CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

PROJECT REPORT OF 5th SEMESTER 2015

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

TOPIC- NATO

GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS BYMRS. SUGANDHA SINHA

SUBMITTED BY
SONAKSHI
ROLL NO.-1054
BBALLB

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is my privilege to record my deep sense to perform gratitude to those who helped me in

completion of this project. In making of this project many people helped me immensely directly
or indirectly. I sincerely acknowledge the help rendered to me by our faculty Mrs. Sugandha
Sinha who had given me an idea and encouragement in making this project. I also acknowledge
the help of library staff and my friends for being cordial in order to make conducive
environment of the CNLU Hostel.

Sonakshi
ROLL NO. 1054

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INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 6
NATOS CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION...................................................................... 7
Demonstrable need: the case to intervene .............................................................................. 7
Regional support .................................................................................................................... 9
Clear legal basis to intervene ............................................................................................... 10
KOSOVO AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ........................................................ 12
Legal Difficulties on NATOs way...................................................................................... 12
Reviving the notion of Humanitarian Intervention ........................................................... 16
NATO: CHARTING THE WAY FORWARD ................................................................... 18
What Challenges Do the NATO Members Face? ................................................................ 18
Top Priorities ................................................................................................................... 20
1.

Attacks on allies ................................................................................................. 20

2.

Crises emanating from failed and failing states ................................................. 22

3.

Terrorism............................................................................................................ 23

4.

WMD and missile proliferation ......................................................................... 23

What Functions Are Needed to Address These Diverse Challenges? ................................ 24

Deterrence And Reassurance ........................................................................................... 24
Public Diplomacy............................................................................................................. 26
What NATO Brings to the Table ......................................................................................... 26
Common Values............................................................................................................... 27
Political Legitimacy ......................................................................................................... 27
Military Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 27
Command And Control .................................................................................................... 27
Intelligence And Information Sharing ............................................................................. 28
Joint Operations And Interoperability ............................................................................. 28
What Are NATOs Limitations? .......................................................................................... 28
The Need For Non-Military Solutions ............................................................................. 28
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Diverging Political Will And Different Security Priorities ............................................. 29

Declining Defence Spending ........................................................................................... 30
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 32
BiBliography ............................................................................................................................ 33

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of the topic NATO through books,
suggestions and different writings. The aim has been to come to a conclusion very much
indigenous.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS:

Though the topic NATO is an immense project and pages can be written over the topic but
because of certain restrictions and limitations we might not have dealt with the topic in great
detail.

SOURCES OF DATA:

The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project1. Books
2. Internet
METHOD OF WRITING AND MODE OF CITATION:

The method of writing followed in the course of this research paper is primarily analytical. The
researcher has followed Uniform method of citation throughout the course of this research
paper.

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INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is based on the North Atlantic Treaty that
was signed on 4 April 1949 by twelve nations. Fundamentally, it was a defense pact, meaning
that an attack to one of the members would be considered an attack to all. In 1952 Greece and
Turkey joined. West Germany followed in 1955.When the Soviet Union suggested in 1954
that it should join NATO USA and UK refused.1 Soviet Unions response was the formation
of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955. It consisted of the Soviet Union and seven other nations.
The Warsaw Pact effectively divided the world into two opposing forces. NATO was never
involved in a military engagement during most of the Cold War. It stood as a countermeasure
against the Warsaw Pact.
The Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991 and NATOs military engagements began. Bosnia was
bombarded by NATO forces as a response to the Bosnian War2, and soon after Implementation
Force (IFOR)3 was established. It was followed by Stabilization Force (SFOR)7. In an attempt
to help Kosovo in 1999, NATO bombarded Yugoslavian forces.4 The bombing led to the
Yugoslavian forces withdrawal from Kosovo, and the subsequent implementation of the
Kosovo force (KFOR).5 However, that act was criticized due the number of civilian casualties.
Human Rights Watch estimates to be around 500 civilian casualties, while some sources stating
numbers as high as 5700.6 This operation is also the first NATO has done without having the
approval of United Nations.
The article 5 of NATO Charter was invoked for the first time with the terrorist attack against
USA on 11 September 2001, which stated that an attack to one of the members would be
considered an attack to all. United Nations Security Council passed the resolution witch
authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to engage in the ongoing War
in Afghanistan.7 The other ongoing operations of NATO are the training mission in Iraq, and
that is helping the interim government with local security;8 Protection of ships in Gulf of Aden
from Somali pirates, known as Operation Ocean Shield;9 and the present intervention in Libya.

Fast facts about NATO. (2009, April 6). Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/04/03/f-natofast-facts.html.
2
Bethlehem, Daniel L.; Weller, Marc (1997).The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law.Cambridge International
Documents Series.5. Cambridge University Press.p. liiv. ISBN 9780521463041.
3
Operation Joint Endeavour. (1996, December 20). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.html.
4
Tulak, A.N. (1999, March 15). Physical attack information operations in Bosnia: Counterinformation in a peace
enforcement environment. Retrieved from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tulak.html.
5
Bonnn, Preben (2003). Towards a common European security and defense policy: the ways and means of
making it a reality. LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Mnster. p. 18
6
NATO's
role
in
Kosovo.
(2011,
October18).
Retrieved
from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm
7
Crisis in Kosovo. ( n.d. ). Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.html.
8
Resolution 1386. (2001, December 20). Retrieved from http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386(2001).pdf
9
Status of coalition forces in Iraq.
(2007, February 21). Retrieved
from
http://web.archive.org/web/20070223060807/http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/iraq_coal
ition_glance
13
OperationOceanShieldcurrentnews.
(n.d.).
Retrieved
from
http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx

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NATOS CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION

Does NATO have standard criteria to decide whether to intervene in a humanitarian crisis
situation in a sovereign country? Of course, the nal decision will always be a matter of
consensus among the 28 member nations, but that consensus must be built upon safe grounds
of coherent policy and moral standards. The answer to that question cannot be found in any of
NATOs documents, but recently NATO ofcials have referred to the criteria, or the
conditions that must be satised to allow for an intervention. It all started with Operation
Unied Protector in Libya in 2011 under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1973
of 17 March 2011. This is the rst mandate ever by the Security Council for a military
intervention based on the Responsibility to protect or R2P doctrine.
During the internal NATO debates preceding the operation, the long shadow of the Iraqi war
was always present, and there was a fear of precipitation. The United Kingdom led the debate
and presented a set of three conditions to be met prior to authorizing the humanitarian
intervention in Libya. These conditions were demonstrable need, regional support and a
clear legal basis10. Since Ambassador Mariot Leslie, the Permanent Representative to the
North Atlantic Council at the time, was the one who presented them to the NAC, they are now
commonly referred as the Leslie criteria. Since then, there has been a shared understanding
that these are NATOs standard criteria for intervention.
The rst conclusion is evident: these criteria are very different from the ones used for the
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. Then, the lack of any legal basis
triggered some international criticism of the operation. Actually, the Leslie criteria have some
precedent in the Blair Doctrine laid out by Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech in Chicago
on 22 April 1999.11
The analysis of these three criteria in light of the Just War and R2P doctrines can help us
evaluate their suitability to better inform the decision making process of our leaders in general,
and of NATO in particular. Throughout this analysis, the comparison between the Kosovo and
Libya cases recurs in order to better illustrate the study and to help us to raise some
considerations in relation to Syrias current crisis.
DEMONSTRABLE NEED: THE CASE TO INTERVENE
The key prerequisite is, of course, an obvious case, a demonstrable need to intervene. It is
common understanding that a ruthless violation of human rights must be occurring or will occur
imminently. The right to intervene in such circumstances is considered an exception to the
universal principle of territorial sovereignty (Art. 2(4), 2(7) of the UN Charter), even if the only
formal exceptions to it are self-defense (Art. 51) and Security Council enforcement for the
10

Statement of the UK Prime Minister to the House of Commons on 18 March 2011. And repeated on a substantive
motion on 21 March, two days after the RAF had become involved in the military action. See Hansard, HC Vol,
525, Col. 700, 21 March 2011 (David Cameron MP).
11
See Chris Abbott. Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention Global Dialogue
7. 1/2, winter 2005.

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restoration or maintenance of international security and peace (Chapter VII). Humanitarian

intervention is an old just cause to wage war already contained in the Just War spirit, and its
at the core of the modern Responsibility to protect doctrine of the UN. The main obstacle to
applying this criterion is identifying where the threshold of an unbearable violation of human
rights is in order to justify the exceptional measure of intervening against the will of the affected
country. There is no clear answer to this, but a good rule of thumb is the minimalist denition
of fundamental human rights proposed by Pavel Barsa12 (following Michael Walzer in this
regard), i.e. only massacres, ethnic cleansings and forced labour.
The humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999 was considered by NATO members to have gone
well beyond the threshold, and the aerial campaign over Serbian targets started in spite of the
lack of authorization by the UN Security Council. There is little doubt about the illegality of
NATO decision but, at the same time, there is broad consensus that it was the right decision a legitimate one, a moral duty. And it was such because it complied with the Just War Tradition
precepts.
A retrospective application of the R2P doctrine to that intervention also afrms its correctness.
This doctrine, presented by the ICCIS13 to Ko Annan in December 2001, comprises three
specic responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to rebuild. All of them were exercised by
NATO. It also contains four principles: right intention, last resort, proportional means and
reasonable prospects. Again, in our opinion, NATO broadly respected those yet to be stated
principles. The only caveat some analysts offer up about the legitimacy of the operation is in
regard to the means employed during its execution: it is not clear if the high altitude bombing
posed an extra risk to the civil population14, which would have been an infringement of the
proportionality and discrimination principles of the ius in Bello.
The same conclusion can be reached about the Libya intervention; in our opinion, the
previously mentioned UN Security Council Resolution 1973 only added a plus of legality, but
NATO should have intervened without it - we will come back to this in the nal section. But
ironically, in spite of its extra legality, the Libya intervention has provoked much more
international criticism. If the operations nal phase was craped to effectively become a regime
change including support of the rebels, then the initial legitimacy of the operation was lost, not
only because regime change was not authorized by Resolution 1973 (therefore making the
execution of it illegal) but, mainly, because it was no longer a humanitarian intervention. In
other words the right intention principle would have been violated15. The aftermath of Libya
In Pavel Barsa, Waging War in the name of Human Rights? Fourteen Theses about Humanitarian
Intervention. Institute of International Relations, Prague. Perspectives: Summer 2005, p. 7.
13
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Prime
Minister of Canada during the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. R2P is fully explained in Abbot
(2005).
14
There are opposing opinions about this issue. See Hugh Beach Secessions, interventions and just war theory:
the case of Kosovo Pugwash Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 1, February 2000.
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/beach.html.
15
Besides, NATO has ofcially refuted these accusations, and some argue that it was not NATO but individual
states that deviated from the mandate. The article jointly published by US President Barak Obama, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron on 14 April 2011 does not help the
ofcial posture. There is also evidence that at least France, Qatar, Canada and Egypt supplied arms to the rebel
12

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has created the perception among many that NATO abused the international order and the
Security Council mandate; this is the main reason stated by Russia and China16 for vetoing any
resolution to intervene in Syria, and it will probably undermine the promising prospects of the
R2P doctrine in the Security Council for some time to come.
From the humanitarian perspective, the situation in Syria is very similar to the one in Libya
before the NATO intervention17. Nevertheless, according to NATO ofcials, there is no
intention or appetite to consider intervention for the time being. That brings to the table another
related issue that is not possible to address in the space of this brief, but is worthy of
mentioning: selectivity in humanitarian intervention affects the credibility.
The point to make here is that the international responsibility to avoid crimes against humanity
should no longer be a choice it should be a duty. The recourse to arguing a lack of national
interest or appetite reveals that we are still far away from a pure humanitarian ethic unmixed
with other political considerations. And that doesnt mean advocating for NATO to become
the police of the world: thats not its mission, it would be unrealistic, and it would generate
instability and conict.
REGIONAL SUPPORT
This second condition, having regional support, is very much related to the multilateral
approach to crisis management. But it is also a valid measure for some Just War principles in
regard to the probability of success and the responsibility to rebuild. Going back to
multilateralism, it is very often presented as a credential for legitimacy. The argument behind
it is that, when many democracies reach a consensus and join together to fight someone else, it
can only be because it is a just cause to use military force and to wage war. As considered by
Barsa (2005), international multilateral decision-making function(s) as a test for
universality, and he concludes, For this reason multilateralism is the most general answer
to the question of how we distinguish an imperialist conquest disguised as a humanitarian
intervention from a real humanitarian intervention.

forces. Unsurprisingly, some NATO and US ofcials have also mentioned regime change and rebels
support when asked about Libya during their lectures and briengs, according to the last NDC Field Study.
Finally, some try to justify the regime change by alleging intervention by invitation, but there is wide
consensus that that is not allowed in a civil war scenario.
16
Not only Russia and China, but South Africa, India, Brazil, and others have joined in the same criticism and in
feeling betrayed by the UK, US and France. See Geir Ulfstein and Fosund Hege The Legality of the NATO
bombing in Libya The International Comparative Law Quarterly 62.1 Jan 2013, p. 160 and ss.
Of course, Libya is not the only reason for Russia and China to oppose any resolution about Syria. They have
interest in maintaining the status quo in Syria, but now they have a good alibi to do so without further
explanations.
17
As reported by Ulfstein, At the end of April 2011 the revolt in Syria already displayed similar features to the
Libyan uprising at the time the Security Council decided to intervene militarily to protect the civilian population
there and by September 2012 the intensity of the conict had reached the legal threshold for a noninternational armed conict. Ibid, p. 170 It is important to stress that the situation in Syria is only similar to
Libya, as said, from the humanitarian perspective. It is understood that Syria is a more complex political
scenario, and many other factors affect the decision to intervene, as always.

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In our opinion, that is a very pragmatic but weak philosophical argument and, if accepted, it
would make useless any further debate about the legitimacy of the intervention vis--vis the
Just War principles. Therefore, we follow Walzers judgment in regard to this issue of
multilateralism. In his opinion, numbers do not matter when dealing with legitimacy - broad
support and consensus or even a UN decision cannot legitimate a wrong decision to go to war.
As he puts it, States dont lose their particularistic character merely by acting together.18
Finally, the concept of regional support is so vague that it can hardly serve as a discriminative
factor to qualify the legitimacy of an intervention. As an example, in the Libya crisis, regional
support was claimed even though the African Union opposed the intervention. So, which is the
region to be considered? Is it a geographical or an ideological region? It is true that the Arab
League did support it initially, but there are serious doubts about its support for the operational
development of the intervention; its Secretary General, Amr Moussa, deplored the bombing
campaign and declared What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-y
zone and then he underlined the authorization to protect civilians in Libya, but not to enforce
regime change19.
In conclusion, while regional support and multilateralism have some signicance as criteria for
intervention, great care should be taken not to overestimate the weight those factors have
relative to the more fundamental principles of the Just War Tradition.
CLEAR LEGAL BASIS TO INTERVENE
This nal criterion has already been addressed partially along with the legitimacy issue
discussed above. Nevertheless, it deserves a few more comments. The need for a clear legal
basis emerged strongly in the Libya intervention as a consequence of the asco of the invasion
of Iraq some years before. This time, the Allies struggled to obtain a clear mandate from the
UN Security Council; it was a must. But one could argue that once they had the green light,
Resolution 1973, it was interpreted and executed against its spirit and in obliviousness of the
noticeably restrictive atmosphere that characterized the preparatory debates in the Security
Council. That raises the question of whether a Security Council mandate is a binding document
or only a tick mark on the check list before ring.
In any case, the weight of the Security Council resolutions is relative. Taking into account the
Security Councils decit of democracy, its numerous cases of paralysis and its inability to
properly control its own mandates, its resolutions cannot be considered the blessing of
legitimacy. And legitimacy is what truly counts, not the formality of a legal document. Abbott
goes even further and alerts us: The problem is that its decision whether or not to intervene in

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War:. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Third Edition, Basic
Books, New York 1977. p. 10.
19
The Goal in Libya is not Regime Change, New York Times, March 30, 2011. And in
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-condemns-broad-bombing-campaigninlibya/2011/03/20/AB1pSg1_story.html
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a particular conict does not necessarily reect internationally agreed objective criteria and
legal norms, but the domestic and global imperatives of the ve permanent members.20
Therefore, it is dangerous to set this legal basis as a go-no go criterion for the future. In the
rst place, having a Security Council resolution is not unbiased proof of legitimacy; and even
worse, failing to obtain it could paralyze an intervention necessary to stop a human disaster.
Syria could be a sad example of this.
One possible solution to the threat of paralysis in the Security Council is to promote the
authority of the General Assembly, using the Uniting for Peace procedure that allows it to
recommend collective action and use of force. It was used, for example, in 1956 by the United
States when Egypt was attacked for nationalizing the Suez Canal.21
To be fair, we must acknowledge the unique relevance of the Security Council in international
security, especially in the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. And, in spite of its
deciencies, it is probably the best we can have to do the job. We are only trying to put it in
perspective vis--vis the Just War Tradition, because, as said before, both must be
complementary in the decision making process. The UN Charter is not enough. In Delahuntys
opinion, it is even worse than that: the Charters use of force rules thus erect a formidable
legal barrier to the protection of human rights and to the safety of populations at risk throughout
the globe.22
In summary, while it is very convenient to act under the umbrella of Security Council
resolutions, the lack of Security Council authorization should not be treated as a red line in
severe humanitarian crises.

KOSOVO AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

LEGAL DIFFICULTIES ON NATOS WAY

Abbott, Chris. Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention Global Dialogue 7.
1/2, Winter 2005, p. 5
21
For details about the Uniting for Peace procedure, see Abbott, Chris. Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma
of Humanitarian Intervention Global Dialogue 7. 1/2, winter 2005).
22
Delahunty, Robert J. and Yoo, John. From Just War to False Peace. Chicago Journal of International Law
13.1, Summer 2012, p. 37
20

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The main difficulty is that if NATO uses force without an authorization of the UN Security
Council, it breaches International Law as codified in the UN Charter. NATO actions in similar
(i.e. intrastate) conflicts can place the organisation outside legality. This question was given
extensive discussion on the occasion of NATOs war against the FRY, which denounced the
attack before the International Court of Justice.
The threat or use of force is governed under international law by the UN Charter. Article 2 (4)
reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The UN Charter provides only for two exceptions from this prohibition, embodied in Art. 51
and Art. 394, Art. 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
This Article constitutes the legal foundation of the Washington Treaty by which NATO was
founded, and serves as a basis for its Art. 5.
The second exception that allows for the use of force can be found under Article 42. It reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 415 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The sole competence of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security is laid down in Article 39:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Consequently, any threat or use of force that is neither justified as self-defense against an armed
attack nor authorised by the Security Council constitutes undeniably a breach of the UN
Charter.23

23

So far, Article 48 of the UN Charter constituted the legal foundation which enabled the Security Council to
entrust NATO with the enforcement of its mandates. It reads as follows: "(1) The action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. (2) Such decisions
shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members."

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Those paragraphs of the UN Charter referring to regional arrangements should be mentioned

as well. Although NATO has never applied for recognition as a regional agency dealing with
security issues in accordance with in Chapter VIII of the Charter7, these provisions would be
applicable by way of analogy.
While Art. 528 allows for the existence of regional arrangements, Article 53 explicitly forbids
military intervention by regional agencies without a Security Council mandate:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council.
It should be noted that Charter regulations prevail over any other treaty or agreement, as stated
in Article 103 of the Charter itself:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
In addition, the pre-eminence of Article 2(4) of the Charter over any other source of
international law is enshrined in Art. 30.24 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties, according to which the ban of force of Article 2(4) is part of ius cogens, i.e., it is
accepted and recognised by the international community as an unalterable norm.25 It is binding
on states both individually and as members of international organisations, as well as on
international organisations.
Moreover, one should note that all NATO members reiterated the obligations acquired under
the UN Charter at a regional level in the 1975 Helsinki Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.26 Even though it does not have legal consistence and is geographically
restricted to Europe, it includes some provisions repeating the above-mentioned principles:
Title II calls for refraining from the threat or use of force:
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations and with the present Declaration.

The NSC can be defined as the statement of the Alliance's objectives, setting out NATO's political and military
strategy. The predecessors to the documents approved in 1991 and in 1999 were classified documents providing
guidelines for military planning activities. See Cragg, Anthony: A new strategic concept for a new era, NATO
Review, 47(2), Summer 1999, p. 1.
25
The term ius cogens refers to a peremptory norm of general international law. It is defined as a norm accepted
and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. See Art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.
26
Predecessor of OSCE
24

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Title IV sets forth the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs:

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or
collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another
participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.
Finally, NATO members once again confirmed their commitment when they signed the
organisation's founding act, the Washington Treaty. Article 7 explicitly binds NATO countries
to act within the UN Charter:
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations.
Despite statements by US officials27, the conduct of operations such as the Kosovo intervention
are inconsistent with the text of the Washington Treaty. It runs counter to the Alliances
commitment to refrain from the use of force set forth in Art. 1 as well as to the responsibility
of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace recognised in Art. 7.
Moreover, the new task can be considered to contravene Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. Since
Art. 5 endorses the use of force only to repel an armed attack against a NATO member, a
negative reading of this paragraph excludes any use of force other than one aimed at selfdefense.
The question raised is: can interventions such as the one over Kosovo be possibly justified
under international law?
One should look at the justifications adduced by the organisation and the states concerned.
NATO governments, left with the responsibility of presenting the wars objectives to its
respective constituencies individually28, gave three legally relevant justifications for the
recourse to armed force:
First, they argued that the operation took place within the framework of UN Security Council
Resolutions. When Secretary-General Solana explained why NATO had issued the activation
order, he made explicit reference to UN Security Council Resolutions stating that the FRY had
not yet complied with the urgent demands of the International Community, despite UNSC
Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 followed by UNSC Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998,
US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott said: Some commentators contend that such adaptations require a
revision of the North Atlantic Treaty, or believe that we are proposing one. This is untrue. The framers of the
Washington Treaty were careful not to impose arbitrary functional or geographical limits on what the Alliance
could do to protect its security. However, as Simma recalls, no unanimity of NATO member states can do away
with the limits to which these states are subject under peremptory international law ( jus cogens ) outside the
organization, in particular the higher law (cf. Article 103) of the UN Charter on the threat or use of armed force.
NATO is allowed to do everything that is legally permissible, but no more. Legally, the Alliance has no greater
freedom than its member states. For both statements see: Simma 1999, Chapter 3, p. 2 and p. 6 respect
28
Some analysts have observed how the stated objectives narrowed in the course of the campaign. See Woodward,
Susan L.: Should we think before we leap?, Security Dialogue, 30(3), September 1999, p. 278. Some criticised
that certain objectives, particularly the refrain from targeting civilian objectives were not entirely honoured. See
Rogers, Paul: Lessons to learn, The World Today, 55(8/9), August/September 1999, p. 5. 14
27

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both acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. He further said that the deterioration of the
situation in Kosovo and its magnitude constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the
region as explicitly referred to in the UNSC Resolution 1199.
It was argued that a number of Security Council resolutions on Kosovo repeatedly denied by
the Yugoslav government had largely determined that the crisis in this region constituted a
threat to international peace and security and therefore provided some legal basis for military
action. The intervention was aimed at enforcing FRYs compliance with the demands issued
by the Security Council in previous resolutions. According to US Secretary of State Albright:
Acting under Chapter 7, the Security Council adopted three resolutions -- 1160, 1199 and
1203 -- imposing mandatory obligations on the FRY; and these obligations the FRY has
flagrantly ignored. So NATO actions are being taken within this framework, and we continue
to believe that NATO's actions are justified and necessary to stop the violence.29
Resolution 1160 called upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to immediately take the
further necessary steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through
dialogue.30
Resolution 1199 adopted an increasingly assertive tone and demanded that all parties, groups
and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo17 and that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression18.
Furthermore, in the same paragraph Yugoslavia was demanded to enable .international
monitoring in Kosovo.
Finally, Resolution 1203 of October 24, 1998 demanded the implementation of the agreements
Yugoslavia had signed with both NATO and OSCE concerning a Verification Mission and the
public commitment of Yugoslavia to negotiate a political settlement.
While all these resolutions were the premise for authorisation of the use of force, the act needed
to actually resort to force never materialised within the Security Council. However, it is only
the competence of the Security Council to authorise the enforcement of its resolutions, not of
the individual states or groups of states; thus, legally speaking, enforcing a resolution without
enforcement provisions is unlawful. In the words of White, where there is no authorisation,
there is no legal basis.31 At best, the strict adherence to UN Security Council resolutions offers
political advantages as opposed to other unilateral actions.32

29

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, press conference on Kosovo in Washington, DC, March 25, 1
UNSC Res 1160 of March 31 1998, operative paragraph 1.
31
White, Nigel D.: The Legality of the threat of force against Iraq, Security Dialogue, 30(1), March 1999, p. 80
32
As Simma puts it, a reading of the relevant Council resolutions together with the respective pronouncements
of NATO (members) might lead an observer to conclude that the two sides are acting in concert.[...] NATO tries
to convince the outside world that it is acting alone only to the least degree possible, while in essence it is
implementing the policy formulated by the international community. Simma 1999, p. 14
30

15 | P a g e

US Secretary of State Albright also argued that the behaviour of Serb forces in Kosovo was a
breach of the Geneva Conventions, the Charter on Human Rights and, if the ethnic cleansing
continued, of the Genocide Convention of 1948. She contended that these treaties provided an
alternative source of legitimisation of NATO action.22
Most jurists agree that the Genocide Convention was not affected.23 In any case, these treaties
do not provide for enforcement; therefore, they do not offer a legal basis for the use of force.
The reference to the breaches could at best be seen as a means to justify the situation in Kosovo
was amenable to an intervention on humanitarian grounds. In view of these prohibitions, it is
clear that the Kosovo intervention could not possibly be legitimised by UN Security Council
Resolutions. There seems to be no way for NATO to circumvent the unlawfulness of crisis
management operations without a UN mandate.
REVIVING THE NOTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Some within NATO claimed that military intervention in another state can be justified in cases
of overwhelming necessity. While all leaders clearly put the emphasis on the humanitarian
distress, reference to the theory of humanitarian intervention was sometimes made more
explicitly than others. NATO Secretary-General Solana repeatedly stressed that the campaigns
objective was to avoid a humanitarian disaster. In the above-mentioned letter explaining the
Allies approval of the activation order, he mentioned the very stringent report of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to both resolutions, (which) warned inter alia
of the danger of a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. He further referred to the continuation
of a humanitarian catastrophe, because no concrete measures towards a peaceful solution of
the crisis have been taken by the FRY. The risk of the conflict spilling-over the Yugoslav
borders took a secondary place: Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more
repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo. We must also act to prevent
instability spreading in the region. We must stop violence and bring an end to the
humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so. The
responsibility is on our shoulders and we have to fulfil it.33
Among NATO leaders, British Prime Minister Tony Blair most vigorously intended to
conceptualise the moral rationale of the intervention, even formulating a doctrine of the
international community: I believe that a real sense of moral purpose is also motivating
NATO. We either allow ethnic cleansing to succeed, or we say that the world community has
an obligation to stop this most violent form of nationalism. Our job is to go in there and reverse
it and defeat it.34

The pertinent articles were not specified. See for instance: Transcript of the Secretary of States press
conference on Kosovo in Brussels, 8 October 1998, on website http://secretary.state.gov./www/statements/1998
34
Simma 1999, p. 1. Ambos is one of the few to dissent, arguing that the dolus specialis, a special intent aimed at
the destruction of a protected group existed in the case of Kosovo. However, an intent is generally difficult to
determine. See Ambos, Kai: Comment on: Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects,
European Journal of International Law, 10(.1), 1999, p.
33

16 | P a g e

While the validity of the two first mentioned justifications - UN Security Council resolutions
and international treaties - was easily dismissed, the question of the humanitarian intervention
is more complicated. Could the doctrine of humanitarian intervention confer some legitimacy
to the Kosovo operation?
In order to give an answer to this question, the first issue to be clarified is whether the
humanitarian intervention actually exists as an institution. Humanitarian intervention
encompasses any use of armed force by a State against another State for the purpose of
protecting the life and liberty of the citizens of the latter State unwilling or unable to do so
itself.35 Although a majority of writers supported the idea of a lawful humanitarian
intervention during the era previous to the signing of the UN Charter, it is debatable whether it
was clearly established under the customary international law of that time. In any case, it is
clear that even if that right had existed prior to 1945, it had not survived the adoption of the
Charter; although no explicit reference is made in the Charter to humanitarian intervention, it
is in conflict with the prohibition of the threat or used of force in Art. 2 (4).
Only a minority of jurists maintained in the period after 1945 that the institution of
humanitarian intervention is permitted under customary international law, a recognised source
of international law. They argued that the principles of non-violence and the protection of
human rights must be balanced against each other in any particular case, with the result that in
extreme situations involving seriously inhumane treatment, the latter principle should override
the former. It was often adduced that humanitarian interventions were not precluded by Art. 2
(4) of the UN Charter since it only banned the use of force when directed against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the target state, and not at the protection of its
population.28 This argument is based on a wrong understanding of the terms in question, which
were not added to the text in order to restrict its scope, but in the spirit of specifying the
prohibition. Furthermore, it has been generally rejected as incompatible with the system of the
Charter, since its framers had attributed a predominant role to individual non-violence. The
recognition of humanitarian intervention as an exemption from this prohibition of Art. 2(4) was
deliberately abnegated in order to prevent a confrontation of the two power blocks.29
Some of these specialists have voiced the need for reappraisal of this question in view of a
number of events taking place after the end of the Cold War. They contend that notions of
legitimacy are changing, with humanitarian reasons emerging as a third option for justified
military intervention in a sovereign state. 30 Two constitutive elements define the existence of
an international custom: diuturnitas, i.e. a consistent international practice and opinio juris, i.e.
acceptance of this custom by states.31 In order to determine the existence of the institution of
humanitarian intervention, it should be demonstrated that both elements are present. Advocates
of this notion point to recent UN and state practice and codified and non-codified signs of
growing acceptance of this institution. In the following, these arguments will be examined.

35

Beyerlin, Ulrich: Humanitarian intervention, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law,
Vol. I (1992), p. 926. The use of armed force for the protection of its own nationals will not be considered here.

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NATO: CHARTING THE WAY FORWARD

WHAT CHALLENGES DO THE NATO MEMBERS FACE?
For 65 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as a fundamental
cornerstone for the security of the West. It has weathered many internal political storms, stood
strong against powerful adversaries, and conducted crisis-management operations within and
beyond Europe. It has served as an indispensable forum for dialogue among its members, and
a platform for military cooperation between members and non-members. It is for these reasons
that many see NATO as the most powerful and capable military alliance in the worlds history.
And it is also for these reasons that adversaries and allies alike are interested to see how NATO
responds to the myriad challenges before it.

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The world will therefore be closely watching as the 28 Heads of State and Government of
NATO meet in Wales in September 2014. The international security landscape has evolved in
a considerably more dangerous direction since the leaders last met in Chicago in 2012, and
particularly during the last year. In 2010, NATO agreed upon a new Strategic Concept that
articulated a broad set of roles and missions for the alliance. Unfortunately, the document is so
general that it provides little guidance as new challenges emerge, leaving member states still
debating the institutions responsibilities and priorities.
With the support of NATOs Public Diplomacy Division, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, and the Canadian Department of National Defence, the US Project at Chatham House
held three roundtables to discuss the way forward for NATO. The discussions culminated in
this paper, which aims to inform debate leading up to the September summit in Wales.
The paper briefly lays out the principal external challenges that NATO members face, what
tasks are required of the institution, its current resources and capabilities, the gaps between
strategy and capabilities, and what actions NATO needs to take to fill these gaps. Starting from
the threats that the NATO member states prioritize, and remaining in the confines of the
Strategic Concept, the paper is intended to offer a path forward for NATO. It provides guidance
on how the alliance can move ahead in the coming years to address current and emerging
challenges.
Over the past few months, events have challenged the assumptions that many NATO members
have made regarding the stability of the international environment and, accordingly, their own
national security. The grand strategic project to make Europe whole and free and at peace
with itself, once considered complete, is now very much in question largely as a result of
Russian aggression36. To Europes southeast, the Syrian conflict has metastasized to dangerous
levels and has spilled over into Iraq, with profoundly worrying counter-terrorism implications
for Turkey (a key NATO member) and Europe.37
While it is absolutely vital that NATO members respond to the pressing nature of the above
concerns, they must also keep in mind the longer-term strategic and future trends that will affect
them. The organization needs to be able to react to the former while making progress on others,
including over the horizon, critical issues such as grappling with natural resource constraints
(particularly in energy) and cyber attacks.
Key national security priorities are largely a function of geopolitical realities. While there are
some challenges on the importance of which the vast majority of NATO member states can
agree, others are more a factor of specific interests or geography. Thus the urgency of the
Russian threat diminishes the further from Russias borders a member is located. Similarly, the

36

Statement of the UK Prime Minister to the House of Commons on 18 March 2011. And repeated on a substantive
motion on 21 March, two days after the RAF had become involved in the military action. See Hansard, HC
Vol, 525, Col. 700, 21 March 2011 (David Cameron MP).
37
See Chris Abbott. Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention Global Dialogue
7. 1/2, Winter 2005.

19 | P a g e

exigency of crises in North Africa is more palpable for Mediterranean members contending
with refugee inflows stemming from instability in the region.
In order to understand whether, and how, countries differ in their views of the emerging threat
environment, Chatham House asked national security experts how their respective countries
prioritized their security requirements. Table 1, derived from a combination of their responses
as well as relevant government policy statements, reflects the similarities and differences of
opinion on critical national security priorities across the alliance.38
It is important to note that Table 1 reflects issues that both national security experts and national
strategy documents deemed critically core interests of their countries. As such, it necessarily
excludes other issues that are important, but not considered truly crucial by those surveyed. It
is illustrative rather than definitive. In some cases the respondents did not prioritize issues such
as violations of national territorial integrity, probably not because they are unimportant but
because they are, in the minds of those commenting, so unlikely to occur as to be irrelevant.
Discussed below are the principal challenges that most member states studied here could agree
are critical to their national interests. While this paper largely follows the organization of Table
1, some categories have been merged given the significant overlap, such as attacks on allies,
violations of territorial integrity, and Russia; and crises emanating from failed and failing
states, and Middle East and North Africa.
Top Priorities
1. Attacks on allies
While Russia is not the only possible adversary for NATO members, it is certainly the most
potent one today. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has placed significant emphasis on
engaging with it. In 1994, Russia joined the NATO-led Partnership for Peace, a programme
designed to promote democratic values, strengthen military-to-military ties, and help reform
security institutions in former Warsaw Pact countries. Building on that partnership, and despite
frictions associated with NATOs operations in the Balkans (and in Kosovo specifically), the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established in 2004 to promote transparency and
cooperation between the two former adversaries, and to allow NATO and Russia to discuss
matters of mutual concern. While NRC talks were suspended in 2008 following Russian
incursions into Georgia, by 2010 the two parties had agreed to begin reconvening such
meetings. Over the past few months, however, Russia has taken actions in Ukraine that
emphasize that its interests go against the fundamental objectives of NATO, and show the
continued high level of its distrust of the institution.
In February 2014, following the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine, Russia
invaded Crimea, in order to, in President Vladimir Putins words, protect Crimea, [which] has

38

Cheryl Pellerin, Intelligence Leaders Detail Global Threats to Senate Panel, US Department of Defense, 11
February 2014, http://www.defense. gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121644.

20 | P a g e

always been an inseparable part of Russia.39 Apparently in order to continue to ensure Ukraine
remains an unstable buffer state, Russia has conducted large-scale military exercises (at their
height involving approximately 40,000 troops) along their common border, making many in
the region and beyond uncertain of its intentions regarding the acquisition of further territory.
Russias activities along, and within, Ukraines borders have caused many NATO leaders to
reconsider their post-Cold War assumptions about it, as well as about peace and stability in
Europe more broadly.
Putins use of asymmetric tactics, and the speed with which he was able to bring them to bear
(thereby changing the facts on the ground before the alliance had the opportunity to respond
meaningfully) set an entirely new challenge for NATO. By blurring the lines between civilian
and military actors, utilizing a shrewd public relations campaign and conducting military
exercises on the border with Ukraine without crossing it (with the exception of Crimea), Putin
has made it extremely difficult for the alliance to formulate a rapid and coherent response. In
so doing, he challenged directly the viability of NATOs security relationships with its partners.
While Putin has not directly tested the credibility of NATOs Article V, he has raised the level
of uncertainty over whether the organization would respond adequately if he did so. He also
made NATOs partners question whether they gained any tangible improvements in security
from their relationship with it. Many believe that in the coming months, Putin will further probe
the alliances solidarity. And many NATO members and partners alike now worry that probing
might in time lead to territorial loss.
What makes this challenge difficult to manage are the levels of economic and energy
interdependence between Russia and some European countries. Russian individuals and firms
have invested heavily in Europe, making both sides increasingly reliant on one another and
Europe loath to risk the economic consequences of sanctioning Russian entities or individuals
(although Russia is more dependent upon Europe than the reverse).40 As such it becomes even
more difficult to organize a coherent, cross governmental response to Russias assertive
behaviour.
Given the urgency and attention that recent Russian moves have inspired within NATO and its
member states, it is perhaps surprising that there is less strategic consensus among those
surveyed about the degree to which it presents an overwhelming threat to national interests.
However, this is likely to be due in large part to the economic and energy ties that Russia has
with many of the member states, making it a necessary partner as well as a cause of concern.
It also reflects the geopolitical realities of different member states: the further a NATO member
is from Russias borders, the less likely that the latters moves will be seen as a critical and
direct national security threat.

President Putins address to Parliament over Crimea, Russia Today, 19 March 2014,
http://rt.com/politics/official-word/vladimir-putin-crimeaaddress-658/.
40
Raoul Ruperel, EU and the Ukraine: What are the Limits of Europe?, Open Europe, 18 March 2014,
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/ Documents/140318_OE_Briefing.pdf
39

21 | P a g e

More broadly, protecting allies is perhaps today all the more pertinent given the broadening
array of possible forms of attack, and the recognition that borders are porous an attack against
one can have real implications for its neighbours. However, strategic-level agreement belies
some likely disconnects among allies as to what the Article V provision means in practice.
With the rise of asymmetric threats and non-traditional challenges such as cyber security,
serious questions have been levelled as to what today might constitute an attack on allies, and
what the appropriate responses might be to those attacks.
2. Crises emanating from failed and failing states
Particularly since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become involved in a number of military
operations designed to tackle the challenges posed by failing states.9 Susceptible to disruptive
actors such as insurgent or terrorist groups, and in the absence of legitimate governance, these
territories can be used as launching points for terrorist attacks and other regionally, if not
globally, destabilizing activities (as was demonstrated in the 11 September 2001 attacks). As a
result, NATO and its member states have conducted interventions in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, as well as counter-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, over
that period, the world, and particularly Europes near neighbourhood, has become significantly
less stable. Governments and civil society institutions are being shaken to their foundations and
in many instances, terrorist and other radical groups are filling the void created by the absence
of state institutions. Looking forward, instability is increasing across the Middle East and in
sub Saharan Africa areas that are deemed critically important to several NATO member
states.
While the region is outside the European theatre, most NATO member states have critical
interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Among other things this is due to its
proximity to Europes southern and southeastern borders, cultural ties between citizens on
either side of the Mediterranean and particularly between France and Algeria, energy supplies,
shipping routes through the Suez Canal and around the Horn of Africa and, recently, operations
in Iraq. Since the Arab revolutions in 2011, these interests have increasingly been at risk given
the instability in the broader MENA region.
Egypt, a long-standing ally of the United States, has been through six governments over the
past three years and continues to be disrupted by competition between vastly differing groups,
each with differing interests that would like to lead it in divergent directions. Despite a NATOled intervention to protect Libyan citizens in anti-Gaddafi areas of Libya (most notably
Benghazi), which subsequently led to the overthrow of the regime, instability in Libya
continues.
Events in Syria are perhaps of most concern and raise tensions with regard to humanitarian,
refugee and terrorism issues. The conflict has recently spilled into northern and central Iraq
(which has remained unsettled following the exit of US and other foreign troops in 2011), and
raised the spectre of a radical jihadist group, in this case the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

22 | P a g e

(ISIS/L), once again having control over significant territory from which to operate against the
West.41
3. Terrorism
Somewhat related to developments in the Middle East and North Africa and to failing states,
terrorism remains a critical concern for many NATO member states. Yet for many this is not a
new threat: Britains experience with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Spanish
experience with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) being notable examples. However, the
catastrophic impact that newer terrorist groups can have, combined with the radical jihadist
inspirations for such attacks, are relatively new. This was highlighted during the 11 September
2001 attacks on the United States perpetrated by Al-Qaeda. And despite interventions in
Afghanistan and elsewhere to eradicate the Al-Qaeda threat, the organization has evolved into
a series of loosely affiliated (or franchised) groups, each with its own objectives.
Some states feel the threat of terrorism more than others, and the direction from which it
emanates is different. For example, of particular concern to France is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, which has been working to destabilize key areas in North Africa, and which led to
Frances intervention in Mali. The United States and the United Kingdom are more focused on
ISIS/L in Iraq and Syria as well as radical groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
4. WMD and missile proliferation
For decades, a central interest of NATO member states was to prevent and deter the use of
weapons of mass destruction. This is still on the minds of most of them. However, while
historically the fear was focused on Russias potential use of nuclear weapons against NATO
members, today it is on Iran (although given the recent concerns about Russian aggression
discussed above, many countries are increasingly worried about Russias recent moves to
modernize its nuclear arsenal).42
The question of Irans nuclear capabilities whether they are truly civilian or military in nature
has been much debated since shortly after the overthrow of the shahs regime in 1979.
Regardless of the nuclear programmes ultimate intent, Iran has also worked to improve its
long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and several of its Shahab missile configurations are
capable of reaching European soil.43 While there is little evidence to suggest that Iran would
target Europe with a nuclear capability (if acquired), it appears that its desire for such a

Martin Chulov, Isis advance threatens Iraqs very future, claims John Kerry, The Guardian, 23 June 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/jun/23/isis-threatens-iraqi-future-john-kerry-claims.
42
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Russia Flexes its Nuclear Muscle: Moscows Modernization Moves Might Derail the
Obama Administrations Goal of a Less Nuclear World,The National Interest, 14 November 2013,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russia-flexes-its-nuclear-muscles-9399.
43
Ethan Bronner, U.S. plays down warning by Israeli over Irans nuclear missiles, New York Times, 2 February
2012, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/israel-warns-iranian-missiles-might-threatenus.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=Iran%20Yaalon&st=cse&.
41

23 | P a g e

capability stems from the belief that it will both enhance its security (against regime change by
the United States or Israel, for example) and support its aspiration to regional leadership.
It is clear that a nuclear Iran would have a significantly destabilizing effect on its region. It is
not in the Wests interests to have any one power dominate the Middle East. And the likelihood
of further proliferation would increase significantly were Iran able to gain nuclear weapons
capabilities.
WHAT FUNCTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS THESE DIVERSE CHALLENGES?
Meeting the security needs laid out above will require NATO to focus on two major functions
that, taken together, provide the capabilities to address them. These are:
deterrence and reassurance,
public diplomacy,
For example, deterrence and reassurance (among allies) is required to counter the challenges
posed by Russia, WMD use, terrorism or cyber attacks. Challenges stemming from instability
in the Middle East are handled, principally, through crisis management. At the same time,
NATO members should endeavour to prevent crises or attacks taking place, or to prepare for
them adequately, through early warning and intelligence-gathering, and crucially, intelligencesharing. The alliance must also mitigate the consequences of being unable to do so by building
resilience among members but also with their neighbours and partners. And finally, NATO and
its member states will require much more sophisticated public diplomacy capabilities if they
are to explain to their citizens the alliances enduring relevance as well as countering the
narratives of adversaries.
Deterrence And Reassurance
Defending the territorial integrity of all members remains one of NATOs foremost tasks. It
will require the alliance to deter aggression as well as reassure members. However, deterrence
was never, and will never be, easy to execute, requiring NATO to demonstrate capability and
credibility.44
Complicating this challenge is the fact that deterrence needs to work against many types of
actors, and the strategies for doing so can differ and require a variety of assets. Deterrence and
reassurance are necessary tasks against states such as Russia as well as non-state actors
including terrorist groups such as ISIS/L and Al-Qaeda.
Given the decline in military spending among NATO members over recent years, many have
questioned whether the alliance has the capability to deter its adversaries. This is particularly
true in the case of Russia where, as Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted recently
at Chatham House, since 2008, Russia has increased its defence spending by around 50 per
44

See: Kathleen J. McInnis, Extended Deterrence in the Persian Gulf: The US Credibility Gap, Washington
Quarterly, Summer 2006.

24 | P a g e

cent while, on average, NATO allies have decreased theirs by about 20 per cent.45 While
NATO members together still spend 10 times more on their armed forces than Russia does on
its military, the picture is significantly less imbalanced if one takes out the US contribution.46
Perhaps of more concern, however, are worries over the alliances will to use its assets and,
given the size of the coalition at 28 members and the consensus decision-making structure, the
speed with which it is able to do so. Following Russias actions over Ukraine, many countries
in Europe have found making decisions to act against it tough to make politically, given their
dependence on it for energy supplies. Thus NATO must have the capability to target an
adversarys critical points of vulnerability as well as to demonstrate its political resolve to take
action.
Many have suggested that in the past two decades, following the end of the Cold War, NATO
has forgotten how to deter. Such lessons need to be relearned to restore credibility. However,
while there are some key lessons from the Cold War experience that may be applicable for
deterrence today, NATO and its member states must be careful not to over-rely upon that
playbook.
As the situation in Ukraine shows, adversaries, including in this case Russia, have also learned
lessons from history, and are finding ways to work in the grey areas for which specific actions
by NATO have not been defined and where divisions can potentially be created among the
allies. NATO needs to prepare for contingencies politically and militarily that are blurry
(or nonlinear, hybrid warfare), to respond to asymmetric tactics. It must understand the kinds
of military capabilities, or combinations of capabilities, that will most effectively deter
aggression and develop full-spectrum deterrence. It is likely that a wide variety of tools,
military (from Special Operations Forces to nuclear, and air and sea policing) and non-military,
will be necessary. NATO will also need to coordinate its actions with non-military
organizations such as the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the World Bank, that are better positioned to leverage economic and other
instruments to bring greater pressure to bear on an adversary.
In addition to military resources, a robust public relations strategy will be necessary to
underscore the alliances political credibility, consensus and the international legitimacy of any
actions taken. It will also have to respond to the public narrative of an adversary (something
that Russia has used very effectively over the past decade, if not longer) and make transparent
not just to elites but also to the public the intentions and objectives of the NATO response and
limit any sense of provocation.
As noted, it is not just states that need deterring. So too do terrorist groups or other non-state
actors that might use weapons such as cyber attacks against NATO members. In many respects
these actors are harder to deter. It is often more difficult to prove that they are the instigator of
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Future NATO, Chatham House, London, 9 June 2014,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ opinions_111132.htm?selectedLocale=en.
46
SIPRI,
SIPRI
Military
Expenditure
Database,
2014,
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.
45

25 | P a g e

any attack, and targeting them is more challenging as they often lack a clearly defined territory.
Therefore, deterring them is likely to require fewer large-scale military capabilities but far more
targeted resources, including, as will be elaborated below, intelligence and resilience.
However, being able to identify and then act against these groups is a necessary part of the
deterrence portfolio.
Public Diplomacy
While NATO and its member states are often quick to underscore the importance of effective
strategic communications, in practice their public diplomacy efforts tend to be fairly reactive
and are often focused on communicating existing programmes and priorities to NATO societies
at large. The latter is certainly necessary but must be significantly enhanced: improving
transparency between NATOs military instruments and the public is essential, particularly if
members want to build support for reversing declines in defence spending. NATO needs to
support member states in building an argument for the alliance and explaining why shared
resources and shared burdens are so vital to addressing the traditional and non-traditional
challenges that members face.
However, this is insufficient. Public diplomacy today also has another role. During the past
decade of operations in Afghanistan, ISAF forces learned how imperative it is to counter the
media narratives of adversaries. Winning the support of locals required ISAF, alongside the
Afghan government, to be an agile and effective communicator of its progress, intentions and
objectives while simultaneously refuting the arguments articulated by the Taliban and other
insurgent groups on the ground. Russias behaviour with respect to Ukraine has underscored
the urgency with which member states (supported by NATO) must become more effective at
offensive public diplomacy, even beyond the capabilities developed for Afghanistan. Russia
uses major global media outlets to propagate its narratives in order to gain legitimacy for its
illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as its aggressive behaviour on the border with Ukraine.
Unfortunately, NATO has, by many accounts, been slow to counter Russian arguments and
narratives, thus blurring the clarity of logic and weakening the will to act in many countries.
This type of competition is likely to be an enduring aspect of conflict in the future. While the
front line of public diplomacy must continue to lie with the member states (publicity is more
effective when considered at a local level), NATO should play a critical role in supporting and,
if appropriate coordinating, its members to counter adversaries narratives more effectively
while advancing their own.
WHAT NATO BRINGS TO THE TABLE
The challenges with which NATO must grapple are considerable and the tasks that it must
accomplish diverse. However, they do not constitute as great an obstacle as might at first
appear. Many of the characteristics that are required for deterrence are similar to those needed
to provide crisis management or to build resilience. Public support is required for all these tasks
to be fulfilled to varying degrees. Thus there is significant overlap with respect to the necessary
elements to fulfil the defined tasks.
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NATO already brings many assets to the table that contribute to these functions. In some cases,
it is uniquely qualified and able to achieve these tasks. These assets make it the most relevant
organization for its members to meet many of the challenges they face today and will face in
the future. Some of its most important strengths are outlined below.
Common Values
NATOs greatest strength is the common values that the member states hold, which lead them
often to have similar interests, bring legitimacy to the organization, and have allowed the
alliance to weather crises successfully over the years. These values are underscored in NATOs
founding document, the Washington Treaty. They include the belief in democracy and the rule
of law, the security and freedom of its member states, and the principle of collective defence.
They create a political and policy basis for an unprecedented level of military cooperation
among the 28 member states.
Political Legitimacy
NATO, while principally a military organization, is also an important political actor. While the
assets it brings to the table are in the military domain, it is the ability of the leadership of the
member states, all Western democracies, to come together and build political agreement for
action that makes the institution so important today and gives its activities such legitimacy.
Accordingly, while NATOs assets will remain in the military space, its value as a political
entity that is looked up to and to which non-members aspire should not be dismissed. It is also
in this area that many have concerns for the future as NATOs will to act is increasingly
questioned. In time, however, if NATOs decision-making and its coordination with other
institutions can be enhanced, this strength could become even more central as it provides a
forum or path for bringing assets from other organizations to bear.
Military Capabilities
While it is true that there is always room for improvement in terms of how NATO conducts its
business, it remains the worlds premier security organization, with military capabilities more
effective than any of its potential adversaries. Member states often underestimate the capacity
and capability of their military might, not just in terms of raw numbers, but also, following the
coalition operations in Afghanistan, of the ability to prosecute military campaigns jointly. At
its best, NATO allows its member states to contribute to operations in a manner that makes it
more than the sum of its parts.
Command And Control
One of NATOs greatest assets is its command- and control-system, with which it manages the
military units operating under its authority. Supported by the International Military Staff (IMS),
the system is the only truly integrated multinational military command structure in the world.47

47

UK Joint Delegation to NATO, NATO Summit in Wales 100 days to go, 27 May 2014,
https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/ nato-summit-in-wales-100-days-to-go.

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The importance of this accomplishment is hard to overstate. Over its 65-year history, the IMS
has allowed members to exercise, train, plan and deploy together. It is quite flexible, capable
of simultaneously managing a number of different operations, in a variety of different sizes and
configurations. For example, in 2009 NATO was simultaneously responsible for counterpiracy operations, an Iraqi Security Force training mission, stability operations in the Balkans,
counter-terrorism exercises in the Mediterranean, Baltic air-policing operations, and
commanding and controlling over 100,000 ISAF personnel in Afghanistan.
Intelligence And Information Sharing
NATO has also provided its member states with an architecture for intelligence-sharing. While
this can, and should, be improved, the fact that this sharing exists at all is a testament to the
level of mutual trust and confidence allies have built over the years. Furthermore, through
operations in Afghanistan, NATO has built a reasonably effective architecture through which
information is shared with non-NATO partners.
Joint Operations And Interoperability
In large part owing to successes with the international military structure and intelligencesharing, NATO has become an invaluable platform for NATO and non-NATO countries to
operate together. Critically, these activities have taken place across all the military domains
from air-patrolling to counterinsurgency and stability operations, maritime policing and
collaborative cyber-defence exercises. Building on the operations and exercises conducted over
the past two decades, NATOs militaries have an unprecedented level of experience in working
together, both on the ground in challenging environments and at NATO headquarters to resolve
political and policy disagreements on pursuing security objectives.

WHAT ARE NATOS LIMITATIONS?

While NATO brings many capabilities to the table, it cannot do everything. Its strengths are
not sufficient to achieve the tasks laid out above. And the fact that the institution comes with a
number of challenges complicates its task. There are three main problems to which NATO
must find solutions (or get around) in order to meet these growing security challenges and fulfil
the tasks laid out for it.
The Need For Non-Military Solutions
National militaries alone cannot address many of the security challenges identified in this
paper. While there is in many cases a vital role for the military, meaningful management of
these issues and their implications requires a more comprehensive, cross-governmental
response. For example, a critical component of deterring Russia includes economic sanctions
and a reduction in Europes energy dependence upon it. The military toolkit is necessary but
not sufficient for the task. Equally, with regard to Middle Eastern instability, economic and
developmental support will be a vital part of conflict prevention. Humanitarian assistance will
also be required to manage refugee or migrant flows and to mitigate the spread of any conflict.
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These are assets that NATO does not, and should not, control. Instead, it must work much more
closely with its non-military partners in order to achieve collective security goals. However,
NATO can still provide a coordinating and supporting function or, at a minimum, can help
build coherence among the responses of its members, for example with regard to public
diplomacy efforts.
Diverging Political Will And Different Security Priorities
It is not surprising that NATOs 28 member states, each with its own interests, appetite for risk,
history and geopolitical realities, perceive the emerging security landscape differently. And
even in those areas where there is broad agreement about the nature or character of a threat,
this does not necessarily translate into policy agreement regarding what must be done to address
it. For example, while all countries involved in ISAF believed that the cultivation and
trafficking of narcotics were a key threat in Afghanistan, there was considerable disagreement
among them as to how they should be tackled.
Furthermore, operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere demonstrated that each country has its
own appetite for risk, which was revealed in the form of different caveats, or national
restrictions on the use of its forces in-theatre. While these caveats have proved a significant
constraint for NATOs military commanders, ultimately they are an expression of the fact that
not every member is willing to take on the same degrees of risk, particularly to their ground
forces. It is worth noting that some at times also invoked caveats in order to compensate for
the fact that their respective forces were inadequately trained and equipped to perform some of
the required missions in Afghanistan.
Finally, with the memories of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War fading, the
publics and at times elites in many countries no longer value the role of their militaries. They
see themselves as peaceful countries in largely peaceful regions and therefore the need for
building up the military is diminishing, when held up against that for jobs and the economy, or
spending on education, social security and healthcare. This lack of public support for
involvement in any security challenge beyond the borders of members is leading in many cases
to an unwillingness on the part of leaders to argue for such a role or to insist on one. Thus a
lack of political will to act arises. This showed itself most clearly in Germanys abstention from
the Libya operation. Only 37 per cent of Germans approved of intervention by international
forces in Libya and 30 per cent said they were optimistic about the stabilizing effects that
intervention would have.48
Declining Defence Spending
While it is true that NATO militaries retain significant capabilities and effectiveness, serious
questions have arisen as to whether that will remain true in the future, particularly given the
wider range of security challenges they will face. This is for two principal reasons. First,
48

The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2011, 2011,
http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/ TT2011_final_web.pdf.

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NATOs European members have consistently decreased their defence budgets since the end
of the Cold War, and particularly after the financial crisis in 2008. Despite the fact they agreed
to spend a minimum of two per cent of their GDP on defence in 2006, only four members of
NATO Estonia, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States met that target in 2013,
with France and Turkey falling just shy of it.49 More recently however, in the wake of recent
Russian aggression some, notably the Baltic states, are revisiting their defence spending levels.
Compounding the problem is the fact that downward spending trends have not been
accompanied by a greater rationalization of defence spending or defence industries across
Europe. Member states continue to protect their own, often duplicative, defence-industrial
bases and create policies and strategies (and make acquisitions) that are independent of their
neighbours and allies.50 This is despite the fact that policy-makers have consistently signalled,
at least politically, their intention to collaborate more effectively on defence acquisition
matters. Meanwhile, industry actors are unable to devote resources to research and
development (R&D), and new technologies until they have clear guidance from their customers
about whether there will be sharing (in which case there might be opportunities for mergers or
co-production) or whether they will be independent.
While the results have been only somewhat damaging to date, that is unlikely to remain true in
the future. The challenge is compounded by the fact that a number of European NATO states
spend over 50 per cent of their military budgets on personnel and less than 15 per cent on
defence investment, including procurement and R&D.51 Furthermore, the United States pivot
to Asia, and its across-the-board defence budget cuts (sequestration) are significantly
constraining its ability, politically and militarily, to compensate for capability gaps emerging
from reductions in European defence expenditure. Looking ahead, NATOs member states will
need not only to increase spending on defence, but also to find even greater efficiencies in their
defence spending through other activities, including better collaboration with allies on defence
acquisition, particularly on critical capability shortfalls such as strategic lift, air-to-air
refuelling, drones, ISR and precision munitions.

David Alexander, Ukraine crisis highlights NATO defence spending problem: Hagel, Reuters, 2 May 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/05/02/us-usa-nato-hagel-idUSBREA410EX20140502.
50
For more detail on these dynamics, see Antonio Missiroli, Enabling the Future, European Military Capabilities
20132025: Challenges and Avenues, EU Institute for Strategic Studies, 6 May 2013,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/enabling-the-future-europeanmilitary-capabilities-20132025-challenges-and-avenues/.
51
European Defence Agency, National Defence Data 2012 of the EDA Participating Member States, February
2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/ docs/default-source/finance-documents/national-defence-data-2012.pdf.
49

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CONCLUSION
NATO continues to be a vital organization that brings together the transatlantic partners to
pursue their mutual interests of freedom, security and prosperity. However, these interests are
increasingly vulnerable to a variety of old and new threats, the interconnections of which are
becoming more complex.
With the end of operations in Afghanistan, the recent events in Ukraine, and more broadly the
changing trends in the security arena, from the use of new techniques or tools such as hybrid
warfare or cyber-attacks to new challenges in energy and economic areas, NATO needs to do
more and to do it more effectively. Its long-standing challenges remain, but the way they are
sometimes manifest has changed. And this means that NATO needs to change with them. Its
mission is just as important as it has always been, but how it achieves that vision needs further
reflection.
Part of the answer is more resources NATOs member states need to reverse the downward
trend in military spending. But much can be done to better focus NATO against the new threats,
find efficiencies, and rethink its processes to respond more effectively to the challenges in new
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ways. Fundamentally, despite decreasing resources, NATO needs to become more agile and
flexible.
The upcoming Wales Summit on 45 September 2014 is an action-forcing event that can
provide NATO with a new path forward. This opportunity must be grasped. While NATO will
undoubtedly need to make some strong statements in order to underscore its capability and
credibility in response to the Russian threat, more critically, it must lay the foundations for a
future alliance that is capable of managing the new challenges it faces today and in the future.
This paper aims to contribute to this conversation.

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