"Possible Worlds and

Substances
by Vladislav Terekhovich
A comment by Vasil Penchev

I agree with the thesis

The categories of possible both worlds and substances
should be inified
The base of that unification can be the concept of possible
histories (by the way utilized already in quantum mechanics in
order to interpret it as consistent histories)
Futhermore, one can attempt to describe the set of possible
histories metaphysically as a general history of how possible
substances as initial elements become gradually, stage by
stage different possible worlds clearly distinguishable from
each other and therefore disjunctive to each other as
different realities

The intention of my comment

To mention a few ideas as philosophical and metaphysical as
properly scientific sharing Familienhnlichkeit (family resemblance)
to each other as well as to Terekhovichs conception at issue
Namely:
The unification of the Gibbs thermodynamics of the states of a
whole (system) and the Botltzmann thermodynamics of the
elements of the same system
The main objectivity of quantum mechanics to describe uniformly
discrete motions (such as quantum leaps) and smooth motions
(such as motions according classical mechanics)

The main objectivity of quantum mechanics

and its interpretations
The main objectivity of quantum mechanics is realized by a
mathematica formalism based on the separable complex Hilbert space
That mathematical structure (as any other one) admits a variety of more
or less isomorphic metaphysical interpretations as to quantum
mechanics such as the Copenhagen, probabilistic (Max Born), many
worlds, consistent histories, quantum information ones, etc.
All those attempt to resolve the fundamental metaphysical problem of
how possibility as a universal substance of the world before
measurement transforms into the statiscal ensemble of many possible
realities (or possible worlds) after measurement though offering
different solutions

Still more members of the same family

(though more distant relatives)

Quantum information theory and the definition of information by

identifying possible world and possible substance
The foundation of mathematics as consistent orderings
The meta-matahematical interpretation of infinity as a second
dimension of finiteness: a second finiteness separated from the first
one by a discrete gap (such as that between two possible worlds)
Possible worlds semantics and Kripke semantics
The idea of abstract (or philosophical, or metaphysical)
thermodynamics as quantitative mereology
Counterfactual, alternative, many pathways, and mathematical
history as well as the corresponding theories of time

A genetic affinity featuring all family

All members are either properly mathematical or tend to mathematics
too strongly
One can use the metaphor of mathematical field attracting all
enumerated theopries, hypotheses, or conceptions and allowing of
them to be formalized and mathematized essentially
That metaphor of mathematical field admits furthermore a
metaphysical realization as certain forms of neo-Phytagorenism
identifying mathematics and reality rather than mathematical neoPlatonism meaning a separate mathematical reality
For example then, quality tends to quantity, possibility to probability,
and possible quality to probable quantity, and possible world to
possibility as substance

About both difficulties in the conclusion of

Terekhovichs paper :
(1) a problem of generality, that we use the same word possible to
refer very different notion: world, object, state and history
(2) a problem of psychologism, that we try to transfer the properties
of our conceivable private possibilities to all possibilities in general
Phytagoreanism inspired by quantum mechanics resolved both
problems as follows:
(1) Possible is identified as probable: then possible world, object,
state, and history are different interpretations of a universal
substance of probability such as probability distribution, or wave
function, or quantum information, or etc.

About (2), the problem of psychologism from

the viewpoint of that quantum Pythgoreanism

Our conceivable private possibilities are interpreted as subjective

probabilities, and all possibilities in general as objective
probabilities
Then, subjective probabilities and objective probabilities should be
identified as a single universal probability underling the being and
appearing whether as subjective one or as objective one
The same statements can be thought as interpretations as
metaphysical generalization of similar experimentally confirmed
theorems in quantum mechanics:
Theorems about the absence of hidden variables in quantum
mechanics (Neumann 1932; Kochen, Specker 1968)
Free will theorems (Conway, Specker 2006; 2009)

About Neumann 1932; Kochen, Specker 1968

The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics inplies the
identification of the coherent state before measurement and the
statistical ensembles of results after measurement
Therefore it excludes any hidden variable as far as it would distinguish
the former from the latter
The state before measurement should be associated with subjective
probability and our expectation about what will happen
The set of results after measurement should be associated with
objective probability and what has really happen independently of our
expectations
Then the cited theorems imply the identification of subjective &
objective probability

About Conway, Kochen 2006; 2009

That implicit corollary from the former theorems is explicated
strictly and mathematically in the latter theorems meant here
Simon Kochen might be considered as the live link between the
no-hidden-variables and free-will theorems
Conway and Kochen state literally the following:
If the experimenter has free will and a few statements of
quantum mechanics and special relativity are true, the observed
quantum entity (they say an electron) has necessarily free will,
too
In fact, the experimer free will exemplifies subjective
probability, and electron free will objective probability: both
are identified

Experimenter
Eureka!
...then
I should have
free will!!!
Continuum of free will
The sense of
the free will theorems:
If the experimenter
may choose,
then the electron
If...
...then
may choose, too

Electron:

If...

... and in comparison to the classical opposition:

OK, but if I have not,
you have not, too! I have free will,
but you have not!

I find the idea quite intolerable that an electron

exposed to radiation should choose of its own free
will, not only its moment to jump off, but also its
direction. In that case, I would rather be a cobbler,
or even an employee in a gaming-house, than a
physicist.
Albert Einstein1
1 Einstein, A.,

M. Born (1969) Albert Einstein Max Born Briefwechsel 1916 1955 (kommentiert von Max Born). Mnchen:
Nymphenburger, p. 118 (Brief 48/29.04.1924): cited
according to the English translation: The Born Einstein
Letters (transl. I. Born). London, etc.: Macmilan, 1971, p. 82.