Ottoman Port Cities and Foreign Trade

Research Foundation of SUNY
Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives

Author(s): alar Keyder, Y. Eyp zveren and Donald Quataert
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 16, No. 4, Port-Cities of the Eastern
Mediterranean 1800-1914 (Fall, 1993), pp. 519-558
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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Port-Cities
in theOttomanEmpire
Some Theoreticaland HistoricalPerspectives
aglarKeyder,Y. Eypzveren
& Donald Quataert
I
of thetheoreticalperspectivewe adopt,port-cities
in
Regardless
theperipheryemergeas theprivilegedlocales of contactwith
theworldcapitalisteconomy.This is more thana geographicalnecessity.Trade was the principalmechanismof incorporationinto
capitalistcircuits;tradedcommoditiescrossedpoliticalboundaries
by merchants
onlyaftertheywere channelledthroughport-cities
who inhabitedthese same cities. Such commercialcenters had
existedpriorto capitalistexpansion,withinagrarianempires.These
empiresnormallysoughtto establisha closed and compactdivision
oflaborwithintheirboundaries,and, therefore,
attemptedto minimizeeconomic"leaks."Externaltradewas ideallykeptunderstrict
controland regulation,
withtheintentionof reducingitsimpacton
the largereconomy.In fact,an argumentcan be made thatportcitiesthatgainedimportanceduringthecapitalistexpansionof the
fromimperialcomnineteenthcenturywere necessarilydifferent
mercialcentersengagingin administeredtrade. For obvious reasons,a different
spatialorientationof theeconomyrequireddifferent nodes of economic activity.As has oftenbeen remarkedby
mostportsstudiedin conjunctionwith
geographersand historians,
of
(e.g., China, the Ottoman
capitalistpenetration world-empires
different
form
in
existed
very
priorto theirincarnationas
Empire)
trade.
involvedin core-periphery
port-cities
it
is
to
this
backdrop,
easy understandwhyport-cities
Against
XVI,4, FALL1993, 519-58
REVIEW,

519
520
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
constitutea specificobjectofstudy:Theirfatecrystallized
thetransformation
usheredin throughforeignpenetration.
Whetherforeign
tradeand investment
and populationmovementswhichdisturbold
or negbalancesare consideredpositiveelementsof modernization
ativeharbingersof dependency,the port-city
cannotbe ignored.
The port-city
capturedand reflectedin concreteformtheentireepisode of incorporation.
Its physicalappearance,spatiallayout,economic mechanisms,populationdynamics,class structure,
political
aspirationsand culturallifecould onlybe understoodthroughthe
The timingand mode ofincorpoprismof thecolonialintercourse.
rationand responsesto thisstructuration
determinedboththematerialcontoursand the humanecologyof the port-city.
Hence, to
colonialism
is
also
to
study
studyport-cities.
The port-city
was also a human laboratorywithinwhich the
social transformation
conditionedbytheencounterwithexpanding
could
be
observed
in aggrandizedperspective.New types
capitalism
of economic activitybegot new groups of people who obviously
bore littleresemblanceto the pre-incorporation
subjectsof the
the
These
new
concentrated
in
Hence,
port-city.
Empire.
groups
conflictsthatarose betweenthemand variousgroupsowingtheir
existenceto the pre-existing
orderwere concentratedin the portwhich
as
the
locus
commodofconflict.
city,
emerged
Transporting
itiesto and fromtheagrarianperiphery
and theindustrial
core,forand
servants
their
eigners,colonials, merchants,intermediaries,
livedin theport-city
whichservedas theessentialintermediate
stop
and
on
end
of
the
commerconsumers
either
connectingproducers
cial network.The new groupsowed theirexistenceto the function
of mediation they performed.As such, however,they became
transagentswhoappearedto be responsiblefortheuncomfortable
formation
undergoneby thelocal populace.
II
Once we identify
the port-city
as the spatialexpressionof the
we mayalso classifyapproachesto the
core-periphery
relationship,
formerunderthesame rangeof perspectives
thathavebeen adopted to understandimperialism.
If some of thevariantsare collapsed
intotheprincipalcompetingparadigms,we end up withthreeidentifiableapproaches:modernization,
dependency,and class. In this

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
521
ofeach of theseapproaches
section,we willoutlinetheimplications
forthestudyof port-cities.
The modernization
approachto urbandevelopmentbeginswith
the premiseof divergingoriginsof European and "Asian" cities.
The latterwerereplicasof theimperialseat of power,whichrepresentedadministrative
and the culturaldominationof the
authority
GreatTradition.Theyowed theirexistenceto a pre-economiclogic
of politicaldominationand the symbolismof power.The western
city,on the otherhand, obeyedan economiclogic fromits beginit
nings.In fact,it owed its existenceto the economic rationality
of manuembodied.1As the seat of commerceand, subsequently,
the
existence
its
developmentof
eventuallyengendered
facturing,
an economic class whose collectivelabel-bourgeoisie-reflected
withthecity.The bourgeoisiealso fulfilled
theirveryidentification
rulers.Urban adthe territorial
a politicalrole in counterbalancing
of
constituteda firstrehearsal subsequentbourgeois
ministration
It is, of course,one of the staplesof
rule in modernnation-states.
Orientalistthoughtthattheabsenceofurbanautonomy(ultimately
derivingfrombureaucraticcontrolover the Orientalcity)conditioned the absence of resistanceagainstthe sovereignand sancofhis absoluterule(Turner,1978). Hence,
tionedthecontinuation
the Orientalcityremainedthe artificialcreationthatit was, and
neverbecame the theaterof social differentiation.
In thisperspective,the colonialcityemergesas a graftonto an
alien organism(see Elvin,1974; Murphey,1974). Its logic is manifestlyeconomic,its inhabitantsare a new breed of people who
logic thatupholds the politicaland culescape the administrative
tural symbolismpropagatedby the imperialruler. At the same
time,theyembodya new logic and a new irreverencetowardthe
traditionsof the realm.Whoevercomes into contactwiththemis
not onlyexposed to the newpatternsof thoughtand behavior,but
also noticesthe potentialconflictthese engender.It is mostlyminoritieswho become readyreceptorsof the message,because they
cultureand
alienatedfromthedominanttraditional
are sufficiently
possess a nichewhichwillserveto protectthemfromsome of the
1 The classical referenceis Lewis Mumford,The
Cityin History(1961); see also
Weber (1958).

522
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
more unpleasantconsequences of social disapproval.Foreigners,

and minoritiesin contactwiththem,become "agentsof change"
who serveto diffusemodernideas and practicesto the restof the
and immutabilirealm,whichis otherwisecharacterized
bytradition
The
is
where
modern
ideas
and practicty(Hoselitz,1957).
port-city
es become visible and tangible,where the contradictionswith
traditionalmodes of thoughtand behaviorare the mostevident.
In the modernizationparadigm,the diffusion
processoperates
at the level of values and norms,culture,consumptionpatterns,
and politics.The primaryrationale,the economic logic, which
into existencereceiveslittlenotice.Scant atbroughtthe port-city
and to the structentionis paid to the processof peripheralization
the
the
embodies.
effects
of
economic
relation
that
port-city
turing
and thecompleThe relationship
of theport-city
withitshinterland
it instigatesare ignored.The dependency
mentarytransformation
from
a critiqueofthissilenceand employsstrucapproachproceeds
turingand exploitationas the cornerstonesof the analysis.In this
derivesfromthe process of
perspective,the logic of the port-city
The
colonial
cityservesas the conduitbeimperialistexploitation.
are
and theimperialist
tweenitshinterland
core,and itsinhabitants
a
but servantsof foreignimperialists.
constitute
"comprador"
They
Their
class who become aliensto the land and itstrueinhabitants.
impactis essentiallynegativebecause of the role theyplay in enablingexploitation(see thediscussionin Basu, 1985). It is assumed
thatwithoutexploitationtherewouldbe autonomousdevelopment
and transformation;
unableto introduce
compradorsare,therefore,
On the
a positivedialecticintoan essentially
environment.
stagnant
There is no benigndifcontrary,
theyare thebearersof stagnation.
fusionof "modern" behavior,rathera strugglebetweennational
and colonial orders.A politicalprogramreadilyfollows:Compradors must be drivenout in order for nationaldevelopmentto
proceed.
One of the tenetsof the dependencyapproachwas the pervasivenessoftheimperialist
relationship
throughnetworks
linkingthe
In otherwords,the colonialimpact
mtropoleswiththe satellites.2
2 For an
application of dependency to urban sociology,see Timberlake (1985);
Chase-Dunn (1984); Walton (1982).

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
523
was notconfinedto thesiteof foreignpresence,or thewalledportcity.The tentaclesof the capitalisteconomyreachedall cornersof

the peripheralcountry.Once thispenetrationis posited,it is difficultto discovera socialforcewhichwouldbe freeofitsstigma.The
questionof "whowilldrivethecompradorsout" receivesat bestan
ambivalentanswer.If thereis no "national"bourgeoisie,thegroup
thatremainsas a plausiblecandidateis thebureaucracyor theintelIn fact,this
ligentsia,untaintedbycollaborationwiththeforeigners.
logic enjoysa special validityin the case of agrarianempires in
whichtheold bureaucraticelitepreserveda dominancein thestate
administration
despiteincreasingforeignpresence(cf.Trimberger,
"Revolutions-from-above"
1978b).
staged by such elites reacting
in the case of China
successful
were
arguably
againstdependency
and theOttomanEmpire.As wouldbe expected,theserevolutions
resultedin a devaluationof theold colonialcities,whichwereidentifiedwithimperialistpresence.The politicallogic of old or new
capitalcities(ofteninland) once again replaced the economic rationaleembodiedin port-cities.
In whatmaybe calledthe"classapproach,"theproblemoffindagencyis avoided. The foreignpresence is
ing an anti-imperialist
whichresultsin the formationof
as
a
seen
capitalistimplantation
new classes. The merchantsand creditorsthatdependencyterms
in an exploitativerelacompradorsare not simplyintermediaries
the
potentialofevolving
tionshipbetweencountries:Theyalso have
the foreigninto a bourgeoisiein theirown right.By downplaying
the class approach argues that the investment
nativedistinction,
or the minoriundertakenby the foreigners
and economicactivity
contiesdid notdifferfromthoseof thenativenationals.Structural
such
of
direction
and
nature
the
straintswould shape
activity,
talent.
or
of
of
the
entrepreneurial
provenance capital
regardless
recentexample of such revisionismhas been the
One significant
case of interwarEgypt.The dependencyapproachextollingnative
enterpriseforlong had soughttheoriginsof independentdevelopbusinessfollowingthe First
mentin the rise of Moslem-Egyptian
WorldWar. The presenttrendof scholarshiprejectsthisclaimby
thatthe positingof an essentialistconflictbetween
demonstrating
"comprador"and nativebusinessis misleadingand thattherewas,
in fact,a mergerbetweenthe twogroups.Therefore,the process
should be seen as the developmentof a unifiedbourgeoisie(Tig-

524
zveren? Quataert
Keyder,
of bourgeoisdenor,1984; see also Vitalis,1990). The counterpart

of
is
the
formation
a
modern
proletariat,whichwas a
velopment
in
nationalist
For
theclass approach,the
rhetoric.
neglectedgroup
wherenew
is the siteof class formation
and class conflict,
port-city
demandsand new formsof politicsare mostlikelyto arise out of
the creationof a bourgeosie and a proletariat(Quataert, 1983;
Beinin& Lockman,1987).
The perspectiveof the class approachon the preexisting
social
formationalso allowsforan understanding
of the class positionof
thebureaucraticelites.Insteadofvirtuousnationalists
or modernizof the old
bureaucratic
elites
now
as
defenders
ing agents,
emerge
order facinga revoltby the newlyformingbourgeosie (Keyder,
1988; 1987). Once again,the case of the OttomanEmpire,witha
theagrariansurplusin theformof
powerfulbureaucracyextracting
case. Arguably,
itwas thisbureaucracy
taxes,providesan instructive
and finallydeits
class
that
resisted
defending privileged
position
featedthe emergingbourgeoisie.
The developmentof capitalismand of a bourgeoisiewere correlatedwiththe evolutionof port-cities.
Due to theirtradeorientain portcitieswas determinedby
tion,thelevelof economicactivity
the cyclesof developmentof the world capitalisteconomy,and
port-city
prosperitywas an indicationof the momentumof bourgeois development.At some historicalpointduringthisevolution,
the newlyemergingbourgeoisiemayhave feltsufficiently
strongto
establisha degree of independencefromthe foreignrelationship.
As thiscoming-of-age
oftencoincidedwitha downturnin theworldthe
economy, port-city
bourgeoisiewere even willingto relinquish
theirprimarily
commercialnatureand orientthemselvesmore deto
terminedly manufactures.The point is that the commercial
originand genealogyof the bourgeoisiesdo not necessarilycondemnthemto a subordinatepartnership
in trade;thereis nojustification in essentializingthe character,of minority-comprador
or
commercialcapital.As thecontextchangesso do theopportunities
open to capital,and so do thebourgeoisies.
Ill
One majorimplicationof theclassapproachhas been a guiding
hypothesisof the researchpresentedhere. If it is true thatport-

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
525
citiesnurturebourgeoisies,and if,as one of the mostpowerfulof

historical
scenariospredicts,bourgeoisiesbecomepoliticaland want
to transform
thepolitical-ideological
contextthroughchangingthe
state and its administrative
capacities (the bourgeois-revolution
should
we
not
to
model),
bourgeoisiesengaging
expect see port-city
in (revolutionary)
politics?This is especiallyrelevantin the case of
a multiethnic
ideologyand proempirein a periodwhennationalist
forces.
For it is often
are
effective
nationalistgreat-power
pressure
ratherthanmultiethnic
empires,are the
arguedthatnation-states,
and that bourthe
units
of
capitalistworld-system,
appropriate
to
an
geoisiesseeking adequate politicalentity properlyservetheir
needs would targetthe formationof nationalstates.Hence, not
only Greek,Armenian,and otherseparatistmovementsbut also
the Empirealong soverany supremacistattemptat restructuring
to
would
be
ideals
nationalist
expected germinatein the coneign
the most likelyvenues for the politicizationof
textof port-cities,
bourgeoisies.
There are two separateclaimshere, the firstis thatbourgeois
groupsbecome political.There is abundantevidenceconcerning
and not much dissent;the onlyproblemconsuch a politicization
or fervorinvolvedin the process.In
cernsthe degree of militancy
otherwords,were the bourgeoisieswillingto engage in a potenor were theycontentto
tiallyriskychallengeto state authority,
manner?
a
in
demands
individual
confrontation-avoiding
press
to establish,but
There is a corollarywhichmaybe more difficult
Whatwas thedegreeof class conwhichalso requiresinvestigation:
sciousness behind the politicization?The labeling of the social
group in port-citiesas bourgeois does not automaticallyimply
behavior.Whathas to be researchedis the process
class-conscious
and channelsof gaininga sharedconsciousness.A venerabletraditionassertsthatconsciousnessis gainedthroughstruggle.The likely
strugglein thiscase would emergefroma conflictwiththe ruling
class,thebureaucraticelite,wherethebourgeoisiewouldpressdetheireconomic interests.Only aftera series of
mands furthering
such conflictssharpened their perceptionof common interest,
would it be possibleto expectpoliticallyconsciousbehaviorfrom
thebourgeoisie.
The processwherebyconsciousnessis createdwillalso relyon
themoreordinaryinstruments
of culturaland ideologicalpropaga-

526
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
tion.Clubs,journals,secretsocieties,masoniclodges,ethnicand religious associations,as well as more explicitlypoliticalchannels,

such consciousness
and fashioning
servedthepurposeof nurturing
intellecduringthe prewarperiod.The nationalistor separationist
tuals were alwayspresent,independentof the sympathetic
receptionof theirideas- preciselybecause thiswas a periodin worldhistorywhen such currentswere supreme.Hence, the questionwas
whethertheseideas formingbourgeoisconsciousnesswouldbe accommodated.
The second claimimplicitin the bourgeoisrevolutionscenario
and its nationalistextensionis thatthe struggleof the bourgeoisie
movements.In other
constitutes
the motorof nationalist-separatist
evolveinto
words,bourgeoisclass consciousnessand politicization
demandsforbourgeoisnationalstates.This modelwouldlead us to
expectMaronitemerchantsin Beirutto mobilizeto forma "Lebanese" state;Greekmerchantsin Izmiror Trabzon,orJewishmerchantsin Salonica to engage in secessionistand state-building
politicalactivity.
But,of course,such expectationsare too naive,and
colored by our retrospectiveknowledge that nation-statestriumphedin the post-1918world.In historicalfact,thebourgeoisies
seem to have behaved pragmatically,
supportingcauses thatconformedto theirinterestsin the shortor the mediumrun.Among
alternatives
to theindependentnationalstatesthatthebourgeoisies
have
entertainedwere demandsforgreaterautonomywithmight
out secession,city-state
independence,or evencolonialaccommodations.3Independent national states did historicallyemerge, but
oftenin distheirmajorproponentswere,in fact,theintelligentsia,
cordancewiththebourgeoisie.
scenariowas thehisfromthebourgeois-nationalist
Evenfarther
toricalevolutionwherebyimperialistpowerswere the veryarchitectsof new nation-states
emergingout of the partitionof moribund empires.Thus, it was leftto postwartreatiesto draw the
boundariesof new states,to createthemon the basis of imagined
and
and suspectreportsof hastilyformedcommissions,
affiliations
to forcelarge-scalemovementsof peoples in the hope of creating
3 See Hobsbawm
(1977) foran argumenton the historicalcontingencyof the nationalistobject.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
527
morehomogeneouspopulationswithinnewboundaries.4Whether
or notthebourgeois-revolution
scenariois a usefulresearchagenda
in the case of the periphery,its couplingwithnationalistmovementssupposedlyled bya state-forming
bourgeoisieis less obviousso.5
In
the
case
of
the
of the OttomanEmpire,
dismemberment
ly
bureaucraticreactionto imperialism,the designs of imperialists
and the diffuseimpactof the nationalist
themselves,
(all of
Zeitgeist
as
whichwe willbe discussedbelow),seemto be at leastas important
of nation-states.
in explainingtheformation
bourgeoisnationalism
we will
In orderto further
elaboratesome of thesecontentions,
firstdiscuss the dimensionsof Ottomaneconomictransformation
activities.
in port-city
and itsreflection
century
duringthenineteenth
IV
At the outsetof the nineteenthcentury,the ancientOttoman
Empirewas on the eve of its finalpoliticaland economictransformation.As a world-empire
spanningthe Mediterraneanworld in
theOttomanstatehad been a largelyself-susthesixteenthcentury,
fewgoods withthe outside
tainingeconomy,exchangingrelatively
world. By 1800, the power had long vanished,and autarkywas
quicklyfadingintomemory.The Empirewas startingon itsextensiveprogramofpoliticalreform,
focussingon thecardinaltenetsof
The Ottomaneconomy,for its
and westernization.
centralization
part,continuedits ongoingevolutionfroman autarkicto a freemarketeconomy.In an importantdevelopmentof the late eightforexample,Europeanpowerspriedloose theOttoeenthcentury,
manhold on theBlackSea and made itan open economiczone. As
part of a desperateeffortto marshallresources,betweenc. 1750
and the 1810's, the state imposed a host of controlmechanisms
thatseem harsherand more rigid
over trade and manufacturing
of
thanthoseof the classicalage the Empire.6Soon afterthesere4 The Wilsonian
principleswere takento heartin the Middle East; argumentsbased
on populationwere paramounton the nationalistagenda since the Sykes-Picottreaty.
5 The more recent Marxistwork is closer to the modernizationist
approach to
fromGellnationalism.See Anderson(1983), wherethe argumentis not verydifferent
ner (1983).
6 See thevariousarticles Mehmet
Gen, especially(1984), and see Akarli(1986).
by

zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
528
strictive
deviceswerein place,however,thestateshifteddirectionin favorof a freereconomy.The 1826 destruction
of theJanissaries
eliminatedthe armedsupportersof theguildsand theirprivileges,
thus facilitating
the destructionof the guild monopoliesthathad
been encouragedand supportedby the stateduringthepreceding
The 1838 Anglo-Turkish
Conventionand theImperial
half-century.
Decree of Gulhanein 1839 followed.The 1838 treatyis commonly
consideredto have removedthebarriersimpedingtheflowof British (and more generallyEuropean) goods into the OttomanEmpire.The second setforth,in generalterms,thereformagenda that
theOttomanstatewouldfollowformuchof thecentury.In various
ways,both continuedthe processof undermining
monopoliesand
two
sets of actions
restrictions
on economicactivity.
the
Together,
directionthatthe
indicatedthe new,classicallyliberallaissez-faire
economypursueduntiljust beforethe FirstWorldWar,whendisgruntledOttomanelitessoughtto reversethe patternby adopting
nationaleconomicpolicies.
that ocAs in other peripheralregions,the transformations
curredwithintheOttomaneconomyduringthenineteenth
century
These
were reflectedin the rise and prosperity
of the port-cities.
of
which
in
their
mark
the
changes,
totality
ongoingincorporation
the Ottomaninto the world-economy,
were trulyexceptionaland
deservetheattentionlavishedupon themin thisissueand in theliteratureon Middle East economichistory.
Theyexhibittheprocess
of theincorporation
of theMiddleEasterneconomyand thefading
of
the
that
characterizedan earlierage.7
away
autarky
Beforeproceedingfurther,
we shouldnotethatthehistoricalliteraturehas paid insufficient
attentionto (1) the internaldynamics
of Ottomaneconomiclifeand (2) theelementsof continuity
in the
The representation
oftheOttoeconomyofthenineteenth
century.
man actorson the economicstageremainstoo shadowy:We know
too littleabout theiractual activitiesand how domesticobjectives
and considerationstemperedtheirdecisions. In the absence of
more detail concerningits innerworkingsand internaldynamics,
our viewof the Ottomaneconomyremainstoo much thatof the
outsiderlookingin. For example,it is importantto note thatthe
7 For
example, see Pamuk (1987) and othersources cited therein.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
529
Ottomansremainedtheirown best customers.This is anotherway

of sayingthatthe value of intraempiretrade,c. 1914, surpassed
thatof international
commerce,even thoughthe latterhad risen
availand is more amplyrecordedin currently
quite impressively
the
within
able documents.The exchangeof manufactured
goods
Empireremainedvibrantand important.In the industrialsector,
manychangeshad takenplace, drivenby a combinationof factors,
lossesand Europeanindustrialization.
Marketing
notably,territorial
networksconnectingthe northernand southerncoastal zones of
the BlackSea werebrokenwiththe expansionof the Russianstate
between
and itsprotectionist
exchangenetworks
policies.Similarly,
the Ottomanprovincesof Serbia,Greece and Bulgariawere fractureddue to territorial
losses.As Manchesterrose and exportedits
cottonyarnand textiles,Kayserimerchantsno longerboughtcotton in Adana forspinningat Amasya.
Althoughmanynetworkscollapsed,otherssurvived.In 1914,
in
Aleppo stillshipped major quantitiesof its textileseverywhere
what remainedof the Empire and to Egypt.Newlyindependent
Bulgariacontinuedto sell importantquantitiesof itswool clothto
Anatoliancustomers.The fewOttomanfactoriesthatwere estabor establishednewones of
lishedsometimesfitintooldernetworks
cottonin thenewmillsof
domesticexchange.Adana machine-spun
of those
the late nineteenthcenturywas sold to the grandchildren
Anacentral
and
in
northern
of
cotton
who had been handspinners
shoresof Anatotoliaand to newconsumerson theMediterranean
to
have
believed
lia. The Bursasilkclothindustry,
declined,in
long
factended the centurywithrecord-high
productionlevels,forsale
to Ottomanconsumers.These examplessuggestthecontinuingiminto
wellafterOttomanincorporation
portanceofinternalmarkets,
theworld-economy.
V
commercein theeastern
and flowofinternational
The structure
Mediterranean
centuryunderwentimportant
duringthenineteenth
and western
trade
grewimpressively
changes.Simplyput, foreign
relative
(as well as central)Europe came to play an ever-greater
role. The value of trade increased(in constantterms)some nine
more in importsthanin extimesbetween1840 and 1914, slightly

530
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
ports.By 1914, the vastmajorityof Ottomanand easternMediterraneantradefocussedon GreatBritain,France,Germany,AustriaHungary,and Italy,and thediplomaticagentsofthosestatesplayed

political
commensurately
powerfulrolesin Ottomaninternalaffairs,
as wellas economic.In a centuryof steadyincreasesin trade,there
were two periods of real boom. The firstoccurredbetweenthe
1840's and the 1870's and thesecond tookplace at the turnof the
sustainedgrowth,the
century.Duringthefirstperiodof significant
doubled
in each decade.
trade
so-calledmid-Victorian
boom,
nearly
This was due in partto theverysmallinitialtradebase fromwhich
output(and exports)readilyexpanded to feed workersin the incountriesand armiesin the Crimeanand the Ameridustrializing
can civilconflicts.
In thisperiod,Ottomanexportand foreigntrade
rates
exceeded
growth
globalrates.This era was thetrueheydayof
the port-cities
in the easternMediterranean.
The second boom bewith
the
climb
in
agricultural
pricesafter1896.
gan
sharp
The EuropeanprovincesoftheEmpirehad forcenturiesranked
firstin international
tradebut lost thispositionwiththe ongoing
withand
military
politicaldefeatsthatled to massiveterritorial
drawals.The remnantsof theseprovincesremainedcomparatively
wealthyand important;in 1912, the value of the tradeof Salonica
alone surpassedthatof Trabzon and Samsun combinedand was
about double thatof Beirut.8Anatoliahad assumed firstplace in
Ottomaninternational
tradearound the midcentury
point.At that
some
of
all
British
to
the
Middle
75%
time,
East,including
exports
Izmir.
Thereafwestern
Anatolia,
Egypt,passed through
particularly
the
the
Arab
volume
of
international
trade
in
ter,
provincesgrew
the mostrapidly,but was stillwellbelow thatof AnatoliaimmediatelybeforetheFirstWorldWar.Iraqi seabornetradeincreased37
timeswhilethatof Syriarose 20 timesbetween1840 and 1914.
At the end of the century,the port-cities
of Izmir,Beirut,Saloand
Trabzon
accounted
for
of
total
Ottomantrade re46%
nica,
ported in officialsources.9Between1800 and 1914, the totalvolume of shippingat Beirutrose froman estimated40 tonsto 1,700
8
Compare commercialstatisticsin Issawi (1988: 154-55) and Issawi (1980: 82).
9 See
Turkey(1327: 160-61). This officialsource,however,does not listimportant
ports such as Samsun. At this date some 90% of all commercewas carried in European-ownedships.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
531
tons while its value rose eight-fold

between the 1820's and the
1910's. In Izmir,the increasewas 22-fold,from100 to 2,200 tons
between1800 and 1914,whilethevalue rose four-fold
betweenthe
1840's and 1910's. Trabzon shipping,in the period 1800-1914,
climbedfrom15 to 500 tons,as the value increasedseven times
from1840 to 1912 (data in Issawi,1988; 1980). The majorportimboom or
provementsoccurredeitherverylate in themid-Victorian
Great
afterwardsand withoutexception were foreign-financed.
quays were built at Salonica and Izmir during the 1860's and
some twoand fourkilometersin length.As late
1870's,respectively
as the 1880's the portof Beirut,whichwas the best in the region,
averagedonly two metersin depth-at a time when the average
steamshipexceeded 1,000tons.Duringthesubsequentdecade, foreign capital deepened the harbor and improvedother port facilities.
in developingraillinkagesto itshinterIzmirled the port-cities
land. During the thirdquarterof the century,the great Aegean
railsystem(outsideofEgypt)
portpossessedthemostsophisticated
When completed,theselines traced
in the easternMediterranean.
in iron the richrivervalleysof itshinterland.The railroadarrived
at Salonica duringthe early1870's; othersfollowedbetween1888
to
and 1896, includinglines thatlinkedthe Macedonianport-city
Istanbul.Now the railheadof threelines,Salonica boomed at the
end of thecentury.Samsunand Patraswiththeirtobacco-and currants-driven
growthand Beirut, where total tonnage doubled
between1895 and 1910,wereequallysuccessful.In a different
patboom;
tern,Trabzonhad reacheditspeak duringthemid-Victorian
afterthisperiod,it lost its positionto Samsun,mainlybecause its
commercewas mostlytransittrade,and it did not commandthe
surplusesof a large hinterland.The commercialgrowthof Izmir
was largelyoverby 1870,and 40 yearslatertradelevelshad scarcely
changed.In the interval,the relativeimportanceof Izmirdeclined,
fromaround 30% to 20% of the totalOttomanforeigntrade.But
the citycontinuedto prosperand the end of the centurywas a
golden age of commerceand culturefor its Greek population.
Salonica ship tonnagerose fromone milliontons in the 1880's to
twomillionsby 1912. A railroadforPatras,one of severaltransport
at thesame timeas the
fortheport,was constructed
improvements
rail connectionof Salonica. Beirut firstimprovedits road con-

532
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
nectionswithDamascusin the 1860's and builtitsrailroadslater,in

the mid 1890's. Firstat Izmirand then at Salonica, the railroads
rolleddirectly
intotheportareas.At Beirut,however,theterminus
remaineda full mile fromthe harbor,sharplyraisingtransport
absent
costs.In Trabzonand Samsun,railroadsremainedaltogether
beforetheFirstWorldWar,perhapsa functionoftheirveryrugged
hinterlands,
strongRussianopposition,and,in thecase ofTrabzon,
economic
fortunes.
declining
VI
at theoutset
The structureof tradewas alreadywell-established
of the centuryand changedlittleover the period. The Ottomans
purchased manufacturedand colonial goods, witha tendencyto
more of the latterduringthe second halfof
buy proportionately
the century.In exchange,the Ottomaneconomysupplied mainly
foodstuffs
and raw materials.The risingexporttrade was based
chieflyon agriculturalcommodities,secondarilyon mineralproducts,and in a distantthirdplace, on theshipmentof certainmanumineralexportswereimporfacturedgoods. Amongtheport-cities,
tantonlyforIzmir,and theydevelopedlate in the period.Most of
and operated and
the extractiveindustrieswere foreign-owned
orientedto international
therewas an inexports.In agriculture,
commercialization
over
the
as
a
forsale in
whole,
creasing
period
both domesticand international
markets.On the domesticside of
demand,the urban populationrose,both in relativeand absolute
terms.Most of this increasewas due to the growthof the portand rawmatericities,and requiredincreasedsuppliesoffoodstuffs
als.
Internationaldemand,forits part,had accountedforperhaps
8% of totalOttomanagrarianoutputin theearlierpartof thenineteenthcentury,c. 1840. By the 1880's, the exportedshare had
nearlydoubled,to as muchas 15% while,by 1914,itreachedabout
one-fifth
of totalagricultural
output(Pamuk,1987: 39-40). In some
selected areas, the exportablesurplusderivedfromrelatively
advanced agriculturaltechnologycombinedwithlarge estates.The
Adana plain in southeasternAnatolia(via its port of Mersin)and
Hama in the Syrianprovincesare notable examples.In most of
Anatoliaand in the lands behindBeirut,however,smallplotspre-

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
533
vailed and furthersubdivisionof propertyoccurredlater in the

or of
silkindustry,
period.Here, thedemandsof theexport-driven
Almost
tobacco,lefta lastingimprinton local landholdingpatterns.
in the Ottomanlands,familiesworkingsmallplots aceverywhere
countedforthebulkof theexportedoutput.Dependingon conditionsduringthatparticularyear,verymanyof themgrewadditional cropsor raisedextraanimalsforsale.
It was oftenthe merchantswithlinksdeep intothe countryside
who purchasedgoods forshipmentto Ottomanurban consumers
and to foreignmarkets.In some areas,caravaneers,sometimesacting on theirown behalfand at othertimesformerchantsof both
travelledabout buyingthe surplus.The
interiorand port-cities,
withcreditoftenobtained
urbannotablewho providedcultivators
marketing
rightsto theirsurplusin partialcompensation.Agriculturalproductssubmittedas paymentfortaxes(on eithercrops or
animals,for example, the tithe/ojror animal tax/agnamvergisi)
formeda verysignificant
proportionof marketedagrarianproduction.Here again,theurbannotablesused theirpowerto obtaintax
farmsthatwerecentralto manymarketing
operations.In some instances,foreigncompaniescontracteddirectlywithcultivatorsto
became morecommon
buytheirsurplus.This kindof relationship
later in the centurybut stillremainedrelativelyrare. The MacAndrewsand Forbes Company,for example,procuredliquorice
rootin westernAnatoliaand Syria.The AmericanTobacco Company became a powerfulmarketforce in many areas, althoughit
began itsOttomanoperationsonlyverylate in theperiod.Overall,
was markedmore by its diversity
Ottomancommercialagriculture
than its specialization.Most cultivatorsgrew a wide varietyof
and industrial
cereals,fruits,
crops.Monoculture-suchas in Egypt's
cottonagricultureand the Beiruthinterland'srelianceon raw silk
production-remainedexceptional.But, as in the case of large estatesin thehinterlandof Izmirand Salonica,theexceptionalin the
Empirewas sometimesthe normforthe port-cities.
withworlddein rhythm
The exportmixchangedconsiderably
mand and foreigncompetition.Over the course of the century,
grapevines,cotton plants,and even olive trees were alternately
plantedand uprooted,dependingon the market.Cottonexports
fromIzmir and Adana jumped substantially
during the United
StatesCivilWar and thecottoncrisisof theearlytwentieth
century.

534
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
in Samsun,tobaccobecame theleadingexport,thanksto
Similarly,
theboom in Americandemand.By 1914, tobaccohad become the
leadingOttomanexport.On the otherhand, the role of grainsin
In part,this
Ottomanexportsfellverysharplyafterthemidcentury.
districts
for
resultedfromtheloss ofsome important
grain-growing
dethe
measure
the
Rumanian
But
in
example,
principalities.
larger
cline derived fromthe emergenceof more efficientproducers,
notablythe UnitedStatesand Russia,thatcapturedhuge sharesof
the world market.Similarly,the Ottoman contributionto the
world'ssupplyof opium diminished,due to growingand cheaper
and sometimescritical
suppliesfromEast Asia. Once an important
supplier of certaincommodities,by the end of the nineteenth
century,the Empire,in almost all the commoditiesit exported,
merelyfilledsmall niches in the internationaleconomy.In one
small) quantitiesof wheat,
year,it mightsupplyneeded (relatively
or
rose
the
attar;during subsequentyear,it mightmakeup
grapes,
smallglobal shortagesin barley,figsand olive oil. Only "Turkish"
tobaccoplayeda significant
role,and thatat theend of thecentury.
VII
In regardsto exportsof manufactured
goods,thestorychanges
fromdeclineto growthwhenthe focusshiftsfromthe destruction
whichstartedin the mid-eighteenth
of
centuryto theperformance
the second halfof the nineteenthcentury.An accountingof manufacturing
exportsbeginningc. 1750 clearlyrevealsa patternof lost
international
markets.Ottomanclothand yarnexportsfelldramatically,includingthose of red cottonthread,as well as silkand mohairclothand finally
mohairyarnitself.Mostofthelosses in export
manufactures
had alreadybeen sustainedby 1850. Thereafter,
a vaof
new
industries
The
Beirut
hinterland
and
riety
export
emerged.
theBursa regionin westernAnatoliaprovidednotablequantitiesof
silk"thread"(raw silk),Beirutsomewhatless thanBursa. The two
regionstogetheraccountedforperhaps1% of the world'srawsilk
needs betweenthe 1870's and the FirstWorldWar. In the reeling
millsaround Bursa,some 19,000 personsworkedpart-or full-time
whileanother14,000 workedin the Lebanese mills.In both cases,
almostall theworkerswerefemale.Stillmore importantin the exporttradewere Ottomancarpets.In Anatolia,at the period'send,

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
535
some 60,000 persons,also largelyfemale,laboredin carpetmaking,

almostexclusively
forexportto Europe and the UnitedStates.In
home industriesprovided"Irish"lace and emaddition,important
broideredgoods to European consumers.All of these Ottoman
exportindustriesgrewduringthesecond halfof theperiod.In the
thisgrowthwas in part
examplesofcarpets,lace, and embroideries,
due to the industrializing
West's penchantfor handmade goods
thesegoods were
reminiscent
of a nonstandardized
past.Ironically,
typicallyproduced frommachine-made,usuallyimported,yarns.
But mostof all, theOttomanexportindustrieswerelabor-intensive
foundedand expandingthanksto wage rates thatwere
activities,
standards.Not
low,both by Ottomanand international
extremely
in
was
concentrated
little
of
this
coincidentally,
very
exportindustry
the port-cities,
althoughalmost all of it was organizedand controlledfromthere.The merchantsof thesecitiesmarketedtheproduct and paid the labor forcewhichlived in the hinterlandand
continuedto engagein agriculture.
werequite diverseand, by eastThe industriesof theport-cities
ernMediterranean
mechanized,holdinga high
standards,relatively
of
the
inanimately
powered machineryin the region.
proportion
of
the
most
in
industryfocusedeitheron support-cities,
Initially,
goods forexport.
plyingthe city'sneeds or processingagricultural
In addition,generallylaterin theperiod,a fewimportsubstitution
makingdurablegoods emerged,forexample,a nailfacenterprises
toryin Salonica and iron foundriesin Izmir and Patras. Thus,
estabflourmills,olivepresses,and food-processing
steam-powered
common.Izmiralso had factoriesforpackwererelatively
lishments
a large tobacco factory;Patras
contained
Salonica
while
ing figs,
involvedin currantprocontainedseveralfactoryestablishments
cessing.Lightindustriesflourishedin Patrasafter1875, including
wineand alcoholproduction,silk-spinning
mills,and evensome silk
weaving.The industrialcomplexof Salonica was perhapsthe most
impressive.Duringthe mid-1870's, the Salonica silk industryhad
950 workerswith475 reels in 18 factories(see Gounaris,in this
boom ofthe 1880's,some 20
issue).Then,duringtherail-promoted
factoriesopened, includinga distillery,soap factories,and a
Trabzon,by contrast,possessed a meagerindustile/brick
factory.
trialbase but, in common withSalonica and Beirut,had several
substitutedforimports
soap factories.Most of the manufacturing

536
zveren? Quataert
Keyder,
and cateredto urbandemand. However,port-cities

soon emerged
as regional manufacturing
centersas well. Late in the century,
and
Salonica
all
builtcottonand wool-spinning
mills
Patras,Izmir,
thatexportedyarnsto theirhinterlandsand elsewhere.Trabzon,
forits part,sold smallquantitiesof silkclothalong the Anatolian
shoresof the BlackSea.
This diversification
of industry
pointsto an importantdevelopment(increasingeconomicautonomythroughthedevelopmentof
industries)in at least some port-cities
during
importsubstitution
thelate nineteenthcentury.For muchof theperiod,theprosperity
of these citieshad depended on the success of the harvest.Good
and theirmiddlemento buyimports.
crop sales enabledcultivators
Poor sales spelled depressed importsand bad business. For an
agrarianeconomysuch as the Ottoman,thisis scarcelya surprise:
We wouldexpectto finda veryclose linkbetweenagricultural
conditionsand international
werebecoming
trade.Butsome port-cities
to
autonomousof local crop cycles.It seems significant
relatively
note that Salonican exports stagnatedafter 1899 but imports
a decade. The same typeofpatboomed,doublingin approximately
ternrecurredin Beirutand perhapsat Patrasas well.10The economies of at least Salonica and Beiruthad become independentof
the local crop cyclesof theirhinterlands.If thisis true,thenperhad changed,or was changing.
haps thefunctionoftheseport-cities
That is, theiroriginalfunctionas a two-way
conduitforinternational tradewas decreasingin importance.Theywereconduitsbutwere
also more than that.They evolvedin a varietyof ways,acquiring
more complexfunctions.In the exampleshere,theybecame small
centers with varyingsets of relationships,some
manufacturing
enclosedwithintheport-city
properand othersreachingout to surNow
roundingregions.
possessinga diverse,complex (modern)
itselfbecame a significant
economy,theport-city
buyerofimported
connections
to
its
own
hinterland
and strengthgoods, weakening
eningthosewithEurope. At thesame time,however,thepotential
of an hinterland-directed
activitywas evolving.In
manufacturing
these
seem
to
have
balance,
developments
promotedthelikelihood
10The same
patternwas probablypresentin Izmir,althoughthe case of Trabzon
is less certain.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
537
of thesecities'merchantsplayinga majorpoliticalrole in thestatebuildingprojectsof thelate and post-Ottoman

periods.
VIII
The populationof theOttomanEmpire,excludingEgypt,grew
at approximately
0.8% annuallybetween1800 and 1914. Much of
theincreaseoccurredbetween1875 and 1895,whenthepopulation
rose some 40 percent.Decreases in diseases,notablytheplague,as
well as improvements
in sanitation,medical care, transportation,
and communication
playeda role. The bulk of the net population
however,
gain,
probablyderivedfromtwosources:(1) theimmigrationofMoslemrefugees,thosefleeingfromonce-independent
printribes
of
settlement
the
and
Russia
(2)
by
conquered
cipalities
(Karpat,1985: 57). The flightof formerRussiansubjects,in combinationwiththeemigrationof OttomanMoslemsfromlostprovinces to theremnantsof theEmpire,shiftedthedemographicbalance
decisivelyawayfromthe OttomanChristians.In the 1820's, forexample,Muslimsalreadyaccountedfor60% ofall Ottomansubjects;
lossesin Serbia,Greece,Bulgaria,Rubythe 1890's,afterterritorial
fora record76% of thetotal
accounted
Muslims
and
so
on,
mania,
Ottomanpopulation(Karpat,1985: 72).
oftengrewat spectacular
The populationsof some port-cities
in Beirutjumped fromfewerthan
rates.The numberofinhabitants
10,000in 1800 to an estimated150,000in 1914,whileAlexandria's
populationrose from15,000 to 300,000. Izmirgrewmore slowly,
but froman enormousbase, increasingfrom100,000 to 300,000.
Salonicaperhapstripledin size,to c. 150,000personsbetween1800
and 1912. The huge demographicincreasesof theport-cities
probnot
but
in
decline
the
accelerated
some,
occurring
population
ably
all, inland urban centers.The growthof Salonica and its developmentas a rail center,forexample,drainedawaythe economy
fellby
and populationof Edirne,wherethe numberof inhabitants
of
The
the
nineteenth
20% during
vitality intercentury. continuing
regionaltrade assured,however,thatthe populationsof most inland townsdid notfallduringthenineteenth
century(Issawi,1980:
34-35, populationtable).
in part derivedfrom
The populationgrowthof the port-cities
thefactorsmentionedabove,forexample,sanitationimprovements

538
zverenf Quataert
Keyder,
and refugeemigration.These entreptsgenerallyofferedmuch

betterthanaveragehealthand medicalcare. Such healthimprovementswere due as muchto the local merchantcommunities'own
efforts
as to the overallreformprogramof the Ottomanstate.But
theirtradingfunctionsalso made these citiesloci of disease and,
for much of the period, theymighthave been less healthythan
otherurbancentersof the region.
The populationof the port-cities
grewat such incrediblerates
mainlybecause theireconomic opportunitiesattractedmigrants
fromEurope, fromthe Mediterraneanbasin,and fromthe Ottoman interior.Foreignersformeda significant
proportionof the
totalpopulace of some cities,such as Izmir,wheretheyaccounted
fora fullone-quarterof the inhabitantsin the 1880's and 1890's
(see Kasaba and zveren,in thisissue). Izmiralso acted as a magnet, pullinglarge numbersof Greeks fromthe Archipelagoand
fromcentralAnatolia.Duringthe 1890's,OttomanChristianscomprised30% of thetotalIzmirpopulationand thusformed,withthe
thedominantgroupin thecity.Salonicareceivedimporforeigners,
War of
tantnumbersof Moslem refugeesafterthe Russo-Turkish
1877-78; manyGreeksmigratedfromthe hinterland,whileSlavs
moved therefromwar-torn
Macedonia in the 1890's. Even so, the
historically
importantJewishpopulationremaineddominant,accencountingfor55% of thetotalpopulationin theearlytwentieth
of
all
Salonica
their
formed
about
one-third
for
Moslems,
tury.
part,
residents.Beirutdrewon its immediatehinterlandformostof its
less
population;hence, foreignerswere numericallyinsignificant,
than2% of itsinhabitants
1983:
(Fawaz,
50-52).11
therefore,these cities were predominantly
Characteristically,
Christianand foreign(orJewishin the specialcase of Salonica). In
the Empireoverall,however,non-Moslemsformednot more than
one-quarterto one-thirdof the totalpopulation.Once again, the
port-citiesnorm is the Ottomanexception.In the cases of both
Izmirand Beirut,Christianshad been an important
segmentof the
from
the
population
veryearlydays. By
beginningof the 1870's,
morethanone-halfof all BeirutiswereChristianand, amongthese,
11The
population of Samsun duringthe 1880's was about evenlydividedbetween
Muslimsand Christians.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
539
the GreekOrthodoxformedthe largestsinglegroup (zveren,in

thepopulation
thisissue;Fawaz,1983: 50). But,in otherport-cities,
were
had been primarily
Moslem,and onlythroughimmigration
these cities transformed
into Christiancenters.In Salonica, the
Moslemproportionfellfromperhaps50% to about 30% between
1800 and 1914. The exclusiveChristianpresence in Patras obviously also reflectsthe flightof Muslimsfollowingthe successful
in TrabGreekWar of Independence.The populationdistribution
there
zon, however,does standout as an anomaly.The inhabitants
Moslemuntil1860 and around55% durwerenearlythree-quarters
highfigures.Here, perhaps,we see
ingthe1870's-1890's-relatively
the impactof the continuingrole of Trabzonas a transit-trade
city
overlandroutes.
on long-distance
These distribution
patternsin the populationreflectChristian
trade. Foreign
and foreigndominationof Ottomaninternational
merchants,who had been crucial in its formationand growth,
tradetowardstheend of the
probablycontrolledmostinternational
was
Their
number
quitesmall;forexample,the
century.
eighteenth
19 leadingtradecentersin the easternMediterraneanat the time
containedonly 150 Britishor Frenchmerchanthouses. But then,
trade exploded duringthe firstdecades of the new
international
centuryand, as thisoccurred,OttomanChristianmerchantsgraduallybegan to replacetheirformerforeignpatrons.There were412
Ottomanmerchantsregisteredin themajorOttomancitiesin 1815
and some 1,300 of themtwenty
yearslater(Bagis,1983: 93). Interwas
dominated
nationaltrade
by OttomanGreeksand Armenians
for the remainderof the century,while the role of Moslems reIn Izmir,foreignershad a greaterimpormained unimportant.12
tance,as did Jewishmerchantsin the lifeof Salonica. The trade
matand itshinterland,
betweena port-city
however,was a different
same
the
be
of
to
tended
the
merchants
ter,and here
religionas
of theinlandpopulation.Moslemmerchantsdominatthemajority
ed the tradeof IzmirwithwesternAnatolia,whileBeirutiMoslems
12The
is sugpredominantrole of these two Christiangroups in manyport-cities
gested by a governmentsurveytaken at the end of the period, one thatenumerated
over 1,000 officially
registeredmerchantsdoing businessin the capitalcityof Istanbul.
Foreignersand Muslimstogetherformedonly 13% of the total(Turkey,1911).

540
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
controlledthe tradewithDamascus and Baghdad (Kasaba, in this

issue; Fawaz,1983: 50).
IX
It can readilybe imaginedthatthe exceptionthatwas the portcitiesintroduceda newvariablein Ottomanpoliticswhichcould be
difficult
to contain.Alongvariousdimensionseconomicactivity,
populationdynamics,religiouscompositionintroducedradport-cities
icallynewsetsof elementswhichdid notfindreadyaccommodation
in thepoliticaluniverseof Ottomanrulers.To betterevaluatethedimensionsof the anomalyand the contradictions
it gave rise to, we
willnowattemptto locateport-city
a generaldiswithin
developments
cussionofnineteenth-century
transformations
in
theEmpire.
political
Followingthesuccessfulrecentralization
duringthefirstthirdof
the nineteenthcentury,
thegoverningclass of the Empireengaged
in a series of politicaland administrative
reformsdesignedto enhance the likelihoodof theirown survivalas rulers.This was a difficulttask,however,principally
because, by thistime,the Empire
was integrally
involvedin the intricatedynamicsof the European
interstatesystem.Withinthissystem,the prevalentbalances had
evolvedto permitGreatBritain,now the unchallengedhegemonic
power, to emerge as a guarantorof the Sultan, preferringthe
of Istanbulto the dismemberment
of the Empire.
strengthening
Britishsupportwas ambivalent,
in
that
the
however,
quidproquo often involvedreformswhich would underminethe rule of the
bureaucracy.In extendingthegeographicallimitsofliberalism,the
Britishstatepressed forpoliticaland economiclibertiesand, indiof the administrative
rectly,forthe dismantlement
logic.Fromthe
of
view
of
the
as
the
carrieda
point
bureaucracy well,
prescription
veryrealthreatbecause,eveniftheBritishcureeventually
strengthened the centralauthority,
it apparentlydid not serveto maintain
the class positionof the rulingelite.The reformshelped createactivitiesand groupswhichwouldeventually
underminebureaucratic
rulebased on a peasantry-controlled
and a stable
agrarianstructure
tax funneledto the state. As the reformsgraduallyratifiedthe
transformation
thatthe economywas undergoing,thebureaucrats
as wellwereforcedto changetheirobjective:fromconservatism
to
controlledtransformation
(Keyder,1988).

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
541
Bureaucraticreformism
coincidednotonlywithBritishinterests
but also withan upturnin theworld-economy
thatseemed to fulfil
the promisesunderlyinggreateropenness to Europe. Until the
1870's,progresswas smooth,volumeoftradeincreased,loans were
albeit withgreaterdifficultyand power seemed to
forthcomingshiftfromthePalace to thePorte,theseat of thebureaucracy.The
unintendedconsequencesof reformsalso accumulatedduringthis
period,in theformof growingsocial conflictbetweentherisinginand theMosclassof minority
merchantsand financiers
termediary
lempopulation,whichwasbecomingrelatively
peasantized.Moslem
weregraduallybeingeliminatedas non-Moslemintermemerchants
diariesgained ground.13Throughtrade and the widerincorporationof the countryside,
peasanthouseholdsbecame more market
thathad characthe self-sufficiency
oriented.As peasantsforfeited
terizedrurallifeforcenturies,theybecame morevulnerable.Their
in the new divisionof labor oftenimpliedrelinquishparticipation
activitiesin favorof a specializationthat
ing some nonagricultural
the marketnow demanded.
of theEmpirereflectedtheimplicitconThe agrarianstructure
flictbetweentheimperialrulingclass and themerchantswho were
The old legal and
theproductof the new economicincorporation.
tendedto imposestrictlimitson theexpanframework
institutional
on thedegreeofOttomanincorporasion ofexports,and therefore
tion into the world market.Even under the accommodationof
balancesbetweenthepeasantthecustomary
bureaucraticreforms,
as
and
the
state, underpinnedby the declared ideologyof the
ry
of thedimade expropriation
rulingclass and thelegal framework,
of the early
Afterthe recentralization
rectproducerverydifficult.
whichmeantthe reversalof a feudalization
nineteenthcentury,
dynamic thathad startedwiththe rise of a group of local notables
knownas the ayan, new legislationconcerningagrariantenurial
practicestended to accommodateand ratifythe existingstate of
In otherwords,the bureaucracywere not willingto ushaffairs.14
and concentration.One
er in a new episode of land privatization
consequence of this historicalchoice was that worldsignificant
13See Kasaba
(1988) fora discussionof the westernAnatoliancontext.
14The 1858 Land Code has been
See Barkan
interpretations.
subjectto conflicting
(1940) and Gerber (1987).

542
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
marketincorporationhad to evolve on the basis of an agrarian

structurewhich was overwhelmingly
characterizedby the dominance of small owners.As the marketpenetratedfurther,these
familyfarmsbecame commercializedand adapted to whatmaybe
called a petty-commodity-producing
universe(Keyder,1983).
and
Althoughincorporation trademayproceed on thebasis of
imposesa
petty-commodity
production,such a structureinevitably
has preslow pace on the process. Merchantcapital historically
ferredand created organizationalunitsof large-scalecommercial
(as in Egyptor LatinAmerica)because thusthesurplus
agriculture
therewouldbe concentratedin thehandsof theexploitinglord,or
owner.Bycontrast,thedispersionofproductionand of themarketbased on
able surplusrequiresa muchmoreextensiveorganization
The
first
of
therelationship merchantswithdirectproducers.
problem here is to induce the directproducersto actuallyproducethe
subsistencecrops.Thisswitch
exportableratherthanthetraditional
is a process thatrisk-averting
peasanthouseholdswillbe reluctant
to embarkon. Concurrently,
the shell of subsistencehas to be
crackedso thatthe peasanthouseholdspurchasecommoditiesin
the market.Such an integration
intothemarketof a largenumber
of smallproducersis a slow processwhenthereis no recourseto
an extra-economic
force(comparecolonialventuresimposingmonetarytaxes or corvee obligations)and requiresa large numberof
intermediaries
for its success. Hence, therewere objectivelimits
both to the pace and the extentof tradeintegration.
WhilecountrieslikeEgypt,wheregreatestatesdominatedthecountryside,
increased theirexportsrapidly,and werequicklyand inextricably
ininto
the
world
the
Ottoman
market,
tegrated
economy'sintegration
seemed slow,hesitant,and reversible.
For the same set of reasons, the growingintegrationof the
Ottoman economy into the world marketwas attendedby the
interemergenceof a largegroupof merchantand money-lending
mediaries.Giventhe necessityto deal witha largenumberof producers and consumers,these intermediaries
were geographically
dispersedand formeda networkthatreachedfromthe port-cities
to the interior.Those who actuallywere situatedin the port-cities
werethelargertradersand creditorsto whomthesmallerintermediarieschannelledthe surplusthatwas produced.In popular perwhichprovideda spatiallyconcentrated
focusof
ception,port-cities,

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
543
theintermediary-direct
representedan alien
producerrelationship,
presence.
This alienpresenceseemed to drivea visiblewedgebetweenthe
increasingly
divergingevolutionof the peasantproducersand that
of thewealthyintermediaries.
Thus,whiletheconditionsfora conweremafrontation
betweentheproducersand theintermediaries
and
the
rulers
between
the
relation
that
existed
turing, privileged
the Moslempopulationwas beingundermined.Now thatthe market became the new measureof economicbehaviorand the peasants seemed to depend on the merchantsand moneylendersfor
theireconomicwelfare,the old ideologyof the "circleofjustice"
and mutualobligationbetweenthe peasantsand the bureaucrats
could no longer be justified(Sunar, 1987). The dislocationof
ideologyfromitsonce dominantpositionintroduceda newlack of
trusttowardthe bureaucracy.In fact,as a resultof the developmentsof the 1870's, thisdistrustbecame morepervasive;muchof
of the
thebureaucracy'ssuccesswas reversed,and thecontinuation
reformera along itsearlierdirectionbecame impossible.
X
downturnstartingin the early1870's meanta
The Kondratieff
slackeningin therateofgrowthof tradeand a reversalin theterms
of tradeforOttomanexports.A momentumwhichhad lastedsince
the 1820's had, despiteitsunevenrewards,meanta transformation
and monetizain crop patterns,in the level of commercialization
tion,and had startedto effectmajorchangesin thelifeof theOttoman peasant,nowended itsexuberantphase (Pamuk,1984). In additionto thereversalin thetermsof trade,the 1873 financialcrash
startingin Austriahad a directimpacton the Ottomaneconomy
fundssupportingthebudgetdeficitof the Emwheninternational
expenditures,
pire dried up. A growingbureaucracy,new military
had been financedin partthroughloans; by the
and centralization
1870's, freshinflowof fundswas requiredin order to servicethe
of the Ottomangovaccumulateddebt. Althoughthe bankruptcy
ernmentdid not come as a surprise,it gave justificationto the
current.The greatAnatolianfamineof 1873-74 conantireformist
tributedto the feeling.Capitalizingon the discontent,Sultan AbmovedulhamitII reversedmuchof thegainsof the constitutional

544
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
ment.By the end of the decade, reformist

bureaucratshad been
retired,and the Palace secretariathad establisheditselfin a dominantposition.
The same period of transitionalso markeda change in Great
Powerrelationswiththe Empire.The BerlinTreatyof 1878 recogsimilar
in protecting
theArmenianminority;
nizedRussia'sinterests
sentiments
werevoicedby GreatBritainand Franceas well.It was
no longerthecase thattheinterstate
systemguaranteedtheintegrity of the Empire. Parallel to this change in policy,imperialist
to acquire clientsfromamongthe
powersacceleratedtheirefforts
theOttomanpopulation.Directlyor
ethnicgroupsthatconstituted
Greeks,Armenians,Maronites,and,
indirectly,
openlyor covertly,
to a lesserextent,Jewswerecultivatedby the GreatPowers.
in the 1870's also witnessedthematuringof
The periodstarting
Withtherelativedeclinein
Greekand Armenianentrepreneurship.
had opened for
trade and in foreignpresence,new opportunities
had
been
the indigenouspopulationwho,untilthen,
relegatedto
a subsidiarypositionby foreigncapitalists.This became theperiod
whenport-city
populationsstabilizedand the politicaland cultural
activitiesthatcould be expectedfroman economicallyprospering
populationgainedmomentum.At thesame timeeconomicactivity
and toward
was redirectedawayfromexclusivetradeorientation,
manufactures
and importsubstitution.
It mayalso be argued that
towardthe towns
thelocus of activity
shiftedfromthe countryside
and, in particular,to the port-cities.
XI
The combinationof economicmaturationand changingGreat
Powerpoliticspromotedthe politicization
of minority
populations
in theEmpire.The wealthiest
elementsamongtheminority
populations were the merchantsand manufacturers
livingin the portcities.Their interestshad evolvedin a complexmanner,compared
to the simplerconcernsof the more slowlytransforming
segments
of the population;theyfrequently
were in a positionto confront
the politicalauthority
withdemandsforprivilegesand concessions
and thusto politicizetheirconcerns.Findingthemselvesin conflict
withboth foreigncapitaland withlocal politicalpower,theywere
It shouldalso be mentionedthatthe
preparedforpoliticalactivity.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
545
activities
in theport-cities
impliedtheforgrowthof manufacturing
mation of a proletariat,oftenof the same ethnic and religious
originas the entrepreneurs.Hence, a new typeof class conflict
based on capital-laborrelationsalso became a factorin the politicizationof port-city
populations.The factthat this class conflict
could oftenbe channeledintoethnicand confessionalpoliticsis an
indicationof the relativestandingof the variousideologicalcurrentsof the age. It also is a reminder,however,that the newly
evolvingbourgeoisieswere successfulin deflectinga directchallenge to theireconomicstatus.
tendencyof the
Againstthe backgroundof the restorationist
of theOtPalace,thecostsassociatedwiththerapidtransformation
wereimputedto thepresence
tomaneconomicand socialstructure
In otherwords,whatsome authorscall the
of the intermediaries.
and whatwe maydescribeas the costsof
strainsof modernization,
social order,were blamed
the disruptionof the pre-incorporation
The
on the physicalpresence of the non-Moslemintermediaries.
of thisnotionin the publicmindfed intoan Islamicreformation
vivalismwhichseemed to fuel the attemptsat restorationunderwiththeSultan.Againstthisturn
takenbythePalace and identified
of eventsin the ideologicalsphere,politicaland ideologicaldevelmay emerge in a defensivelight.The
opmentsin the port-city
"bourgeois"culturaland politicalawakeningof the intermediaries
was not solely a resultof the "wealth-leads-to-politics"
dynamic.
There also was a reactivedimensionto an ideologicalatmosphere
whichhad changedfromaccommodationto mild and thenactive
bourgeoisiessearched for ways to deal
aggression.The port-city
withthishistoricalalienation;nationalistand separationistpolitics
available.The worldwas onlyone of thepathsthatwerepotentially
historicaldevelopmentof nationalistideologyand theconcomitant
rise of Turkishnationalismwithinthe rulingelite finallydeterminedthe exclusionof all the otheralternatives.
XII
will
ofworld-historical
ideologicaldevelopments
Anydescription
involvea discussionof Europe and its impact in the Ottoman
are conarena. As faras politicaland ideologicaltransformations
half
second
the
with
coincides
we
are
the
cerned, period
discussing

546
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
of the "long" nineteenthcenturywhichnotionallystartedin 1789

and lasteduntiltheFirstWorldWar.The FrenchRevolutionas the
than the end point: The
startingpoint is far more self-evident
Revolutiondemonstrated
thelikelihoodofdiscontinuincontestably
ous sociopoliticalchangeand the centrality
of social movementsin
bringingabout such change. The choice of 1914 as end point is
of the social
since it does not markthe termination
more arbitrary
and politicalprocessesprecipitatedby the FrenchRevolution.Yet,
it can be justifiedin termsof a different
concern,namely,the outbreak of hegemonicrivalryamong European Powersand the subsequent dismembermentof multiethnicempires.15The First
World War is relevantalso because the role of non-Muslimmiof the
modifiedby the dismemberment
noritieswas substantially
OttomanEmpire.
Even ifthe economicfoundationsof the port-cities
systemsurvivedforanotherdecade, its politicalstructureswere alreadydissolvedand minority
populationswerelargelydislocatedduringand
in the aftermathof the Great War. In some cases, however,the
was not fullydetermineduntil
politicalfutureof these port-cities
the end of the Second World War. Salonica was dissociatedfrom
the OttomanEmpireand became partof the Greekstatein 1912,
but it was still the home of a Macedonian particularismstrong
enough to make it the targetlocationof a provisionalsecessionist
movementduringthe GreekCivilWar. Izmirand Trabzonbecame
objects of Greek irredentismin the aftermathof the Ottoman
defeatduringthe Great War. The foundationof the TurkishRestateforgood.
the territorial
public redefinedtheirstatusvis--vis
As forBeirut,whetheritwouldbe thecapitalof a stateof Lebanon
as envisionedby the Maronitesor whetherit would become a
Syriancityremainedan open questionnot onlythroughthe Man15There existsat least one more historical
turningpoint whichis relevantto our
purposes of delimitingthe era, and thatis the Great Depression of the 1930's. This
latteris significant
forending the mode of economic organizationwhichcharacterized
the nineteenth-century
worldand set the preconditionsforthe rise and survivalof the
port-citiesas essential points of concentratedinteractionbetween the core and the
periphery.With the Great Depression the highlyorganized processes of the worldeconomy were once and for all transformedso as to necessitatea radical reorganization along the lines of nation-states
thatnow had to assume economic roles in accordance withthe changingdemands of the world-economy.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
547
date period but also duringthe subsequentdecades of conflictin

theArabworld.Patras,in thissense,is moretheexceptionthanthe
rule,as it was associatedwiththe Greekstateas earlyas the 1820's
by the choice of itsown merchantnotables.
XIII
The nineteenth-century
world,at least fromthe viewpointof
core areas, underwentunprecedentedpoliticaland ideologicalreThis European-ledtransformation
providedthe restof
structuring.
the world witha model to emulate-more or less creatively.The
was domipoliticaland ideologicalsubstanceof thistransformation
nated by threecontestants:liberalism,nationalism,and socialism.
Elitesinfluencedbytheseideologiesattemptedto relatethemselves
to social movementsand thusengaged themselvesin competition
withone anotherin orderto gain a popularfollowing.Not surprislesstemmed,butdrewdifferent
ingly,each ideologicalformulation
sons,fromthe experienceof the FrenchRevolution.
Accordingto theliberalmovement,theRevolutionhad demonmonarchiesand
stratedthe inevitabledownfallof unconstitutional
a gradualistpath towards
the potentialdangerof not undertaking
The palace-basedcomponentof Ottomanreformism
liberalization.
shared thisanalysisinsofaras thisconclusionformedits founding
principle.
The socialistmovementinterpretedthe FrenchRevolutionin
yetanothermanner,byfocussingon thewayin whichtheexploited
could affectthe course of historyand improvetheirconditionby
takingmattersintotheirhands.Fromtheviewpointof socialism-inmovements,the demonstrationof
spiredand/or working-class-led
the existenceof a realm of politicsbeyond thatof the traditional
formalpoliticalspherethatrenderedmass participation
impossible
was obviouslypromising.
movementwas the
For obvioushistoricalreasons,thenationalist
the futurehistoryof the region.In
mostimportantin determining
the nationalistconception,the end of imperialmonarchiesled to
where soverthe beginningof more homogeneous nation-states,
such
That
potential
eignty,in principle,belonged to "the nation."
name
the
in
a
to
be
exercised
had
by leadershipacting
sovereignty
who
felt
those
of
the
attracted
of "thenation"naturally
imagination

548
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
was
such a historicalfunction.Since homogeneity
theycould fulfill
conceivedof primarilyin termsof religionand/or language,the
firstnationalistsrose fromthe ranksof eitherthe clergyor the
One of the classicalpillarsof the Otrapidlygrowingintelligentsia.
tomansociopoliticalorganizationhad been themilletsystem,under
whichcommunitieswerestructured
along religiouslines.The logic
of the milletsystemwas based on rightsof self-government
in
mattersofimmediateinterestto thereligiouscommunity
whichdid
not impingeupon the Porte'ssovereignty.
The traditional
strength
of non-Moslemreligiousauthoritiesarisingfromthe milletsystem
gave theman advantagein appropriating
politicalleadershiproles.
The relativestrengthof the clergyin demandingnationalchurches
(not along religiousbut ratherlinguisticlines)and the corresponding weaknessof secular nationalistsin earlyBalkan nationalisms
demonstratethispoint(see Rogel, 1977).
On the otherhand, Ottoman,Turkish,and Arab nationalisms
werecharacterized
bytheincontestable
predominanceofan un-reliSuch later examif
not
secularist
gious
outspokenly
intelligentsia.
of
nationalism
to
their
claims
ples
sought strengthen
througha process of acculturation,
whichtheyalleged to be the "awakening"of
a nationalessence.The rehabilitation
of thefolkloreand thepurification of the languageprovidedthe vehiclesforthe creationof a
sense of nationalconsciousness.Naturally
enough,as Andersonhas
these
nationalists
made
argued (1983),
heavyuse of the printing
pressin orderto conceiveand promotethese"imaginedcommunities."
The temporaland spatialdistribution
of the threepoliticalprowithin
not
to
mention
the
their
jects
Europe,
periphery,
highlights
derivation.
and
the
Great
world-systemic
By
large, hegemonicpower,
Britain,remainedthroughoutthe "long" nineteenthcenturythe
Not onlydid GreatBritainenforce"free
primeexampleofliberalism.
trade"on a worldscale as the majormechanismof furthering
her
economiclead, but also promotedliberalism
as an ideologicalmodel
forsocialand politicalorganization
on thepresumption
thatit necesforall partiesconcerned.
sarilywouldbringeconomicprosperity
Like Great Britain,France did not become a stage for the
growthof nationalismeither.Both countrieswere organizedas
withintheinterstate
strongnation-states
system,and theygradually
increasedtheirinternalcohesion withoutnecessarilygeneratinga

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
549
nationalistideology.Furthermore,
both Great Britainand France
launched their"empire-building"
projectsat veryearlydates. By
themid-nineteenth
centurytheirsuccessin thisrespectcircumvented theprospectsof nationalismwithintheirborders.Theirgrowing
economicwealthmade any strategyfor"catchingup" redundant,
while at the same time providingthe politicalauthoritywiththe
meansto buyoffpopulardiscontentwhichcould resultin workingclass unrulinessin the long run.16The major consequence of this
tendencywas to consolidateliberalismas the predominantideologicalparadigmin both GreatBritainand France.
of GreatBritainand Franceconverged
Whereasthetrajectories
towardsliberalismin thecourseof thecentury,nationalismgained
momentumin the restof Europe. For all bourgeoisiesthatdid not
equallybenefitfromtheeconomicupswing,theideologyof nationalism,whichunderpinnedattemptsat contestingand "catchingup"
with Great Britain,was highlyattractive.The other significant
dimensionof thenationalistprojectis to be observedin itsanti-Napoleonicorigins.Embryonicnationalismwas firstexperiencedas a
reactionto the invasionof Europe byNapoleon's armies.As Napoleon undertookthe task of eradicatingthe vestigesof many an
AncienRgimeand reshapingEurope in the image of postrevolucultivatedthe seeds of variousnationaryFrance,he inadvertently
tionalisms.17
It is of criticalimportanceto note thatthe anti-Napoleonicdielemensionofthenationalist
projectentaileda strongconservative
mentwhichlaterwas to become the backboneof antileftist
strugwhich
of
wave
1848
the
After
swept
revolutionary
upheaval
gles.
such zones, the threatof popular uprisingsappeared more real
weakand indecisive
thaneverbefore-especiallysince the relatively
the popularchalto
contain
able
less
and
bourgeoisiesseemed less
lenge. Nationalismbecame a highlyusefuldouble-edgedswordin
this context.On the one hand, it challengedliberalismand free
of its own,while,on the other
tradeby protectionist
prescriptions
hand, it advanced a sociopoliticalprojectto containmore radical
16For a
framingof nationalismas an ideologyof catchingup withinthe contextof
uneven development,see Nairn (1977).
17 For an informativesource on various
European nationalistexpenences, see
Seton-Watson(1987).

550
zveren? Quataert
Keyder,
challenges.Consequently,the thirdquarterof the nineteenthcennotablyin theaccomturywitnessedthegoldenage of nationalism,

of
German
and
Italian
unification
movements,which
plishments
demonstratedthe strengthof this new forcein Europe. It is important,however,to note thatthesetwosuccessstorieswere characterizedby unique circumstances.In both cases, liberaland nationalistprojectsconvergedratherthancontradictedone another.
The unification
itselfbecame a necessaryconditionforthecreation
forthe
of the geographicalspace and the institutional
framework
a
not
the
naof
liberalism.
In
way,
only
self-proclaimed
operation
tionalistsbut also the liberalbourgeoisieshad somethingto gain
fromthe success of nationalism(Seton-Watson,
1987).
XIV
By the last quarterof the nineteenthcentury,nationalismentered into a new phase and a new geography.In its diffusionbeyond what had become Germany,it moved into two multiethnic
While the
empiresof immensemagnitudeand culturaldiversity.
dismembermentof the AustrianEmpire caught in the wave of
nationalistmovementsremainsthe classicexamplein historytextbooks, the OttomanEmpirewas no less devastatedby the consequences of the nationalistchallenge.Both empiressoughtto come
to termswithnationalismby reactivemeans rangingfromrepression to cooptation,and preemptiveones such as the fosteringof
or "Otto"official"nationalisms
in theformof "Austro-Hungarian"
man" identities.
Of the threecompetingpoliticalprojectsof the nineteenthcentury,nationalismemergedas themostdangerousfromthepointof
viewof theseempires.The prospectsforworking-class
movements
were dim because of the weaknessof such classes in economically
backwardempires.Stronglyresentfulof liberalismin the firsthalf
of the century,theseempiressubsequentlyshoweda willingness
to
adopt at least some formalfeaturesof liberalismin order to stave
offgreaterdiscontent.Afterall, an atomizedsocietyorganizedon
the basis of individualinitiativeas promisedby liberalismwould
obstructthegrowthof communalloyaltiesand therebygivemonarchies a chance to survive-hence the advance of constitutionalism.
The economic foundations(notablyan atomizingmarket)forthe

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
551
realization
ofliberalism,
werenotyetpresent.
however,
Nor werethebourgeoisies
inclinedtowardliberalparticularly
ism.In thesecondhalfof thenineteenth
thedivergence
century,
betweenGreatBritainand France,on theone side,and therestof
Europe,on theother,had becomefarmoreacute.Whereasemin the
and liberalaspirations
advancedconcurrently
pire-building
nationalof
former
twostates,inthemoreperipheral
parts Europe,
thehopesforitsecoismobstructed
theliberalproject,shattered
intoan amforcedliberalintellectuals
nomicpromises,
and finally
ofthe
Outside
with
the
nationalists
alliance
(Deutch,1969).
biguous
thebourgeoisieat leastpartially
old core of theworld-economy,
nationalist
in favorof emerging
abandonedliberalism
politicsas
ifnotilwhichoftenbehavednon-liberally
advocated
byleaderships
liberally.
andnaliberalism
vis--vis
In a sense,then,thebourgeois
position
createdandconon theopportunities
tionalism
dependedinvariably
wasnever
The
context.
historical
the
straints
bourgeoisie
imposedby
to avoid
strived
and
attachedto eitherprogram
unconditionally
On theotherhand,itdidadopt
itseconomicprospects.
jeopardizing
nationalist
towards
accommodation
of
movements,
a benignstrategy
to endorsetheminsofaras they
and evenindicateditswillingness
withmoderate
combined
neweconomic
couldpromise
opportunities
could
nationalism
After
andcentrist
all,
potentially
regimes.
political
from
momentum
succeedinchanneling
working-classaway
popular
Suchan outcomewouldindeedbe highly
projects.
political
inspired
desirablein theeasternand southern
partsof Europe,wherethe
weakandvulnerable.
remained
particularly
bourgeoisies
hitthe twolargemultiwaveeventually
Whenthe nationalist
betweenthe
ofEurope,thestruggle
ethnicempireson thefringes
and
cumbersome
and
was
the
old
and
newmovements
polity long
thefinaloutcomenotreadilypredictable
(Kahn,1973).Afterall,
theexperienceof therestof Europehad providedan important
could survivethe onlessonshowingthatimperialbureaucracies
Old statesand
atleastpartially.
ofnewpolitical
movements,
slaught
ofnationversions
own
their
foster
couldpotentially
bureaucracies
a newcohesionintotheirsocieties.Translated
alismand introduce
to
of
context
intoa
empires,thiswouldcorrespond
disintegrating
nations
theirown
thecase of newstateschoosingand designating
ratherthanviceversa.The optionchosenby thebourgeoisiein

552
Keyder,zveren& Quataert
such situationsdepended upon the potentialeconomicopportunitiesit could be offeredbycompetingprojects.Whilelanguage,culinfluencein dictatture,and religionmayhavebeen ofdetermining
theirrole was of
ing the choices of the state-building
intelligentsia,
in
the
secondaryimportance securing
bourgeoisie'scommitment.
The bourgeoisieoftenhad recourseto severalalternatives,
given
thatthisclass oftenwas multilingual
and boasted a highlycosmopolitanculture.
The disintegration
ofthesetwoempires,following
upon thefailure of theirrespectiveattemptsto fosternewand all-embracing
loyalties,was foreshadowedby an earliercase in worldhistory.Even
to Europe and
thoughthe problemwas compoundedbyproximity
of
the
and
confessional
in
the
case
Austro-Hunlinguistic
diversity
of SpanishAmerigarianand OttomanEmpires,the disintegration
ca (the homelandof the longesthistoryof nation-states
outsideof
a
useful
in
southeast
Europe) provides
counterpoint understanding
ofSpanish
(Anderson,1983). The fracturing
Europeannationalisms
Americais largelyto be explainedbytheabsenceof a unifiedbourgeoisie whichcould pursue economicdominationon a largescale.
The fragmentation
of administration
and the regionalizationof
merchantcommunitiesin the absence of operativemeans of transtiltedthebalance towardsdisintegraportationand communication
tionin both SpanishAmericaand theAustro-Hungarian
and Ottoman Empires.The materialconditionsfor the realizationof an
"imaginedcommunity"in such a geographicalspace did not exist.
Unlike in Spanish America,the provinciality
of merchantcommunitiesin the old-worldempires coincided with theirsimultaneous involvementin economic and culturalnetworkswithother
countrieswhichreinforcedtheirfragmentation.
It was no surprise
merchantcommunithat,fromtheperspectiveof such fragmented
ties, imperial-scalenationalismremaineda distantoption. If they
wereto supportanynationalist
havebeen
project,itwouldcertainly
one whichappealed to theirprovincially
bound outlook.
XV
The goldenage of nationalismwas thethirdquarterof thenineteenthcenturywhensuccessfulunification
movementstook place.
We argued above thattherewas littleprospectforEuropean-type

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
553
unification
movementsof empire-level
nationalismin the Ottoman
the
nationalism, versionthathit the OttoEmpire.Disintegrative
man Empire,came intobeing not duringthe thirdquarterof the
thischronology,
it is importantto
centurybut later.In illuminating
note thatthe golden age of nationalismcoincidedwiththe golden
Giventhefactthata verylargeproportionof the
age of port-cities.
in port-cities,
merchantclasseswerespatiallyconcentrated
including
where
Istanbul,
theyexperiencedunprecedentedwealthand transtherewas littleroom forresentmentstemformationof lifestyles,
from
the
perceptionofunevendevelopment,or, forthatmatming
ter,lack of money-making
Duringthisperiod much
opportunities.
cultural
and
was
laid
in
educational
developmentbut
groundwork
nationalist
littlewas done to launchovertly
projects.If the mid-Victorianboom enhancedthematerialbasisofthecommercialstratum
the reversalof economic trendsduringthe last
in the port-cities,
quarterof thenineteenthcenturyprecipitateda reactionon partof
the merchantswhich could potentiallytake on a politicalform.
Eveniftheformin whichthistendencymanifesteditselfprovedineffective
and feeble,the expressionwas importantin thatit prefigured whatwas yetto arrive.
of the
The reversalof the trendcoincidedwiththe dismantling
success and the consequentassertion
momentaryconstitutionalist
The proclamationof theconstiturule.
ofAbdulhamid'sautocractic
moofan Ottomanenlightenment
tionof 1876 was theculmination
tivatedbyaspirationstowardliberalism.The overallweaknessof its
social basis assured the quiet collapse of the liberal quest at the
theOttomanEmpireenteredthe
wordoftheSultan.Consequently,
lastquarterof thenineteenthcenturywithstifledliberalaspirations
at the expense of the society.The long
and a staterestrengthened
Hamidian interlude,which lasted until the coup d'etat of 1908
of 1876 was restored,was an era of unprecewhenthe constitution
and majoreconomicand, especially,infradentedpoliticalstability
structuraland educationaladvances.The integrationof the social
space of the Empireby means of communicationand transportation networksand the expansion of the bureaucraticapparatus
helped to consolidatethe autocraticsystem.
ruleoftheHamidianregimereduced
theheavy-handed
Initially,
the prospectsof nationalism,as reflectedin the absence of major
territorial
separationsfromthe Empireduringthisperiod. Under

554
zveren? Quataert
Keyder,
such circumstances,
withpoliticalprojectsbecame
experimenting
to
the
riskyenough discourage bourgeoiselementsdispersedin various provincesand port-cities
of the Empire.The combinedeffect
of the risks,on theone hand,and thecreationof majoropportunitiesas a resultofeconomicadvancesand rapidurbanization,
on the
the
for
accommerchants
with
an
additional
motive
other,provided
modationism.Giventhe chance to advance theirimmediateinterwho ocests,theycould be co-opted.Notablesof majorport-cities
cupied leadingbourgeoispositionscompetedto monopolizesuch
opportunitiesas arose fromparticipationin bodies as diverseas
municipalcouncilsand benevolentsocieties.
The oppositionto the Hamidianregimeby the enlightenedinwas also based in thesesame port-cities
and at timeswas
telligentsia
coordinatedfrom Paris, Alexandria,and Cairo, where diaspora
communitiesconcentrated.However,as the resistancebecame an
undergroundmovementby necessity,it lost its appeal to established merchantcommunitiesof good standing.While secretsocietieschallengingHamidian autocracywere unquestionablyinfluenced by bourgeoisexperiencesin the westand professedliberal
and reformist
of theirmembershipdeideologies,the distribution
fiesanystrictcorrelationwitheconomicposition.The leadershipof
the clandestineoppositionwas certainlynot drawnfromthe ranks
of the bourgeoisie.Small but cohesivesecretsocietiescoordinated
thedownfallof theHamidianregimebyeffectively
mobilizingsocial
contradictions
whichdevelopedwithinthesocietyand thestateapparatusitself(Ahmad,1969).
XVI
The new era thatopened in 1908 permittedvariousliberties
and rightsas well as some level of representational
politics.The
merchantnotablesof port-cities
embracedthe occasion to ride the
popular momentumin order to assume provincialleadership.
Hence, politicalleadershiponce again derivedfromsocial and economic positionsof strength.One of the reasons whythe bourgeoisie tended to assume such leadership positions lay in the
emergingclass politicsof the port-cities.Immediatelyafterthe
downfallof theHamidianregime,a waveofstrikesbrokeout in virThe demands of the workers
tuallyall major Ottomanport-cities.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
555
and theirdeterminationto pursue them demonstrateda will to

bringintothe realmof Ottomanpoliticsa segmentof the populationthathad hithertoremainedmarginal.The Unioniststoo made
use of this new mobilizationthroughorganizingboycottsagainst
foreignmerchantsand commodities,in whichthe workingclass
playeda prominentrole. From thenon, the laborersof port-cities
became a forceto be reckonedwith.
The Ottomanworkingclass obviouslyconstituteda verysmall
percentageof the total population and was engaged mainlyin
servicesand small-scalemanufacturing.
However,its overallpower
in major port-cities.In
was magnifiedby its spatialconcentration
were themselvesdiscommunities
that
merchant
fact
of
the
light
weakin termsof organizationand politicalexpersedand relatively
perience, the potentialstrengthof labor reshaped the political
To counterbalancethisemergparametersof Ottomanport-cities.
ing and unpredictableforce,merchantshad to engage themselves
more overtlyin politicsas well as strikinga conciliatorynote towardsdifferent
segmentsof thesociety.In otherwords,theyhad to
get involvedin more popularprojectswhichdefiedanyimmediate
class affiliation.
As merchantnotablesmovedin to fillthenewlyavailableleadershippositions,theyfoundthemselvesfacingan inevitabledilemma.
On the one side, theyhad to safeguardtheireconomic prerogatives,while,on the other,theyhad to fulfilthe requirementsof
leadershipbydefendingtheriskypositionswhichthepublicforced
on them.A closer look at the actual course undertakenby merin
thatthedifferences
chantnotablesin variouscitiesdemonstrates
relative
the
to
attitudecan onlybe understoodby reference
importanceofthetwocompetingtendencies.The usual inclinationwas to
withprotectthe statusquo by advancingpoliticaldecentralization
oftheEmpire.Whenpopularfeelings
outjeopardizingtheintegrity
tiltedtowardsnationalistseparatism,however,theyrode thetidein
ordernot to endangertheirposition.But even thentheywerecautiousand soughtto keep the popularmovementundercontrol.
were well organThe merchantcommunitiesof the port-cities
ized and well educated, and, hence, quite effectivein promoting
theirinterests.Theyprovedthemselvesby theirabilityto playvarious forces-both nativeand foreign-againstone anotherand by
resultedfromthe
fromthispowergame.Theirstrength
benefitting

556
zveren& Quataert
Keyder,
linkagesthatembedded themin widercontexts.First,withinthe

thekindsoflinksthatcut acrossconfessionalboundaries
port-cities
constitutedan advantagepromotingthe status of the merchant
None of the othersocial stratawas as well placed for
community.
similarintercommunal
agility.Secondly,merchantcommunitiesin
various port-citieswere linked horizontallywith one another
throughbusinessdealings,as well as throughsharinga universal
culturebest definedthroughitsbourgeoisaspirations.However,to
the extentthattheirmaterialexistencewas determinedby changes
in theirimmediatesocialcontext,theunderlying
differences
among
merchantsof different
ethnicand/orconfessionalbackgroundsurfaced immediately.Beyond a facade of unityheld togetherby
of interestsstood the divisiveidentitieswhichcould surmutuality
face when a slightchange in the contextaltered the precarious
balance among centripetaland centrifugal
forces.This was not an
inevitabledevelopment.It occurredbecause, as late as the turnof
the twentiethcentury,sea routes were much fasterand cheaper
thanland routes.Hence, not onlywere manyport-cities
ethnically
but also they
and culturallydifferentiated
fromtheirhinterlands,
were not well connectedwiththemuntilthe realizationof expensive railwayand carriageway
projects.Giventhe value of interconnectionsamongtheport-cities,
it is no puzzle thatmanymerchants
remainedfarmoreconsciousof theneed to preserveinter-port-city
networksthanof anything
else.
Politicalloyaltiesstartshifting
wheneconomicorientationsunThe
Ottoman
dergo major changes.
Empire,in general,and Ottoman port-cities,
in particular,offerno exceptionto this general
rule. Only when an imminentthreatwas posed to theirnetworks
did the merchantcommunitiesshow growinginterestin either
The fateofSalonica
separatistprojectsand/orforeignintervention.
was determinedmilitarily,
and it is not clear ifanyimmediatematerialadvantageaccrued to anyclass and/orcommunity
in the immediate aftermathof its dissociationfromthe Ottoman Empire.
Even if it did, thisdoes not sufficeto demonstratethatthe class
in questionplayeda leadingrole in determining
and/orcommunity
the fateof Salonica. Otherwise,forTrabzon,Izmir,and Beirut,the
absence of a sense of the imminentdismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire restrainedthe activepursuitof such projectsbefore
theFirstWorldWar. Consequently,theboundariesof theOttoman

OTTOMAN EMPIRE
557
successorstateswere drawnmore by the impactof imperialistobjectivesand inlandbureacraticand politicalstrongholdsthanbythe

whichheld the largestconcentrationof bourgeois eleport-cities
ments.
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Ottoman Port Cities and Foreign Trade

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Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives

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Some Theoreticaland HistoricalPerspectives

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more unpleasantconsequences of social disapproval.Foreigners,

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was notconfinedto thesiteof foreignpresence,or thewalledportcity.The tentaclesof the capitalisteconomyreachedall cornersof

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of bourgeoisdenor,1984; see also Vitalis,1990). The counterpart

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citiesnurturebourgeoisies,and if,as one of the mostpowerfulof

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tion.Clubs,journals,secretsocieties,masoniclodges,ethnicand religious associations,as well as more explicitlypoliticalchannels,

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example, see Pamuk (1987) and othersources cited therein.

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Ottomansremainedtheirown best customers.This is anotherway

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ports.By 1914, the vastmajorityof Ottomanand easternMediterraneantradefocussedon GreatBritain,France,Germany,AustriaHungary,and Italy,and thediplomaticagentsofthosestatesplayed

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tons while its value rose eight-fold

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nectionswithDamascusin the 1860's and builtitsrailroadslater,in

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vailed and furthersubdivisionof propertyoccurredlater in the

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some 60,000 persons,also largelyfemale,laboredin carpetmaking,

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and cateredto urbandemand. However,port-cities

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of thesecities'merchantsplayinga majorpoliticalrole in thestatebuildingprojectsof thelate and post-Ottoman

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and refugeemigration.These entreptsgenerallyofferedmuch

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the GreekOrthodoxformedthe largestsinglegroup (zveren,in

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controlledthe tradewithDamascus and Baghdad (Kasaba, in this

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marketincorporationhad to evolve on the basis of an agrarian

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ment.By the end of the decade, reformist

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of the "long" nineteenthcenturywhichnotionallystartedin 1789

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date period but also duringthe subsequentdecades of conflictin

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challenges.Consequently,the thirdquarterof the nineteenthcennotablyin theaccomturywitnessedthegoldenage of nationalism,

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and theirdeterminationto pursue them demonstrateda will to