Professional Documents
Culture Documents
vs
Executive
Secretary
EDCA is In the Form of an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate Concurrence (Saguisag vs Exec Secretary,
2016)
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US
may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed
upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through
Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from
general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as
citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the
Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the
disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has
been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its
incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify setting
aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself,
particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is
behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a
public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise
its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the
requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such
and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of
the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec
25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of the foreign
troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. The
EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of
Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
ANSWER:
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are
DECLARED
not
in
accordance
with
the
VFA.
VFA
is
Constitutional
The SC ruled that the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States, and the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does not detract
from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by
the
other
contracting
State.
The issue, the Court said, is whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the
VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State. It is, the Court ruled. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military
exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the Court held. visit
fellester.blogspot.com The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence
of
both
the
Philippine
Senate
and
the
United
States
Senate.
Romulo-Kenney
Agreements
not
in
accord
with
the
VFA
itself
The Court however ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements
on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such
detention is not by Philippine authorities. Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides that the confinement or detention
by Philippine authorities of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippines and United States authorities. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888,
February
11,
2009)
DISSENTING
OPINION
In his dissent, Chief Justice Puno maintained his view in the earlier case of Bayan v. Zamora that the VFA falls short of
the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, which provides that the agreement allowing the presence
of foreign military troops in the Philippines must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. For the Chief
Justice, the majority of the Court in Bayan v. Zamora gave undue deference to the statement of former US Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard that US Senate advice and consent was not needed to consider a treaty binding on the US, then
jumped to the conclusion that the US recognized the VFA as a treaty, and that the constitutional requirements had been
satisfied. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which
is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,
and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form
of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of
time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose
behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All
they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do
not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to
as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more
formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes
or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are
not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover
such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil
aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of
trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts;
while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.
Facts:-the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a Chinaman, residing in
Ilagan, Isabela and in Sta. Cruz, Manila.-it was alleged in the complaint that in December 1963, a number of NBI
agents searched an office on O' Donnel St. in Sta. Cruz, which was believed to be theheadquarters of a guerilla unit of
the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and among those arrested was Go Tek.- Go Tek was
an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.- Also, as further alleged, there
were several fake dollars found in his possession and that he had violated Art. 168 of the RPC and rendered himself
anundesirable alien.-The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the
Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirablealien, and that "his presence in this country having
been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community".-Go Tek filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him in the city
fiscal's office of Manila for violation of Article 168.He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view
of the obiter dictum in
Qua Chee Gan
that the boardmay deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.-The Board, in its resolution of April 21, 1964
denied Go Tek's motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State myexercise its
rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report
and recommendation to thePresident in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation
proceeding.-Go Tek filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the Board.
- CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek, citing the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan, stating that mere possession of fake dollars is
not a ground for deportation under theImmigration Law; and that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be
deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a termof one year or more for a crime involving
moral turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168,the
deportation was premature.-The Board appealed to the SC alleging that the decision was contrary to law.-The parties
stipulated that the Deportation Board is an agency of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of
undesirable aliens and toreport and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein.Issue: Whether the
President has the power to deport undesirable aliens?Ruling: Yes.The President's power to deport aliens and the
investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:SEC. 69.
Deportation of subject of foreign power.
A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deportedexpelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator,conducted by said
Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the
personconcerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three
days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examinethe opposing witnesses.On the other hand, section 37 of the
Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specifiedin section 37.So, under
existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected(1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration
upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law.The State has the
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens .That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems
such action necessaryfor the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation". According to Justice Johnson, that
when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continuedin the country is injurious to the public interest, he
may, even in the absence of express law, deport them. The right of a country to expel or deport aliensbecause their
continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified .The Deportation Board is composed
of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the solicitor General, and a representative of the Secretary of
NationalDefense (Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).Section 69 and Executive Order No.
398 provides that, the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation. Paragraph (a) of Executive
Order No. 398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board,
motu proprio
or upon complaint of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable
alien or not,and thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien.As observed
by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the
intention of the law is to grantthe Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the
country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts
upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final andexecutory."The
reasons may be summed up in a single word: the public interest. Also, It is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case.
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on
press freedom.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect
point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)