Roe VS.

Wade
Facts
Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or
attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal
prosecution for violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple
with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the
grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county District
Attorney Wade (D).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe
and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that
declaratory relief was warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief
was not warranted and that the Does complaint was not justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the
Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because
the district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not
warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and
Wade cross-appealed the district courts judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.
Issues
Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical
advice to save the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States?
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion?
Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion?
Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case
was decided by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot?
Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
Holding and Rule (Blackmun)
Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving
procedures on the mothers behalf, and that do not take into consideration the
stage of pregnancy and other interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a womans right
to terminate her pregnancy, against state action.
Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her
pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant womans
health and the potentiality of human life at various stages of pregnancy.
No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not render her suit moot.
Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision
must be left to the judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In regard to second
trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the mothers health by
regulating abortion procedures related to the health of the mother. Regarding third
trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the potentiality of
human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.

The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of
repetition, yet evading review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual
controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the
action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only
declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed
when the case is brought on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the
arguments on the issues of both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily
identical.
The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which
might or might not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual
case or controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallfords case for
injunctive relief because once the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas
authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.

Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)

GR. No. L-2690 (January I, 1949)
Liberty of abode and travel
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety
or public health, as may be provided by law.
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of
his cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the
province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without
returning
the
advance
payment
it
gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
be founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary
power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of
courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason
for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such
indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way
subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact
that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary
losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The
fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human
freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or
any other business enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who,
in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to

work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is
prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining
her.
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997.]
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created on 11 July 1974, by virtue of
PD 505. On 23 December 1975, PD 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter.
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the
pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on 21 March 1985, which
embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of
Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that
aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots
in out ports for 3 months and in the Port of Manila for 4 months.
It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are
given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor
pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental
or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Harbor pilots in every harbor
district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which
would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective
pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating,
communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the
PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a
proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his
duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his
predecessor.
Administrative Law, 2003 ( 8 )Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
Subsequently, then PPA GM Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92 7 on 15
July 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford
better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services.
This was implemented by providing therein that all existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall
remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor
pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of 1 year
from date of effectivity of subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. On 12 August 1992, the United
Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C.
Compas, questioned PPA-AO 04-92 before the DOTC, but they were informed by
then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or
annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors
as its governing body. Meanwhile, on 31 August 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum
Order 08-92 8 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the
reappointment of harbor pilots viz.:
(1) Qualifying Factors: safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and,
(2)Criteria for Evaluation: promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA
Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels
serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age. The Associations
reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO 04-92,
but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the
jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed the ruling to the
Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC. On 23

December 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was
intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. On
17 March 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order
issued earlier. He concluded that PPAAO 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all
intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section.6 of PD No .857, mandating it to control, regulate and
supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.
Consequently, the Associations filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages, before Branch 6 of the RTC Manila (Civil Case 93- 65673). On 6
September 1993, the trial court rendered judgment holding that the PPA, DOTC, and
OP have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a
capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative
Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders,
declaring that PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are null and void. From this decision, the PPA, DOTC and OP elevated their
case to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and affirmed the assailed decision of the
court a quo dated 6 September 1993, without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Pilotage a profession, a property right; Withdrawal or alteration of right requires
due process
The Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a
profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines,
Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would
be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots.
Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly
made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was
apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to
the issuance of PPA-AO 04-92; the Associations allegedly learned about it only after
its publication in the newspapers. Indeed, PPA-AO 04-92 was issued in stark
disregard of the pilots rights against deprivation of property without due process of
law.
2. Due process clause of the Constitution; Conditions that concur to fall within aegis
of provision Administrative Law, 2003 ( 9 )Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause
of the
Constitution, viz.: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law,.. In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
3. Procedural due process
When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural
due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced, while
substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.
4. Essence of due process of law; Lumiqued v. Exevea

As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be
heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (Lumiqued
v. Hon. Exevea). In the present case, the Associations questioned PPA-AO 04-92 no
less than 4 times before the matter was finally elevated to the Supreme Court.
5. Coast Guard represented in the PPA; No consultation required of Coast Guard as
there is no naval defense involved The MARINA, which took over the licensing
function of the Philippine Coast Guard (issuing the licenses of pilots after
administering the pilots examinations), was duly represented in the Board of
Directors of the PPA. There being no matters of naval defense involved in the
issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be
consulted.
6. Notice and hearing not required in agencys performance of executive or
legislative functions
The fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity
of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.
7. Licensure and license defined
Licensure is the granting of license especially to practice a profession. It is also
the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with
established standards. A license is a right or permission granted by some
competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license,
would be illegal.
8. Pilotage as profession practiced only by duly licensed individuals; Vested right
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they
literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but
five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. The five
government professional examinations, namely,
(1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a
vessel for at least a year;
(2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a
year;
(3) For chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a
year;
(4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at
least 2 years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that
given for pilots. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows
them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years.
This is a vested right. Administrative Law, 2003 ( 10 )Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
9. PPA-AO 04-92 unduly restrict right of pilots to enjoy their profession
Under the terms of PPA-AO 04-92, it is readily apparent that PPA-AO 04-92 unduly
restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual
cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on
the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are
suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that
period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of

performance which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled.
Hence, the use of the term renewal It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which
primarily makes PPA-AO 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
10. PPA-AO 04-92 a surplusage, an unnecessary enactment; must be struck down
PPA-AO 04-92 and PPA-MO 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO 03-85, which is still
operational. PPA-AO 04-92 is a surplusage and, therefore, an unnecessary
enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in
Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment,
performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which
are duplicated in PPA-AO 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it
adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO 04-92 must be struck down.
11. PPA GM Dayan presumed to have acted in accordance with law
The Associations insinuation that then PPA GM Dayan was responsible for the
issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after
all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations.
The trial courts finding of animosity between him and the former might likewise
have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between Associations
and Dayan cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of
PPA-AO 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed
to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any
event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative
authorities.

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills

Inc.,
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a
mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming
Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that
the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise
of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt
the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This
was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their
jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and
No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the

PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject
of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power
of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet
it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be
in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held,
under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real

property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to

China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants
last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of
the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with
the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was
made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over
the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the
subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it
may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of
action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent
of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference
to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in
court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at
all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the
action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event
of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the
property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise
a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against the entire world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be
a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly

speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference
to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated
as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based.
The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property
of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are
in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication
is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted
as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant
fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]

En Banc, Laurel (p): 6 concur.
Facts:
<Incomplete story except facts provided that 89 laborers were laid off due
to shortages of leather materials; that Toribio Teodoro allegedly
dominates the National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay and was
biased against him National Labor Union.>
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR
and to the motion for new trial of the National Labor Union. The Supreme Court
found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the SolicitorGeneral, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the

motion for a new trial and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as maybe
relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separ
ation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its function
s are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, settle any question, matter controversy
or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It
shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage shares or compensation,
hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall,
before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile
the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to
the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to be paid by
the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements,
but not free
to ignore ordisregard fundamental and essential requirements of due proc
ess involving proceedings of administrative character
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable. (Section 20, CA 103.) It shall not be restricted to the

specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or

agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(Section 13) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have
been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry
into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character.
3. Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings;
Guidelines
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after t the party is given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile
if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside with
out notice or consideration
c .Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power
.d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incom
petent in judicialproceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as
to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of i
nvestigating anddetermining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.)The CIR may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local
board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any
part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may

delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself
of any of its powers (Section 10)
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is
such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to
authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to
appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure
to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result

Pefianco vs. Moral

Facts:
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the
National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the
pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian
Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision
as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and
justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were missing
from the FAD vaults of the National Library. The DECS Investigating Committee
conducted several hearings on the complaint. Secretary Gloria issued a resolution
finding respondent guilty of the administrative offenses charged to her. She was
ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and
forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations. Respondent
received a copy of the resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
Respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the
DECS Investigation Committee Report which is denied.
She filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated
September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied. Respondent moved
for reconsideration but the motion was "noted" that the denial of the request for the
production of the Investigation Committee Report was final. Respondent did not
appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service.
Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular
courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from
enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause
of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court.
The appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Glorias
petition for lack of merit.
Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review. Meanwhile, she was replaced
by Secretary Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary
Gloria.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the
trial courts order
denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for reconsideration
would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually decided the case,
and that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the
Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition for mandamus has
no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner
still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have
not been violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy
of mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law,
DECS order or regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents
for reasons of confidentiality or national security.

LEONARD W. RICHARDS, Complainant vs.PATRICIO A. ASOY, Respondent

A.C. No. 2655, October 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Asoy received from Complainant Richards, his client, compensation to
handle his case in the trial court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest
and failure to prosecute. Asoy abandoned his client in violation of his contract
ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. Furthermore, Asoy
ignored the processes of this Court and it was only after he was suspended from the
practice of law of that he surfaced. On July 9, 1987, the Court resolved to DISBAR
him and order him to reimburse Richards the sum of P16, 300 within 30days from
notice. On November 11, 1987, the Court received a letter dated November 3, 1987,
complained that respondent had not reimbursed him the P16, 300. Hence, the Court
issued a resolution requiring Asoy to show cause why he failed to reimburse,
however, Asoy still failed to comply. Complainant filed another letter informing the
Court that Asoy still failed to comply with the order of reimbursement.
Thirteen years after the promulgation, Asoy filed a Petition for readmission to the
practice of law stating, among other things, that on January 2, 1996 or about nine
years after his disbarment and directive to reimbursement complainant made, he
effected payment of P16,300 via consignation with the Courts Office of the Cashier.
The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
On August 2, 2010, Asoy filed another petition for Reinstatement to the
Bar stating that he effected payment ofP16, 300 before the Office of the Cashier of
the Supreme Court as complainant could no longer be found or located; that he had
already suffered and agonized shortcomings; and that as positive evidence of his
repentance and rehabilitation he attached testimonials of credible institutions and
personalities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Asoy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Asoy violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 10 states that Lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor
towards this Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement and through
consignation with this Court at that he sent out a strong message that the legal
processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.
Respondents consignation could not even be deemed compliance with the Courts
directive to reimburse because the Court does not represent the complainant; the
latters address was readily ascertainable had respondent wished to communicate
with the complainant for the purpose of making amends. Hence, respondents
petition for reinstatements in the Roll of Attorneys is DENIED

UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM

MARGARET CELINEG.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999
Facts:
Private respondent Ms Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India
enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with
selected panel members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri
Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina , the last included as the
deans representative. Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of
her dissertation that was lifted from different sources without proper
acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue to with her oral defense. Four
(4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to incorporate the suggestion
made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the
approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should be submitted. On March
24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation pending the
final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent submitted the
supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained that suggestions
were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medinaand did not
wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting that
a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were
later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr.Medina. Private respondent was
disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with
maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean
Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude
the private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for clarification of
her charges against panel members and accusations relating to her dissertation.
Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was allowed to
graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic
clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean
Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended for the withdrawal of her doctorate degree. Dean Paz formed an adhoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate
and recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private
respondent was informed of the charges in letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90
instances or portions of thesis lifted from other sources with no
proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from
the CSSP and Univ. Council there commendation for withdrawal was endorsed to
Board of Regents who deferred its actions to study further for legal implications.
Private respondent was provided with a copy of findings and in return she also
submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to discuss her

answer. Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent
for withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the there were massive
lifting from published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of
being guilty of plagiarism. On the basis of the report and recommendation of the
University Council, the Board of Regents send a letter to inform private respondent
that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree. On August 10,
1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC.
She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed
that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00
as moral and exemplary damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost
earnings.
RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts
decision and ordered to restore her doctorates degree.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and
ordering petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral
degree cannot be recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual
property and to justice and equity. Held/Ruling:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.
1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private
respondent was denied of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the
ambit of disciplinary powers of
UP. In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the
charges, the privaterespondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed
in writing about the charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating
committee. She was asked to submit her explanation which
sheforwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the UP Chancellor a
nd Zafaralla Committee during their meetings. She was given the opportunity to be
heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student,
as the Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student
that is in question. The investigation began before graduation. She was able to
graduate because there were many investigations conducted before the
Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed to graduate.
2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a
university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then
the Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed, may cancel that
degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a
wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction
of being its graduates

Facts:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to
the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed
(par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed
the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was
joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of
the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD:
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have
been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues.
Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial
review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity
that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this
case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing
of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly

classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office,
if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be
to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees; aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.

Tablarin vs Guiterrez
Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine.
However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and
5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of
Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and
prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5
(a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate
of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a
uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224
and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as
condition for securing (cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate
the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition
for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to
take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as
a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before
us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for
medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular,
in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test
like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country."

Central Bank employees vs BSP GR No 148208

Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993,
effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949)
by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now
BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of
the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in
Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human
resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the
authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act.
Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates
the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994
rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed
together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary
board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the
provision that the classification of employees is based on real and actual

differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism

and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal
protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the
officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with
the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of
mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher
wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by
the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al

Facts:
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to
P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies
whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervener,
the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00,
and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00.
The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail
from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from
this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the
said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within
the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the
law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has
not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former
executives and their widows among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.
HELD:
The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary
needs the franking privilege as so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that
need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster
cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from
the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster
would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary,
then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other
departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the
liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has
been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it
does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not
recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.