FIELD METHODS

REVIEWS

REVIEW ESSAYS
Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can
Succeed Again, by Bent Flyvbjerg. Translated by Steven Sampson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 204 pp. Appendix and index.
To suggest that social science has been less successful than natural science is almost de rigueur for philosophers of science and students of research
methods. Evidence of the truth of this assertion is too abundant to brook serious argument, whether we examine the myriad transformations of daily life
since the scientific revolution or the relative credence given social and natural scientists in public discourse. Still open to dispute are the questions posed
by Bent Flyvbjerg, professor of planning at Aalborg University, Denmark:
How do we explain this disparity, and what should social scientists do about
it?
Flyvbjerg quickly answers the first question: The study of social phenomena is not, never has been, and probably never can be, scientific in the
conventional meaning of the word science (p. 25). He develops more
gradually an answer to the second question, about social science praxis, and
states it most succinctly near the books end: The purpose of social science
is not to develop theory, but to contribute to societys practical rationality in
elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according to diverse sets of values and interests (p. 167). Throughout this wideranging, insightful, and provocative book, Flyvbjerg adduces evidence and
argument from philosophy, learning theory, political science, and practical
research in support of these two answers.
Although the books chapters are divided into two parts, the topics they
cover are best apportioned conceptually into four sections: (1) statement of
the problem, (2) explication of challenges for social science research methodology, (3) perspectives on the role of power in social processes, and (4)
guidelines for social science practice. I will first review sections 2, 3, and 4
and then evaluate Flyvbjergs evidence and arguments; at that point, I will
also return to his initial statement of the problem.
What methodological challenges does social science face, in contradistinction to the natural sciences? If the natural science goal, as well as achievement, is, as Flyvbjerg avers, context-independent theory that explains and
predicts phenomena, the social sciences are handicapped by the evident context dependence of social processes and by the subjective meanings that peoField Methods, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2002 228240
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ple give to their actions and those of others, both as subjects and as social
scientists.
The problem is apparent in the Dreyfus model of the learning process
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988): True experts make decisions intuitively without conscious deliberation, using a mature, context-dependent, holistic
understanding. Such expert performance is situationally based and arational,
in that it cannot be described by formal rules; context-independent rule-based
decision making underlies competent, not expert, performance. The problem
also is apparent in the inability of economic theory to predict changes in the
stock market, exchange rates, or other phenomena that reflect actual human
behavior and variable, context-dependent interpretations. The problem is
apparent in the superiority of case study research for revealing the real complexity of social life.
There is abundant philosophical precedent for this distinction between
context-independent and context-dependent knowledge. Flyvbjerg locates it
in the contrast between Platos (and Socrates) search for context-independent universal rules and Aristotles inductive, case-centered approach. He
identifies the intellectual virtues of analytical rationality, of universals and
invariant knowledgeepistemewith Socrates and Plato while linking the
intellectual virtue of pragmatic, context-dependent deliberation about values
and praxisphronesiswith Aristotle. Episteme is the mantra of modern
science, and technetechnical know-howhas become its handmaiden;
phronesis, the sense of what is ethically practical, is the lost virtue.
In the books third section, after having introduced and explicated the idea
of phronetic social science, Flyvberg turns to what he sees as the one critical
omission in Aristotles conceptualizationthe lack of attention to power. In
a way that roughly parallels his distinction of universal natural science and
context-dependent social science, Flyvberg distinguishes Habermass
foundationalist approach to power and conflict from Foucaults situational perspective. Habermas, building on Kant, argued that consensus
seeking and a desire to be free from domination are universal, hence contextindependent, human traits. Power can be found in particular structural positions and can be controlled by ensuring a structure that gives free reign to
these natural consensus-seeking impulses. Foucault, on the other hand, like
Nietzsche, rejects the notion of a general will la Rousseau. Instead,
Foucault accepts the inevitability of conflict and the necessity of checks and
balances to maintain freedom, and he reconceptualizes power as a multiplicity of force relations. It is Foucaults conception that Flyvberg favors, so he
urges making power the core of analyses conducted in the spirit of phronetic
social science.

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In his books last section, Flyvbjerg presents methodological guidelines

for and some examples of phronetic social science. The guidelines consolidate advice proffered by researchers with qualitative, action, and hermeneutic research orientations. They emphasize the study of process and narrative,
the importance of cases and contexts, the need to examine practice before discourse, and the potential significance of little things. Power and values are
central, and the role of researcher-as-expert is eschewed in favor of dialogue
with a polyphony of voices. Flyvbjergs primary example of such praxis is
the Aalborg Project, which won the European Unions European Planning
Prize in part due to Flyvbjergs insistence on broadening the range of citizen
involvement beyond the previously entrenched pattern of accession to powerful business interests. Another example is Bellah et al.s (1985) Habits of
the Heart, with its combination of qualitative analysis and public philosophy.
Flyvbjergs analysis teaches us much about why social inquiry fails and
how it can succeed again. Each of the contrasts he drawsbetween the
Dreyfus learning model and the more traditional rule-based approach;
between the philosophical traditions rooted in Aristotle and Plato; between
Foucaults and Habermass analyses of power, Wertrationalitt (value rationality) and Zweckrationalitt (instrumental rationality); and even between
the hermeneutic and hypothetico-deductive research traditionssharpens
our understanding of the complex problems faced by social science. By subsuming the more interpretivist pole of each of these antipodes within his
larger agenda of developing phronetic social science, Flyvbjerg has also
charted a new direction for those who recognize these complexities and seek
to improve the practice of social science.
Yet ambitious as his scholarly reach is, Flyvbjerg cautions that his is only
one attempt among many possible (p. 5). While this clearly is an attempt
that is worth further refinement, it is also one whose basic premises need
ongoing reexamination. For once we acknowledge that context matters, that
human consciousness poses unique challenges, that case studies are valuable, and that human social life is more complex than extant explanatory
social theory, the question becomes whether we should still pursue the goal
of a theoretically rich and powerfully predictive social science. It is a fateful
decision to reject this possibility. Even Bent Flyvbjerg does not abjure it
entirelyThere exists only context-dependent knowledge [in the study of
human affairs], which thus presently [emphasis added] rules out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction (p. 71)but he clearly is on the side
of the naysayers who see no progress toward predictive social theory after
more than 200 years of attempts (p. 32).

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Are the methods and accomplishments of natural and social science really
so divergent and their achievable goals quite so inapposite, as Flyvbjerg
believes? I will suggest an alternative perspective with reference to each of
the four sections of his book.
First, the extent of philosophical and empirical divergence between the
natural and social science traditions can be understood as much less sharp
than is the case in Flyvbjergs portrayal (Tarnas 1991). While Plato did
believe in universal truths, he was, after all, an idealist who felt that certain
archetypal forms shaped empirical reality, while it was Aristotle who came to
emphasize sensory perception as the basis of knowledge and more commonly is regarded as the progenitor of natural science. More recent discoveries have muddied the contrast even more. Recognition of the ubiquity in the
natural world of nonlinear patterns, chaotic systems, relativistic relationships, and quantum peculiarities has undermined faith in universal laws and
invariant physical processes. Flyvbjerg acknowledges some of these challenges to Newtonian certainties but chooses simply to emphasize the continuing greater power and persuasiveness of natural than social theory. While
this emphasis is perfectly defensible, it is born more of a priori orientation
than of necessity.
Empirical research gives more hope for context-sensitive yet still predictive social theory than is apparent in Flyvbjergs discussion. In the area of
politics, ongoing research on political participation has identified not only
the dominant pattern of an association between social class and participation
but also social contexts in which this pattern is overturned (often due to ethnic cohesion or ideological motivation). Sherman and Berks pathbreaking
research on the police response to domestic violence, with its widespread
impact on public policy, has been amended by replications that have identified social contexts where the same response has different effects. In these
and numerous other areas, the cumulation of results has stimulated the development of more powerful social theory.
And what of values and practice? Flyvbjerg favors active engagement in
the politics surrounding topics under investigation and points to his success
in steering the Aalborg Project in a more democratic direction. Yet the possibilities for, and examples of, missteps in the application of social science
findings in the midst of political struggles are legion. Sherman and Berk
released their initial findings of a positive impact of immediate arrest in
domestic violence cases to a receptive public, yet later replications (after the
policy was almost universally adopted) forced them to conclude that these
effects were context dependent. The myriad replications of Stanley
Milgrams experiments on obedience to authority defy simple characterization or easy translation into policy prescriptions, even though they exhibit

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some consistent patterns that can inform social theory. While there may be an
ethical imperative for social scientists (indeed, all scientists) to be concerned
with the social consequences of their scholarship, it is hard to discern a clear
or consistent benefit to either social science or the public from eager engagement in interest group politics. The Aalborg City Center Committee may
have been open to social science nudging, but in many political contexts,
contrarian findings are likely to be accorded no more respect than the pleadings of any other unelected constituent.
Bent Flyvberg begins his work with the implicit assertion that social science does not matter or, more precisely, that in comparison to natural science,
social science has mattered little for society. This assertion is never seriously
examined, even though it is buttressed only with brief references to the controversy over Alan Sokals (1996) Social Text hoax (see Weinberg 1996) and
the vociferous criticisms of Edward Laumann et al.s (1994) sex practices
survey (see Lewontin 1995). Yet Social Text is not a social science journal by
any stretch of the imagination, and natural scientists criticisms of one crosssectional survey hardly do justice to the vast body of policy-relevant social
science research. A book that reviewed systematically evidence for the progress of social science during the past 200 years would be unlikely to come to
such a dismal conclusion.
So we are left with a 2,000-year-old debate over the nature of empirical
reality and the appropriate direction for social inquiry. Whatever we conclude about his perspective on social science practice itself, we can feel grateful to Flyvbjerg for his articulate review and extension of this debate and for
the many insights he has shared from his own praxis. He has helped us to
move ahead another decade or two on the path that leads toward resolution of
our most profound philosophical and methodological conundrum. Making
Social Science Matter deserves to be on the required reading list for both
practitioners of and instructors in research methods.

REFERENCES
Bellah, R. N., R. Madsen, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swidler, and S. M. Tipton. 1985. Habits of the
heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. New York: Harper & Row.
Dreyfus, H., and S. Dreyfus. 1988. Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.
Laumann, E. O., J. H. Gagnon, R. T. Michael, and S. Michaels. 1994. The social organization of
sexuality: Sexual practices in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewontin, R. C. 1995. Sex, lies, and social science. New York Review of Books, 20 April, 28.
Sokal, A. D. 1996. Transgressing the boundaries: Toward a transformative hermeneutics of
quantum gravity. Social Text 14:12.

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Tarnas, R. 1991. The passion of the Western mind: Understanding the ideas that have shaped
our world view. New York: Ballantine.
Weinberg, S. 1996. Sokals hoax. New York Review of Books, 8 August, 12.

RUSSELL K. SCHUTT
University of Massachusetts
RUSSELL K. SCHUTT is professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts,
Boston. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Illinois at Chicago and was a postdoctoral fellow in the Sociology of Social Control Program, Yale University. His research
has focused on homelessness, mental health services, and organizational practices. He
is the author, coauthor, or coeditor of five books, including Investigating the Social
World: The Process and Practice of Research (now in its 3rd ed.) and The Organizational
Response to Social Problems: Research in Social Problems and Public Policy (vol. 8,
coedited with Stephanie W. Hartwell, 2001), as well as numerous articles and book
chapters on homelessness, organizations and occupations, mental health issues, the
sociology of law, and training programs on CD-ROM, videotape, and disk.

Ethical Issues in Practitioner Research, edited by Jane Zeni. New York:

Teachers College Press. 2001. 239 pages.
Fieldwork, Participation and Practice: Ethics and Dilemmas in Qualitative
Research, by Marlene de Laine. London: Sage. 2000. 207 pages.
Two recent books consider the ethics of fieldwork. Both contribute to an
ongoing dialogue on the morality of knowledge production and application
in human science research. The dialogue has roots in ancient philosophy. In
his Metaphysics, Aristotle (1958) claimed that people naturally seek to know.
His view was that knowledge is intrinsically desirable and is better than ignorance. Knowledge can also be valued for instrumental purposes for the goals
it permits people to achieve. Whether valued intrinsically or instrumentally,
knowledge is inextricably bound to ethics because it results from human
activity, and humans judge all their activities for goodness and rightness. The
discovery, development, and validation, as well as the application of knowledge, are based on assumptions about the nature of what is good and what is
right.
Such assumptions and the standards derived from them vary by context,
culture, and time. The view of the intrinsic goodness of knowledge was reaffirmed by Enlightenment thinkers and the subsequent Scientific Revolution.

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