issued
to
October,
ECCI
Presidium
the
the
end of
a
at
'relevant sections'of the Comintern, recommendingthat the "intensified
in
be
based
[that]
front
"united
must,
upon a
struggle againstreformism"
the overwhelming majority of cases,be constructedfrom below."4

The British Party leadersknew very little about the proposedpolicy

Central
Committee
informed
CPGB's
that
Gallacher
the
William
changes.
had
been
British
"discussions
the
going on since
question
on
although
August," the meeting that he, Albert Inkpin and Jack Murphy had held
did
inconclusive.
"We
had
been
in
September,
Bukharin
vagueand
with
get to know that there was actually somesort of possibility of a change
taking place in Britain, or a strengtheningof the line againstthe Labour
Party leadership" Gallacherrevealed,but "no seriousdiscussion"on the
had
The
'changes'
had
even endorsedthe
meeting
nature of such
occurred.
draft resolutionsof the Ninth Party Congressthat maintainedthe Party
2Quotedin K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit. p74.
3The memorandumwas intendedto facilitate a discussionon Party policy at the Ninth
Congressof the CPGB. For reasonsthat remain unclear however, it failed to arrive in
time.
4Letter from the Presidiumto the CCs of the CPs 31 October 1931. Translatedcopy by
JamesKlugmann. Klugmarm Papers.

84

In
Government.
November,
Gallacher
in
favour
Labour
once
slogan
of a
"British
[had
been]
find
Moscow
that
the
to
question
very
again visited
seriously and thoroughly discussed... and certain conclusionsreached."
Subsequently,at various meetingswith ECCI representativesand the
Anglo-American secretariat,Gallacher debatedresolutionsthat appeared
to "[come] from nowhere" and were "thrown at us quite unexpectedly."5

As for Jack Murphy, the CPGB'srepresentativein Moscow insistedthat

"only very scrappyconversationstook place" prior to the October
Presidium,and "no meeting of the secretariat"had discussedthe
modification of CPGB policy. Murphy's only inkling of a possiblechange
of line came from a discussionwith Bukharin, Piatnitsky and Kuusinen
undertakenshortly before his return to Britain in late 1927.The possibility
of "sharpeningthe struggle and challenging the leadersof the Labour
Party" was raised,but "so far as a full review and political analysis of the
it
"6
Harry
Pollitt
[was]
the
took
of
sort
nothing
place.
situation
concerned,
ECCI
luminaries
informative
had
with
certain
meeting
seems,
a more
(Stalin and Bukharin amongthem) during a visit to Moscow in October
1927. "The interview took the form of putting up the question for a change
I
CC.
"At
time
line,
"
informed
the
Pollitt
the
resisted... and got a
of
hammering from one fellow which lastedeight hours."7 But this occurred
Pollitt,
October
its
first
issued
ECCI
had
the
along
memorandum.
after

5Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist Pajjy of Great Britain 17-18
March 1928.Klugmann Papers.Murphy and Robin PageArnot were also in Moscow at
this time, representingthe British Party in the Comintern. They were both involved in
thesediscussions.
61bid.
7Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg!jy of Great Britain 7-9 January
1928.Klugmann Papers.

85

line,
behind
but
the
Dutt,
to
Palme
change
of
neither of
was quick get
with
October
1927.8
(publicly
to
to
the
of
prior
privately)
them referred
matter

The initial directives of the ECCI were limited and basedupon a number
ECCI
the
In
terms
fragmentary
policy,
of actual
conceptions.
of
Party
Communist
that
candidatesstandopenly against
recommended
CPGB
Party;
Labour
the
that
exposesocial
the
and
representativesof
democratic'flirtations' with the USSR as a'manoeuvre'to weakenthe
based
decision
for
upon
The
was
a
such
rationale
movement.
revolutionary
the conceptionthat "the situation has completely changedin comparison
Party
for
Labour
Lenin
the
and
time
the
advocated
voting
when
with
had
headed
Labour
"
MacDonald
it
into
a
already
power.
pushing
Governmentthe ECCI reasoned,and thereby 'demonstratedhis polices'to
the workers. Thus, with the working class 'swinging to the left', and the
Labour Party and trade union leadershipturning to the right,9 the CPGB
decisively
Party
forward
the
the
"come
instructed
of
to
as
only
was
10
"
boldly
criticise reformism.
working classand more

Perhapsunderstandably,the CPGB leadershipfound the ECCI

[and]
too
"decidedly
and
cryptic
altogether
vague
memorandums
...
'the
ECCI's
IIA
"
the
of
objective
estimation
reply rebuking
ambiguous.
by
Bureau,
Political
dispatched
the
in
Britain'was
subsequently
situation
for
ECCI
CPGB
between
was
arranged
representatives
and
and a meeting
had
leadership,
ECCI
British
the
In
the
15
December.
the
the
opinion of
Government
first
Labour
both
the
and
the
of
significance
overestimated
8The correspondencebetweenPalmeDutt and Harry Pollitt is housedat the Museum of
Labour History in Manchester.Dutt's papersare also kept at the Working ClassMuseum
Library and the British Library.
917heECCI even countenancedthe possibility of a Lib-Lab pact.
IOLetterfrom the Presidiumto the CCs of the CPs 31 October 1927.Klugmann papers.
II Letter from the Political Bureau to the ECCI 23 November 1927.Klugmann Papers.

86

the militancy of the working class.The majority of workers remained

PB
Party
Labour
the
to
the
reasoned,and a changeof policy
committed
Communist
Party.
As
"hostility"
the
towards
such,the
would only generate
Decembermeetingwas designedto clarify the theoretical basis of the
Comintern line, and to raise issuesfor discussionwithin the CPGB.

In effect however, the meeting placed the formulations of the ECCI more
firmly on the CPGB's agenda.The Party slogan in favour of a Labour
Governmentwas deemedinappropriate given the existing Labour Party
leadership'sattitude towards the USSR, China, and the working class.The
fighting
CPGB
candidates
on a platform that exposed
necessityof
election
the Labour and trade union leaderswas recognised,and the sloganof a
Revolutionary Workers' Governmentwas provisionally raised.Although a
branches
Party
Labour
local
front
was still encouraged,the
united
with
in
be
'exceptional
that
given
cases'
should
only
votes
commissionresolved
in support of the Labour Party.12While such a policy remaineddecidedly
inconclusive, it was, by December 1927,the central issueon the CPGB
agenda.

Although the ECCI provided the impetus for a changein CommunistParty

New
Line
to
the
the
which
was
this
policy,
should not exaggerate extent
it
13
Nor
CPGB.
to,
the
should give credenceto the
enforcedupon, or alien
by
Stalin
facilitate
his
to
Period
Third
that
the
was engineered
argument
New
Line
14
the
The
to
to
that
of the
constitute
came
rise power.
policies

12Noteson the Small Commission of the Presidium 15 December 1927.Klugmann

Papers.
13Theinfluence of the Soviet Union was central to the perspectiveof the Comintern
however. The analysis- and method of analysis- that predeterminedcommunist policy
was very much a Russianproduct.
14Such an argumenthas long beendiscredited.For an overview of the historical
discussion,seeK. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit. pp8l-119.

87

Communist International and the CPGB, emergedfrom very real

determinants,both British and international. And while the Third Period
becamethe arenafor the dramatic struggleswithin the Soviet Union, the
'left turn' of the Comintern was well underwayprior to the StalinBukharin rift of 1928-29. Thus, while theoutside' influence on the CPGB
by
Party
Line
New
the
the
the
must
was clearly evident,
actual adoption of
be
in
necessarily placed perspective.

First, as outlined in the previous chapter,many of the conceptsthat

doctrine
New
Line
the
the
of the
constituted
were already engrainedwithin
International by 1927.In relation to Britain for example,the 'sharpening
class struggle;' the 'left lackey' role of the ILP; the 'rapprochement'of the
Labour Party-trade union bureaucracyand the capitalist class;theTascist
Government;
Baldwin
the
and the 'deceptions'of the'left'trade
methods'of
15
Eight
ECCI
in
Plenum
May.
the
leaders,
at
underlined
all
were
union
Moreover, theseconceptionswere accepted,endorsedand propagatedby
the CPGB. The Ninth Party Congressresolutions were pepperedwith
referencesto the 'intensifying class struggle' and the needto sharpenthe
fight againstreformism.16As such,the discussionwas initiated from
damped
it
down
"we
Pollitt,
Harry
in
because,
the
at
words of
outside
home."17

15'Resolutionof the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI on the Situation in Great Britain. 'In The
Ninth Congressof the Communist Pagy of Great Britain op. cit.
16ibid.While Gallacher and Inkpin did not discussthe overhaul of CPGB policy with
Bukharin in September1927,"five points" were neverthelessagreedupon. These
included the intensifying classstruggle, the radicalisation of the working classand the
needto sharpenthe offensive againstreformism. Minutes of the Central Committee of the
Communist Pga of Great Britain 17-18 March 1928.Klugmann Papers
17Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pam of Great Britain 7-9 January
1928.Klugmarm Papers.

88

Second,the changesrecommendby the ECCI were not antithetical to the

CPGB. At its formation, the Party had been sharply divided over the
Party.
Many
Labour
CP's
the
to
the
communists,
questionof
relationship
including Harry Pollitt and William Gallacher,had only grudgingly
by
CPGB,
initially
the
the
and
pursued
accepted parliamentarypolicy
hostility towards theTallacy of reformism'was central to the communist
in
line
had
debated
Moreover,
Party
the
of
a similar change
perspective.
the wake of the first Labour Governmentand in responseto the restrictions
imposedupon communistsat the 1925Labour conference.In a letter to the
Party Executive Committee, Saklatvalahad urged the CP to "adopt
mercilessmeasuresto fight the Labour Party." The CPGB should "set
itself up as the only avowed anti-capitalist party" Saklatvalaargued,and in
a premonition of the New Line debatesof 1928, insisted that the trade
unions withhold their political subscriptions.18Helen Crawfurd also
revealedthat a sectionof the Party had discussedsimilar matterswith
Mikhail Borodin "someyearsago." 19Subsequently,although the ECCI
CPGB
leadership,
the
the
to
of
a
surprise
as
something
memorandumcame
found
Labour
Party
independent
the
soon
of
recommendationof a policy
Party.
the
within
widespreadsupport

Finally, the initial changes in CPGB policy recommended by the ECCI

were limited in scope and flexible in character. In line with the left turn
already discussed vis a vis the French Communist Party, the October
memorandums to the CPGB dealt exclusively with electoral strategy. The
finer detail, or wider scope, of the New Line remained undetermined.

18M.Squires,Saklatyalaop. cit. pp52-55. Saklatvala'sletter is included amongstthe

DocumentsSelectedfrom thoseObtained on the Arrest of the Communist Leaderson the
14 and 31 October. 1925.HMSO.

19Minutes of the Central Committee

of the Communist PiIM of Great Britain 7-9 January
1928. Klugmann Papers.

89

Thus, when ECCI representativesmet with Inkpin, Gallacher and other

British communistsin December,Bukharin made it clear that the
Comintern'srecommendations"should not be taken as an instruction, but
1120
British
for
the
the
comrades.
of
as suggestions
consideration

Even so, the 'considerations'of the CPGB were determinedby the

theoretical framework establishedby the ECCL As such,the Party
maladroitly formulated a policy applicable to both the Comintern and
Great Britain, and in the processcameclose to tearing itself apart.

Definitions:

What Was the New Line?

The left turn initiated by the ECCI in late 1927 was open to a variety of
interpretations. While such notions as the 'intensifying class struggle, 'the
treachery of social democracy' and the 'radicalisation of the working class'
International,
the
the problem of relating
throughout
were endorsed
revolutionary practice to revolutionary theory remained. How far had the
had
intensified?
How
the workers become? Such
radicalised
class struggle
fundamental questions formed the basis of the debate over the New Line,
formulate
by
ECCI
to
the
the
an exact
and
subsequent attempts made
Comintern
in
divided
section.
every
solution
communists

Within the CPGB, the varying opinions of the Party leadershipwere

representedin three theses,and discussedat the Ninth ECCI Plenum in
February 1928.The'majority thesis'- so called becauseit was endorsed
by sixteen of the 23 Party leaderspresentat the CC meeting of 7-9 January
in
November.
by
PB
Drafted
by
the
Johnny
the
extended
concerns
raised
Campbell and Andrew Rothstein,the 'majority' representedthose such as

201bid.

90

Arthur Homer, ErnestBrown, and Tommy Jackson,who felt the Party was
in dangerof "mistaking our subjectivenotions for the revolutionary
f'21

feelings of the proletariat.

The'majority thesiswas basedlargely upon Lenin's Left Wing

Communism,and soughtto arguethat the'objective conditions'that had
shapedCPGB policy in 1920-21 had not changedsufficiently to warrant
an overhaul of the Party line in 1928.First, Campbell and Rothstein
insistedthat the Labour Party remaineda "federal body of trade unions and
affiliated political parties." Subsequently,despite "its social democratic
programme,its 'completely putrefied leadership,' and the attemptsof its
leadersto imposesocial democraticdiscipline, [the Labour Party was] not
yet a social democraticparty in the acceptedmeaning of the term." The
trade unions still had a'numerical predominance'within the Labour Party,
and from such a basis communistscould enter and influence Labour as
delegatesto committeesand conferences,and as parliamentary candidates.
Thus, the CPGB should continue to apply for affiliation, the'majority'
argued,in the belief that as the labour movementstrengthened,the
'bureaucracy'would be less able to stifle communist influence.22

Campbell and Rothsteinendeavouredto explain the radicalisation of the

working classwithin a British context. Rather than turning en masseto the
CPGB, the militancy of the working class was instead demonstrated by an

211bid.The quote is from Jackson.Rothsteinhimself felt the policy of standing CP

candidatesagainstthe Labour Party was "childish. " Other notable commentscamefrom
Wal Hannington, Tom Bell and PeterKerrigan. Hannington fearedthat by openly
opposing Labour, "we retreatand leave the right wing completely in charge of the
machine." Bell raisedconcernsabout the ECCI "doing the thinking. " And Kerrigan
predicted that the Party would "lose influence" if it followed the ECCI line.
227hesisof the Central Committee the CPGB.'In Communist Policy in Great Britain.
of
The Report of the British Commissionof the Ninth Plenum of the Comintem (London,
1928).pp132-152.

91

increasein Labour Party support.The Labour Party was subsequently

"tom betweenthe classaspirationsof the massesand the bourgeois
Labour
its
leaders";
the
agitation
within
communist
while
and
policies of
Party was "becoming more difficult, " it had also proven effective.23
Communistsled "all forms of working classprotest within the Labour
Party," the thesis claimed, and to standopenly againstLabour would
"impede" the CPGB's growing influence on the working class.Thus, the
but
'majority'
thesis,
the
radicalisation of the masseswas endorsedwithin
to a limited degree.

The'majority' also arguedthat British capitalism remained'relatively

stable.'No colonial uprising threatenedthe empire, the labour movement
was characterisedby reformism and a declining organisedworkforce, and
for
'both
(a
Leninist
tnational
the
prerequisite
revolution)
affected
no
crisis'
'24
While
the thesis acceptedthat the tempo of
the
exploiters.
and
exploited
in
it
deemed
to
the
again
ascendance,
was
once
was
revolutionary struggle
have "not yet reachedthe pitch attained in 1920."25Indeed,themajority'
labour
in
"
"depression,
the
movement
which
the
of
period as one
portrayed
Stalin's
"
"on
defensive;
that
with
not
only
the
contrasted
a position
was
talk of 'revolutionary upsurge,'but also with a number of the CPGB's own
assertionsof 1926-27.26

The ECCI's suggestionthat the Labour Governmentof 1924had

demonstratedits policies and thus alienatedthe British working class,was
'
"The
Labour
by
the
the'majority.
experience
of
challenged
similarly

231bid.
24SeeIN. Lenin, Left Wing Communism:An Infantile Disorder (Little Lenin Library
edition 1934,originally published 1920).pp59-71.
25'Thesisof the Central Committee of the CPGB.' op. cit.
261bid.

92

Governmentexposedto a numberof the most active membersthe true

characterof the leaders,[but] the experienceof the Labour Government
was too short and incompleteto convince the massof the workers that the
communistswere right. " Even the GeneralStrike, Campbell and Rothstein
argued,had only revealedthe true characterof the Labour bureaucracyto
thoseworkers affectedby and'accessibleto'CP propaganda.While the
political consciousnessof the working classwas rising, revolutionary
consciousnessremainedelusive.27

The basic task of the Communist Party therefore, remainedunchanged;to

"push the Snowden-HendersonGovernmentinto office in order to help the
workers ... convince themselvesof the worthlessnessof reformism."
Although the 'majority' acceptedthe primacy of the united front from
below and the necessityof an independentParty line, CPGB parliamentary
candidateswere only recommendedto stand in specific instances.Thus, in
areasalready contestedby the CPGB; double member constituencies
where only one Labour candidatewould stand; localities where the Labour
Party branchhad beendisaffiliated; and heavily working class areaswhere
a Labour-CP split would not allow a Tory victory; the Party was to adopt
an independentprogrammeand contestthe seat.Elsewhere,the Party was
to maintain its 'critical support'of the Labour Party.28

As such,the 'majority' thesis favouredthe continuation of the existing

Party line. The radicalisationof the working class and the'sharpening'
classstruggle were endorsedby Campbell and Rothstein, but were placed
within a specifically British context. While the workers were turning to the
left, the 'objective conditions' in Britain were not seenby the majority of
271bid.
281bid.

93

the CP Executive to be conduciveto a communist offensive. This revealed

(that
had
1926-27
led
from
to the
the
of
attitude
militant
more
a retreat
GeneralStrike slogan againstthe Trade Union Bill) and suggestedthat the
had
1926
by
the
given way to a
of
struggle
miners'
expectationsgenerated
more soberprognosis.29

However, there was a sizeableminority within the Party leadershipwho

in
Executive
At
ECCI's
the
the
meeting
recommendations.
endorsed
January,Helen Crawfurd, Shapurji Saklatvala,Percy Glading, William
Allen and William Joss,all upheld the adoption of a more independent
Comintern
leaders
line.
Party
Moreover,
the
to
those
connected
communist
apparatus- PageAmot and Jack Murphy - similarly favoured a
30
in
Party
in
differing
Communist
though
strategy;
ways.
realignment
Finally, and most formidably, Harry Pollitt and Palme Dutt seizedquickly
Pollitt
Indeed,
Dutt
initiative.
ECCI's
the
and
sought to widen the
upon
debatebeyond the immediate issueof election tactics. Pollitt raised the
formulations
for
NLWM
the
theoretical
the
of
while
example,
questionof
PalmeDutt quickly went beyond the tentative synopsisissuedby the
Comintern in October. Dutt's connectionswith the ECCI enabledhim to
keep one step aheadof the debatewithin the CPGB, and he was
in
line
far
develop
tune with the prevailing
to
more
a
subsequentlyable
'mood' of the International.

29Amongthe supportersfor the thesishowever, were those such as William Rust who
emphasisedthe needto sharpenthe Party line againstthe Labour Party. Minutes of the
Central Committee of the CommunistPagy of Great Britain 7-9 January 1928.
Klugmann Papers.
,
301bid.Crawfurd suggestedthat "if we opposesome of the traitors like MacDonald and
Thomas,the workers would have a better idea where we stand." Jossmeanwhile, asked;
"must we tell the working classto vote for candidateswe know will betray us?"
Interestingly, Campbell also referred to an attitude of "IeVsfight the bastards"within the
Party.

94

It was Dutt and Pollitt therefore,who drafted an alternative thesis to that of

the Party 'majority.' At the end of 1927the two men met in Brusselsto
31
line',
Pollitt
Dutt
to
and
was
as'our
soonreferred
establishwhat
'majority'
detailed
the
thesis at the
of
to
critique
subsequentlyable offer a
JanuaryExecutive.32Pollitt further articulated the 'minority' position in a
documentdated24 January 1928. "We must revise our presentpolicy in
become
had
the
Labour
he
Labour
Party
to
the
urged.
whole"
as a
relation
"third capitalist party," while the consolidation of the "MacDonaldHendersonhegemony"and the simultaneouscapitalist offensive against
the working class,constituteda "complete change" in the 'objective
the
Accordingly,
Pollitt
that
1920.
to
recommended
situation' compared
Party denounceits policy of affiliation to the Labour Party; supportonly
thoseLabour candidateswho agreeto work with the CPGB; and stand
communistcandidatesagainstprominent Labour leaders.Furthermore,
Pollitt endorsedthe liquidation of the NLWM, so as to encouragethe
Labour left to join the CP, and suggestedthat the Party campaignfor a
for
be
"used
levy
the electoral work of the
to
the
political
proportion of
local CommunistParty."33

Pollitt. sentthe 'minority' statementto Palme Dutt, who addedtheoretical

bite to the thesis and madesubtle alterationsto the proposals.Dutt inserted
34
line,
'minority'
from
Bukharin
the
to
emphasised
substantiate
quotes

31Quotedin K. Morgan, HaM Polli op. cit. p62.

32Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PgM of Great Britain 7-9 January
1928.Klugmann Papers.Pollitt referred to the Labour Party as the "third bourgeois
Party", recommendedthe liquidation of the NLWM, and renouncedthe Party's affiliation
brief
issues
by
initial
ECCI
beyond
those
the
and
raised
all
of
which
went
policy;
way
Campbell and Rothstein.
3313ocument
Sianedby Ha!2y Polli 24 January 1928.Klugmarm Papers.
3413ydoing so Dutt revealedthe central role Bukharin played in the formation of class
againstclass.Bukharin had insisted that "the situation is now quite different" and
underlined the fact that the Labour Party had already been in power. Inpreco 29
December 1927.

95

inconsistenciesin the 'majority' thesis,and demonstratedthose aspectsof

the'new phase'that necessitateda changein Communist Party
Government
35
Labour
included
These
the
the
of
experience
perspective.
and the GeneralStrike, the'leftward advanceof the working class',the
industrial
leadership,
the
the
of
programme
consolidation of
reformist
peace,and the "increasing transformationof the Labour Party on to a
limited, opportunist basiswith discipline and exclusions."36Crucially
however, Dutt temperedPollitt's initial line.

The last stageof the Labour Party's transformation- the exclusion of

communistsas trade union delegates- had not yet occurred, and Dutt
subsequentlyemphasisedthe needto 'utilise' such an important channelof
propaganda.Similarly, although Dutt maintainedthat the Party's affiliation
campaignwas "finished", he also recommendeda final application as a
meansto propagatethe CPGB's independentline. As for the NLWM,
"tendency"
Dutt
the
of the Left Wing Movement
acknowledged
although
to appearas an independentpolitical force, and thus serve as "a barrier" to
Communist Party growth, he refuted Pollitt's call for liquidation. There
was "still room ... for an organisedopposition movementwithin the
Labour Party" he insisted.37

35Theapparentdichotomy betweenthe perceivedradicalisation of the workers following

the GeneralStrike and the decline in industrial action in 1927(excluding the extraordinary GeneralStrike year, the number of days lost to stoppagesfell from 7,950,000
in 1925to 1,170,000in 1927)was initially explained by Dutt as being due to 'the
initiative laying with the bourgeoisie.' The workers' subjection to conditions of defeat and
victimisation servedonly to augmentclassdifferences,arguedDutt. 'Problemsof the
New Policy in Britain. ' Article sent to the C1in July 1928 (Dutt Papers,BL). Seealso
Inpreco I March 1928.
36'AltemativeProposalsto the Thesis of the Central Committee.' In Communist Policy in
Great Britain op. cit. pp 153-165.
371bid.

96

Finally, Dutt concededthat the intricacies of the Party's election tactics,

particularly with regardto constituencieswhere no communist candidate
was presented,needed"further discussion",although he proposedurging
the workers not to vote. As such,the 'minority' thesis offered a far more
radical analysisof the 'objective situation', while maintaining a cautious,
open endedpolitical strategy.This suggeststhat the ECCI did not have a
fixed position on thepolicy of class againstclassin late 1927/early 1928,
and Dutt refrained from presentingtoo unyielding a line to the
International.38Even so, Dutt was confident enoughto detail the'New
Phaseof the Labour Party' in Labour MonLhly prior to the ECCI Plenum,a
breachof Party discipline for which he was censuredby the CP Political
Bureau.39

A final position was taken by Jack Murphy, who endorsedthe basic

theoreticalprerequisitesfor the New Line, but reachedrather different
solutions.Murphy called for the Party to drop its policy of affiliation while
recommendingsimultaneouslythe formation of a national anti-capitalist
Wing
disaffiliated
Parties
Left
Labour
and
groups. However,
party of
Murphy's proposition receivedno supportwithin either the CPGB or the
Comintem, and he soon aligned himself with the 'minority' canip.40

The theseswere presentedto a British Commissionat the Ninth ECCI

Plenumheld between9 and 25 February 1928.After preliminary
discussionswith Bukharin, Campbell concludedthat although the Party's
"estimation on the situation in Britain did not differ to any considerable
381bid.
39LabourMonthly February 1928.Minutes the Political Bureau the Communist
of
of
Pa!jy f Great Britain 17 February 1928.Klugmann Papers.Pollitt supportedthe censure.
Dutt's article was describedas a "thinly veiled attack on the Party."
40'OurParty: Its Election Tactics
and its Relationsto the Labour Party.' In Communis
Policy in Great Britain op. cit. ppl66-174.

97

drawn
had
Cl,
Party
from
the
the
that
nevertheless
very
of
extent"
different 'practical conclusions.'41In tandem with the 'minority' thesis,the
beyond
Party's
the
the
electoral strategy.
well
went
commission
scopeof
The theoretical aspectof the line predominatedthe discussion,and
amongstthe various ECCI representativeswho spoke at the commission,a
42
Subsequently,
the
expressed.
was
more cohesive,cogentposition
'majority' thesis was widely criticised, and while the 'minority' position
(presentedby Robin PageArnot) was not endorsedcompletely, the
theoretical line on which Pollitt and Dutt had basedtheir argumentwas
43
validated.

The'British question'was consideredwithin a far more international

in
'majority'
thesis, with particular referenceto
the
than
outlined
context
Britain's colonies.44The transformation of the Labour Party into the 'third
by
bourgeoisie'
the
was
acknowledged
a number of speakers,
party of
the
the
class
and
the
working
accentuationof class
of
radicalisation
while
ECCI
As
Bukharin
the
made
clear,
reiterated.
antagonismwas similarly
Party,
Liberal
the
trade
[British]
the
"the
union
government,
regarded
bureaucrats,and the bureaucracyof the Labour Party [as] one hostile camp
its
the
class conscioussectionsand
particularly
proletariat and
against
"45
Movement.
Minority
the
the
communistsand
primarily

41Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 17-19
March 1928.Klugmann Papers.
42SeeCommunist Policy in Great Britain op cit. for a report of the proceedings.Among
the severalleading communistswho took part in the debatewere Togliatti, Roy, Varga,
Losovsky, Remmele,Braun and Bukharin.
43Forexample,there were wide differencesover the question of when, or if, the Party
should recommendthe workers to vote Labour. Seeibid, pp33-36.
441bid.p36. The Czechcommunist Smeral for example,recommendedthat insteadof
voting Labour, workers should be called upon to write'self determination for India,
including separatism!' on their ballot papers.
451bid.pp46-57.

98

The resolutionsof the Ninth Plenumtherefore,endorseda theoretical

paradigmthat relatedclosely to the 'minority thesis'. "Class strugglesof
increasingacutenessaccompaniedby an increasingly close alliance.
betweenthe reformist leadersand the bourgeoisie" were deemedto
characterisethe British labour movement.The rising crisis in British
capitalism had engendereda changein the "intellectual outlook" of the
'reformist labour leadership.' Consequently,the Labour Party and the trade
unions were in the processof becomingan auxiliary apparatusof the
bourgeoisie,and were thus brought into conflict with an increasingly
radicalisedworking class.46

In terms of actual policy, the commissionwas arguably less radical. The

initial ECCI recommendation that communist representativesstand
againstthe Labour Party at any forthcoming election - was acceptedby
the CPGB, as was the sloganfor a Revolutionary Workers' Government.
And the Party was instructedto "adopt clearer tactics of opposition to the
Labour Party and the trade union leadership." However, the CPGB was to
also maintain its affiliation campaign,and the importanceof communist
agitation within the Labour Party was repeatedlyunderlined. Similarly, the
more problematic aspectsof the new approachto the Labour Party were
noticeably fudged by the commission.The tactical question of how the
workers should vote in constituencieswhere no Party member was
standingremainedundecided,and neither the role of the NLWM, nor the
questionof the political levy, were referred to in the resolutions.47

As such,the line introduced in February 1928combined a hardening of

communistperspectivewith a relatively limited political 'left turn'. But
461bid.'Resolutionof the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI
on the British Question.' pp 191-195.
471bid.

99

while the line fell short of both Dutt and Pollitt's recommendations,it did
indicate a decisive shift in both the electoral policy, and the political
conceptions,of the CPGB. The discussionsof the Ninth Plenum further
revealedthe embryonic nature of the New Line; and while the theoretical
basis of the Third Period was coming into ever sharperfocus, the practical
responseswarrantedby an 'upsurgein revolutionary struggle' were
evidently still under review. Moreover, the transferral of the New Line to
wider spheresof communist activity, particularly industrial politics, was
conspicuouslyabsentfrom the commission'sreport. Thus the New Line
should be regardedas an amorphous,unfolding development,and the
policy of class againstclassthe beginning of a strategic and theoretical
overhaul that evolved throughout the Third Period.

Problems of Application: How the Line was Transformed

The transformation of the New Line from its rather limited beginnings in
1927-28 to the all encompassingpolicy of the Tenth ECCI Plenum of
1929,was directed by four interlinking factors. First, by the attempt to
apply coherently the logic of the ECCI's formulations (sharperclass
conflict, social democratictreachery)to the practical work of the
Communist Party. Second,the referral of those formulations to all aspects
of Party theory and activity. Third, the varied interpretationsof the 'new
period' and the necessity(in accordancewith the principles of democratic
centralism) to develop an exclusive, 'correct' policy. And Fourth, the
absorption of the New Line into the emergentstruggle betweenBukharin
and Stalin inside the Soviet CommunistParty. In the following section, the
initial attemptsof the CPGB to apply the line of the Ninth Plenum will be
discussed,along with the tensionsgrowing inside the Comintern and the
CPSU.

100

The resolutionsof the Ninth Plenumwere acceptedby the overwhelming

majority of the CPGB. In the leadership,only Tommy Jacksoncriticised
the logic of the New Line, claiming to seeneither the economiccrisis nor
the radicalisedworkers that justified the left turn. For others,such as Sam
Elsbury, the line was a "God send."48Indeed,it soon becameclear that the
far
it
did
Party
New
Line
that
the
the
not go
was
within
main criticism of
in
landmark
"a
the
described
Thus,
Dutt
the
enough.
while
resolutions as
history of British communism," Aitkin Fergusoncomplainedthat the
49
failed
"complete
break"
the
to
old poliCy.
resolution
with
establisha

In the District and Local Party branches,the resolutionswere

"enthusiastically" received.The PB recordedthe unanimousacceptanceof
the resolutions in Manchesterand Birmingham, and clear majorities in
South Wales (44 to one), Liverpool (3 1 to one), Sheffield (15 to two) and
Tyneside (48 to one).50But once again, there was evidencethat many local
independent
lead
CPG13
the
Party
to
take
the
the
wished
of
membersof
further. In London for example,the District Party Committee only
for
CP's
defeated
to
the
attemptsto
an
end
calling
narrowly
a resolution
51
Party.
Labour
to
the
affiliate

Subsequently, even before the Sixth World Congress of the Comintem in

July-August, and in spite of both Party and ECCI endorsement,an

48Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pa!V of Great Britain 17-18
March 1928.Klugmarm Papers.Arthur Homer did admit later that I am still not
convinced of the New Line despitemany attemptsto persuademe." Minutes of the
Central Committeeof the CommunistPaM of Great Britain 28-30 April 1928.
Klugmarm Papers.
49ForDutt, seeInpreco I March 1928.For Ferguson,ibid.
5OMinutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist Pa!V of Great Britain 27 March
1928.Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist PgM pf Great Britain 17-18
March 1928.Klugmann Papers.
5IMinutes of the Political Bureauof the Communist Pam of Great Britain 3 April 1928.
Klugmann Papers.

101

inclination to pull the Party beyond its establishedguidelines was clearly

issues
New
in
And
to
the
the
CPGB.
the
specific
of
relation
evident within
Line, numerousquestionscontinued to plague the leadership.As the
London DPC suggested,"the affiliation policy is inconsistentbecauseon
independent
for
demonstrating
the
hand
the
role of the
the one
need
we are
Communist Party as the leadersof the struggle againstreformism, and, on
democratic
in
inclusion
for
fighting
the
hand,
social
the other
our
we are
Labour Party."52Jack Murphy in particular (along with Harry Pollitt,
Helen Crawfurd and William Allan) raised similar objections, and when
the issuewas voted upon in July, the Executive was split exactly down the
53
for
the
the
poliCy.
and nine against
maintenanceof
middle, with nine

The Party was also divided over the question of how to vote in areaswhere
the Communist Party was unrepresented.In the two by-elections that
immediately followed the Ninth Plenum, the Party recommendeda Labour
in
Linlithgow
(following
the withdrawal of
in
Hanley,
abstention
and
vote
the CP candidate).Such an obvious inconsistencywas immediately
line.
But
develop
Party
insisted
the
by
Dutt,
prior
a
clear
who
condemned
formulations
despite
Congress,
World
and variations,
numerous
to the
and
in
did
that
to
Party
policy
not,
cohesive
the
remainedunable construct a
the last instance,result in abstention.54

52Statementon the Policy of Affiliation to the Labour PajjY by the London District Paqy
Committee 30 June 1928. Klugmarm Papers.
53Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 30 June-2
July 1928.Klugmann Papers.Interestingly William Rust and Walter Tapsell, both of
whom emergedas championsof the more militant New Line from September1928,
voted for the maintenanceof the affiliation policy.
54Letterfrom R.P. Dutt to the CPGB 17 April 1928. Klugmarm Papers.Minutes of the
Central Committeeof the Communist PgM of Great Britain 30 June-2 July 1928.
Klugmarm Papers.Five Executive membersvoted for abstention,twelve against,while
Gallacherabstained!

102

Less contentiouswere the issuesof the political levy and the NLWM. The
Ninth Plenum'srecommendationthat the Party campaignfor local control
of the levy was endorsedby the CPGB, and only Murphy seriously
challengedthe preservationof the payment in the meantime.55Similarly,
only SamElsbury voted againstthe maintenanceof the NLWM. 56
However, while the Party continuedto recognisethe Left Wing Movement
as a 'bridge' organisationlinking the CPGB with the Labour left, the
'danger'of its transformationinto an organisationdistinct from the CPGB
was an increasingly tenderedargument.As well as Elsbury and Harry
Pollitt, both the London and Tyneside DPCs had questionedthe necessity
of the NLWM by April 1928,and subsequently,an agit-prop
memorandumwas issuedby the OrganisationBureau to quell talk of
liquidation.57

While the Party leadershipremainedunsureabout the connotationsof the

Ninth Plenum,the formulations of the New Line were increasingly applied
beyond their initial limits. The gathering of the RILU in March 1928for
example,offered an opportunity for the 'independent'line of the CPGB to
be related to the industrial sphere.Left wing militants in the ECCI such as
Losovsky, had long beenagitating for a more militant, oppositional trade
Fourth
RILU conference
the
the
of
union policy, and although
resolutions
offered little in the way of a1eft tum, 'the speechesand committeesthat

55Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 30 June-2
July 1928.Klugmann Papers.Wal Hannington had initially suggestedthat in unions
where memberswere denied "their political rights" they should refuse to pay the levy.
Minutes of the Central Committeeof the CommunistPLM of Great Britain 17-19 March
1928.Klugmann Papers.
56Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PaE!
y of Great Britain 30 June-2
July 1928.Klugmann Papers.Murphy, this time with support from Arthur Homer, again
suggestedthe transformationof the NLWM into a separateparty, but to little effect.
57Workers'Life 23 March and 6 April 1928.Memorandum the Left Wing Movement
on
30 May 1928.Klugmann Papers.

103

distinctly
58
Arthur Homer
the
were
radical.
accompanied proceedings
reported that "the tendencyto treat all reformist unions as having actually
becomeunits of capitalist production" was prevalent at the congress,and
fight
"have
CPGB
to
that
the
against ...
would soon
correctly predicted
[the] setting up of independentunions."59

Such a militant position had not beenconsideredby either the CPGB or

the MM prior to the RILU congress,although Dutt had placed the strategy
of the MM clearly within the framework of the ECCI's'new phase'by
January 1928.The 'capitulation' of the trade union bureaucracywas
complete, Dutt insisted, and the MM representedthe "sole opposition" to
the reformist leadership.The 'pseudo-leftism'of A. A. Purcell and George
Hicks had beenrevealed,and "new methods" were required to win over
the 'massof workers.' But the focus of the Minority Movement remained
within the existing trade union movement.The slogan of 'All Power To
The GeneralCouncil'was maintainedand the objective of the MM
in
for
Revolutionary
"win
the
trade
the
to
unions"
struggle
a
over
remained
Workers' Government.60The notion of independent'red' trade unions
harder
immediate
the
the
rhetoric essentially
agenda,
and
remained off
from
line
MM
August 1926.
increasingly
the
the
of
critical
endorsed

Although the CPGB leadershiphad been slow to adopt the

recommendationsof the EM

therefore,once the basis of the New Line

had been revealedto the wider sectionsof the Party, it was the limitations
of the policy that prompted and extendedthe debate.Pressurefrom the

58Reportof theFourthCongless
of theRILU(London,1928).
59minutes
Pa!jy of GreatBritain28-30April
of theCentralCommittee
of theCommunist
Papers.
1929.Klugmann
60TheSituationin BritainandtheTasksof theTradeUnionMovement
January1928.
JackTannerCollection.
J. Callaghan,
RaianiPalmeDuttop.cit.p116.
104

Party Districts compoundedthe uncertaintiesand inconstanciesthat

characterisedthe Ninth Plenumresolutions.And as the Party soughtto
formulate a coherentpolicy that applied the theoretical conceptionsof the
'new phase'to the practical work of the CP, the 'left turn' gained in
momentum.

Within the International, the significance and the objectives of the 'new
period' were also under discussion.Moreover, the debateswithin the
Comintem becameentwined with the struggle for power inside the Soviet
Union. As such,the battle betweenBukharin and Stalin over the future
direction of the USSR undoubtedly shapedthe direction of the New Line
and the formulation of the Third Period. That said, the eventualvictory of
Stalin should not lead necessarilyto the conclusion that the New Line was
either forged as a tool in the ensuingstruggle, or that it reflected a purely
'Stalinist' view. Rather,the debateswithin the Comintern were utilised to
inflect the divisions evident within the CPSU. The policies of the Third
Period were very much in the Bolshevik tradition; relating to the growing
breachbetweencommunismand social democracyevident since the
outbreak of the First World War.

Although the policies pursued by Bukharin within both the Soviet Union
and the Communist International were coming under mounting criticism
by late 1927, the onset of the New Line and the formulations of the Third
Period were established before Stalin broke ranks with his former ally.
When Stalin talked of "the crisis of capitalism and the preparation of its
doom grow[ing] as a result of stabilisation, " he did so in essentially
Bukharinist terms.61Even when, at the Fifteenth Congress the CPSU in
of
6lQuoted in T. Draper, 'The StrangeCase
of the Comintem.' In Survey op. cit. ppl03104.

105

December 1927, Stalin declaredthatEurope has entereda new

"increasingly
it
the
within
context
of
revolutionary period', remained
decayed"capitalist stabilisation. More indicative of the forthcoming
ignored
'right
Bukharin
the
Losovsky's
that
accusation
struggleswere
danger'emerging within the Comintem, and the critical analysis of
Bukharin's portrayal of western capitalism offered by Shatskin and
Lominadze,both of whom were associatedwith Stalin.62

As StephenCohen has arguedconvincingly, the issuesthat would

decisively divide the Soviet Politburo - collectivisation, investmentpolicy,
the tempo of industrial growth - were 'taking shape'in late 1927,but do
not seemto have become'sharp and systematic'until late Januaryor
February 1928.63Similarly, divergent opinions were evident within the
Comintern, and it would be incredulousto presumethe ECCI formulated a
ideas
into
the
and
perspectives
varying
coming
without
policy
coherent
debate.It was the interlocking of the various disputeswithin the Soviet
Union and the Comintern that affected decisively the political evolution of
the Third Period and prompted the New Line to go beyond its initial
parameters.

It was not until the Sixth World Congressof the Comintern however, that
the divisions within the CI becameopenly apparent.On a number of
issues,the prevailing ECCI perspective.came in for severecriticism, and
line
was not proposedat the congress,
while a coherentalternative political
dissatisfactionand a desire for more radical action was clearly evident in a
The
in
the
congress
commissions.
main
of
speeches,
number
and
closed
points of debatecentredaroundthe theoretical definition of the Third
62SeeS. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (Oxford, 1980). p267.
631bid.p263-267

106

Period; the extent and pattern of capitalist crisis, the role of the noncommunist left in sucha period, and the main threatsto communist
advancement.

While Bukharin saw the Third Period as one in which the contradictionsof
he
inevitably
lead
to
saw such a
upheaval,
revolutionary
capitalism would
developmentas a gradualone, in which the revolutionary 'spark'would
come from external factors and imperialist war. For Bukharin, capitalism
was in theprocess of decay.However, a more radical interpretationwas
also palpable at the congress;one which portrayed capitalism as teetering
on the brink of immanentcollapse.As a consequenceof intensified class
antagonismand capitalist degenerationit was reasoned,the 'new period'
would be one of revolution and war, in which the forces of social
democracy(including the British Labour Party and trade unions) would
openly supportthe interestsof capital againstthe revolutionary aspirations
left
democratic
From
the
social
and
the
a
position,
such
of
working class.
the communistright becamethe 'most dangerousenemiesof communism',
Bukharin
to
line
wholly
contrary
was
not
of
reasoning
and although such a
(who agreedthat the right representedthe main danger,acknowledgedthe
'openly fascist role' of social democracy,and favouredan offensive against
the 'shamleft') 64it greatly simplified and/or exaggeratedhis original
synopsis.

The sourcesof the adversity to Bukharin's position were varied, and had
beenexistent for sometime. Those on the left of the ECCI had always
pushedfor a more revolutionary strategy,as Humbert Droz's referenceto
the 'struggle againstLosovsky' revealed.Meanwhile membersand sections

641npreco 6 June, 1928.

107

had
for
Communist
League
Young
the
continually
agitated
more radical
of
had
Longo,
Italian,
For
the
consistently beena
example,
young
action.
thorn in the side of the pC165in a way similar to the agitation conductedby
66
factor
in
The
USSR.
1928
in
RAPP
the
the
crucial
such
associations
as
however, was that such radical perspectivesreceived encouragementfrom
important sectionsof the communisthierarchy, as those gatheredaround
Stalin sought to mobilise opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy. Slogans
fascism
democracy
that
were reapplied
social
such as
equating
with social
by the KPD for instance'67and the basis of Bukharin's theory of capitalist
stabilisation cameunder critical discussionwithin the Soviet press.68

A section of the Germanleadershiphad also been agitating to take action

against,and to broadenthe definition of, the 'right danger'within its own
ranks since at least early 1928.At the Ninth Plenum, a meeting between
Russianand Germandelegateshad ruled that "tolerance toward the
deviation"
69
And the
the
was
erroneous.
of
right
representatives
organisationalmeasuresdemandedby the KPD would soon be effectively
applied.

While criticism of Bukharin's position was apparentin several speechesto

the World Congress(including those given by Jack Murphy and Robin
Page Amot) it was behind the scenes, in the breaks and the closed

65SeeT. Draper, 'The StrangeCaseof the Comintern!op. cit. J.B. Urban, Moscow and
the Italian-Communist PaM. From Togliatti to Berlingue (London, 1986). pp43-44.
66RussianAssociation of Proletarian Writers, previously the VAPP.
67Forthe origins of the term social fascismseeT. Draper, 'The StrangeCaseof the
Comintern' op. cit. pp 119-137.The term was first officially re-usedin June 1928by Josef
Lenz, the Chairman of the GermanParty ProgrammingCommission. Social fascism was
used to denotesituations where the bourgeois statewas 'aided and abetted'by social
democratsto block the advanceof the working class.This becameincreasingly important
at a time of imminent revolution.
68SeeS. Cohen, Bukharin op. cit.
p292.
69j. B. Urban Moscow and the Italian Communist Party
op. cit. p67.

108

commissions,that the real agitation was accomplished.As B. Gitlow of

the CPUSA later recounted,"there were two congressesgoing on at the
Sixth World Congress.One was the official congressover which Bukharin
presided... Then there was the corridor congresscalled togetherby
Stalin.1170
It was in the corridors that policies were canvassed,and
criticisms of Bukharin's line circulated. Jack Murphy for example,recalled
the "rush of leading membersto the committeeroom" as "rumour got
going that Stalin and Bucharin [sic] differed."71Moreover, Johnny
Campbell was to complain later that severalBritish delegatesreturned
from Moscow with a "new union complex" as a result of militant agitation
in the closedcommissions.72Therefore,while the final resolutionsof the
congresswould remain close to Bukharin's initial perspective,
discrepancieswithin the ECCI were simultaneouslyrevealed.The result
was a struggle for hegemonythat would preoccupy the Comintern for the
following twelve months.

What effect did the disagreementswithin the communisthierarchy have on

the congress?In terms of actual policy, the importancelay in the
implications of the numerousamendmentsBukharin madeto the congress
reports and resolutions.The most obvious examplewas in relation to the
'right danger, which Bukharin agreedwas the "chief danger" of the Third
Period. The fact that his own political perspectivewas associatedwith
such a deviation, and the ambiguity of its meaningwas accompaniedby
calls for the "tightening of internal discipline", meantthe clausetook on
seriousconnotations.Additionally, Bukharin was forced to make

70QUotedin E.H. Carr, Foundations

of a PlannedEconomy 1926-1929 Vol 11op. cit.
p74.
71J.T. Murphy, New Horizons
op. cit. pp282-283.
72j.R. Campbell'The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A Policy'
undated.
Klugmann Papers.

109

theoretical concessions. While the more extreme concept of social fascism

was not accepted by the ECCI for example, reference to social
democracy's "tendency" towards fascism was included in Bukharin's
congress report. 73

Such modifications, combined with the criticism Bukharin received from

both congressspeechesand corridor conversations,representedthe
beginning of the New Line's extensionbeyond its relatively moderate
origins. The militant mood evident at the World Congressgained credence
and support from September1928,and becamelinked to debatesraging
within the Soviet Union. In such a way, the demandsto extendthe policy
of classagainstclassevident within the CPGB prior to the World
Congresswere encouraged.As such, the return of the British delegatesin
September1928heraldedthe onset of the most traumatic year in the
CPGB'sbrief history.

Conclusions
The politics of the Third Period should not be regardedas a set entity. The
basisof the New Line extendedgradually throughout 1928,and following
the Sixth World Congress,evolved far beyond the policies adoptedby the
CPGB at the Ninth ECCI Plenum. Subsequently,the framework for the
Third Period remainedrelatively flexible and open to interpretation; a
developmentthat facilitated the conflicts over policy that afflicted all
sectionsof the Comintern between 1928 and 1930,while also enabling the
ECCI to reinterpret continually its position in accordancewith its political
perspective.

731npreco 4 September1928.

110

Crucially, pressureto adopt a more militant International policy was

from
beyond the
Congress,
World
to
the
came
and
evident prior
left
The
Stalin's
turn undertakenby
parametersof
organisationalcoterie.
the ECCI in 1928was basedupon theoretical formulations established.
from at least 1926,and reflected a widespreaddesirewithin the
international communistmovement.As the CPGB discovered,the policy
of classagainstclasswas embracedby a sizeablesection of the movement,
basic
"the
in
New
Line
KPD,
Parties
the
the
while
complimented
such as
orientation of the [Germancommunist] activist."74Furthermore,the power
strugglethat tore through the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern
utilised the debatessurroundingthe New Line. The Third Period thus
becamethe arenafor Stalin's consolidation of power, as opposedto its
expression.

Finally, the CPGB leadership'sinitial resistanceto the policy of class

be
interpreted
indicative
as
of the mood within the
againstclass should not
Party as a whole. A considerableand powerful minority of the leadership
favouredthe New Line, and were supportedby severalof the Party
Districts. Moreover, although the majority of the CPGB Executive initially
Campbell
Comintern's
the
communists
such
as
recommendations,
opposed
Bukbarin's
Rothstein
thrust
the
of
general
endorsed
and
nevertheless
theoretical analysis.Where the British Party disagreedwith the Comintern,
its leaderswould not refrain from registering their opposition. For
example,CPGB delegationvoted againstthe ECCI resolution on
colonialism at the Sixth World Congress.75
74E.Hobsbawrn,'Confronting Defeat: The GermanCommunist Party.' In Revolutionaries
op. cit. p49.
75Theresolution, 'The Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi Colonial
Countries',was drafted by Kuusinen. Kuusinen criticised the line of R.P. Dutt and M.N.
Roy, in particular Dutt's belief that British imperial policy included the industrialisation
of colonies. After a long debate,all but four of the British delegationremainedopposed
III

Following the congresshowever,the formulations of New Line would

fascism,
Charges
beyond
Bukharin's
of
social
analysis.
more subtle
stretch
deviation'
disintegration,
the'right
and
predictions of capitalist
CPGB
for
the
the
and
activity;
and
communist
rhetoric
predominated
is
It
brink
the
to
brought
Party
to
the
collapse.
of
ensuing sixteen months
effects of suchturmoil that this study now turns.

the ECCI line, and voted againstthe thesis. For a detailed discussion,seeL. J. Macfarlane,
The British Communist PM op. cit. pp204-210.

112

Chapter Four
The Party in Crisis
September 1928- December 1929

Within a year of the Comintern Sixth World Congress,the British

Communist Party was racked by internal conflict and political confusion.
The ECCI offensive againstthe 'right danger'plunged the CPGB into a
period of communist civil war, resulting in two national congressesand an
overhaul of the Party leadership.The focus of the Comintern centredupon
theoretical orthodoxy, and for a Party not known for its dialectical
proficiency, the debateson communist practice that dominated 1928-29
threatenedto underminethe very existenceof the CPGB.1

The Party's antipathy to theoretical debatewas clearly demonstratedby

Arthur Homer at a meeting of the Central Committee in September1928.
Exasperatedby his comrades'protracted attemptsto interpret the ECCI
line, Homer resolvedto "ask the Party congresswhether or not the average
[worker] in this country is of the opinion that only those who sit at a table
and write theseswhich nobody readsand which are always critical because
they can never be tested,are fit comradesto be in the leadershipof the
Party."2 In a period where such theseswere the measureof communist
ardour however, the Party was forced to devote much of its time to just the
kind of discussionthat Homer detested.And while this suited those such
as Palme Dutt, who appearedto live for contentious debate,it alienatedthe
CP from the workers it endeavouredto represent.As the London District
secretaryR.W. Robsonreportedin 1930,the "year of great internal
I See S. Macintyre, A Prol, -tarian Science
op. cit. for an excellent overview of Marxism in
Britain; and particularly the CPGB's contribution.

2Minutes of the Central Committee the Communist PgM

of
of Great Britain 24-26
September1928.Klugmann Papers.

113

discussion" (ie. 1929) led to many workers leaving the Party becausethey
line.
3
Comintem
in
interested"
the
the
"not
of
peculiarities
were simply

Events 'at home' also informed the increasingly leftist perspectiveof the
CPGB however; although the Party suffered a number of political setbacks
in its attempt to forge an independentleadershipof the working class.The
General
England
the
North
disputes
the
that
and
textile
of
ragedacross
Election of May 1929both facilitated extensivecommunist campaigns.
But here too, the import attributed to the 'right danger'impinged upon
communist activity. Party failures were upheld as evidenceof the
leaderships'vacillation'. And communistssuch as Walter Tapsell, John
Mahon, Maurice Ferguson,and Lily Webb, agitatedtirelessly againstthe
perceived'right errors'of Rothstein, Campbell., Inkpin and Bell. Even
Harry Pollitt was accusedof 'right deviation' in 1929, as a vocal 'left wing'
4
Party
the
ranks.
emergedwithin

The sixteen month betweenSeptember1928 and December 1929were

history.
In
in
Party's
this
bitter
the
chapter
the
sectarian
and
most
among
be
outlined, with
will
therefore,the causeand effect of such upheaval
CPGB's
factors
the
to
internal
relevant
to
and external
particular attention
be
the
the'left
it
that
decline.
Furthermore,
extent
of
argued
will
apparent
turn'within the CPGB was facilitated as much by the Party rank and file as
by the ECCL

3Reporton the London District PaLty9 July 1930.Klugmann Papers.

4The more radical conceptionsemanatingfrom Fergusonet al would often prove to be
incompatible with the official Comintem line. The ECCI appearedto tolerate such
invention however, so long as the tenantsof the ECCI's position - the theoretical basesof
the Third Period - were adheredto.

114

The Movement Turns Left

In accordancewith the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, the
CPGB was committed to the political objectives outlined by the Executive
Committee of the Communist International. Moreover, as a section of the
international communist movement,the CPGB endeavouredto pursue a
policy in accord with the theoretical framework of the Comintem. In the
immediate aftermath of the Sixth World Congresshowever, whereat
existing orthodoxy's had been challenged,'correct' theory and practice
becamesomewhathard to define. And although the militant agenda
encapsulatedin the speechesof Losovsky, Manuilsky and ThUlmann
would eventually eclipse the more moderateprognosis of Bukharin, the
ECCI evidently fell into somedisrepair in late 1928.

In their recent study of the Comintern, Kevin McDermott and Jeremy

Agnew list a number of contemporaryaccountsthat reveal the disordered
nature of the International at this time. Andreu Nin for example, described
the CI in 1928as'demoralised, where "nothing at all gets done.
Everybody is awaiting the outcomeof the fight between Stalin and the
right. " Togliatti too, in December 1928,bemoanedhow "bad" and
factional the "internal regime" of the CI had become.And Clara Zetkin
referred to the ECCI as "dead mechanism"in March 1929.5As such, the
directives that had sought to guide international communism since 1920
becamefractured and inconsistent.Thus, when J.R. Campbell bemoaned
the "poisonousfractionalism" afflicting the CPGB in September1928,
Jack Murphy caustically remarkedthat "the fault is somewhereto be found
in the International itself'16

5K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern op. cit.

6Minutes

of the Central Committee of the Communist

September 1928. Klugmarm Papers.

115

p86.
Pg! y of Great Britain

24-26

The concessionssqueezedout of Bukharin at the Sixth World Congress

were utilised immediately by his adversariesin the Soviet Union and the
Comintern.7 The 'right deviation', which Stalin describedas the "tendency
and inclination, albeit unexpectedor undeveloped,on the part of some
communiststo depart from the revolutionary line of Marx in the direction
of social democracy," was extended.Subsequently,'right conciliation', or
"those who criticise the right deviation but do nothing to combat it

...

[or]

who entertainconciliatory sentimentstowards the representativesof the

8 Inside the
right deviation", was addedto the ECCI list of misdemeanours.
Soviet Union, Bukharin's policies and basesof influence were attacked;
the editorial boardsof Pravdaand Bol'shevik overhauled,the Moscow
Party apparatuspurged, and the 'softer' domestic line of Bukharin, Rykov
and Tomsky castigated.By mid 1929the 'Bukharin group' had been
publicly as well as politically undermined.

Within the International, the KPD set the pace.The more militant
immediately
Ulbricht,
Lenz
Thalmann,
and
was
propagated
of
perspective
throughout the GermanParty, and a distinct 'rightist group' was targeted
within the KPD.9 Subsequently,an ECCI Presidium in December 1928

7Throughout 1928, the duumvirate'srelationship had beenbecoming increasingly

strained.Differences of opinion over the meaningof the 'offensive againstthe Kulak!, the
'extra-ordinary measures'undertakenby Stalin to procure grain from the peasants,the
need for what Kuibyshev called 'super industrialisation', and the Shakty affair, all
contributed to a definite split within the Soviet PB. By July, Stalin had accusedBukharin
of a'break with Leninism', while Rykov and Tomsky, the two other PB memberswho
had beencritical of recent Soviet policy, were similarly condemned.The latter was
criticised for what Losovsky called a 'conciliatory' trade union policy. The Sixth World
Congresstherefore,saw the battle for power within the Soviet leadershipextendto the
internationalstage.
8j. Stalin, 'BetweenLeft and Right: Speechto the Plenum the Moscow Committee
of
and
Moscow Central Commissionof the CPSU 19 October 19282In Labour Monthly
December1928.
9ThAlmarmwas himself under
attack in late 1928.Chargesof corruption had been
levelled againstthe Germanleader,but with the support of an ECCI Presidiumheld in

116

accusedcommunistsassociatedwith Thalheimer, Ewert and Meyer, of

forming an "anti-Leninist Party" intent on undermining the authority of the
Comintern.10The ensuing'Open Letter' from the ECCI precipitated a
wholesalepurge of the KPD apparatus,and effectively set the precedent
other Comintern sectionswere to follow.

While disagreementswithin the CI intensified throughout 1928,support

for a more revolutionary political perspectivespread.Severalcommunists,
particularly the younger generationbolstered and driven by the radical
rectitude'sof the 1917revolution, had balked consistently at the 'soft'
policies of the mid twenties, and the initial left turn of late 1926-28 had
enlivenedtheir campaignfor more radical policy. The international events
of 1927-29 only servedto compoundthis. The war scareof 1927,the
deteriorating international relations of the USSR and the West, the onsetof
fascist or neo fascist regimesthroughout Europe, 'rationalisation' and
Crash,
Street
Wall
the
and the repressionof working class
unemployment,
protest in Germany,all gave credenceto a theory of 'imminent capitalist
collapse.' Indeed,the shooting down of May Day marchersin 1929on the
orders of the SPD police chief Z6rgriebel effectively augmentedthe more
radical perspectivewithin the KPD. II Subsequently,the argumentfor a
revolutionary Comintern perspectivebecameincreasingly persuasive
throughout 1928-29, as the theoretical foundations of the Third Period
cameunder debate.

Moscow on 6 October 1928- at a time when Bukharin and Humbert Droz could not
attend- his dominanceat the headof the KPD was pointedly reaffirmed.
I OCitedin K. McDermott and J. Agnew, The Comintern
op cit. p84.
II This was reportedon in somedetail in Labour Monthly June 1929. SeeW. Pieck,
'SharpeningClassWar in Germany.'

117

From September1928therefore,the nature of the Comintern changed

dramatically. Although not officially removed from the ECCI until July
1929,Bukharin rarely appearedat the Comintern following the Sixth
World Congress.Meanwhile the Executive becamepreoccupiedwith
defining and rooting out the 'right danger'throughout the communist
movement.For the CPGB, the struggle at the heart of the International
exacerbatedthe political uncertaintiesof the New Line. In order to assess
the work of the British Party therefore, it is necessaryfirst to outline the
theoretical paradigm in which the Party attemptedto function.

The more militant agendaof the Comintern was finally revealedat the
Tenth ECCI Plenum in July 1929.Even so, the Plenum was not the
revolutionary call to arms so often portrayed, and a mixture of
revolutionary impetuosity and political caution characterisedthe
proceedings.While speecheswere often strident and infused with
revolutionary vigour, and the Plenum resolutions outlined a world poised
for revolution, the directives of the ECCI were not overtly sectarian.The
formation of 'red' trade unions was not unconditionally sanctioned,and the
united front from below did not discount work within reformist
organisationsor co-operationwith workers on the non-communist left.

The misinterpretation of the ECCI's'New Line'by contemporary

communists (and subsequent historians), stemmed from attention being
focused on the speeches and agitational propaganda of those such as
Losovsky in the RILU or young communists mobilised by the ECCI in the
battle against the right, rather than the actual directives of the Plenum
itself. This was partly due to the fact that Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky,
and others associated with the usurpation of Bukharin, had not gained total
control of the Comintern by mid 1929, and needed to accommodate

118

in
domination.
left
Even so, the
to
the
order
secure
sectionsof
communist
resolutions of the Tenth Plenumreveal that the more pragmatic members
of the ECCI had influence enoughto check the extremepolicies many in
the CI wished to enforce.

At its basis,the policy detailed at the Tenth ECCI Plenum placed the
world in a period of "general crisis", where "an upward swing of the
revolutionary movementin the principal capitalist countries" was evident.
By accentuatingand supplementingBukharin's theory of capitalist
stabilisation, a period of revolutionary struggle was declarednecessaryto
combat the capitalist offensive launchedagainstthe working classand the
USSR. In particular, the more extreme interpretation of social democracy
was endorsed.

In the ECCI's analysis,the bourgeoisiein alliance with the representatives

of social democracy,had embarkedon a policy of "unashamedrobbery,
enslavementand barbarousoppression." Unemployment was increasing,
wageswere being cut, and the "economic strangulationof the working
fascist
"the
by
"political
that
entailed
reaction"
class" was accompanied a
transformation of the stateapparatusof the bourgeoisie,the intensification
by
d'etat
fascist
terror,
aided
world capitalism
coup
of repressionand white
(Yugoslavia), massarrestsof workers (France,Poland, etc), [and]
suppressionof revolutionary organisations( ... in Germany) ...1112
Capitalism was perceivedto be transforming into fascism,while in
countrieswhere there were strong social democraticparties, the guise of
'social fascismwas assumed.Thus, the leadersof social democracywere

12TheWorld Situation and Economic Struggles.Thesesof the Tenth Plenum the ECCI
of
(London, 1929).pp 1-12.

119

'social fascists'who servedthe bourgeoisieby "paralysing the activity of

the masses." 13

The extremity of such a theory contrastedwith Bukharin's more gradualist

notions, and it is noticeablethat the conceptof social-fascism was only
belatedly endorsedby the ECCI. The 'Closed Letter' to the CPGB in
February 1929for example,madeno referenceto social-fascism.Nor did
the Executive'sinstructions to Josef Lenz, the ECCI representativeat the
Tenth Congressof the CPGB in January.14By the Tenth Plenumhowever,
and particularly in responseto the SPIDsponsoredrepressionof workers in
Germany,the sloganwas firmly on the Comintern agenda.

Consequently,the ECCI resolvedthat the primary task of the communist

movementin the Third Period was twofold. First, to intensify the struggle
againstsocial democracyin order to allow the radicalisation of the
working classto be expressed.Second,to purge its own ranks of
'opportunist' elementsso asto successfullycarry out the New Line. Those
who did not fight the right deviation or follow "implicitly" the Comintern's
decisions,were now consideredto be "outside the ranks of the
Intemational."15

Such pronouncementsappearedto highlight the sectariannatureof the

united front from below. However, a closer look at the New Line revealsa
more flexible approach.The resolutionsemphasisedwork inside the
'reformist unions'. United front campaignsamong women and young
131bid.
14SeeClosed Letter of the Political SecretariatECCI to the Central Committee CPGB 27
February 1929.CommunistArchive. The letter was reproducedin full in L. J. Macfarlane,
The British Communist Party op. cit. pp308-319. Instructions for the Comintern Deb-CrAtp
to the Conferenceof the CPGB. CommunistArchive.
"The World Situation op. cit. 18.
p

120

workers were encouraged.Communistswere to become"revolutionary

delegateselectedby the workers," and "the survival of sectarianism"was
explicitly denounced.16Moreover, with regard to actual trade union policy,
a militant theoretical analysiswas similarly juxtaposed with a
differentiated political method.

GeneralStrikes in Poland and Columbia; 'major disputes'in Germany,

Franceand Austria; and 'small strikes' in Great Britain, were all presented
as evidenceof working classradicalisation and intensifying classstruggle.
Unorganisedworkers were becoming increasingly politicised, the ECCI
fathomed,as the social fascist nature of the reformist trade unions was
revealed.And yet, the policy of the ECCI did not match the militant
aspirationsof Losovsky in the RILU or communists on the left of the
International. The developmentof "wide committeesof action" electedby
the workers at the point of industrial protest for example, were clearly
describedas 'non-Party' committees.As for 'red' trade unions, the Plenum
acceptedthe principle of working classorganisation opposedto the
reformist bureaucracy,but simultaneouslyimposeda seriesof conditions
to restrict their formation, thus acknowledging the potential dangersof
such a policy.

Thus, only "at the high tide of strikes, only when the political struggle is
very acute,when considerablesectionsof the proletariat have already
graspedthe social-fascist characterof the reformist trade union
bureaucracy,and when thesemassesare actively supporting the formation
of a new trade union," should a 'red' union be established.17Indeed,the
ECCI was explicit in warning communists"not to withdraw from
161bid.pp20-21.
171bid.p45.

121

[reformist] unions, but to contribute in every way to the accelerationof the

process of revolutionisation" of the working class'8

There should be "no relaxation in our efforts for the winning over of the
trade union rank and file, " the ECCI insisted. "On the contrary, this work
must be increased... The struggle for ousting all the bureaucratsand
capitalist agentsfrom the unions, the fight for eachelectedposition in the
unions, especiallythe struggle for the positions of the lower trade union
delegates,must serve in our handsas a powerftil instrument for exposing
the role of social-fascist trade union bureaucracy,and for combatingit. " 19
And even where'entire trade union bodies'were expelled, the ECCI
recommendedthat they continue to function while campaigningfor
reinstatement.

Subsequently,although communist strategyinside the 'reformist' unions

was revised at the Tenth Plenum-'Iegalism'was denouncedand the task
of organising the workers againstthe existing union leadershipemphasised
indiscriminate
formation
did
New
Line
the
the
necessitate
of
not
communist trade unions. As with other sectionsof the ECCI programme,
the practicalities of CP policy remainedflexible. Rather, it was the
adoption of the theoretical basesof the New Line that would determinethe
future of the respectiveCommunist Parties.

A Question of Emphasis: Interpretations of the New Line

As Tom Bell informed the British PB in September1928,no new
decisionswith regard to actual CPGB policy were reachedat the Sixth

181bid.p30.
191bid.pp4l-42.

122

World Congress.20However, the basic theoretical questions that

CI
discussed,
divisions
the
the
were
constituted
within
and were
considered in relation to the CPGB's existing political strategy. The role of
the NLWM was debated, along with the Party's relationship with the nonParty left and the 'reformist' trade unions. 21Consequently, the more
militant depiction of the 'existing situation' prevalent within the
Comintern, necessitated that the CPGB once again review its political
perspective in preparation for the Tenth Party Congress.

Such a discussionsaw a plethora of views and attitudes emerge,both

within the Party hierarchy and amongthe rank and file. Generally, the
more militant attitude adoptedby the ECCI received widespreadsupport
from the membership,albeit in a rather indeterminateform, as the
predominant issueswere discussedwithin the Party press,local Party cells
and District Committees.The debatewas most colourful in the Workers'
Life, wherein articles underlining the main themesof discussion,such as
'Which Way is A. J. Cook Going?'22were complimentedby letters from the
readership.Views coveredthe gamut of communist opinion, ranging from
G.H. Cole of Salford's demandfor the liquidation of the NLWM, to E.R.
Payne'swarning that an independentCommunistParty would be little
more than a "political sect."23Even so, a completebreak from the Labour

20Minutesof the Political Bureau of the CommunistPajjy of Great Britain 17-19

September1928.Klugmann Papers.
21For evidenceof this, seeLetter from the British Delegation to the Political Bureau of
the CPGB 2 August 1928.This called for a revision of the Party's policy towards the
Cook-Maxton campaign.The letter criticised the Party'sresponseto the campaign,and
emphasisedthe need to 'sharpen'the Party'sattitude towards the non-Party left. "Our role
today must be one of ruthlessexposure," it declared.For evidencethat 'red' trade unions
were discussed,seeJ.R. Campbell 'The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A
Poligy' undated.Klugmann Papers.
22Workers'Life 26 October 1928.
23Work rs'Life 2 November 1928.

123

Party was almost unanimouslycalled for, and a sharperline of agitation

encouraged.24

The discussionalso gave an opportunity for those within the Party

leadership,and indeedthe International, to propagatemore radical
for
Monthly
Labour
Palme
Dutt's
outlined
editorials
political perspectives.
rigorously (and monotonously') the 'critical' nature of the Third Period.
Revolutionary zeal was applied to eventsin Britain; the likes of James
Maxton were subjectedto vicious political attacks;the need for
'independentleadership'was constantly touted (though never clearly
defined); and as early as September1928,Dutt was proposing that the
theory of social fascismbe applied to developmentsin the UK. 25

Jack Murphy too, issueda seriesof inflammatory articles in both Workers'

Life and the CommunistRevieW.26Thesewere particularly significant in
that although basedaroundissuesof policy, they sought to identify the
1vacillators'and 'conciliators' who were holding the Party back.27
Moreover, younger communistssuch as John Mahon, beganto question
the Party's existing trade union policy. "The main strength of reformism is
Commons
but
in
its
in
House
140
Labour
the
the
of
not
representatives
...
domination over the trade union movement" he wrote, going so far as to

24Seefor example'H. Ss' letter in Workers'Life 9 November 1928, which insisted that
"the Party may as well seekaffiliation with the ConservativeParty." Also Olive Budden's
letter in the sameissuethat declaredthere was "one choice - either with the Communist
Party and the workers, or with the capitalistsagainstthe workers." 25LabourMonthly September1928."The essentialprocessof fascism is being
accomplishedin the more advancedcapitalist countries through legal-democratic forms"
Dutt wrote, after quoting Rinaldo Rigola's commentthat developmentsin Britain were no
different to thosein Italy.
26TheCommunist Review was known as The Communist throughout 1928.
27Forexample,'Is There a'RighV Danger in our Party'. In The Communist November
1928.Seealso Workers'Life 26 October 1928.Communist Review January 1929.Tom
Bell and Johnny Campbell seemedto receive the bulk of Murphy's criticism, mainly for
their continued support for the NLWM.

124

dismissprevious "concessions"gainedby the unions as "grantedby

capitalism during its period of expansionin order to ... avoid unnecessary
interruptions in the extraction of surplusvalue."28Mahon effectively
belittled the whole trade union tradition.

Such opinion was bolsterednot only by thoseBritish delegateswho

1129
from
Sixth
"new
World
Congress
the
union
compleX,
returned
with a
but also by the RILU. In October 1928the imaginatively titled Red
International of Labour Unions was issued;primarily as a soapboxfor
Losovsky to propound a more radical industrial policy. Losovsky
condemnedthe 'reformist' trade unions as "tools in the handsof the
bourgeoisstate" and called for communiststo lead the workers "without"
the official union apparatusand if necessary,"against it. " Communists
were urged to look towards the unorganisedworkers for support, while
subjugation to trade union moreswas scornfully dismissedas "legalism."
And while the needto work inside the trade unions was underlined by
Losovsky, his polemics also urged communistsnot to shy away from splits
occurring within the existing organisations.30

While such a viewpoint alienatedcommunistssuch as Harry Pollitt and

Arthur Homer, who regardedthe trade unions as a fundamentalcomponent
of the class struggle, for other comrades,the scenariooutlined by
Losovsky related closely to eventsunfolding around them. In Scotland for
instance,communist influence in Fife had provoked the formation of a
breakawayunion (The Fife Association) under W.C Adamson.31The
28LabourMonthly December 1928.
29j.R. Campbell,The Mining Situation in Great Britain. A. J. Cook: A Policy
undated.
Klugmarm Papers.
30RedInternational of Labour Unions October 1928and November 1928.
31Adamsonformed the Fife Association on the eve of Philip Hodge's
election as General
Secretaryof the Fife Union. (Hodge was a memberof the Minority Movement.) Once it

125

subsequentsupport given to Adamsonby the Scottish Mineworkers

Executive, appearedto embody the 'treacherousrole of the reformist
bureaucracy.' And in the wake of similar eventsin Lanarkshire,the CPGB
establishedthe United Mineworkers of Scotland

(UMS).

32

In London too, where the NUT&GW refusedto support striking workers

at Rego Clothiers Ltd., many communists- including SamElsbury, the
London organiserfor the NUT&GW - becameconvinced of the needto
createalternative union organisations.In March 1929,Elsbury got his
way, and the United Clothing Workers' Union (UCWU) was established
under the auspicesof the CPGB and the Minority Movement.

Finally, the Swansea TUC verified the more militant ECCI line in the
minds of many communists. The endorsement of the Mond-Turner talks,
and the launching of an enquiry into 'disruptive elements' inside the trade
union movement, gave an enormous amount of credence to the more
radical arguments of Elsbury, Mahon and Losovsky. 33In Birmingham and
Bradford for instance, Party discussions favouring 'red' trade unions were
reported in September 1928.34

becameclear that the MM would dominate the union apparatus,the Scottish Executive
sought to postponethe annual conference,and refused to recognisecommunist union
representatives.
321nLanarkshire,despitethe Presidenctand Secretaryof the district union being MM
representatives,the 'old' Executive remainedpredominantly opposedto Communist/MM
influence. Subsequently,legislative attemptswere madeto declareCP or MM delegates
ineligible for union office. For more detail on thesedevelopmentsee,R. Martin,
Communism and the British Trade Union Movement op. cit. pp90-93. L. J. Macfarlane,
The British Communist Party op. cit. pp265-270. W. Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde.
(London, 1990, first printed 1936).pp272-276.D. Proudfoot and J. McArthur, Barriers o
the Bureaucrats.Fife BreaksThrough. (MM pamphlet, 1929).
33SeeNational Minorily Movement Information Bulletin September1928.Tanner
Collection.
34Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pggrty Great Britain 24-26
of
September1928.Klugmann Papers.Ernest Brown reported the debates,and claimed to
be very 'perturbed'by their conclusions.

126

The emergenceof such militancy and the support it engenderedin sections

of the CPGB, led to a polarisation of opinion within (and between)the
central and District leadership.The influential London District Party
becamea key centre of the leftist outlook within the CP. Members of the
CP Executive who favoured a more militant Party line, such as R.W.
Robson (the London District Secretary)and SamElsbury, held prominent
William
Secretary
YCL,
London
DPC.
The
the
whose
positions within
Rust was electedto the ECCI at the Sixth World Congress,also had a
Rust
Dutt,
influence
by
Palme
Encouraged
and
the
sizeable
across capital.
Cohen,
Rose
including
Walter
Tapsell,
Stuart
Purkis
and
young militants
led the inter-Party offensive againstthe 'right danger.'35And on the
Tyneside and Scottish District Party Committees,a vociferous and prolific
opposition developedthroughout 1929.

Initially, debatefocusedsolely on the practical political implications of the

New Line.36However, the uncertainty at the heart of the Comintern and,
'right',
ECCI
the
the
the
offensive
against
of
primacy
more precisely,
As
left
leadership.
CPGB
the
turn
the
such,
effectively compromised
Party
desire
the
CPGB
by
the
the
of
membership,and
reflected
undertaken
in many caseswent beyond the parametersof the ECCI line.

On affiliation, the Party was unanimous in dropping its seemingly futile

influence
The
further
communist
endorsed
campaign.
safeguardsagainst

35L.J. Macfarlane makesa similar point in The British Communist Pally op. cit. p218.
The fact that such young radicals correspondedwith Palme Dutt is also significant, given
Dutt's sensitivity to the Comintern line. SeeR.P. Dutt Letter to the Central Committee 3
August 1929.BL. Dutt lists Groves,Purkis, Mahon and Shepardfrom the London Party,
Stewart and Proudfoot from the Scottish, and Fergusonfrom Tyneside, as potential new
leaders.Interestingly, Purkis and Groves were to becomeTrotskyists in 1931-2. Also,
R.P. Dutt Letter to Rea Groves 27 November 1929.BL
361ndeed,
it was such a focus that led the ECCI to accusethe CPGB of perceiving the
New Line as "chiefly an electoral policy. " SeeClosed Lette op. cit.

127

by the 1928 Labour Party Conference, 37convinced William Rust that the
Labour Party had "completed the transformation

into a social
...

democratic party. " A verdict with which the Party agreed unaniMOUSly.38
Moreover, in line with the militant spirit of the Sixth World Congress, the
Executive also resolved to recommend that the trade unions disaffiliate
from the Labour Party. 39

Other issuesproved more contentioushowever. At the core of the New

Line was the belief that the Labour Party could no longer be transformed
into a revolutionary instrument of classstruggle. As such,Harry Pollitt
(reiterating his argumentfrom January),Jack Murphy, Walter Tapsell and
PalmeDutt all questionedthe existenceof the NLWM. Calls for its
liquidation were madeon the groundsthat it was "no longer simply an
opposition movementwithin the Labour Party, but a national political
its
Party
Labour
the
with
own political programme
organisationoutside
between
Labour
the
standing
candidates
and
and national organisation,
Even Ralph Bond, the NLWM
Party and the CommunistParty.1140
Secretary,supportedthe movement'sliquidation. Following the enforced
disaffiliation of militant Labour locals, Bond admitted at the closedsession
in
NLWM
the
Congress,
Tenth
Party
the
the
were
of
workers
majority
of
no longer membersthe Labour Party. Consequently,after numerous

37Theseincluded the barring of affiliated organisationsfrom promoting, or associating

with the promotion of, parliamentaryand municipal candidatesin opposition to Labour.
Denying eligibility to delegateswho opposedLabour candidatesor belonged to a political
party ineligible for affiliation; and prohibiting local Labour Parties from sharing a
political platform with those ineligible for affiliation. SeeL. J. Macfarlane, The British
Communist Parjy op. cit. pp214-216.
38Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 12 October
1928.The PB voted unanimouslyto drop the affiliation campaignon 6 November 1928,
and the CC concurredon 19 November 1929. Klugmann Papers.
39Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PaM of Great Britain 18-19
November 1928.Klugmann Papers.This was to causeproblems for the CPGB later. See
below.
40Duttin Communist Review January 1929.

128

dissolution
had
the
of the movement,and with the
speeches recommended
41
for
influential
London
DistriCt,
the
the
resolution
calling
endorsementof
by
defeated
55
for
NLWM
the
votes to 52.42
was
continued support

The majority of the Party leadership had favoured the retention of the
NLWM, perceiving it to be an essential element in the struggle against the
Labour Party bureaucracy. Although the role of the Left Wing Move ment
needed to be modified the leadership reasoned, the NLWM remained a
43
CP.
between
left
the
valuable point of contact
wing workers and
militant
Subsequently, the defeat of the leadership's resolution at the Tenth
Congress clearly revealed the extent of the leftward momentum within the
CPGB. Furthermore, the liquidation of the NLWM went beyond the
recommendations of the ECCI. Even the intervention of William Rust,
who informed the congress of Comintern support for a Left Wing
Movement, did not prevent the Party rank and file dragging the CPGB to
the left. 44

Differences of opinion also emergedin relation to the Party's approachto

the Cook-Maxton campaign.The campaignhad been instigated by the ILP
M. P. John Wheatley, with the intention of propagating a socialist agenda
Parliamentary
As
the
Labour
Party.
the
of
and
members
prominent
within
industrial left wing, JamesMaxton and Arthur Cook headedthe crusade,
41TheLondon DPC had voted againstthe Party'sresolution on the NLWM at its District
Party Conferencein December 1928.The Tyneside District only supportedthe Party
resolution by fourteen votes to thirteen. SeeWorkers' Life 14 December 1928.
42Forarticles calling for the liquidation of the NLWM seeJack Murphy in The
CommunistNovember 1928; Harry Pollitt in Workers'Life II January 1929; Walter
Tapsell in Workers Life 14 December 1928; and Palme Dutt in Communist Review
January 1929.For the Congressspeechesand vote seeNotes on the I Othand II th
Congresses.Klugmann Papers.Also, Workers' Life 25 January 1929.
43Forthe majority argument in favour of the NLWM, seeTom Bell's article in Workers'
Life 26 October 1926.Bell describedthe NLWM as a 'bridge' betweenthe CP and the
Labour Party.
44Noteson the I Othand II th Congresses.Klugmann Papers.

129

and a manifesto of limited demandswas publicised through

demonstrationsand the SundgyWorker. Although the campaignwas
interpretedinitially as evidenceof a'leftward trend'by the CPGB - and
William Gallacher and the NLWM had beeninstrumental in its
Labour
the
Cook
Maxton
to
reform
were
attempting
emergence45
and
Party from within; a conceptthat contrastedwith a basic tenet of the New
Line.

At the Sixth World Congresstherefore, the British delegationdiscussed

the issueand recommendedthat the Party "ruthlessly expose"the
campaign.46To endorsethe manifesto was to mislead the massesinto
believing the Labour Party representedthe interestsof the working classit
was argued,while Cook and Maxton personified the manoeuvresof the
'shamleft.' Although the Party Executive resolved to 'sharpen'its critique
it
from
Murphy, Dutt, and Rust,
however,
took
the
agitation
of
manifesto
before
from
ECCI,
Party
further
the
the
cameout
pressure
along with
47
the
campaign.
openly against

The questionof misleadingthe workers was similarly raised by Jack

Murphy in relation to the political levy. Paymentof the levy implied that
the unions could overtly influence the political perspectiveof the Labour
Party, Murphy argued.And although such a theory found little support
Murphy's
leadership,
Party
the
reasoningwas echoedwithin
among
central

45W. Gallacher,The Rolling of the Thunder (London, 1948).pp97-99.

46Letterfrom the British Delegation to the Political Bureau 2 August 1928.Klugmann
Papers.
47SundgyWorker 6 January 1929,and Instructions for the Comintern Delegateto the
Conferenceof the CPG13.Communist Archive. In October 1928,the PB voted by seven
votes to three to attendthe next Cook-Maxton meeting despitea memo from Rust
insisting that the Party changeits line. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist
PLr!y of Great Britain 12 October 1928.Klugmann Papers.

130

the Party Districts. 48Even so, the majority on the Party Executive resolved
to continue paying the levy, while simultaneously campaigning for local
branches
intended
to
Such
to
union
allow
was
a strategy
union control.
finance locally elected (and therefore potentially communist) candidates
for political office. 49

With regard to industrial strategy,attemptswere madeby both the RILU

Party
CPGB
to
the
existing
radically overhaul
and young militants within
Congress
the
Fourth
belated
Losovsky's
Despite
the
of
portrayal of
policy.
RILU as the birthplace of the New Line, prior to the Sixth World Congress
the Minority Movement remainedcommitted to "transforming the trade
the
1150
In
into
the
the
of
midst
of
class
struggle.
weapons
effective
unions
left
however,
'right'
the
the
turn
to
the
the
and
against
offensive
As
Losovsky
such,any
gained
considerable
momentum.
perspectiveof
dismissed
'transforming'
the
apparatus
was
as a rightist
union
question of
illusion, and communistswere instructedto work in opposition to the
independently
lead
the
of
to
workers
trade
and organise
unions;
existing
the bureaucracy;and exposethe left wing inside the unions as treacherous
51
agentsof capitalism.

Although the more militant agenda of the RILU was never completely

by
Executive
its
the
by
ECCI,
were
utilised
the
concepts
many of
endorsed
'right.
'
from
distinct
the
that
develop
of
so-called
to
a theoretical platform
481nthe Political Bureau, Murphy was in a minority of one. In the CC he receivedthe
Sheffield,
both
London
In
the policy of the
ldris
Cox
Percy
Glading.
and
of
and
support
Party Executive was defeated.Tyneside and Dundeealso recordedconsiderable
opposition. Workers'Life 14 December 1928.
49Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist PgM of Great Britain 6 November
1928. Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 18-19
November 1928.Klugmann Papers.
5OReportof the Fourth Congressof the RILU op. cit. p 100.
51Foran early statementon the revised strategyof the MM, see Statementon Strike
StrategyJanuary 1929.Tanner Collection

131

Such irresolution however, induced division and confusion within the

CPGB. While the Party leadershipacceptedthe "capitulation of the former
'lefts' to the right wing, " and the 'ever closer alliance' of the trade unions
and the capitalist state,as a theoretical basis,the practical application of an
effective industrial policy proved more diffiCUlt.52For example,the
formation of 'red'trade unions promptedvariant reactionswithin the
CPGB, and the issueplaced the Party leadershipin regular opposition to
the Profintern.

Thus, while the establishmentof the UMS and UCVYFU

reflected the advent
of the Party's left turn, the CP leadershipsuccessfullyresistedthe
establishmentof'red'trade unions where conditions were deemed
unfavourable.53By way of illustration, the TUC's proposedexpulsion of
the National Union of Seamen(NUS) inspired the British delegationto the
Sixth World Congressto recommendthe formation of a'red'altemative. 54
The CP leadership(and Harry Pollitt in particular) resistedhowever, and
proposedinsteadthe establishmentof a seaman'ssectionwithin the

52SeeCampbell's'Thesison Party Trade Union Policy to be Submitted to the Tenth

Congressof the CPGB.' In The CommunistNovember 1928.Campbell presentedthis to
the CC of 24-26 September1928.Seealso'Thesis on Party Trade Union Policy'. In The
New Line: Documentsof the Tenth Congressof the CPGB. Held at Bermondsv. London
On JanuM 19-22 1929 (London, 1929). pp87-101
53Theformation of the UCWU was not unanimously acceptedby the CP. While Elsbury
had majority support amongstunion membersin London, he did not have the backing of
the majority of the union as a whole. Subsequently,although the decision to form the
union was supportedby the CPGB in March 1929,Harry Pollitt would later insist that:
"on the basis of the conditions presentedfor the formation of new unions, I would have
opposedits [the UCWU] formation." Minutes of the Central Committee of the
Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929.Klugmann Papers.Pollitt
consideredattemptsto set up'red'trade unions would make the Party "look ridiculous."
Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 24-26
September,1928.Klugmann Papers.For more detailed discussionon the UCWU see,
S.W. Lemer BreakawgyUnions and the Small Union (London, 1961).pp85-143.
53Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PM of Great Britain 7-11
August 1929.Klugmann Papers.The "fascist nature" of the NUS was outlined by the
delegation.
54Minutesof the Political Bureau the CommunisLEgly
of
of Great Britain 25 October
1928.Klugmann Papers.

132

Minority Movement, and the transference of the NUS membership to the

TGWU. 55Although such a policy provoked a letter ftom Tom Bell in
Moscow, who informed the PB of the RILU's insistence on anew union, 156
the Party held firm. "At this moment (a new union] would not stand a
from
ECCI
57
And
Pollitt.
the
refrained
subsequently,
chance" maintained
58
its
ftill
behind
RILU
poliCy.
authority
putting

Other trade union issuesalso proved divisive. For Johnny Campbell,

Arthur Homer and Harry Pollitt, the "possibilities of utilising the trade
union machine from the inside [were far] from

For
"59
their
exhausted.
...

comradeson the left however, most vocally John Mahon, Walter Tapsell,
and Stuart Purkis, the Party line "must be away from" the existing
unions.60An exchangebetweenPollitt and Mahon was consequently
Labour
MonLhly,
in
the
of
with three topics predominant:
pages
published
the question of unorganisedworkers; the definition of the united front
from below and the formation of factory committees;and work in the
existing unions.

The notion of mobilising unorganisedworkers was acceptedby all

degrees.
Speaking
differing
Party,
to
though
the
as a skilled
sectionsof
boilermaker, Pollitt insisted that a "large proportion of the unorganised"
he
falling
"61
Even
trade
"backward.
that
"apathetic"
so,
accepted
were
and
551bid.
56Letter to the Political Bureau of the CPGB 30 October 1928. Klugmann Papers.
57Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 18 November
1928. Klugmann Papers.
58The Party line towards the NIJS was criticised at the Sixth MM Conference. See Now
for Action! The Policy of the National Minorijy Movement. A Report of the Sixth Annual
Conference (London, 1929). p22.
59Harry Pollitt, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pggy of Great Britain
22-24 September 1928. Klugmann Papers.
60Walter Tapsell, Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLM
of Great
Britain 23-25 March 1929. Klugmann Papers.
61Labour Monthly August 1929.

133

union membershipand victimisation meant a number of militant workers

existed outsidethe union organisation.In contrast,John Mahon believed
the workers were actively leaving trade unions in responseto the official
leaderships'inability to fight. Mahon claimed that 'unorganisedstruggles'
at the Rego clothiers in London, and Austins in Birmingham, revealedthat
the "desire of the working class for militant trade unions to organisetheir
struggle is as strong as ever.1162

The basic criteria for a 'united front from below' - factory committees,
bulletins and independentleadership- were also acceptedby Pollitt and
Mahon. However, the more militant perspectiveregardedthe formation of
factory and/or workers committeesas "the beginning of [a] new union.1163
Such initiatives were to be completely free from official union influence
Mahon argued,with control administeredby the workers themselvesunder
the guidanceof the JW.64This was repudiatedby Pollitt, who saw the
in
back
"lead
the
to
to
them
organise
workers
order
means
committeesas a
into unions to smashthe leadership."65

The extent and objectives of work inside the existing trade unions proved
to the most divisive questionhowever. While Pollitt insisted on the
intensification of suchwork, Mahon took a far more extremeview. A
communistpresencein the union should be gearedprimarily towards
leaders
and
union
with "no
encouragingaction againstemployers
concessionsto union discipline," he argued.As for leading the
unorganisedworkers back into the unions, Mahon rhetorically asked
62LabourMonthly June 1929.
63LabourMonthly October 1929.SeeHomees report of the MM
conference,'The
Minority Conferenceand the TUC'.
"Labour Monthl June 1929.
65Minutesof the Central Committee the Communist PaM
of
of Great Britain 7-11
August 1929.Klugmann Papers.Labour Monthly August 1929.

134

included
"committed
Mondism,
led
by
bureaucrats
to
this
whether
a union
lower
in
fact
dictatorship
the
the
organs
of
unions,
over
exercising a
"66
by
fascist
the
means?
goveming
membership

In the final instance,the Sixth Minority Movement conferenceof August

1929adopteduniformly theprinciples of the New Line. "We must build
the Minority Movement so that it becomesthe massopposition in the
factory and trade union," Pollitt reported, and endeavourto make it "the
new national trade union centre."67Pressurefrom the RILU ensuredthat
the MM acceptedits numerous'vacillations and mistakes',and a more
explicit class analysis of Mondism and trade union bureaucracywas
inserted into the conferenceresolutions at the bequestof Losovsky.68In
terms of policy however, the conferencefell somewherebetweenthe lines
of Mahon and Pollitt.

The formation of factory committeesand the establishmentof councils of

industrial
the
to
non-union
workers
at
of
point
action organiseunion and
Similarly,
by
'constitutional
both
the
conference.
endorsed
struggle, were
denounced.
But
legalism'
'trade
communist activity
were
union
action' and
inside the 'official' trade unions was not substitutedfor a purely
independentleadership,nor did it diminish in importance.On the contrary,
communistsand membersof the Minority Movement were to wage "a

66LabourMonthly June 1929.

67Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist PaW of Great Britain 7 September
1929.
68Letterfrom the RILU to the Executive Committee of the National MinorijY Movement
15 August 1929.Tanner Collection. Eight amendmentsto the draft conferenceresolution
were recommended.The needto outline previous errors; the need to establishcontact
with colonial trade union movements;the sharpeningof the conferenceline towards
Mondism; the intensification of the line against'bureaucraticmanoeuvres';the needto
augmentthe UMS and UCWU; a more rigorous analysisof the Austins,strike; the need
for closer contact with the Pan-Pacificand Latin-American secretariats;and the need for
an increasein work amongwomen

135

more determinedstruggleto securethe official positions in the union

branchesand districts; to maintain those positions by rallying the masses
in support of our policy againstthe bureaucracy;to campaignfor more
affiliations and closer connectionswith branchesaffiliated; in all casesto
bring to union meetingsthe day to day struggle in the factories,and to turn
the union apparatustowards the factories."69

As for Pollitt's insistenceon leading the unorganisedworkers into the

unions, the final report statedthat "on the basis of our masssupportand
influence in the factorieswe can then organisethe unorganisedinto the
trade unions asnew forces coming to the support of the revolutionary
workers already fighting under our leadershipin the trade unions against
the existing treacherousleadership[my emphasis].1170

Thus, the trade union policy of the CPGB had a far broader basis,and was
far lesssectarianthan historians have subsequentlyaccountedfor. As with
so many aspectsof the New Line, the divisions within the Party related to
by
left
inaugurated
71
The
the
the
turn
of
momentum
points of emphasiS.
onsetof the Third Period, and the ECCI's insistenceon the 'struggle
itself.
The New Line
CPGB
danger,
'
the
the
at war with
set
against
right
could be interpretedin a numberof different ways, and while the
leadershipdebatedits connotations,it was left to the Party rank and file to
embodya policy that pitted classagainstclass.

69Now for Action!

op. cit. pp 13-15.
701bid. p 13. Similar
statements were made at the Eleventh CPGB Congress in November.
See Resolutions of the Eleventh Conaress of the Communist P=
of Great Britain
(London, 1929). pp22-23. "The necessity for an independent leadership in no way
signifies a weakening of our work in the unions. "
71By focusing
on the conditions needed to form new unions, and on work inside the
existing unions, Rust suggested that Pollitt "distorts the general line of the [Tenth
Plenum] Resolution. " Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Partv
of Great
Britain 7-11 August 1929. Klugmann Papers.

136

A Partial Implosion: The Right Danger and the Struggle for Stability
The disagreementsover policy that blighted the CPGB in 1928-29 were
exacerbatedby the intervention of the ECCI in the wake of the Tenth Party
Congress.Throughout 1929therefore,the debateon the New Line was
focusedprimarily upon theoretical formulations and the characterof the
British leadership.As such,questionsof theory, or the reasonsfor
1920s.
life
inter-Party
the
the
communist policy, predominated
at
end of

As John Mahon later noted, the ECCI intervened in Party affairs because
the leadership"did not presentany general line for discussion but put
...
forward only resolutions on separateissues."72Consequently,the ECCI
dispatchedJosefLenz to the Tenth Congressof the CPGB with
instructions to determineBritish explanationsfor the 'new course',and to
"ascertainwherein the 'right tendencies'are finding their expression."73
Thus, the amendmentsto the congressresolutions suggestedby Lenz were
concernedpredominantly with the theoretical basis of the Party line, as
insisted
Lenz
CPGB
its
the
to
more acutely
expression.
opposed
practical
outline the disintegration of British capitalism, the radicalisation of the
working class,and the fusion of the labour movementwith the capitalist
"constitute
ECCI
"All
the
the basis for
together"
these
things
argued,
state.
the new tactics of the Party."74

Suchrevisions were clearly designedto make explicit the reasonsfor the

New Line and to eliminate inconsistencieswithin the Party programme.
Passageswere addedto the text to confirm a more militant definition of
72j. Mahon, Hg=Pollitt.
A Biouqp
(London, 1976). pl59.
731nstructions for the Comintern Delegate to the Conference
of the CPGB. Communist
Archivc.
741bid.

137

the Third Period. Thus, the ECCI recommendedthat the phrase,"mighty

upheavalswhich shatterthe temporary and precariousstabilisation and
be
"
the
the
thesis
to
on
added
the
capitalism,
sharpen generalcrisis of
'PresentSituation and the Tasks of the Party'. Similarly, an additional
75
Cook
AJ.
'mistakes'
the
suggested.
was
of
paragraphcondemning

The sweepingcriticisms of the 'Closed Letter' sentto the Party by the

ECCI in February 1929,similarly emphasisedthe theoretical basisof the
Third Period. "The chief difference betweenthe generalline of the central
committee and the congressis to be found in the attitude towards capitalist
Britain"
Great
in
the
prospectsof a revolutionary struggle
stabilisation and
the ECCI insisted.76It was a perceiveddisbelief in the imminent collapse
'right
to
British
the
mistakes',that set
refusal
recognise
and
capitalism,
of
the ECCI againstthe CPGB leadership.

The Party's failure to comply with the prevailing theoretical orthodoxy of

decisions
by
Comintern
regardedas
the
were exacerbated political
inconsistentwith the New Line. The exclusion of Robin PageArnot and
William Rust from a list of Central Committee nominations presentedto
interpreted
for
Congress
as a slight against
Tenth
Party
the
example,was
British
the
Arnot
two
Page
Comintern.
Rust
of
were
the
and
77
Even
New
Line.
keen
the
ECCI,
of
the
proponents
and
representativeson

75Ibid. Other examplesincluded the needfor a greateremphasison the war danger;an

line
Movement;
Wing
in
Left
clear
the
and
a
the
analysisof
various elements
demonstratingthat left wingers such as Maxton and Cook were "against" the Party.
76CIosedLetter op. cit.
77TheECCI regardedthis as a'demonstrationagainstthe Comintern. The CPGB claimed
PageArnot and Rusts'commitmentsto the Cl would not allow them to fully participate
in the CC. In the final outcome,after Rust and PageArnot had appearedat the congress
and demonstratedagainsttheir exclusion,their nominations were put to the membership.
PageArnot was voted onto the Executive, William Rust was not. Rust'sconversion to the
New Line occurredat the Sixth World Congress.Prior to August 1928,he had sided with
the'majority' in the Party leadership.

138

more alarming from the ECCI's perspective,was Campbell, Rothstein and

Inkpin's vote in favour of endorsingLabour candidatesin non-Party
constituencies.78That three membersof the British Political Bureau
advocateda policy antithetical to the New Line, presentedclear evidence
of a 'right deviation' at the heart of the CPGB.

A dwindling membershipand a disastrousGeneralElection performance

also focusedthe ECCI's attention on the British Party. As noted below, the
Party leadershipwas invited to Moscow in June 1929to discusschangesin
personnel,while the Tenth ECCI Plenum featurednumerousreferencesto
the deficienciesof the CPGB. Dmitri Manuilsky accusedthe Party of
"wavering for a long time" over the New Line, and of supporting the
policy through "discipline" rather than "conviction. "79Several'right
mistakes'were subsequentlylisted,80and Walter Ulbricht demandeda
"new active" British leadershipthat could "be counted upon to carry out
consistently the line of the Intemational."81

Manuilsky's concluding speechfocusedspecifically on the CPGB. The

British Party was "too polite" he insisted, a "society of fhends" in which a
"little breach" was necessary.
82Calling for the "least deviation" to be
78Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PgrM of Great Britain 23-25
March 1929.Klugmann Papers.GeorgeAitkin and Frank Bright also voted in favour of
supporting Labour Party candidates.The British delegationto the Sixth World Congress
had dismissedboth 'abstentionism'and voting Labour. Circular to all Locals and District
Pgr1yCommittees 18November, 1928.Klugmann Papers.By May however, the Party
decidedthat on no occasionshould the Party recommendvoting Labour, and Bob
Stewart drafted a report on'Effective Abstentions'.The PB subsequentlyrecommended
writing'Conununism'on the ballot paper.To all Districts and Locals where no
Communist P= Candidateis in the Field. PB Statement27 May 1929. Klugmann
Papers.
791npreco 20 August 1929.
80TheCommunist International I October 1929.Otherright'
mistakes included
succumbingto a mood of depressionfollowing the General Strike, the Partys attitude to
the Cook-Maxton campaign,and its exposureof'lefV deviations rather than'right. 1
811npreco 20 August 1929.
821bid.

139

attacked, Manuilsky pointed towards the example of the KPD, and

demandedthat the Party "eradicatefrom its ranks all remnantsof right
opportunist deviation."83In the lead up to the Eleventh Party Congressof
November 1929,the CPGB attemptedto do just that.

Criticism of the CPGB also came from within, not least from William
Rust. As a member of the ECCI, Rust harried and reprimanded the British
Party leadership throughout 1929. At an ECCI Presidium held to discuss
the CPGB in February for example, Rust condemned unreservedly the
"passive attitude" of the Party leadership, castigating Johnny Campbell for
attempting to "minimise the importance" of the New Line, and bemoaning
a catalogue of 'right errors' supposedly committed by the Party. Although
Tom Bell and Harry Pollitt had sought to defend their British comrades,
the 'Closed Letter' to the Party Executive that proceeded the Presidium was
uncannily similar to the tirade unleashed by Rust. 84

Meetings of the Party leadershipwere similarly dominated by

disagreementsand in-fighting. The March Executive held to discussthe
'ClosedLetter' of the ECCI, included heateddebatesbetweenCampbell,
Tapsell and Gallacher,with redrafted resolutionsand miscellaneous
amendmentsclearly revealing the divergent perspectiveswithin the Party.
While Campbellwould only acceptthe ECCI's criticisms of the CPGB "in
general- and complainedabout "right wing mistakesthat were never
made"- Tapsell fully endorsedthe ECCI letter, and proposedto use it "as
a platfonn for the correction of the admitted right wing mistakes." The

83Theseson the International Situation and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist
International (London, 1929).
84Speeches
of the British Delegationto the Presidiumof the ECCI 13 February 1929.
Kluginann Papers.

140

later
be
Tapsell's
'exposed'by
amendment
would
voted
against
nine who
Rust as archetypes of the 'right' tendency within the CPGB. 85

Moreover, the debateswithin the leadershipwould often descendedinto a

Tommy
Jackson
insults
Just
as
would refer to
accusation.
and
mire of
Gallacher as a "bloody liar" for his acceptanceof the ECCI's 'Closed
Letter', so Arthur Homer would chargeRust of "never [seeing] the
in
from
"86
The
result of such
and
platforms.
working classexcept pictures
tension had ramifications throughout the Party. Not only did it hinder
dissent
in
fanned
but
it
leadership
the Party
the
at
centre,
also
effective
Districts.

The mounting uneasewithin the Party leadershipwas complimentedand

heightenedin the Party branchesand DPCs. As the content of the'Closed
Letter'became known, the focus of debateshifted away from Party policy
(and
London
Tyneside
led
leadership
to
culpability).
and
capability
and on
the way in such criticism, two Districts with an influential and vocal left
87
keen
implement
to
poliCy.
radical
a
more
communist
wing

85Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 23-25
March 1929.Klugmann Papers.Report of Voting in the Executive Committee and
Political Bureau from the Tenth to the Eleventh Congress.Communist Archive. The nine
were Campbell, Inkpin, Hannington, Allan, Ferguson,Jackson,Turner, Kerrigan and
Wilson. Finally, an amendmentby Rothstein sought to balancethe disagreement.It stated
that the CC endorsedthe main line of the letter, but was not committed to 'every one of
the detailed illustrations' listed therein. Tapsell, Gallacher, Campbell and Jossvoted
againstit.
86Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PM of Great Britain 23-25
March 1929.Klugmann Papers.Jacksonwas often spurred into invective. At the August
CC he said to Tapsell, "if the idea is that you are revolutionary if you are a hooligan, and
then the sooner it [the Party] is abolishedthe better." Minutes of the Central
offensive,
...
Committee of the Communist Pa!U of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929.Klugmarm
Papers.
87TheLondon Distr ict included Dutt and Rusfs prot6g6sin the YCL, including Purkis,
Groves and Tapsell.,Tyneside was led by Lily Webb (a member of the CC) and Maurice
Ferguson,both of whom held views on the left of the Party.

141

The TynesideDistrict had alreadyclashedwith the centre in connection

dispute
(see
below).
88
And
Dawdon
during
Party
the
colliery
with
practice
this was followed in July by a strongly worded resolution that claimed the
Party was "drifting to isolation and impotence." A "national Party
Congress"was demanded,"to review Party policy and ... elect a new
leadershipwhich will operatethe new line."89The London District
in
leadership
Party
for
the
addition to the
of
an overhaul
similarly called
'Closed
Letter,
discussions
Executive
the
and an
and
publication of
immediateParty Congress.90By all accounts,the meeting of the London
Aggregatein July 1929was a bitter affair. Reg Groves, a young left wing
"dishonest
Wilson's
later
Rothstein
Party,
the
and
recalled
memberof
defenceof the Party leadership",and the angercausedby their "abuseof
the District Committee."91Meanwhile, the six-hour meeting was reported
to the CC by R.W. Robsonand Wal Hannington. The London District
Secretarydescribedthe aggregateas "abhorrent," while the unemployed
leaderreportedthe "disgraceftil" behaviour of Groves,Young, Purkis and
Bond. They actedas "a pack" said Hannington,with the apparentobjective
92
leadership.
debasing
the
existing
of

Following the Tenth Plenumhowever, the leadershipwas forced to

"welcome" the mounting tide of criticism, as the Party openedthe debate
93The result was an avalancheof
in preparationfor a November CongresS.
focus
discussion
the
of
main
centred
condemnationand rejection, with

88SeeFergusorfsarticle'Lessons of the Dawdon Struggle' Communist Review August

1929.
89Resolutionof the Tyneside District Pgty Committee 9 July 1929. Klugmann Papers.
"The Communist International October 1929.SeeResolution on the Closed letter of The
ECCI adoptedat the London aggregatemeeting 20 July 1929.Klugmann Papers.
91R.Groves,The Balham Group op. cit. pp2l-22.
92Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Ppjjy of Great Britain 7-11
August 1929.Klugmann Papers.
93CommunistReview September1929.

142

by
Spurred
ECCI,
Executive.
Party
the
the
the
the
and
on
conduct
of
upon
"Bolshevik
Palme
Dutt,
the
who
praised
of
private and public missives
decisively
Party
Tyneside
Party,
turned
the
the
membership
spirit" of
94
leadership.
the
against

District Party Committeesacrossthe country insisted on a CP 'cleansed'

from'top to bottom'.95The Party's declining membershipand growing
isolation from the wider labour movementwas attributed to 'right errors' in
the leadership,and no Executive memberwas sparedin the searchfor
Central
McNally
Scotland,
In
the
accused
vacillators and conciliators.
Committee of. "dying of old age," and insisted that it "neededburying."
Meanwhile, the ebullience of the left in Tyneside was expressedin the
District Party's condemnationRust and Tapsell, two advocatesof a
ferocious
Gallacher
96
Indeed,
Line.
the
that
New
attacks
were
so
militant
like
it
in
life.
"97
Similar
"never
have
to
anything
my
seen
claimed
in
South
Liverpool,
London,
recorded
and
were
wholesalecriticisms
Wales. And even Palme Dutt, the harbinger of the New Line, was deemed
to have revealedhis 'conciliatory leanings.'98

Although the criticisms aimed at the CPGB leadershipwere encouragedby

the ECCI, it should not be assumedthat the New Line was synonymous

94,
Workers'Life 15 November 1929. R.P. Dutt, Letter to the Central Committee 3 August
1929.Klugmann Papers.R. P. Dutt Messageto the Eleventh PpIV CongressNovember
1929.BL.
95.
Workers'Life 15 November 1929.
96Minutesof the Scottish District Congressundated 1929. Report on the Tyneside
District PaLlyConuess 5-6 October, 1929. In his report of the Tyneside DPC, Gallacher
claimed only Dutt was excluded from the criticisms. Lily Webb accusedWilliam Rust of
having "capitulated to the right. " Klugmann Papers.
97Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 26-27
October 1929.Klugmann Papers.
98Workers'Life 13,20, and 27 September.Also N. Branson, Histojy of the Communist
Pgrly of Great Britain op. cit. pp26-47. For criticism of Dutt, seeWorkers' Life. 29
November 1929.

143

with the left wing agendaexpressedby sectionsof the Party. While the
'right danger'was seento be the primary danger,both the Comintern and
Party leadershipwere awareof incipient ultra-leftism. Subsequently,a
discrepancybetweenthe desiresof the Party rank and file (and comrades
Tapsell)
Ferguson
Mahon,
Purkis,
and
and the objectives of the
as
such
ECCI, was clearly evident.

In contrastto the Party membershipat the Tenth CPGB Congressfor

example,the ECCI recognisedthe importanceof a Left Wing Movement
inside the Labour Party. Its liquidation, the Comintern insisted in its
'ClosedLetter'to the British CC, would "isolate the Party from elements
that might have beenutilised by it, and ... gives an opportunity to the soleft
left
in
Party
Labour
to
their
the
organise
wing ...
called
elements
for
Party's
"99
The
ECCI
to
the
trade union
call
also objected
againstus.
disaffiliation from the Labour Party.100Thus, Lenz's instructions warned of
a CPGB "faced with two dangers";from the'right'and the "ultra-left. " A
"hazy desireto abandonthe struggle inside the existing organisationsand
createnew red unions without taking into considerationthe concretestate
of affairs and the correlation of forces" was recognisedand condemnedby
the ECCI.101As such,Maurice Fergusonwas forced to publicly acceptthe
'left errors' committed by the Tyneside District Party during the Dawdon
102
strike.
colliery

"Instructions for the Comintern Delep-ateto the Conferenceof the CPGB. Communist
Archive, op. cit. Closed Letter op. cit.
10OSuch
a policy "gives rise to the harmful illusion that the trade union bureaucracy
consistsof more progressiveelementsthan the Liberal leadersof the Labour Party.
Closed Letter op. cit.
101Instructions for the Comintem Delegateto the COiference of the CPGB. Communist
Archive. op. cit.
102CommunistReview August 1929. Ferguson'sarticle was principally a tirade against
the 'right' errors of the MM, Harry Pollitt and the Party leadership.However he
'confessed'to "sectarianism"and "rejecting the struggle within the existing unions."

144

PalmeDutt similarly warned that the 'struggle againstthe right' could lead
the Party to "jump to the other extreme."103The communist theoretician
blanket
forced
that
the
to
criticism enveloping the Party in
complain
was
late 1929impededthe "driving forward of policy. " "[We] must be
he
Groves;
disconnected"
Reg
"criticism
but
advised
should
not
merciless
front
"the
has almost gone out
leadership.
"
As
united
such,
show signs of
draft
Eleventh
in
Party
Dutt
the
theses
the
the
of
relation
noted
picture"
of
Congress.104The Party's analysis of an 'acutely revolutionary situation' in
Britain was "dangerousand incorrect." And the Comintern's depiction of
the intensifying contradictions of capitalism and the radicalisation of the
working class,was'robbed of all seriousness'bythe Party's'left'
105

phrases.

Even in the wake of Manuilsky's commandto attack the'least deviation',

the ECCI warned againsta'clean sweep'of the Party Executive.106
Obversely, the Comintern remainedcommitted to Harry Pollitt, whose
in
June
1929
Party
to
the
coincided with wide scale
secretariat
promotion
'
leadership
had
MM
deviation.
Pollitfs
'right
the
of
provoked
of
charges
criticism from both the Profintern and sectionsof the British Party, while
his attitude towards trade union policy contrasted noticeably with the
his
Similarly,
Johnny
Campbell,
of
comrades.
militant
mood
who
more
103R.
P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 17 August 1929. BL.
104R.
P. Dutt, Letter to Reg Groves 27 November 1929.BL.
105R.
P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 25 September1929. BL. The draft theses"fell
into 'left' phrases"wrote Dutt. In a letter to Reg Groves, Dutt complained of the "extraordinary objection to making any fighting demandsof the Labour Government(which is
the very method to exposethem and lead the massesagainst them...), or the fear to
develop any wider massmovementaround the party's leadershipas a'right danger'." R.P.
Dutt, Letter to Reg Groves 27 November 1929. BL.
1060penLetter from the Communist International to the Eleventh Pam Congress.
Klugmann Papers.Seealso Inpreco 29 November 1929. The new CC should be
Itcomposedof the best elementsof the current leadership and of new proletarian
...
'clean
"
For
W.
the
Gallacher'sreferenceto Tyneside,
of
sweep'
an
example
see
elements.
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 26-27
October 1929.Klugmann Papers.

145

in
for
danger'
Party
Districts,
'right
the
the
many
was
personified
leadership
discussions
held
in
included
Party
the
with the
continually
ECCI prior to the Eleventh Congress.

The ECCI's'hands on'responseto the divisions within the CPGB only

initial
Party
1928,
July
In
to
the
the
changes
compounded problem.
hierarchy had seenJ.R. Campbell rise aboveAlbert Inkpin in the CP
secretariat,adoptingthe role of Political Secretaryover Inkpin's position
as BusinessManager.107Even so, the continual loss of membership,and
the Party'swretchedGeneralElection campaign,convinced the ECCI that
further changeswere required. June discussionswith Comintern
in
Western
held
Berlin,
the
the
thus
auspices
of
under
were
representatives
EuropeanBureau (WEB), whereat Harry Pollitt was elevatedto
OrganisationalSecretary.108A Political Bureau of Bell, Pollitt, Campbell,
Gallacher,Murphy, Homer and Rothsteinwas recommended,with
Campbell'srole as Political Secretarycounteredby Pollitt's promotion.

The ensuing Party Executive meeting made a mockery of the WEB's

And
PB
The
however.
was
rejected.
after numerous
suggested
proposals
leadership formations and much counter productive voting, the CC
Campbell
Rothstein,
Homer,
Pollitt,
PB
Bell,
and
of
a
reduced
adopted
Wilson (with Inkpin as a candidate member); and a Secretariat of
Campbell, Pollitt and Inkpin. 109For those expecting a radical overhaul, the
107Reportof the Small Commissionon Central Organisation 6 July 1928.Klugmann
Papers.Campbell out-polled Harry Pollitt for the position. Ernest Brown remainedin
chargeof Party Organisation,and Jack Murphy oversaw the Party'sindustrial department.
108Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist PaM of Great Britain 12 June 1929.
Klugmann Papers.Arthur Homer replacedPollitt as the Secretaryof the National
Minority Movement, while Inkpin was to be dispatchedto work with the Party Districts.
Pollitt's position checkedthe predominanceof Campbell somewhat;a move that reflected
the two men'srelationship to the New Line.
109See
Pollitt's speechto the Eleventh Congress.In Notes on the Tenth and Eleventh
CpGB CoqUess.Also Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PgM Of

146

decision of the Executive was somewhatdisappointing. The YCL

Executive complainedto the ECCI that those to the left of the existing
leadership,namely Gallacher and Murphy, had been excluded.I 10
Subsequently,further discussionswere held between British
delegation
Tenth
ECCI
Plenum.
Russian
the
at
and
representatives

This time a Secretariatof Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher was

Campbell,
Gallacher and
PB
Bell,
Pollitt,
of
recommended,along with a
Homer. Those deemedto have most openly resistedthe New Line Rothstein, Inkpin and Wilson' 12- were dropped altogether. And in order
to bolster the 'left bias' of the PB, Idris Cox and three young London
workers (Moody, Glading;and Herman) were nominated as candidates.' 13
Even so, left wing membersof the Party Executive such as Lily Webb still
danger
from
leadership
to
the 'right." 14
that
the
open
remained
complained

Great Britain 15-16 June, 1929.Klugmann Papers.Rothstein had objectedto the Berlin
proposalsat the PB meeting on 12 June.The various proposalswere submittedby Aitkin
Ferguson,Walter Tapsell and Ernest Brown. Tapsell adoptedthe most'lefv wing
position, with a proposedSecretariatof Murphy, Gallacher and Campbell, and a PB of
Murphy, Gallacher,Campbell, Pollitt, Rothstein, Stewart and Wilson. He was defeatedby
20 votes to one. The WEB recommendationswere defeatedby seventeento nine, and
Ferguson'sby eighteento four. Brown's line up was acceptedby fourteen votes to eleven,
but its small majority led the PB to recommendindividual candidatesfor election to the
PB.
II ONoteon the YCL Executive Committee 26 June 1929.Klugmann Papers.
III Inpreco 12 September.
1121npreco 21 August 1929.Rothstein'searlier resistanceto the Berlin proposals
effectively sealedhis fate, following his previous 'conciliation! to the 'right'. He was sent
to South Wales to gain'contact with the masses.' Inkpin's removal from the PB was due
officially to reasonsof Party stagnation,caution and finance. Tom Bell, Minutes of the
Central Committeeof the Communist PaLtyof Great Britain 7-11 August 1929.His lack
of enthusiasmfor the New Line was the proverbial nail in his coffin, and he was
tsentenced'temporarilyto Party work in Birmingham. Jock Wilson, who had beencoopted onto the PB in July, was also dropped for resistanceto the New Line (and'political
inexperience').
IDSee Pollitfs speechin Notes on the Tenth and Eleventh Congress.Klugmann Papers.
114Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 7-11
August 1929.Klugmann Papers.Webb dismissedthe changesas a "reshuffle."

147

By the Eleventh Party Congress,' 15the Party leadershipwas divided and,

in the'eyesof many rank and file members,discredited. In line with the
Party
ECCI
Dutt
Palme
the
therefore,
the
sought
and
recommendationsof
to remove all "social democraticrelics" from its practice. A'panel system',
implemented,
bloc'
'en
CC
list
was
elected
candidateswas
of
whereby a
116
Although
Executive.
into
Party
drafted
the
'new
elements'were
and
difficulties again hamperedproceedings- Rust disagreedwith Dutt's
CC,
117
be
the
the
"all
tendencies"
and
that
on
represented
recommendation
ECCI delegate,Walter Ulbricht, was forced to insist that a'panel
draw
list
Districts
Party
the
the
of
up
commission'representativeof
Of
leadership
'old'
18
that
the
the
was
replaced.
systemensured
nominees' the 35 nameson the list, only twelve representedthe out-going
Executive.119

As for the Congressitself, the Party endorseda programmebasedupon the

Tenth
ECCI
Period
the
Third
interpretation
the
at
outlined
of
radical
Plenum.Although Harry Pollitt and Wal Hannington attemptedto
by
Congress
the
left
limits
the
turn,
the
characterised
the
was
of
emphasise
fervour of the Party left. Even Rust was provoked to wam the Congress
that there was a "dangerof a swing from right wing to left wing

115The Eleventh Congresswas held in Leeds between30 November and 3 December.

116Memorandurn
from Rajani PalmeDutt to the Central Committee 20 October 1929.
CommunistArchive.
1171bid.
118Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pgrty of Great Britain 29 October
1929.Klugmann Papers.Rust headedthe Panel.
119N
Klugmann Papers.The new CC comprised
.
Rust,
Pollitt,
Campbell,
Gallacher, Murphy, Page
Joss,
Robson,
Tapsell,
Dutt,
Cox,
of
Arnot and Allan, from the'old' leadership.The new memberswere Shields,Moffat,
Usher, Duncan, Moody, Herman,Scott, Williams, Parcell, Coslett, Collins, McGree,
Hoyle, Rushton,Phillipson, Wilde, Gee, Short, Ancrum, Webb, Walsh, Allison, Woolley
forward.
Hannington was voted onto
Individual
themselves
Cree.
also
put
candidates
and
the Executive, but Lily Webb and Maurice Fergusonwere both rejected.The list was
30.
by
52
to
votes
accepted

148

from
be
Congress
120
'mood'
the
"
the
the
can
gleaned
of
while
mistakes,
'stony silence' and subsequentcriticism that met Harry Pollitt's maiden
become
had
Pollitt
Secretary.
Indeed,
Party
noticeably
speechas
withdrawn in the months following his promotion, and the tone of
"hopelessness"that Gallacher noted in Pollitt's report correspondedwith
the Secretary'srecent outpouringsto PalmeDutt. 121

By late 1929therefore, the internal regime of the CPGB was divided and
fragmented.The struggle againstthe right dangerhad brought the Party
in
leadership
discredited
small
a
membership
and
close to collapse,with a
facing
British
difficulties
the
in
But
the
number and rebellious character.
Communist Party as it enteredthe 1930swere more than compositional.
The Party's standing among the working classwas also in disarray, and it
is to the CPGB 'at worle that this chapternow turns.

The Party at Work: The Effect of the New Line

Despite the Comintern's favourable'objective analysis',the politicaleconomic climate of 1928-29 was not conducive to revolutionary
Unemployment
in
Britain.
continued to rise, the
communist activity
in
did
defensive
disputes
few
industrial
that
were
occur
relatively
in
122
The
labour
the
retreat.
rank and
remained
movement
character,and
file trade union membershipmay well have been more willing to resist the
120Noteson the Tenth and Eleventh Congress.Klugmarm Papers.
121K. Morgan, Hquy Pollitt op. cit. pp69-72. Notes on. Klugmann Papers. Jimmy Shields
also criticised Pollitt's speech, claiming that it gave no clear lead to the Party. At a CC
meeting in October, Rust, Gallacher and Stewart all commented on Pollitt's withdrawal
into administrative work, with Rust going so far as to recommend Pollitt's removal.
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 26-27
October 1929. Klugmann Papers. For the relevant correspondence between Pollitt and
Dutt, see Hg= Pollitt Pgpers. Communist Archive.
122The Minisqy of Labour Gazette December 1929. The aggregate number of days lost to
7,000,000 of these
stoppages in 1929 numbered 8,290,000 in December. Approximately
can be attributed to the Lancashire textile disputes. For an overview of the period, see
C. J. Wrigley (Ed. ), A Histoly of British Industrial Relations Vol 111914-1939
op. cit.

149

changescausedby industrial rationalisation than the trade union

leadership,123but such action was generally a1ast ditch' attemptby
workers in the 'old' industriesto maintain their position in a changing
economy.

However, the GeneralElection in May 1929and the onset of industrial

action in the textile, mining, and motor industries,enabledthe CPGB to
disseminateits New Line to broad sectionsof the working class.And as
the Wall StreetCrashsent shock wavesthrough the capitalist world, the
revolutionary perspectiveemergentin the Comintern since 1926,suddenly
had a resonance.

The Dawdon colliery dispute of March-June 1929appearedto justify the

Comintern'sprognosisof'reformist treachery'and worker militancy.
Although the Durham Miners' Association (DMA) recommendedthe
in
cut
piece rates,the Dawdon miners rejected
acceptanceof a proposed
such advice, and resolvedto struggle alone.124The Communist Party
respondedquickly to the workers initiative. The Tyneside DPC established
a local Party branch. Meetingswere called, strike bulletins issued,and
mealsorganisedthrough the Workers' International Relief. With the
establishmentof a Strike Committeehowever, inconsistenciesin the
Party's approachbecameapparent.

The District Party's insistencethat thoseDMA union representativeswho

had endorsedthe proposedcuts be excluded from the Committee,was

123C.
j. Wrigley, 'The Trade Unions Betweenthe Wars'. In A HistoKyof British.Industrial
Relations op. cit. p104.
124Workers'Life 29 March 1929.Seealso LJ. Macfarlane, The British CoMM]j
op. cit. pp262-264.

150

deemedprematureby the Party centre.125Consequently,the strategyof

Harry Pollitt and the Minority Movement contrastedsignificantly with that
of the local comrades.A Vigilance Committee was establishedto oversee
the existing strike leaders.Sloganssuch as 'make your leadersfight' were
issuedby the MM, and Pollitt focusedhis activity primarily within the
fellow
framework,
his
taking
alongside
communist
place
existing union
GeorgeLumley at the arbitration proceedings.(A. J. Cook was also elected
to representthe miners but was unable to attend the discussions.)

The Party consequentlybecameembroiled in a tactical dispute,with

Maurice Ferguson,the Tyneside District organiser,accusingPollitt of
"legalism." The slogansissuedby the Minority Movement, and Pollitt's
failure to adequatelycondemnthe'reformist officials', demonstratedthe
"contradiction betweenthe formal acceptanceof the new line and the
126
inter-Party
And
Ferguson
the
argued.
although
such
old"
operation of
little
Durham
dispute
the
to
themselves,
the
miners
meant
wrangling
betweenDistrict and centre undoubtedly hamperedthe Party's activity.

Although communistswere able to mobilise considerablesupport among

the local miners, as Pollitt and Lumley's election to the arbitration
discussionsdemonstrated,the in-roads madeby the Minority Movement
were limited. The workers remainedloyal to their official union
representatives,despitethe DMA's initial reluctanceto support the pitmen. Furthermore,the support engenderedby the Communist Party proved
to be transient. The Party branch establishedduring the dispute for

125MauriceFergusonanalysedthe eventsin Communist Review August 1929. Kevin

Morgan offers a succinct but excellent overview of the dispute in HAM Pollitt op. cit.
pp67-68.
126Aproposed'counter Bulletin' was scrappedbecauseit rejected work in the existing
unions. Communist Review August 1929.

151

Consequently,
example,numberedjust fifteen by November 1930.127
Dawdon followed the traditional pattern of communist activity in the
North East. Militant action was endorsedby the workers, and the MM
evidently retainedthe prestige it had forged amidst the GeneralStrike. But
this did not 'inevitably' lead the workers into the CPGB. As the Party
gradually distanceditself from the traditional channelsof working class
organisation,so its ties with the Durham miners becameincreasingly
tenuous.

Similar shortcomingswere evident during the Austins motor disputein

Birmingham. The disputebroke out on 25 March 1929and revolved
around the employers'introduction of efficiency gradesto determine
payment.The workers' rejection of such a system,and the largely
unorganisedworkforce, ostensibly offered a perfect opportunity for the CP
to establishan independentlead. But the lack of an establishedCP or MM
baseat the factory, and the Strike Committee'sobjection to the MM's
depiction of 'Vehicle Builders officials' as " weak-kneed and
...
treacherous",led the workers to reject'outside leadership.'128

The MM's report on the disputerevealeda number of shortcomings.Only

one memberof MM was included on the Strike Committee (Comrade
Fleetwood); local communistswere not aware of the pending disputeuntil
two days before its outbreak;and the various revisions of the MM strike
bulletin resulted in criticism from both the Strike Committee and the Party
centre. Subsequently,the CP was unable to block the AEU negotiated
settlement,and the workers re-enteredthe factory on 4 April. 129
127Rel2ort on the TyLieside District PaM 30 November 1930. Klugmann Papers.
128National Minorijy
Movement Executive Bureau Preliminajy
Statement on Minori! Y
Movement Work in the Austins DiMute 16 April 1929. Tanner Collection.
1291bid.

152

For the MM Executive and the CPGB, the strike had revealed clearly the
"treacherousrole of the trade union officials. "130Similarly however, the
dispute had exposedthe difficulty the Party had in influencing the workers
struggle from the 'outside.' And while the Party leadershipblamed the lack
of communist influence on local members'call for workers to join the
deep-rooted
ignored
the
more
union,
such
a
conclusion
existing
inadequaciesof the CP (and the MM) in the area.131

The difficulty of forging an independentleadershipin areasand industries

lacking a militant (or indeed communist) basiswas most evident in the
Party's approachto the textile disputesthat raged throughout the 'Third
Period.' The workforce in the Lancashireand Yorkshire mills were
predominantly female, largely 'unorganised',and traditionally nonindustrial
decline
Britain's
however,
had
led
The
to
of
effect
militant.
In
the summer of 1929,the
and
rationalisation.
unemployment
widespread
on-going struggle againstwage cuts in the Lancashiremills once again
erupted,with a lock out of over half a million workers.

So intensewas the hostility betweenthe workers and the employers,that

Andrew Rothstein claimed to perceive the "prospectof a revolutionary
massstruggle."132But although the Party was able to establish'rank and
file committees'in Burnley and Oldham, the often sympatheticresponse
received by Party leadersdispatchedto the region was counteredby
continued support for the workers' official representatives.As Lily Webb

1301bid.
131SeeR. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions
op.cit. pp 114-115.
132Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist PaM
of Great Britain 7-11
August 1929.Klugmann Papers.

153

informed the CC in August: "the Party are not regardedby the workers as
a seriouspolitical force." 133

Similarly, when the Yorkshire woollen workers were faced with wage
in
in
October
1929,
Party
the organisationand
the
assisted
reductions
mobilisation of the local workers. Despite the limited successof
communistssuch as Isabel Brown, the Party succeededonly in
134
(in
factory
Bradford).
With such
establishingone
committee
organisationssupposedlyforming the very "basis of the united front from
below," 135it was evident that the CPGB neededto firmly locate a
in
local
the
order to wield a significant
workforce
membershipamong
influence.

The lack of such an influence was illustrated at the Minority Movement

delegates
from
1929,
the textile industry
only
six
where
of
conference
factors
136
Other
contributed to the Party's apparentweakness
attended.
however. The lack of consensuson the Party line again impeded
communist activity. While the first edition of the Cotton Lock Out Special
was criticised for failing to articulate clearly the independentline of the
Party,137the MM programmecombinedthe demandfor a forty hour week
and a minimum wage with an intemperateattack on the trade union
leadership.138Such demandswere unrealistic in the midst of a defensive

1331bid.Macfarlane quotesa report from January 1930. "While acceptingthe Minority

Movement policy, [the workers] retain all the illusions about the trade unions being
capableof struggling againstthe employers." L. J. Macfarlane,The British Communist
P= op. cit. pp252-3
134M.Hill, Red Rosesfor Isabel (London, 1982).pp3l-32.
135See
Hornees report on the Tenth Plenum. Minutes of the Central Committee of the
Communist Pany of Great Britain 7-11 August 1929.Klugmann Papers.
136Nowfor Action op.cit., p39.
137Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgr1y Great Britain I August
of
1929.Klugmarm Papers.The criticism camefrom Andrew Rothstein.
138.
Labour Monthly September1929.

154

struggle,and the harsh criticism of the workers' representativesserved

only to alienatethose workers who believed themselvesto be fighting
againsttheir employers.Finally, by 'flying in' a strike leadership,
insufficient knowledge of local conditions, and a political perspectiveat
odds with the nature of the various disputes,alienatedthe Party from the
local workforce. Thus, although the CP played a 'valuable role' in
organisingresistanceand forcing the unions to respondto the workers
demands,its impact remained marginal.139

The formation of two communist led trade unions however, suggeststhat

the CPGB was able to exert an influence beyond its relatively small size.
Establishedin April 1929,at a time when Scottish communistswere
leaving the Party, the UMS represented15,000membersat its First
Annual Conferencein September.140The majority of the unions'
membershipwas centred around traditionally militant localities in Fife and
Lanarkshire;areaswhere communistssuch as Abe Moffat and Jimmie
Stewartwere popular membersof the local community. 141

Even so, the initial formation of the union was fraught with problems of a
financial and organisationalnature.142The union representedno more than
ten per cent of the total workforce, and William Gallacher, writing in
1936,describedthe unions' legacy as "a seriesof unfortunate and illconductedstoppages[which gave] an impression ... that the only concern
of the organisersof the new union was to stop the pit regardlessof whether

139L.J. MacfarlaneThe British Communist Pa!jy op-cit. pp252-3

140A.Campbelf,'The Communist Party in the ScotsCoal Fields in the Inter War Period.'
In G. Andrews, N. Fishmanand K. Morgan (Ed.), Opening the Books op. cit. pp57-58.
141SeeA. Moffat, My Life with the Miners (London, 1965).
142See
I. MacDougall (Ed.), Militant Miners:
john McArthur,
of
-Recollections
Buckhavem.and Letters. 1924-26. of David Prou Ifoot. Methil to G. Allen Hutt
(Edinburgh, 1981).

155

there was causefor it or not." 143Such a summationwas borne out at the

SecondAnnual Conferenceof the UMS in 1930.The union Executive
warned against"mechanically bringing the men [out] on strike"; and in the
sameyear David Proudfoot reportedon the 'mess'in the Lanarkshire
branches,where a'strike, strike, and continually strike heritage'had
severelydepletedthe union membership.144

The UMS survived the Third Period, and in accordancewith the Party's
realignmentof policy between 1930and 1932,was able to effectively lead
its membersin a number of industrial struggles.In 1929-30 however,
divisions over the New Line within the ScottishParty, and disagreements
over the formation of the UMS, restricted the unions' efficiency. 145As
Stuart MacIntyre has argued,"the regional strikes organisedby the UMS
in 1929and 1930demonstratedanew the problems of minority
unionism."146

The formation of the UCWU meanwhile,revealedthe extent of communist

influence within the London clothing industry. Again however, while
absorbingthe majority of the NUT&GW London membership,the UCWU
remaineda minority union nationally. Moreover, the eventssurrounding
the Polikoff dispute in May 1929demonstratedthe fragility of the union,
and very nearly causedits demise.

The dispute arosefollowing Polikoff s withdrawal of its recognition of the

UCWU. Pressurefrom the NUT&GW and the WholesaleClothiers

143W.Gallacher,Revolt on the Clyde op. cit. p275.

144A.Campbell, 'The Communist Party in the ScotsCoal Fields in the Inter War Period,'
in G. Andrews, N. Fishmanand K. Morgan (Ed.), Opening the Books op. cit. pp57-58.
145S.MacIntyre, Little Moscow's op. cit. pp67-69.
1461bid.p69.

156

Federationhad prompted the Polikoff decision, and Sam Elsbury called his
debacle.
Polikoff
the
The
strike as a
presented
a
was
result
out.
members
(unsurprisingly)
NUT&GW
to
the
refused
support
while
plot
communist
the striking workers. With the non-appearanceof the promised strike pay
(offered by the CPGB), and the successfulprosecution of a union member
for failing to give notice of the strike, the workers resolve collapsed.147
The dispute servedto estrangethe Polikoff workers from both the union
during
Party
Elsbury's
CP,
and
practice
of
condemnation
while
and the
from
hounded
Elsbury
his
led
to
was
expulsion.
after the strike eventually
Party
by
E.
R
Pountney,
another
the union and replacedas secretary
UCWU,
damaged
irrevocably
the
incident
The
and as
whole
member.
CP
hundred,
few
the
declined
to
eventually
mere
a
membershipsteadily
NUT&GW.
the
to
rejoin
advisedunion members

The industrial work of the CPGB in 1928-29 was fraught with difficulties.
The relative paucity of strike action createdan obvious paradox between
the revolutionary rhetoric of the Party and the generally small scale
disputesin which its memberswere concerned.Among the London
Depot
Party
for
the
a
number
of
organised
example,
railway workers
Committeesin preparationof expectedwage cuts. Depot newspapers
in
1929
January
Conference
MM
inaugural
Railway
was
appeared,and an
Despite
branches.
NUR
by
securing minor victories
twelve
attended
however, the movementdiminished once the immediate threat to the
in
late
1929.
The
had
measurestaken against
passed
packet
pay
workers
bureaucracies,
by
trade
the
the
union
and
various
members
communist
Party's mounting condemnationof union representativesand union
147See
S.W. Lemer, BreakawayUnions op. cit. pp85-143 for a detailed history of the
UCWU Lemer suggeststhe union lost nine-tenths of its membershipin the wake of
Elsbury's dismissal,with a numberof workers disaffiliating from the MM and organising
interference'.
'outside
independent
of
pp 139-140.
themselves

157

influence
CPGB.
The
the
the
potential
minimised
of
undoubtedly
practice,
Party was placed'outside'the mainstreamof the labour movement; and as
unemploymentrose in conjunction with industrial decline, communists
simultaneouslyfound themselves'outside'the workplace.

More indicative of the CPGB'sability to mobilise support was the work of

the NTJWCM.Given that communist influence was most evident in
localities basedaroundthe old staple industries,the decline of Britain's
traditional industrial baseforced a number of Party members,and the
communities in which they lived, into the dole queue.Thus, as Communist
Party influence diminished within the traditional labour organisations,it
flourished amongstthe unemployed.148

Such a refocusing of communist activity was helped in part by the lack any
of significant competition in the realm of unemployedorganisation.TUC
support for initiatives such as the Labour run Bristol Unemployed
Association for example,was successfullyreferred back at the 1928
Annual Congress.149It also reflected the necessityof communist
involvement amongthe indigenouspopulation. Respectedcommunist
workers now becamerespectedNUWCM organisers;Edwin Greeningof
Aberman in Wales for instance,or GeorgeWatsonof Manchester.

While it remainedtrue that the majority of the unemployeddid notjoin the

N-UWCM (nor embraceits militant politics) the movementwas eminently
1480neis remindedof Engelsdictum that developing tendenciesrepresenta higher reality
then empirical fact.
149See
R. Croucher,'Divisions in the Movement': The National Unemployed Workers,
Movement and its Rivals in ComparativePerspective.' In G. Andrews, N. Fishman,K.
Morgan (Ed.), Openingthe Books op. cit. pp23-42. Also R. Croucher,MLeRefusLeto
Starve in Silence op. cit. pp90-92. As Croucher shows, communistswere also able to
influence such organisations. The Bristol NUWCM expandedin accord with the BUA. It
was such developmentsthat provoked the referenceback at the TUC.

158

in
did.
The Hunger March
those
that
mobilising
organising
and
successful
of January-February1929was a casein point. Over 1,000unemployed
workers marchedin opposition to the 'not genuinely seekingwork clause',
from
delegations
acrossthe country converging on the capital to force
with
150
from
Government.
Regional demonstrations
the
notable concessions
were also organised.In Scotland,where severalNUWCM branches
Lanarkshire,
in
Fife
the
areas
of
and
around
mining
emerged and
in
late
Edinburgh
1928, securing
to
marched
unemployedminers
NUWCM officials the right to representclaimants at the Court of
Referees.151Although the movementwould continue to suffer from a
transientmembership,the number of NUWCM branchesacrossthe UK
grew significantly in 1928-29.

The Sixth National Conferenceof the NUWCM, held in September1929,

boasted82 delegatesfrom 46 branches,152and while the conference
its
decline
in
the
the
of
movement
since
relative
re-emergence
symbolised
the mid 1920s,it also brought the NUWCM into line with prevailing
communistpolicy. First, the sub-committeebasedat the movements'
headquarters(renamedthe HeadquartersAdvisory Committee) was
in
strengthened
order to centralise the organisation.Thus, the
significantly
Council
National
Administrative
(NAC) was fortified; a
the
of
authority
move reflected in the dropping of the word 'committee' from the
movement'stitle. Second,in line with the principles of the 'united front
from below', the NUWM pledgedto strengthenits links with the Minority
Movement and the "rank and file workers in the workshops and factories,
150See
R. Croucher,We Refuseto Starve in Silence op. cit. pp95-96. W. Hannington,
Unemployed Struggles 1919-1936 op. cit. pp 182-205 and W. Hannington, Never on our
Knees (London, 1967).pp221-225.
151R.Croucher, We Reftise to Starve in Silence op. cit. pp92-95.
152Reportof the Sixth National Conferenceof the NUWCM 14-16 September1929.
WCML.

159

Women's
And
Similarly,
"
third,
a
section
was
established.
and
mines.
mills
the constitution of the NUWM was revised to embracethe theoretical
stipulationsof the'Third Period. The possibility of mobilising the TUC
was refuted, the Labour Governmentcondemned,and the objective of a
Workers Revolutionary Governmentdetermined.153

Unlike the MM however, the NUWM remainedfree from the sectarian

Organiser,
Wal
Hannington
As
National
New
Line.
the
of
excesses
it
those
that
the
claimed to
with
close
contact
movement's
ensured
legal
Conference
Sixth
The
established
a
maintained.
was
represent
departmentto advisethe unemployedon the ever more complex laws
focus
154
And
benefit
a
proved a
such
although
entitlement.
surrounding
it
CPGB,
issue
the
was neverthelessan effective
within
contentious
componentof the NUWM; offering practical advice and a clear'grass
roots' link to the unemployed.

Within the parliamentarypolitical sphere,the 1929 GeneralElection

it
However,
British
the
communism.
clearly revealed marginal characterof
Communist
Party
judge
inequitable
British
the
tiny
to
on such
seemsrather
in
influential
CPGB
basis.
The
certain villages and towns across
was
a
industrial Britain, and its dedicatedmemberscould claim a vocal and
in
dominant
trades
trade union
councils
and
on
presence
sometimes
branches.Even the Comintern acknowledgedthat "no one could have
in
first
the
electoral attack ... againstall the
success
expecteda quantitative
bourgeoisparties, including the Labour Party."155As such,the Party were
its
impossible
by
in
the
pitching
near
candidates
areasof
attempting
1531bid.
154Thedepartmentwas headedby Sid Elias. Seethe pamphlet How to Get
UnemploymentBeneft (London, 1929), for an example of NUWM initiative.
155TheCommunistInternational I October 1929.

160

"special political importance"156;Labour strongholds and against Labour

figureheads.Subsequently,the CPGB was more concernedwith the
principle of its standagainstthe Labour Party - as laid out in the manifesto
ClassARainstClasswritten of Jack Murphy - than the actual result. As
Dutt madeclear on the eve of the Election:
a militant working class fight in the presentelection and the return of a militant working
class fighter to parliament (or even if none is returned) is more important and a greater
gain and advanceto the working class as a whole than the return of a ... Labour majority
committed to rationalisation, industrial peace, imperialism and the maintenance of the
157
capitalist state.

There were preliminary hopesof limited success.The Aberdeen byelection result in August 1928,had seenthe communist candidate(Aitkin
Ferguson)beat the Liberal to secondplace with a vote of 2,618. In an area
with a Local Party ofjust ten members,the Party concluded that such a
158
A poor showing in the
justifie[d]"
"completely
the
tactics.
new
result
Municipal Elections of 1928however, gave the Party a glimpse of the
difficulties that lay ahead.As William Jossreported to the CC in
November 1928; "it had [been] explained by most candidatesthat the
workers did not understandthe new policy of the Party, and that, although
the workers listenedto the policy ... they were more bent on putting the
Labour Party into power and could not regard the Communist Party as an
alternative to the Baldwin government." The workers may agreewith the
CP that the Labour Party "is not just what it ought to be" Jossconcluded,
but "our weaknessis not only a numerical weakness."159
156Circularto all Locals and District P@,
qy Committees 18 November 1928.Drafted by
the British delegationto the Sixth World Congress.Klugmann Papers.
157LabourMonthlY May 1929.
158Reporton the AberdeenBy-Election (Duplicate) unsigned document. Klugmann
Papers.Seealso Dutt's Notes ...' in Labour Monthly October 1928. Other Party members
however.
William Gallacher called the Aberdeen result
sceptical
more
remained
"abnormal." Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa!jy of Great Britain
18-19 November 1929.Klugmann Papers.
159Statement
on the Municipal Elections November 1928. Klugmann Papers.

161

The GeneralElection did not go well however, even by the CPGB's

Party
CP
the
25
None
the
were
successful,
and
candidates
of
reckoning.
lost its one existing seatin North Battersea,where Shapudi Saklatvalawas
defeatedby Labour'sW.S. Sanders.Elsewhere,in constituencieswhere the
CP had previously gained significant electoral support, the communist
in
Arthur
Homer
for
Saklatvala,
160
Apart
dropped.
only
vote uniformly
RhonddaEast, and Alex Geddesin Greenock,polled more than 2000
161
votes.

Harry Pollitt's stand against Ramsay MacDonald was particularly

indicative. Not only did the wheels fall off Pollitt's election car in full view
in
jokingly
the
his
but
MacDonald,
window
placed
was
portrait
election
of
in
just
1,43
1
Pollitt
Subsequently,
house.
deserted
votes,
gained
of a
faced
Murphy
Jack
lackey's'35,615.
'bourgeois
a similar
the
comparison to
'up hill battle' in South Hackney, where he stood against Herbert Morrison.
In his memoirs Murphy recalled: "I had tried hard to get Herbert into
in
house
laughed
just
he
but
debate
every
windows
at my efforts ...
public
in almost all the streets were decorated with his portrait. " 162.
...

The critical analysisof the 1929GeneralElection in The Communist

International placedthe blame for the Party'spoor showing at the feet of
the Party leadership."The electoral campaignshowedwith astounding

1601nDundeefor example,Bob Stewart had secured8,340 votes in October 1924.In

1929he polled 6,160. The Dundeevoters electedthe independentprohibitionist E.
Scrymgeourinto Parliament.Ferguson'svote in Aberdeen meanwhile, was halved
161Geddes
polled 7,005 votes comparedto W. Leonard (Labour) 9,697 and G.P. Collins
(Liberal) 11,190.Homer gained 5,789 comparedto Lt. Co. D. Watts-Morgan (Labour)
19,010.
162H.Pollitt, Serving My Time op. cit. pp265-283 J.T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit.
Fetters
Breaking
for
Stewart
174-179,
the
Bob
See
op.
cit.
pp
an amusing
also
p293.
his
election campaign.
of
account

162

Communist
British
Party and at the
the
the
of
weaknesses
main
clearness
long
those
time
elements
opportunist
which
over
revealed
a
same
period
have been accumulatedwithin its ranks." 163Although Dutt attemptedto
salvagea degreeof dignity from the result, suggestingit revealedthe
leftward march of the workers and describing the swing to Labour as "an
act of classwar,"164the Party could gain little encouragementftom the
indicative
Even
May
1929.165
the
more
result
was
of the
so,
eventsof
British working class'perception of the CPGB, than a rejection of a
specific set of communistpolicies.

Conclusions
R.W. Robson'sportrayal of 1929as "the year of great internal discussion"
was a succinct and perceptiveone.166The searchfor communist orthodoxy
CPGB,
independence
debate
the
theoretical
as
overwhelmed
and political
Party.
With
the
the
confronting
realities
a
more practical
eclipsed
deterioratingbasisof support and restricted influence within the labour
in
CPGB's
the
perspectivewas a necessaryone.
realignment
movement,a
However, the offensive againstthe 'right danger'and the divisions that
effectively paralysedthe Party apparatus,only exacerbatedcommunist
insularity.

The transformationof the political framework within which the CPGB

loss
influence
Party
the
that characterised1927-29, were
of
operated,and
intrinsically linked. While the sectarianismengenderedby the New Line
facilitated communist ineffectiveness,the New Line in itself did not cause
163TheCommunist International I October 1929.
164LabourMonthly July 1929.Cited in L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Pa!!Y op.
cit. pp230-231.
165Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 30 May-I
June 1929.Klugmann Papers.
166R.W. Robson, Report on the London DistrigLparly 9 July 1930. Klugmann Papers.

163

the Party'sdecline. The paucity of industrial conflict and the shifting of the
Party's supportbaseto the ranks of the unemployedwas crucial to the
CPGB'sproficiency. Moreover, traditional obstaclesto British
communism- parliamentarytraditions, relative class equanimity, and the
in
the
neutrality
of
state
remained
place.
perceived
-

Furthermore,the left turn of 1926-29 gained a momentum of its own.

While the battle over political theory necessitatedideological clarity, the
basisof the New Line remainedrelatively broad. As such, the extremesof
the New Line were engenderedby a collapse in ECCI authority, and the
emergenceof widespreadleftist opinion within the International. In
Britain, sectionsof the Party leadershipand the rank and file expressed
opinion 'to the left' of both the CPGB and the ECCI. Thus, at the Tenth and
Eleventh Congress',and amidst the various industrial struggles,indigenous
interpretationsof the New Line transposedthe 'correct' (or ECCI)
perspective.

Even so, the re-emergenceof an effective unemployed movement

counteredthe Party's industrial dissolution; though this was scantcomfort
to a Party basedupon the working class.Communist activity in the
NUWM was indicative of the changingrealm of Party struggle however,
and the movement'ssuccesswas a testamentto the dedication and
CP
the
of
membership.As the 'space'within which the Party
capability
operatedwas transformed,the CP was forced to reassessboth its policy
and its method. In 1930-32, the changing nature of the CPGB was
confirmed.

164

Chapter Five
Isolation and Reappraisal

January 1930- May 1931

Although the introduction of the New Line has been discussedextensively

by historians of the CPGB, little attention has beengiven to the plight of
the Party between 1930and 1932.Yet theseyears saw the British
CommunistParty significantly realign its approachto the workers'
its
falling
the
for
Concern
obvious
and
membership,
struggle.
CP
led
in
1929-30,
the
to
Party
proposea
militancy
of
shortcomings
from
'isolation
Party's
the
designed
initiatives
the
to
address
number of
issues
(most
Charter,
"
Workers'
A
political
an emphasison wider
masses.
female
the
the
curbing of
and
proletariat),
and
obviously unemployment
decline.
Furthermore,
the
Party's
the
tempered
evident
sectarianism,all
for
Party
Worker
Daily
the
activity
practical
provided
publication of
difficult
These
industrial
little
months
time
were
unrest.
of
membersat a
for the CPGB, but onesin which the Party's problems were recognisedand
actedupon.

The CP'sability to combatsectarianismwas undoubtedly abettedby a

Cl
have
As
the
Comintern.
the
the
seen,
warned
we
similar move within
CPG13about the "ultra left danger(sectarianism)"in January 1929.2
However, the 'deviation' receivedmore defined attention towards the end
for
1.
In
1930-3
the
the
throughout
autumn
that
example,
and
year,
of
GermanYouth Leaguewas forced to deal with the problem of the'left

I in Histoly of the CommunistPaM of Great Britain op. cit., Noreen Branson offers an
in
but
does
discuss
Party's
this
the
the numerouspolitical
work
period,
not
of
overview
by
CPGB
in 1930-3 1.
the
theoretical
undertaken
realignments
and
21nstructionsto.the Comintern Delegateto the Conferenceof the CPQB. Communist
Archive.

165

dangerof isolation from the masses.13And once Stalin's notorious

'Dizzinessthrough Success'letter of February 19304had recommendeda
'struggle on two fronts' - that is againstthe right and left5 - the issueof the
'left deviation' was firmly on the Comintern agenda.

CommunistParty activity centredupon a number of issuesbetween

January 1930and May 1931. In particular, both the on-going textile
disputesin the North of England and the intensifying problem of
unemploymentpromptedParty campaigns.Moreover, the purge of the
'right danger'in late 1929enabledthe leadershipto re-focus its attention
on the practical application of Party policy. Although practicalities could
from
be
theoretical concepts,the shortcomingsof
separated
completely
not
the militant strategypursuedby the CPGB in 1929and early 1930,
necessitateda radical overhaul of the Party's approachto the British
proletariat.

1930 and early 1931 therefore,saw the Party attempt to 'find its feet' again
after the uncertainty of the previous two years.With a new leadershipin
in
in
daily
and
paper production,
conditions Britain becoming
place, a
(a
Party
to
more
advantageous
a
revolutionary
world
superficially
in
CPG13
the
crisis,
unemployment),
many
rising
saw an
economic
future
for
It
the Party, centrally and in the
ahead.
remained
auspicious
districts, to place itself back amongthe working class,to organise
strugglesasthey occurred,and to seizethe opportunities prophesiedby the
Third Period.

3E. H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern

4Published in Pravda 2 March 1930.

1930-1935

(London,

1982). p12.

5See E. H. Carr, Twiligh

op. cit. p12. Stalin called for "a struggle
behind
lag
those
who
and against those who rush ahead. "
against

166

on two fronts, both

The Background
By the end of 1929, the relative stability of the British economy was
6
being
Although emerging 'new' industries had
unden-nined.
undoubtedly
gone a little way to offset the decline of the old staple industries evident
since the War, the World economic upheaval at the end of 1929 plunged
Britain into a series of ever more acute crises. While export orders had
been falling since 1928, the problems that beset the US economy in the
following year compounded Britain's degeneration. The decline of the old
industries intensified, unemployment continued to rise, and the balance of
trade proceeded to deteriorate. Subsequently, areas of the country reliant
on such industries as mining and textiles, areas where the Communist
Party had its main basis of support, slid into ever-deeper depression. In
Wales for example, unemployment rose from an already high 19.5 per cent
in 1927 to 34.6 per cent in 1932; while across Britain as a whole
in
from
1,534,000
January 1930 to 2,783,000 in July
unemployment rose
1931.7

As remarkedon in chapterone, the British labour movementsuffered in

such conditions. Trade union membershipcontinued to fall, industrial
action remaineddefensive,and the various schemeslaunchedby the
Labour Governmentto offset Britain's economicdecline systematically
failed. Indeedthe Government'sencouragementof 'rationali sation,in
industry only exacerbatedmatters;swelling the ranks of the unemployed
and inducing disagreementsbetweenthe Governmentand the unions as

6For an overview of the 'depression'see:A. Thorpe, The British General Election 1931
of
(Oxford, 1991).C. Cook & J. Stevenson,The Slump. Sociely and Politics in the
Depressio (London, 1989).R. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour
Governmentof 1929-1931 (London, 1967). S. Pollard, The Development of the British
Economy 1919-1990 4th ed. (London, 1992).
7Minis!Kyof Labour GazetteDecember 1930 and 1931.

167

well as within the Labour Party itself.8 Moreover, the changingbasis of the
British workforce - new industries,unemployment,and the increasing
number of femaleworkers - necessitateda revision of long held traditions
and prejudicesthat the labour movementseemedloathe to undertake.

Thus, as Andrew Thorpe has demonstrated,although the depressionin

Britain was 'mild by international standards',its effects were perceivedas
traumatic by 'contemporaryobservers'.9 To those millions forced into the
dole queueand onto Hunger Marches; to Labour supporterswho had
regardedtheir party as one of full employment;and to trade unionists who
believed their organisationswere designedto resist attackson working
for
improvement,
the eventsof 1930were
their
and
campaign
conditions
devastating.

For the CommunistInternational, it was essentialthat the various

CommunistPartiesrespondeffectively to the crisis afflicting capitalism; a
crisis that hit countriessuch as Germany and the USA far harder than it
did Great Britain. From the ECCI's perspective,the predictions of the
Third Period had beenverified as economiescrashedand class
antagonismswere heightenedby the social effects of unemploymentand
poverty. Yet a number of Parties,including the French as well as the
British, were in obvious decline, and it was evident to at least a section of
the ECCI that a consequenceof the offensive againstthe'right danger'had
beenan upsurgein ultra-leftism. 10Additionally, in parties where the left
8Cutting costsin industry usually beganwith the dismissal of 'excess'labour. The return
to the Gold Standardin 1925had led to stringency measuresat a time when credit was
required.
9A. Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s(Oxford, 1992).p85.
IOAccordingto E.H. Carr, the ECCI was divided betweenthe more flexible approachof
Manuilsky and Kuusinen, and the morehard line' of Bela Kun and Losovsky. SeeE. H.
Carr Twiligh op. cit. p5. During the overhaul of the ECCI in late 1928 and early 1929,
the'hard liners' temporarily securedthe upper hand. Beyond the Tenth Plenum however,

168

had come to dominatethe leadershipin 1929-30, the outcomehad been

in
Germany,
Thus,
the "complacent and
neither positive or effective.
dampened
by
ECCI
KPD
that
the
was
soon
an
of
mood
combative"
left
'
Party's
'revolutionary
the
the
to
wing.
phrases'of
optimistic
objected
Subsequently,the strategiesand emphasesof the ECCI were refined
danger
the
the
throughout
of
stress
on
with
our period,
continually
being
perhapsthe most obvious example.
sectarianism

The first of suchrealignmentsoccurredat the Enlarged Presidium of the

ECCI, held betweenFebruary 8 and 18 1930.Manuilsky, the highest
Comintem
in
Secretariat,
ECCI
Political
the
sectionsto
on
called
authority
focus attention on the 'partial demands'of the workers,12while the
Presidium resolution on the KPD pronouncedthe needto fight
"opportunismboth open(right) and concealedin 'revolutionary phrases'
(left). " 13Such opinion was echoedin a number of congressspeeches,and
formed the basisof a seriesof articles published in the communist press.
Thus, "swaggeringover the smallestadvancesand successes"and the
labelling of all non-communistsas 'social fascist'was condemned.
Simultaneously,work within the reformist trade unions, and the
14
the
re-emphasised.
economic struggle,were
concentrationon

The ECCI now insistedthat the revolutionary crisis of the Third Period
left's
in
doing
fanciful
illusion
the
that
checked
more
and
so
emerging,
was

thosecomradeswith a more moderateapproachregainedthe initiative. Thus, the

restrictions placed on Losovsky's trade union policy for example,were increasingly
emphasisedfrom 1930.
1IE.H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. p8-1 1.
121nprecorr28 March 1930
13E.H. Carr, Twili
op. cit. p 11. This was aimed primarily at Paul Merker (Presidentof
the RGO), a supporterof Losovsky and a keen advocateof 'red' trade unions.
14Forexamples,seeThe Communist International Nos. 13-14 1930, and Inpreco 28
March 1930.

169

such a crisis was already apparent.15Consequently,the Communist Youth

Leaguecondemned"sectarianismand left deviation" in mid 1930,while
(at
Congress
in
forced
its
Fifth
August)
Profintern
the
to warn
was
even
fon-nation
danger
"schematic
the
the
of
new
unions"
and
of 'left
against
'16
sectarianism.

Similarly, the Comintern'sestimateof fascismwas also redressed.

Although any conceptionthat social democracyrepresenteda 'lesserevil'
left
fascism
denounced,
ECCI
the
the
those
on
who saw
as
condemned
was
either a 'historical necessity, or a prerequisiteto revolution. Different
stagesof Tascisisation'were distinguished,and the tendencyevident in the
KPD to label the BrUning Governmentof 1930asTascist',was pointedly
17
rebuked.

Within the national sections,stepswere taken by all Partiesto combat the

'new type of leftism'. At the SixteenthConferenceof the Soviet Party, a
deviations
18
both
'left'
initiated.
The KPD
'right'
was
and
struggle against
from
his
Merker
Losovsky's
Paul
removed
prodigy
position at
meanwhile,
the headof the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO), and
resolvedto pursuea 'united front from below' that distinguishedbetween
the workers and the leadersof the social democratictrade unions. Such a
realignmentalso emphasisedthe importanceof work within thoseunions,

15SeeManuilsky'sspeechinInpreco

8Mayl930.

16E. H. Carr, Twilight

op. cit. pp 20-2 1. Harry Pollitt later revealed that the RILU was
"questioning whether it is worth carrying on with'red'unions",
in August 1930. See
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 13 September
1930. Communist Archive.
17See Theses. Resolutions. Decisions. The Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International (Moscow, 193 1). Also E. H. Carr, Twiligh
op. cit. pp26fascist dictatorship' was endorsed by the
27 and 29-37. ThRlmann's synopsis of a'ripening
ECCI and the KPD.
18E.H. Carr, Twilig,
op. cit. pp 18-19. Molotov's speech to the Soviet Congress devoted
-ht
danger
to
the
of the 'lefV.
attention
considerable

170

demands'
'partial
the
of the workers. In Francetoo, the
and concentratedon
PCF denouncedthe'left danger'and following a Comintern commission in
May 1930,determinedto 'battle for every worker'; to 'struggle on two
fronts'; and to concentrateon the day to day issuesrelevant to the French
19
working class.

By the Eleventh ECCI Plenum of March 1931therefore, the fight against

the 'exaggerations'and 'adventurism'of the left was an integral part of the
Comintern line.20'Left opportunism'was accusedof 'fostering' the right
danger,of leading to the "neglect of the exceptionally important work in
the reformist unions," and of completely identifying "social fascismwith
fascismand the social fascist upper stratumwith the rank and file social
democraticmassesof the workers."21As such,the ECCI committed its
its
forms,
in
'
dictatorship
'bourgeois
to
all
and the New
sections combating
Line appearedto have at last found a balance.22

The CPGB: Learning from Experience

Just as adjustmentsin the policy of the Comintern influenced the

CPGB,
the
of
so the experiencesof the various national
perspective

19Suchmeasureswere undertakenthroughout the Comintern.

20Theses,Resolutions,Decisions.The Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committeeof
the Communist International op. cit. "The principal task ... is to win the majority of the
working class..." pp2-20.

21 E. H. Carr, Twilight op. cit. ppl2-19.

221t has been argued by both E. H. Carr, and K. McDermott
and J. Agnew, that this
represented a 'softening' of Comintern policy, and that it was instigated in response to
leadership
from
Soviet
Narkomindel
(the Peoples Commissariat
the
and
of
pressure
Foreign Affairs). The economic crisis in the West, along with initiatives such as the
Young Plan, raised fears of an'Imperialist
the USSR, and Moscow is said to
war'against
have forced the ECCI to moderate its revolutionary
rhetoric. While the defence of the
USSR was a major priority for the Cl however, such a concern should not be seen as
total. Indeed, it could be argued that attempts to broaden the appeal of the Communist
party were more alarming to the West than the protestations of a militant minority.

171

23
directives
ECCI.
While
influenced
Cl
the
the
the
the
of
sectionsof
CPGB had little influence on the ECCI in isolation, the experiencesthat
the British Party sharedwith a number of other Communist Parties
fact
New
Line.
The
the
that
to
the
of
realignment
undoubtedly contributed
in spite of the supposed"revolutionary upsurge"the Party was "not
being
led
it
to
the
askedabout
questions
progress should"24soon
making
both the leadershipand the policy of the CPGB.

Until the Eleventh Party Congress(and for a short time after), the blame
for this lack of progresswas attributed to 'right' errors committed by the
'old' leadership.However, a number of developmentssoon refocused
attention on to the deficienciesof the existing Party Executive. Party
membershipcontinuedto decline throughout 1930,while the diminishing
and the modest circulation of the new
salesof communistperiodicaIS25
Daily Worke all suggestedthat the Party's influence was retracting, as
,
opposedto increasing,in the wake of the Leeds Congress.The Party's
failure to play a decisive role in the industrial disputesof 1930and the
ECCI's emphasison 'left errors' also raiseddoubts about the aptitude of the
Leedsline. Thus, in order to explain the Party's own responseto the
difficulties of the New Line, it is necessaryto examinethose experiences
that inspired the refinement of Party policy and strategyin 1930.

23At the SixteenthCongressof the CPSU, Manuilsky linked the struggle againstthe'left,
inside the Comintern to the failing membershipof the national Parties.E. H. Carr,
Twiligh op. cit. ppl8-19.
24ECCIrepresentative'Butler'. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PMIY of
Great Britain 10 July 1930. CommunistArchive.
25TheParty seriously considered merging, or even liquidating either Labour Monthly or
the CommunistReview in 1930.Dutt opposedsuch action however, and even offered to
take over the editorship of the CommunistReview. SeeR.P. Dutt. Letter to the Political
Bureau 9 Januaryand 9 August 1930.Communist Archive.

172

The textile disputesthat had eruptedacrossthe North of England in 1929

for
CPGB
foremost
industrial
'battleground'
in
the
the early
the
remained
thirties. The publication of the Macmillan Report in February, endorsing
for
impoverished
the
cuts
woollen workers, provoked
wage
already
severe
lock-outs
fresh
of
and worker protest. Indeed, the high number of
round
a
unorganisedworkers involved in the dispute and their apparentreadiness
to take action, once again offered the CPGB a seeminglyperfect
opportunity to cultivate an 'independentleadership'of the struggle.

The Party's approachto the new wave of disputeswas discussedat a

leading
A
Political
20
Bureau
March
1930.26
the
of
meeting of
number
on
Party figures, including Harry Pollitt, William Gallacher and Jack Murphy,
by
Action
Conference
dispatched
Yorkshire,
to
organised
of
and a
were
the Minority Movement oversawthe establishmentof a Central Strike
Committee in Bradford under the chairmanshipof Ernest Brown.27Strike
bulletins and pamphletswere issued,and Party membersendeavoured
tirelessly to developworkers' committeesin the various mills acrossthe
Brown28
by
Isabel
led
Committee
In
Shipley,
Strike
was
county.
a
Locals'
Party
'active
Gallacher
that
were at work
reported
established,and
in Leedsand Huddersfield.29As such, individual communistsdid play a
significant and consequentialrole in the dispute- arranging pickets,
for
food
the unorganisedworkers - and the
aid,
and
providing
collecting

26Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 20 March
1930.CommunistArchive.
27Theconferencewas attendedby 125 delegates, non of whom were representatives
of a
trade union branch, and was addressedby Gallacher, Pollitt and Ernest Brown (the
District Party Secretary).The electedCommittee of Action becamethe Central Strike
Committee.Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaLtyof Great Britain 27
March 1930.CommunistArchive.
28Ernestand Isabel were married.
29Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PaLty Great Britain 5-6 April
of
1930.CommunistArchive.

173

dedicationand enthusiasmof the CP was exemplary.30By the end of April

however, it was evident that the rewards for such hard work were
negligible.

Despitethe "favourable" conditions, Gallacherreported that the Party had

'not beenas successfulas anticipated.' Walter Tapsell for example,had met
"local hostility" in Huddersfield. With the Party largely isolated from the
dispute,recruitment of new membershad been "neglected."31Gallacher's
findings were echoedin the report of a group of young communistsfreshly
Dispatched
in
to
Moscow.
to
the
Lenin
from
region
the
school
returned
the
dispute,
leadership
the
to
the
sternly
noted
students
give political
Party's failure to set up mill committees.32

More humorously, the Party'salienation from the massof the workers was
days
Brown
hard
After
by
Brown.
Isabel
was
campaigning,
a
recalled
leaflet
CP
female
and shouting:
a
to
waving
worker
galled seea young
"Up with the lavatory seat.Down with the lavatory chain," in imitation of
33
it?
Brown.
it
"
"Is
thought
Party's
the
worth
militant rhetoric.

The Central Strike Committee in Bradford also gave causefor concern.

With only four non-Party members,the committee was indeed of a "non
30N. Branson, Histoly of the Communist PgIV op. cit. p84. See R. A. Leeson, Strike op.
dispute.
Committee
A
Textile
Aid
for
Brown's
the
Isabel
of
recollection
cit., ppl2l-124,
in
by
(British
Section)
April,
Relief
International
Workers'
by
the
and
run
was established
the MM.
31Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PqM of Great Britain 24 April 1930.
Communist Archive.
32Report of the Lenin School Students. Report of the Activities of the Textile (woollen)
Group. May-June, 1930 22 July 1930 (WCML). The students were sent to Yorkshire to
develop Party training and strengthen Party organisation during the dispute. They do not
by
local
been
have
to
communists, and the group's efforts to'speed up
welcomed
seem
initiate
mill committees met with only minor success. The students
and
recruitment'
included Hymie Lee from Manchester, Majorie Pollitt (wife of Harry), Lily Webb, Dora
Roberts, R. Jones, M. Jordan and G. Brown.
331nR. A. Leeson, Strike op. cit. p122.

174

its
"34
call on the workers to maintain the
so
and
representative character,
ignored.
begun,
had
The
drift
back
to
the
was
concertedly
work
strike once
for
described
"talking
Party
as
shops
similarly
were
committees
mill
Moreover, the interchangeable personnel that constituted the
members.1135
dispute,
blurred
during
bureaus
the
the
established
and committees
various
36
MM.
CP
the
and
supposedly separate roles of

Although there was little for the CPGB to celebratein its 'Resolution on
the Woollen Textile Strike', the eventsof April-May 1930undoubtedly
influenced the future developmentof the Party. The very real problems the
Party experiencedin translating the revolutionary policy of the New Line
to the mills of Yorkshire revealeda number of deficiencies in the Party's
British
to
the
working class.
approach

The attemptto 'fly in' a strike leadershipwas neither appreciatednor

base
37
lack
The
Party's
by
local
of
an
established
within
workers.
accepted
either the region or the various weavers' organisationswas again clearly
in
described
"virtually
CP
the
non-existent"
and
as
was
evident, and
38
dispute.
Of
200
Bradford
the
to
the
or so comradesthat
prior
around

34Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 May 1930.
CommunistArchive. Pollitt visited Bradford the following weekend and found Party
influence to be "minimal. "
35E.H. Brown, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PqM of Great Britain
24 July 1930.CommunistArchive.
36TheParty was supposedto 'lead and direct' the strike, whilst the MM 'organised'the
strike on the ground. Seethe ECCI's Letter to the Political Bureau of the Communist
PaElyof GreatBritain 6 March 1930.Klugmarm Papers.
37Therewere also difficulties with local communists.See Report of the Activities of the
Textile (woollen) Group. MU=June. 193022 July 1930 WCML. The Lenin school
local
leaders
"in
that
the
opposition to the new Party line." Ernest
were
reported
students
Brown had certainly beena casualtyof the leadershipoverhaul. A member of the
Secretariatprior to the Sixth World Congress(in chargeof organisation), he was removed
from the PB following the June discussionwith the WEB in June 1929.Brown had
voiced his opposition to aspectsof the New Line throughout 1928-29.
38Reportof the Lenin School Students.Report of the Activities of the Textile (woollen)
Group. MU-June. 193022 July 1930(WCML)

175

from
in
59
May
1930,
Party
the
District
Bradford
the
only
were
madeup
39
50
trade
industry,
of
a
union.
were members
textile
and only
Subsequently,the Party campaignedon the periphery of the dispute, and
the Central Strike Committeeremainedan organisation of Party
functionariesdetachedfrom the workers themselves.40

The militant approach of the Party had also alienated the workers. ldris
Cox recognised that communists had placed too much emphasis on
belatedly
41
Party
that
the
accepted
slogans
the
and
struggle,
politicising
Soviet
Union'or'Hands
the
such as'Defend

off India'were of "minor

battling
Huddersfield
in
Shipley
to
resist wage
to
or
workers
relevance"
"workers
dispute
42
Similarly,
the
the
as
a
counter
portrayal of
reductions.
43
William
Yorkshire
defensive
the
belied
the
proteSt.
nature of
offensive"
Rust (who a year earlier had led the offensive against the 'right' in the
CPGB) sharply critici sed the 'left phraseology' of those who interpreted the
dispute as 'a struggle for power. '44

Rust likewise noted the Party's failure to campaignaround the "grassroots

demands"of the workers in Yorkshire.45In particular, the CPGB was slow
39Report on Pqr1y Organisation November, 1930. Klugmann Papers. Also, Analysis o
Membership, 30 July 1930. (WCML) The Bradford membership fluctuated enormously
just
58. The DPC then
DPC
Bradford
1929,
December
In
the
numbered
time.
this
at
dispute,
50
during
the
250
only
per
although
that
were
made
new recruits
some
reported
155.
District
November,
By
the
stood
at
membership
cent returned.
40Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 May 1930.
Communist Archive.
41As noted by Harry Pollitt. Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr!y o
Great Britain 27 May 1930. Communist Archive.
42Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgiy of Great Britain 31 May-2
June 1930. Communist Archive.
43SeeJ.R. Campbell's article, 'The Workers'Counter Offensive in the Woollen Textile
Industry. 'In Communist International July 1930.
44Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLiV of Great Britain 31 May-2
June 1930. Communist Archive. This was a reference to John Mahon's article in Labour
MgnLbly June 1930, entitled'The Woollen Strike and the Struggle for Power'. Mahon
"workers
"
the
on
as
a
attack
capitalism.
strike
portrayed
451bid.

176

to adaptitself to the predominantly female characterof the dispute. Initial

for
focused
been
had
the
spinners
example,while
male
mule
on
attention
the Women'ssectionof the Shipley Strike Committee - led by Kitty
Morris - madelittle progressbefore its disintegration following the return
to work.46As such,the Party committed itself to either general calls for
day,
increases
or to the revolutionary
shorter
working
or a
wage
in
it
described
recognition of such
partly
was
above;and
phraseology
deficiencies,that the CPGB launchedthe Workers' Charter in August.47

The CPGB's'discovery' of such 'sectarian'mistakesconcurred with the

ECCI's re-emphasison the'left danger'.Although 1930had begun with a
British Party leadershipcommitted to 'ridding the CPGB of the last
fragmentsof the right danger,'48the 'struggle on two fronts' effectively
Pollitt,
left.
'
Harry
'drift
Party's
the
to
who reported on the
the
abated
FebruaryPresidiumto the Party Executive, immediately highlighted
"sectarianismof the worst order" in the attitude of certain Party members.
The "ultra left sectariantendencieswhich have hitherto dominated the
British YCU were condemnedfor example.In addition, Pollitt
inside
'reformist'
insistence
the
trade
Manuilsky's
on
work
emphasised
CPGB
initiative
back
49
Subsequently,
the
the
swung
within
unions.
46Foran excellent overview of the CPGB in the Woollen Strike, and with particular
S.
Yorkshire
Bruley, Leninism,
interaction
Party's
the
to
the
women,
see
with
reference
Stalinism, and the Women'sMovement in Britain op. cit. pp 195-198.
47By 1930,the numerousstrikes in Britain, Germany and the US involving female
Conference
European
Sections
in
hold
Women's
Comintern
to
the
of
a
prompted
workers
August 1930.An'energetic struggle'in support of women workers was duly proclaimed.
in Germanyfor example,the RGO was instructedto take up women's issuesas a central
be
below.
' See
its
to
campaigns
were
and
non-sectarian
organised'from
agitation,
part of
V. Moirova, Communist International October 1930.Also S. Bruley, Leninism op. cit.
ppl95-198.
48Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PaM of Great Britain 6-7
December 1929.CommunistArchive. The Political Bureau was comprised of Pollitt,
Gallacher, Rust, Tapsell and Cox.
49Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pm!y of Great Britain 15-16
March 1930.CommunistArchive. The PB and CC meetings of early 1930were tenseand
in
CC
for
March
The
example,was dismissedas a "fiasco" by Harry
argumentative.

177

towards the more moderatemembersof the Party Executive, and Harry

Pollitt was frequently able to obtain ECCI support againstwhat he
left.
Party
be
the
the
to
of
excesses
perceived

In January,Pollitt called on the ECCI to intervene againstthe harsh

treatmentapportionedby the PB to those comradeschargedwith 'right
deviation.' After PalmeDutt had insistedthat a purge be "systematically
leading
1150
Party,
taken
the
throughout
against
such
was
action
conducted
Cant,
Turner,
Ernie
Beth
Wilson,
Inkpin,
Jock
Albert
communistsas
Andrew Rothsteinand Arthur Homer. So vicious were the attacks on the
likes of Inkpin, who after years as the CPGB Secretarywas refused even a
"strongly
job
Pollitt
Party,
to
that
the
express
and
was
moved
minor
within
by
Tapsell
Rust.
hard
line
feeling"
his
taken
to
the
and
opposition
with
Despite being called "sentimental"by Rust (who insisted the CP "must
fight
firm
time
the
againstopportunist elements,and not
and
all
stand
leave room for them to creepback in"), Pollitt took his concernsto the
ECCI and was vindicated.51The ECCI registeredits disagreementwith the
British PB's methods,and Inkpin was reinstatedas secretaryof the Friends
of Soviet Russia.

ECCI intervention was also necessaryto block the formation of a 'red'

SWMFs
CP
following
in
Wales,
South
the
the
expulsion
of
miners'union
dominatedMardy Lodge. The militant lodge had been decimatedin the
Pollitt. PageArnot producedan incomplete Report of the ECCI Presidium, Tapsell
had
PB
differences
draft
that
the
already
agreed
upon,
resolution
and
political
a
attacked
dominatedthe proceedings.Pollitt subsequentlyreminded his comradesthat "we do not
fight
but
lead.
"
Minutes
CC
Political Bureau of the
to
to
the
of
meetings
attend
...
Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 20 May 1930.Communist Archive.
50RPDLetter to the Central Committee 6 January 1930.Klugmann Papers
51Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pj!M of Great Britain 11-12
January 1930.Communist Archive. The ECCI insisted that the PB's actions "were not the
danger
fighting
'right'
in
Party.
the
" Minutes of the Political Bureau
the
of
method
correct
Great
Britain
PaKly
21
February
Communist
1930.Communist Archive.
the
of
of

178

wake of the GeneralStrike asthe owners rejected a return to pre-strike

found
lodge
themselves
the
members
of
majority
conditions and
blacklisted.
As
a result of migration, self-preservation
and
unemployed
just
by
(compared
350
1929
lodge
to
the
numbered
unemployment,
and
1,743in 1927),of whom only 25 were employed.52Mardy had thus
becomea'militant rump, unrepresentativeof the local mineworkers and
increasingly hostile to the policy of the SWMF. In February 1930,the
miners'union voted in favour of the lodge'sexpulsion.

The idea of a new union to compliment the UMS emergedfrom William

Gallacher's'Report on the Mining Situation', presentedto the PB in
March.53With the adoption of the New Line and the emergenceof the
UMS, the Party slogan in favour of'One Miners Union'had taken on a
the
Gallacher,
For
the
one,
was
a
national
and
question
new significance.
dues
was essentially an attempt to
union
proposedpolicy of withholding
dislocatethe MFGB.

Although opposedby the majority of the PB, Gallacher was supportedby

J. W. Mills, a Profintern representativedispatchedto South Wales in
February to root out the 'right danger.'54As such, the resolution was
presentedto the Party Executive in April, where again considerable

52H.Francis & D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp 163-170.

53Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 27 March,
1930. CommunistArchive. Prior to this, the Party recommendedthe formation of 'all in'
lodges
dues.
Action,
Committees
to
to
other
mobilise
withhold
union
and
attempted
of
pit
SeeMinutes of the Executive Bureau of the Minorijy Movement 14 March 1930.Tanner
Collection.
54Detailsabout Mills remain uncertain. For the PB's acceptanceof his appointment see
Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 6 February
1930. CommunistArchive. For his scathingreport on the South Wales DPC, seeDaily
Worke 5 and 7 April 1930. Mills wanted a'secret document' outlining the need for a
United Mineworkers'Union to be circulated to the Party. Minutes of the Political Bureau
Great
PLr-t_y
Britain
27
March
Communist
the
of
and 3 April 1930. Communist
of
Archive.

179

by
55
However,
that
the
to
emphasising
expressed.
was
proposal
opposition
Gallacher's resolution endorsed the principle of a new union, Mills
line.
The
Party
ECCI
debate
therefore
the
to
the
should
adroitly applied
"in
Union
Mineworkers'
United
approach the'Mardy question'with a
forming
keeping
Mills,
the
such
of
actually
possibility
while
mind"56 said
be
to
'
As
the
'in
redrafted and
was
resolution
such,
perspective.
a union
57
CC.
by
the
adopted

The doubts expressedby British leaderssuch as Pollitt, Murphy and

McGree however, were endorsedby the ECCL After the resolution had
beensent to Moscow for ratification, the ECCI condemnedthe Party's
Comintern
A
"
deviation.
"left
"premature"
representative
and a
strategyas
CPGB
insisted
('Butler')
in
that
the
July
Executive
was
Party
meeting
at a
its
leaders
the
"drag
and
workers along
the
and
to
organisation
attempting
for
in
the
Union
One
Miners
form
struggle
of
organising
place
to
a
...
be
'new
formation
[The
union']
cannot
put
of a
againstthe employers...
forward at the presenttime."58The whole debaclewas indicative of the
division
the
Comintem,
the
acutely
and
revealed
changingmood within
betweenthe ECCI and the RILU. Moreover, the CPGB's own uncertainty
the
line
through
'correct'
pronouncements
the
publicly
revealed
was
over
59
Worker.
in
Daily
the
and retractions

55Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg_r!

y of Great Britain 5-6 April
1930.Communist Archive.
56Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 3 April 1930.
Communist Archive.
57Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 5-6 April
1930.CommunistArchive.
58Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr!y of Great Britain 17 July 1930.
And Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 19-20
July 1930.Communist Archive. The proposal was dismissedlater as a "serious mistake."
Resolution on the Questionof One Miners Union July 1930. Communist Archive.
59Forexample,seeDaily Worke 12 and 22 March 1930 for contradictory positions.

180

The ultra-leftism (or sectarianism)evident in the Party's responseto

in
CPGB
in
Wales,
South
the
endemic
within
was certainly
problems
1930;although the extent to which it impededcommunist activity varied
from region to region. As Richard Stevenshas shown, "strident
in
its
by
"notable
the
trades
the
councils
of
absence"
was
sectarianism"
East Midlands, where "Communist Party delegates... held various offices
in the council, and

the most active delegatesof the time."60

were
among
...

Elsewherehowever, the 'left danger'was more apparent,as the Party's

'Report on Party Organisation- commissionedin September,completed
in November and updatedin February 1931- revealed.

In Tyneside,Idris Cox claimed that "sectarianism... is stronger than in any

in
Maurice
"61
The
that
Party.
[region]
the
membership
gains
of
other
Fergusonhad boastedof in the wake the Dawdon colliery dispute had all
but disappearedby November 1930.By February 1931 "political passivity
have
led
"isolation"
to
leadership"
to
the
incompetent
considered
was
and
had
New
Line
disputes
the
CP.
The
District
the
polarised the
over
of
District Party, and the internal bickering that appearedto characterisethe
DPC were symbolisedin the local Party auxiliary organisations,which
1162
described
"sectarian
excellence.
par
as
were

The Party found similar problems in Scotland,although the failing District

disenchanting
to
the
effects of
membershipwas attributed ostensibly
boasted
Scotland
Yet,
UMS
the
also
and
victimisation.
and
unemployment
traditional militant heartlandsin Fife and Lanarkshire. As such, the
60R.Stevens,TradesCouncils in the East Midlands, 1929-195 1: Politics and Trade
Unionism in a7raditionally Moderate'Area Ph.D Thesis, Nottingham 1995.
61Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM of Great Britain 5 November
1930.Communist Archive.
62GeneralReport of the PgM Organisation in the Tyneside District 16 February 1931.
Klugmann Papers.

181

decline
for
Party's
the
numerical
were very real onesand
given
reasons
63
Even
for
Party
than
the
the
stronger
statistics
revealed.
remained
support
did
difficulties
for
CPGB
in
Scotland
the
tradition
the
cause
of
militant
so,
1928-31.

As Alan Campbell has noted, Bob Selkirk (a Sub-District Party Organiser

in Fife) vilified the Party leadershipfor ignoring Lenin's advice to "[train
"
While
David
bombs.
Proudfoot,
for
the
of
production
mass
our workers]
the UMS GeneralSecretarybetweenDecember 1930 and September1931,
featured
(Red
Guard)
Fife
that
crossedrifles on
pit paper
complainedof a
its front page.64

In the wake of the FebruaryPresidium therefore, it was those on the left of

the Party who receivedthe bulk of ECCI and CPGB criticism. Walter
Tapsell for instance,following his recall from the struggles in Yorkshire,
Not
had
fellow
Tapsell
by
his
only
comrades.
mercilessly
was rebuked
failed to offer adequate"political leadership," he had also been responsible
for a 'Strike Now' slogan65that the PB was belatedly forced to reject. Most
damningly however, he had chosento go to the cinema following the local
May Day demonstration!As such, it was decidedthat Tapsell did not have
the "prestigeto carry out the policy" of the CP, while the simultaneous

63See'The CommunistParty in the ScotsCoal Fields in the Inter War Period.' In Openin
the Books op. cit. pp44-59.
641bid.p56. In 1930,Selkirk and a handful of similarly militant comradeswere expelled
from the CPGB. After charging the Party with 'opportunism', Selkirk establisheda new
CP branch supposedlymore loyal to the Cl. Seealso Minutes of the Political Bureau of
the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 12 June 1930. Communist Archive. Regional
variations are discussedin chapterone.
65TheParty's agit-prop departmenthad originally issueda slogan of'Strike Nowand
censuredthe Bradford DPC's sloganof'Prepare for Strike Action. 'Minutes of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 27 March 1930. Communist
Archive. However, the PB then consideredsuch a slogan to be premature,and Tapsell (its
leftism.
with
charged
was
author)

182

decline of YCL under his stewardshipensuredhis removal from the PB in

mid

1930.66

Tapsell'slinks with the YCL were significant. The League had been
ECCI
the
both
to
by
Dutt
the
offensive against
mobilise
and
encouraged
the 'right danger,' and young communistssuch as Stuart Purkis, John
Mahon and Reg Groveshad personified the militant temper of New Line.
When attention turned to the 'left' deviation, it was inevitable that the YCL
Party
1930,
that
fire.
January
the
In
itself
noted
under
come
would
"'radical' phrasemongering, [and] opposition to masswork" was
67
1930
By
Communists.
the
the
Young
the
summer
of
characteristicof
just
fallen
375,
had
to
YCL
membership
situation was even worse.
brancheswere closing or in decline, and the "acute political and
into
"isolated
YCL
had
the
transformed
an
and
organisationalcrisis"
69
The
firm
the
body
youth.
working
class
with
contact"
with no
sectarian
blame for this deteriorationwas attributed to the "left sectariandanger," of
Party
YCL
the
Rust,
William
Tapsell
representatives
on
as
and
which
Executive, were accusedof promoting 69

66Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa!!y of Great Britain 27 June 1930.
Communist Archive. "After the May Day demonstrationthere was nothing much on and I
deemed
ignore
he
Now'slogan
The'Strike
to
"
Tapsell
was
to
the
said.
cinema,
went
'running
the
thus
the
to
and
was
ahead'
of
strike,
organise
needed
preparation
necessary
for
leftism.
Arnot
target
Page
Robin
the
charges
of
other
primary
was
masses.
67'Reporton the YCL' Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pam o
Great Britain 11-12 January 1930.Communist Archive.
68Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 31 May-2
June, 1930.Furthermore,the 'sectarianismof the YCL'was a major point of criticism in
the Party's analysisof its shortcomingsduring the woollen dispute. SeeRusfs report in
Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PaE!y of Great Britain 21-22 July
1930.Communist Archive.
69Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PgM of Great Britain 31 May-2
June 1930.Communist Archive. Rust acceptedhis shareof the blame, but also pointed
towards the directives of the YCI which he claimed were as much, if not more,
line
YCL.
for
the
the
of
sectarian
responsible

183

Similar problems surrounded the Daily Worker, launched by the CPGB on

I January 1930.70A communist daily had been on the CPGBs agenda
Daily
hoped
it
the
its
formation,
that
the
emergence
of
and was
since
Worker would bring the Party back into closer contact with the workers.
However, difficulties, both organisational and political, soon emerged.
Harry Pollitt had warned consistently that the Party's perilous financial
initial
fledgling
the
the
editorial
offices'
paper, and
situation would plague
lack of such j ournalistic rudimentaries as lighting or a telephone seemed to
justify his concerns.71Moreover, the Party's attempt to produce a paper
that was at once revolutionary and of popular appeal to the British
both
Party
differences
the
led
to
within
of
opinion
sharp
working class,
leadership and amongst the readership.

On a practical level, the Daily Worker had to overcome extraordinary

difficulties. Within days of the paper's launch, the Provincial Wholesalers
Federation moved to boycott the Daily Worker, and by July (after London
had
distributive
CP
followed
had
the
Scottish
no
suit)
wholesalers
and
initial
Party's
fell
far
the
Meanwhile,
of
short
circulation
network.
for
but
hoped
least
25,000
figure
A
provisionally,
was
of
at
expectations.
by
Subsequently,
IS
11,000.72
as
early
as
at
around
circulation settled
January, a loss of E500 a week was being incurred, 73and the PB regularly
discussed the need to cut down the number of pages in the Daily Worker. 74
70Thebest overview of the Daily Worker is K. Morgan'The Communist Party and the
Daily Worker 1930-1956.'In Opening the Books op. cit. pp142-159. Seealso W. Rust
The Sto1yof the Daily Worke (London, 1949).
71N.Branson,Histoly of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain op. cit. p53. For materials
detailing the Daily Workers' developmentseeInformation on the Daily Worker Dutt
Suitcase.WCML.
72Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist Pqrty of Great Britain 21-22 July
1930. Communist Archive.
73SpecialReport of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 15
January 1930.Communist Archive.
74TheDaily Worke beganwith twelve pagesbut was soon down to just four. Minutes of
the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM of Great Britain 24 July 1930. Communist

184

Suchproblems inevitably led to discussionsover the objectives of the

William
in
Rust,
daily.
The
conjunction with
editor
communist
paper's
Palme Dutt, envisagedthe Daily Worker to be a "leader and agitator
expressingthe revolutionary line of the Party."75In contrast, Harry Pollitt
expecteda workers' daily paperto rival other daily papers; covering
topical news eventsand sport. Both parties were to be disappointed.Dutt
lead,
"76
is
"there
to
tendency
that
and Pollitt
report, not
protested
a
complainedthat the Daily Worker was more like a "a daily edition of
Inpreco " than a wide-ranging, popular newspaper."All the topical news
of interest is omitted" he observed,"[and] only struggle and death"
77
remained.

It was Pollitt who receivedmost supportwithin the Executive. Joe Scott, a

factory worker and memberof the Central Committee, complained that he
had tried to sell the paper at work "but found it impossible

the paper

...
doesn'ttreat things in which the workers are interested."78Other Party
leadersalso felt the paper "dull" and "unattractive to the workers"

(Murphy), 79and crucially, after Pollitt had had discussionsin Moscow, the
PB resolvedto developthe daily as a'popular massnewspaper.180
Even so,

Archive. The Party was forced to desperatelychaseup unpaid dues,For one of many
appealsseeWalter Tapsell'sarticle on Tyneside in Daily Worke 4 June, 1930.Also
Circular to all Pgjy Local 22 September,1930.Klugmann Papers.
75Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PpM of Great Britain I 1- 12
January 1930.Communist Archive.
76RPDLetter to the Political Bureau 12 February 1930.Klugmarm Papers.
77Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr!y
of Great Britain 19 June 1930.
Communist Archive.
781bid.Idris Cox also observedthat the languageof the paper "'opportunism'...
tsectarianism'...'social fascism,"' - would serve only to alienate the readership.
79Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PaLiy Great Britain 2
of
and 9
January,and 19 June 1930. Communist Archive.
80K. Morgan, 'The Communist Party and the Daily Worker'
op. cit. p 145. Seealso,
Communist Review October 1930.

185

Pollitt was still expressingthe need for the paper to use "more popular
193
1.81
in
February
expressions"

between
fissure
the
highlighted
that
the
Worker
Daily
existed
As such,the
CPGB and the working class it claimed to represent.In relation to the
the
for
theoretical
the
with
sharply
clashed
example,
coverageof sport
inclusion
Dutt,
For
interests.
the
lives
of
and
actualities of the workers'
"capitalist sport" was "incorrect and indefensible." The racing tips the
Daily Worke published initially, were dismissedas an "alternative to the
in
Dutt's
Cup
FA
"
the
should
opinion
classstruggle, while eventssuch as
Day
Armistice
"as,
in
been
have
the
say,
way
same
reported
insisted
Stewart,
by
Bob
that
the
"82
He
who
was supported
celebrations.
kings.
'83
Despite
'sport
the
than
of
paperpromote workers sport rather
from
"avalanche"
the
Pollitt
from
Harry
complaints
of
an
and
protestations
Stewart
incensed
Dutt
had
and
that
tips
particularly
readers,the racing
the
the
to
84
activities
of
over
was
given
space
were removed, and more
BWSF.

Such sectariansquabblesshould not lead to a dismissal of the Daily

Worker however. While the paper did not induce a massupsurgein the
CP's popularity, it did contribute towards lifting the Party out of the
introspective doldrums of the previous two years.First, it gave inactive or

81Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr1yof Great Britain 15 February
1931. Communist Archive.
82RPDLetter to the Central Committee 6 January 1930.Communist Archive. 'Sj2ortand
(BL).
To
1930.
Dutt
Papers
'21
January
Dail
report non-critically on major sporting
our
for
insisted
Dutt.
be
capitalism,
propaganda
effectively
eventswould
8313ailyWorker 4 January 1930.
84Forthe removal of the racing tips see,Minutes of the Political Bureau of the
CommunistPM. of Great Britain 16 January 1930. Communist Archive. Rust referred to
Political
Bureau
Communist
in
Minutes
Pam of Great Britain 23
letters
the
the
of
of
such
January 1930.CommunistArchive. For examplesof the sport debateseethe Daily
Worke throughout January-February 1930.

186

dispirited Party membersa focal working point. As Noreen Branson has

recognised,the paper "acted as a tonic," forcing the Party to develop its
85
distribution
network. Party membersthrew themselvesinto ensuring
own
the Daily Worker reachedits destination, loading papersonto trains in
London, collecting and distributing them acrossthe country, recovering
returns and payment.In his autobiographyNo Mean Fighte , Harry
McShanedescribeshow,
Every moming a fleet of about 30 memberson bicycles met at a railway station and took
bundles of papers out to the different localities where others were waiting to distribute
them to the newsagents.86

Second,the Daily Worker did highlight the deficiencies of too sectarianan

approachto the Party line. The small circulation of the paper, and such
controversiesas that engenderedby the paper'ssports coverage,raised
debatewithin the Party leadershipas to the best way to approachthe
workers. As such,the paperwas not consumedwholly by the ultra-leftism
describedabove.The Party realised that "to leave out all capitalist sport
football
"
drive
and
reports and scoreswere
away,
would
workers
maintainedthroughout 1930-31.87Moreover, the paper'sattempt to muster
worker correspondentsand foster political debatecontributed greatly
towards the distinct culture that developedaround the CPGB in the
thirties. Such featuresas Madge Brown's women'spage, film reviews, and
articles on the Worker' TheatreMovement, revealedthe CPGB's desireto
appealto a broad section of the working class,and to mobilise independent
working class activity.

85N.Branson,Histoly of the Communist PLM of Great Britain op. cit. p55.

86H.McShane,No Mean Fighter op. cit. p 167.
8713ailyWorker I September1930.Football reports appearto have been sacrificed during
the economiccrisis of late 1931. As more spacewas required to report the treacheryof
MacDonald and the National Government,the amount of sport coveredby the paper
diminished noticeably. SeeDaily Worke 10 October 1931, for the last football reports.

187

Thus, on the eve of the ECCI commissionheld in August 1930to discuss

the CPGB's'isolation from the masses',the Party was aware of the
'sectarianism'that blighted the Party's progress.In the Executive meeting
that precededthe commission,a number of leading Party members
denouncedthe shortcomingsof the ultra-militant line pursued in the first
half of 1930.Garfield Williams for example,one of the Lenin school
line,
Party
Wales
South
the
despatched
to
to
reported of
enforce
students
Daily Worker readermeetingswhere non-Party memberswere quizzed as
to why they attended;and pit meetingsin Cardiff where communists sat
demonstrated
88
Kath
Duncan
from
the
meanwhile,
non-communiStS.
away
how "we shun our comrades we analysethem and make them feel they
...
We
incapable
correctly
at
all
anything
of accomplishing
are considered
...
must cut out all this appalling phrasemongering and claptrap which the
lead
Moscow,
"89
In
sentiments
would
similar
workers cannotunderstand.
to a major re-evaluationof the CPGB's approachto the Third Period.
While the realignment of the CPGB accordedwith the realignment of the
discussed
Comintern
the
were very real
problems
sections,
various other
onesand the measuresoutlined very necessary.

A Workers Party?
The British Commissionof August 1930enabledthe ECCI to appraisethe
development,
CPGB's
the
and to simultaneously
problems afflicting
Comintern.
As
Party
British
the
the
the
concerns
with
prevailing
of
realign
instigate
to
the
measuresthat would transform
attempted
commission
such,
88Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PpM of Great Britain 19-21 July
1930.Communist Archive. For the findings of the Lenin school studentsgroup see,
Report of the StudentsGroup, South Wales District June 1930.WCML
89Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PMyof Great Britain 19-21 July
1930. CommunistArchive. Idris Cox and R.W. Robson were among the other Party
leadersto outline the deficienciesof the Party line.

188

the CPGB into a'mass Party'capable of offering a coherent lead to the

(theoretically) revolutionary workers in the Third Period. Subsequently,
the commissionwas correctly described(by Harry Pollitt) as a
"straighteningout" of the New Line; "a turn in the direction of correctly
applying the line of the Communist International."90

As the leading British delegate,Pollitt reported the findings of the

commissionto the CPGB Executive on 13 September.91The ECCI had
he
[in
CPGBI"
"a
to
to
the
tendency
recounted,and
go extremes
noted
through succumbingto both 'left' and 'right' dangers,the Party had become
increasingly isolated from the British working class.Not only had Party
members'lost sight' of the importance of working inside the trade unions
and the Labour Party Pollitt explained,but the united front from below had
beenconsistentlymisapplied.92
We have always been talking about the united front tactic, and yet it has been
misinterpretedthroughout the Party. It is translated as working with one or two workers
who, if they do not swallow everything we want them to, become social fascists ... who
must be mercilessly exposed... [In] organisationsunder Party control, there is no attempt
to bring workers to the front ... If there is in any factory 20 or 30 workers who are
preparedto work with us on the basis of two or three simple issues,but who have no use
for our belief in armed insurrection or on the question of religion we should not reject
...
theseworkers. We should work with them.93

Although the commissionmaintainedthat the 'right danger'was the

"biggest fight" within the CPGB, Pollitt now assertedthat'left
901bid.
91Pollitt had previously reported on the commission's findings to the PB on 28 August.
See Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 28 August
1930. Communist Archive.
92Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 13-14
September 1930. Communist Archive. The move away from the more hard line policy
was also signified by J.R. Campbell's return from Moscow to work on the Daily Worke
.
As Campbell had been held responsible for numerous'right deviations' throughout 192829, his return emphasised the high regard with which Campbell was held in the
Comintern. His presence on the Daily Worker was (possibly) intended to check the overmilitant line of Rust.
931bid.

189

dangerous"
deviation.
Those
had
"most
the
who
sectarianism'was
"sneered"or raised chargesof 'legalism' against Party membersworking
inside the trade unions were denouncedby Pollitt, and the need "to win
inside
bureaucracy
in
the
[and]
forces,
to
positions
order
win official
new
to strengthenthe independentleadershipof the MM" was underlined.94
Significantly, Pollitt usedthe example of Bradford, where the CPGB's
isolation from the organisedworkers was explicit, to emphasisethis
95
point.

In addition to highlighting the CPGB's deviation from the Comintern line,

the ECCI commissionalso recommendedmeasuresby which the Party
behind
full
its
Harry
ECCI
its
decline.
First,
the
authority
put
could redress
Pollitt in an attempt to stabilise the Party leadership.A Secretariatof
Pollitt, Rust and Gallacherwas recommended,and the commission stated
that "ComradePollitt has to be looked on as the Secretaryof the Party and
from
August
1930
"96
It
fullest
therefore, that Pollitt
the
was
SUpport.
given
becamethe defacto leaderof the CPGB.

94Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pgr1yof Great Britain 13-14
September1930.CommunistArchive. Pollitt clearly insisted that such a re-emphasison
trade union work was not a return to the 'old line'. The communistswere working "not in
bureaucracy,
bring
" but to win
the
to
the
to
upon
pressure
apparatus,
or
order capture
support and developthe MM.
95TheFifth RILU Congressmadesimilar references.Held in August 1930, the RILU
criticised the'sectarian tendencies'of the MM. "The line of independentleadership...
[has] beenwrongly interpretedas meaningthe abandonmentof work within the refon-nist
trade unions ... neglect of the struggle againstthe trade union bureaucrats... the calling of
strikes without preparation... slogansnot conforming to actual situations ... the
mechanicalenforcementof programmesof action and demandsfrom the top; the general
indulgenceof abstractappealsand phrasemongering as a substitute for day to day
failure
to popularise simple, practical economic and
activities;
practical
systematic
political demands." Resolutionsof the Fifth World Congressof the RILU Held in
Moscow. August 30 (London, 1931). Several'right errors' were also listed.
96Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 28 August
1930.CommunistArchive.

190

Second,the commissiondevelopedplans for a Workers' Charter; a "broad

demands
"series
based
that
front
of
around
a
action"
of
programme
united
day'
'day
to
"
to
the
therefore
immediately
applicable
practicable, and
were
Party
97
Where
to
revitalise
attempts
the
previous
workers.
concernsof
to
'revolutionary
the
attract membership9scompetition'
as
activity - such
had focusedon the CP itself, the Workers' Charter was a concertedattempt
In
British
Party
the
Communist
integrate
class.
working
the
among
to
dispute,
broad
the
more
woollen
revolutionary slogansof
place of the
immediate,'limited' demandswere presented.Theseincluded an increased
disqualifying
benefit
the
all
abolition of
and
rate of unemployment
day
and a minimum wage; and campaigns
a
seven-hour
restrictions;
Charter
The
Act.
Disputes
Trades
dismissals
was also
the
and
against
intendedto focus on specific sectorsof industry. So for example,a
Women'sCharter was developedto demandequal pay and benefit rights.

But how effective was the CPGB'sturn'towards the masses'?With regard

high
initially
Party's
Charter,
Workers'
the
expectationssoon proved
the
to
deceptive.The Party pressextensively promoted the campaign,numerous
district conferenceswere organised,a pamphlet- The Workers' CharterCharter
120,000
candidatescontestedmunicipal
and
copies,
quickly sold
Conferences
Women's
took
National
Two
in
late
1930.99
also
elections
held
Charter
Convention,
National
1;
193
August
in
April
and a
and
place,
in Bermondseyon 12 April, was attendedby 788 delegatesrepresenting

97R.PageAmot, Twenly Years 1920-1940. The Policy of the Communist PajjY of Great
Britain from its FoundationJuly 31,1920 (London, 1940). p42.
98Memorandumon Revolutionga Competition undated (March 1930). Tanner
Collection. The MM's attemptto apply such a concept found little success.
990n 26 October, a massdemonstrationin support of the Workers' Charter met in
Trafalgar Square.Reportedly 7-8,000 people were present.Information SheetNo. 6 28
October 1930.Tanner Collection.

191

over 300 workers' organisationsand 100 local Charter Committees.100

Even so, despitesuch relatively impressive figures, the Minority
Movement had registeredits concernabout the "uneven" successof the
campaignby October 1930.101

The National Convention acutely revealedthe problem. Although the

less
the
actually
was
encouraging,
convention
attracted
attendance
union
and workshop representativesthan the 1929MM conference.Moreover, as
Jack Murphy complained,despitethe number of non-Party representatives
in attendance,the "Party monopolisedthe campaign,especially the
speeches... [and] it was more like an MM conferencethan a Charter
Conference." 102Pollitt, who disagreedwith Murphy at the time, was left to
rue the Party's insistenceon decidingfor the workers insteadof working
103
the
with
workers.

At a local level, it soonbecameclear that the high number of Charter

meetingsand committeesdid not necessarilytranslate into broad, wideranging support.A Bermondseymeeting in October 1930 for example,
attractedjust four people, while in Tyneside the supposedlybroad based
campaignnumberedjust twelve, with one non-Party member!104

10OFor
examplesee,Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PPM of Great
Britain 21 August, 8 October 1930,16 April 1931. Communist Archive. T. Bell, British
Communist PLr!y op. cit. p145. R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions op.
cit. pp 157-163.S. Bruley, Leninism op. cit. p 198. Bruley corrects Martin's assumption
that the Women'sConferencesdid not take place.
10IMinutesof the Executive Bureau of the Minorijy Movement 9 October 1930.Tanner
Collection. Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PqiV of Great Britain
22-23 November 1930. CommunistArchive.
102Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 16 April
1931. CommunistArchive.
103K.Morgan, H2= Polli op. cit. p76.
104R.Martin, Communism and the British Trade Unions
op. cit. pp 158-5 9. General
Report of the Pqrly Organisation in the Tyneside District 16 February 193 1. Klugmann
Papers.

192

Subsequently,with only a handful of union branches(mainly in the AEU

dissolved
in
late
SWMF)
the
the
campaign
showing
support,
and

1931.105

The problem of organising a masscampaignwith limited personnel,

in
labour
be
Uthe
to
to
movement
a
many
coupledwith what appeared
turn in the CPGB'sperspective,blighted the Party's attempt to popularise
the Workers' Charter.The Minority Movement, which the Charter was
launch
by
late
1930
to
too
to
adequately
weak
was
supposed rejuvenate,
Committees
106
Charter
Although
the
were supposedto
such a campaign.
be subordinateto the MM, there were many areaswhere fledgling
Committeesexisted and Minority Movement sectionsdid not.107However,
the conceptof the Charter did much to preparethe Party for the struggles
issues,
Women's
the
unemployment, and
ahead,and
recognition of
indigenousworking classconcerns,confirmed that the Party had at least
leamt from its experiencesin early 1930.108

The re-emphasison the united front from below arousedsimilar confusion.

It soonbecameclear that neither the British Commission, nor the Fifth
105AsRoderick Martin has pointed out (Communism op. cit. p160), William Allan later
reportedto the RILU that "after the conclusion of the Campaign, all the namesand
its
had
during
progresswere pushedinto a
we
collected
which
addressesof workers
drawer in a desk and nothing was done with them... " Red International of Labour Unions
February 1932.
106Reportsto the MM Executive were uniformly discouraging in 1930.For an example,
seeReport of the Furnishing Trade Minorijy Movement 5 April 1930.Tanner Collection,
107Assuch,the campaignrevealedthe inadequacyof the MM, and underlined the need
for the CPGB to changethe meansthrough which it approachedthe working class.
Although the MM hobbled on into 1932,the JanuaryResolutions (as we shall see)
effectively markedthe liquidation of the MM.
108More attention was applied to womens industrial issuesas 1930 drew on. A Women's
pageappearedin The Worker; the Women'sDepartment- headedby Rose Smith issues
around
such
as equal pay; and a Women's Departmentwas
campaigned
actively
organisedin the NUWM following its Sixth National Conferencein 1929.The
departmentwas headedby Maud Brown (who was not in the CPGB), while a number of
local branchesestablishedWomen'ssections.At its 1931 Conference,the NUWM
develop
Women's
in
finiher
to
a
section
every locality, and a Women's
resolved
feature
became
a
regular
of the National Hunger Marches in the 1930s.SeeS.
contingent
Bruley, Leninism op. cit. pp 179-193.

193

Congressof the RILU, had elucidatedadequatelythe 'correct' meansby

'broad
Party
the
a
such
alliance' of the workers.
should
construct
which
The two major disputesof early 1931consequentlyrevealed markedly
different interpretationsof the united front within the CPGB. Amidst the
ensuingdebatesand remonstrations,the Party almost lost one of its most
popular members,Arthur Homer. As such, despitethe ECCI and CPGB's
emphasison supportingthe workers within the reformist trade unions, the
Party remaineduncertain as to how to apply the Comintern line

This was clearly evident in the mining dispute of early 1931. The dispute
had beenbrewing for sometime prior to its eventual outbreak on I
January.Disagreementsover the Government'sCoal Mines Act, which
reducedthe miners'working day from eight to sevenand a half hours, had
implementing
based
led
to
the
new
rosters
coal
owners
around
eventually
lower wagesand the spreadover of hours. The SWMF thus called its
membersout, while Governmentand union officials sought, and secured,a
temporary compromisewith the owners.A Conciliation Board then met to
review the settlement,and although the SWMF narrowly voted not to
resumestrike action in March - following the Board's reduction of
dispute
the
the
rates
and
subsistence
wage
was effectively
percentage
concludedand the miners defeated.

Once again however, the Party proved unable to substantially influence

events.The Miners'Minority Movement conferenceheld on 10 January
(and attendedby 55 delegates)attemptedto forge an independent
leadershipof the dispute.A Central Strike Committee was elected,chaired
by Arthur Homer, and a campaignto form pit committees of organisedand
launched
in opposition to the 'manoeuvring'of the
men
was
unorganised

194

SWMF.109Problemsemergedhowever, with the decision to return to work

on 17 January.

While Homer believed the Party had no option but to accedeto the
SWMF's decision, both the South Wales DPC and the PB insisted that the
Central Strike Committee call for the extensionof the strike.
Subsequently,only one pit respondedto the CPGB's appeal,and Homer
Committee.
Strike
his
from
the
position as chairman of
resigned

In a letter to the RILU, Homer demonstratedthat the Party's approach

towards the disputewas fundamentally flawed. "There was not the most
he
insisted,
dispute"
for
the
and as such
on
carrying
elementarymachinery
"the tactics employedto continue the struggle on Monday morning were
infantile." Homer's reasoningwas basedon the premise that the role of the
SWMF was "neglected" (the Party had only one delegateattendantat the
SWMF conference),no relief fund had been set up, and the "artificial
"
Basically,
had
Party
"without
the
content.
mass
strike committees"were
little or no influence, and the Strike Committee of "250 MM members...
[was] isolated from the massof the workers." Horner, by contrast,had
hoped to work within the SWMF; speakingto the workers and organising
'
1()
Finally,
the
trust.
workers
of
acquiring
a
result
strike committeesas
Homer complainedthat the Party had neglected'local issues',which he felt
for
III
been
have
the
to
support
strike.
utilised mobilise
could

109Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgty of Great Britain 15 January
1931. CommunistArchive.
II OArthurHomer Letter to the RIL-U 21 January 1931. Klugmann Papers.Minutes of the
Political Bureau of the Communist P= of Great Britain 22 January 1931. Communist
Archive.

III Minutesof theCentralCommitteeof the CommunistPqM of GreatBritain 30 May-I

June1931.CommunistArchive.

195

Homer was opposedby Idris Cox, the PB's representativeon the South
Wales District Party Committee. Cox insisted on the need to maintain the
strike, and he explainedthe ineffectivenessof the pit committeesand the
miners' subsequentdisregardfor sustainedaction, as being due to the
"inactivity of local Party members"and a lack of belief in independent
despair,
"
Cox
line
"gospel
Homer's
said, while any overt
of
was
a
action.
detracted
from
have
local
the wider
grievanceswould
concentrationon
political issuesof the dispute.' 12

At the Party centre,Pollitt and Gallacher both sought to strike a balance;

in
in
Homer's
to
point relation activity the SWMF, while
accepting
has
Carr
initial
his
E.
H.
'defeatism'.
Indeed,
Party
the
noted,
as
criticising
'left'
focused
dispute
the
the
on
errors of the Welsh
primarily
report on
isolation
from the
Party's
'
13
The
PB's
to
the
constantreferral
comrades.
PB
'capitulating'
led
Cox
that
the
to
to
the
was
complain
massof
miners
Homer.114Even Palme Dutt however, found Cox's interpretation of
'independentleadership'too sectarian:
Our local comradesin South Wales still have the obsessionthat the task of independent
...
leadership consists of holding everything tight in our hands and in the hands of the
present Central Strike Committee, that if the workers make any move on their own or
through the lodge machinery it is bound to be wrong becauseit is not in our hands, and
we must give our alternative lead against it etc., instead of recognising that the one
important question is that the fight should go forward whatever the initial forms, that the
workers should act, and our leadership will come out ... in helping to show the way
forward. 115

What Particularly rankled the Party centre however, was first; Homer's
refusal to appreciatethat his acceptanceof the SWMF's call for a return to
112Minutesof the Political Bureau of the CommunisLEqM of Great Britain 23 January
1931. CommunistArchive.
113E.
H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. pp210-211. Daily Worker 28 January 1931.
114Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 29 January
1931. CommunistArchive.
115R.
P. Dutt, Letter to the Political Bureau 22 March 1931. Communist Archive.

196

interpreted
'legalism',
his
flagrant
be
and
as
second;
criticism
work could
itself.
Homer
himself
leadership
Party
thus
the
positioned
against the
of
As such, although
Party line, or as Rust put it, "opposed to the C1.11116
117
by
CPGB,
it was
Homer's
the
accepted
argument were
aspects of
Homer's history of opposition to the New Line that precipitated the vicious
Daily
18
in
Worker.,
'Homerism'
the
the
of
pages
against
campaign
Circulars were issued to Party branches, and Executive members such as
Ernest Woolley called for'steps to be taken'against Homer and
"Homerites everywhere. " 119With the 'right danger' still the 'main danger',
Homer became the principal target.

The final word restedwith the ECCI, which upheld the chargeof'legalism'
but crucially, criticised Homer for a tactical error rather than opposition to
the CI line. Moreover, much of the ECCI resolution focused on the
far
from
CPGB,
the
complimentary. Most pointedly,
and was
conduct of
the ECCI criticised the failure to form the "basis for independent
leadershipamongthe broad massesof the miners, both the unorganised
and especially the organised,although there were grounds for it. " 120
Similarly, the ECCI found Cox guilty of sectarianismwith regard to the
issueof local grievances;'mechanism'over the application of the line; and
116Minutesof the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain 31 May-I
June 1931. CommunistArchive.
117For example,Rust called on communiststo join the SWMF, and highlighted the need
to put demandsto union officials 'in order to exposethem.' This latter point, Rust said,
had beenmadeto him at both the August Commission and the RILU Congress.Minutes
of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg of Great Britain 29 January 1931.
Communist Archive.
118Letterfrom Robin PageArnot to Ham Pollitt and Political Bureau 8 February 1931.
Klugmarm Papers.Arnot felt Homer placed every struggle within the framework of the
MFGB, and that thereforea'struggle againstHornerism' should be unleashed. For public
Worke
10,12,23,28
Daily
February 1931.
see
criticism
119Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pgr!y of Great Britain 14-15
March 1931. CommunistArchive. Political Letter Re: Arthur Homer. to all District and
Local Pqr1yCommittees27 February 1931. Klugmarm Papers.
120Resolutionon the Questionof ComradeHomer 15 September1931. Klugmann
Papers.

197

'rushing ahead'in his calls for strike action.121Both 'right' and 'left' errors
were thus condemned,and the necessaryflexibility of the CI line
emphasised.

The CPGB's inability to influence the miners' struggle of 1931 cannot be

wholly attributed to the dispute within the Central Strike Committee, or to
the line of Homer, Cox, or the CPGB. Fundamentalto the CP's isolation,
impotency,
indeed
SWMF's
the
to
were the over-riding
apparent
and
both
factors
the strength of the union and
that
undermined
socio-economic
the militant influence within the pits. Once strong, united communities had
been destroyedby unemployment,victimisation and despondency
following the GeneralStrike, and the CPGB and the SWMF both suffered
as a consequence.Thus, the CPGB's attemptsto mobilise support in the
Conciliation
Board
6
March
between
January
17
the
report
of
and
weeks
found little expression.Only the Llwynypia colliery respondedto the
Minority Movement'scall to maintain the struggle,122and the Conference
Committee
Central
Strike
by
Action
the
was attendedby
established
of
just four miners' lodges.Overall, the miners' dispute of 1931revealed
acutely the contradictionsthat still prevailed at the heart of the CPGB, and
the "disarray" that characterisedthe once mighty SWMF. 123

The other major dispute of early 1931was the on-going struggle of the
textile workers, whose opposition to rationalisation and the introduction of
the'more looms'system had intensified in late 1930.The failure of the
121Activity of Centre in South Wales Dispute undated.Klugmann Papers.The Party's
approachto the miners strike of 1931was a later used by the ECCI as an exampleof how
not to employ an independentleadership.Kuusinen referred mockingly to the Central
Strike Committee("without masssupport") as a "game of spillikins. " SeeE.H. Carr,
Twiligh op. cit. P220.
122Eightother pits took action on local issueshowever.
123See
H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. pp 176-179, for an in-depth overview of
theseevents.I have drawn heavily from their work.

198

Manufacturers' Association and the Weavers' Amalgamation to find any

kind of compromise led individual mill owners to simply go ahead with
the systems introduction. Indeed, it was just such an attempt in Burnley
that sparked the lock-out of January 193 1. Workers in nine mills downed
tools initially, and organised weavers voted against negotiations over
'more looms' by a majority of two to one The strike remained solid, the
owners (temporarily) backed down, and the mills reopened on existing
terms. 124

The Party'srole in the disputeremainedmodest.Despite two years'

in
in
the
the
communist presence the mills and the
agitation
region,
weavers' organisationswas describedas "very weak," and the Party
dispute.
125
it
had
Moreover, the
"no
the
the
outset
of
at
admitted
prestige"
Central Strike Committeenumberedjust 40, and Ernest Brown's concerted
attemptsto organisea conferenceof mill committeesproved futile. 126

Even so, a more pragmatic approachto the dispute was clearly evident.
Harry Pollitt remindedthe PB that "one of the great lessons of Bradford
...
last year was the completeneglect of trade union [activity]" and "good
work" amongstthe organisedworkers was duly reported.127The slogan
'Unions Call Out Your Men'was defendedby William Rust, who referred
to the RILU's insistenceon putting demandsto official union
representativesas "a meansof exposing the officials ..."128Furthermore,
124R.Martin, Communismand the British Trade Unions op. cit. ppl63-164. Seealso, S.
Bruley, 'The LancashireWeaversin the Depression! In Opening the Books op. cit. pp6482. A. and L. Fowler, A HistoKyof the Nelson Weavers'Association Burnfev 1984.
125Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 15 January
1931. CommunistArchive.
126Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PM of Great Britain 13 February
1931. CommunistArchive.
1271bid.
128Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist.Pagy Great Britain 29 January
of
1931. CommunistArchive.

199

the Party madeattemptsto adaptto local conditions. Given the fact that 70
per cent of the strikers were women, Rose Smith and Bessie Dickinson
for
female
line.
Party
Thus, specific
hard
the
to
support
secure
worked
issues,such as the owners' tendencyto sack female workers aheadof male
129
workers, were addressed.

Although the weavers (short-lived) victory was due primarily to the efforts
influence
least
in
Party
the
themselves,
the
claim
an
could
at
of
workers
the dispute. And while an 'independent leadership' was not forged in
Lancashire in early 193 1, communists such as Dickinson and her husband
Harold, James Rushton and Amy Hargreaves, were at the centre of the
struggle; rallying resistance and organising pickets with significant local
support. 130

In the realm of industrial disputestherefore, the Party generally remained

in
Amongst
193
0-3
1.
the unemployed
to
the
struggle
workers'
peripheral
however, the CPGB's influence continued to grow. The number of dues
in
1929
10,000,
had
NUWM,
totalled
the
some
which
of
paying members
purportedly doubled by March 1930with The Worker quoting a (rather
131
in
figure
August.
The movement'slegal
39,000
of
optimistic)
departmentwas further refined, additional brancheswere establishedand
demonstrationsto local Public AssistanceCommittees increasedacrossthe
country. Theselocal campaigns,often instigated in and around labour
129Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 13 February
1931. CommunistArchive. Seealso SueBrulcy, Leninism op. cit. p215-220. B.
Dickinson, Women and the More Looms SystemTextile Minority Movement. London
1931.
130SeeS. Bruley, 'The LancashireWeavers'op. cit. pp74-75. For BessieDickinson's
Leeson,
Strike
R.
A.
op. cit. ppl24-25.
see
recollections
131Minutes of the Political Bureau of the CommunisLEg! y of Great Britain 21 March
1930. CommunistArchive. The Worker 29 August 1930.For an alternative estimatesee
S. Davies, 'The Membershipof the National Unemployed Workers' Movement 1923-38.'
In Labour Histojy Revie Spring 1992.

200

exchanges,were complimentedby branch meetingsheld in the open, thus

giving the N-UWM the massexposurethe ECCI and RILU craved.

The main reasonfor such growth appearsobvious, the simultaneous

increasein the number of unemployed.But by 1930,with the main focus
of (nation-wide) working class struggle having arguably switched from the
workplace to the dole queue,the Party's long history of'unemployment
struggles'stood it in good stead.132In addition, Wal Hannington
fought
by
the CP and the RILU to alter
off
attempts
successfully
significantly the foundationsof the NUWM. The movement maintained its
emphasison 'grassroots' issuesand close contact with non-Party members,
campaigningfor suchbasic demandsas an increasein the rate of
unemploymentbenefit, and adapting itself to local grievancesand
conditions. Subsequently,while the Party could not claim to be the
it
had
the
someclaim to the title with regard
vanguardof
working masses,
to the unemployed.133

The two national demonstrationsorganisedby the NUWM comprised of

an'International UnemploymentDay'held on 6 March, and a Hunger
March to London from 30 March through to I May. The former was
conceivedby the ECCI secretariatof 16 Januaryand revealedto the CI
sectionsat a WesternEuropeanBureau (WEB) meeting in Berlin on the
3 1. With barely a month to prepare,the results (perhapsunsurprisingly)
proved disappointing.Walter Tapsell reportedthat "plans were only
carried out in part" and the 'unsatisfactory'turn out was verified by the

132Fortwo historical overviews of the NUWM, seeW. Hannington, UnemRloyed

Struggleaop. cit. and R. Croucher, We Refuseto Starve in Silence op. cit.
133Foran alternativeview see,H. Harmer, 'The Failure of the Communists:The National
Unemployed Workers' Movement, 1929-1939: A Disappointing Success.'In A. Thorpe
(Ed.) The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain (Exeter, 1989). pp29-48.

201

NUWM at its National Conferencethe following year. Harry McShane,

the Scottishorganiserof the NUWM, recalled later that only "two hundred
"a
in
Glasgow,
demon
although
number of other
strated
of us"
demonstrators[later] arrived."134

More successfulwas the National Hunger March of 1930.The march was

inclusion
Women's
both
due
the
to
of
a
contingent
particularly significant
hostility
by
Brown
the
headed
Maud
the
marchers
encountered
and
from the governing Labour Party.

The Women'scontingent was the first of its kind, and reflected a growing
labour
by
(sections
the
female
movement.
the
of)
workforce
awarenessof
The Labour Party's opposition to the march meanwhile, caused
forbidding
local
A
for
NUWM.
the
circular
considerableproblems
branchesto have any contact with the movementindicated that Labour
halls would be unavailable as temporary accommodation.And as Labour
help
to the weary marchers,the
to
offer
councils generally refused
'rogue'
Labour
forced
the
to
of
supporters
on
goodwill
rely
organiserswere
limited
135
institutions.
As
law
the
local
to
march
the
such,
was
poor
and
just 1,000demonstrators,with a further 20,000 greeting the marchersat
Hyde Park on I st May. 136Protestsand marchescontinued throughout the
from
deputation
MacDonald
Ramsay
to
meet
refused
a
week, and although

134H.McShane,No Mean Fighter op. cit. pp 167-169. The demonstrationendedin a

Seventh
Report
Annual Conference(N-UWM,
McShane
the
arrested.
of
was
scuffle and
1931).
1351nW. Hannington, Never on our Knees op. cit. p227, Hannington recalled how an
'advancedguard'would travel aheadof the march to secureaccommodationfrom'Labour
women' willing to serveon reception committees.However, the women were often
threatenedwith expulsion as a consequenceof their actions.
136W.Hannington, Unemployment Strugglesop. cit. pp2ll-213. Hannington reported
50,000.
of
estimates
newspaper

202

the NUWM, those demonstratorswho successfullyraided the Ministry of

Health generatedvaluable publicity for the unemployed.

Despite its continuedgrowth however, the N-UWM's duespaying basis and

its representationalwork did come in for criticism following the Party's
LeedsCongress.At a PB meeting in mid January,R.W. Robson
indicative
"legalism,
"
NUWM's
the
that
of
and
were
methods
complained
that masswork had beensubjugatedto the individual needsof its
PB
dues
'scared
The
the
members
off
potential
of
question
members.
had
developed
NUWM
Amot
Page
the
Robin
that
suggested
reasoned,and
into a "kind of specialisedtrade union."137

Hannington answeredthe various criticisms levelled againstthe NUWM at

branches
1930.
While
21
March
Bureau
Political
some
the
on
a meeting of
did pay too much attention to individual matters said Hannington, he
deniedthat "hostile elements.and renegades[gathered] round the NUWM. "
Hannington also agreedthat masswork was necessaryand desirable
(indeed the N-UWM had a history of it); but the PB's accusationthat not
factory
between
the
and
committees
movement
was
made
contact
enough
it
by
Hannington
that
the
tellingly
on
grounds
was difficult
rejected
was
138
As
CPGB
did
the
that
such,
continued
not
exist!
such committees
given

137Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgjY of Great Britain 16 February
1930.For R. PageArnot's commentseeMinutes of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 21 March 1930. Communist Archive. Similar concerns
Congress
Comintern.
At
RILU
in
August 1930,the NUWM
the
the
within
were raised
was condemnedfor its "opportunistic tendencies." At the Eleventh ECCI Plenum in April
1931, Piatnitsky said he "shudderedto think what would have happenedif all Partieshad
had.
CPGB
" However, the RILU remaineddivided over
the
the
as
unemployed
organised
whether'closer contactwith the unemployed'should be carried out by the CP itself or by
a distinct organisation.
138Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PgM of Great Britain 21 March
1930. CommunistArchive.

203

to criticise the NUWM while allowing Hannington to continue in his own

way.

Conclusions
By mid 1931, the CPGB's attemptsto re-establishitself amongstthe
British working classappearedto have made little progress.Although the
issues
had
blocked
day'
'day
the
to
trade
and
union work
emphasison
itself
CP,
Party
find
to
the
the
the
continued
within
ultra-left
ascendancyof
"unable to approachthings from the point of view of the workers."139
Moreover, the continual refinement of the Party line led to both confusionitself
Party
disagreement
the
within
and

The inter-Party feud that emergedfrom the South Wales miners dispute
demonstratedconflicting interpretationsof an'independent leadership',
day
day
CP's
left,
the
to
the
those
the
to
on
concernsof
emphasis
on
while
the workers was tantamountto 'economism'.This was most eloquently
Lenin's
(in
by
Freda
Utley,
of
recently translated
a
review
who
expressed
What is to be Done? insisted that the Party explain to the workers just
in
jeopardy.
Theory must take
jobs,
their
and
conditions
were
wages
why
down
before
declared.
140
"bow[ing]
spontaneity"
she
over
precedence
Significantly, Utley was supportedby Stuart Purkis,141Reg Groves,Harry

139SeeWilliam Rust'sreport, Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pa!jY

Communist
Archive.
March
193
1.
14-15
Britain
Great
of
140Communist Review May 1930.Also F. Utley, Lost Illusion op. cit. pp32-36. The
Party replied in kind - also referring to What is to be Done - and accusedUtley of
neglecting the'concrete demands'of the workers, and substituting theory for action. See
Communist Review January 1931 for the official PB reply. Also Tapsell and Hutt in
Communist Revie July and Septemberrespectively.
141Labour Monthly November 1930.Unless, strikes led to an understandingof the'ills of
"victories
be
Purkis
will
stated,
worse than defeatsexperiencedin consciously
capitalism'
lessons
in
defeat
the
which
of
struggle
are learnt." He too was accusedof left
planned
sectarianism.

204

Wicks and Henry Sara,left wing communistswho becameincreasingly

August
Commission.
CPGB
following
the
the
critical of

Yet the conclusionsof the August Commissionwere valid ones.The battle

left',
had
incited
democracy',
'sham
'social
the
sectarianism
or
against
As
Harry
Pollitt
Party.
the
remarked to the
of
within wide sections
Eleventh ECCI Plenum, "nine tenths of our membersare so disposedthat,
if a new worker, especially a worker from the ILP, is not ready to swallow
whole the 21 conditions of Comintern, they call him a social fascist."142
Similarly, the Party had lost contact with significant sectionsof the
line
CPGB,
due
but the
This
the
to
the
of
not
wholly
working class.
was
Party'spreoccupationwith internal affairs and the theoretical conceptsof
the Third Period engenderedthe infamous language,or 'phraseology',that
cameto characterisethe CPGB.

It soonbecameclear that talk of 'social fascists'and 'opportunism'

alienatedthe workers, and the Party was forced to reassessthe "Party
terminology ... [that] scaresnew membersaway."143Thus, while the
CPGB remainedmarginalisedthroughout 1930and early 1931, initiatives
such as the Workers' Charter and the Daily Worker enabledthe Party to
focus its attention on the concernsof the class it claimed to represent.And
CPGB
blight
to
the
throughout the first
continued
although problems
influence
the
the
thirties,
growing
of the NUWM, and the
months of
recognition of the sectariantrend within the CP, provided the Party with a
basisto respondto the political-economic crises of late 1931.

142Cited
in E.H. Carr, Twiligh op. cit. p2l 1.
143Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgrtv of Great Britain 21-22 July
1930. Communist Archive. The quote is from Robson, but the 'problem' was commented
on by severalmembersof the Party, particularly in relation to the Bradford textile dispute
and the Daily Worker..

205

Chapter Six

A Communist Culture
1926-1932

The cultural developmentof the CPGB was a significant, though little

'
Between
1926
1932,
Period.
Third
the
and
as
recognised,constituentof
the Party becameincreasingly detachedfrom the mainstreamof the British
labour movement,a distinctly pervasiveculture emergedaround the
CPGB. Subsequently,erstwhile institutions such as the Clarion Cycling
Club were estrangedby communist attemptsto develop "new methodsof
"2
The
Plebs
League
and the
entertainment.
and
working class sociability
labour colleges,through which many communistshad come to embrace
Marxism, severedtheir links with the ever more intractable CPGB; while
'old' forms and expressionsof working class culture, from the theatre to the
"ideological
Party
by
dismissed
the
field,
weaponsof the
as
were
playing
bourgeoisie."3

An alternative political culture, designedprimarily to forge a revolutionary

in
image.
Party's
the
constructed
was
consequently
classconsciousness,
Party schoolsand theatregroups, sportsclubs and socials, all emergedto

I The cultural side of the CPGB hasbeenwritten about but has never been incorporated
into an overall history of the CPGB. The most important works on Communist Party
S.
Cosgrove
Theatres
in
Samuel,
E.
MacColl,
Left
1880R.
included
the
of
are
culture
1935op. cit. S.G. Jones,Workers at Plqy op. cit. ppl33-194. S.G, Jones,The British
Labour Movement and Film. 1918-1939(London, 1987). S.G. Jones,'Sport, Politics and
the Labour Movement: The British Workers Sports Federation 1923-35' The British
Journal of Sports Histm Vol 2, No. 2 1985.pp 154-178.A. Howkins, 'Class Against
Class:The Political Culture of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1930-35.' In F.
Gloversmith, ClassCulture and Social Changeop. cit. pp240-257. The Histo! y Workshop
Journal, has also featureda number of relevant articles, while R. Samuel's'The Lost
World of British Communism,Vols. 1-Yin the New Left Review Nos. 154,156 and 165,
offers a meandefingjoumey through Party life.
2See Programme of the Young Communist International (London, 1929). Communist
Archive.
3Communist Revie February 1930.

206

"soothing
(capitalist),
the
of
professional
syrup"
voluntary, and
counter
factory basedleisure initiatives.4 In addition, while such a culture
remainedalien to the majority of the British working class,the educational
and recreationalopportunities instigated by the CPGB were integral to the
Party's political evolution.

Such a developmentwas a by-product of severalinter-linking factors.

First, the theoretical basis of the Third Period necessitateda reappraisalof
all reformist labour organisations,both cultural and political. Although the
Labour Party, ILP and trade unions all provided spacefor cultural
expression,the CPGB perceivedsuch 'reformist' initiatives to be inimical
to the interestsof the working class;particularly in a period of
'intensifying classstruggle,' wherein the forces of social democracywere
aligned with capital against the workers. Second,the Party's attempt to
develop alternative outlets for working class culture was precipitated by
the hardeningideological differencesevident betweenBritish labourin
in
1920s.
As
the
outlined
chapter one, the
socialistsand communists
increasingly distinct natureof the Labour Party, and the simultaneous
Bolshevisationof the CPGB, compoundedthe fundamental differences
existent within the British labour movement.Third, the Party's approach
conformedwith the totality of communist experience.As David Goldinger
recalled, "I consideredmy work in the ... trade unions and other
organisations... as Party work. "s Subsequently,the CPGB regardedculture
as yet anotherrealm of the class conflict in which a 'relentlessstruggle'
had to be fought.

4Quotedin S.G. Jones'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement'

op. cit. p 161.
5D. Goldinger, Autobiographical inescript undated.Communist Archive.

This chapterwill offer therefore,an examination of the various cultural

initiatives mobilised by the CPGB in the late 1920s,and charter their
develoPmentthrough the Third Period.

Party Life and Education

While the CPGB aspiredto becomea massparty of the working class,the
dedication and commitment required of (and given by) its members
life
desire.
Party
constituted a never ending round
a
severally negatedsuch
distributing
pamphletsand papers,
of meetings,writing and re-writing,
factory
labour
and
canvassing
exchanges
organising pit groups,picketing
in
CPGB,
MM,
NUWM.
just
Added
to
the
that
and
relation
was
gates;and
to this was trade union, tradescouncil and (if possible) Labour Party
(FOSR)
Soviet
Russia
in
Friends
6
or
of
work
meetings; auxiliary
International ClassWar Prisoners'Aid (ICWPA); and fund raising work in
the form of Party socials,bazaarsand campaigns.For the CPGB, the
Joining
Party
flowed
the
together.
the
was not
political
personaland
it
future,
lending
the
was
a
means
of
shaping
of
support,
simply a caseof
fundamental
'direct
Leninist
'
The
'the
action'
of
was
notion
cause.
serving
to the CPGB, and it shapedevery facet of a communist's life.

This was true throughout the communisthousehold.Inter-Party marriages

CP,
the
and communist parentsendeavouredto
within
were very common
Party
included
As
the
the
organisation
such,
rear communist children.
Young Pioneers,a communist alternative to the 'bourgeois, imperialist'
learnt
the
comrades
wherein
young
revolutionary songs,
scout movement,
madewall newspapers,and rallied resistancewithin the'capitalist school

6Wherepossible,communistsremainedin the Labour Party or ILP. Douglas Hyde for

examplewas a memberof the ILP in North Wales, where he attemptedto take
"communism into the enemy camp." D. Hyde, I Believed op. cit. pp45-46.

208

instance,
for
in
1930
1928
17
In
a
school
strike
was
called
and
system.
in
Young
Pioneers
In
1932,
Day.
May
one
group
of
of
celebration
Clapham defiantly produceda red flag to counter their school'sunfurling a
8
Day.
jack
Empire
on
union

The various memoirs and biographiesof known and unknown Party

band
Mick
Jenkins,
dedicated
to
this
testament
of
people.
a
membersare a
Manchestercommunist,has recollectedthe 'constantstream'of meetings,
leaflet distribution, pavementchalking, "education classes,lectures, YCL
"9
His
Jimmy
dances
comrade
children.
work
amongst
and
rambles,
...
Miller (Ewan MacColl) has similarly describedhis ceaselessworkload;
local
(aalford
distributing
newspapers
various
and
producing
writing,
Docker, CrossleyMotor, and the Ward and Goldstone'sSpark); rehearsing
district
branch
Movement;
Workers'Theatre
the
attending
and
with
"We
have
Worker
Daily
the
the
at
weekend.
must
meetings;selling
day,
he
"
"Politics
fifteen
from
to
twenty
a
noted.
miles
coveredanything
there seemednothing else in life, nothing elsethat was worth a damn."10

The Welsh communistEdwin Greening,rememberedorganising meetings

in
day,
Daily
Worker,
demonstrations,
the
the
studying
and
selling
and
'politicising' in the eveningsand at weekends.II And Margaret McCarthy
The
being
"overwhelmed
to
she
activity",
as
contributed
with
recalled
7Seefor example,Be Preparedfor War (YCL pamphlet, 1927). "For what do scouts
stand?They stand for the bossesagainstthe workers." Also, A Short History of the
Working ClassChildren's Movement in Great Britain (YCL, undated).Johnson-Pollard
Collection. The Young Pioneersdemandedfree school meals and the abolition of caning,
amongstother things.
8M. Waite, Young People-andFormal Political Activi1y M. Phil, 1992.Communist
Archive. For the Party demandfor a school strike in 1930 seethe Daily Worke 24 April
1930.
9M. Jenkins, Preludeto Better DUs unpublishedmanuscript. WCML.
101nE. MacColl, 'Theatreof Action, Manchester.'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S.
Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. pp219-222.
II In H. Francis and D. Smith, The Fed op. cit. p 104.

209

Young Worker while "holding street meetings, fly posing ... chalking

door
door,
for
from
literature
the
to
and
recruiting
streets,canvassing
Young Communist League. "12

Such a wide variety of activity truly did constitute a 'lost world of

Worker
Daily
the
the
'
through
of
reveals
pages
communism, and a glance
dress
fancy
for
Party
carnivals, sports events,
countlessadverts
internationalist"
for
the
"the
the
place
and
unemployedconcerts
Nanking Chineserestaurantin London's Denmark Street.13Indeed the
Daily Worker encapsulatedthe all-encompassingenvironment of the
CPGB. Articles on the Soviet Five-Year Plan sat next to Madge Brown's
14
A
baby
its
tipS.
critical analysis
and
rearing
recipes
women'spagewith
Workers'
Theatre
the
Britain's
of
reports
accompanied
policy
colonial
of
Movement, health hints from the worker's doctor, or Mickey the Mongrel
focused
'
While
the
in
primarily
sports
page
cartoons thechildren's comer.
(BWSF),
Federation
Sports
Workers'
British
the
with
the
activities of
on
its swimming galasand London Labour Football League.

Party eventsmeanwhile,where diverse and celebratory affairs. The

LPC
by
St.
Pancras
to
the
commemorate
organised
programme
concert
International Women'sDay in 1928, included the singing of revolutionary
by
local
by
theatre
a
speech
and
group,
comrade,
workers'
a
songs,a play
Phyllis Neal.15
12M.McCarthy, Generationin Revolt op. cit. pp93- 94..
13AIItheseexamplesare drawn from the Daily Worke 7 January 1930,but every edition
See
A.
Howkins
"Class
Class'op.
Against
also
of
events.
cit.
array
a
similar
provided
pp240-257.
14,Traditional' gender roles were still firmly in place within the CPGB. However, there
female
in'the
Workers'
the
of
proletariat's
role
awareness
struggle',
and
growing
a
was
Weekly included a page dedicated purely to women's industrial activity in the 1930s.
15Concert ProgT-amme6 March 1928. Johnson-Pollard Collection. The play was called
'Baldwin's Pipe Dream, 'Cedar Paul led the singing, and Neal spoke of the importance of
International Women's Day. A previous social meeting held by the St. Pancras LPC

210

It was this commitment to 'the cause',and the totality of Party life, that
both enticed and repelled workers. Douglas Hyde rememberedbeing
local
ICWPA,
Party
tireless
the
the
through
to
the
work
of
while
attracted
Margaret McCarthy found that the "practical activity" of the YCL
ILP
Guild
"no
favourably
the
the
action
policy"
of
of
with
contrasted
Youth shehad initially associatedwith. 16However, such dedication and
the intensely involved nature of communist activity, also kept workers out
for
One
Durham
Party.
the
example,complained to the Daily
miner
of
Worker that he did not have time to join the CPGB.17In addition, the
in
Cohen's
Children
life
Party
Phil
of the
of
recollections
numerous
Revolution invariably describehow the Party negateda 'normal'family
upbringing.18Indeed,such a total existencecould even prove too much for
in
leaving
Party
195
On
1, Bob Darke (a
Party
the
members.
committed
"a
has
in
Hackney)
that
complained
communist
no
communist councillor
private life. "19

Moreover, the consequencesofjoining the Party were often equivocal.

While the Party could give a senseof purposeand direction to a potential
her/him
it
likewise
to victimisation, police
subject
member, could
isolation.
Arrest
and/or prison sentenceswere an
and
social
surveillance
in
Party
the midst of an
activity,
particularly
acceptedconsequenceof
industrial dispute.Over 1,000communistswere arrestedin the courseof
the GeneralStrike for example,while the textile disputesof 1929-32 led
to communistssuch as Amy Hargreaves,Ernie Woolley, Vera Crossley
included a communist orchestra,revolutionary songsled by Rab Stewart, and a play, 'The
Cat Burglar.' Programmefor St.PancrasLPC Social 4 February 1928.Johnson-Pollard
Collection.
16D.Hyde, I Believed op. cit. pp I- 13. M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt op. cit. pp 7183.
17DailyWorke 8 April 1930.
18p. Cohen, Children of the Revolution
19B. Darke, The Communist Technique

op. cit.
in Britain

211

(London,

1952). pp 7-17.

in
their
time
Dickinson
Bessie
a
consequence
of
gaol
as
spending
all
and
lead
Party
to
20
Communist
victimisation
membership
could
also
activities.
in the workplace and even the trade union. This was particularly true after
1926,as employerstook advantageof surplus labour to oust known
from
21
their
officials
ranks.
communist
militants, and unions expelled
Similarly, police surveillancewas not only the common lot of the Party
leadership;even district members,such as David Goldinger, were kept
followed
in
22
to
Goldinger
work
was regularly
under careful supervision.
the late 1920s,and according to his unpublishedmemoirs, his children
fTom
23
USSR!!
'letters
father's
the
their
interrogated
to
with regard
were

The communistworld could also be an isolated world. The Third Period's

dismissal of non-communistorganisation,and the Party's growing
ideological separationfrom the Labour mainstream,often alienated
Margaret
McCarthy
from
community.
the
class
working
wider
communists
has eloquently describedthe "hieroglyphic verbal terms and high sounding
CPGB
the
this
time.
to
that
at
characterise
came
phraseology"
political
This was coupled by an almost wilful pride in separationthat Harry Pollitt
in particular, sought to destroy.24The CPGB Executive discussedregularly
193 1. Communist Archive.
20See also Len Powell's Prison Letters October-November
Also, H. Francis, Miners Against Fascism op. cit. p5O-5 1. Welsh communists "were
(which
imprisoned
they accepted with equanimity)
and
often
victimised,
usually
...
derive[ed] sustenance and strength from each other, " writes Francis.
21Ernest Pountney was expelled from the National Union of Shop Assistants,
and Clerks in 1928 for example. See E. Pountney, Autobiogrgphical
Manuscript undated. Communist Archive. Stuart Purkis was also dismissed from the
Railway Clerks Association, mainly in response to his workplace news sheet The Jogger.
See Verbatim Report of an Interview between Mr. S. Purkis and the Executive
Committee of the R-C. A 3 March 1929 (London, 1929).

Warehousemen

Typescript undated. Communist Archive. Jack

Autobiographical
Murphy's wife Molly has also described how the police'lived
virtually on our doorstep'.
Communist Archive.
In Molly Murphy, Nurse Molly unpublished autobiography.
Goldinger was a Jewish tailor from the East End, and was active in the NUW(C)M
and
the MM.
231bid.

22D. Goldinger,

24M. McCarthy,
Pollitt,

Generation

in Revolt

'How can the Communist

op. cit. p96. For one of many examples, see Harry

Party get Closer to the Masses. ' In the Daily Worke
I

212

the Party'sattitude to new recruits, and the Daily Worker issuedcountless

"in
Party
to
welcome
workers
a real spirit of
members
articles urging
25
"off-hand
"
the
than
manner"
many
complained
of,
comradeship, rather
Moreover, communistswere invariably a small minority within their
in
Nelson
Lancashire,
in
Even
towns
as
where
such
community.
local
influence
textile workers, the
had
the
amongst
some
communists
fastidious local Party minutes reveal meetingsof only five to eight
26
comrades.

However, the almost puritanical streakthat could at times be discerned

included
While
Party
be
CP,
the
the
exaggerated.
not
should
within
hard-nosed
(Bob
Stewart),
apparatchiks
and
prohibitionists
vehement
(most obviously PalmeDutt and William Rust), the majority of Party
Leo
Frank
Bright,
McGree
Trory,
including
Ernie
and of course,
members,
Harry Pollitt, were as happy discussingpolitics in the local pub as on the
its
being
insisted
27
Party
The
the
members
on
of
platform.
political
'maximum mental and physical fitness,'but it similarly demandedthat
it
28
integrate
to
the
claimed
workers
represent.
among
communists
Communistswere productsprimarily of their environment, and despitethe
difficulties outlined above,membershipof the Communist Party offered a
full and rich life to thosewho embracedit.

September1930. In the cited article, Pollitt complained of members"who can tell the
but
Generals
know anything
Chinese
the
to
average
worker
wants
when
namesof all
...
benefit,
hated
he
to
the
organisations
or
workmen's
goes
unemployment
getting
about
...
social fascist."
25paily
L Worker 29 March 1930.For the Party Executive see,Minutes of the Central
_
Committeeof the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 19-21 July 1930. Communist
Archive.
26NelsonLocal CPGB, Minute Book 1924-1928. WCML.
2713or
Trory seeE. Trory, Between the Wars. Recollections of a Communist Organiser
(Brighton, 1974). For Frank Bright seeR. and E. Frow, Frank Bright. Miner, Marxist and
Communist.Organiser. 1891-1944 North West History Group (Manchester,undated).
28Seefor example,the Daily Worke 4 June 1931, in which a Nottinghamshire miner
line
for
Party
the
on alcohol.
asked

213

Education
Communistssaw themselvesas the representativesof their class,and
throughout the Third Period the needto demonstratethe endeavourand the
efficacy of the Party was central to CP activity. This was exemplified by
Phil Abrahams,who recalled; "we had an opinion in those days that the
Communist Party was the vanguardof the workers. You had to be honest,
sober,industrious, a good citizen: thesewere the qualities we were looking
for. "29Welsh communists,of whom Abrahamswas one, even had their
fulfil
khaki
In
to
tie.
shirt and red
order
such a role, the
own uniform, a
Party emphasisedthe importanceof education,and the scholarly traditions
of the early British labour movementwere maintainedby the CPGB.

From its formation in 1920,the CPGB had close links with both the labour
college movementand the Plebs League,and the Party participated
initially in the National Council of Labour Colleges(NCLC) in 1921.30By
the mid-1920showever,the CommunistParty's mounting criticism of the
college syllabus, and the reciprocal anti-communismof the college
SecretaryJ.P.M. Millar, had severally debasedthe Party's involvement in
the NCLC. The Bolshevisationof the CPGB led the Party to develop its
own educationalstructure,and from 1924the Party endeavouredto create
a'systematic altemative'to the existing forms of working class
education.31Tom Bell prepareda Party training manual, and the Party's
concentrationon Marxist-Leninist tracts, the international working class

29Quotedin H. Francis, Miners Against Fascismop. cit. p50.

30Forthe backgroundto working classeducationwithin the labour
movement,seeS.
MacIntyre, A ProletarianScienceop. cit.
31Ibid. pp85-87. The Party still had memberson the NCLC however,
and within the
Central London College (CLC), the Party was often to the fore in inter-college disputes.
In 1925,thirteen of the 31 studentsregisteredat the CLC were communists, and cases
of
communist expulsion were recordedup to 1928.

214

Soviet
Union,
the
the
example
of
contrastedmarkedly with
and
movement,
the more British perspectiveof the NCLC. 32

Although the CPGBs initial attemptsat'Party training'were problematic,

by the late 1920sa functioning and progressiveeducational framework
had beenestablished.33In 1926,the central training school instituted by
the Party in London conducteda six monthcourse for twelve district
introduced
instruct
day
local
'four
to
were
schools'
while
representatives,
dispatched
34
Party
district
to the
were
also
representatives
organisers.
and
districts to stimulate local training groups, and by 1930 the Party had
district
192
72
tutoring
groups,
schools
and
study
and
eleven
established
597 workers respectively.35

In July 1931, with the Party committed to offering a 'Leninist education'to

its
its
Party
to
the
a
summer
school
growing
added
members,
all
by
Jack
Murphy,
based
basis.
Organised
the
course
was
educational
development
the'organisation
of capitalism'and the'tactics of
and
around
the proletariat after the conquestof power', and included lectureson the

32The1927 edition of T. Bell, Communist PaM Trainin (London, 1927), can be seenat
the WCML. The courseoutline included'Why the Communist Party,, 'The CPGB and the
other parties,"Party Organisation,' and 'The Party and the International.'
33St.PancrasLocal CPGB Annual Report, 1926-1927. Johnson-Pollard Collection. Two
by
in
1926
May
the St. PancrasLPC. None of the
training
were
established
groups
early
24 studentscompletedthe coursehowever. Twenty one dropped out and the remaining
three failed to turn up for the examination.
34TheNinth Congressof the Communist P!,Ljjy of Great Britain. Reports, Thesesand
Resolutionsop. cit. pp28-29.
35CommunistReview January 1931. Theseworkers' study circles included 197 non-Party
London,
Manchester
South
Wales were the most enlightened
Scotland,
and
members.
districts. Scotlandboastedtwenty Party trainers for example,while the London DPC
claimed 47 district school tuteesand 150 participants in worker study groups. Liverpool
however, had no district school, and along with Bradford and Birmingham, included no
non-Party membersin its study circles. By 1931, the number of study groups had risen to
74, and included 647 members.PaM Training. Dutt Suitcase.WCML.

215

Soviet Five Year Plan, the Communist International and its sections,and
Fascismand Social-FasciSM.36

As well as an increasingly distinct political syllabus, the Party sought also

to develop teaching methodsdistinct from the labour colleges. The
Congress
described
how
Party
Ninth
to
the
a "lecture
organisationalreport
discussion
be]
[should
with
mutual
combined
and the working
programme
"37
in
This
in
by
the
the
room.
students
class
was
endorsed
out of problems
Tom Bell's revised training manual of October 1927.Party trainers should
his
but
knowledge,
"
be
"lecturer
a tutor who "asks questions
showing
not a
38
debate.
By the 1930s,the
discussion"
the
and
concludes
provokes

...
Party soughtto replacethe lecture format completely. A systemof

"collective reports" was recommended,whereby the subject discussedwas

"a collective responsibility" with "different comrades[paying] attention to
special points.1139

The Party's attempt to raise the theoretical and educational level of its
membershipwas further boostedby the formation of the Lenin school in
Moscow. The school had beenestablishedin 1924,with British members
in attendancefrom 1926,and offered one year and three-year courses.
Studentsundertook an intensive study programme,including field trips to
Soviet
Union
the
and a rigorous syllabus of Russian,
of
various sections
economics,political theory, dialectical materialism and hiStory.40
Although the first British delegationhad been critical - so much so that

36Daily Worker 23 March 1931. Outlines for Studentsand Pagy Trainers London 1931.
37TheNinth Congressof the Communist PgM of Great Britain. Reports,Thesesand
Resolutionsop. cit. p29.
38CommunistPgly TMining October 1927 edition (London, 1927).
39COM unist Review January 1931.
40j.T. Murphy, New Horizons op. cit. pp248-249.

216

the CI considered sending the British students hoMC41- those students

tutored in Moscow were soon feted by their fellow comrades. "You tended
to take everything they said as gospel" recalled Jimmy Miller (Ewan
MacColl), and by 1930, fresh Lenin school graduates were dispatched to
the various districts to advise local comrades and to enforce the Party
line. 42

As Stuart MacIntyre has stated,the experienceof the Moscow students

in
43
Britain.
level
Marxist
the
understanding
of
undoubtedly raised
However, the Cominternjargon, the increasingly doctrinaire approachto
Marxist (-Leninist) theory, and the very apparentveneration of the Soviet
Union reinforced by the Lenin school, compoundedthe extraneousquality
increasingly
the
CPGB.
As
the
various
outline
of
the
structured
such,
of
Party courses,and the obligatory deferral to the 'correct' line of the
Communist International, hinderedany truly original theoreticians
Lenin
Party
the
local
from
or
school.
groups,
study
either
emerging

Nevertheless,the educationalopportunitiesthe Party offered to the British

finest
CPGB.
The
be
included
the
the
of
achievements
among
workers can
Party's commitment to education,discussionand personalresearchwas
initiative
class
of
working
allowed
encouragement
exemplary,and such
thoseneglectedby the wider British schooling systemthe chanceto learn
literary
heritage
CPGB
Indeed,
the
the
themselves.
of
was
rich
and express
but just one consequenceof this.44
41Letter from J.T. Murphy to the Political Bureau of the Communist Pam of Great
Britain II April 1927. Klugmann Papers. Murphy also castigated the British Party for
encouraging criticism.
42E. MacColl, 'Theatre of Action, Manchester. 'In R. Samuel, E. MacColl,
Theatres of the Left op. cit. p218.

S. Cosgrove,

43S. Maclntyre, A Proletarian Science op. cit, pp86-87. For more on the Lenin school see
the five volumes of related material in the Communist Archive.
44See A. Croft, Red Letter DAys (London, 1990).

217

On Stage and Field

By the early 1930s,the CPGB was in the midst of a complex cultural
evolution. And just as the Party'seducationalperspectivebecame
increasingly defined by Lenin, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union,45So
other realms of Party activity similarly transformedinto unique hybrids of
indigenousand internationalist forms. This section will focus on two such
CPGB auxiliaries. First, the Workers'Theatre Movement and second,the
British Workers' SportsFederation;both of which emergedfrom the wider
British labour movement;and both of which becamedistinct, communist
cultural entities in the Third Period.

The first performanceof the Workers'Theatre Movement (WTM) was a

Singing
it
Jailbirds,
Sinclair's
Upton
took place in July
and
rendition of
1926at the Memorial Hall in Farringdon, London. The WTM had begun
instigated
by
Sundgy
Worker and the
the
as a collaborative venture,
Central Labour College, supportedby, amongstothers, the Plebs League
and the Daily Herald, and emanatingfrom the rather obscureCouncil for
ProletarianArt formed by membersof the CPGB and ILP in 1924.As
such,the origins of the WTM were firmly rooted in the federal,
collaborative traditions of the British labour movement, and the CPGB's
initial involvement centredprimarily aroundthe SundayWorker (whose
editor William Paul chaired severalearly performancesof the VvITM),and
46
keen communist drama enthusiasts.

45PartyLi undated, 1927.The paperof the Party'sOrganisational Bureau

was dedicated
solely to Party training. "The lessonof Lenin that without theory there is no movement"
the paper read, "must be taken to heart by all comrades."
46R.Samuel.E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left
op. cit. p33.

218

The theatreencompasseda militant agendathat complimented its

in
Carter,
Sunday
Huntley
Strike.
Peneral
the
the
to
writing
proximity
Worker, perceivedthe WTM to be a theatreof 'direct action'; a
'propagandamachine'groundedin the class struggle and focused on
topical issuesrelevant to the working class.47Workers were to write and
insisted,
WTM
their
manifesto
and
an
early
own material
perform
factory,
in
the
be
the
the
to
on
of
or
shadow
staged
were
performances
Scottish
from
Corrie,
Jim
49
Writers
the
the
a
miner
as
such
street.
of
comer
Bowhill Village Players,were adoptedby the movement, and Corrie's In
Time of Strife, a play about the 1926miners' lock-out, was among the first
WTM performances.Severalregional dramaclubs also emergedat this
time. A WorkersArts Club was establishedby Larry Finlay in Salford; a
ManchesterWTM emergedout of the NCLC in Levenshulme;and in
Hackney, Tom Thomasled the Hackney People'sPlayers.49

Despite its radical intentions however,the initial WTM remained within

the traditional paradigmof labour theatre.Performanceswere held in trade
(Ewan
Jimmy
Miller
labour
local
as
clubs
where,
union, co-op or
MacColl) remembered,"everybody knew eachother - it was an audience
I
And
there
twenty-five
twenty,
was
people.
wanting to seethe
of maybe
his
Tom
Thomas
Similarly,
to
"50
came
realise,
as
plays
such
as
revolution.
Philanthropis
Trousered
Ragged
were still reliant on a stage,
own
471bid.Seealso Carter'sarticles in the SundgyWorker particularly 6 June, 19 July and 22
August 1926.
48SundayWorker 30 October 1926.Carter was very influenced by the new Soviet drama
troupes.
49R.and E. Frow, 'The Workers'Theatre Movement in Manchesterand Safford, 193119402In North West Labour History Group Journal No. 17 1992-93. pp66-7 1. Also R.
Samuel,E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. pp37-38 and pp223-225.
As Tom Thomasand RaphaelSamuelhave noted, the original protagonistsof the WTM Huntley Carter, Christina Walshe,Rutland Boughton, Havelock Eliss, Eden and Cedar
Paul - were essentially"upper-middle classbohemians"committed as much to aesthetics
The
socialism.
regional groups were generally more proletarian.
as revolutionary
50R.Samuel,E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. pp224-225.

219

51
divide.
Moreover,
the
audience-performer
and
rehearsals,
numerous
between 1926and 1928,the perspectivesof the WTM's original sponsors
had diverged sufficiently to becomeuntenable.Communist involvement in
in
Rego
the
WTM
textile strike for
of
given
support
performance
a
College
its
Cent
Labour
to
the
expel
ral
seven
of
example,prompted
drama
labour
became
Simultaneously,
to
in
1928.
reference
students
increasingly critical in the pagesof the communist press.Palme Dutt had
dismissedILP dramaas'reformist'by August 1926,and even communist
ONeill,
Sean
O'Casey
Eugene
and
were reproved
as
sympathisers,such
52
Worker.
in
Sunday
the
regularly

The real advancein both the work and profile of the WTM occurred with
the CPGB'sadoption of the New Line in 1929-30. As the Party sought to
influences,
WTM
detached
itself
itself
the
so
of all social-democratic
shed
from the limitations recognisedby Thomasand Miller. As the parameters
beyond
landscape
the confines of parliamentary
the
widened
communist
of
focal
became
CP
WTM
As
industrial
the
a
point
of
agitation.
politics,
and
StephenJoneshas suggested,the Party's divergencefrom the wider labour
movement"effectively isolated Marxist forms of cultural expressionfrom
their labour socialist counterparts.Until about 1933,communistswere to
develop the WTM as a revolutionary alternative to the establishedmodes
"53
The
democratic
Party
provision.
social
was able to
of capitalist and
in
line
ideology
its
define
with the politics of class against
cultural
clearly
class,and the cultural-political boundariesthat divided 'politics' and
'culture'were torn down.

51Ibid. p50.
52LabourMonthly August 1926. SundgyWorker 4 July 1926,24 June and 25 November
1928.
53S. G. Jones, Workers

at Play op. cit. p 156.

220

Such a developmentexpresseditself in a number of ways. Primarily, the

form of WTM performancechangeddramatically. With hindsight, as Tom
Thomashas noted, the WTM was already "fumbling towards the idea of. an
agit-prop theatre" between 1926and 1928.From 1929 however, the notion
of a theatre "without a stage,which could use dance,song and cabaret...
improvise
its
own material
which could

...

[and] in which the audience

54
WTM
become
The
"
to
take
was
was
a
very
real
one.
could
part,
a tool of
the classstruggle,and its methodsnecessarilycomplimented its
revolutionary message.

Subsequently,the performancesof the WTM becameincreasingly radical

in both method and content.In Manchester,a piece'entitled Still Talkin
was basedaround a public meeting with players planted amongstthe
audience.In London in 1929,Tom ThomaspresentedStrike Up a
performancethat similarly utilised actorson and off the stage.Strike Up
was essentiallya revue, incorporating satirical versions of contemporary
B
Boy
(Sonny
became
Money
Bo
or example), danceroutines, short
songs
y
sketchesand monologues.55The political messageof the WTM was
brought explicitly to the fore, and the importanceof the plays context - as
well as its content- becamecentral to the movement'sapproach.

This was compoundedby the exampleof the Workers'Theatre Leagueof

Germany,whom Thomasencounteredon a visit to the Ruhr in the spring
his
On
1930.56
return, Thomaspennedan article for the Daily Worker
of
54T.Thomas,'A PropertylessTheatre for a PropertylessClass.'In R. Samuel,E. MacColl,
S. Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. p87. Originally printed in Histoly WorksLop
Journal No. 4 1977.
551bid.pp87-88.
56TheWorkers'Theatre Leagueemergedout of the Red Front Fighters League(the
paramilitary organisationof the KPD), Germanunemployed, and Young Communist
Organisations.From at least 1928,the KPD utilised 'semi spontaneous'agit-prop theatre
to mobilise workers around Party campaigns.See.E.D. Weitz, Creating German

221

Theatre
Struggle'dramatic
of
slogan
and
a
new
a
new
outlining
-'The
longer
Scenery,
stage
were
sets
and
no
approach.
necessaryhe declared,
labour
drama
'old,
the
of
settings
should be abandoned.
naturalistic'
and
Insteadthe WTM was encouragedto develop material that was short,
be
flexible,
direct.
Performances
to
were
so as to be displayed
and
popular
in open cars or on the back of lorries, and Thomas called on every CPGB
district to form its own workers' theatregroup.57The German influence
was further extendedin 1931, when a WTM troupe toured the Rhineland,
and Germancomradesregularly visited British theatre groups to offer help
and advice.58

Although the political climate in Britain differed greatly from that of

Germany in 1930,the exampleof the KPD's drama troupes, and the
Worker,
by
Daily
life
the
to the WTM.
gave
new
offered
encouragement
Communist theatregroups appearedacrossthe country. By 1931, ten
including
Red
Star
Troupe of West London,
in
London
the
alone,
existed
the Red Magnets of Woolwich, the Red Front group of Streatham,the Red
Blousesof Greenwich,and the Yiddish speakingProltet in the East End.59
Elsewhere,the DundeeRed Front Troupe, the Liverpool Red Anchor
Troupe, and the SunderlandRed Magnets also affiliated to the WTM. In
for
based
in the North of the
theatre
groups
weekend
school
addition, a
England and the Midlands was established,attracting 40 delegatesfrom

Communismop. cit. p262. Weitz refers to, R. Bodek, We are the Red Megaphones:
Popular Music. Agi1propTheatre.Everyday Life and Communist Politics during the
Weimar Republic. Ph.d. University of Michigan 1990.
57Daily
II May 1930.An article on the WTM entitled I Workers Drama
-A
Weaponin the ClassStruggle'had featured in the Daily Worke on II January 1930.The
piece, by'Trudnik, 'emphasisedthe WTM's role in the class struggle and called for
workers' theatregroups to report their activities to the paper.
58paL_
ly Worker 12 January 1931. For Germanvisits to Britain seeDaily Worke II June
1930and 3 January 1931.
59SeeD. Waterman, 'Proltet: The Yiddish Speaking Group of the Workers' Theatre
Movement! In Histoly Workshop No. 5 1978.

222

become
integral
The
WTM
1931.60
in
May
to
towns
was
an
part of
eight
the Party machine, an "important weapon" able to assist in "agitation on
in
"61
As
theatre
the midst of
groups
appeared
such,
particular events.
industrial action, at election rallies, on unemployed demonstrations and
hunger marches.

In Manchester,the Salford Red Megaphonesexemplified the new spirit of

the WTM. Basedaround the nucleus of Jimmy Miller (Ewan MacColl),
Joe Davies, Grace Sodden,Alex Armstrong, Len Heckert, Flo Clayton,
Nellie Wallace, and Martin Bobker, the Megaphonesdevelopeda seriesof
Lancashire.
they
across
which
performed
scripts,
written
collectively
Dressedin dungarees6 la their Germancomrades,62the group appeared
labour
back
local
factory
the
and
even
on
exchanges,
of
gates,at
outside
trucks during the'more looms'dispute of 1931-32. Their scripts included
The P.A. Q Sketch,The Trial of Private EnteMrise, and numeroussongs
63
Pieces
Lancashire
in
the
to
struggle.
workers'
and skits written relation
intended
"rouse
fit
local
to
they
to
our
and
conditions,
were adapted
bum
like
fire
[with]
immediate
that
to
would
words
and
action
audiences
set our slums ablaze."64

60Daily Wo
29 May 1931.
61Communist Review June 1932.
62TheManchestergroup's affinity to the Germanexample stemmedfrom Miller's
German
YCL.
details
Rudi
Lehmann
Lehmann
Miller
the
of
of
sent
with
correspondence
Germanagit-prop groups, along with song scores,scripts and newspapercuttings. SeeE.
MacColl, 'Theatreof Action, Manchester'in Theatresof the Left op. cit. p229.
Manchesterwas also visited by a representativeof the YCI, who similarly influenced the
developmentof Miller and the Red Megaphones.
63SeeR. and E. Frow, 'The Workers'Theatre Movement in Manchesterand Salford,
1931-1940.' In North West Labour Histoly Group Journal No. 17 1992-93. p6g. Also E.
MacColl, 'Theatreof Action, Manchesteein R. Samuel,E. MacColl, S. Cosgrove,
Theatresof the Le op. cit. pp233-238.
64E.MacColl, Journeyman.An Autobioiz[aphy (London, 1990). p207.

223

The theoretical basisof the WTM was also transformed from 1929,and on
25-26 June1932the Workers'Theatre Movement held its first National
Conferencein London.65Crucially, the theatre was placed firmly within
the context of the classstruggle. Capitalist theatre "served to blind the
workers to the existenceof the classstruggle" the conferenceresolution
insisted,while the theatresof the non-communistleft were lost in
"ingenious but sterile technicalities." Even worse however, were the
theatregroupsof the ILP and Labour Party who sought either to impose
bourgeoisart on the workers, or merely to expressthe misery of the
66
workers existence.

By contrast,the WTM portrayed itself aspart of the class struggle, a

weapon of revolution that not only'unmasked the capitalist system,'but
fight
'67
And
their
to
way
oUt.
rather than
workers
also organised'the
level
'raise
to
the
of the workers through contact with
cultural
attempt
"mass
WTM
dramatic
'the
to
produce
propaganda
endeavoured
great
art,
dramatic
the
through
of
representation." 68
particular method
and agitation
In both the Daily Worker and the movement'sown periodical The Red
Stage,the WTM soughtto focus and define its revolutionary perspective
in accordancewith the line of the CPGB. With regard to theatre criticism,
Charlie Mann69(thee.ditor of Red Stage)insisted that the WTM "expose
the artful propagandaof the bourgeoisscribes,who are perforce influenced

65Twentytwo groups were representedat the conference,with another ten registered

absentfor financial reasons
66'TheBasis and Developmentof the Workers'Theatre Movement., Resolution of the
First Conferenceof the WTM, reproducedin full in, R. Samuel, E. MacColl, S.
Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. pp99-105.
671bid.
68WTM resolution for memorandumfrom 1930.Quoted in R. Samuel,E. MacColl, S.
Cosgrove,Theatresof the Left op. cit. pp33-34.
69Charliewas the son of Tom Marin and a memberof the Lewisham Red Players.The
Red Stagewas first producedin 1931, and was regardedas a major step forward by Tom
Thomas.

224

in their writings by loyalty to a systemon which they live. 1170

The concept
of 'classagainstclass'also initiated numerousdiatribes (and WTM
Party
ILP,
Labour
the
the
and
against
and although the
sketches)
become
'divorced from the
tendency
the
to
movementwarned against
distinctly
WTM
'71
the
a
communist entity.
remained
masseS,

The Workers'Theatre Movement flourished in the New Line years of the

CPGB. The Party's attempt to establishan independentleadershipof the
focus
and clear objective to the WTM, and the
working classgave a
numerousdramatroupes formed under its bannerbecamean integral part
of the Party'spropagandamachine.Continually creative, the WTM was
format
its
flexible
to a variety of topics, from the Meerut
to
able adapt
disputes
industrial
(The
(Meerut),
Rail Revolt),
to
prisoners
local
C
Sketch),
issues
P.
A.
The
Murder in the
and
social
unemployment
Coal Field). Theseshort sketches,plays and songs,allowed the Party to
despite
and
effectively,
and
quickly
regular police
political
points
make
attention, the 'propertylesstheatre'was able to move swiftly from the
factory to the labour exchangeto the market place. Thus, the WTM was
indicative of the Third Period'stransferral of communist activity from the
workplace to the street.The movementencapsulatedthe total world of the
CP, as the political and the cultural coalescedto produce a truly working
in
theatre
rooted the classstruggle.
class

Equally representativeof the CPGB'sincreasingly distinct cultural world

was the British Workers' SportsFederation(BWSF). Establishedin 1923
on the initiative of the Clarion Cycling Club and various representatives
from the wider labour movement,the BWSF resolved to promote 'peace
70The Red Stage March 1932. See S. G. Jones, Workers
at PlU op. cit. p 156.
71'The Basis and Development of the WorkersTheatre
Movement. 'op. cit. pp99-105.

225

betweennations'through workers sport. As such, Europeantours were

in
BWSF
1927
Cyclists
the
Clarion
the
the
represented
undertaken,and
Workers Olympiad in Prague.Despite TUC recognition and affiliation to
federation
however,
(LSI)
International
the
Sports
Lucerne
remained a
the
limited
in
just
1920s,
in
the
support
with
mid
relatively small organisation
London and Scotland.72

CPGB involvement in the BWSF intensified following the General Strike

73
In
1927
influence
a successful
evident.
soon
was
and a communist
football tour of the Soviet Union was undertaken, and representatives of
the BWSF were invited to the tenth anniversary celebrations of the
Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, communists such as George Sinfield and
Walter Tapsell, who were on the national committee, sought to radically
Tapsell
BWSF.
that
the
the
moved
ob ectives
the
of
transform
constitution
"unrelenting
be
the
federation
existing
struggle
against
an
the
should
of
Sinfield
While
"
domination
published a pamphlet
of
sport.
capitalist
inciting the BWSF to "expose capitalist sports clubs ... to win away from
influences
thousands
the
of clubs composed of workers
all pro-capitalist
broaden
[and]
the
to
from
and
extend
control
capitalist
apart
run
which
...
1174
workers' sports organisation.

Perhapsunsurprisingly, thesedevelopmentscausedconsternationamongst
increasingly
The
the
committee.
national
non-communistmemberson

72S.G. Jones,'Sport, Politics and the Labour Movement: The British Workers Sports
Federation 1923-35.' op. cit. pp 154-157.This remains the only historical overview of the
BWSF.
73TheYCL in particular campaignedfor greaterattention to be paid to workers' sport.
During the GeneralStrike and miners' lock-out, the YCL had organisedvarious
2
May
See,
Sunday
Worker
1926.
Fourth
Also
Report
the
of
activities.
recreational
Congressof the Young Communist Leagueof Great Britain 26-27 December 1926.
BWS_F28 April 1928.Communist
74Rgpi_ortof
tIbLe N-ational
Of
Lthe
-Confe-rence
-First
Archive. G. Sinfield, The Workers' SportsMovement London 1927

226

federation
'violate
in
the
the
would
played
communists
role
prominent
for
BWSF'
Party
the
the
Labour
TUC
committee
support
and
spirit of
feared.75Furthermore,the objectivesTapsell and Sinfield applied to the
BWSF were describedas "antagonisticto the federation" and the LS1.76
After much discussionand a National Conferencehowever, the Party
George
Sinfield
the
in
was
movement.
succeeded wresting control of
for
LSI
to
the
BWSF
was substituted
secretary,affiliation
elected
(RSI),
International
Sports
the
Red
and
the
to
communist
affiliation
Clarion Cycling Club, TUC and the Labour Party all withdrew their
in
BWSF
the
77
Tapsell's
that
the
engage
class
actively
resolution
support.
from
Conference,
National
the
and
struggle was consequentlyadoptedat
1928the federationbecamean integral part of CP life. As such, the
initiatives of Sinfield and Tapsell predatedthe CPGBs adoption of the
New Line, and a disparity in outlook betweenthe communist and labour1928.
to
BWSF
the
evident
prior
clearly
was
socialist membersof

Sport was regardedas far more thanjust 'healthy recreation' by the Party.
Working class interest in sport was seento be at once beneficial and
detrimental to the revolutionary struggle.Professionalsport was portrayed
ideological
"one
influence
the
the
of
strongest
on
workers
as a corrupting
distract
from
"dope
to
bourgeoisie"78
the
the
workers
weaponsof
- and a
dismissed
factory
too,
Voluntary,
"79
sports
were
the struggle.
amateurand
by the communist led BWSF. Such activity merely diverted the workers
75Minutesof the National Committeeof the BWSF 16 October 1927. Communist
Archive. Although the national committeecondemnedthe action, the communist
dominatedLondon section of the BWSF did senda delegate.
76Conferenceof the National Committee of the BWSF 8 January 1928.Communist
Archive.
77SeeMinutes of the.Sub Committee of the BWSF 10 July, 12 October and 19 October
1928.Communist Archive.
78CommunistReview February 1930.
79R.P. Dutt, Sport and our Daily. Letter sent to the Daily Worker 21 January 1930. Dutt
Papers.BL.

227

attention away from the rationalisation and wage cuts being imposed
simultaneouslythe Party argued,and both Harry Pollitt and Michael
Condon linked the lack of workers'playing fields, leisure time and
facilities, to the wider capitalist offensive againstthe working class.80

Alternately, workers sport, as designatedby the CPGB/BWSF, was

facilitating
"The BWSF
as
a
means
of
class-consciousness.
perceived
representsa magnificent auxiliary organisationfor both League and Party"
Jack Cohen arguedin 1930,and the BWSF subsequentlyendeavouredto
"direct the instinct for sport on the part of the workers into channelsthat
servetheir own interestson the sports field, and in the field of industry."81
Similarly, as the BWSF PresidentHarry Pollitt ventured, by appealingto
"young workers [who were] interestedin swimming and football, " the
Party could generatean interest "in the unemployedworkers and so on.1,82
With support from the Daily Worker therefore,the Party sought to
significantly raise the profile and scopeof the BWSF, and by 1930the
federation had a functioning national organisationwith branches
throughout the country.

The activities of the BWSF were adaptedto correspondwith the totality of

the CPGB'spolitical vision. The federation soughtto develop sport
organisedunder'worker's control'that would "exposethe corrupt nature of
boss sport."83As well as the various sporting initiatives describedbelow,
this entailed formulating campaignsrelevant to sporting issues.For
80WorkerSportsmanMay 1932.M. Condon, The Fight for the Workers' Playing Fields
(London, 1932).
81Report of the SgcondNational Congressof the BWSF 6-7 December 1930. Communist
Archive.
82Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PgM
of Great Britain 13-14
August 1930.CommunistArchive.
83Report of the Second National Congress of the BWSF 6-7 December 1930. Communist
Archive.

228

example,the federationled a successfulcampaign againstthe Tottenham

district council's banning of Sundaysporting activities. A Workers' Sports
Association was established,and the Party was able to mobilise
local
workers, trade union branches,and
considerablesupport among
labour organisations.84The BWSF also campaignedfor better facilities for
worker sportspeople, including the opening of all parks and open spaces
for
free
Sundays,
workers teams,adequatemaintenance,and free
access
on
85
local
BWSF section
In
Manchester,
the
changing accommodation.
formed a RamblersRights Movement, demandingfree accessto the
countryside,and a subsequentmasstrespassaround Kinder Scout in
Derbyshire becameone of the most notorious CPGB initiatives. 86

In a wider political context too, the Party utilised the BWSF to disseminate
communist ideals. Sporting activities were organisedaround, or in support
of, striking workers such as the London Lightermen and the Yorkshire
woollen workers.87In Leeds,BWSF cyclists were mobilised to raise
resistanceto bailiffs seekingto evict victims of the meanstest.88Socials,
raffles and galasraisedmoney for CP election candidates,and the Party
anticipatedthe use of sporting eventsto effectively propagatethe Workers'
Charter. Less practical however, were the communist campaignsagainst
capitalist sport. When the CPGB/BWSF called for a boycott of Upton
Park, in responseto West Ham's high admissionchargesfor a Sixth Round
84T.Condon, The Fight for the Workers'Plqying Fields op.cit. Seealso, Minutes of the
Sub Committeeof the BWSF 19 September1930,and Daily Worke 20 May 1930.
85Reportof the S2condNational Congressof the BWSF 6-7 December 1930.Communist
Archive.
86RamblersRights Movement Circular undated.WCML. Daily Sketc 25 April 1932.J.
Lowerson, 'Battles for the Countryside.' In F. Gloversmith, Class, Culture and Social
Changeop. cit. pp272-73. B. Rothman,The 1932Kinder Trespass:A PersonalView of
the Kinder ScoutTreMassTimperly, 1982.D. Cook, 'The Battle for Kinder Scout.' In
Marxism Tod August 1977.
87Daily Worke 14 May 1930and 29 January 1932. Sport and GamesJanuary 1932.
Report of the Third National Conferenceof the BWSF. 4-5 March 1933. WCML
"Sport and GamesJanuary 1932.

229

FA Cup tie in 1930,the Daily Worker was forced to report that a "huge
89
crowd" neverthelessattended.

In terms of actual sporting events,the BWSF participated in numerous

local and international activities. British footballers, cyclists, boxers and
1928
1932,
Spartakiades
Soviet
in
the
and
cyclists and
of
took
part
athletes
footballers visited Germany and France,boxers fought in Norway,
Switzerland and Russia.In return, French and German workers visited
Britain, although a proposedRussianfootball tour was postponedwhen the
Labour foreign secretary,J.R. Clynes, refusedto submit visas to the Soviet
team.90

Red SportsDays were organisedby the BWSF. On 26 April 1930,1,000

in
Hyde
Park,
at which
sporting
events
of
spectatorswatcheda plethora
football
Daily
Worker
Youth
trophy
the
Guild
ILP
West
Ham
won
of
the
91
football
Inter-regional
Girls
the
Hackney
matches,
cup.
netball
won
and
massrambles,boxing tournamentsand cycling tours were all successfully
between
football
London
A
1933.
1929
between
match
and
undertaken
by
for
Wales
South
watched
a crowd of over
was
example,
workers
and
3,000; and a London swimming gala, held at HaggerstonBaths in 1930,
best
"as
described
later
the
organisedand most successfulsporting
was
federation
The
"92
BWSF.
to
by
held
the
also
endeavoured
promote
event
'women'ssport.'A women'ssection was set up in 1930, and a London
89Daily Worker I March and 4 March 1930.
90Daily Worke 17 April 1930.Minutes of the Special Meeting of th.!National Sub
Committeeof the BWSF 17 April 1930.
91Daily Worke 28 April 1930.Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 2 May 1930.
CommunistArchive.
92Reportof the National Committeeundated.Communist Archive. The limitations of the
BWSF are revealedby the fact that two Germancontestantscomplained to the RSI
following the gala. Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 24 October 1930.
CommunistArchive. What the complaintswere is unclear, but they were repudiatedby
the BWSF.

230

netball leaguewas establishedalong with various gymnastic, swimming,

hockey and athletic sections.93

Although a national organisation,the BWSF maintained a federal

structure,and the successesof the workers' sports movement were most
evident at a local level. In Manchester,the Workers' Arts Club in Salford
included a boxing gym (through which many boxers were recruited to the
YCL/CPGB), while the local BWSF organisedSundayrambles and
cycling trips. A camping trip to Clough Head Farm in 1932was attended
by 180 'lads and girls' from the ManchesterDistrict, and although
problems blighted the campers- and'E.F.' [Eddie Frow?] insisted on
taking a typewriter, Lenin's collected works, and volumes one to six of
Inprecorr - further campswere organised.94

Cycling was particularly popular acrossthe country, with Red Wheelers

emergingin Rochdale,Eastwood,Leeds,Doncasterand most other Party
localities. Cycle rides from London to Brighton were organised,while
local rambling sectionsregularly arrangedSundayafternoonjaunts into
the countryside.A Newcastleboxing gym of 60 memberswas established
in 1930,football leaguesemergedin Fife, South Wales and Derby, and
cricket gameswere played in Bradford. There was even a workers' hockey
team in Shipley, a workers'tennis club on Tyneside, and a baseballteam in
the Rhondda!Glasgow alone had six BWSF sectionsrepresentingover
400 membersby 1931.95The London section meanwhile, was involved in

93Minutesof the National Committeeof the BWSF 23 February 1930. Minutes the
of
Sub Committeeof the BWSF 14 March 1930.Minutes of the National Committee of the
BWSF 7 February 1932.Communist Archive. The realms of 'male' and'female sport
were in no way challengedby the CPGB.
94BWSFCamp Souvenir undated.Communist Archive.
95Thesedetails are taken from the Minutes of the BWSF. Communist Archive. The
Welsh football leaguewas forced to close in 1931, following the Rhondda district

231

football
The
BWSF had already establishedtwo
competitions.
several
workers' football leaguesby 1927and numerouscup and leagueevents
were addedbetween 1928and 1934.In 1932 for example, the London
BWSF spearheadedthe broad basedLondon Workers' Football Council to
which 99 clubs were affiliated.

Ultimately however, the BWSF remaineda marginal organisation.

Financial and practical problems constantlyplagued both the national
committee and the various local sections,and the federation could in no
way be regardedas a seriousrival to the bastionsof 'bourgeois sport' that it
sought to challenge.Money was a constantconcern.The hiring of
facilities, equipmentand groundsproved extremely difficult for an
its
dependent
organisation
on raising own funds. By 1931, the BWSFs
in
due,
fee
RSI
to
the
was
still
while the Worker Sportsman,the
affiliation
federationpaper, had long since collapsed.96The fact that those running
the BWSF were either working or unemployedalso hamperedthe
movement'sgrowth. While tours to the Soviet Union or Germany were an
federation
for
the
members,many planned trips and
exciting prospect
competitions failed to occur. Those withjobs often found it impossible to
take time off work, while the sheercost of transporting a team of
footballers or cyclists to Europe madeparticipation impossible.97

And yet, the BWSF encapsulatedthe spirit and dedication of Communist

Party members.The federation organisedsuccessfulworkers' sporting
eventsacrossthe country and in so doing provided entertainment,
council's ruling that teamsplaying in the BWSF leaguewould not be allowed to play in
the RhonddaLeague.
96WorkerSportsmandissolved in 1929.A similar fate befell Sports
and Gamesand The
Worker Sportsmanin 1932.
97For example, see Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF
July 1929 and 28 March 1930. Communist Archive.

232

21 October

1928,19

in
to
thousands
of
workers
activity
and outside the Party.
and
excursions
Through its trips abroad,the BWSF offered workers the opportunity to
beyond
in
the reach of the averageworkers wage
places
visit and perform
BWSF
local
level,
to
the
campaign
was
able
effectively,
on
a
and
packet98;
for workers rights. As well as the successesin Tottenham mentioned
Club
free
Sports
Workers'
Stepney
to
the
managed
gain
accessto
above,
BWSF
facilities,
trespasses
the
the
of
mass
ramblers
and
gym and netball
(and
Moreover,
CPGB
the
support).
attention
while the
nation-wide
won
BWSF in 1927-33 was very much a product of the CPGB's divorce from
the wider labour movement,the federationgenerally remained free from
the extremesectarianismthat blighted other CPGB,auxiliaries. Where
99
it
height
the
even
was
condemned,
and
at
noted
of
was
sectarianism
'class againstclass'(1929-30) the federation included ILP football teams
100
Clarion
By
1932,
Cycling
many
members.
numerous
non-Party
and
Clubs and ILP brancheswere co-operatingwith the BWSF.

Conclusions: A Culture of a New Type

The numerouscultural and educationalactivities instigated and extended
by the Communist Party from the mid 1920swere central to the formation
Communists
CPGB.
to
the
particular
sought
of a political culture
fuse
to
a political and cultural consciousnessthrough such
successfully
initiatives as the WTM and BWSF. Indeed,the CPGB's cultural immersion
had
by
1930s
Party
blossoming
the
the
total
early
a
one,
and
was a
"The BWSF football team that visited the Soviet Union in 1927 played in front of
35,000 people for example.S.G. Jones,'Sport, Politics, and the Labour Movement,' op.
cit. p159.
"Minutes of the Full National Committeeof the BWSF 7 June 1931. Communist
Archive.
10OCommunist
domination did causesome problems however. Teams such as the Bow
West Ward Labour Party football team withdrew from the London Group Cup in 1928
for example.And in Newcastle,many workers "feared the club [BWSF] was run by the
Communist Party." Minutes of the Sub Committee of the BWSF 30 November 1928 and
Minutes of the Full National Committeeof the BWSF 7 June 1931. Communist Archive.

233

Workers'Film Society, Workers'Camera League,Workers'Music

Association, and even a West London Workers' EsperantoClub. 101As
dilation
Party's
became
the
Sunday
trips
political
a
of
rambling
such,
industrial
theatre
conflict,
an
extension
of
performances
activity, workers
facilitating
ftinding
the
Party
class struggle.
and
of
a
means
socials
and

The political import the CPGB applied to its cultural initiatives servedalso
While
labour
from
divorce
the
Party's
movement.
the
wider
to reinforce
by
between
Party
the
the
the origins of
numerousorganisationsusurped
1926and 1928were rooted in the crossparty traditions of the pre-war
labour movement,the Party infused them with a Bolshevik rigour that
liberal
those
the
of
such
as
the
approach
moderate,
more
contrastedwith
Tom Groom, the chairmanof the Clarion Cyclists and the original BWSF
Soviet
Union
CPGBs
the
Additionally,
the
of
reverence
secretary.
increasingly underpinnedthe cultural direction of the Party, and this
distinguishedfurther communistpractice from that of the labour-socialist.
The singing of Soviet songsbecamea regular part of the Party's cultural
development,
Soviet
based
the
for
upon
plays
while
example,
experience
Soviet
dedicated
to
Worker
Daily
supremacyand
articles
numerous
basis
Party
Russian
increasingly
Stalin,
the
of
education,all
and
comrade
distinguished
CPGB
the communist'scultural
that
the
a'foreign-ness'
gave
world.

101Daily Worker 3 January 1931. The most important of these,the Workers Film Society
(WFS), emergedout of the London Film Society establishedin 1925. As with the WTM
Party
Communist
BWSF,
the
memberssoon ensuredthat
the
of
enthusiasm
and
films
Soviet
(and
dominated
the
then
society,
and
were
shown
regularly
communists
distributed) throughout the country. In Manchester,the Workers' Arts Club again
in
for
district
WFS,
impetus
London the Scala theatreprovided
the
the
while
provided
in
'Cinema
See
R.
Bond,
Thirties:
film
Documentary
Film and the
the
evenings.
regular
Labour Movement.' In J. Clark, M. Heinemarm,D. Margolies, C. Snee,Culture and Crisis
(London, 1979).pp241-256. S.G. Jones,The British Labour Movement and
Ln,
_the30s Also R. Cordwell, Workers'Film Socie!
Film op. cit.
y undated.WCML.

234

And yet, the fastidiousnessof the CPGB's approachto education,the

totality of political expression,and the particular focus of Party culture
(on, say, football, rambling, cycling) all had British precedents,as Stuart
MacIntyre and StephenJoneshave shown. The life of a British communist
differed significantly from that of a German,Swiss or American
communist.The cultural developmentof the CPGB was thus a synthesisof
both national and international forces, wherein indigenous cultural forms
interpreted
through a Marxist-Leninist perspectiveof
were politicised and
classstruggle. This was itself variable, and dependedon the class
relations, cultural traditions and the social composition of a particular
region.

Thus, the Third Period consolidatedthose differences that separatedthe

Communist Party from the wider labour movement,while simultaneously
propitiating the distinct characterof British communism. In terms of
culture, the Party developeda rich and varied environment, the legacy of
which benefitedboth communistsand non-communistsalike.

235

Chapter Seven

Crisis and Reorganisation

May 1931 - December 1932

BetweenJuneand December 1931, the membershipof the Communist

Party of Great Britain rose from 2,756 to 7,478.1The main reasonfor such
that
the
and
economic
crisis
political
undoubtedly
was
an advance
Government
Labour
in
Britain
the
those
collapsed,the
as
months,
engulfed
demonstrations
floundered,
the
of the
and
mutinied,
sailors
economy
intensified
In
bloodier.
bigger
became
an
political
and
unemployed
its
tribulations
the
meant
of
capitalism
whole edifice
global
climate, when
cameinto question,the predictions of capitalist collapse and encroaching
2
1927,
CPGB
by
the
suddenly
vindicated.
touted
were
since
war

The British Communist Party'ssimultaneousattempt to 'turn towards

Party
by
the
the
of
apparatus
and
overhaul
an
was
substantiated
masses'
CP
'from
bottom
designed
the
to
the
rebuild
publication of a programme
Resolutions'of
1932
Morgan,
For
Kevin
the'January
'3
marked
upwards.
the beginning of "an effective communist presencein this country" and
is
initial
slow
and
problematic,
such
an
assertion
was
progress
although
focus
4
CPGB's
This
therefore,
the
will
on
chapter
essentiallycorreCt.
interpretationof and responseto the crisis of 1931, and the reorganisation
in
1932.
Party
that
the
occurred
of

I Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLily of Great Britain 31 December
1931. CommunistArchive. Report on Paqy OrganisationNovember 1931. Klugmann
Papers.
2Suchan advanceshould obviously not be exaggerated.The Party remainedrelatively
small.
3Minutes of the Central Committeeof the Communist Pgly of Great Britain 16-17
January 1932.CommunistArchive.
4K. Morgan, Hany Pollitt op. cit. p77.

236

The Party'snumerical growth remainedwithin the framework of the New

Line, indeedthe eventsof late 1931can be seenas the summation of the
Third Period from the CPGB'sperspective.While the Party's interpretation
of the united front from below broadened,its hostility to the Labour Party,
the ILP and the trade union bureaucracyremained as vehementand as
vociferous as it had beenin 1929.As such,the Twelfth Congressof the
CPGB, held in November 1932,did not mark the end of the New Line.
Rather, it encompassedthe policy of the classagainst class in its most
coherentand applicable form. By supporting various 'rank and file'
initiatives inside the trade union movement,the CPGB relinquished the
burden of the MM and moved towards re-establishinga communist
presenceinside the organisedlabour movement.

The rise of Hitler in 1933would necessitatea thorough revision of

communistpolicy throughout the International, and the struggle against
fascismand war provided the CPGB with a causeto rally the support of
thousands.It was in theseyears, 1933-45, that the CPGB finally
establisheditself as a sizeablepolitical force in Britain. 5But history is not
divided into neat segments,and the evolution of the Third Period into the
Popular Front, like that of the SecondPeriod into the Third, was not a case
of black turning to white. Thus, someseedsof the Party's further
developmentwere planted in the Third Period; and it is to the origins of
the CPGB'sgrowth that this chapterturns.

5See K. Morgan Against Fascism and War op. cit. for an excellent
overview of the
Popular Front period.

237

Crisis: The Third Period Justified?

"The fight is here," wrote Palme Dutt in October 1931.6 For Dutt and the
CPGB, the financial and political crisis of 1931 was confirmation of the
theoretical formulations of the Comintern. While the Wall Street Crash,
fascist
(or neo-fascist) regimes
the
of
onset
rising unemployment, and
throughout Europe had already given credence to the determinants of the
Third Period, the collapse of the Labour Government placed the period
acutely within a British context. "The correctness of our [position] is
revealed," wrote Dutt, the CP must now "seize the tempo" and lead the
British workers to revolution. 7

The eventsof 1931were indeed dramatiC.8Unemployment continued to

by
9
July.
Meanwhile,
2,783,000
out
registered
of
work
rise, with
people
the world economic crisis that had intensified in the wake of the Wall
StreetCrashwas further bolsteredby the collapse of the Austrian and
Germanbanks in May 1931. British assetsin both countries were frozen,
and as the Bank of England choseto borrow E50,000,000from the New
York FederalReserveBank and the Bank of Paris - and the Government
simultaneouslymaintainedthe high value of the pound with its
commitment to free trade and the Gold Standard- foreign investors
from
deposits
London. Such a1light
their
remaining
withdrew
anxiously
from the pound,' which threatenedto completely undermine the British
by
then
the publication of the May Committee
compounded
was
economy,
deficits
in
huge
for 1932-33 and
July,
which
predicted
report
in
substantial
cuts
public spending.
recommended

61,
abourMonthlyOctober1931.
7Letterto thePoliticalBureauIS September
1931.Klugmann
Papers.
8See
Electionof 1931op.cit.
A. Thorpe,TheBritishGeneral
9Minisigy
February
1932.By September,
of LabourGazette
hadrisento
unemployment
2,825,772.
238

For a Governmentalreadyracked by internal divisions and declining

for
1931
too
the
therefore,
summer
were
much
of
a
events
popularity
10
While
Labour
the
to
of
a
section
cabinet
endure.
minority administration
benefit,
in
limit
the
the
of
unemployment
to
rate
any cuts
sought resist or
demanded
banks
the
the
all
employers
ever
and
world
opposition parties,
between
his
MacDonald
thus
own
sandwiched
was
severereconomies.
bequest
August
24
the
at
of
on
the
and
majority of parliament,
party and
Labour
Party
Government
the
National
that
formed
he
King,
pushed
the
a
into opposition.' I Consequently,pay cuts for Governmentemployeesand
brutal
restrictions were placed on
announced,
servicemenwere
from
forced
'flight
the
the
pound'
continued
unemploymentrelief, and
Britain off the Gold Standardon 19 September.12

The CPGB's interpretationof such eventswas revealedby William Rust in

his reports to the Political Bureau,and in the pagesof the Daily Worker.
"The National Government... representsa step towards fascism," Rust
13
August,
17
while the effective mobilisation of the unemployed
said on

IOA.Thorpe, The British GeneralElection op. cit. pp2l-26. The Governmenesfailure to

tackle the problem of unemploymentor to meet even the most limited of trade union
demandshad already led to discontentwithin both the Labour Party itself and the wider
labour movement.Throughout 1930the unions becameincreasingly critical of the
Government,and the numerousdisputesover unemploymentengenderedthe wrath of the
Party left, particularly in the ILP. Moreover, Labouesby-election results had steadily
worsenedfrom February 1930onwards.
I IThe formation of a National Governmentdid little to alleviate Britain's economicplight
however. The'flight from the pound'continued apace.
12Theseincluded an increasein contributions to unemployment insurance,a reduction in
the rate of unemploymentbenefit, the restriction of the period allowed for receipt of
benefit, the imposition of a meanstest to evaluateindividual claimants, and the
See
W.
Hannington,
Ten
Lean
(London,
1940)
Years
various'anomaties'.
of
amendment
for an overview of such measuresfrom the perspectiveof the NUWM.
13Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist Par!y of Great Britain 27 August
1931. CommunistArchive. William Gallacher backedRust's synopsis,adding that the
National Governmentrepresentedthe unification of the capitalist class againstthe
workers.

239

"14
For
Dutt
"revolutionary
the
spirit.
class's
working
was clear evidenceof
too, such unrest and massmobilisation revealed the "fight for life between
the bourgeoisieand the working class." 15Capitalism was bankrupt wrote
Dutt, the workers were under attack but rallying againstthe 'capitalist
dictatorship
"capitalist
in
Government
National
the
was
a
offensive', and
...
full action." 16Indeed,by as early 27 July, Dutt had completed and
despatchedthe first of two articles entitled 'British Capitalism on the Edge
impending
in
Pravda
the
Inpreco,
Precipice'to
of
preparation
and
of a
collapse.17

The Invergordon mutiny of 15 Septemberwas regardedby the CPGB as

Ly
Through
Rail
tension.
indicative
the
the
mounting political
of
particularly
Worker, the Party called on other sailors, soldiers and workers to support
in
had
to
18
The
response
a proposed
occurred
the
mutiny
mutineers.
of
Government
its
by
National
issued
the
25
as
part
of
per cent
wage cut of
despite
the
However,
the
amount
of
space
copious
measures.
stringency
CP gave to the incident, Invergordon remainedan isolated protest.19Even
imaginations
CPGB,
the
further
had
the
it
of
and
revolutionary
stirred
so,
the Party was rewardedfor its insurrectory efforts by a Special Branch raid
director
Utopia
imprisonment
Worker,
the
Daily
the
of
managing
of
the
on

14W.Rust Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Pg!U of Great Britain
19-20 September1931. Communist Archive.
15Letterfrom R.P.
to the Political Bureau 4 September1931. Klugmann Papers.
-Dutt
16R.P. Dutt, The Workers'Answer to the Crisis (London, 1931).
1713ritishCapitalism on the Edge of a Precipice, sent 28 July 1931. Part Il was sent I
August 1931. Dutt Papers(BL).
18DailyWorker 18 September1931. Seealso, Minutes of the Central Committee of the
CommunistPgiy of Great Britai 19-20 September1931. Communist Archive.
19Fora far more detailed account.seeD. Divine, Mutiny At Invergordon (London, 1970).
F. Copernan,Reasonin Revolt (London, 1948).pp40-53. Copemanjoined the CPGB
following the mutiny.

240

(W.T. Wilkinson), and the arrest of Party membersGeorgeAllison

PresS20
21
Shepherd.
Frank
and

Far more favourablefor the CPGB were the unemployment

demonstrationsof September-November.Throughout Britain, marches
drawn
forms
Public
test
petitions
up,
and
returned,
means
were organised,
AssistanceCommitteespicketed. Huge crowds marchedthrough Dundee
th
London
27
24th
the
Glasgow
the
on
and
as
on the
on 22 September,
,
banner
industrial
in
town
the
the
under
rallied
major
every
unemployed
NUWM. 22Such demonstrationswere often viciously repressed.In Salford
for example,a peacefulmarch to the town hall was met by police
"charging with their batons," and protesterssuch as the Manchester
beatings
by
local
Frow
to
the
Eddie
severe
subjected
were
communist
demonstrations
23
Moreover,
the
continued to gather
as
constabulary.
leaders
NTJWM
October-November,
the
the
throughout
of
momentum
becameregular targetsfor arrest.Wal Hannington and Sid Elias were both
imprisoned,and the Chief Commissioner,Lord Trenchard, was forced to
issuea ban on meetingsheld at labour exchanges.

With a GeneralElection called for 27 October 1931, the CPGB had a

British
The
its
the
to
to
people.
principles of class
analysis
put
chance
20UtopiaPressprinted the Daily Worker.
21See N. Branson, History of the Communist PpM of Great Britain. op. cit. pp70-71. W.
Rust, The StoEy of the Daily Worker op. cit. pp2l-24. Shepard and Allison had made
contact with the sailors only to be framed by the security services for distributing
subversive leaflets.
22Every NTJWM

branch organised demonstrations.

The numbers present on each
demonstration are impossible to gather with the estimates given in a number of sources
ranging from 10,000 to 150,000.
23 R. and E. Frow, The Battle of Bexley Square. (Manchester,
1994). See also W.
Greenwood's novel Love on the Dole. (London, 1948), for another eyewitness account.
Wal Hannington, in his autobiography Never on our Knees op. cit. pp237-245, gives
several accounts of these demonstrations and their harsh repression. In Glasgow on I
October a particularly viscous baton charge met the unemployed as they marched through
the city.

241

againstclasswere once again laid out in a manifesto drawn up by William

Rust, ErnestWoolley, Robin PageArnot, William Jossand Kath
Duncan.24Subsequently,'Workers'! Sailors'! SoldiersT focusedas much
on the treacheryof the Labour Party and the ILP as it did on the
Government.
National
The Party called for the
of
an
elected
ramifications
hands',
fight
'into
the
to repudiatethe 'enemiesof
to
take
their
own
workers
socialism' (Hendersonand the TUC), and to relaunchthe spirit of the
GeneralStrike.25The Election itself was dismissedas a "mockery" in
PalmeDutt's pre-electionpamphlet: an attempt to hide a 'capitalist
dictatorship' under a 'democraticveil'.
The National' Government is already formed and carrying out its programme the cuts
...
are put through. The workers are robbed, starved, batoned. And then, after all this, the
representativesof the capitalist parties, of the robbers, turn smiling and bowing to the
workers, to the 'sovereign people', to give them their votes and 'approve' all their
26
actions.

The CPGB fought 26 constituenciesin the 1931General Election and

in
As
1929,
the communist candidatesall failed to
74,824
votes.
polled
Arthur
Homer
(although
their
and Bob Stewartboth polled over
seats
win
10,000votes), and although the numberof votes registeredan
improvementon the Party'sprevious performance,the result revealed
clearly the disparity betweenthe CPGB as an agitational, organisational
presencewithin the labour movement,and as a viable political alternative
to the Labour Party in the minds of the working class.Furthermore,
despitethe months of crisis and unrest,the election resulted in an
overwhelming victory for the National Government.The number of

24Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PqM of Great Britain 19-20
September1931. CommunistArchive. Rust implored his comradesto speakin a language
"closer" to the workers.
25Worker'! Sailors'! Soldiers'! General Election Manifesto of the Communist Pam
of
Great Britain (London, 1931). Also in CommunistReview November-December 1931.
26R.P. Dutt, The Workers' Answer to the Crisis op.
cit.

242

Labour M. Ps fell from 287 to just 46,27and the National candidatespolled

554
14,000,000
to
seats.
secure
votes
over

Just what the Election result proved was to be a contentious issue for the
CPGB. If the masseswere radicalising and the class struggle accentuating,
how was it possibleto account for a fall in the Labour vote by some
2,000,000,and the apparentlyhuge swing to the ConservativeParty?
Typically, Dutt was quick to offer an explanation,producing a dialectical
Certainly
his
1929.
the election was
to
analysisof
piece of wizardry match
figured,
but
Labour
Party
Dutt
blow'
the workers
the
against
a'smashing
had not voted Conservative.Rather, as the Liberal vote had declined by
three million and the Conservativevote had risen by three million, there
had beena "rearrangement"of the bourgeoisvote, from Liberal to
Conservative.The fall in the Labour vote meanwhile, was due to the
labour
'old'
from
the
turning
movementand towards a new
away
masses
'workers' movement.'28

Such an analysiswas unable to standup to close inspection, and it was

Purkis
Jack
Murphy.
Both
by
both
Stuart
and
agreedthat the
criticised
defeat of the Labour Party was a chief feature of the General Election, but
this did not lead to the conclusion that the Labour Party was in ruins - it
had still polled over six million votes- or that workers had abstained
29
for
Essentially,
National
difficulty
for
the
the
than
candidate.
vote
rather
the CPGB came from the needto fit the result of the Election to the line of
the Party, rather than vice versa.As Dutt 'admitted' in his reply to Purkis,
if his analysiswas "inadequate it would mean that we should have to
...
27plUSsix unendorsed candidates, three of which were ILP.
28Daily Worke 5 November 193 1.
29For Purkis'reply to Dutt see Daily Worke 6 November 193 1. For Murphy, see Letter
to the Political Bureau 8 November 193 1. Klugmann Papers.

243

line
incorrect
the
of radicalisation of the working classas
whole
revise as
With such
the characteristicfeatureof the presentstageof crisis ... 1130
31
Dutt's
PB
the
analysis.
adopted
reasoning,

The questiondid not end there however. At a DecemberPresidium called

to discussthe 'situation in the British Party', Dutt's analysis came in for
luminaries
Gerhardt,
Comintern
from
Emmerich,
such
as
severecriticism
Safarov,Heckert and Kuusinen. It was "complacent" to seethe Labour
Party as finished said Emmerich, while Heckert dismissedthe idea that the
it
latter's
"quite
false.
"
Indeed
did
Tory
the
as
was
vote
not
workers
analysis,that the radicalisation of one section of the working class had led
dialectically to a swing to the right in another,that eventually won the
approval of the ECCI.32The radicalisation of the working class was still
accepted,but Dutt's 'rose-tinted'view of Britain's revolutionary
developmentwas far too optimistic for the more pragmatic Executive.

So, where did the crisis of 1931leave the CPGB? Certainly the heightened
dislocation,
the
and the'crisis mentality'of the
economic
political climate,
time gave credenceto a communist alternative to capitalism; particularly
Soviet
Union's
Year
Plan
Five
the
the
that ran
of
success
given
increase
The
in
the'depression
years'.
with
unemployment
simultaneously
and the subsequentactivity of the NUWM also did much to 'win over'
CPGB.
As
Party
the
the
to
expandedrelatively rapidly
such,
workers
during the 'crisis months'.Membershiphad begun to increasefrom the
beginning of the year, rising from 2,555 in November 1930 to 2,756 by

30Reply to Criticism of S. Purkis. Sent to the Daily Worke 17 November 1931. (BL)
31Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pa!ly of Great Britain 5
and 12
November 193 1. Communist Archive.
32The British Commission of the ECCI 2-29 December 193 1. Communist Archive
and
Klugmann Papers.

244

June 1931. Between then and December 1931 however, the Party more
than doubled. An official figure of 7,478 was presented to the Party
Executive in December, while even the number of factory cells - always
49.33
for
Party
to
the
rose
an embarrassment
-

In every Party District an improvementin the CPGB's standing was

daily"
"almost
Sheffield
DPC
For
the
reported
an
example,
recorded.
influx of new membersas a result of the "fight againsteconomiesand the
from
District
Party
just
Birmingham
"34
Elsewhere,
the
test.
grew
means
101 members in June, to 500 in November; the Scottish District from 428
to 1,396; and the London Party from 998 to 2,000.35While it is true that
the Party launched a recruitment campaign in May, it was undoubtedly the
in
Party
the subsequent weeks that made the
the
events unfolding around
36
campaign appear such a succesS.

Although many of the new recruits would be transitory members,and the

influx
fact
five
that
this
the
came
after
vast majority was unemployed,
did
bolster
isolation
Party.
to
the
much
and
stagnation
years of apparent
Young academicssuch as John Stracheycamecloser to the CPGB, and
had
formed
in
October
1931
the
of
communist
cells
a
number
since
itself
from
distanced
ILP
Labour
Party,
37
Moreover,
the
the
as
universities.
CP.
Such
branches
the
local
towards
overtures
made
a
several

33Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgjy of Great Britain 31 December
193 1. Communist Archive.
34Report to the Organisational Department from the Sheffield District P4M Committee
November-December 193 1. Klugmarm Papers. The District membership rose from 228
in June 1931 to 450 in November, with the bulk of the new recruits coming in the "last
two months. "
35Rel2ort on Pgjy Organisation November 193 1. Klugmarm Papers.
361bid. The increase in membership in June-July was relatively minor.
37Letter from 114gy Pollitt to Jimmy Shields 4 March 1932. Klugmann Papers.
According to Pollitt, there were eighteen in London, ten in Oxford, 25 in Cambridge and
between two and four in Reading, Durham, Leeds and Manchester.

245

developmentwas tentatively welcomedas an example of radicalisation,

but the Party also regardedany connectionwith the ILP as "very
dangerous"and there remained"clearly no question of a united front from
the top."38Even so, both Cox and Robson,in July 1931, underlined the
needto approachthe ILP rank and file, 39and examplesof local
collaboration, particularly in relation to NTJWM, becameincreasingly
40
common.

Finally, the organisationalsuccessof the NTJWM did much to heighten the

Party'sprofile and appeal.The vast majority of new recruits cameto the
CP through the unemployedstrugglesof the time, and although the
NUWM would continueto endurecriticism from the Party and the RILU,
it remainedthe most auspiciouscommunist auxiliary of the Third Period.
By the end of 1931, The Worker estimatedthat the NUWM had over 300
branchesand representedsome35,000 workers.41

Thus, although the CPGB remainedon the periphery of British politics in a

parliamentarycontext, its work amongstthe unemployed suggestedthat
the Party was a consequentialpart of the British labour movement.
Furthermore,the divisions within the Labour Party and the ILP, and the
Party'sre-emphasison work within the trade unions, beganto open up
38Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 19-20
September1931. CommunistArchive. Rust recommendedthat the Party put demandsto
the ILP that the leadershipwould not acceptbut which the rank and file would seeas
united front proposals.
39Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PLr!y of Great Britain 9 July 1931.
Communist Archive.
40Seebelow. Also Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pgm
of Great
Britain 8 October 1931. CommunistArchive. PageArnot reported on CP-ILP
collaboration in Glasgow, Liverpool, London and "others." For an example,seeR.
GrovesThe BalharnGroup op. cit. pp40-42.
41The Worker 5 December,1931. Seealso R. Croucher, We Refuse to Starve
op. cit.
p126. This figure hasbeenquestioned.S. Davies, 'The Membership of the National
UnemployedMovement'op. cit. Davies estimatesthat the membershipwas closer 23,000
at the end of 1931.

246

front
from
below'to
be
in
for
the'united
applied
a more
opportunities
discernible form. Whereverthe Party existed,communists continued to
it
in
Ernest
Woolley
felt;
Manchester,
their
was
whether
presence
make
demonstrators
being
his
to
whilst
unemployed
speech
on
carrying
42
by
Red
Wheelers
from
the
police;
walls
or
over
chased
simultaneously
the Leedscycling club, rallying supportto prevent the eviction of a
43
in
It
in
family
test.
the
the
was
an attempt to
means
wake
of
worker's
build on such hard work and potential therefore,that the Party once again
overhauleditself in 1932.

Reorganisation and Reapplication

In January 1932, Harry Pollitt unveiled plans to overhaul the existing
structure and working
'January Resolutions'

methods of the CPGB. These became known as the

Party's
the
to
they
sought
augment
gains of the
and
establishing

previous six months while simultaneously

a more effective

factories
The
the
trade
the
and
unions.
within
communist presence
preliminary
Commission

details of the reorganisation

were developed at a British

in December 193 1, held by the ECCI in order to offer a

'thorough examination'

of the Party in the wake of the General Election,

declining
the
to
reverse
and
(The commission

Party influence in the trade union movement.

was run in conjunction

with the Eighth session of the

RILU CC. ) The result, after several days of discussion with such ECCI
heavyweights

as Manuilsky

and Kuusinen,

led to what Jack Murphy

described as the most important document since the ECCI's'open

letter'to

the Leeds Congress in 1929.44

42M. Jenkins.Preludeto Better Dgys. Autobiographical Manuscript held at the WCML.

43Sportsand GamesJanuary 1932.
44SeeThe British Commissionof the ECCI 2-29 December 1931. Communist Archive
and Klugmarm Papers.For Murphy's comment,seeMinutes of the Political Bureau of the
Communist PUN of Great Britain 9 January 1932.Communist Archive.

247

In an echo of the 1930British Commission,the'January Resolutions'

blamed the Party's isolation on the lack of effective contact with the daily
life and work of the working classin the factories and the trade unions.
However, while the objectives and methodsof the united front from below
were restated,the 1931commissionalso outlined plans to radically
restructurethe CPGB apparatus.This entailedthe refocusing of
communist activity onto four key districts, London, Scotland, South Wales
and Lancashire.Leading membersof the Executive were dispatchedto the
from
form
District
Party
Working
they
to
were
centres,
where
relevant
Bureausand "chosethe most decisive factories and unions in.which they
forward
line.
The whole agitational resourcesof the Party
the
carry
will
will be thrown into that particular factory or trade union branch."45

Consequently, the Party centre was drastically reduced. Political Bureau

meetings were held on alternate Saturdays with Pollitt and Rust cofrom
King
Street
in
interim.
Distinct
Party
the
affairs
sections
ordinating
Women's
Department,
incorporated
into
CPGB,
the
the
the
as
were
such
of
Idris
Cox
(South
Party.
Wales),
William
Gallacher
the
of
work
general
(Scotland), Robin Page Amot (Lancashire), Harry Pollitt and William Rust
(London), were placed in charge of the chosen DistriCtS,46and every
Executive member of the Party was assigned to a factory cell and trade
in
instructed
institution
'every
to
they
utilise
which
were
within the
union
factories and mines to rally the workers around specific issues' relevant to
life in the workplace. 47For those communists not in work, 'street cells'

45Minutesof the Political Bureauof the CommunistPaqy of Great Britain 9 January

1932.Communist Archive. The other Districts - Liverpool, Bradford, Birmingham,
Tyneside and Sheffield - were to remain but without additional resources.
46Minutesof the Political-Bureauof the CommunistPagy of Great Britain 14 January
1932.Communist Archive.
47Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist Party Great Britain 9 January
of
1932.CommunistArchive.

248

were to be developedto agitate around local issuesand recruit potential

Party members.In Hammersmithfor example,the street cell produceda
local news-sheetand organisedschool meals for the children of the
unemployed.48

Suchreorganisationwas certainly necessary.In Kuusinen's words, the

CPGB had become"an apparatuson top, but not a Party

...

directly

Party
both
"49
By
the
the
overhauling
apparatus
with
masses.
at
connected
the centre and locally, it was hoped to establishstronger links with the
working classwhile simultaneouslyalleviating the burden of bureaucracy
on Party functionaries.This did not imply a lesseningof 'revolutionary
innovations
however,
the
resolutions
outlined
work'
and
significant
with
regard to the Party'sapproach.

In the trade unions for example,"the sharpestpossible turn" was to be

"The
in
Party's
theory that the old unions are
the
attitude.
and
work
made
in
them to destroy them is absolutely
we
are
schoolsof capitalism and
false," said Pollitt. As such,the idea that the trade unions were 'played out'
was to be 'strangled'along with the 'new union psychology' of the Third
Period.50

This was an issuethat matteredgreatly to Pollitt, who had fought

consistentlyagainstthe radical trade union policy propagatedby Losovsky
at the RILU, and the left in the CPGB. The example of the AEU Members

48Communist

Review January

49The British Commission

Klugmann Papers.

1933.

of the ECCI 2-29 December

5OMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist

1932. Communist Archive.

249

193 1. Communist

PPM of Great Britain

Archive

and

9 January

Rights Movement (MRM) in particular, bolsteredPollitfs belief that a

fundamentalrealignment in the CP's policy was needed.
The MRM had emergedin the wake of the AEU's expulsion of various
union membersopposedto the Executive'sacceptanceof reducedwage
ratesand revised working conditions. The campaigngained widespread
supportthroughout the union, eventually securingthe reinstatementof
thoseexpelled in June 1932.Most significantly for Pollitt however, was
the leading role played by communist engineerssuch as Joe Scott and
Percy Glading, and the supportive role played by the Metalworkers'MM
under Jack Tanner.51

Such a'united front', initiated by the workers and inclusive of communist

form
basis
Party's
the
the
would
alike,
of
new
and non-communists
initiative
however,
his
forced
Pollitt
In
to
to
was
approach. order apply
Losovsky
Thus,
ECCL
the
the
when
accusedPollitt of
secure supportof
'negatingthe policy of independentleadership'at the Eighth RILU Plenum
in December1931, he was rebukedby Kuusinen, the ECCI
further
Presidium
52
December
The
ratified Pollitt's
representative.
did
final
And
far
the
resolution
not
go
so
although
as to
perspective.
suggestthat trade unions could be transformedinto ...real organs of class
it
Gerhardt
Kuusinen
(as
made
suggested),
clear that such a
struggle"

51SeeR. and E. Frow, Engineering Struggles.Episodesin the Story of the Shop Stewards'
Movement (Manchester,1982).pp9l-94. Also N. Fishman,The British Communist P
op. cit. p42.
52Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 9 January
1932. Communist Archive. The disagreements within the ECCI and the RILU over the
in
late
193 1. The more moderate line of
to
trade
policy
came
a
climax
of
union
question
Manuilsky, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky eventually came through, as evidenced by the
Resolutions of the RILU Plenum and the endorsement of Pollitt's line. See Breaking
Through RILU pamphlet. 1932. Pollitt believed there to be a "definite campaign against
me at RILU headquarters. " "Because I dared to criticise the Profintern, I committed the
lads
blood.
" Letter from Han Pollitt to Jimmy
the
are
now
after
sin
and
my
unforgivable
Shields 18 March 1932. Klugmann Papers.

250

transformation"was possible among someof the lower branches." In his

concluding speechon 22nd December,Kuusinen was even more explicit:
We must say to the workers that they must fight for turning the trade unions into real
class fighting organisations ... and the workers through their own experience, through
their struggle for changing the trade unions into classstruggle organisations,should learn
through their own experience that the communists are the best leaders of the class
53
struggle.

Pollitt

also raised the question

The name of the movement

commission.
important'he
the Plenum,

of the MM

its objectives

supporting
organising

them on a national

essentially

the 'death knoll'

movement's
"without

recent record.

any vestiges

was the tendency

office"

for the MM

predicted,

the intention

as Pollitt

The establishment

lambasted

of Strike

or mass influence"

to issue programmes

"and we will

would

of

basis "at a later stage. "54 This was

of support

Movement

with

at

Opposition;

Trade Union

emanating

life
"the
than
of the workers
rather

of the Minority

The movement

revised.

rank and file initiatives

workers

liquidated

was not officially

were noticeably

now form the basis of a Revolutionary

speech to the

was notTundamentally

the MM

said, and although

in his opening

as we know

Committees

was condemned,
from

themselves.

it today will

have a mass organisation

the

the "Party

as

or MM

" "The composition

disappear"

growing

Pollitt

up in its

place. "55

The question of work amongthe unemployedwas less revelatory, with the

usual chargesof 'legalism' again levelled at the NUWM. Hannington once
again defendedthe dues-payingbasisof the movementto the commission,
531bid.
54Report of the British Commission2-29 December1931. Communist Archive and
Klugmann Papers.
55Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Pa!V of Great Britain 16-17
January 1931. Communist Archive.

251

for
he
did
the NUWM's failure to set up the
admit
responsibility
although
Councils
based
Unemployed
outlined at the Prague
non-membership
Conferenceon unemploymentheld in July-August 1931.56As Richard
Croucherhas explained in somedetail however, these'all-in' councils were
difficult to apply to Britain. The NUWM was already well established,and
the vast majority of local branchesregardedsuch councils as an
57
unnecessaryrival organisation. Although the NAC, under pressurefrom
the RILU, continuedto call for their establishmentthroughout 1932,
initiative.
from
the
nothing came

With regard to other political parties, the CP maintained its commitment to

the notions of classagainstclass.Indeed,the Party had become
increasingly hostile to the ILP in responseto Maxton and company's
widening breachwith the ParliamentaryLabour Party. "The ILP is the
It
dangerous
the
class
working
movement.
of
constitutesa
enemy
most
terrific barrier betweenthe radicalised massesand the Party" declared
Pollitt in January;and subsequently,instanceswhere the Party had
formally collaboratedwith the ILP were condemnedunreservedly.For
example,the CI and the British PB both criticised the Scottish District
Party for allowing an unemploymentdemonstrationto be headedby John
McGovern of the ILP. 58Similarly, the N-UWM's involvement with a

56Forthe PragueResolutionsseeInpreco 8 September1931. Hannington was very

critical of the PragueConferenceat the British Commissionin December.The first three
days of the conferencewere taken up with reports on the severity of unemployment in
various countries he said. Subsequently,he and Johnny Campbell met Walter Ulbricht for
just one hour to discussthe new approachto the unemployed in Britain. No resolution
appearedbefore the congress,no definite agreementswere made, and Hannington
have
to
only seenthe Pragueresolutionswhen they were reported by Robin Page
claimed
Amot in mid September.
57R.Croucher, We Refuseto Starve op. cit. pp126-130.
58Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pagy of Great Britain 8 and II
October 1931. Communist Archive. Both Gallacher and Peter Kerrigan argued in favour
of the Glasgow DPC. Furthermore,the Scottish Party were chargedwith'Iegalism, for
first; seekingpermissionfor the demonstrationfrom the local magistrate,and second;for

252

deputationto meet RamsayMacDonald (organisedby JamesMaxton and

David Kirkwood) was censured,along with the NUWM-ILP meeting at
the Friends Meeting House in London on 23 September.59

As both Kuusinen and Pollitt correctly explained,the policy outlined at the

British Commissionwas not a repudiation of the New Line. The
Third
Period
the
the
and
of
paradigm
within
remained
resolutions
1930
line
the
the
at
commission.
established
essentiallysupplemented
However, the measurestaken to restructurethe CPGB were indeed radical.
The overhaul of the Party apparatusand the realignment of the MM
New
leftist
interpretation
Line.
final
the
the
the
of
of
preclusion
signified
Whilst the fundamentalconstructsof class againstclassremained, the
CPGB
the
were revised significantly.
of
methods
working

Problems of Application
Although the JanuaryResolutionswere endorsedunanimously by the
CPGB Executive, the initial results of the Party's reorganisationwere
had
been
little
there
PB
that
The
concerned
once
was at
variable.
in
Party
ftindamental
"real
to
the
change"
work
outlined
appreciationof
the resolutionS,60and this was bome out in the reports issuedby the
"not
The
[South
District
were
resolutions
grasped
representatives.
various
Wales]" by local Party members,or had been accepted"without proper

in
'arm
to
themselves
the
a march protesting againstthe police
workers
not allowing
brutality of the I October demonstration.
59Forthe Friends HouseMeeting seeThe Workers United Front and the ILP (London,
1931). For the criticism of NUWM contactwith Maxton seeMinutes of the Political
Bureau of the Communist Pg! y of Great Britain 8 October 1931. Communist Archive.
60Minutesof the Political Bureauof the Communist Pa!jy of Great Britain 22 January
1932.CommunistArchive. Gallacher,Cox and Pollitt felt the CC had gone badly, and the
ECCI representative,'Jack!,said the resolutionswere endorsedwith'suspicious
unanimity.'

253

'161
In
despite
[Manchester].
the appearanceof the Party
addition,
study
Organiser,with articles entitled'How Party Work can be Improved'and
'Knowing What Goeson in the Factory' pennedby Harry Pollitt, it soon
becameapparentthat the 'turn to masswork' would not occur without
diff, CUlty.62Subsequently,although the Working Bureausestablishedin
the districts quickly designatedvarious factories,pits and unions to focus
forced
CC
Pollitt
to
to
the
complain
meeting of June 1932about
was
upon,
the 'mechanicalacceptance'of the resolutions.Two months later, at the
Twelfth ECCI Plenum,Pollitt estimatedthat only 25 per cent of Party
membersactively applied the resolutions,while the rest 'clung' to the 'old
sectarianroutine.' 63

Idris Cox provided the details of the Party'sdevelopmentto the Central

Committee in Juneand the Twelfth Party Congressin November 1932.
Despite recruiting 2,500 memberssince January,Cox explained, the Party
from
just
fallen
7,000
5,400
by
had
to
over
actually
membership
November.Despite an increasein the number of factory cells throughout
1932,from 40 to 82, only 39 per cent of Party memberswere in work, and
the vast majority of new recruits continuedto come through the NUWM. 64
The effect of the Party'strade union work was similarly varied. Only 35
61For Cox's Report on South Wales, seeMinutes of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Pgly of Great Britain 6 February 1932.Communist Archive. For the
commentson the London District seeLondon District ReRort22 April 1932. Klugmarm
Papers.
62PaElyOrganiserNo. I March 1932and No. 8 December 1932.
63Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PLalyof Great Britain 4-5 June
1932.CommunistArchive. Seealso Pollitt's Letter to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932.
Klugmarm Papers.For an overview of the ECCI Plenum seeR.W. Robsolvs report in the
paily Worker 6 October 1932,and E.H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern op. cit., pp64-74
and 220-222.
64Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist PaM of Great Britain. 4-5 June
1932.Communist Archive. Report of the Twelfth Congressof the Communist Pam of
Great Britain 12-15 November 1932.Klugmann Papers.70 of the cells were in the four
key districts, and all 82 had a total of 550 members.For the total membershipfigure, see
Minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist PLrjy of Great Britain 9 November
1932.CommunistArchive.

254

in
June
holders
Party
union
members
were
registered
card
per cent of
1932,although Cox reportedthat the re-emphasison Party work in the
trade unions and the factories had indeed brought the CPGB 'closer to the
workers.'65

The numerous reports on the four key Districts emphasised these mixed
in
ftom
fell
2,120
December
Party
In
London
the
membership
results.
1931 to 1,800 in June 1932. However, the percentage of Party members
Party's
in
the
trade
supportive role
and
slightly,
union rose
who were also a
in various disputes (see below) led to the recruitment of 180 'industrial
from
25
33.
The
factory
in
increase
to
cells;
communist
workers'and an
Scottish membership also fell (from 1,453 to 1,200) between January and
November. The number of factory cells in Scotland rose ftom five to
twenty, but only 226 Scottish communists were registered trade union
doubled
had
Party
than
the
Scottish
Even
since
the
more
so,
members.
CPGB
UMS,
NUWM
the
the
1,
193
through
was able
and
and
summer of
beyond
Scottish
the
the
working
class
to mobilise significant sections of
led
for
instance,
66
UMS
The
a successftil strike of
Party membership.
5,000 miners against proposed wage cuts in May. 67

In South Wales, although the District membershipfell from 700 to 594

betweenJanuaryandJuly, thePartymanagedto go someway towardsrein

Welsh
Party
The
itself
trade
the
members
union
of
number
establishing
65Reportof the Twelfth Congressof the Communist PgISyof Great Britain 12-15
November 1932.Klugmarm Papers.Approximately 2,500 peoplejoined the Party
betweenNovember 1931and November 1932; and the samenumber left. In Birmingham,
in
left
Party
1932,
double
District
the
the number who
was
who
the number of people
it.
in
remained
66 Seethe various reports to the PB in Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist
Party of Great Britain 1932.Communist Archive and Klugmarm Papers.The number of
factory cells was given as 18-20 in May 1932.
67Reportof the Fourth Congressof the United Mineworkers of Scotland 4-5 December
1932.Klugmann Papers.Seealso the Daily Worke throughout May 1932.

255

increased,and ldris Cox reportedthat communistsoccupied several

CP
delegates
The
MM
of
number
and
positions.
attending
union
official
the 1932SWMF conferencerose to eight (comparedto just two in 1931),
four
district
evident
on
union committees,sixteen
were
communists
and
branch committeesand two district councils.68

The LancashireDistrict meanwhile, saw an increasein Communist Party

between
January
October,
834)
(from
515
to
and
primarily as
membership
dispute.
Even
CP
the
textile
the
so,
was not
ongoing
of
consequence
a
happy with the rate of developmentin Manchester,and the PB became
increasingly critical of Robin PageArnot, as the Executive's
Organiser.
Robinson,
Trevor
District
Despite the
the
representative,and
intensifying unrest in the textile towns, the Party remainedunable to make
line
dispute.
Opposition
Party
impact
to
the
the
within the
on
a significant
District Party (of which PageArnot was himself guilty) undoubtedly
hampereddevelopment,with trade union work consideredto be extremely
69
'inadequate'.

All four'key Districts' recounteddifficulties in mobilising the majority of

local communiststo the new approach.Many 'local comrades'were
in
January
found
'nothing
Resolutions,
have
the
to
neNV
or had
reported
had
done
to
they
the
work
continuing
as
whilst
resolutions
accepted

68At Ferndale,the lodge secretarywas a communist, as was the vice chairman.

Additionally, five of the fifteen membersof the lodge committee were CP members.In
lodge
had
40
Party
Tylorstown
the
members,only one of whom bothered to
contrast,
South
Wales
District
Report
6
February 1932.Communist
its
the
on
meetings.
attend
Archive.
691bid.For criticism of PageAmot see,Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist
Pqrty of Great Britain 20 August 1932.Pollitt later called for PageArnot to be relegated
to a candidatememberof Party Executive, but he was opposedby Gallacher, Cox and
Rust among others.For Robinson,seeMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist
Party of Great Britain 25 June 1932.Both Communist Archive.

256

before.70At the Twelfth Party Congress,ldris Cox complained of older

Party")
hostility
("the
the
to new memberswho
of
grandfathers
comrades'
they thought threatenedtheir position.71Elsewhere,most notoriously in
London, thoseon the left of the Party registeredopenly their disagreement
with the leadership'sre-emphasison trade union work (seebelow).

Although the JanuaryResolutionswere intendedto transform the CPGB

from a 'sect'to a massparty, initial progresshad proven slow and
problematic. The main increasein Party membershiphad come during the
political upheavalsof 1931, and although the Party was able to maintain a
steadylevel of membershipthroughout 1932,it was unable to add to it.
(The degreeof fluctuation in Party membershipwas describedas
72)However, the resolutions'more supportive, pragmatic
'unprecedented'.
line enabledthe Party to register somenotable successesin its trade union
work in 1932,and through the NUWM, the CP continued to dominate the
unemployedmovement.

Difference of opinion betweenthe CP and NT-JWMExecutives over the

issueof UnemployedCouncils did not noticeably diminish communist
agitation amongstthe unemployed.At a local and national level, the
NUWM remainedat the forefront of the'class struggle' throughout 1932,
70TrevorRobinson said this was particularly evident in Manchester.SeeReport of the
Twelfth Congressof the Communist PaM of Great Britain 12-15 November 1932.
Klugmann Papers.
71Report of the Twelfth Congressof the Communist P!M of Great Britain 12-15
November 1932.Klugmann Papers.The Party was very aware of this tendency.William
Allan had informed the British Commissionof a "local where five new membershad
recently beenbrought into the Party and thesefive new memberswere talking about what
inside
Quite
they
the
taking
place
where
work.
place
a useful thing to talk about I
was
should think. And becausethey were talking without knowing any of the usualjargon,
the local comradesthere snubbedthem and told them they should talk like Bolsheviks
...
bring
forward
they
that
questionsrelating to Bolshevism." Report of the
should
and
British Commission.2-29 December1931.Communist Archive and Klugmann Papers.
72ThiSwas the view of Idris Cox. Report of the Twelfth Congressof the Communist
PaM of Great Britain 12-15 November 1932.Klugmann Papers.

257

CPGB
N-UWM
the
that
the
it
the
through
could most
of
work
and was
influence!
have
to
a'mass
precisely claim

In most localities,

maintained a continuous agitational presence; mobilising

demonstrations
labour
regular
the
organising
exchanges,
at
Assistance Committee (PAC), rallying

opposition

individual
to
legal
and other advice
offering

the NTJWM

the unemployed
to the Public

to evictions,

unemployed

and

workers. The fact

local
PAC
the
Borough
County
meant
that
councils appointed
or
discontent could have a significant

influence on the relevant council's

N-LJWM
The
consequently
policy.

registered a number of successes in

by
benefit
forcing
the
the
committee,
set
of
rate
up
either

or lessening the

73
Even
teSt.
the
so, such success often came at a price,
means
of
strictures
demonstrations
local
as
Demonstrations

from
the authorities.
met with a violent response

in
Castleford
by
baton
and
police,
charged
were regularly

demonstrator,
one

Arthur Speight, was beaten to death. 74 In September the

intensified
clashes

further. The protest at Birkenhead

violently

was attacked

by the police for example, and the whole NTJWM branch

by
75
PAC.
before
the
were
granted
concessions
committee was arrested

Nationally, the NTJWM organised a'Day of Struggle' on 23 February.

Large demonstrations took place across Britain, particularly in Bristol,
Manchester, London, Edinburgh and Glasgow, and although often ending
in scenes of violence, the extent of the campaign and the size of support

73Reportof the National Advisojy Committee 23-24 January 1932. Klugmann Papers.
Early successesincluded Wigan, the Vale of Levan, Stoke, Keighly, Newcastle and
Sheffield. Here the NAC reported that the local PAC or council had beenunable to
implement the meanstest or had been forced to modify it.
74SeeR. Croucher, We Refuseto Starve.op. cit. pp 132-133.In Northern Ireland, in
demonstrators
British
different
two
circumstances,
were
shot,
and
police were
somewhat
in
Increases
into
the ratesof relief were granted subsequently.
action.
called
751bid.pp 133-136.Seealso W. Hannington, Never on our Knees op. cit. pp252-54, for
during
the'riots'.
and
after
of
events
account
an

258

mobilised, led the NUWM to regardthe day as a triumph.76The movement

was also able to producea national newspaper,the Unemployed Special
(and then the UnemployedLeader).And on 28-29 May, a'Conference
againstthe MeansTest'attracted 679 delegatesfrom various NUWM and
trade union bodies.A Hunger March was organisedfor SeptemberOctober, and while winning few concessionsfrom the Government,the
march was a major propagandasuccessfor the NUWM. Some 1,500
Women's
led
including
by
Lily
the
contingent
now
customary
marchers,
Webb and Maud Brown, convergedon London with a petition of
1,000,000signatures.77They were greetedby thousandsof supporters(as
well as the obligatory police batons) in Hyde Park on 27 October, and so
ominous did the NUWM appearto the British authorities in late 1932,that
its leaders(Hannington, Elias, Llewellyn and 78 year old Tom Mann) were
days
Hyde
Park
The
the
to,
of,
rally.
or
within
police
prior
all arrested
House
to
the
the
the
planned
march
and
of Commons
even seized petition,
78
was duly repressed.

Although actual NUWM membershipcontinued to fluctuate, the

high
a
relatively
number of cadresthroughout
maintained
movement
1932.79Moreover, despiteILP and trade union efforts to instigate rival
76Reporton Demonstrationson the National DU of Struggle undated (1932). Klugmann
Papers.
77Thepetition called for the abolition of the meanstest and the anomaliesact, and the
restorationof the 10 per cent benefit cut. 'Unofficial' Report of NUWM as at 19 August
1932Klugmarm Papers.
78Hanningtonwas arrestedfollowing a NUWM meeting at which he had been
incriminating
document
handed
an
alluding to terrorist activities.
surreptitiously
Hannington exposedthe'plot'but was arrestedthe following day. SeeUnemploye
Struggles. 1919-1936 op. cit. p253-255. Sid Elias was arrestedon chargesrelating to
letters written to Hannington from the USSR. Llewellyn and Mann were both charged
with sedition. At a local level too, leading NUWM memberswere regular targets for
C.
Tsuzuki,
Mann
1856-1941:
Mann
Tom
For
The Challengesof Labour
see,
arrest.
(Oxford, 1991). pp243-45.
79S.Davies has estimatedthat the NUWM membershippeaked in late 1931 with a total
).
At the sametime The Worker 5 December
Membership
(rf'he
23,643
of
op.
cit.
of
1931, claimed the NUWM represented35,000, and Hannington informed the ECCI of

259

80
NUWM
lead
the
to
the
organisations,
continued
unemployed
in
By
June
1932,the South Wales
the
of
cases.
vast
majority
unemployed
DPC reportedthat the NUWM represented12,000workers in 28 branches,
while a month earlier PeterKerrigan claimed the N-LJWMwas a'main line'
of Party activity in Scotland,with 13,000members.81Although
Hannington was removedfrom the Party Executive at the Twelfth Party
Congress(due to political differences),the successof the NUWM
for
the CPGB.
remaineda sourceof pride

More directly linked to the initiatives of the JanuaryResolutionshowever,

was the progressmadeby the Party in its industrial work. This was due, in
part, to the fact that the Party now measuredits achievementagainst its
initiatives,
to
to
various
working
class
grievances
and
ability offer support
in
lead
its
the
to
than
workers
actually
a specific
against ability
rather
dispute.Although the needfor a more systematicapproachto work within
the trade unions had beenstressedby the CPGB since 1930,the
file
its
and
committees,
condemnationof the
on
rank
emphasis
resolution's
MM's 'hard line' tactics, and its re-assertionthat lower sectionsof the
union apparatuscould be'won'by the CP, gave the Party even wider scope
for trade union agitation. Indeedthe impotency of the MM by 1931 made

37,000. Report of the British Commission2-29 December 1931. Communist Archive and
Klugmann Papers.Davies suggeststhat the averagemembershipthroughout 1932was
Harry
Pollitt
50,000
in
The Communist International
20,000,
claimed
while
around
October 1932.
8OForexample,a District Committeeof the AEU in Scotland set up an unemployed
Political
Bureau
See
Minutes
the
of
of the Communist PLM of Great
organisation.
anhLin 9-10 April 1932. CommunistArchive . The TUC General Council also set about
forming unemployedassociationsunder tradescouncil control from January 1932, a
decision that was endorsedat the SeptemberConference.
81Report of the South Wales District 5 July 1932. Scottish District P4M Committee
Report May 1932.CommunistArchive.

260

82
As
CP
the
necessary.
particularly
such,
of
policy
offered
such a change
its support to a number of disputesthroughout 1932, and often to effect.

In January 1932,London dockworkers formed a number of rank and file

TGWU
in
to
endorsedwage cuts, and according to
opposition
committees
Joe Leigh (a London communist), Harry Pollitt threw himself into the
dispute.After instructing the local Party branchto establishcontact with
the dock workers, "[Pollitt] went out himself, found a lighterman bom in
Manchester," and from his discussions("they were like old pals united")
drew up an accountof the lightermen'sdemandsand working conditions
for the Daily Worker.83Although the strike was defeated,the support the
Party gave to both the strike and the Vigilance Committee establishedin
its wake, won the CP the appreciationof the striking men, and also gained
the Party a number of new recruits.84

The Party was even more successfulin its work amongstLondon transport
been
hostile
had
MM
Although
to the numerous
the
previously
workers.
busmen,
London
Party
file
lent
the
the
of
eventually
movements
and
rank
its supportto militant workers such as Albert Papworth in mid 1932.
Again, TGWU endorsedwage reductionsprovoked the dispute.85Thus, in
August 1932,the CPGB and the Daily Worker championedthe Rank and
82Thefact that the South Wales District had more branchesof the Friends of Soviet
Russiathan the MM by mid 1932was indicative of the movement'sdecline. There were
ten FOSR brancheswith 256 members,comparedto three MM brancheswith 65. Roort
of the South Wales District 5 July 1932.Communist Archive. In December 1931
William
Allan
MM
the
admitted that the movement only functioned
secretary
meanwhile,
in London and Scotland.Report of the British Commission 2-29 December 1931.
Communist Archive.
831nJ. Mahon, liagy Pollit op. cit. p170.
84Aswell as covcragein the Daily Worke the Party and the MM also organiseddock
issued
leaflets,
bulletins
strike
and special editions of the London Docker
meetings,
gate
Strike
London
Dock
See
Renort
February
the
1932. Klugmann Papers.
on
news-sheet.
For the appreciationof the dock workers, seeReport of the South Side Strike Committee
10 January 1932.Klugmann Papers.
851-1.
A Clegg, Labour Relationsin London Transport (London, 1950). ppl4-17.

261

File DelegateCommittee establishedby Papworth and his fellow militants.

The committeewas heraldedas a'united fighting front',86and the
Busmen'sPunch (originally a communistrun news-sheet)was relaunched
became
Punch,
the official organ of the
Busman's
the
quickly
and
as
in
link
Emile
Bums'
CPGB's
to
the
The
committee
was
evident
committee.
inclusion
Party
the
the
technical
of
news-sheet,
of
editor
as
position
Sharkey,
Bernard
Ware
Bill
and the significant
and
as
memberssuch
87
Party.
Thus,
District
by
London
the
rather than
supportoffered
busmen,
by
MM
in
the
to
the
as
exemplified
militant
remaining opposition
CPGB
1932,88
to
February
late
the
claim a significant
was
able
as
as
degreeof responsibility for the workers eventualsuccess.89Party
CP
in
London
the
the
garages
and
increased
accordingly,
membership
important
influence
boast
an
and militant section of the
among
an
could
working class.

Among the railway workers too, the CPGB refocusedits attention away
from the MM and onto the Railwaymen'sVigilance Movement (RVM) and
The Railway Vigilant, a news-sheetthat claimed 12,000readers.90The
MM had initially seenthe Vigilance Movement as a link between itself
1933
RVM
but
by
January
the
the
was recognisedas the
workers,
rail
and
"actual alternative leadershipof the railwaymen in the processof
development."91The Party was relatively well representedin the railway
industry, particularly in London where a number of communist cells were

86N.Fishman,The British Communist Pgr1yop. cit. pp50-54.

87LondonDistrict Report 22 April 1932.Report on London Bus Work 15 November
1932.Communist Archive.
"For example,seeDaily Worke 23 February 1932.
89Thewage reductionswere withdrawn in return for minor concessions.SeeN. Fishman,
The British Communist Pgjy op. cit. pp50-54.
90N. Branson,HistojX of the Communist Pg! Y of Great Britain op. cit. p93.
91Rail
II January 1933. In R. Martin, Communism and the British Trade
_Statement 173.MM
Unions op. cit. p
membersfitrictioned as "supportersand members."

262

in existence,but the sectarianismof young militants in the Railway MM

(such as Stuart Purkis), had often stifled Party influence. The formation of
the RVM, in which the communistheadof the Railway MM, W. C Loeber,
played a prominent role, undoubtedlywidened the scope for communist
involvement.92Indeed,one historian of the NUR has suggestedthe RVM
"revive[d] a militant spirit within the union."93

However, difficulties were apparent,particularly on occasionswhere local

Party leadersremainedcommitted to the more 'hard line' interpretation of
the'independentleadership.' This was very evident during the Lucas
dispute in Birmingham, where Pollitt once again clashedwith Maurice
Ferguson,the District Secretary.The dispute emergedwhen the (mainly)
unorganisedwomen workers at the factory objectedto the introduction of
the American Bedauxbonussystem.Local Party activists rallied to
began
into
immediately
them
the MM.
the
recruiting
women
and
support
However, this contrastedwith the strategyof the Party centre, which
instructedthe DPC to organisethe workers into a rank and file committee
within the official trade union.

The DPC met to discussthe dispute on 20 March, with Harry Pollitt in

by
(the
T.
Roberts
Party Organiser), several
After
a report
attendance.
local comrades,including Ferguson,Millins, Kingston and Lily Webb,
join
it
"fatal
to
to
the trade unions."
that
workers
advise
was
maintained
Such a tactic madethe workers "prey to the trade union officials" said

9217or
the Party'sattitude to the RailwaymenseeHarry Pollitfs article in Communist
Review January 1933.
93p.S. Bagwell, The RailwayLnen.The Histo!3! of the National Union of RailwgYmen
(London, 1963).p522.

263

Millins, and Pollitt - who was forced to intervene in order to affirm the
ECCI endorsedpolicy - was accusedof reversing the line of the Party.94

The strike itself was successful.Moreover, the Communist Party's

in
factory
the
enabledthe Party to gain a degreeof
agitation and around
hostility
despite
"confusion"
to trade union work Pollitt
the
and
support93
noted on his visit to Birmingham.96The main obstacleto Party activity, a
informed
factory
the DPC, was the workers' fear of
the
young worker at
victimisation. 17hus,the support engenderedby the local comradeswas lost
following the return to work.97

Eventsin Lancashirealso stirred mixed feelings within the Party

leadership.Local disputesagainst individual employersoccurred
throughout the year, but by July the situation had intensified significantly.
Burnley weaversvoted for an 'all-out' strike following the Trades
Federations'failure to respondto the employer's suspensionof all previous
wage and work agreements;and at the end of August massdemonstrations
took place acrossLancashire.98

However, the District Party boastedonly fitleen cotton workers amongst

its membershipin June 1932." Individuals such as Lily Webb, James
Rushtonand BessieDickinson had beencontinually involved at the heart
94Rcp(wriin Meeting in Binningharn 20 March 1932.Dutt Suitcase,WCML.
,
95SccT. Robert'sspeech.The Twelfth Con=ss of the Communist PaLlyof Great Britain
12-15 November 1932.Klugmann Papers.Robertswas carried to the factory by 1,000
workers in the nameof the MM. There is also a dreadfully written piece by Roberts in
PartyOryaniscr December 1932.
961,riter froni-I lagy Ptllijt to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932. Klugmann Papers.
97RCMrlon_Mgoing in Birmingham 20 March 1932.Dutt Suitcase,WCML.
"For the details of the disputeseeS. Bruley, inQpgning-the Books ov. cit. and A.
Bullcn, Thc Calling of the 1932Cotton Strike', in hLorthWest Labour History Group
Bolictin No. 3 undated.
991)rafl Rcsolution on the Cotton Strike'. SeeMinutes of the Political Bureau the
of
CommunimPaily Qf Grcat-Hritain4-5 October 1932.Communist Archive.

264

of the battle, and a number of communistswere included amongthose

battles
between
during
the
strikers and police.100
countless
arrested
However, the Party essentiallyremainedinconsequentialto the workers
101
concerns.

For Pollitt, who visited Lancashireduring the strike, the Party's inability to
left
from
New
impact
Line.
decisive
the
the
excesses
of
stemmed
make a
Robin PageAmot's initial attemptsto develop and organisethe Party's
'independentleadership'wereroundly condemnedby the PB, along with
his report claiming that the Party was actually 'leading the strike."02 Thus,
Pollitt becameconvinced of the needto further emphasisethe importance
of a communistpresencewithin the existing workers organisations.

The adoption of the JanuaryResolutionsdid not immediately transform

the CPGB into aParty of the masses'.While the overhaul of the CP's
had
involve
Party
itself
the
to
methods
enabled
working
organisationand
Twelfth
the
the
the
working
class,
resolution
of
among
more effectively
Party Congresssummedup succinctly the CPGB's record in 1932:

10OForjustone example,seeBessieand Harold Dickinson in R.A. Leeson,Strike op. cit.

ppl24-125.
10I'Draft Resolution on the Cotton Strike.' Minutes of the Political Bureau of the
Communist PaEtyof Great Britain 4-5 October 1932.Communist Archive. Certain minor
successeswere achievedduring the 1932dispute.The Solidarity Movement that took
over from the MM establishedbroadercontactswith the local workers; a number of new
Party Locals emergedduring the dispute; the Communist news-sheet,Cotton Strike
Leade achieveda circulation ofjust under 1,000;and the CP led Strike Relief
Committee succeededin getting resolutions adoptedby the County Conferenceof
striking workers held in Burnley on 7 September.
102Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 20 August
1932.Communist Archive. For Pollitt, Lancashirewas "a typical example of the Party
lagging behind" the workers.

265

The Communist Party, although it has won increasedinfluence in the factories and the
trade unions, has not yet found the way to develop the militancy of the workers into an
organisedrevolutionary trade union opposition, firmly basedon the factories, and able to
develop the independentleadershipand organisationof the economic struggles.103

Problems of Definition
As well as producing variable results, the January Resolutions caused a
number of internal difficulties for the CPGB. The muted response of a
has
been
but
Party
to
above,
referred
such passivity
members
number of
infiltrated as far as the Party Executive. Of the 81 leading communists who
had attended the January meetings, only thirteen were trade union
members, and only six bothered to reply to the Secretariats' circular in
March requesting details of Party work. 104

Meanwhile, the overhaul of the Party apparatushad left Pollitt and Rust
leadership.
The apparent
burden
the
the
central
co-ordinating
of
with
lethargy of his comrades,becamea constantsourceof irritation for the
General Secretary.In March, Pollitt describedto Jimmy Shields the
"steadydaily grind" from "early morning to midnight" that madeup his
however,
105
In
life.
to
the
such
organisational
addition
problems
political
CPGB leadershipalso encountereddifficulties relating to the interpretation
of the Januaryline.

The actual meaningof the united front from below, and the extent to which
the slogan should be applied, was one such example.The London District
Party complained in Juneabout "confusion [over] the question of the ILP, "
as local ILP branchesapproachedthe CP to discussthe possibility ofjoint

103TheRoad to VictoKy. The Twelfth Congress of the Communist PgM

of Great Britain
(London, 1932).
104Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pqr!
y of Great Britain 10-11
October 1932. Communist Archive.

105Letterfrom Hara Pollitt to Jimmy Shields 10 March 1932. Klugmann Papers

266

campaigns against'hunger and war. '106In addition, this 'confusion'was

compoundedby the possibility of the ILP's disaffiliation from the Labour

Party.107

In June,the Party Executive describedthe 'united front' as,

[an] alliance (not organisational).It is the working of Communist Party memberswith all
other workers irrespective of political or organisationalassociation, for the realisation of
an immediate programme of action. It is not something that can achieve unity of the
divisions that exist in the working classmovement,but it is something that can strengthen
the workers daily struggle in the present situation. It does not mean an organisational
bloc; it does not mean coming together in a specific bloc of organisationssuch as the ILP
or the Labour Party; but it does mean that in the factories and the localities, ILP, Labour
Party etc. workers can come together to fight against the means test, wage cuts, for a7
hour day.108

As for the ILP itself, the CP resolved to expose its disaffiliation from the
Labour Party as a manoeuvre provoked by the increasingly militant rank
and file, but designed to prevent the workers crossing over to the
Communist Party. The CPGB insisted that while the ILP leadership uttered
'left phrases', its policy essentially remained the same as that of the Labour
Party. 109Indeed, so bitter were the denunciations of the ILP in the Daily
Worker, that at the Twelfth ECCI Plenum, Gusev (of the KPD) warned the
CPGB that such attacks were more likely to ward off potential recruits
than attract them. I 10Even so, the 'treacherous nature' of the ILP remained a
fundamental facet of the CPGB line - as demonstrated at the open debate

106SixMonths Work in the London District Cagying out the CC Resolution undated
1932.Klugmann Papers.
107TheILP finally voted to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in August 1932.
108Minutesof the Central Committeeof the Communist Paqy of Great Britain 4-5 June
1932.Communist Archive.
109See
The Road to Victo! y. The Twelfth Congressof the Communist Pgr1yof Great
Britain op. cit.
I IOSeeRobson'sreport on the Plenum to the PB. Minutes the Political Bureau the
of
of
Communist PaE!
y of Great Britain 4-5 October 1932.Communist Archive. See!)ALIY
Worker 20 July 1932 for an exampleof the Party'sattacks on the ILP leadership.

267

betweenHarryPollitt and FennerBrockway in April I H-while joint

action with ILP memberswas encouragedonly so long as'no compromise'
in
from
CPGB
the
the process.The united
over reformism was exacted
fTonthad to be on communist terms.112

It was the question of trade union work that most occupied the CPGB
leadershipin 1932.In London, the'Balharn Group' of left communists
launcheda number of attackson the Party line following the adoption of
the JanuaryResolutions.The main focus of criticism was the resolutions'
be
by
lower
trade
the
that
the
utilised
could
union
organs
assertion
Party;' 13and the group quotedboth Dutt and Losovsky to support their
"unsuited
be
to
that
trade
were
effective organsof class
unions
view
January
line
Resolutions,the secretariatand the
114
"
In
the
with
struggle.
London District Working Bureau dismissedthe group's criticisms as
'sectarian.' However, once it becameclear that certain membersof the
Trotskyists,
influence
American
Groves,
links
had
that
any
with
group
Sara,Wicks and Purkis wished to have on CPG13policy was curtailed. The
Party decreedin Junethat no ftirther articles by the group would be
began
Party
the
to
the
through
as
group's
criticism
press,
and
published
target the Party leadershipand the policy of the ECCI, three of its leading

III See,Which Way for the Workers? HLM Pollitt versusFenner Brockwgy (London,
1932).Pollitt remainedfiercely opposedto the ILP, and he belittled Brockway's 'feeble
performance'in a letter to Jimmy Shieldson 21 April 1932 (Klugmann Papers).While
keen to re-addressthe excessesof the Party'strade union policy, Pollitt remainedtotally
committed to classagainstclassvis a vis rival political parties (and indeed the trade union
bureaucracy).
112Roadto Victo1y. The Twelfth Congressof the Communist PaM of Great Britain op.
cit. The Congresscalled for ILP membersto join the CPGB and even answeredcriticisms
of the CPGB madeby the ILP rank and file. However, a united front from above was
categorically ruled out and the policy of the ILP condemned.
IDDaily Worke 14 April 1932. Seealso, R. Groves,The Balham Group op. cit. pp4552, for a discussionof the group and its links with Trotsky.
114Lefterto the Secretariat12 May 1932.Communist Archive. Printed in Daily Worke
27 May 1932.The Losovsky quote was edited out of the article, but Losovsky himself
wrote in defenceof the CPGB line in Daily Worke 10 June.

268

Wicks
Henry
Sara
duly
Groves,
Harry
Reg
and
were
membersexpelled.115

Jack Murphy was also expelled from the Party in 1932.Murphy, who had
in
CPGB,
fell
foul
the
been
character
of
maverick
of
a
something
always
the Party leadershipfollowing his suggestionthat the Party campaign for
be
built
in
for
Soviet
British
be
issued
USSR,
to
to
the
to
ships
and
credits
leadership
Party
line,
'
16
Such
the
the
reasoned,
of
a
rest
ship yards.
be
'integrated'
the
that
could
and
capitalist and socialist systems
suggested
that capitalism could actually help Soviet development.After a seriesof
debates,at which Murphy rarely appeared,he was expelled and
in
'
17
Party
denounced
the
press.
systematically

One interesting sideline of the dispute however, was the contrastbetween

Harry Pollitt's attitude to Murphy and his attitude to the 'right deviationists'
likes
defended
Inkpin
Rothstein,
had
he
Pollitt
the
Where
1929.
of
and
of
had
been
Murphy.
The
two
men
never
close,
wastedno such effort on
despitetheir being'founding fathers' of the CPGB, and in late 1923Pollitt
had only just refrained himself from hitting Murphy at an EC meeting.' 18
With Murphy's fall into disfavour in 1932,Pollitt describedhim as a
"coward" and a "renegadeof the first rank."' 19
115R. Groves,The Balharn Group op. cit. pp69-71. The Balham Group was thus
'liquidated'with individual membersbeing invited to re-apply for membership.Hugo
Dewar, a Tooting communistwho had links with the Balharn Group, was also expelled.
For Henry SaraseeA. J.P. Taylor, A PersonalHistory (Great Britain, 1983).pp54-55 and
72-77.
116ForMurphy's argument,seeMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PLM
of Great Britain 5 March 1932.Communist Archive. Communist Review April 1932.
Also, Minutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist PgjY of Great Britain 7 May
1932. CommunistArchive.
11717or
example,Daily Worke 10 May, 1932.Communist Review June 1932.
118K.Morgan, HagyPolli op. cit. p42.
119Letterfrom Pollitt to Jimmy Shields II May 1932.Klugmann Papers."Every time
detectiveswere outside his office" Pollitt revealed, "he [Murphy] would always come and
ask if we should not go underground,and before he went to Sheffield it go so bad that we

269

More damagingto the Party leadershipwas the disagreementthat emerged

in the wake of Harry Pollitt's attempt to instigate a "slight turn" in the
Party'strade union work. 120As noted above,the example of the Members'
Rights Movement in the AEU, and the CPs evident ineffectiveness,had
convinced Pollitt of the needto emphasisethe necessityof communist
for
in
Daily
Worker
Moreover,
the
in
the
trade
an
article
unions.
agitation
branches'
into
'drive
the
Pollitt'insisted
July,
29
that
could
union
a
on
effect the policy of the TUC; a position that contrastedclearly with the
idea that the trade unions were an entrenchedpart of the capitalist state
121
in
instrument
the
longer
struggle.
class
an effective
and thus no

PollitVs main intention was to refute any suggestionthat the Party pursued
for
Cotton
Strike
122
In
the
trade
an
editorial
written
poliCy.
union
an anti
Leade he insistedthat "we carry forward the fight inside the unions so
,
leaders,
by
hands
the
the
them
and
of
present
take
of
out
that we can
in
local
the
to
workers
all
positions
sincere
and
reliable
electing militant,
in
daily
instruments
into
them
weapons
our
strong
and
transform
union,
trade
123
In
that
"
union opposition
a
revolutionary
suggesting
struggles.
branches,
District
"strengthening
the
be
without
could not achieved
Committeesand everything which has to be had with the workers struggle

had to tell him to work away from his office ... [and he] never took ajump that meantno
in
how
Murphy
it.
"
Pollitt
to
wages
the
go
without
refused
also,
recalled
end of
money at
1928despitethe fact that the rest of the Party leadershipwere obliged to. Minutes of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Pgrty of Great Britain 8 May 1932.Communist
Archive.
120Pollittdescribedhis policy as a'sligbt turn! at the PB in October. Minutes of the
Political Bureau of the Communist PaM of Great Britain 10-11 October 1932.
CommunistArchive.
121DailyWorke 19 July 1932. "We must clear our minds of the belief that nothing can
be done inside the trade unions, that the leadersare taking no notice of rank and file
demands."
122Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist P4rly of Great Britain 17 September
1932.Communist Archive.
123CottonStrike Leader September1932.Klugmann Papers.

270

in the trade unions,"124Pollitt raised further issuesthat potentially diverged

from the Comintern line. Could the unions becomeorgansof classstruggle
leadership?
file
How
the
the
the
policy
of
union
effect
rank and
and could
how
the
the
the
control
of
capitalist
under
state
and
apparatus
was
much of
local
Were
the
officials socialactually'win'?
communists
could
much
fascistsor potential allies?125

To Pollitt's surprise,his remarks in July initially went unchallenged,but

his subsequentarticles in the Daily Worker, Communist Review, and the
Cotton Strike Leader,provoked a reply from Palme Dutt. Pollitt's articles
be
impression
trade
Dutt,
that
the
the
unions
could
existing
gave
warned
developedinto organsof classstruggle, and that statementsalluding to
'powerful united trade unionism' negatedthe Party's opposition to the
126
by
'interview'
Dutt
was
also
appalled
an
with
apparatus.
existing union
the MM secretaryWilliam Allan, in which Allan called the 1932TUC
'magnificent
display
in
the
workers
cotton
a
of
of
resolution support
had
been
by
'interview'
William
Rust,
fact,
'In
the
composed
solidarity.
Johnny Campbell and William Gallacher,127but such statements
'uneven
'strengthening
Dutt
talk
general'
with
and
of
along
complained
line.
"our
"128
trade
union
of
whole
a
reversal
unions'- suggested

124Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist PajU of Great Britain 10-11
October 1932.Communist Archive.

125For
the lastquestionseeDaily Worke 30 August1932whereTom Wintringham
discussed
theclasspositionof the'pettybourgeois'unionofficial, andthe needto 'win'
thesebranchsecretaries
etc.For an opposingview seeG. Grahamin Daily Worke 7
1932.
September
12617or
HarryPollitVsviews,seeDaily Worke 20 August1932andCommunistReview
1932.For Dutt, seeDaily Worke 19September
1932.
September
127Minutes
of the PoliticalBureauof theCommunistPartyof GreatBritain 17September
1932. Communist

Archive.

128For
theAllan interviewseeDaily Worke 8 September1932.For Dutt'scriticismsee
1932.
Daily Worke 14September
271

While the debateraged in the Daily Worker, it positively exploded in

had
be
One
Willie
PB.
to
the
even
meeting
adjourned
as
of
meetings
Gallacher and Johnny Campbell disagreedangrily over the extent to which
129
following
William
Rust,
Dutt's
lead,
be'won'!
branch
could
a union
line,
he
Party
'falsifying'
Pollitt
the
that
and
was supported
was
contended
by Tapsell and Campbell in insisting that the Party pursuea policy distinct
from the trade union apparatus.130Pollitt's emphasison trade union work
'encouraged
the
belief
that
the
the
unions
strengthen
could
communists
and
'131
Rust.
said
opportunism,

The most vocal supporterof Pollitt was William Gallacher. Gallacher, who
described
Dutt's
Pollitt,
Dutt
Rust
against
of
plotting
and
accused
"132
definite
"a
trade
and mobilised
anti
union
poliCy,
very
argumentsas
133
Scottish
District
Party.
Pollitt
for
Pollitt
the
through
was also
support
backedby the MM secretaryWilliam Allan, who felt Dutt's approach
129Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 17 September
1932.CommunistArchive.
DOThemain argumentstook place at the P13meetingson 17 September,4-5 October and
10-11 October. Tapsell insisted that the "trade union branch is a necessarypart of the
is
[by]
[and]
the
the
always
gripped
control
apparatus
trade union apparatus...
...
Campbell
October,
1932)
Johnny
4-5
it.
(Minutes,
"
maintained that
through
exercises
"you have to have a struggle independentof the union apparatus"(Minutes 10-11
October, 1932), and agreedthat the branch was intrinsically linked to the apparatus
(Minutes 17 September,1932). In the Daily Worke 15 September1932, Campbell also
denied the possibility of forcing the trade union bureaucracy'into actiotf, and he
in
TUC
the
Rust's
the
that
resolution
support of the cotton
passed
sununation
supported
(Minutes
1932).
10-11
October,
the
to
strike
of
workers as a manoeuvre gain control
This castsdoubt on Nina Fishmatfs theory that Pollitt and Campbell worked closely
together to changethe Party'strade union policy (seeN. Fishman The British Communist
Larty op. cit. pp5-6). While the two men were both membersof the secretariatand were
in
See
P13
line
Party
did
the
the
they
also,
either
or
press.
not
present
a
coherent
close,
Campbell in Daily Worke 8 November 1932.
13IMinutes of the Political Bureau of the Communist Pq!jy of Great Britain 10 October
1932.Communist Archive. Rust believed that the TUC's support of the cotton workers
was a 'manoeuvre'to win the leadershipof the strike from the workers in order to betray
it.
132Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Parjy of Great Britain 17 September
1932.Communist Archive.
133TheScottish Party passeda resolution condemningRust and Dutt's estimation of the
trade union bureaucracyin October. SeeResolution of the Scottish District Pally
Committee 6 October 1932.Klugmann Papers.

272

"hampered"the workers struggle. To claim that the unions were "devoted

to capitalism" Allan reasoned,would only discouragethe workers.134
The eventual resolution presented to the Twelfth Party Congress
line
January
in
Resolution
the
the
terms of the
endorsed
of
effectively
Party's'aims and objectives. The Party was to "participate in every phase of
trade union activity, and aim at the winning of all elective posts and
representative positions in factory and trade union activity. " As such, trade
union work was a "logical, vital and integral part of our mass work ... and
the object is the winning of trade unionists and lower organs for the line of
independent leadership and struggle. "135Certain more 'thorny' issues were
dropped, such as the ability of the rank and file to influence the TUC, and
the possibility of 'strengthening' the trade unions; while the emphasis was
placed on winning trade unionists, rather than the trade unions per se.
Moreover, the line was linked back to the Leeds Congress - despite
Pollitt's assertion that the Eleventh Congress resolution now made him
136
Rust
desire
Dutt's
for
"Vomit"
thus
to
appeasing
and
continuity.
want
However, Pollitt and Gallacher had succeeded in emphasising both the
central importance of trade union work and the significance of the workers'
rank and file movements. Indeed, this "modus vivendi, " as Kevin Morgan

134Minutesof the Political Bureauof the CommunistPagy of Great Britain 17 September

1932.Communist Archive. Daily Worke 19 September1932.Pollitt was also supported
by R.W. Robson,Jimmy Shieldsand Idris Cox, and severallocal communistswrote in
support of the more optimistic trade union line. The Tyneside District Party however,
supportedDutt.
135SeeDaily Worker 18 October 1932,and The Road to Victojy. The Twelfth Congress
of the Communist Party of Great Britain op. cit. At the JuneCC, the Party had resolved to
"win every position we possibly can in the union branches,every contact we can, and to
take into the trade union branchesnot merely ourselves,but massesof workers who we
have influenced, in order that theseunion branchescan becomepowerful allies in the
independentstruggle of the working class." Minutes of the Central Committee of the
Communist PLrjy of Great Britain 4-5 June 1932.Communist Archive. Also seeParty
OrganiserJune 1932.
136Minutesof the Political Bureau of the Communist Pg!
y of Great Britain 10-11
October 1932.Communist Archive.

273

describesthe congressresolution,137was evident in both Dutt and Pollitt's

Worker.
138
for
Daily
the
articles
congress
pre

The Twelfth Congresswas the last to be held before the significant

overhaul of Comintern policy in 1933-35 towards the Popular Front. In
its
in
Line
New
the
the
expressed
most workable
saw
ways
congress
many
form. The Party finally jettisoned the sectarianvestigesof the policy, and
front
united
a
viable
of the working
about
constructing
simultaneouslyset
class'from below.' This entailed an emphasison work within the trade
for
joint
it,
the
call
action with the
union movementas well as outside and
issues
(and
Party)
file
ILP
Labour
the
the
on
relevant to
even
of
rank and
the struggle of the workers.

Although such policies had beenpossible(potentially) since the adoption

difficulties
interpretation,
in
1928,
Line
New
the
numerous
the
of
and
of
the various realignmentsof the ECCI vis a vis the'right danger, had
its
And
Third
hampered
the
the
application.
while
problems
of
constantly
Period should neither be exaggeratednor underestimated,the
in
1932,
Party
the
and the more politically charged
reorganisationof
climate of 1931-32, enabledthe Party to re-establishitself amongsta
wider section of the working class.

137K.Morgan, HqMLPollitt op. cit. p80.

13817or
Pollitt, seeDaily Worke 7 November 1932.Pollitt admitted making'unclear
formulations', the main criticism of Dutt. For Dutt see,Daily Worker 12 November 1932.
Dutt emphasisedclearly the necessityand possibilities of trade union work. The outcome
of the ECCI Plenum, held in August-September,had given credenceto Pollitts more prounion agenda.Pollitt quoted liberally from the Plenum speechesof Kuusinen and
Piatnitsky at the Party Congress.The Plenumhad underlined the need for a communist
presencein the unions, including the utilisation of trade union branchesand councils,
while Losovsky withdrew his description of unions as 'schoolsof capitalism.'

274

Crucially, the CPGB was advancingat the end of the Third Period.
Membership figures had returnedto their pre GeneralStrike level, the
shacklesof the MM had finally beenabandonedin favour of rank and file
developing
inside
the establishedtrade unions, and the
movements
NUWM was the undisputedleaderof the unemployed.Moreover, in the
fledgling anti-war campaignsinstigatedby the Party, the beginningsof the
development
As
front
the
such,
of the
evident.
were clearly
anti-fascist
CPGB throughout 1931-32 ebbedand flowed in conjunction with the
wider political developmentsin Britain and its labour movement.And
although the Third Period had brought the Party to the brink of collapse,
the CPGB had stubbornly refusedto disappear.

Conclusions
The political-economic of crisis of 1931gave new life to the CPGB. The
heightenedpolitical climate and the successfulmobilisation of the
CPGB
NUWM,
heart
by
the
the
the
placed
at
of events.
unemployed
Furthermore,the sustainedcampaignsof the unemployed movement
dominant
influence
jobless
Party's
the
the
among
acutely revealed
workers. As such,the shift of communistpractice referred to throughout
this thesiswas clearly apparent.While the Party remainedon the periphery
irrelevant
'industrial
to Britain's parliamentarypolitics,
the
and
of
struggle'
in local communities and aroundthe dole queues,communistswere
fore.
to
the
regularly

Within the Party itself, the organisationaloverhaul of January 1932,and

the adoption of a broaderinterpretation of the united from below, the
CPGB successfullysteadiedits precariousexistence.Although difficulties
and disagreementsremained,the emergenceof Harry Pollitt as the
undisputedleaderof the CPGB allowed a more focusedpolitical strategy
275

to develop. Additionally, the CPs concentrationon both the 'grassroots' of

the Party and the workers struggle placed communist agitation more firmly
within the reality of 1930sBritain. Communistsonce again allied
themselveswith militant workers in the factories and the unions. In
addition, the exposureof 'left sectarianism'restricted but did not remove
its negative influence.

Crucially however, the policy detailed in the Januaryresolutions remained

firmly rooted to the conceptsof classagainstclass.Both the ECCI and
British leaderssuch as Pollitt, Gallacherand Allan, varied the emphasisof
the New Line. The focus on independentleadershipwas substitutedfor
support in favour of the 'day to day' demandsof the workers. The offensive
by
'right'
the
was
replaced
exposureand condemnationof 'left
against
factors
included
All
in
'
these
the resolutions of the
were
sectarianism.
Tenth ECCI Plenum, it was their expressionand their primacy that was
transformedthroughout the Third Period.

From 1933,the focus of the ECCI becamecentredincreasingupon the rise

of fascismand encroachingwar. Although not officially abandoneduntil
the SeventhWorld Congressof the Comintern in 1935,the New Line was
effectively adaptedto the temper and political-economic paradigm of the
mid 1930s.Similarly, the arrestof the economicdepressionpresentednew
structural transformations.Such developmentsonce again altered the
'spaces'in which the CPGB were able and endeavouredto act, and a new
chapterof the Party's history was opened.

276

Conclusion
The Third Period Reassessed

The six yearsbetween 1927and 1932were difficult and traumatic onesfor

I
the CPGB. The Party's slow but steadygrowth from 1920 to 1926cameto
an abrupt end following the collapseof the miners' lock-out, and as links
betweenthe CPGB and the wider labour movementwere severed. Unemploymentravagedthe Party membership.In addition, the militant
line pursuedby the communist movement,particularly in 1928-30 induced
divisions within the CPGB that exacerbatedproblems already afflicting the
Party.

As a consequenceof such turmoil, methodsof Party work were necessarily

focus
Moreover,
the
of communist activity shifted to correspond
revised.
location
the
time,
the
the
environment
of
and
social-structural
with
of the
CP rank and file. Thus, militant miners becamemilitant unemployed
had
activists
who
worked inside the trade unions
workers, communist
becameconcernedpredominantly with the CPGB (and NUWM) and
'critical support' of a Labour opposition becamecondemnationof a Labour
Government.

Most importantly, the fortunes of the CPGB must be consideredwithin the

general social, political and economic framework of 1926-32. Four interrelating factors were central to the Party'sexperience;first, the structural
changesand deepeningeconomic crisis afflicting Great Britain throughout
the 1920s-30s;second,the defensiveand subsequentlymoderateposition
of the British labour movement;third, the increasingdisparity betweenthe
communist and labour-socialistperspective;fourth, those conditions
inherent within Britain's political composition antithetical to the
277

Within
CPGB
the
such
of
militant
policy.
a
context,
was
advancement
forced to realign both its policy and its perspective,a transition that proved
incapacitating.
temporarily
painful and

The CPGB'smembershipof the Communist International was also

fundamentalto the Party's political perspective.The infamous 21
decisions
Comintern,
bound
CPGB
CI
the
the
to
the
the
of
conditions of
CI
the
the
were subsequentlyexpressedthrough the
of
objectives
and
British Party. This was particularly evident between 1928-29, as the
Comintern conductedan offensive againstthe'right danger'throughout the
New
Line.
imposed
the
the
theoretical
of
orthodoxy
and
movement,
However, as Kevin McDermott has recently suggestedin relation to the
CI's programmeof Bolshevisation,the statedaims of the Comintern were
1
interpretation.
With
New
Line
to
the
diverse
to
this
regard
open
and
often
'tasks
detailed
Party'
The
the
the
of
at
various
numerous
so.
was equally
Disparities
between
relatively
remained
varied.
congresses
plenums and
ECCI, RILU and CPGB policies were evident, and once the'right danger'
had beendefeatedin 1929,a political pragmatismcharacterisedthe
directives of the International Executive.

The pressureplaced upon the British Party by the ECCI between 1927 and
1929should not suggesthowever, that the formulations and objectives of
the New Line contrastedwith those of the CPGB. The CP's approachto
the Labour Party and trade union bureaucracyhad hardenednoticeably in
the wake of the GeneralStrike. Restrictionsplaced on communist
influence within the 'official' labour movementpreoccupiedthe Party

I K. McDermott, 'Boishevisation'From Above'or'From Below'. The Comintern and

EuropeanCommunismin the 1920s.'In T. Saarelaand K. Rentola, CommunismNational
and International (Finland, 1998).p 112.

278

Executive'sdiscussionsof 1927-8. In addition, the notions of class against

classwere welcomed by a significant minority of the Party leadership,and
large sectionsof the rank and file. The divisions that ravagedthe British
Party must therefore be seenas a culmination of indigenousand external
forces.

And yet, the Third Period also included an increasein Party membership,
the extensionof the communist led NUWM, and the onset of a distinct
CPGB.
The
the
ability to organisethe
culture
centred
around
political
CPGB's
late
the
the
success
of
principal
was
undoubtedly
unemployed
1920s,early 30s. The movementhad begun as the embodimentof a united
front from below in 1921, and although many of the methodsemployedby
Hannington,McShaneand Elias were criticised by the CPGB and the
Comintern, the NLJWM exemplified the 'independentleadership'endorsed
in the New Line. Ironically however, the CPGB placed more emphasison
the working class,and the NUWM never received the acclaim it deserved.

The cultural initiatives of the CPGB demonstratedcommunist zeal and

level.
local
Workers'
at
a
sport and theatre groups
enthusiasm,albeit
exposedthe CP to broad sectionsof the working class,and the formation
of campaignssuch as the TottenhamWorkers' SportsAssociation and the
Ramblers'Rights Movement benefitedmany outside the parametersof the
CPGB. Similarly, the Party's commitment to educationperpetuatedthe
labour
traditions
the
scholarly
century
noble
of
nineteenth
movement.

Altogether, the years of class againstclasswere onesof transition for the

CPGB. The foundationsof the British labour movementwere shifting and
the Party was forced to adapt itself accordingly. Subsequently,although
the Third Period has come to representa'low' in the Party's development,
279

the eventsand traumasof 1926-32 were integral to the CPGB's future

development.That the Party survived at all was testamentto the
committed men and women who gave themselvesso selflessly to 'the
cause.' It is to them that this thesis is dedicated.

280

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