PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION v.

PRADO
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
Case Digest
In relation to ARTICLE VI (Legislative Department)
FACTS:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The
main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are
members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the abovenamed measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its
own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69,
180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
HELD:
YES. It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of
the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices and officers. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may
be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
The Court does not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major
and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the
grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National
Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In the Courts view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need
of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and
the people. Assuming that basis, the Court cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there
is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the
respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis

precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others
less deserving. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal
from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The Court is unable to agree
with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power.
NOTE:
Franking Privilege - The privilege of sending certain matter through the public mails without payment of
postage. In pursuance of a personal or official privilege. (Black's Law Dictionary)